T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
The Humanitarian
Impact of Drones
1
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
© 2017 Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom; International
Disarmament Institute, Pace University; Article 36.
October 2017
The Humanitarian Impact of Drones
1st edition
160 pp
Permission is granted for non-commercial reproduction,
copying, distribution, and transmission of this publication
or parts thereof so long as full credit is given to the
organisation and author; the text is not altered,
transformed, or built upon; and for any reuse or
distribution, these terms are made clear to others.
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Contents
3
Cristof Heyns
6
Cover photography:
©2017 Kristie L. Kulp
Introduction
Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton,
and Elizabeth Minor
Edited by Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton,
Elizabeth Minor, and Allison Pytlak.
Thank you to all authors for their contributions.
This publication is supported in part by a grant from the
Foundation Open Society Institute in cooperation with the
Human Rights Initiative of the Open Society Foundations.
Preface
Impacts
15
1. Humanitarian Harm
Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle
24
Country case study: Yemen
Taha Yaseen
29
2. Environmental Harm
Doug Weir and Elizabeth Minor
35
Country case study: Nigeria
Joy Onyesoh
36
3. Psychological Harm
Radidja Nemar
48
4. Harm to Global
Peace and Security
Chris Cole
58
Country case study: Djibouti
Ray Acheson
64
Country case study: The Philippines
Mitzi Austero and
Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang
2
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Preface
Christof Heyns
68
Transparency
Anna Diakun
81
Country case study: United States
Rachel Stohl
Perspectives
85
6. Human Rights Perspectives
Shahzad Akbar
97
Country case study: Yemen
Waleed Alhariri
101
7. International Law Perspectives
Adriana Edmedes
115
Regional case study: Latin America
Hector Guerra
120
It is not difficult to understand the appeal of
5. Harm to Governmental
Christof Heyns is Professor of Law at the
University of Pretoria. He is a member of the UN
Human Rights Committee and is a former UN
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summar y,
or arbitrar y executions.
armed drones to those engaged in war and other
violent conflicts. Those using force on behalf of
states have long had the aim of subduing their
opponents with as little harm to their own forces
as possible. In addition, increasingly there are
international and other norms that require more
precise targeting, sparing those not directly
engaged in the conflict.
Getting close to the target has traditionally
placed one’s own forces in harm’s way. Drones
provide an opportunity to bring an “unmanned”
weapons platform close to the target, from which
force can be launched via remote control. If the
platform is destroyed by enemy fire, the cost is
measured in money, not in the number of lives of
one’s own forces lost.
Drones also provide those who use it with the
Regional case study: Europe
argument that the maneuverability of the
Jessica Dorsey
platform, in close vicinity to the target, may allow
more precise targeting. Even if the jur y is still
127
8. Gendered Perspectives
out on the veracity of the second claim, the
Ray Acheson
argument persists that this may be the case in
the future. The appeal of the first claim, on the
141
150
9. Moral and Ethical Perspectives
other hand, is evident. In an age of technology,
Peter Asaro
drones were bound to happen.
10. Religious Perspectives
If a drone were to be used only in isolated cases,
Emily Welty
there would probably have been few questions
asked. It is after all not easy to point out a
principled difference between a single missile
fired from a F16 flying at the speed of sound,
when an on-board pilot presses the button, and
the same missile being fired from a loitering
drone, with the button being pressed by an
operator in another countr y. However, what is
2
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P R E FAC E
at stake is not the isolated use of a few drones,
fact that the world is turning to remote controlled
This debate thus seems centrally important from
by a few countries, but rather a new way
use of force. Considerations of the broader
the perspective of asking the age-old question:
altogether of releasing force; one that will play a
humanitarian implications of the remote
how do we solve problems? How and when can
dominant role in the conflicts of the future, with
controlled use of force are thus most apt
we resort to the use of force? What is effective,
more and more states—and non-state actors—
and welcome.
also in the long run? Clearly, a world in which
those who are far out of harm’s way have a
using this technology. It is this evolving use of
drones as the weapon platform of the future that
The chapters in this in this book do exactly that.
button with which they can eliminate someone
raises profound questions about the peace and
They look at the implications of a world where
whom they see as posing a threat half-way
security as well as some of the core values of
drones are becoming the new normal from the
around the world, is ver y different from one
the world we live in.
perspective of the various societies involved—
where such instant ”solutions” are not available,
including the gender implications, and also the
and different if less dramatic means to achieve
I, and others, have argued that drones should
psychological implications, from the perspective
the same objective have to be found.
follow the law, and not the other way around.
of those who operate drones and their societies,
Drone-using states have argued for a relaxed
and those who are on the receiving side. What
A thorough discussion of the broader
application of norms covering the use of force
are the implications for societies on both sides
implications of the use of armed drones is also
that have developed over centuries—for
of the digital divide? Peace and security as well
important for other reasons. This includes the
example, what is to be considered an “imminent”
as the humanitarian framework in which we
fact that armed drones are increasingly being
attack against which self-defence by a state is
operate may be compromised not only because
used not only in armed conflict and
allowed; when do the more permissive rules of
drones make it so much easier for those with
counterterrorism operations abroad, but in
international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to the
this technology to use force, and thus lower the
domestic law enforcement contexts as well.
use of force; to what extent does human rights
threshold for a resort to force, but also when the
Moreover, remote controlled release of force is
law regulate the use of force outside the scope
less obvious fissures in societies are opened up.
being replaced by autonomous use of force,
of an ongoing armed conflict; and what sort of
where computers will take the critical decisions.
transparency is required?
Force release, that is, is becoming more and
more impersonal. We need a much better
These are important questions, and warrant the
understanding of the early manifestation of this
full attention of the international community. But
trend—armed drones in armed conflict—than we
more than policing the legal boundaries of the
currently have to ser ve as a basis to respond to
use of force is required to ensure a responsible
this broader phenomenon. For all these reasons,
response to the challenges presented by drones.
this book is a most welcome contribution to a
In fact, the debate may to some extent have
vital debate.
become too legalistic, as if solving the legal
aspects is all there is to meeting the challenges
presented by drones as a whole. At least of
equal importance is the extent to which we fully
understand and think through the broader
implications of this technological development.
Applying legal frameworks to concrete cases
ver y easily leads to an exclusive focus on the
individual case. Using a legalistic lens only to
look at armed drones may thus mean one could
miss the wider and cumulative implications of the
4
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Introduction
those people that are not the target than other
states’ actual jurisdiction or officially designated
forms of aerial bombing. They point to the
zones of armed conflict. The authors of the
lowered risk of casualties on the attacking side
chapters in this study raise questions about
and claim that the ability of drones to loiter over
whether this tempts policymakers to use
an area for extended periods of time enables a
violence in less restrained ways and displaces
Humanitarian and human rights norms have
more judicious use of force. The discourse that
harm away from the attacking state onto the
long sought to restrict the exercise of remote
suggests that “drone strikes” are somehow a
local population in the “target area”.
violence. In the last two hundred years, the rapid
more humanitarian form of violence than
Freedom (WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy
development of weapons technology has enabled
traditional warfare has dominated political and
This approach to violence is arguably one of the
and research on weapons and militarism, which
people to kill and maim others at increasing
popular discussion, particularly in those
main drivers of the development of weapons
always includes a gender perspective.
distance, both physical and psychological.
countries that make extensive use of UAVs.
technology. As the most militarised countr y in
Her work also includes monitoring and analysing
Rifles, artiller y, landmines, aerial bombing, and
This discourse is grounded in elite, militarised
the world, with over 800 foreign militar y bases
missiles all function to reduce the potential for
power structures, where capacities for violence
and the largest expenditure on weapons and war,
human encounter between an assailant and a
are bolstered by access to high technology and
the United States has engaged in numerous
target or victim.
the ability (and willingness) to project violence
post-Cold War conflicts or other acts of violence
far beyond one’s own borders. This discourse
that have predominantly required realitively quick
1
Ray Acheson, Matthew Bolton, and Elizabeth Minor
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching
Critical Will, the disarmament programme of
the Women’s International League for Peace and
international processes and forums related
to disarmament.
Matthew Bolton directs the International
Disarmament Institute at Pace University in New
2
York City, where he is also associate professor
Thoughtful militar y personnel, diplomats,
also makes certain assumptions about the
domination of targets through aerial
of political science. He has ser ved as an advisor
lawyers, relief workers, philosophers,
inviolability of militar y necessity and inevitability
bombardment, long wars of occupation, and
theologians, and activists worried that this ability
of “collateral damage,” which draws the
“covert” special forces “counterrorrism” or
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
to project harm far beyond our own bodies
conversation away from the impact of drones
“counterinsurgency” operations. Because of this,
Arms Trade Treaty, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
increases the risks that violence could be less
on people’s lives. This study makes clear,
the US militar y is a “trend-setter in militar y
Treaty and Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty.
discriminate, less proportionate, less attuned to
however, that reality is less simple than this
technologies, to which all others react.”3
the suffering of others. These concerns—
convenient narrative.
Drones—for sur veillance and war fighting—are
to advocacy campaigns conducting advocacy in
the UN General Assembly First Committee,
Elizabeth Minor is an Advisor at Article 36, a
currently at the front edge of the development of
UK-based organisation that works for the
motivated by norms of humanity and the voices
development of new policy and legal standards to
of public conscience—have been progressively
The technology of the drone is embedded in
technologies for violence. These weapons are
prevent the unintended, unnecessar y or
encoded into international law through treaties
conceptual and legal frameworks that work
marked abroad by harm to civilians, further
unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons.
such as the Hague Conventions, Geneva
together to stretch in new ways normative
increasing fear of and anger towards the US
Conventions, International Covenant on Civil and
constraints on the use of force. This enables
government; within the United States, the use of
investigated the methodologies and practices
Political Rights, Convention on Certain
user states to use the “drone apparatus”—
drones is marked by lack of transparency and
used by states, international organisations and
Conventional Weapons, Antipersonnel Landmine
consisting of the weapons system, legitimating
accountability, and a growing concern that these
civil society to document and record the
Ban Treaty, and Convention on Cluster
discourse, and associated legal, policy, and
weapons may one day be used at home, in
casualties of armed conflict and violence.
Munitions. They have also undergirded activism,
administrative foundations—to kill people
particular to suppress internal dissent or protest.
academic writing, and various forms of legal
presumed to be a threat far from either the
She was previously a researcher at Ever y
Casualty and Oxford Research Group, where she
and political action to curtail, prevent, or stop
the spread of tools of violence, as well as
violence itself.
The emergence of drones—or “unmanned” aerial
vehicles (UAVs) —and other remotely-controlled
militar y equipment poses new challenges to
these humanitarian and human rights norms.
Advocates for their use argue that airstrikes
undertaken by armed drones cause less harm to
6
While there has been scattered academic,
1 With then President Obama claiming in 2016, for example, that,
“I can say with great certainty is that the rate of civilian casualties
in any drone operation are far lower than the rate of civilian
casualties that occur in conventional war.” See “Remarks by the
President in a Conversation on the Supreme Court Nomination,”
University of Chicago Law School, 8 April 2016, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/08/
remarks-president-conversation-supreme-court-nomination.
2 For example, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
declared in an interview with CNN in 2013 that this capability
meant that “you can far more easily limit collateral damage with a
drone than you can with a bomb, even a precision-guided munition,
off an airplane.” See “ Interview with Robert Gates,” State of the
Union with Candy Crowley, 10 February 2013, http://edition.cnn.
com/TRANSCRIPTS/1302/10/sotu.01.html.
activist, legal, policy, and media contestation of
the conventional wisdom on drones, this has
been fragmented and has not resulted in
substantive international policy change. Indeed,
those seeking to limit the impact of armed
3 Andrew Lichterman, “Automated warfare, weapons
modernization, and nuclear war risk,” Presentation to the 2015
NPT Review Conference, New York, 28 April 2015, http://www.
wslfweb.org/docs/Automated-warfare-and-nuclearweapons-4-28-15.pdf.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
INTRODUCTION
drones often end up caught in two discursive
Given that the over whelming majority of air
boundaries of where the use of certain forms of
Currently, the majority of countries developing
traps. The explicitly anti-war rhetoric adopted by
strikes from drones have been conducted by one
violence are generally accepted. This practice
armed drones are high income countries, who
some campaigners is often dismissed out of
countr y—the United States—much of the policy
has also been identified with the United
also form the largest group of drone possessors
hand by government officials, who often refuse
conversation so far has been focused on its
Kingdom, and with Israel in territories it
and users. 9 Within the limited numbers, the lower
to hear denunciations of militarism. But if a
specific national context. However, the United
occupies. Other users have conducted airstrikes
a countr y’s income group, the less likely they are
narrower critique is made, for example on the
States is not the only government using or
within their own countries or contested regions,
to be using, possessing, or developing armed
basis of international humanitarian law,
seeking to acquire drones, and evidence
including Azerbaijan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, and
drones. Looking at the picture by region,10
obfuscation by states leads to technical debates
presented in these pages suggests that without
Turkey—either in militar y operations, or in
western countries similarly make up the largest
that marginalises all but those trained in the
a collective understanding of the limits that must
domestic security activities. The use of drones
group of armed drone developers. Countries in
esoterica of weapons law. This remains far
be put on these technologies, unacceptable
by countries to target their own citizens has
the Asia-Pacific region are at similar levels of
from the realities of those who are most affected
activities can be less easily challenged and will
thrown this into particularly stark relief for some
possession to western countries, followed by
by the use of drones. While there have been
be replicated. As a result, this study aims to
commentators. 6
Eastern European and African countries. Latin
many important reports focusing on the
provide a more global perspective on drones,
American countries are currently absent from the
impact of drones on people, they tend to be in
suggesting the crucial need for the continued
In this context, the acquisition of drones for
small circulation academic journals or single
development of national conversations in
civilian domestic policing also bears
development, though are importing drone
case studies.
countries other than the United States and the
consideration within the global landscape of how
systems more broadly.
4
picture of armed drone use, possession, and
countries in which it has used drones, as
drone technology is implicated in harm and
This study aims to reframe this conversation
well as international policy discussion in
problematic trajectories in the use of force.
In recent years, in the context of a low level of
by collecting in one place a comprehensive,
multilateral settings.
Though there has been no reported use of
international debate on armed drones, more
weapons launched from an aerial drone by police
states have begun expressing concern about the
multi-countr y and multidisciplinar y summar y of
the evidence of harm that drones cause. As an
Open source data gathered by the New America
ser vices, in the United States for example the
proliferation of drones, and armed drones in
artifact, it draws on the tradition of many
Foundation think tank to track the use,
use of drones armed with less lethal weapons by
particular. There has, at times, been discussion
humanitarian and human rights campaigns, going
possession, development, and import/export of
police has been authorised in one state (North
about if and how drones may be accounted for
back to the anti-slaver y societies of the 19th
drones around the world records that eleven
Dakota) and is being considered by others.
under arms control standards articuled by the
Centur y. It aims to undermine denial—e.g. the
countries have used armed drones, and twenty-
Police in Dallas used a remote-controlled ground
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). In 2013, a group of
claim that “we couldn’t have known” the many
eight states currently have armed drone
robot to kill a suspected sniper with plastic
governmental experts reviewing the potential
ways that drones pose a threat to rights and
systems. Eight of these countries first used them
explosives in 2016.7 Companies are also
expansion of the UN Register of Conventional
humanity of affected people. As such, it is
in the past two years.
marketing drones equipped with less lethal
Arms, clarified the categor y of aircraft to include
weapons for riot control, which have been
UAVs. In 2016, the United States issued a
5
focussed less on policy recommendations per
se, but rather is intended to ground any policy
Examining the pattern of reported use so far,
purchased in South Africa, for example. More
political declaration supported by 51 states, on
debate in a human-centered evidence base.
some armed drone deployment has occurred
broadly, drone technology is increasingly used
the “responsible export and subsequent use”
where the user is inter vening in support of
for extensive sur veillance both in policing and
of “armed or strike-enabled” drones.11
another government or party to an armed conflict
other contexts, which is closely tied to the use
(such as the United Kingdom in Afghanistan, the
of force—with many cases of unarmed drones
United States in Iraq, Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the
contributing to airstrikes from other platforms,
United Arab Emirates in Libya, or Iran in Syria).
for example.
4 These include, for example, James Cavallaro, Stephan
Sonnenberg, and Sarah Knuckey Living Under Drones: Death,
Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in
Pakistan, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution
Clinic, Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, Global
Justice Clinic, https://law.stanford.edu/publications/living-underdrones-death-injury-and-trauma-to-civilians-from-us-dronepractices-in-pakistan; The civilian impact of drones: unexamined
costs, unanswered questions, Center for Civilians in Conflict,
2012, http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/publications/The_
Civilian_Impact_of_Drones_w_cover.pdf; and case study
documentation by organisations such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International. These and other such reports and
references have been cited where relevant throughout this study.
8
8
As mentioned above, the United States has been
the major user of drones in other countries to kill
people suspected of affiliation with certain
groups, for the stated purpose of achieving
domestic security objectives—challenging the
5 See New America, ‘World of Drones’, accessed 11 May 2017
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/world-of-drones/.
6 See for example New America’s World of Drones
report:https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/world-of-drones/.
7 Simone McCarthy, ‘What does Dallas’s ‘bomb robot’ mean for
the future of policing?’, Christian Science Monitor, https://www.
csmonitor.com/USA/USA-Update/2016/0709/What-does-Dallas-sbomb-robot-mean-for-the-future-of-policing .
8 ‘Tear Gassing by Remote Control’, http://remotecontrolproject.
org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Tear-Gassing-By-RemoteControl-Report.pdf.
9 According to New America data, using OEDC-DAC country
income groups.
10 Using UNGA regional groups for simplicity of grouping
countries.
11 The text of the declaration is available in the US State
Department archives at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/
ps/2016/10/262811.htm.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
INTRODUCTION
Countries currently in possession of armed drones (New America)
The ver y nature of remote controlled warfare is
specific to armed drones, and the policies as
impacting user and affected communities in a
well as risks inherent in the technology that
variety of ways, and this study looks at these
these might result from, should be drawn out in
impacts from a number of critical perspectives
this context. How international standards could
such as human rights, international law, gender,
be developed or clarified on this basis can then
and ethics and morality. Given the range of
be considered. In order to compel an effective
harms, as well as the variety of perspectives
international process, how greater engagement
from which to analyse these harms, this study
amongst a wide range of stakeholders could be
aims to:
developed is also a key consideration.
1. Refocus the debate about armed drones on
Methodology and overview
the harm caused to people, disrupting
narratives that emphasise the “low
The editors of this study have sought
human costs” of deploying explosive force
contributions from a diverse group of known and
from drones;
emerging experts from across academia,
research and policy groups, and specialists from
2. Shift the burden of proof onto users of armed
the field.
A process is currently under way to develop more
knowledge about who these were inflicted on,
elaborated standards. This initiative can be
notwithstanding the efforts of civil society
considered problematic in several ways: the
organisations in this regard. This has been
standards contained in the declaration are low; it
accompanied by a lack of avenues for assistance
is led by the current dominant user of drones,
and redress for victims, linked to secrecy and
whose activities have raised most concerns; and
questionable practices in the use of drones. As
primarily tackling proliferation, rather than
well as physical injuries, deaths, and the
addressing the broader concerns with these
destruction of civilian infrastructure,
technologies, is not the optimal approach.
psychological impacts have also been a key and
However, the initiative shows recognition by
perhaps unique harm experienced by people
states that armed drones pose particular issues,
living in areas where drones are operating and
and of the specific link between drone
represent a near constant, threatening presence.
technology and risks of problematic outcomes
There also seem to be unique psychological
and policymaking on drones, beyond the
estimates of casualties—particularly of
(which, though this is not acknowledged in the
harms to drone operators. Furthermore, the use
specific national contexts of user and
civilians—and the current systems of redress.
declaration, have been clearly evident in the
of armed drones has particular impacts on
“target” countries.
Following this account of physical human harm,
actions of current possessors and users). Such
international and regional peace and security
recognition may be helpful to the national and
that may differ from challenges raised by other,
As you read the evidence presented in this
presents troubling evidence that people in
international conversations that are needed on
more established weapon systems or modes
study, we ask you, the reader, to keep in mind
communities affected by drone sur veillance and
this issue.
of warfare.
possible policy questions relevant to addressing
violence also suffer adverse psychological
drones, putting pressure on them to justify
their policices and practices;
In his preface, Christof Heyns emphasises that
the evolving and future use of drones raises
3. Highlight specificities of armed drones as
weapons systems—and the conceptual and
profound questions about peace, security, our
values, and the legal pathways available to us.
legal formations that surround them—that
pose particular threats to peace and security,
The chapters that follow are divided into two
rule of law and human rights, humanitarian
primar y sections. The first section focuses on
protections, gender equality, and the
the harms caused by the use of armed drones.
environment; and
Jack Serle and Jessica Purkiss of The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism review the humanitarian
4. Demonstrate the need for global advocacy
harm of drone strikes by considering the var ying
Radidja Nemar of the Alkarama Foundation
the harm caused by armed drones. The limits of
However, the harms to people, places, and
consequences. Doug Weir of the Toxic Remnants
what is acceptable and unacceptable in relation
communities at the local, national, and
of War Project and Elizabeth Minor of Article 36
to the development and use of these
international level should be the focus of any
then look beyond immediate human harm to
technologies should be considered, from the
international or national conversations about
examine how harm to the environment should be
perspective of the harm caused in all the
armed drones. These harms are enumerated and
considered in assessing the implications of
dimensions in which it is examined—from
analysed in this study. They include deaths and
drones. This angle has rarely been considered in
immediate physical impacts to challenges to
injuries—and an unacceptable lack of public
much depth in the media, policy, or academic
global governance. The challenges that are
discussion of drones.
10
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
INTRODUCTION
Drones also cause political harm to local,
Interspersed throughout the study’s chapters are
national, and global governance. This is
a series of case studies that focus on specific
considered in a chapter by Chris Cole of Drone
national and regional contexts, including Yemen,
Wars UK, in which he examines the impact of
Nigeria, Djibouti, the Philippines, Latin America,
proliferating drone use on international peace
Europe, and the United States.
Impacts
and security. Anna Diakun of the American Civil
Liberties Union then argues that the secrecy of
Substantive chapters were anonymously
the drones program is having deleterious impacts
reviewed by experts on facets of the legal,
on systems of transparency and accountability,
political, policy, and technical dimensions of
and on the rule of law.
drones. The editors ensured that there was
broadly gender equity in the the choice of peer
The second section of the study anlyses these
reviewers. Authors were required to address the
harms from a variety of critical perspectives,
critiques of the reviewers in the drafting and
including law. Shahzad Akbar of the Foundation
revision process. The editors of this study have
for Fundamental Rights Pakistan and Reprieve
also endeavored to engage in a thorough and
argues that drone strikes are threatening crucial
rigorous fact-checking and editorial review.
human rights protections. Adriana Edmedes of
Rights Watch UK considers the various types of
liability in international law that could relate
different types of assistance states provide to
their allies with armed drone programmes.
This is followed by Ray Acheson’s consideration
of the gendered impact of the policies and
practices of drone programmes. She argues that
drones should be viewed through a gender
perspective to help situate in them in the broader
context of militarism and the culture of violence,
and highlights ways in which the use of drones
can constitute gender-based violence and
undermine gender equality. Peter Asaro
considers the moral and ethical aspects of drone
use, as well as the psychological impact on
operators. Emily Welty of Pace University and
the World Council of Churches Commission on
International Affairs elaborates religious
perspectives of faith communities regarding
armed drones.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
1. Humanitarian Harm
Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle
On 29 June 2011, US President Obama’s chief
Jessica Purkiss is a reporter on the Bureau’s
Covert Drone War team. Before joining the
Bureau she was a staff writer and editor for
Middle East Monitor. She has also reported from
Palestine. Jessica has an MA from Kingston
University in human rights and genocide.
counter terrorism advisor John Brennan stood in
front of a packed room in an academic division
of John Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.
and made a bold assertion. No civilians had been
killed in US counter terrorism operations in
Jack Serle has been a specialist reporter on the
Bureau’s covert drone war team since he joined
the Bureau in 2012. He was part of the team that
won the Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism in
2013 for its work on drones and the US covert
war on terror. He graduated from the University
of Edinburgh with a BSc (Hons) in Biological
Sciences in 2010 and was awarded an MA in
science journalism by City University London the
following year.
nearly a year, he said.1
Brennan was answering a question about
“targeted killings”, a euphemism for Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) drone strikes. The
strikes were raining down on Pakistan at the
time, though officially the administration refused
to acknowledge the drone campaign even
existed, sticking resolutely to the vague “counter
terrorism operations” term.
Such operations had not claimed a single
innocent life in months due to the
“exceptional proficiency and precision”2 of the
capabilities America had been able to develop,
Brennan claimed.
For reporters at the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, Brennan’s contention did not ring
true. For months, reports that civilians were
dying in US drone strikes had been appearing in
Pakistani and international media.
We felt we needed to create a comprehensive
database, to collate details of who had been
killed in what location, and how many drone
strikes had taken place, in order to open the US
counter terrorism programme to proper scrutiny.
1 C-SPAN, Obama Administration Counterterrorism Strategy,
C-SPAN, 2011. Online video, 49:35. https://www.c-span.org/
video/?300266-1/obama-administration-counterterrorism-strategy.
2
14
Ibid.
15
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M
This has developed into a major effort to
Our findings directly challenged Brennan’s
monitor the drone war through investigative
claims. Yet despite the Bureau’s evidence, US
journalism, now in operation for over five years.
intelligence sources continued to insist there had
been no civilian casualties, with one senior
In this chapter, we will provide an over view of
the project, its key findings, and the lessons
Hussain Jamil al-Qawli (left) holds a photo of his son
Salim al-Qawli, 20; and Muhammad al-Qawli holds a
photo of his brother Ali al-Qawli, 34. Salim and Ali
al-Qawli were killed in a drone strike in al-Masnaah
on Januar y 23, 2013.
official describing the Bureau’s findings as
“wildly inaccurate.”5
learned. We will finish with a summar y of efforts
to seek justice and redress for innocent victims
The CIA drone program was at its peak during
of drone strikes - an area with which civilian
this period, reaching an all-time high in
casualty recording is closely linked.
September 2010. 6 American troop numbers had
surged in neighbouring Afghanistan, with a
Tackling the wall of secrecy
In our efforts to create a database of strikes, we
started by gathering information from as many
sources as possible – news stories, social media
posts, leaked documents, and reports from nongovernment organisations (NGOs). Ever y time
we found a credible report of a drone attack in
Pakistan, we logged it, alongside whatever
details we could uncover about who it had killed.
sustained aerial campaign aimed at Afghan
insurgents who were using Pakistan’s tribal
areas as a base to launch operations against US
and Afghan troops across the border.7 Reports
of drone strikes were frequently appearing in
major US news outlets, and government and
intelligence officials were briefing journalists
about the strikes. Yet on the record, they would
say nothing.
We developed a robust methodology in order for
In President Obama’s first public comments on
our data to be reliable.
the drone campaign in Januar y 2012, he
By August 2011, we had recorded 116 CIA covert
drone strikes in Pakistan between August 2010
and June 2011. 3 We deepened our reporting by
carr ying out field investigations, with Bureau
researchers visiting the tribal areas of Pakistan
addressed the mounting allegations of civilian
casualties. He stated, “I want people to
understand actually drones have not caused a
huge number of civilian casualties, for the most
© 2013 Letta Taylor/Human Rights Watch
part they have been ver y precise precision
By this point in 2012, we had already started
rarely go on record when speaking to media
to investigate the strikes. We found that at least
recording data on US counter terrorism
about drone strikes. In this case, we require
ten of them had resulted in civilian casualties,
operations in Yemen and Somalia, in addition
three different types of named or unnamed
killing 45 or more civilians, including six
to the earlier information about Pakistan.
Yemeni sources – such as government officials,
children. This number later increased as more
In 2015 we added Afghanistan to our coverage,
tribal sources, or eyewitnesses – to report a
information came to light.
after the US ended its combat operations
strike before it is considered by us as confirmed.
against the Taliban but continued air strikes and
When we cannot achieve this level of certainty, it
raids against al-Qaeda, by special
is recorded as a possible strike. We also use a
operations forces.
range for reporting our casualty estimates, as
strikes against al Qaeda and their affiliates.”8
4
5
Ibid.
6 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA and US military
drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, https://docs.google.
com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wg
LZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=694046452.
3 Chris Woods, “US Claims Of No Civilian Deaths Are
Untrue,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 18,
2011, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2011-07-18/us-claims-of-no-civilian-deaths-are-untrue.
4
Ibid.
16
7 Kate Clark, “Drone Warfare 2: Targeted Killings – a future
model for Afghanistan?” Afghanistan Analysts Network, March 1,
2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/drone-warfare-2targeted-killings-a-future-model-for-afghanistan/.
8 White House YouTube channel, “Your Interview with the
President—2012”, 30 January 2012 https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI
even within a single report it is not uncommon
As the number of countries that we were
for there to be contradictor y information on how
investigating grew, we tailored our methodology
many people were killed or injured.
for each one. For example, in order to confirm a
US strike in Afghanistan, we require a named
Using this methodology, the Bureau has
Afghan official to have acknowledged it. In
recorded at least 723 air and drone strikes as of
Yemen, the climate is different and officials
15 August 2017 across Yemen, Somalia, and
17
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M
Pakistan since the US began conducting strikes
In Pakistan, the drone programme slowed almost
This was realised in May 2016 when the CIA
findings – for instance our figure for civilian
in those countries (2002, 2007, and 2004,
to a halt with three strikes conducted in 2016.
provided intelligence, including imaging
deaths was six times higher than theirs.
respectively). We have also recorded at least
One of these, the strike that killed the leader of
intelligence collected by drones, to the US
3,275 strikes in Afghanistan since 2015, when
the Afghan Taliban, was conducted by the US
militar y who were the agency that moved
The director of national intelligence (DNI), who
the US became the only countr y known to be
militar y, which is not subject to the same shroud
for ward with the strike in Pakistan that killed
released the figures, has put for ward an
flying fast jets and armed drones. As a result of
of secrecy as the CIA. This strike, in May 2016,
Mullah Mansour, the leader of the Afghan Taliban.
explanation for these discrepancies.15 It said
all these strikes, we have counted the deaths of
was the last for nine months and we felt
between 744 and 1,434 civilians. Due to the
optimistic that greater transparency could follow.
10
difficulty in gaining access to the precise
that the higher numbers recorded by NGOs
Paradoxically, while the CIA was responsible for
could be attributed to combatants being counted
the strikes in Pakistan as well as some of those
as non-combatants. As it explained, the
location of drone strikes, along with the lack of
However, these small steps towards greater
in Yemen, the drones were flown and missiles
government’s access to multiple sources of
official accounts of individual strikes, it is hard to
transparency may be short-lived, which
fired by US Air Force ser vice men and women.
intelligence and its refined post-strike
determine whether we are capturing the full
continues to make our work necessar y as well
US drones recently returned to Pakistan, with
methodology enable it to more adequately
extent of the civilian death toll. Regardless, the
as challenging. For example, it became clear by
four strikes reported since Trump came into
evaluate the status of a casualty. The DNI
strikes we do capture and the details we are
Februar y 2017 that US Central Command’s
office in Januar y, all of which have been
pointed out that the reliance of NGOs on local
able to record are important pieces of a puzzle,
release of monthly Yemen figures described
attributed to the CIA.13 It is not known if the
media reports may also skew figures, as they
even if not a complete picture.
above had been reversed, with a spokesperson
same arrangement still applies.
are vulnerable to reporting misinformation
telling the Bureau that, “there is no current
spread by certain actors.
requirement for US Central Command to
In Afghanistan, the US has provided the Bureau
announce strikes monthly.”11 The US has since
with monthly strike totals since the end of 2016,
However, the DNI did not mention that NGOs
released bulk information on its strikes in Yemen
following months of pressure. But these figures
and other monitoring bodies have conducted
Positively, American counter terrorism operations
on an ad-hoc basis, following an upsurge in
may not be as reliable as they once would have
extensive ground investigations, inter viewing
have become somewhat less secretive over time,
strikes in recent months, but there is little
been. The American fight against various
sur vivors and relatives of victims. The US
although that trend may be changing.
information provided about individual strikes,
insurgent groups in Afghanistan is now
militar y recently admitted that its investigations
making the information difficult to interrogate.
conducted almost entirely by air, with US forces
into strikes in Iraq and Syria do not include
The Wall Street Journal reported in March the
taking an advisor y role on the ground. This has
similar inter views because the locations, and
Trump administration has given senior officials in
made civilian casualty tracking and recording
people, are inaccessible.16 It is hard to see how
the CIA the authority to order drone strikes with
much more difficult.
CIA officers would have better access to the
The transparency
environment today
In Yemen and Somalia, the US Central Command
and US Africa Command are the bodies
responsible for militar y operations in the two
countries. Both began to regularly release
information on drone strikes, sometimes with
estimates of how many people were killed. At
autonomy from the White House and National
Security Council.12
tribal agencies in Pakistan, for example.17
As of July 2016, the US began publishing
information on strikes outside of areas of active
Despite the limitations of the data provided in
the end of 2016, US Central Command said it
To some extent, the above reverses the sort of
hostilities. However, the figures amalgamated
2016, the White House’s publication of figures
was implementing a monthly roll-up of strikes in
freedom enjoyed by the CIA to conduct drone
data from across four countries and over nearly
represented a welcome step towards greater
Yemen, releasing figures normally on the first
operations under President George Bush.
seven years.14 The lack of a year-by-year or
transparency. It is not clear what the fate of this
Friday after the 15th of each month.
President Obama had gradually eroded this
countr y breakdown, and a total absence of any
policy will be under President Trump but current
freedom, seeking to improve transparency and
detail, makes the figures difficult to interrogate
trends are not encouraging for transparency
accountability. His ambition was to remove the
or draw any conclusions from. Some aspects
proponents.
CIA from drone operations, and place
also differed significantly from the Bureau’s
9
responsibility with the US Air Force.
9 Major Josh Jacques, Personal communication with Jessica
Purkiss, 4 April 2017.
18
10
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.
11
Ibid.
12 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Trump Broadens CIA
Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes,” The Wall Street Journal,
March 13, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gave-ciapower-to-launch-drone-strikes-1489444374.
15
13
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism.
14 US Director of National Intelligence, Summary of Information
Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active
Hostilities, July 1, 2016.
Ibid.
16 Micah Zenko, “Why is the US Killing so many civilians in
Syria and Iraq?” New York Times, 19 June 2017.
17 Airwars, Transcript of Pentagon’s Al Jinah Investigation
Media Briefing, June 27, 2017. https://airwars.org/news/
transcript-of-al-jinah-investigation-briefing/.
19
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M
However, the PPG is policy and not law, and this
Changing patterns of
civilian casualties
has made it vulnerable to shifts in US domestic
Justice, compensation and the
humanitarian toll on families
politics. It is already under review by the Trump
There are a few known instances of financial
compensation being paid to victim’s families.
US drones launched missiles at an al-Qaeda
Though our data is not a complete record, by
administration, which is likely to overhaul the
The families of those killed by drones may spend
compound in Pakistan’s tribal areas in Januar y
tracking civilian casualties over time the Bureau
rules, or, as it has been doing already, finding
years searching for justice. For example, Bibi
2015. Unknown to those who ordered the
has been able to identify and compare different
ways to circumvent them.
Mamana, a grandmother of nine, was picking
strike, two foreign hostages were also on site.
phases of the drone war. Overall civilian casualty
vegetables when a drone strike killed her. Atiq,
figures in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia have
In Yemen for example, the Trump administration
decreased. This is in part because of the
declared three provinces to be areas of active
significant decline in civilian deaths in Pakistan.
hostilities. 20 This is a technical term used to
Operations have slowed in the countr y, but the
define areas where the PPG rules do not apply.
rate of civilian casualties has also declined.
An unprecedented number of strikes have
We collected many different parts from the
The deaths of Lo Porto and Weinstein first
occurred there.
field and put a turban over her body,” he told
emerged in April 2015 when President Obama
the Times. 26
publically acknowledged they had been
Mamana’s son, said he rushed to the scene.
“We found her mutilated body a short time
after wards. It had been thrown quite a long
21
22
American efforts to prevent civilian casualties
An inquir y about whether the near certainty
Policy Guidance (PPG) in May 2013 (though
principle was still in place in Yemen yielded an
The family went to Washington, D.C. in 2013 to
details were not released until July 2016).
ambiguous response. 23
provide evidence at a congressional briefing.
Known as the drone “playbook”, the PPG put
certain restrictions on strikes conducted outside
“areas of active hostilities”, such as Yemen,
Somalia and Pakistan. Under these, for example,
the US militar y would need “near certainty” that
a strike would result in no civilian deaths in
order to conduct it – a standard more stringent
than the international laws of war applicable
Parts of Somalia have also been declared as
areas of active hostilities. 24 There, however,
US Africa Command has told the Bureau that
even though they have greater flexibility to
conduct strikes more quickly, they will still
maintain the same level of certainty to minimise
civilian casualties.
25
during conflicts.19
aid worker, and fellow aid worker Warren
Weinstein, an American citizen.
distance away by the blast and it was in pieces.
were codified and signed in Obama’s Presidential
18
The strike killed Giovanni Lo Porto, an Italian
killed in a US counter terrorism operation.
“Nobody has ever told me why my mother was
“As President and as Commander-in-Chief,
I take full responsibility for all our counter
terrorism operations, including the one that
targeted that day,” Rafiq ur Rehman, another of
inadvertently took the lives of Warren and
Mamana’s sons, testified.
Giovanni,” he stated. 30
27
While only a handful
of congress members attended the session,
possibly due to other pressing hearings taking
President Obama explained that the existence of
place that same day, all reportedly apologised
the operation was declassified and disclosed to
and expressed their condolences. 28 The briefing
the public because “the Weinstein and Lo Porto
was the first time the US Congress had come
families deser ve to know the truth”. 31 As the
face to face with drone strike victims.
operation had been carried out under the
authority of the highly secretive CIA, such an
The publication of the PPG was a response to
pressure from the Bureau, and other monitoring
groups, as well as the media and NGOs, but
would not have been possible if the White House
administration had not been receptive to the
idea of engaging with outside parties and being
more transparent.
18 See: The White House, Procedures for Approving Direct
Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities, May 22, 2013, https://
www.aclu.org/foia-document/presidential-policyguidance?redirect=node/58033 and Fact Sheet:
20 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is
Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules,” New York
Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/
politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html.
21 Major Audricia Harris, Office of the Secretary of Defence
Public Affairs department, Personal communication with Jack Serle,
31 March 2017.
22 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Unprecedented number of
US air and drone strikes hit Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, 2 March, 2017. https://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/stories/2017-03-02/unprecedented-number-of-us-drone-andair-strikes-hit-yemen.
23 Christopher Sherwood, Department of Defense spokesman,
Personal communication with Jack Serle, April 2017.
The White House, The President’s May 23 Speech on
Counterterrorism, May 23, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-president-smay-23-speech-counterterrorism.
24 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Eases Combat Rules
in Somalia Intended to Protect Civilians,” New York Times, 30
March 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/world/africa/
trump-is-said-to-ease-combat-rules-in-somalia-designed-to-protectcivilians.html.
19 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL:
Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14.
25 Colonel Mark R. Cheadle, Director, Public Affairs and
Communications Synchronization and Sr. Leader Engagement, US
Africa Command, Discussion with author, 30 March 2017.
20
While this response seems positive, the family’s
admission marked a rare moment of
lawyer, Reprieve’s Jen Gibson, stressed that the
transparency.
apology should have come from the
administration. 29 The Obama administration
The US response to the deaths was
however remained silent.
unprecedented in several ways. Lo Porto’s family
received over €1 million, the first confirmed
example of the US paying relatives of a drone
26 Robin Pagnamenta, “My Dead Mother Wasn’t an Enemy of
America. She Was Just an Old Lady,” The Times, 10 November
2012. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/my-dead-mother-wasntan-enemy-of-america-she-was-just-an-old-lady-2n8k3djvr9c.
27 Natasha Lennard, “Nobody Has Ever Told Me Why My Mother
Was Targeted That Day,” Salon, 29 October 2013, http://www.
salon.com/2013/10/29/nobody_has_ever_told_me_why_my_
mother_was_targeted_that_day/.
28 Shaya Tayefe Mohajer, “Congressmen Apologize for Drones
That Killed Pakistani Grandma,” Takepart, 30 October 2013,
http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/10/30/congressapologetic-for-drone-strike-killing.
29
Ibid.
strike victim. 32 Approximately eighteen months
30 Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren
Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto, The White House, 23 April 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-warren-weinsteinand-giovanni-lo-porto
31
Ibid.
32 Jack Serle, “US Pays 1M to Italian Couple After Killing Their
Son In A Drone Strike,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,
16 September 2016 https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2016-09-16/us-pays-1m-to-italian-couple-after-killing-theirson-in-a-drone-strike
21
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N I TA R I A N H A R M
after the strike, the family was permitted
civilians. 36 These findings were disputed by
have become more challenging and less likely.
out there that will make you ‘lose the war’ just
a private meeting with US officials to discuss
numerous media and human rights organisations
Senior militar y officials told the Bureau that
from public perception undercutting your
what happened, which thought to be the first
that had compiled extensive records of the
it was much easier to investigate when
legitimacy, losing the support of a population,
time such a meeting has taken place. 33
incident and about the identities of the victims. 37
they had a large number troops on the ground.
losing the support of a nation that you are tr ying
to support…”
43
However the legal agreement between the US
Despite US doubts over the victim’s identities,
One example comes from Iraq. Retired US
government and Lo Porto’s parents specified
compensation funding for the families was
General Arnold Gordon-Bray, who led the 2nd
that the money was an “ex-gratia payment”.
received in the Central Bank in Sana’a. Journalist
Brigade of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division in
This means the US government made the
Gregor y D. Johnsen said in his investigation into
the first months of the invasion of Iraq, recalled
Since the Bureau of Investigative Journalism
payment voluntarily and accepted no legal
the strike that, “Payment by proxy would allow
to ProPublica how his team would sometimes
began recording data, the environment we work
liability or obligation as a result.
the US the wiggle room to have it both ways,
seek out a victim’s family, or leave cards behind
in has altered considerably. American counter
counting the dead as militants while paying for
after ground operations explaining how people
terrorism operations, including drone strikes,
them like civilians.”38
could make a claim. 41 Senior militar y officials
are less likely to be officially denied. Civilian
told the Bureau that in the event of an allegation,
casualty rates have been falling. This is, in part,
34
Other than the “ex-gratia” payment made to Lo
Porto’s family over the strike in Pakistan, there
Conclusions
have been reports of the US making payments
Both of the US investigations relied on pre-strike
they could easily dispatch a patrol to talk to
because of the pressure for greater
to drone victim’s families in Yemen, via the
footage recorded by drones, according to
those affected, something they can no longer do.
accountability and transparency. However, none
Yemeni government, although they remain
Johnsen.
Although this was a far from perfect system, it
of the measures that led to improvements in
unconfirmed by the US government.
militar y officials have put it, is like looking at it
did facilitate a way for those affected to receive
accountability have been entrenched in law, and
as such they are all susceptible to change.
39
Relying on this, as he and senior
through a “soda-straw”, as it often leaves out
One example comes from a strike on a wedding
an acknowledgement of what had happened and
more than it provides.
convoy near the town of Radda’ in Yemen’s
space to discuss.
strike and post-strike footage for civilian
Bayda province on 12 December 2013. A convoy
casualty (CIVCAS) investigations is standard
The US militar y is always at pains to point out
problem. In Januar y 2017, the Bureau found itself
of eleven vehicles were travelling to the groom’s
practice in America’s remote control wars, where
that the payments are not compensation but
once again in a dispute with the US over
village with the bride when they were attacked.
the US does not have boots on the ground to
form a part of their efforts to express their
casualty figures. In this case, it was a commando
In a demonstration of their rage, protesters
investigate an allegation effectively.
condolences to the wounded and victims’
raid in Yemen, hailed by the Trump administration
families. The payments are voluntar y and are
as “successful”. An investigation that we
In Afghanistan, the majority of US troops have
part of a militar y strategy, rather than viewed
published however showed it killed nine children
now withdrawn. Air operations still continue,
as a form of redress imposed on the militar y
under the age of thirteen.
The Yemeni governor in the region agreed to
but without a strong militar y presence
by a court.
provide compensation in the form of money and
investigations into possible civilian casualties
40
The reliance on pre-
blocked a main road to the provincial capital with
the victims’ bodies.
35
guns. Following two reviews, the US reportedly
claimed all American investigations subsequently
found that all the dead were fighters, rather than
“When you have CIVCAS you undercut your
36 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Nothing Says ‘Sorry Our Drones Hit
Your Wedding Party’ Like $800,000 And Some Guns”, BuzzFeed, 8
August 2014, https://www.buzzfeed.com/gregorydjohnsen/
wedding-party-drone-strike?utm_term=.emWBB1nvq#.qdzmmRodL.
37 Reprieve, Human Rights Watch and Al Jazeera
America compiled extensive records of what happened during and
after the strike from interviews with witnesses, survivors, relatives
of victims and government officials. See below:
33 Jack Serle, “Sorry for Killing Your Son, CIA Tells Drone
Strike Victim’s Family,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,
28 October 2016, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2016-10-28/sorry-for-killing-your-son-cia-tells-drone-strikevictims-family-during-unprecedented-meeting.
34
Ibid.
35 Human Rights Watch, “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,”
Human Rights Watch, February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload.pdf
22
Human Rights Watch, “The Wedding That Became a Funeral,”
Human Rights Watch, February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload.pdf.
Iona Craig, “What Really Happened When a US Drone Strike Hit a
Yemeni Wedding Convoy,” Al Jazeera America, 20 January 2014.
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/
america-tonight-blog/2014/1/17/what-really-happenedwhenausdro
nehitayemeniweddingconvoy.html.
38
Johnsen.
39
Ibid.
40 Ibid. Also taken from interview with Senior Military Official by
Jack Serle, US Central Command, Tampa, March 2016.
Disputes over casualty figures continue to be a
As the new administration’s counter terrorism
policy evolves, robust civilian casualty recording
legitimacy, you lose the support of the ver y
practices will need to be in place to make
people you are tr ying to support and tr ying to
targeting policy accountable. This is extremely
protect,” a senior militar y official told the
important to demonstrate the humanitarian
Bureau. 42 “If you are viewing the population as
impact caused by these weapons. With much
the centre of gravity, you are now losing that
attention being given to Iraq and Syria, it is more
centre of gravity. There is no one target out
important than ever to ensure that operations in
there that will ‘win the war’ but there’s a target
more underreported places like Yemen, Somalia
and Pakistan are not forgotten and are subject
to proper scrutiny.
41 Cora Currier, “Hearts, Minds and Dollars: Condolence
Payments in the Drone Strike Age,” ProPublica, 5 April 2013,
https://www.propublica.org/article/hearts-minds-and-dollarscondolence-payments-in-the-drone-strike-age.
42 Senior Military Official, Interview by Jack Serle, US Central
Command, Tampa, March 2016.
43
Ibid.
23
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Country case study:
It has been sixteen years since a US drone
The US drone programme has not so far
For example, these strikes occurred while
Yemen
hovered for the first time in the Yemeni skies
eliminated terrorism agencies, nor succeeded
civilians were practicing normal daily life
and fired a Hellfire missile at a car carr ying
even in curbing the territorial sharp expansion
activities in their own homes, streets; or
a suspected al-Qaeda leader on 3 November
and flourishing of radical militancy in the
working, playing, shepherding, or driving to
2002 in eastern Yemen. Since then, Yemen
countr y. Moreover, these operations have
or from their houses.
Taha Yaseen is a Yemeni researcher with Mwatana
has become a battlefield for expanded US
had an adverse impact on civilians, their
for Human Rights who has for more than six years
drone operations labelled as “a War on Terror.”
families and communities, whose injuries have
On the evening of 26 September 2014, three
mainly contributed to several media, social, and
Since late 2014, Yemen has been parallelly
been left without remedy; their questions
children, including two girls, were playing by
going through a violent war between forces
about the injustice of being victimized remain
their own house at 18:00, when a US drone,
previously worked as a freelancer on Yemeni related
and armed groups loyal to the internationally-
unanswered.
without warning, fired a missile on a passing
conflict and political issues for numerous foreign and
recognized government of President Abdrabbuh
local news agencies.
Mansour Hadi, backed by a Saudi Arabia-led
In a joint report by Yemeni Mwatana for
house where the children were playing in al-
militar y coalition on one hand, and Houthi
Human Rights and Open Society Foundation,
Khosaf village, al-Hazm District of al-Jawf
armed group and forces loyal to former
nine case studies were documented that
governorate, northeast Yemen.
president Ali Abdullah Saleh on the other.
included 26 civilian deaths and injuries to an
This violence has created one of the worst
additional 13 civilians during the period May
The strike killed two AQAP suspects instantly,
humanitarian crises in the countr y with
2013 until April 2014. 3 We present some of
but shrapnel injured the civilian homeowner
millions of people facing famine, displacement
these findings below to illustrate
Orfouj Qaid al-Mar wani, and injured his
and diseases.
the humanitarian impact of armed drones
three children.
1
humanitarian and human rights projects at Yemeni
and foreign think tanks and organisations. He
car on the main road, which is parallel to the
in Yemen.
Since 2002, hundreds of US drone strikes have
Zeina al-Mar wani, seven years old and injured
with shrapnel in the lower part of the spine,
been carried out in different parts of Yemen.
A statement made by the Mwatana
Approximately 249 confirmed US strikes
Organization for Human Rights in 2017
have been carried out and killed at least 160
provided the findings of field research that
civilians in different parts of Yemen. 2 The
included evident civilian harm by US drone
majority of these have been in the east and
strikes. 4 These finding contradict the claims
the south. They have killed significant numbers
from the American government that its drones
of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
programme has “high precision” and a “low
senior commanders and operatives. In addition,
human cost”. Several documented case
they have been ver y successful in keeping
studies provide a considerable evidence of
the US army away from the dangers of direct
how US drone operations in Yemen have led
engagement on the ground. However, dozens
to not only to high scores of civilian deaths
of such strikes have been imprecise enough to
and injuries but also constant pains, suffering,
cause high scores of innocent civilian deaths
In her testimony, the mother of the three
and health associated dilemmas.
children explained that she was pregnant at
and injuries.
pelvis, and right thigh, caused her complete
paralysis. Due to the absence of decent
health care, Zeina passed away on 10 Januar y
2016. The second child, Moe’ed al-Mar wani,
was 12 years old and was injured with
shrapnel in his right thigh and testicles. He is
still suffering from a fragment left in his right
thigh. The third child is Sa’adah al-Mar wani,
was five years old. She was injured with
shrapnel in her legs.
the time of the strike that caused her intense
stress and fear that put her through
severe complications throughout the rest of
24
her pregnancy.
1 “Data of drones war in Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/
data/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2001-2011, 3 November
2002.
3 Waiting for Justice on civilian victims of US drones in
Yemen, Mwatana for Human Rights, 19 January 2017, http://
mwatana.org/en/1912017603.
2 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
25
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
She spoke about the conditions of poverty
A documentar y film that Mwatana has
According to a testimony by a victim’s family
These incidents offer a realistic and local
they have been living under particularly since
produced features a stor y of a US drone
member, the Yemeni state paid a total of 15
perspective on the tangible, adverse impact of
the children’s father, the only provider for the
strike that killed four civilians and injured five
million Yemeni riyals (an equivalent of
US drones that have not been precise and fail
family, passed away three months after the
others while they were driving near another
$69,809 USD at that time) in addition to 30
to prevent civilian deaths and injuries. They
strike. Moe’ed pointed to the absence of
car that was carr ying suspected AQAP
Kalashnikov guns to be all divided among the
were further unable to avoid causing harm to
basic ser vices in their area and he added that
members in al-Baidha Governorate, central
families of the four killed victims. This was
property and to the health and living
he and other children have been deprived
Yemen. Families of the victims spoke with
following a tribal arbitration. The entire
conditions of those in the affected
from being able go to school, as a result of
bitterness in the movie about the suffering of
amount was spent on covering some of the
communities.
the current ongoing war in Yemen.
their inconsolable losses and questioned the
medical expenses needed for treatment of the
reason behind targeting them, as they had
sur viving injured victims.
5
According to a statement made by former US
President Obama on 23 May 2013 6 and the
Based on the testimonies of the families’
nothing to do with militants of any kind. The
victims, US drones, just like AQAP forces,
targeted vehicle was driving behind a Toyota
In the documentar y, Ali Abed Rabbo al-Azzani,
aftermath White House Fact Sheet 7 targeted
have created a constant state of fear that
Hilux vehicle that was transporting around 14
who lost his son Yasser in this strike,
strikes are only made when there is “…near-
accompanies residents of those areas where
civilians who were mostly construction
expressed the bitterness of loss and the
certainty that no civilians will be killed or
these strikes took place or drones hover
workers in addition to the driver. The distance
miser y his son’s death has brought. “What is
injured.” In an apparent reference to so-called
repeatedly.
between the two vehicles was approximately
left of my son is a few photographs and a pile
signature strikes, based on individuals’
20 to 30 meters. The workers were driving on
of humble clothes,” he said. “My son’s death
patterns of behavior, the Fact Sheet asserted
al-Hazemya road from their villages in al-
has left the family in need as Yasser was the
that, “it is not the case that all militar y-aged
Sawma’ah district, al-Baidha governorate and
family’s breadwinner and was killed on his way
males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to
were heading to work in al-Baidha city.
to work.”
be combatants.” Our research however,
The incident occurred on 19 April 2014, at
Hussein al-Khushum also speaks about the
instead, we have found civilians
about 6:00. The shrapnel of the missiles hit
burden his son’s death has left for him to
killed and injured.
the civilians’ car and killed four of them:
shoulder as he is now responsible for taking
Sanad Hussein Nasser al-Khushum (30 years),
care of his three grandsons without any
Yasser Abed Rabbo al-Azzani (18 years),
additional income: “The news of his death
Ahmed Saleh Abu Bakr (65 years) and
broke our hearts and doubled our sorrows. He
Abdullah Nasser Abu Bakr al-Khushu.
was killed. Why? Why did they kill my son
In an inter view with the child Moe’ed alMar wani, he spoke about the physical pain he
still feels due to his injur y, in addition to the
continuous anxiety he and other children in
their village experience ever y time a drone is
heard hovering overhead.
Based on our findings, no official investigation
has been carried out by any party into this
incident nor any redress or remedy has been
yet provided for the poor family.
has found no US adherence to this policy and
Sanad and my cousin Ahmed Saleh Abu Bakr?
It also injured another five civilian passengers:
My son and my cousin did not belong to any
the driver, Nasser Mohammed Nasser (35
organization. My son Sanad was married and
years), Abdulrahman Hussein al-Khushum (22
had three children. His main concern was to
years whose brother Sanad al-Khushum was
secure their future and earn their upkeep,”
killed by the same strike, in addition to Najib
Hussein explained.
Hassan Nayef (35 years), Salem Nasser alKhushum (40 years), and Bassam Ahmed
Salem Breim (20 years).
6 Remarks by US President Obama at the National Defense
University, 23 May 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defenseuniversity.
7 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the
Use of Force in
5 Death by Drone: Civilian Harm Caused by U.S. Targeted
Killings in Yemen, Open Society Foundation, April 2015,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/death-drone,
pp. 44-47.
26
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and
Areas of Active Hostilities,” The White House, 23 May 2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/
fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-andprocedures-use-forcecounterterrorism.
27
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
In addition to not having been adequately
Neglected communities that are affected by
compensated for the harm caused by American
drones are rapidly becoming a conducive
2. Environmental Harm
airstrikes, sur vivors and victims’ relatives
environment for the flourishing of al-Qaeda
Doug Weir and Elizabeth Minor
confirmed that no investigations have been
militants as well as a recruiting source,
conducted into the killings and damages. The
because militants pander to this desire for
US has not so far disclosed any information
revenge against Americans. Finally, and most
Doug Weir Manages the Toxic Remnants of War
regarding these incidents nor the full legal
importantly, the extent of inefficacy of US
Project, which studies the environmental and
basis for undertaking them. It is still unclear for
drone program in Yemen has been ver y clearly
derived humanitarian consequences of armed
many, including the victims, whether drone
seen through not only its failure to curb and
operations in Yemen comply with international
dismantle of terrorism movements, but also the
law or not due to a lack of transparency.
In armed conflict, and its aftermath, legal
protection for the environment is weak, and
systems for accountability and environmental
conflict and militar y activities. In addition to
remediation are largely absent. Those
managing the Project, Weir is a Visiting Research
protections that do exist have been most
Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s
unprecedented thriving and territorial expansion
clearly articulated in relation to massive levels
College London and blogs on conflict and the
and establishing of its radical rule in different
environment for The Ecologist, New Internationalist,
of environmental harm. They primarily focus
parts of the countr y. Al-Qaeda’s affiliates are
UN Environment, and other platforms.
articulating the linkages between
stronger than ever in Yemen, according to a
recent report by International Crisis Group. 8
on the “natural environment”—without
Elizabeth Minor is an Advisor at Article 36, a
environmental quality and the enjoyment of
UK-based organisation that works for the
fundamental human rights.
development of new policy and legal standards to
prevent the unintended, unnecessar y or
However, the risks of the generation of toxic
unacceptable harm caused by certain weapons.
remnants of war—conflict pollution that
She was previously a researcher at Ever y
threatens human and ecosystem health—should
Casualty and Oxford Research Group, where
be an important consideration in taking steps
she investigated the methodologies and practices
used by states, international organisations
and civil society to document and record the
and measures to progressively limit harm in the
use of force.
casualties of armed conflict and violence.
During the last decade, there has been a
renewed effort to clarify and codify the
relationship between environmental obligations
stemming from international humanitarian law
(IHL), international environmental law, and
international human rights law, before, during,
and after armed conflicts. The topic is currently
under consideration by the International Law
Commission, and states have expressed their
growing concern over the environmental and
derived humanitarian consequences of armed
conflict at the UN Environment Assembly.1
8 Yemen’s al-Qaeda: Expanding the Base, International Crisis
Group, 2 February 2017, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middleeast-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/174-yemens-al-qaeda-expanding-base.
28
1 “Analytical Guide to the Work of the International Law
Commission, Protection of the environment in relation to armed
conflicts,” International Law Commission, 2017, http://legal.un.
org/ilc/guide/8_7.shtml; “UNEP/EA.2/Res.15, Protection of the
environment in areas affected by armed conflict,” United Nations
Environment Assembly, 2016, https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/
handle/20.500.11822/11189/K1607252_UNEPEA2_RES15E.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
29
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M
Obligations to address the environmental legacy
• The use of explosive weapons has thecapacity
Environmental impacts from the
use of explosive weapons
relevant concern in the context of airstrikes
of pollution from armed conflicts and militar y
to generate toxic remnants. One key concern
conducted using drones.
activities have been proposed by the
surrounding armed drones is that these
International Law Commission, 2 and have
technologies have facilitated the expansion of
Airstrikes from armed drones typically use
Several widely used munitions that states have
recently been articulated in the Treaty on the
the types of contexts in which states have
explosive weapons. 4 The use of explosive
fired from drones present toxicity concerns,
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted in July
been willing to use explosive force deployed
weapons can produce pollutants that pose risks
such as Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 and GBU-
2017. 3 These and other initiatives could support
from aircraft. If such trajectories are permitted
to human health following their initial impacts,
38 bombs. These contain conventional explosive
the advancement of both law and practice with
to continue, potential environmental harms risk
particularly when these weapons are used in
fills that utilise TNT and RDX. Both explosives
respect to addressing toxic remnants of war.
being seen in a greater variety of contexts;
populated areas. 5
are mobile in the environment, meaning that, for
example, they can spread from soils into
The expansion of the use of armed drones by
• The legal standards of armed conflict have been
These toxic remnants—the effects of which are
groundwater, and are toxic. The metals
states to conduct airstrikes both within and
applied in these particular uses of force,
not well documented—may derive from the
dispersed from these munitions are
outside of armed conflict has coincided with this
though these standards have been widely
constituents of munitions or from the
environmentally persistent. Where use is intense
increased interest in enhancing the protection of
argued to be the inappropriate framework. With
destruction of buildings and damage to
or sustained, evidence suggests that these can
the environment in relation to armed conflicts.
the low standards of environmental protection
infrastructure, such as power, water, and
reach sufficient levels to pose a threat to
However, ver y little research has been
associated with armed conflict, this could also
sanitation facilities. Whilst potential toxic
civilian health. 8
undertaken into any possible relationship
present risks in terms of greater environmental
impacts will be greatest where the use of
between the use of armed drones and
harm from the use of force; and
explosive weapons in populated areas has been
There may also be specific concerns from novel
widespread and sustained,7 even limited use
materials that are being used in munitions
(such as individual air strikes) can bring risks to
deployed from drone platforms. For example,
environmental harm.
• Given the low standards of environmental
6
Whilst not arguing that the environmental impact
protection in armed conflict, it should be
health in communities. As such, the
Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) munitions,
of armed drones is a central component of the
investigated whether drone technology through
environmental impacts of explosive force are a
the long-term health impacts of which are
harms that they cause, this short perspective
its unique characteristics could help facilitate
unconfirmed, have reportedly been deployed
proposes that air strikes conducted from drones
the striking of environmentally risky targets
from drones. 9 A lack of transparency over the
could have environmental implications for
during armed conflicts, and contribute to
communities, and that these should be
harmful practices in this way.
considered in any discussions about the further
regulation of drones. In addressing the
Given the lack of research in this area, this
problematic aspects or potentials of armed
chapter does not propose definitive conclusions
drones as a set of technologies, and current
on these points. Rather, it proposes that these
trajectories in their use, states should at least
are areas where there may be questions and
consider that:
concerns that states and others should be
encouraged to consider, as part of any
discussion on the broader picture of harm
caused by armed drones.
2 See draft principle 16 in “Protection of the environment in
relation to armed conflicts: Statement of the Chairman of the
Drafting Committee,” International Law Commission, 9 August
2016, http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/
english/statements/2016_dc_chairman_statement_peac_9august.
pdf&lang=E.
3 See Article 6 in “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,”
UN General Assembly, 7 July 2017, http://undocs.org/A/
CONF.229/2017/8.
30
4 The humanitarian harm caused by the use of explosive weapons
in populated areas—from deaths and injuries to infrastructure
damage and displacement—has been recognised by a number of
states, civil society, the International Committee of the Red Cross,
and the UN Secretary-General among others. States are currently
developing an international response to address this issue through
a political declaration. See records of international debate
collected by the International Network on Explosive Weapons at
www.inew.org/acknowledgements.
5 See for example Andrew Garrity, “Conflict rubble: a ubiquitous
and under-studied toxic remnant of war,” Toxic Remnants of War
Project, 10 July 2014, http://www.toxicremnantsofwar.info/
conflict-rubble-a-ubiquitous-toxic-remnant-of-war.
6 So far most research into the health risks and environmental
fate of the residues from explosive weapons has been restricted to
domestic training ranges, and may not be representative of their
use in populated areas in conflict and other settings. See for
example: Koponen, K, “Development of Guidance Values for
Explosive Residues;” and Walsh, et al. “Energetics Residues
Deposition from Training with Large Caliber Weapon Systems,” in
European Conference on Defence and the Environment,
Proceedings 2015, http://www.defmin.fi/files/3353/ECDE_
Proceedings_2015.pdf.
7 See for example the UN Environment Programme’s assessment
in 2009 of the impact of the Cast Lead offensive in Gaza, which
documented dioxins and asbestos in the conflict rubble:
“Environmental Assessment of the Areas Disengaged by Israel in
the Gaza Strip,” United Nations Environment Programme, 2009,
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Gaza_web.pdf.
deployment of advanced weapons by drones
limits efforts to study and assess their potential
health and environmental risks from a
perspective of limiting harm.
In populated areas, together with pulverised
building materials, particulate matter,
combustion products, household chemicals, and
electrical components, munitions constituents
can also contribute to the creation of complex
polluted environments.10 The longer-term impact
of these mixed exposures on human health
8 See for example “Lebanon Post-Conflict Environmental
Assessment,” United Nations Environment Programme, 2007,
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Lebanon.pdf.
9 Raymond Whitaker, ‘”Tungsten bombs” leave Israel’s victims
with mystery wounds,’ Independent, 18 January 2009, http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/tungsten-bombsleave-israels-victims-with-mystery-wounds-1418910.html.
10 Garrity, above note 5.
31
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M
The existing thresholds for what constitutes
remains understudied.11 This is due to the fact
As a result of this particular pattern of airstrikes
that public health responses prioritise acute
launched from drones, harms to people known to
threats where such use of weapons creates
result from the use of explosive force in
In addressing drones as a development in
widely acknowledged as being both too high, and
humanitarian emergencies, and lack of access,
conflict—including deaths, injuries, psychological
weapons technology, states should consider
poorly defined 12 —though the relevant general
inadequate environmental data collection, and
impacts, and the destruction of homes—have
which features of systems could facilitate
principles of distinction and proportionality
insecurity hamper studies.
been documented in novel contexts. This
problematic practices or expansions in the use of
nevertheless apply in the selection of targets
transposition of known impacts in to different
force, and how the implications of these could
and of weapons, as does the principle of
Environmental impacts are important to consider
situations could also therefore apply to
be contained. If one aspect of this is to consider
precaution. Reliably predicting the outcome of
in evaluating what the response should be to the
environmental harms. In turn, if some current
how certain capabilities have enabled expansions
strikes on environmentally risky targets requires
harms caused by the use of explosive weapons,
use of armed drones by states has sought to
in the contexts in which certain forms of force
advanced knowledge of the design, state, and
including in considering what the acceptable
redefine where particular sets of laws governing
have been used, another may be to consider the
contents of the facility, and the ability to reliably
limits are for the contexts in which drones can
the use of force apply, such as the law of armed
potential implications of the enhanced
predict the health and environmental
be used to conduct airstrikes.
conflict, this also has clear implications for the
sur veillance capabilities offered by drones for
consequences of the damage caused; factors
protection of the environment.
facilitating attacks on targets whose destruction
that will be balanced against the militar y
carries particularly severe risks of generating
advantage gained from disrupting or destroying it.
Challenging boundaries in the
use of force
Along with other impacts, potentials for
Environmentally risky targets
unacceptable environmental harm under IHL are
conflict pollution.
environmental damage in communities that can
The specific capabilities offered by certain
drones have been used by some states to
facilitate an expansion in the range of contexts in
which they use explosive force. These states
have used drones in a way that pushes at the
legal and conceptual boundaries where certain
types of violence generally associated with
armed conflict are used.
The technological features relevant here include
the range, persistence, and sur veillance
capabilities offered by drones, and the ability to
use force without physical risk to the attacker.
The interplay between the potentials provided by
these characteristics, and problematic patterns
in use—particularly the killing of those
associated with particular groups across
While aerial sur veillance data may increase the
affect human health therefore bear consideration
Numerous target types have the potential to
confidence of mission planners, it is unlikely that
in evaluating what the acceptable limits on the
harm the environment and human health when
it would contribute substantially to prior
use of armed drones by states should be, and for
damaged or destroyed. These include industrial,
knowledge of the intrinsic risks within a facility
setting standards against the facilitation of
petrochemical, or pharmaceutical sites;
or the often unpredictable environmental
expansions in the contexts where certain types
electricity production or distribution networks;
outcome of its destruction. Nevertheless, it is
of force are used.
water treatment and distribution facilities; and
conceivable that access to enhanced
militar y bases and ammunition storage areas.
sur veillance data could encourage the expansion
of strikes against such targets, particularly when
combined with precision weapons. This potential
risk merits further investigation. In the majority
of cases, the weak legal provisions protecting
the environment in conflict make it unlikely that
the consequences of such actions would breach
existing thresholds—even where contamination
creates persistent localised risks to communities
and their environment.
borders—provides a basis for international
discussion on preventing harm from drones as a
specific set of technologies.
11 See for example Manduca P, Naim A, and Signoriello S,
“Specific Association of Teratogen and Toxicant Metals in Hair of
Newborns with Congenital Birth Defects of Developmentally
Premature Birth in a Cohort of Couples with Documented Parental
Exposure to Military Attacks: Observational Study at Al Shifa
Hospital, Gaza, Palestine,” Journal of Environmental Research
and Public Health, 2014 11:5208-5223.
32
12 “Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict - An
Inventory and Analysis of International Law”, United Nations
Environment Programme, 2009, http://postconflict.unep.ch/
publications/int_law.pdf.
33
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
E N V I R O N M E N TA L H A R M
The lack of transparency over the use of armed
Conclusion
Country case study:
drones in recent conflicts makes it difficult to
The Nigerian militar y has asserted a pressing
need for counter-insurgency (COIN) equipment,
determine whether access to enhanced
The environmental impacts of the use of force in
sur veillance data has facilitated the targeting of
general, and the use of armed drones in
environmentally risky civilian and militar y
particular, remain under-documented as a form of
infrastructure. It has been reported that drones
harm that is relevant to assessing the limits that
are being used to some extent in strikes on ISIS
might be placed on different weapons
Joy Onyesoh is President of the Nigerian Section
within an area where there is insurgency but
oil operations in Syria and Iraq by the
technologies.
of the Women’s International League for Peace and
also civilians. There is also the danger that
Freedom (WILPF Nigeria), and Vice-President of
the targeted population might not be “terrorists”
Nigeria
and has argued that drones are “necessar y”
in fighting the insurgency. But a key issue is
how appropriate it is to launch such attacks
international coalition for example,13 but the role
WILPF International’s Executive Committee. In 2015,
or “insurgents”, but might instead be an
and impact of the use of drones in terms of
In considering how state violence should be
potentially raising—or reducing—environmental
constrained, and the contexts in which certain
Award for coordinating the Women’s Situation Room
individual or a group that fits into
risks to local populations in these operations is
impacts of violence may be considered
in Nigeria. The Women’s Situation Room empowers
a specific “terrorist” profile.
not clear. Recent reports of the use of a small
permissible or not, environmental effects with
women to take an active role in promoting peace
drone to destroy an ammunition dump in Ukraine
implications for human health must however be
with grenades, which has likely caused extensive
factored in—including with respect to armed
environmental contamination, are also relevant
drones. The lasting environmental impacts and
drones. These include the potential harms on
to assessing the picture of use against sensitive
long-term risks to human health from the use of
the environment, human health, and agriculture.
industrial targets.14
force must, in turn, be curbed through more
Recently, Nigeria became the eighth countr y to
The geographical zones of Nigeria (northeast
robust international rules.
have used armed drones in combat, having
and northwest) where most counter-insurgency
In identifying risks and issues, and considering
announced a successful drone strike in its on-
operations are taking place are known for their
potential restrictions on armed drones, states
going war against the militant group Boko
rich supply of farm crops such as grains and
should also consider therefore whether the
Haram. On 25 Januar y 2015, a photo appeared
vegetables, and for animal rearing such as of
technology could help facilitate practices that
online at Beegeagle’s Blog appearing to show
cattle, sheep, and goats. Drone activities, in
pose particularly high environmental risks in
a CH-3 UCAV (“unmanned” combat aerial
particular their munitions and the munitions
communities, and seek data on how this and
vehicle) that crashed upside down near Dumge
used against them, may pose a threat to public
other risks may have played out in practice.
village in the Mafa District of Borno Province.
health within these regions and their sources of
Despite damage to the tricycle landing gear
livelihood: the cultivation of crops and rearing
and upper for ward fuselage, the CH-3 appears
of animals.
Joy was awarded the Nigerian Citizen Responsibility
and stability in their communities, and was convened
As a Nigerian, I have a number of additional
by the Nigerian Women’s Platform for Peaceful
concerns about potential effects of the use of
Elections, which was chaired by WILPF Nigeria.
1
to have crash-landed due to mechanical or
control difficulties, as reported on the news. In
Overall, the use of armed drones in Nigeria for
the video released of the attack, there was a
domestic “counter-insurgency” operations is
large blast, and the Nigerian Air Force claims it
troubling in the global context. Questions about
hit a logistics base belonging to Boko Haram,
the validity of armed drone use in such
possibly an ammunition storehouse. 2
contexts have yet to be answered. In addition,
the potential effects of such use on civilians
1
13 See for example, “RAF Tornados launch first strikes against
Isis in Syria”, The Times, 3 December 2015, https://www.thetimes.
co.uk/article/raf-tornados-launch-first-strikes-against-isis-in-syriarqpqq2qd88m. Attacks have frequently been carried out by the
coalition on facilities for extraction, processing, and
transportation—see coalition daily reports archived by Airwars at
https://airwars.org/daily-reports.
14 David Hambling, “Small Russian Drones Do Massive Damage
With Grenade Weapons,” Warrior, 18 July 2017.
34
See Beegeagle’s Blog, https://beegeagle.wordpress.com.
2 See “Nigeria becomes eighth country to use armed drones in
combat,” Vanguard, 3 November 2016, http://www.vanguardngr.
com/2016/11/nigeria-becomes-eighth-country-use-armeddrones-combat/; Kelsey D. Atherton, “Watch Nigeria’s First
Confirmed Drone Strike - Against Boko Haram,” Popular
Science, 3 February 2016, http://www.popsci.com/watchnigerias-first-confirmed-drone-strike; and Jeffrey Lin and P.W.
Singer, “Did An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Just Crash in
Nigeria?” Popular Science, 28 January 2015 http://www.popsci.
com/did-armed-chinese-made-drone-just-crash-nigeria.
and communities poses dangers that have not
yet been addressed.
35
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
3. Psychological Harm
Radidja Nemar
A civilian in Pakistan described drone operations
Radidja Nemar leads Alkarama’s work and
strategy on the Maghreb and Nile regions. She is
currently finishing her PhD on the interplay between
as amounting to a “slap in the dark”.1 This image
is emblematic of a feeling of betrayal and
Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law during
treacher y that is perceived by the civilians living
post-conflict transitional periods, for which she
in areas where drone operations are carried out.
undertook visiting research stints at Oxford and
Yale Law School as a Fulbright Scholar.
For a large swath of population in Yemen, living
under a sky that has become a constant source
Editors’ note: This is a shortened version of the
of trauma is an ever yday reality. The sky in the
report published by Alkarama in Februar y 2015.
Yemeni countr yside, or the United States (US)
It omits the section on legal implications as well as
drones’ playground, regularly inflicts violence
tables, charts, and annexes. The full-length version
without any warning or reason on people that are
is available online at http://www.alkarama.org/en/
already vulnerable to both poverty and conflict.
documents/yemen-alkaramas-report-2015traumatising-skies-us-drone-operations-and-posttraumatic.
US drone attacks have thus emerged to shape
the perceptions, fears, and life choices of a large
proportion of the Yemeni population. In turn,
this “drone generation”—which is inevitably
viewing the skies as a medium of death—is
©2015 Alkarama Foundation.
Nevertheless, the concern over the potential
The combination of unclear legal and policy
psychological impact of drones has been shared
mechanisms around drone operations and
by human rights and humanitarian organisations
technology closely intersects with the
The repercussions of drone operations on
such as the Office of the United Nations High
perpetuation of post-traumatic stress disorder
civilians living in areas where the skies are a
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
(PTSD) among Yemeni civilians living under
source of trauma, especially those who have not
and the International Committee of the
drones. A complete dearth of institutional
directly lost a relative or loved one to a drone
Red Cross (ICRC), which have expressed
mechanisms with regard to regulation,
strike, has not been given due consideration
concern about the lack of measurement of the
accountability, and retribution has ser ved to
within policy or academic debates.
consequences of the constant presence of
perpetuate loss of civilian lives, trauma, and
drones on mental health.
disruption of ever yday activities. Strongly
suffering tremendously from mental stresses
that also culminate into physical distress.
2
3
addressing these shortcomings will be
instrumental, not only for delivering justice to
2 On 22 September 2014, Flavia Pansieri, Deputy High
Commissioner for Human Rights raised the issue of the effects of
drone operations on civilian populations, including the
psychological effects. See: “Human Rights Council Holds Panel On
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Or Armed Drones In Counterterrorism
And Military Operations,” United Nations Press Release, 22
September 2014, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.
nsf/%28httpNewsByYear_en%29/
BCE56ED914A46D40C1257D5B0038393F?OpenDocument.
1 Robert Greenwald, UNMANNED: America’s Drone Wars,
Documentary film, Culver City: Brave New Films, 2013.
36
already vulnerable people, but also for
ameliorating their lives in a countr y experiencing
instances of violence on numerous fronts.
3 Peter Mauer, “The use of armed drones must comply with
laws,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 10 May 2013,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm.
37
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M
This chapter, and the full version of this study,
Yemen is located amidst two regional
AQAP has been responsible for numerous
Although, the US have never declared war on
takes on the difficult task of shedding some light
heavyweights, Saudi Arabia and Iran, which
attacks in the region, including against the US
Yemen, the threat posed by AQAP has been
on the mental state of civilians who attempt to
have been pushing to further their influence over
presence in the countr y while remaining engaged
used to justify a dramatic increase in air and
lead their lives under the murmurs of drones. In
Sana’a. In 2004, fighting began in the northwest
in fierce fighting with both the Houthis and
drone strikes under the Obama administration.11
doing so, this study presents the findings from a
of the countr y between the government and
Yemeni government forces, the latter being
The London-based Bureau of Investigative
sur vey conducted by Alkarama in the Yemeni
the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia minority, leading to
considered by AQAP, as a US proxy.
Journalism estimates that between 2002 and
countr yside that assesses the prevalence of
six rounds of fighting between 2004 and 2010.
PTSD among civilian populations. What makes
Neither party has respected the different peace
In addition, since 2015 Saudi Arabia has led a
strikes in Yemen, killing 362 to 531 people,
agreements over the years. The rebels have
coalition of nine African and Middle Eastern
including 64 to 83 civilians, among which 7 have
account people who have lost their loved ones
accused Saudi Arabia for supporting the Yemeni
countries supporting the Yemeni government in
been children. The Bureau also estimates
to drone attacks as well as those who are simply
government, while the government has accused
the civil war. This militar y inter vention has
possible extra drone strikes ranging between 101
living under the traumatic skies.
Iran of meddling in its internal matters. 5
primarily consisted of bombing campaigns
to 120, having killed 345 to 553 people, of which
against the Houthis, which has resulted in a
26 to 68 were civilians, including 6 to 11
By September 2014, the Houthis started to
humanitarian catastrophe. The aerial
children.12 Yemen’s ties with the United States
exert their strength over the Yemeni government
bombardment of populated areas has resulted in
were reinforced under the Obama administration.
by taking control of key sites in Sana’a and
massive civilian deaths and injuries, as well as
The Yemeni government has given US forces a
demanding the reversal of government policies,
destruction of civilian infrastructure leading to
free rein to participate in militar y operations over
especially with regard to fuel subsidies. 6 Most
famine and the world’s largest cholera outbreak. 9
large areas, without any checks and balances
this study particularly unique is that it takes into
Political background
In 1990, the People’s Democratic Republic of
Yemen (South Yemen) and the Arab Republic
of Yemen (North Yemen) were formally unified
as the Republic of Yemen, despite the fact that
hostilities between the North and South had
existed for nearly two decades amidst Cold War
politics and ideological oppositions. Soon after
the formal unification, a Southern secessionist
movement was born, leading to a brief civil war
in 1994. The South was quickly subdued and the
Northern government based in Sana’a exerted
4
8
2014 there have been 71 to 83 confirmed drone
recently, Yemen was pushed into a civil war
when the Houthis seized the capital, leading
Against the backdrop of decades of political
President Hadi to flee the capital. Although the
instability, the Yemeni economy has also
main battleground remains between the Houthi
suffered considerably. The World Bank indicates
forces and those loyal to the President, both
that Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the
President Hadi and the Houthis also face al-
Arab world. Poverty, which was already in the
Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP).7
rise prior to the latest political crisis, has further
on the use of force. Drone operations have, in
turn, emerged as the “go-to method” for US
militar y operations.13
increased from 42% of the population in 2009
its control over the whole countr y.
to 54.5% in 2012. Additionally, not only has
Yemen one of the highest population growth
rates in the world, but it is also one of the
most food insecure countries with scarce
water resources.10
8 “Yemen’s AQAP Says Houthis Will Pay for Push into Country,”
Reuters, 21 November 2014, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/11/21/us-yemen-qaeda-warningidUSKCN0J518B20141121.
6 “Houthis Clash with Police at Yemen’s Airport” Al Jazeera, 11
November 2014
9 See for example “Yemen: The world’s largest humanitarian
crisis,” Al Jazeera, 3 July 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2017/07/yemen-world-largest-humanitariancrisis-170703130224623.html; Cassady Rosenblum, “Yemen is a
humanitarian catastrophe. U.S. officials don’t want you to know
why,” Los Angeles Times, 3 August 2017, http://www.latimes.com/
opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-yemen-war-crimes-20170803-story.html;
and Pamela Falk, “Cholera crisis hits grim threshold in Yemen,”
CBS News, 14 August 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
cholera-crisis-yemen-world-health-organization.
7 “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?” BBC News, 26 March
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middleeast-29319423.
10 “Yemen Overview,” World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/
en/country/yemen/overview#1.
4 “Yemen Profile”, BBC, 4 October 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-1470495.
5 “Yemen’s Hadi Accuses Iran Of Supporting Secessionists,”
Al-Monitor, 5 October 2012, http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/10/the-yemeni-presidentiran-is-sup.html
38
11 Gregory Johnsen, “Resetting US Policy Toward Yemen,”
Council on Foreign Relations, 27 September 2011, http://www.cfr.
org/yemen/resetting-us-policytowardyemen/p26026.
12 “Drone Wars: The Full Data,” The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2017-01-01/drone-wars-the-full-data.
13 Vivian Salama, “Death From Above: How American Drone
Strikes Are Devastating Yemen,” Rolling Stone Magazine, 14 April
2014, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/deathfromabove-how-american-drone-strikes-are-devastating-yemen20140414#ixzz3GEFtACru.
39
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M
The Alkarama civilian PTSD
screening study in Yemen
Methodology
In order to take for ward our earlier (2012–2013)
From July to September 2014, Alkarama
research on the impact of the US drone attacks
conducted a study to assess the level of PTSD
in Yemen on the civilian population,14 as well as
among the civilian population living in Yemeni
on their legal implications, we decided to sur vey
villages where US drones are operational.
villages where drone operations are being
For this purpose, our field researchers sur veyed
carried out by the US.
100 adults from different age groups, among
whom 50 are women and 50 are men, along with
Our goal was to understand whether or not
27 children, among whom 13 are girls and 14 are
civilians living under drones exhibit symptoms
boys, who were selected randomly in two
of PTSD similar to those who have directly lost
villages. In order to keep the respondents as
a family member as a result of drone strikes. A
well as our researchers out of harms way, we
Stanford-NYU report has qualitatively taken up
have anonymised ever yone throughout this study.
a similar endeavour to highlight trauma among
The sur vey to conduct the PTSD screening is
based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
Our belief, which finds an empirical grounding in
this study, is that the simple fact of living under
drones has psychological consequences that are
no different from those caused by the loss of a
relative in a strike. In this sense, we are tr ying to
show that the fear of being killed or having a
relative killed by a drone at any moment and
without knowing the reasons that might cause
such a death is of such intensity that it can lead
to PTSD. The intensity of the suffering is such
that we believe it amounts to cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment of civilians.
of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric
Association.16 We designed the screening in
such a way that the panel chosen represented an
equal number of men and women, from different
age categories, and inclusive of individuals who
have suffered the loss of a relative in a drone
attack and those individuals who have not.
Furthermore, we designed a separate sur vey for
the PTSD screening of children in order to take
into account the peculiar way children develop
different symptoms.17
into Arabic and were conducted in Arabic by
focus is also directed towards understanding the
Alkarama’s research team in Yemen. They were
effects on the most vulnerable people. We
carried out in the villages of Qawl (in the
believe that, in order to fully comprehend the
district of Jahana, region of Sana’a) and Al Sirin
suffering of a victim of inhumane and degrading
(in the district of Sanhan, region of Sana’a).
treatment, it is also important to take into
Both villages are situated in the southeast of
account subjective elements such as the
Sana’a and are in regions where drone
particular vulnerabilities of some of the victims
operations are carried out by the United States
and the cultural specificities of Yemeni society.
against alleged al-Qaeda militants.
Findings
The questions asked as part of the PTSD sur vey
were closed-ended, thereby implying that the
Our findings reveal that, among adults, PTSD is
respondent was asked a question, which could
extremely prevalent, with 72 respondents
only be answered with either ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘Not
displaying many of its symptoms, 27
Giving an Answer’. The last section of the
respondents deemed as likely to have PTSD, and
screening, however, was left open-ended for the
only one respondent showing a few symptoms.
inter viewer to assess the respondent’s link
between his/her PTSD and drone attacks based
We found the following common patterns of
on their personal interaction, while also providing
symptoms among all respondents regardless of
space for the inter viewer to add further
age, gender, or whether or not they lost an
obser vations and for the inter viewee to express
immediate family member as a consequence of a
her/himself. The comments by the inter viewers,
drone strike:
which often also included testimonies by the
respondents included in this section, enabled us
to collect valuable qualitative data in addition to
the quantitative data collected from the PTSD
Annexes contained in the full-length version of
ensure that the respondents clearly knew what a
this report, for further reference.
designed to highlight the direct link between the
• Constant anxiety;
• Constant fear to be killed or to have a relative
killed by a drone attack;
questionnaire. The sur vey questionnaires for
included a preliminar y introduction in order to
operating in their region. Our study was thus
40
common patterns of PTSD symptoms. A specific
both adults and children are available in the
ascertain that they were aware of drones
15 Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians
from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, International Human Rights
and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford University and Global
Justice Clinic at New York University, September 2012, http://
chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-Under-Drones.pdf.
The sur veys were first translated from English
For both adults and children, the PTSD sur vey
drone and a drone attack were, as well as to
14 “The United States’ War on Yemen—Drone Attacks,” Report
Submitted to the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while
Countering Terror, Alkarama , 3 June 2013, http://en.alkarama.
org/yemen/1335-yemen-the-united-states-war-on-yemen-droneattacks.
This study presents the findings separately for
adults and children, even if all respondents show
a sample of individuals who live in Yemeni
those “living under drones” in Pakistan.15
trauma arising from living under drones to PTSD.
• Sleep-related troubles, including insomnia,
nightmares and enuresis for children;
• Deep emotional distress, especially when drone
operations resume;
• Depression and sadness;
• Anger and frustration towards the Yemeni and
US governments;
16 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association,
1994).
• Feelings of detachment from the ordinar y world;
17 See Foa, E.B., Johnson, K.M., Feeny, N.C., & Treadwell,
K.R.H, “The child PTSD symptom scale (CPSS): A preliminary
examination of its psychometric properties,” Journal of Clinical
Child Psychology, 30, 2001, pp. 376–384.
• Feelings of being not worthy of protection or
and
attention from the government.
41
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M
Civilians who witnessed drone attacks on the
reported being haunted by the horrifying image
The answer to this question is further reinstated
as the perpetrators of violence that creates this
ground are experiencing constant fear and
of their relatives’ bodies and remains and
by a similar trend in the answers to the question
suffering in their lives.
insomnia. Even civilians who do not have
emphasised their fear of being killed in the same
around whether they had upsetting thoughts or
casualties in their families express trauma
way. The fear is increased by the lack of
images about drones that came into their heads
It is important to note that the children who had
syndromes in their daily lives. Comments
understanding of the reasons why their relatives
when they did not want them to. 87% of the
lost a family member have PTSD deriving from
underlying a “desire for revenge” are common,
were killed, making them unable to prevent such
children respondent answered positively to the
both the fact that they lost a loved one as well
especially among men. During the day, the
a fate for themselves or their loved ones. Most
questions. Girls are more affected and the
as due to the fear that a drone attack might
sounds of aerial vehicles make them stop their
of them are now also providing for the wife and
percentage is extremely high regardless of
strike again and kill another member of their
daily activities, while at night, they suffer from
children of their deceased relatives. This adds to
age or situation, as well between those that
family. For example, the son of one the victims
insomnia.18 A recurring pattern is the feeling of
the psychological pressure and anxiety, given
are family members of victims, and those that
of a drone attack, nine-year-old Taha, is suffering
disregard for their human dignity by both the US
the extreme poverty in these communities that
are not.
tremendously and sleeps only in the lap of his
and the Yemeni government.
further heightens vulnerabilities and economic
pressures.
The constant fear of being targeted or having a
older brother. He is constantly scared of losing
Sadness and depression is also assessed by the
his brother, too. Eleven-year-old Muad, who lost
lack of interest children show in activities that
his father to a drone attack in Januar y 2013 in
relative targeted can also be seen in answers to
The fact that none of the victims’ families are
they used to enjoy. When asked whether they
the village of Khawlan, is experiencing serious
questions asking if the respondent is feeling
being heard by the authorities, Yemeni or
are having much less interest in doing things
speech problems due to the trauma.
mostly “on guard” or whether he/she has an
American, nor being offered any form of redress
they used to do, the answers are a striking yes
exaggerated startled response to a sudden
or explanation, is leading to a rise in anger
for 85% of them.
noise. This highlights the constant state of
among male respondents. Depression and
tension that is present in the lives of the
sadness is rampant as well as the feeling of “not
Sadness and depression are combined with other
the question regarding feelings of irritability or
population.
being treated like human beings.” Among the
symptoms, especially anxiety. The anticipation of
having fits of anger. Although the figures drop
victims’ families, the knowledge that drone
another attack creates a recurrent sense of fear
significantly for boys who have not lost a family
Eighty per cent of adults answered positively to
operations are about to resume ser ves as a
that is but furthered by anxiety. It is thus no
member, they stay ver y high for girls and for all
Question 25: ”Do you feel “on guard” most of
constant reminder about the loss of their
surprise that answers to the question, “Are you
the other categories.
the time—i.e. being “super alert” or watchful?”
relatives, and perpetuates their feelings of
afraid that a drone attack might harm you, or
Similarly, 75% of adults answered yes to
hopelessness, anger, and sadness, as well as
your family, or your community?” highlight that
Among girls, the prevalence of anxiety, stress,
Question 26: “Do you have an exaggerated
fear of losing other members of their family. 20
96% of the children feel this way.
and sadness is generally higher. Those who lost
19
We also obser ved that boys who had lost a
family member are more likely to answer yes to
a family member—like twelve-year-old Imen, who
startled response most of the time?”
Effects on children
In general, the feeling of fear is further
lost her mother, and twelve-year-old Yosra, who
exacerbated among children when they hear
lost her father, both in a drone attack in 2013—
The study found that children, too, are expressing
sounds that resemble the buzzing of drones. 74%
stopped the enjoyable activities that they used
Victims’ families are particularly vulnerable to
severe sadness and fear when they hear sounds of
of children respondents say that they are jumpy
to engage in, such as playing outdoors. 22
PTSD. They show symptoms that are both
aircrafts or drones, or when they hear news that
or easily startled when someone walks behind
Thirteen-year-old Saqra, who lost her uncle,
caused by the way their loved ones died as well
drone operations are about to resume in the region.
them or when they walk in the street and/or hear
stopped painting and is constantly afraid of
as by the fear of losing another relative in the
More than half (51%) of the children screened said
any sudden sound.
losing her brother and father. Girls who have not
same way. The majority of men inter viewed
that drones got in the way of their general
Specificity of victims’ families
18 More symptoms were reported. For example, Ahmed a young
farmer who hadn’t lost a family member to drone attacks, says that
he cannot stay in the kitchen because of the sound emitted by the
fridge in the kitchen. It makes him particularly anxious because it
gives him the feeling that there is a drone above him. Other
respondents complained of increased blood pressure when they
hear that drone operations are resuming in the region or after
hearing about a drone attack.
19 See Chart 12, Annex C in the full-length report available
online.
42
21
lost a family member tend to ask if the same
happiness in the two weeks preceding the
We also discovered a worrisome trend among
thing will happen to their relatives and are
screening. When we asked the children if they were
boys who often talk about strong feelings of
constantly worried about their fates.
feeling upset—i.e. scared, angry, sad, guilty—when
anger, hatred, and a desire for revenge against
they think or hear about drones, the answers were
those responsible for the drone attacks. They
almost all positive, especially among girls, 100% of
clearly identify the US and Yemeni governments
whom answered yes.
20
Vivian Salama, “Death From Above,” op. cit.
21 This symptom is particularly prevalent amongst women and
girls.
22 Chart 6 in Annex C of the full report shows the prevalence of
this symptom especially amongst children and women.
43
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M
In addition, we have numerous children from
where no social care is provided. Drone attacks
Finally, it is important to highlight certain unusual
not an individual has lost a family member to a
both victims’ families and families who have not
targeting male members of the society thus have
effects that were reported by other studies.
drone attack, simply because trauma has
lost a relative, who suffer from enuresis,
a strong repercussion on the lives of women in
There have been reports of women miscarr ying
become per vasive in a society living constantly
especially when they hear that a drone attack
these areas.
as a direct consequence of a fear arising from
under the fear of drones. One of the causes of
drones. Rumours that drones are able to see
this fear is the complete lack of understanding,
take place. Such manifestations of fear are
Women tend to show higher levels of fear of
inside the houses and watch women have also
due to the absence of transparency in the drone
bound to have long-term psychological and
losing a child or another relative. 100% of
spread, leading some of them to live under the
policy, as to what might trigger a drone attack,
physical effects on these children.
women who have not lost a relative answer yes
constant fear that, even inside their homes, they
who may be targeted, and when.
to the question, “Are you afraid that a drone
are watched by male US soldiers, 23 hence
In the community of Qawla (district of Jahanah,
attack might harm you, your family, or your
affecting their behavioural patterns as they
The most vulnerable people in the Yemeni
in the region of Sana’a), the death of a teacher
community?” Women respondents also reported
believe they have lost all their privacy. Overall,
society, namely women as well as children, are
killed by a drone strike had a particularly strong
in the comments section that they increasingly
women and girls show higher positive results as
particularly at risk of suffering from severe
effect on the children of the school where the
feared social gatherings, including wedding
one can see in the overall charts contained in
psychological issues. When children start to fear
teacher used to give class. A strong desire for
celebrations, thereby further inhibiting their
Annex C in the full study. For example, 100% of
going to school and worr y about playing outside
revenge now animates many children, especially
movements in the public sphere. Some
women who lost relatives and 95% of those who
because drones might cause death, the growth
boys, who associate it with a feeling of hatred
specifically noted that they “avoided making too
have not reported being easily startled. In the
of a psychologically healthy society that is
and anger. Some of the boys have lost interest
much noise” and “staying for too long in a large
same vein, women and girls in both categories
capable of reducing existing conflicts is under
in school. One of the students of the deceased
group” when participating in local functions or
have higher results when in it comes to sleeping
serious jeopardy. Filled with anxiety, fear,
teacher even said that he lost interest in
celebrations, for fear that it might trigger a drone
problems. 24
depression, anger, and frustration, both the
receiving an education due to the anger he was
attack.
happened or rumours that an attack is about to
feeling following his teacher’s death.
For example, Fatima, aged 40, married and
Lastly, children, like adults, display a high level
mother of five, reported that even sounds of joy
of sleep related troubles such as insomnia or
and celebrations were causing an exaggerated
nightmares. While the majority of the children
startle reaction among women during festivities.
show symptoms of sleep-related troubles (67%
It was also noted that mothers of teenage boys
of them), the girls in particular are most affected
are particularly afraid that their children will be
by nightmares, insomnia, and enuresis.
targeted or killed, as it has been the policy to
target males that are of combat age. Atiqa, a
Effects on women
Effects on women should be understood in the
particular social and economic system that
55-year-old mother of three who rarely steps out
of her home, said that whenever she heard of a
young and old are craving for justice and in some
Conclusions
and recommendations
This study’s objective was to shed light on the
heavy cost paid by the most vulnerable people
living under drones in Yemen. These civilians,
who are already grappling with extreme poverty
and famine, and are exposed to insecurities
from diverse armed groups, are being further
traumatised from the skies by a much more
powerful actor.
drone attack in the area, her blood pressure
cases for revenge against those they identify as
responsible for their suffering. An entire
generation living in a constant state of
uncertainty and unpredictability, with no
recourse to justice or redress, and marked by a
sense of powerlessness to plan a secure future
of respect and dignity, is being lost under
traumatising skies. These immediate
consequences of drone operations, especially if
they are not addressed urgently, will most
certainly contribute towards long-term political,
social, and economic instability in the region.
problems became more severe, forcing her to
The findings of this study are reflective of the
stay in bed for several days.
severity of the costs that civilians have to
Furthermore, the asymmetr y and inequality of
forcibly cope within their daily lives. An
power that marks the strength of US drone
are expected to rely solely on their husbands or
over whelming majority of adult respondents are
operations around vulnerable civilians is
other men in the family for protection, as well as
seen to be suffering from numerous drone-
compounded by a complete absence of any
supporting the children. Becoming a single
inflicted symptoms of PTSD, which are even
administrative or judicial mechanisms, nationally
mother easily exacerbates social vulnerability in
more prevalent amongst children. The situation
or internationally, that can protect these civilians
such a setting.
has transcended the question about whether or
or provide them with any kind of redress. The
defines the Yemeni countr yside. Here, nearly all
married women are stay-at-home mothers who
legal implications of drone attacks, both in
Furthermore, women’s economic vulnerability is
further amplified as a consequence of losing the
family’s sole breadwinner, the man, in a countr y
44
23
Ibid.
24 See Charts 1, 2, 3, 9 and 12 in Annex C found in the fulllength report available online.
international and national legal frameworks, have
been profound as drone attacks continue to
45
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
P SYC H O LO G I C A L H A R M
proliferate with minimal regulation, transparency,
Recommendations for the US government:
suffering from trauma due to drone operations
accountability, and retribution. A “legal blackhole” has engulfed all aspects of drone
• We recommend to the US government to
operations, while the international humanitarian
publish and explain in full transparency its legal
law (IHL) and human rights law are increasingly
standards and institutional processes for
being overlooked.
conducting drone strikes and targeted killings
and take into account due process of law
This most certainly is a failure of the international
guarantee for both US and non-US nationals;
community in containing a weapon and process
of warfare that has underhandedly been causing
• That it also clarify its method of counting
severe harm to civilian populations. Moreover,
civilian casualties and explain how the method
the ver y nature of drone technology and the
is consistent with IHL standards;
peculiar landscape of warfare it invariably
creates have not been engaged with adequately
in legal and ethical contexts. The low political
cost of drone operations for powerful countries
is met on the other side by the constant
suffering of a population towards whom none
can be hold responsible. For those who believe
that fundamental rights of individuals are
universal, a fundamental moral question needs to
be raised: are we not equal with regard to our
protection from this form of militar y action?
• Assist in providing psychological care to those
Recommendations for the
international community:
through technical and financial assistance; and
• We request that the debate on legal and
• Stop drone attacks in Yemen and in all other
territories and favour alternative means to
ethical issues raised by the use of drones takes
centre stage and receives more attention;
“counterterrorism” by putting at the core of its
policy respect for the rights and dignity of
• That more pressure be placed on the US
people affected by both terrorism and
government as well as other states to
counterterrorism.
revise policies and practices surrounding
drone strikes;
Recommendations for the Yemeni government:
• That international mechanisms for regulating
• Where factual disputes exist about the threat
• We request the Yemeni government to demand
and making drone strikes accountable be
levels regarding past drone strikes, we request
an immediate end to drone strikes within its
discussed and developed at the earliest within
the US government to release the relevant
territories and to hold itself accountable
the United Nations human rights mechanisms;
details and explain why a particular threat was
for violations committed with its consent
and
considered as imminent triggering the right to
to its population;
• That greater attention be placed on aspects
self-defence;
• To ensure that civilians affected by drone
• Clarify the condition used to assess the validity
of express sovereign’s consent or the inability
strikes directly or indirectly have provisions
of psychological impacts and loss of life due
to drone strikes among civilians.
for redress within the domestic system;
and unwillingness of those sovereigns to
suppress a legitimate threat for all past, current
and future operations;
• To ensure that the rights of the civilians are
protected in regions where drones are
operated; and
• Engage with the ethical issues, the blowback,
and the negative consequences of the drone
• To address the psychological consequences
policy, including for the United States’ own
of drone operations and push the US
interests, as the impact of drones on civilians
government to implement the recommendations
has created strong feelings of resentment
mentioned above.
towards the US and its allies in the region,
notably by providing families of victims with a
right to effective remedy and compensation;
• Introduce institutional mechanisms which allows
full accountability and retribution for violations
associated with the use of drone;
• Acknowledge the consequence of this policy on
affected populations and provide full reparation
and apologies to these people;
46
47
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
4. Harm to Global Peace
and Security
Chris Cole
Are drones different?
persistence is a new and important strategic
Although some insist that armed unmanned
capability, much prized by militar y planners. This
drones are in effect no different from other
new capability, coming at a time when we have
militar y aircraft and therefore the technology
seen a real decline in public appetite for militar y
itself cannot be at issue, there are two ver y
inter vention, is having an important impact, both
real and important differences. Firstly and
on the way armed conflict is being initiated, as
most obviously, armed drones can be operated
well as the way it is being fought.
The primar y focus of the debate about the impact
remotely, sometimes over ver y great distances,
of armed drones has been their use for
via satellite links. Drone advocates routinely
extrajudicial killing outside of the battlefield:
insist that remoteness is nothing new, often
drones. He is author of Convenient Killing: Armed
targeted killing, as it has become more widely
referring to the fact that soldiers attacked from
Drones and the PlayStation Mentality (2010) and
known. Almost since they were first deployed,
Drone Wars: Out of Sight, Out of Mind, Out of
a distance using the longbow or trebuchet (a
armed drones have been used by the United
Control (2016) and the convenor of the Drones
roman catapult) in the distant past. To suggest,
States in particular but also more recently by
however, that there is little ethical or militar y
Israel and the United Kingdom to “find, fix, and
difference between the distance given through
finish” those deemed to be a threat to national
use of a longbow, and that hyper-remoteness
security. However, the aim of this chapter is to
given through use of an armed drone controlled
look beyond the issue of targeted killing and to
from the other side of the globe, is akin to
argue that armed drones per se are a danger to
suggesting that smart phones are little different
global peace and security.
from carrier pigeons.
Chris Cole is founder of Drone Wars UK, which
was established in 2010 to undertake research,
education, and campaigning on the use of armed
Campaign Network. He lives in Oxford with his wife,
Virginia and their three children.
While the policy of using armed drones to carry out
targeted killings beyond the battlefield is rightly an
issue of serious concern, the wider impact of the
technology itself also needs to be addressed.
Drones combine various pre-existing technologies
to form a new and radically different way of
launching armed force—one with virtual impunity.
The impact of this new weapon system, enabling
so-called risk-free war, on the political-military
decision making process in times of crisis, as well
as on long term military policy, needs to be
carefully examined. It is the advent of the remotecontrolled armed drone that has enabled the huge
expansion of targeted killing over the past decade.
There is growing evidence that the existence of this
new form of war making and its impact on
policymakers is lowering the threshold for the use
of armed force, transferring the risk of warfare
from combatants to civilians, and increasingly
disconnecting the public from the human impact of
armed combat.
48
traditional piloted aircraft. Armed remote
Separate, but linked to the ability of armed
Lowering the threshold for
use of armed force
The primar y way that drones are impacting peace
and security is the way they appear to be
lowering the threshold for use of force, both in
terms of resorting to the use of force (ad bellum)
and the use of force during armed conflict (in
bello). Linked with this is the way the
presentation of drone warfare as precise and
“risk-free” is rehabilitating warfare as a normal
and legitimate means of solving political and
security problems.
Drones and the resort to force
drones be operated remotely, is the issue of
persistence. Due to the lack of crew on board,
In modern democracies, politicians understand
drones can remain airborne far longer than a
that there is a political cost to launching militar y
piloted aircraft. Typically a fast-jet can fly for
inter vention overseas. Whatever the arguments
around eight hours before the crew become
about whether a particular inter vention is
fatigued. Armed drones fly far longer, currently
justified under international law, time and time
around 20 hours, by simply changing the crew on
again, polling has shown that the public do not
the ground. The length of time that armed drones
like to see young ser vice men and women sent
can stay aloft, watching and waiting before
overseas returning in wheelchairs or coffins.1
striking at “targets of opportunity,” is increasing
The potential political impact of TV footage
all the time. It is this ability to be persistent, in
showing grieving families awaiting the funeral
combination with hyper-remoteness, which
corteges of those killed in foreign wars is a
makes armed drones different from other armed
definite restraint on political leaders weighing up
militar y aircraft.
the option of a possible militar y inter vention.
So, there are ver y real and important differences
between armed unmanned systems like the
Reaper and Predator—never mind the much
more advanced armed drones that are beginning
to make their way off the drawing board—and
1 Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler,
“America’s Tolerance for Casualties, 1950–2006,” in Paying the
Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in
Military Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp.
23–66. See also Joel Faulkner Rogers, “Report on British attitudes
to defence, security and the armed forces,” YouGov, 25 October
2014, https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/10/25/report-britishattitudes-defence-security-and-arme.
49
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
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Take away that potential cost, however, by using
While campaigners have been making this
types of force. 6 The results show, say Walsh and
The Stimson Center puts it, “the availability of
armed unmanned systems and it makes it much
argument for some time, as the use of armed
Schulzke, “that participants are more willing to
lethal UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle]
easier for political leaders to opt to use lethal
drones has grown, establishment voices, too,
support the use of force when it involves drone
technologies has enabled US policies that likely
militar y force. Recognising this, British militar y
are now recognising the dangers of the
strikes.” They go on:
would not have been adopted in the absence of
planners circulated a discussion document on
technology itself. General Stanley McChr ystal,
how to avoid “casualty aversion,” as it is known,
for example, former commander of US and
Drones lower inhibitions against initiating
by using a strategy of lowering the profile of
NATO forces in Afghanistan, told a conference in
armed conflicts as many critics of this
The British use of armed drones in Syria in 2014
repatriation ceremonies, as well as using armed
London in 2015 that he believes the capabilities
technology have predicted. Respondents were
and 2015 also shows how drones are lowering
drones, mercenaries, and special forces. 2
of drones make them more palatable to militar y
consistently more likely to favor the use of UAVs
the threshold for the resort of the use of armed
decision-makers and “lower the threshold” for
over ground forces in each of the experiments,
force. In September 2014, following a request for
The availability of armed drones, it appears,
lethal force. 3 Towards the end of his presidency,
regardless of the objectives being pursued.
help from the Iraqi government, British MPs
pushes political leaders away from engaging in
Barack Obama, too, seemed to accept this when
They were also more willing to initiate conflicts
debated a government motion to authorise the
the often difficult and long-term work of solving
he told CNN, “It became so easy to use them
the root causes of conflicts through diplomatic
without thinking through all the ramifications.”4
and political means, towards a quick, short-term
Even the UK Ministr y of Defence seems to have
“fix” of “taking out the bad guys”.
UAVs.”9
7
using drones than piloted aircraft…
use of armed force against ISIS strictly within
the borders of Iraq. MPs approved the motion
The US use of armed drones to attack al-Qaeda
and strikes in Iraq began almost immediately.
in Pakistan in recent years is often cited as an
Within six weeks, however, British drones were
example of how this is happening in practice.
crossing the border into Syria, with intelligence
According to The Bureau of Investigative
gathered by the British drones used by the US-
Journalism (TBIJ) there have been over 420 US
led oalition forces to undertake strikes in Syria.10
Increased use [of remote and automated
airstrikes in Pakistan (up to the end of 2016),
When questioned by the media about legal
systems] in combat and support functions will
all carried out by armed drones. Pakistan has
authorisation for such missions, the Prime
reduce the risk to military personnel and
publicly condemned the strikes on numerous
Minister’s official spokesman said it was
thereby potentially change the threshold for
occasions but does not attempt to shoot down
because the flights did not amount to militar y
the use of force. Fewer casualties may lower
the drones for fear of causing all-out war with
action. He stated, “The prime minister and
political risk and any public reticence for a
the US (although there are reports that indicate
government have made clear that we would
some officials within the Pakistan administration
return to parliament for a separate decision if we
secretly supported the strikes, at least for
were proposing to take militar y action. This is
some time. 8 )
about intelligence gathering.”11
academics James Igor Walsh and Marcus
The US has never risked piloted aircraft to
Despite these claims it is difficult to understand
Schulzke sur veyed 3000 individuals on their
undertake these strikes, relying wholly on armed
how armed militar y flights over a sovereign
perception of the use of force when drones were
drones. While it is hard to prove, it is difficult to
countr y do not amount to “militar y action”.
used in comparison to the deployment of other
imagine the US would have undertaken so many
Flights by Russian militar y aircraft that come
incursions and strikes without the availability of
near, but not within, UK air space incur a strong
come to this conclusion, stating in a recent
policy document, Future Operating Environment
2035:
military response…
5
In a 2015 empirical study into the public
perception of the use of armed drones,
this technology. As respected US think tank,
2 Ben Quinn, “Mod study sets out how to sell wars to the public,”
The Guardian, 26 September 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2013/sep/26/mod-study-sell-wars-public. Note original
discussion paper has been removed from MoD website.
50
3 Richard Norton-Taylor and Alice Ross, “RAF base may be
legitimate target for Isis, says ex-Nato commander,” The Guardian,
25 November 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/
nov/25/raf-base-may-be-legitimate-target-isis-ex-nato-commander.
6 James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, The Ethics of Drone
Strikes: Does Reducing The Cost of Conflict Encourage War? US
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2015, https://ssi.
armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1289.
4 Nicole Gaouette, “Obama on the future of terrorism after bin
Laden raid,” CNN, 3 May 2016, http://edition.cnn.
com/2016/05/02/politics/obama-terror-doctrine-bin-laden-raid.
7
5 Strategic Trends Programme: Future Operating Environment
2035, Ministry of Defence, August 2015, pp. 31–32, https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/607612/20150731-FOE_35_Final_v29-VH.pdf.
Ibid. p. 25.
8 Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, “Secret memos reveal explicit
nature of US, Pakistan agreement on drones,” The Washington
Post, 26 April 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-dronecampaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html?utm_term=.f6d2a9409e35.
9 Recommendations and Report of The Task Force on US Drone
Policy, The Stimson Center, April 2015, https://www.stimson.org/
sites/default/files/file-attachments/recommendations_and_report_
of_the_task_force_on_us_drone_policy_second_edition.pdf.
10 Rowena Mason, “UK to fly military drones over Syria,” The
Guardian, 21 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2014/oct/21/uk-to-fly-military-drones-over-syria. See also
FCO response to PQ from Andrew Rosindell MP, 23 February
2015, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/writtenquestions-answers-statements/written-question/
Commons/2015-02-11/224326.
11
Ibid.
51
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
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response from UK government. Without a UN
The overall question here is whether these
While it seems true the drone pilots appear
consequences of strikes against individuals they
resolution or a request from the Syrian
militar y inter ventions, both the campaign of US
to have little leeway to launch strikes
kill. While not wanting to dismiss these findings,
government, any militar y operation by the UK
airstrikes against Al Qaeda and others in
independently, the only publicly available US
official studies show that in fact the level of
within Syria is contentious at best.12 While drone
Pakistan, and UK operations and strikes against
militar y investigation into a drone operation in
PTSD among drone crews is around half that of
advocates often insist that armed drones are no
ISIS in Syria prior to the December 2015 vote,
which multiple civilians were killed found that the
the general population of the United States. 20
different from other aircraft, it is ver y difficult to
would have occurred without the availability of
Predator drone crew had “a propensity towards
Drone crews are facing high levels of stress and
believe that the UK would have sent piloted
armed drone systems. It seems extremely
kinetic operations” (in non-militar y speak: they
burnout, but this may be more related to the high
aircraft into Syria in this way, as the operational
unlikely in both cases and thus it seems the
were gung-ho to launch a strike).16 In addition,
workload and long hours they are required to
and political risk was far too great.
technology itself is enabling an expansion
reports of so-called “double-tap” strikes,
work owing to increasing use of armed drones. 21
of warfare.
and statements from former drone pilots, provide
From mid-2015, UK militar y officials began
arguing that it was “illogical” and even “immoral”
that UK forces could not undertake airstrikes
Drones and the use of force
within armed conflict
against ISIS in Syria as well as Iraq. In August
some insight into the possibility that such a
It is crucial to remember that concerns about
mind-set may exist among drone crews.
whether drones are lowing the threshold for
Brandon Br yant, a former US drone pilot turned
force within an armed conflict is not a question
whistle-blower has said:
of whether drone operators are “psychos”. That
17
2015, UK drones operating in Syria
Questions around whether drones are lowering
controversially undertook the targeted killing of
the threshold for use of force within a situation
One guy I knew tattooed a Hellfire missile on his
Cardiff-born Reyaad Khan.13 The fact that British
of armed conflict (in bello) are harder to answer
ribs for every shot he took. Another tattooed
drones were already flying missions in Syria, and
without much more transparency. Former UN
the word “Infidel” around his neck. I mean
had already launched one strike and assisted
Special Rapporteur Philip Alston talked of the
there were some real, honest-to-god psychos in
with others, was used in part to leverage support
possibility of a “PlayStation Mentality” where,
that program who wanted nothing more than to
by the public and MPs for wider militar y action
due to the physical and psychological distance
kill people on the ground.18
in Syria. A government motion to extend
from the target, drone operators and crew may
UK militar y action from Iraq into Syria was
perceive strike operations as a kind of video
subsequently tabled and passed in
game.14 ”We have to impress upon them that
December 2015.
they are not just shooting electrons, they’re
killing people,” Major Sam Morgan, a trainer of
Predator drone pilots told the Boston Globe in
2005.15
Drone advocates insist this proposition
denigrates the professionalism of ser ving
militar y officers, ignores the fact there is a
chain of command overseeing strikes, and
is a misrepresentation of the concern and a
misunderstanding of both drone and wider
militar y operations. The drone crew—pilot and
sensor operator—are at one end of a long chain
of command. All of those in the decision-making
process—militar y commanders, defence officials,
intelligence analysts, “counterterrorism” officers,
Others former drone pilots, however, tell a
policymakers, etc.—are engaged in the decision
different stor y. One argued, “Drone operators
to launch a lethal attack. It’s important to
are licensed pilots. We are not terminators
remember that remote “unmanned” warfare may
rampaging across the countr yside like war’s
be engendering a “propensity to use kinetic
a video game. We are not heartless; we are
force” all along that kill-chain, not just at the
not brainless. And we do not like to make
“sharp end”.
mistakes.”19
Far from being gung-ho warriors, drone
supporters argue, drone crews are suffering
PTSD, as they are required to monitor the
overlooks the number of drone pilots suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as
12 See for example: Jennifer Daskat, Ashley Deeks, and Ryan
Goodman, “Strikes in Syria: The International Law Framework”
Just Security, 24 September 2014, https://www.justsecurity.
org/15479/strikes-syria-international-law-framework-daskal-deeksgoodman; and Louise Arimatsu and Michael Schmitt, “The legal
basis for the war against Isis remains contentious,” The Guardian,
6 October 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2014/oct/06/legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamicstatehttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/06/
legal-basis-war-isis-syria-islamic-state.
13 “Cardiff jihadist Reyaad Khan, 21, killed by RAF drone,” BBC
News, 7 September 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukwales-34176790.
52
evidence that drone pilots are far from
“videogame warriors”.
14 Charlie Savage, “UN Report Highly Critical of US Drone
Attacks”, New York Times, 2 June 2010, www.nytimes.
com/2010/06/03/world/03drones.html.
15 Bryan Bender, “Attacking Iraq, from a Nev. Computer,” The
Boston Globe, 3 April 2005, http://archive.boston.com/news/
world/middleeast/articles/2005/04/03/attacking_iraq_from_a_nev_
computer.
16 David S. Cloud, “Anatomy of an Afghan war tragedy,” LA
Times, 10 April 2011, articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/10/world/
la-fg-afghanistan-drone-20110410.
17 Chris Woods, “Bureau investigation finds fresh evidence of
CIA drone strikes on rescuers,” The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, 1 August 2013, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/2013/08/01/bureau-investigation-finds-fresh-evidence-of-ciadrone-strikes-on-rescuers.
18 Vegas Tenold, “The Untold Casualties of the Drone War.”
Rolling Stone, 18 February 2016, www.rollingstone.com/politics/
news/the-untold-casualties-of-the-drone-war-20160218.
19 T. Mark McCurley, “I Was a Drone Warrior for 11 Years. I
Regret Nothing,” Politico, 18 October 2015, www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2015/10/drone-pilot-book-213263.
20 Agata Blaszczak-Boxe, “Drone Pilots Suffer PTSD Just Like
Those in Combat,” Live Science, 20 August, 2014, www.
livescience.com/47475-drone-operators-develop-ptsd.
html#sthash.7k3pIvmK.dpuf.
21 Christopher Drew and Dave Phillips, “As Stress Drives Off
Drone Operators, Air Force Must Cut Flights,” New York Times, 16
June 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/as-stress-drivesoff-drone-operators-air-force-must-cut-flights.html.
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Much more information about how drones are
The term “precision” does not imply, as one
However, data gathered by casualty recording
training camp in Libya appears to have killed two
being used on a day-to-day basis is needed in
might assume, accuracy. Instead, the word
organisations and the few journalists covering
Serbian diplomats being held there. Both sites, it
order to assess the impact of armed remote
precision exclusively pertains to a discriminate
this issue show that there are of course civilian
should be noted, had prolonged and persistent
technology on the decision to launch a strike.
targeting process.... By using a word that
casualties. In Pakistan, where US airstrikes were
obser vation by drones prior to the strikes,
Unfortunately, secrecy prevails and pretty much
has such specific meaning in the mind of
exclusively carried out by drones, The Bureau of
undermining the notion that such persistence
all that tends to be released are rather bland
most civilians, it is easy to see how a gap in
Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) reports between
can enable precision and eliminate civilian
statements, often from anonymous sources,
understanding and expectations has been
420 –960 civilians killed in just over 400 drone
casualties. 28
reporting the elimination of “terrorist suspects”.
fostered. 23
strikes—although the civilian casualty rate, along
There is a crucial need for much more
with the number of strikes, has plummeted since
The notion that they enable civilian-casualty free
transparency about the decision-making process
When militar y spokespeople describe an aircraft
2012 following an increasing international
strikes is not only engendering support for the
in the day-to-day use of armed drones.
or drone as undertaking a “precision strike” it
outcr y. 25
use of armed drones amongst the public but also
The problem of “precision”
tends to get reinterpreted both in the media and
in the minds of the public as being an “accurate”
Another important aspect in relation to the
strike, a misunderstanding that the militar y seem
lowering of the threshold for the use of force
to have little interest in correcting.
is the constant presentation of drone warfare
amongst militar y commanders and politicians
Far from being able to sit above “the fog of war”
who are now able to expand the battlefield to
and launch “pinpoint accurate” attacks as
include areas which would previously have been
advocates argue, the human rights organisation,
off-limits. As Professor Michael Schmitt notes in
Reprieve, found that US drone strikes in Yemen
his article on precision strike and international
as “precision” warfare. This precision narrative
The persistent presentation of drone strikes as
and Pakistan killed 1147 unknown people in
humanitarian law for the International Committee
underlies much of the support for the use of
“precise” and “pinpoint accurate” in this way has
multiple strikes targeting just 41 named
of the Red Cross:
armed drones both within the political and
serious implications for the understanding of the
individuals. Next door in Afghanistan, US militar y
militar y command establishment, but also by the
actual impact of war. Due to the nature of
analyst Larr y Lewis found that in the 12 months
Greater precision enables targets to be
general public.
today’s militar y inter ventions, few people have
from mid-2011 to mid-2012, armed drones
attacked that previously were off-limits due to
access to first-hand accounts of the impact on
caused 10 times more civilian casualties than
likely excessive collateral damage or incidental
While most people would understand “precision”
the ground. Even media reports from these
strikes by “manned” fighter aircraft.
injury. This is particularly true with regard to
to mean “accuracy,” it is ver y important to
locations are extremely rare. 24 This creates in
Unfortunately, we cannot examine this data,
urban and dual-use targets. To the extent that
be aware that when the militar y use the term
the minds of many the idea that drone strikes
as it remains classified. 26
such attacks are seldom free of collateral
“precision strike,” they are not referring to the
accuracy of a strike. Rather, they are pointing to
are clean, safe and victimless. War, it seems, is
no longer the hell it once was.
a process of bringing a wide system of assets to
bear to enable the strike to take place. 22
damage and incidental injury, opening
On occasion it becomes ver y clear that all the
additional targets to attack results in a net
victims of drone strikes are not enemy
increase in potential harm to the civilian
combatants. In Januar y 2015, a US drone strike
population. 29
in Pakistan killed American development expert
Lt. Colonel Jill Long of the USAF explains:
Warren Weinstein and Italian aid worker Giovanni
Lo Porto, who were being held hostage at the
site of the strike. 27 In Februar y 2016, a US
airstrike involving drones and F-15s on an ISIS
25 “Get the data: Drone Wars,” The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/
projects/drones.
23 Lt Col. Jill A. Long, “The Problem with “Precision: Managing
Expectations for Air Power,” MA Thesis, 2012, http://www.dtic.
mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA589415.
22 See “Precision Engagement” in Vision 2020, US Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2000, http://www.pipr.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/jv2020-2.pdf,
54
24 For rare media report from on the ground of impact of US
drone/special forces raid see Iona Craig, “Death in Al Ghayil,” The
Intercept, 9 March 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/03/09/
women-and-children-in-yemeni-village-recall-horror-of-trumpshighly-successful-seal-raid.
26 “You Never Die Twice, Multiple Kills in the US Drone
Program,” Reprieve, November 2014, www.reprieve.org.uk/
press/2014_11_25_us_drone_strikes_kill_28_each_target; Spencer
Ackerman, “US drone strikes more deadly to Afghan civilians than
manned aircraft – adviser,” The Guardian, 2 July 2013, www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/02/us-drone-strikes-afghancivilians.
27 Zeke J Miller, “Obama Apologizes to Families of al-Qaeda
Hostages Killed in US Drone Strike,” Time, 23 April 2015, http://
time.com/3832781/warren-weinstein-giovanni-lo-porto-drone.
28 Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “Evidence mounts that US airstrike
on ISIS in Libya killed Serbian diplomats,” The Intercept, 16 March,
2016, https://theintercept.
com/2016/03/16/u-s-airstrike-on-isis-in-libya-killed-serbiandiplomats.
29 Michael N. Schmitt, “Precision attack and international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross 87,
September 2005, pp. 445–466, https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/
files/other/irrc_859_schmitt.pdf.
55
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H A R M TO G LO B A L P E AC E A N D S EC U R I T Y
While it is beyond question that precision
The problem of proliferation
weapons are more accurate than their unguided
analysts and campaigners alike agree that
The ver y existence of drones means that the use
they need to be much stronger than presently
of lethal force is being contemplated and put into
predecessors, the idea that such weapons hit
While the majority of attention on armed drones
proposed—and draw in China and other
effect in ways that did not happen before the
their target accurately ever y time unless there is
has focused on US use (and to some extent on
exporters—if there is to be any realistic chance
development of such technology. Above all, it
a human-induced error is merely the stuff of
UK and Israeli use), growing proliferation of
of stemming the tide of cross border drone
must be remembered that we are still only at the
Hollywood. In the way that the precision
these systems has meant that a number of other
strikes.
beginnings of the drone war era. The Predator
narrative is both opening up previous off-limits
countries have acquired or developed armed
civilian areas to aerial bombardment, and, at the
drones and are beginning to regularly use them
same time making warfare more acceptable, the
to launch strikes. Most of these “second wave”
precision narrative may be leading to an increase
countries have acquired their armed drones from
in civilian casualties.
China, but some, like Turkey and Iran, have
successfully developed their own.
The important issue here is whether inter vention
34
and Reaper drones currently in operation are
Drones: Damaging peace and
security by eroding hard won
limits on warfare
fairly unsophisticated prototypes of future
This chapter has tried to describe some of the
It is right that that the policy of using armed
ways in which “unmanned” weapons technology
drones to undertake targeted killing outside
drones that are slowly but surely making their
way from the drawing board to the skies.
using armed drones is transferring the risk of
It is highly likely that other countries will acquire
is lowering the threshold for the use of armed
international law norms is strongly challenged by
armed conflict onto civilians. Over the past
the technology and begin launching drone strikes
force. Through enabling militar y inter vention
human rights advocates. But attention must also
over the next few years. Some commentators
without “boots on the ground” and therefore
be paid to the how the technology itself is also
western society sees armed forces personnel.
insist that armed drone proliferation will not be a
drastically reducing the political risk, drones
undermining those norms and is impacting on
Increasingly, the lives of “western” soldiers are
problem, arguing that for smaller countries, the
allow political leaders to bypass the restraint of
peace and security around the globe.
much more highly valued than the lives of
technical and financial barriers to operating such
a casualty averse and war-war y population.
civilians in a conflict zone. The desire to protect
systems are prohibitive. 31 However, a short
decade we have seen a growing change in how
“our boys” for domestic political reasons is
sur vey by Drone Wars UK identified in
leading to the use of remote armed systems,
December 2016 that four of the new wave of
which may be more risky for civilians on the
users (United Arab Emirates [UAE], Saudi Arabia,
ground. Such risk-transfer, as Christian Enemark
Iran, and Turkey) had already launched cross
puts it, is totally “contrar y to the spirit of jus in
border strikes on at least six occasions (UAE in
bello discrimination”. 30 While it is right that all
Yemen and Libya; Saudi in Yemen; Iran in Syria
must be done to lessen the risk to for ser vice
and Iraq; and Turkey in Iraq). 32 The implications
personnel, the principle that combatants should
for global peace and security of multiple nations
endure a greater risk than civilians during an
using armed drones to launch cross border
armed conflict appears to be being eroded.
strikes is ver y serious.
We are also beginning to see the way that armed
drones are having an impact on the wider debate
about how to achieve peace in our insecure
world. In a 2015 op-ed for The Wall Street
Journal, for example, US academic Amy Zegart
argues that drones should be used not just for
targeted Killing but for “targeted hurting”:
Lethal drones may make possible a new form of
high-tech coercion: targeted hurting. Targeted
terrorist-killing operations are designed to take
While there are embr yonic moves by
an enemy off the battlefield. Targeted hurting
international community to develop controls over
could be designed to change any enemy’s
the proliferation and use of armed drones, 33
behavior—by destroying selectively the family
members, friends, associates, villages or
31 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “So what if Iranian drones did
strike Syria? We are not entering a dark age of robotic warfare,”
The Washington Post, 4 April 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/04/so-what-if-iraniandrones-did-strike-syria-we-are-not-entering-a-dark-age-of-roboticwarfare/?utm_term=.ae7cbf550049.
32 Chris Cole, “Drone strikes spread as proliferation surges,”
Drone Wars UK, 6 December 2016, https://dronewars.
net/2016/12/06/drone-strikes-spread-as-proliferation-surges.
30 Christian Enemark, “Drones, Risk, and Perpetual Force,”
Ethics and International Affairs 28:3, 2014, pp. 365–381, http://
cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/26329/Enemark_
drones_EIA_2014.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
56
33 Mohammad Zargham, “U.S., other countries issue declaration
on export, use of armed drones,” Reuters, 5 October 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drones-idUSKCN1252IG.
capabilities that the enemy holds most dear. 35
34 Rachel Stohl, “New Draft on Drone Export Rules ‘More
Problematic’ Than Original,” Defense News, 29 September 2016,
http://www.defensenews.com/articles/new-draft-on-drone-exportrules-more-problematic-than-original.
35 Amy Zegart, “The Coming Revolution of Drone Warfare”, The
Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2015, https://cisac.fsi.stanford.
edu/sites/default/files/amy_zegart-_the_coming_r._of_drone_
warfare_-_wsj.pdf.
57
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Country case study:
The militar y attraction has in part to do with
Djibouti
antipiracy efforts off the coast of Somalia. All
A crashed US drone in Djibouti.
ships passing through the Suez Canal to
Europe or to the Indian Ocean need to sail
through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Twenty
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical
thousand ships and 20 percent of global
Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s
exports travel this route ever y year. 2
International League for Peace and Freedom
(WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy and research
on weapons and militarism, which always includes
a gender perspective. Her work also includes
Beyond that, however, Djibouti is critical for
geostrategic militar y operations in the post-
monitoring and analysing international processes
9/11 world. Djibouti sits between East Africa
and forums related to disarmament.
and the Arabian Peninsula, allowing aircraft
stationed there to reach Somalia or Yemen in
Editors’ note: This case study is based on a
minutes. Many of the foreign militaries
larger publication written by Ray Acheson
operating in Djibouti participate in operations
to be published by the Women’s
against al-Shabaab in Somalia or al Qaeda in
International League for Peace and
the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen—either
Freedom in September 2017, titled Remote
directly through drone strikes or by training
warfare and sexual violence in Djibouti.
Djiboutian and other East African militaries. 3
US special forces use their base in Djibouti
for operations against Boko Haram, the Lord’s
“Djibouti is a countr y of less than 900,000
people that would not register significantly
Resistance Army, and Daesh, and as a
launching pad for drone strikes. 4
in the global consciousness except for its
strategic location in East Africa, at the mouth
US drones in Djibouti
of the Red Sea and the rest of the Persian
Gulf,” writes investigative journalist Tim Mak
“This is not an outpost in the middle of
Photo from a declassified Accident Investigation Board
when it comes to power projection.”5 It has
personnel and US Department of Defense
become an instrumental location in the US-led
contractors. The base also employs about
“global war on terror”.
1,100 local and third-countr y workers.7
The US Navy operates a base at Camp
The operations of Camp Lemonnier are
of The Daily Beast.1 A small, hot, dr y countr y
nowhere that is of marginal interest,” US
Lemonnier, near the Djibouti-Ambouli
shrouded in secrecy. Some is known from
with high levels of poverty, it has made
officials have said about Djibouti. “This is a
International Airport. It is a former French
unclassified and also leaked classified
its claim to fame by virtue of its location,
ver y important location in terms of US
Foreign Legion outpost and was previously
documents and investigative reporting.
attracting the militaries of some of the most
interests, in terms of freedom of navigation,
used as a CIA “black site” where terrorism
powerful countries in the world. The United
States, China, France, Japan, Saudi Arabia,
and Italy have or are constructing militar y
bases in the countr y. Russia, Spain, Germany,
and the United Kingdom also have troops
operating out of Djibouti.
1 Tim Mak, “Inside The Tiny Police State With Seven Armies,”
The Daily Beast, 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/
longforms/2015/djibouti/inside-the-tiny-police-state-withseven-armies.html.
58
2 Ben Ho Wan Beng, “The Strategic Attractions of Djibouti,”
The National Interest, 18 March 2016, http://nationalinterest.
org/blog/the-buzz/the-strategic-attractions-djibouti-15533.
3 “U.S. and Djibouti Launch Binational Forum of
Cooperation,” US Department of State, Office of the
Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 2 March 2015, http://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/03/238107.htm; David Styan,
Djibouti: Changing Influence in the Horn’s Strategic Hub,
Chatham House, April 2013, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/0413bp_
djibouti.pdf, pp. 4, 9.
4 Katrina Manson, “Jostling for Djibouti,” FT Magazine, 1
April 2016, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html.
“Virtually the entire 500-acre camp is
suspects were detained without charges and
dedicated to counterterrorism,” reported
allegedly tortured. 6 It is currently home to
Craig Whitlock of The Washington Post in
about 4,000 US and allied militar y and civilian
2012, “making it the only installation of its
kind in the Pentagon’s global network of
5 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
6 “Secret prisons: Obama’s order to close ‘black sites’,” The
Guardian, 22 January 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2009/jan/23/secret-prisons-closure-obama-cia; Jason
Leopold, “Senate report set to reveal Djibouti as CIA ‘black
site’,” Al Jazeera America, 2 May 2014, http://america.
aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/2/djibouti-senate-cia.html.
bases.” 8
7 “Camp Lemmonier, Djibouti,” Commander, Navy
Installations Command, http://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/
cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html.
8 Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
59
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Among other things, the US Joint Special
thermal imaging devices, radar, cameras, and
The Washington Post reported in 2012 that
did allow China to take up residency, perhaps
Operations Command (JSOC) is responsible
communications.12
the unit designed a uniform patch emblazoned
because China was already financing several
with a skull, crossbones, and the nickname
major infrastructure projects related to ports,
for the operation of US drone strikes in the
region. The Washington Post reported in 2012
Camp Lemonnier was known as “the busiest
orders to find, track, or kill people that the US
Predator drone base outside the Afghan war
government has designated terrorists were
zone.”13 Documents leaked to The Intercept
Based on an internal US Department of
increasingly delivered to Camp Lemonnier.
in 2015 indicated that at the time, the base
Defense report from 2013 obtained by The
Meanwhile, nearly two-thirds of the Djiboutian
Originally, the Pentagon described Lemonnier
operated ten MQ-1 Predators and four MQ-9
Intercept, Camp Lemmonier also housed “six
population lives in poverty and half the labour
as temporar y, but it has “hardened into the
Reapers.14 However, the Predator drones
U-28As—a single-engine aircraft that
force is unemployed. 21 Djibouti’s GDP
U.S. militar y’s first permanent drone war
have reportedly since been removed from
conducts sur veillance for special operations
(purchasing power parity) in 2015 was
base.” 9
Djibouti, after more than 100 missions in
forces—and two P-3 Orions, a four-engine
estimated at $3.094 billion, ranked 186 out of
Yemen and Somalia.
turboprop aircraft originally developed for
230 countries. 22 Twenty-three per cent of the
maritime patrols but since repurposed for use
population lives below the poverty line. The
15
After six drones armed with Hellfire missiles
“East Africa Air Pirates”.18
airports, and railways, worth about $9
billion. 20
crashed, one only 1.5 kilometres from Djibouti
From Chabelley, investigative journalist Nick
over African countries.” The report also
countr y has few natural resources or
City, the US moved its drones to Chabelley
Turse found, US drone missions cover
indicates eight F-15E Strike Eagles, fighter
industr y. 23
airfield in 2013, about 10 kilometres away
“Yemen, southwest Saudi Arabia, a large
jets that are faster and more heavily armed
from the main base.10 While this was thought
swath of Somalia, and parts of Ethiopia and
than drones. “By August 2012” explains Nick
to be temporar y, in June 2015 the US made a
southern Egypt.”16 The drones are flown via
Turse, “an average of 16 drones and four
satellite link by pilots at Creech Air Force
fighter jets were taking off or landing there
Base in Nevada and Cannon Air Force Base in
each day.”19
“long-term implementing arrangement” with
Djibouti to establish Chabelley as an
“enduring” base, allocating $7.6 million to
construct a new perimeter fence around the
system,” a suite of integrated sensors,
9 Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
10 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone
base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https://
theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa; Craig Whitlock, “Chaos in tower, danger
in skies at base in Africa,” The Washington Post, 30 April
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/miscues-at-us-counterterrorism-base-put-aircraft-indanger-documents-show/2015/04/30/39038d5a-e9bb-11e49a6a-c1ab95a0600b_story.html; Craig Whitlock, “Remote U.S.
base at core of secret operations,” The Washington Post, 25
October 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/remote-us-base-at-core-of-secretoperations/2012/10/25/a26a9392-197a-11e2-bd105ff056538b7c_story.html.
11 Letter to Committee of Appropriations from the
Undersecretary of Defense, 25 June 2015, http://comptroller.
defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/execution/reprogramming/
fy2015/milcon/15-10_MC_May_2015_Request.pdf.
60
Within this context of high levels of militarism
New Mexico.17 They are maintained and
Apart from the direct and significant
and poverty, respect for human rights is also
humanitarian impact of drone strikes launched
a major issue in Djibouti. The President, who
12 “USAF boosts security of AFRICOM’s AOR with TASS
installation,” airforce-technology.com, 1 May 2014, http://
www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsusaf-boosts-securityof-africoms-aor-with-tass-installation-4256028.
from Djibouti into neighbouring countries,
was recently elected for a fourth-term in
there are indirect but equally serious
elections considered corrupt by most human
repercussions stemming from the existence of
rights groups, actively suppresses freedom
13 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
the bases that also warrant consideration.
of speech and dissent. 24 In addition, the
launched in Djibouti by an Air Force squadron.
base.11 The US Air Force also reportedly
installed a “tactical automated security
Militarism and human rights
abuses, including sexual
violence and exploitation
countr y’s family laws discriminate against
A militarist rentier economy
14 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone
base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https://
theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa
The foreign militar y bases pull in at least $300
15 Joseph Trevithick, “Why the US Air Force Pulled Its
Predator Drones from a Secret Base in Africa,” Motherboard,
4 December 2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-theus-air-force-pulled-its-predator-drones-from-a-secret-base-inafrica.
upset relations with the numerous western
16 Nick Turse, “The stealth expansion of a secret U.S. drone
base in Africa,” The Intercept, 21 October 2015, https://
theintercept.com/2015/10/21/stealth-expansion-of-secret-usdrone-base-in-africa
18 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
17 Craig Murphy, “Remote U.S. base at core of secret
operations,” The Washington Post, 25 October 2012, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/remote-usbase-at-core-of-secret-operations/2012/10/25/a26a9392197a-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html.
19 Nick Turse, “Target Africa: The U.S. military’s expanding
footprint in East Africa and the Arabian peninsula,” The
Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/dronepapers/target-africa.
million annually in lease fees. The government
recently turned away Russia, worried it would
countries that are already tenants—though it
20 “China ‘negotiates military base’ in Djibouti,” AlJazeera,
9 May 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
africa/2015/05/150509084913175.html.
21 Katrina Manson, “Jostling for Djibouti,” FT Magazine, 1
April 2016, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/2/8c33eefc-f6c1-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html.
22 “Country comparison: GDP (purchasing power parity),”
The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 22
July 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2001rank.html#dj.
23 “Africa: Djibouti,” The World Factbook, Central
Intelligence Agency, accessed 22 July 2016, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dj.html.
24 “Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh wins fourth term,”
BBC, 9 April 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-35995628.
61
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: D J I B O U T I
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
women and in some cases facilitate
children. 28 At the same time, the US
levels of misogyny of which such companies
Histor y has shown that foreign militar y bases,
gender-based violence, such as female
government has failed to enforce its own laws
are capable. For example, DynCorp, which
regardless of the nature of their operations,
genital mutilation.
prohibiting its soldiers or contractors from
has provided support for US militar y
undermine human rights, increase geopolitical
buying sex or facilitating trafficking.
operations for 50 years, failed to hold its
tensions, and facilitate sexual violence. The
employees accountable when they were
symbiotic economic and political relationship
engaged in illicit trafficking, sexual
between the foreign militar y powers and the
The government has also continued to fail to
effectively combat human trafficking and
sexual violence.
25
“Power without vulnerability”
About 100,000 men,
enslavement, and rape of women in post-
“host” countr y in this context seems to be a
women, and children from Eritrea, Ethiopia,
The culture of impunity around trafficking and
and Somalia transit through Djibouti each year,
sexual exploitation when militaries are
most heading to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, or
involved is nothing new. But this sense of
Both the special forces and private
own soldiers or by their host government. It is
other Middle Eastern countries. Since March
power without vulnerability, in the case of
mercenaries have an air of invulnerability and
a chokepoint of violence against local
2015, Djiboutians, Yemenis, and others have
Djibouti, is in some ways matched by the type
impunity. So too do some of their missions
populations, particularly women. This mode of
also fled Yemen via Djibouti. 26 These people
of militar y operations carried out there.
launched from Djibouti, such as those
militarism is damaging to local people, local
involving armed drones. Air Force official
The emphasis on special operations,
economies, and as Vine has argued, “they’ve
David Deptula has stated, “The real
particularly out of the US base, is critical. The
helped lock us inside a permanently
advantage of unmanned aerial systems is that
US special forces are among the US militar y’s
militarized society that has made all of us—
they allow you to project power without
most male-dominated units. According to a
ever yone on this planet—less secure.” 33
projecting vulnerability.”
Pentagon-sponsored sur vey by the RAND
of armed drones is not yet known to be
Corporation, 85 per cent of men oppose
increasing rates of sexual violence by militar y
integrating women into special forces units. 29
personnel or within the militar y. Many factors
are fleeing poverty, drought, war, or
repression, looking for better opportunities
abroad. However, these migrants and
refugees are at grave risk of trafficking,
forced labour, sexual exploitation and abuse,
and forced prostitution.
The foreign militar y presence in Djibouti
exacerbates these risks, providing a steady
market in particular for “prostitutes”—women,
girls, and boys who are forced to sell their
bodies due to poverty or who are trafficked
for sex.
Similarly, private militar y and security
companies—personnel from which constitute
a high proportion of those on the US base in
Djibouti—tend to intensify gender inequalities
compared to public militaries, many of which
The government as consistently failed to
are in the process of “integrating” men and
prosecute traffickers, operationalise its
women into combat roles. Women are a
national action plan to combat trafficking, or
minority in private armies and, because they
to identify or provide protection for trafficking
are private, there are far fewer gender equity
victims. 27 It also has poor practices regarding
guidelines. 30 There have been glimpses of the
those it arrests for prostitution, including
25 “Djibouti: Tier 3,” 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report,
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, US
Department of State, June 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm.
26 “Djibouti,” Humanitarian Compendium, International
Organization for Migration, last updated 3 March 2016, http://
humanitariancompendium.iom.int/djibouti/2016.
27 “Djibouti: Tier 3,” 2016 Trafficking in Persons Report,
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, US
Department of State, June 2016, http://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/tiprpt/2016/index.htm, pp. 155–156.
62
conflict Bosnia. 31
deterrent to any of the governments involved
to confront the human rights abuses by their
32
The expanding use
on militar y bases facilitate or even condone
sexual violence. The histor y of US militar y
bases around the world clearly show the
threat posed to women and girls by the
institutionalisation of women’s sexual
objectification by militar y systems and
personnel. In Djibouti, this threat may be
reinforced by the further dehumanisation of
warfare and the perceived “emasculation” of
soldiers through the growing use of armed
drones to kill remotely, where at the same
time the sense of “power without vulnerability”
28 Sanne Terlingen, “Fear and loathing in Djibouti,” OneWorld,
2 December 2015, http://longreads.oneworld.nl/en/Djibouti_
trafficking; “Djibouti,” 2014 Findings on the Worst Forms of
Child Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, US
Department of Labor, 2014, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/
ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/djibouti.
29 Rowan Scarborough, “U.S. special forces not ready to
integrate women, report finds,” The Washington Times, 15
February 2016, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/
feb/15/us-special-forces-not-ready-to-integrate-women-rep.
30 Maya Eichler, “Miltarized Masculinities in International
Relations,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XXI, Issue
I, Fall/Winter 2014.
is enhanced. (See Chapter 8 on gender
perspectives for more details.)
31 Ed Vulliamy, “Has the UN learned lessons of Bosnian sex
slavery revealed in Rachel Weisz film?,” The Guardian, 14
January 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/
jan/15/bosnia-sex-trafficking-whistleblower.
32 David Patrikarakos, “Eyes in the sky: the legal and
philosophical implications drone warfare,” NewStatesmen, 25
June 2015, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/06/
eyes-sky-legal-and-philosophical-implications-drone-warfare.
33 David Vine, “The United States Probably Has More
Foreign Military Bases Than Any Other People, Nation, or
Empire In History,” The Nation, 14 September 2015, https://
www.thenation.com/article/the-united-states-probably-hasmore-foreign-military-bases-than-any-other-people-nation-orempire-in-history.
63
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: T H E P H I L I P P I N E S
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Country case study:
The use of armed—and unarmed—“unmanned”
In Mamasapano, Maguindanao on 25 Januar y
The AFP made several statements
Philippines
aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones remains a
2015 a militar y operation that targeted known
emphasizing the use of UAVs for intelligence
complex issue in the Philippines. Recent
terrorists affiliated with the Jemaah Islamiyah
and reconnaissance operations, and asserting
militar y operations, which have resulted in
Zulkifli Abdhir (also known as Mar wan) and
that there was no use of armed UAVs in the
deaths and compromised the ongoing peace
Abdul Basit Usman, resulted in the death of
countr y. In Februar y 2015, the AFP through its
Mitzi Austero is the Programmes Manager
process with the armed group the Moro
44 Special Action Forces of the Philippine
spokesperson reportedly stated that its
of Nonviolence International Southeast Asia,
Islamic Liberation Front in the southern part of
National Police and 18 civilians. After this
primar y interest in using UAVs was related to
focusing on the peace education and humanitarian
the countr y, have brought this issue in to the
armed clash, the Philippine government
humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR),
national spotlight.
authorities were questioned during Senate
which was echoed by the Department of
hearings on the use of UAVs and the role of
National Defense. 2
disarmament programs in Southeast Asia. She has
done research on conventional weapons and arms
trade in the region for various publications. Prior to
joining NISEA, she worked as a Program Associate
The use of UAVs was first admitted in public
the US militar y in these operations. The
with Conciliation Resources’ Philippines Program
in 2013, when the Armed Forces of the
hearing was shown live in public, and one of
General public opinion towards the use of
and was also a researcher for book projects
Philippines (AFP) confirmed that it had used
the biggest questions was the role of the
UAVs was formed during the public hearings,
UAVs in a militar y operation in Zamboanga
United States in the operations and about the
with the emerging views that: (1) UAVs are
City. On 9 September 2013, a faction of the
technology used during the operations that
effective for intelligence gathering; and (2) the
Alfredo Ferrariz Lubang is the Regional
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
enabled an operation at night.
use of UAVs could shift from intelligence
Representative of Nonviolence International in Asia.
attempted to raise the flag of the self-
Concurrently, he is the National Coordinator of the
proclaimed Bangsamoro Republik at
During the public hearings in the Senate after
that UAVs are effective intelligence gathering
Zamboanga City Hall. An armed clash erupted
the Mamasapano incident, the PNP and the
tools has also gained traction in the recent
universities in the region in the area of peace and
between the MNLF group and the AFP and
AFP were asked to explain the role of UAVs in
years because of the claims of China and the
conflict studies, humanitarian disarmament and
the Philippine National Police (PNP). The
their operations. They were also questioned
Philippines on the same islands in the South
international humanitarian law. He is mostly based
MNLF took hostages and the resulting
on the issue of foreign inter vention in the
China Sea or West Philippine Sea. 3
in Cotabato City implementing a peace agreement
standoff degenerated into urban warfare,
internal affairs of the Philippines as a
Proponents of the use of UAVs have
where parts of the city were destroyed due to
sovereign state and in particular the role of
established the perspective that in the case of
use of explosive weapons. Based on
the United States, as it was also alleged that
intelligence gathering and sur veillance, the
newspaper reports in December 2013, the
the US militar y provided the Philippine
militar y intelligence provided with UAV
militar y admitted to the use of “unmanned
National Police assistance in intelligence
assistance is more reliable.
aerial systems” during the crisis, which
gathering for the operation, which resulted in
occurred from 9 September 2013 until the
62 deaths.
focusing on the peace processes in the Philippines,
and peasantr y in the Philippines.
Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines. He is a
peace education trainer and has taught in various
between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the
Philippine government.
gathering to tactical use. The emerging view
militar y declared the end of the militar y
operations on 28 September 2013. The AFPoperated UAVs were later displayed in public
at Camp Aguinaldo.1
2 Alden M. Monzon, “Philippines places emphasis on drones’
search and rescue, not military, capabilities,” Business World,
19 February 2015, http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?s
ection=Nation&title=philippines-places-emphasis-ondrones&8217-search-and-rescue-not-militarycapabilities&id=102969.
1 Frances Mangosing, “PH Army displays drones to public,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 December 2013, http://newsinfo.
inquirer.net/549269/ph-army-displays-drones-topublic#ixzz4exAJfgHg.
64
3 Andrea Shalal and Emily Stephenson, “Philippines eyes US
spy drones,” Reuters, 18 February 2017, http://news.abs-cbn.
com/focus/02/18/15/afp-philippines-eyes-us-spy-drones.
65
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: T H E P H I L I P P I N E S
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
However, there are questions and concerns
the AFP’s capabilities to conduct intelligence
Crucial in this debate is the government policy
One of the major considerations against using
about who has access to the intelligence data
collection, mission planning, and
on no collateral damage. Currently, the
armed UAVs is that the Philippines has no
gathered and what the role of foreign
reconnaissance operations.
government has repeatedly stated that it only
capacity to operate and maintain armed UAVs,
uses unarmed UAVs for intelligence and
and they will entail a big cost for the AFP. The
inter vention is in these operations, specifically
that of the United States. During the
The equipment transfer and continued bilateral
sur veillance and for humanitarian and disaster
Philippines will have to rely on the assistance
Mamasapano incident, the Philippines did not
training efforts demonstrate the commitment
relief operations. However, the ongoing
of the United States to obtain armed UAVs
possess equipment such as UAVs with the
between the Philippines and U.S. to work
militar y operations against the Abu Sayyaf 6
and to develop capacity for their use and
capacity to operate during nighttime, and the
towards safer communities and the
group, which vowed allegiance to ISIS—
maintenance, which will imply heavy reliance
PNP or the AFP had no skills to execute the
eradication of global terror networks.
though many analysts consider that they are
on US help. This will, in turn, have
ISIS-inspired not ISIS-directed—could change
implications for the role of foreign inter vention
this policy. The AFP is actively pursuing the
in national affairs.
5
intelligence gathering with the use of the
There is an ongoing push to sway the
technologically advanced UAVs.
Philippines’ government’s position in favour of
The US government recently delivered UAVs
using armed UAVs within the Philippines due
including a RQ-11B Raven to the Philippines,
to several factors: (1) lobbying from
to help with “counterterrorism” efforts that
manufacturers; (2) threats from terrorism; and
both countries have agreed on in the past.
(3) the rise of extremism in the Philippines.
4
terrorist group Abu Sayyaf in several islands.
The government may be pushed to shift its
A further concern in the development of this
position on no collateral damage to minimum
technology and capacity is the chance that
collateral damage, and when this shift in
non-state armed groups will also have access
policy happens, the likelihood of buying and
to and develop their own capacity for armed
using armed UAVs in the areas affected by
UAVs. There will be an increased risk of
the terrorist groups who are also kidnapping
diversion, and an added burden on the
foreign nationals will be high.
government to prevent technology and skill
The Philippines and the United States have an
These factors are helping to push for the use
ongoing bilateral agreement in place since the
of armed UAVs because these platforms are
late 1990s called the US Visiting Forces
perceived as ensuring fewer human casualties
Agreement (VFA). The VFA allows US troops
for the AFP/PNP forces, and because there is
in the Philippines for a temporar y stay in the
perceived a tactical advantage in their use for
The militar y is not adept at urban warfare and
countr y to conduct militar y exercises and
surgical operations in the island areas where
has been employing open battlefield tactics in
training. Technical assistance and training is a
kidnapping and extremism is growing.
urban settings, as seen in the cases of
transfer to non-state armed groups.
big component of this agreement. According
Marawi City and Zamboanga City described
to the US Embassy’s official website:
above. The long, drawn out armed
confrontations have cost many lives and led
In addition to the small-arms transfer, the U.S.
to the destruction of infrastructure and
government provided a Raven unmanned
resources for the government and civilians
aerial vehicle system through the grant
alike. Armed drones are seen as more
counterterrorism program. As part of the
accurate and discriminate, so this weighs in
grant, and in addition to the three unmanned
favour of their use. The United States has
aerial vehicles included in the Raven system,
offered this technology, but the Philippines
Philippine ser vice members received training
has recently refused the use of it.7
in the United States on its operations and
maintenance. The Raven is a hand-launched
6 Maria A. Ressa, “Experts warn PH: Don’t underestimate
ISIS,” Rappler, 13 January 2016, http://www.rappler.com/
nation/118850-experts-warn-ph-not-to-underestimate-isis.
unmanned aerial vehicle that will increase
4 Dana Sioson, “US delivers new counter-terrorism weapons
to Philippine forces,” Asian Journal, 2 February 2017, http://
asianjournal.com/news/us-delivers-new-counterterrorismweapons-to-philippine-forces.
66
5 US Embassy in the Philippines, “U.S. Military Delivers
Counterterrorism Equipment to the Philippine Army and Marine
Corps,” 1 February 2017 https://ph.usembassy.gov/usmilitary-delivers-counterterrorism-equipment-philippine-armymarine-corps.
7 See “Military official: We don’t need US drones, we can
finish Marawi conflict alone,” GMA News Online, 9 August
2017, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/
nation/621303/military-official-we-don-t-need-us-drones-wecan-finish-marawi-conflict-alone/story; and Jose Cielito Reganit,
“Treaty prohibits US airstrikes in PH soil – Palace,” Republic of
the Philippines Philippine News Agency, http://www.pna.gov.
ph/articles/1005352.
67
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
5. Harm to
Governmental Transparency
This lack of transparency prevents the victims
and their families from obtaining any semblance
of accountability, and foments anger and fear
Anna Diakun
Anna Diakun is the Nadine Strossen fellow in the
The stakes: why the fight for
transparency matters
Introduction
among communities in targeted regions. It also
For years, the US condemned other countries
undermines democratic legitimacy and the rule of
that carried out lethal strikes outside recognised
law, because still-secret legal justifications for
armed conflict. But beginning in the mid-2000s,
and consequences of this lethal force mean that
both Republican and Democratic administrations
the public is unable to independently assess the
nevertheless embraced a programme of just
merits and legality of this deeply controversial
these kinds of strikes. 3 The US government
programme. Greater transparency is critical to
sought to hide from the public—domestically and
Since the US government started its targeted
ensuring that US policies and practices comport
abroad—its legal justifications, who it was killing,
killing program, sur veillance, and discrimination
killing programme, it has sought to keep the
with international and domestic legal standards,
and why—all in the name of national security.
against racial and religious minorities. She is a
programme officially secret, even as top
and that the US government is held accountable
Although there may certainly be operational
graduate of Yale College, Central European
government officials proclaimed it to be lawful,
University, and Yale Law School. Prior to joining the
when they do not.
details that the US government could
effective, and strategic. This “official secrecy” is
ACLU’s National Security Project, where she works
on issues related to the government’s targeted
ACLU, Ms. Diakun ser ved as a law clerk to the Hon.
Allyson K. Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit.
legitimately withhold, the government’s secrecy
entirely at odds with foundational principles of
Years of litigation and pressure on the US
claims are sweeping by any reasonable measure.
democracy, and, of course, the often-devastating
government have gradually illuminated the
Furthermore, concealing this information has far-
human consequences of these lethal strikes are
contours of the targeted killing programme,
reaching negative consequences: this lack of
anything but secret for communities subjected
including through the disclosure of policy
transparency hides the human costs of the
to them. The United States has killed at least
constraints the Obama administration imposed
targeted killing programme and undermines the
hundreds of civilians, many of them children.
on strikes and the procedures governing
rule of law.
Human rights organizations and journalists have
decision-making. But despite several hard-fought
documented the deaths of entire families, the
victories for transparency, the public still lacks
Greater disclosure of information would help
destruction of homes, and widespread distrust
many critical details about the programme.
prevent abuses, facilitate democratic
of the US government abroad. But government
Importantly, the continuing force of the publicly
accountability, and increase the legitimacy of US
officials have refused to acknowledge basic
released policy constraints—limited though they
action abroad. Yet the US government not only
details about its targeted killing programme (and,
are—is uncertain: these Obama-era rules are
fails to affirmatively release complete
for a time, even the programme’s ver y existence).
nonbinding and the Trump administration can
information about its targeted killing programme,
easily withdraw them. As the US government’s
it attempts to stymie the work of non-profit and
reliance on remote lethal force abroad only
media organisations that use the US Freedom of
continues to grow, persistent pressure is as
Information Act to obtain documents critical to
critical as ever to achieving accountability
understanding the legal justifications for and the
and transparency.
consequences of the programme. The
1
2
government’s efforts to block access to this
information disfigure the adversarial system and
add an additional hurdle on the path to
transparency.
1 See, e.g., The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs,
Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic
& Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, pp. 24-25, 46, http://www.
law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rightsinstitute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf.
68
2 Hina Shamsi, “Trump Is Considering Expanding Killing Powers
Abroad. The Consequences for Civilians will Be Disastrous,” ACLU
Speak Freely Blog, 15 March 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/
speak-freely/trump-considering-expanding-killing-powers-abroadconsequences-civilians-will-be.
3 Andrea Prasow, “The Year of Living More Dangerously:
Obama’s Drone Speech Was a Sham,” Human Rights Watch, 24
May 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/24/year-livingmore-dangerously-obamas-drone-speech-was-sham.
69
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY
The human costs of the
targeted killing programme
Since President George W. Bush ordered the
Yemen 7 and three in Pakistan. 8 Early signs
communities, noting the consequences beyond
Media organisations and human rights groups
indicate that the Trump administration is
civilian injur y and death—including “the
painted a far grimmer picture, reporting figures
increasing the use of drones in its
interruption of education, the undermining of
ranging from 200 to almost 1,000 civilians killed
religious and cultural practices and the
in that same time period.17 Although the
“counterterrorism” activities abroad. 9
first drone strikes abroad, the targeted killing
programme has grown into a prominent
reluctance to assist the victims of drone strikes
government claimed that it took media and non-
Distilling the consequences to mere numbers,
component of US national security policy. Under
for fear of being caught in secondar y strikes.”
governmental organisation reports into account
though, masks the terrible consequences that
President Obama, the United States carried out
The Council adopted a resolution calling on all
when formulating its tally, it asserted that the
these strikes have. In December 2013, for
an estimated 542 such strikes. 4 The human
states “to ensure transparency in their records”
discrepancy could be explained by the US
example, a US drone launched missiles on a
costs have been extensive: according to one
relating to the use of armed drones and “to
government’s access to information “that is
wedding procession that was transporting the
conduct prompt, independent, and impartial
generally unavailable” to outside groups.18
bride to the hometown of the groom.10 Human
investigations whenever there are indications
The government was essentially arguing that the
estimate, these strikes together killed around
4,000 people, including more than 300 civilians.
5
13
Rights Watch reported that “some, if not all” of
Other tallies put the number of civilian deaths
of a violation to international law caused by their
public should credit US government tallies over
the twelve men killed and the many more injured
much higher: according to The Bureau of
use.”
those of independent reporters and researchers
were civilians.11 The effects of strikes such as
Investigative Journalism, between 384 and 807
these reverberate beyond the immediate victims:
Despite these calls for transparency—and
civilians died in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen as
one report documented that fear of drone strikes
indeed, a pledge from President Obama himself
This secrecy surrounding who the US
a result of 563 strikes, most of which were
caused community members to avoid meeting in
to make lethal targeting “more transparent to the
government has killed and why has prevented
drone strikes. 6 (See chapter one for further
groups, parents to keep their children out of
American people and the world”—the US
affected communities from obtaining official
details and statistics).
school, and family members to not attend
government has failed to deliver.15 The
acknowledgment of deaths and injuries or other
funerals.
government’s disclosures and unofficial leaks
forms of public accountability. The government
about the programme consistently downplay the
has failed to adequately investigate credible
harms to civilians while repeating assertions that
allegations of civilian deaths, and when it does
12
The figures from the early months of President
Trump’s administration are just as troubling: from
(See chapter three on psychological
harms for more examples and details.)
14
on the basis of trust alone.
Januar y to July 2017, The Bureau of Investigative
In 2014, the United Nations Human Rights
Journalism reported that US drone strikes killed
cannot be independently tested about legality
carr y out investigations, the full results are
Council expressed concern over the use of
between thirty-three and forty civilians in
and strategic effectiveness. Although the US
concealed. Although the UN Human Rights
armed drones on children, families, and
government has, on occasion, admitted that
Committee has specifically advised the United
specific strikes have resulted in civilian deaths,
States to “[p]rovide victims or their families with
its official civilian death count is typically lower
an effective remedy where there has been a
than the counts of journalists and independent
violation, including adequate compensation,”19
organisations. For example, in July 2016, the
public acknowledgment of responsibility for
US government announced that it had killed
specific deaths and compensation for families is
between 64 and 116 “non-combatants” in
the rare exception, rather than the norm.
7 “Strikes in Yemen,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/
charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_strikes=1&locat
ion=yemen&from=2017-1-1&to=now (last accessed 11 August
2017).
4 Micah Zenko, “The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power:
Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama,” Council on Foreign
Relations, 2 March 2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2017/03/02/
the-not-so-peaceful-transition-of-power; Micah Zenko, “Obama’s
embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,” New York
Times, 12 January 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamas-presidency/
obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy (last
updated 3 April 2017).
5 Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data,” Council on
Foreign Relations, 20 January 2017, http://blogs.cfr.org/
zenko/2017/01/20/obamas-final-drone-strike-data.
6 Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War
in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush,” The Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, 17 January 2017, https://www.
thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covertdrone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush.
70
8 “Strikes in Pakistan,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/
charts?show_casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_
strikes=1&location=pakistan&from=2017-1-1&to=now (last
accessed 11 August 2017).
9 Murtaza Hussain, “U.S. Has Only Acknowledged a Fifth of it
Lethal Strikes, New Study Finds,” The Intercept, 13 June 2017,
https://theintercept.com/2017/06/13/drone-strikes-columbia-lawhuman-rights-yemen.
10 Letta Tayler, “A Wedding That Became a Funeral,” Human
Rights Watch, 19 February 2014, https://www.hrw.org/
report/2014/02/19/wedding-became-funeral/us-drone-attackmarriage-procession-yemen.
11
Ibid.
12 Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians
From U.S. Drone Practices in Pakistan, Stanford Law School
International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic & NYU
School of Law Global Justice Clinic, 12 September 2012, Available
at http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Living-UnderDrones.pdf.
“counterterrorism strikes” between 20 Januar y
2009 and 31 December 2015.16
In April 2015, for example, President Obama
apologised for a drone strike that killed an
American and an Italian citizen. He explained that
13 The full text of the resolution is available at http://www.un.
org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/25/L.32.
14
Ibid.
15 Matthew Spurlock, “Obama Promised Transparency on
Drones, But We’re Still in the Dark,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 16
March 2015, https://www.aclu.org/blog/obama-promisedtransparency-drones-were-still-dark.
16 “Summary of Information Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism
Strikes Outside Areas of Active Hostilities,” Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, 1 July 2016, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/
DNIReleaseCTStrikesOutsideAreasofActiveHostilities.PDF.
when he learned what had happened, he
“directed that the existence of this operation be
17
Ibid. at 2.
18
Ibid.
19 UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations on
the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America,” at ¶
9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/04, 23 April 2014.
71
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H A R M TO G OV E R N M E N TA L T R A N S PA R E N CY
Impact of the lack of transparency
on the rule of law
In addition to the devastating toll that the
targeting killing programme wreaks on victims,
their families, and their communities, the
per vasive secrecy surrounding it undermines
democratic accountability and the rule of law.
According to the UN Human Rights Committee,
“transparency and accountability ... are ...
essential for the promotion and protection of
human rights.”24 Yet, as the Committee points
out, the US targeted killing programme is
marked by “the lack of transparency regarding
the criteria for drone strikes, including the legal
justification for specific attacks, and the lack of
accountability for the loss of life resulting from
such attacks.”25
A man walks past a graffiti, denouncing strikes by U.S. drones in
Yemen, painted on a wall in Sanaa November 13, 2014.
Transparency in this area would help promote
the rule of law in a number of ways. First,
transparency acts to prevent abuses of
© REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah
authority. 26 If officials know that each operation
declassified and disclosed publicly.”20
compensation from the US government, much
will face public scrutiny, they will be more likely
He did so, he said, because those “families
less public acknowledgment of responsibility.
to strictly adhere to (and document their
deser ve to know the truth.”21 President Obama
compliance with) the laws and safeguards in
ordered a “full review” of the operation and the
In short, President Obama’s acknowledgement of
place, such as those requiring a “near certainty”
US government offered the families financial
the deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo
that non-combatants will not be injured or killed
compensation. 22 While this particular step
Porto ser ved to highlight that the Obama
in the operation. 27
toward public accountability was undoubtedly
administration’s vision of transparency and
positive, it stood in stark contrast to the
accountability for drone strikes did not apply
Second, transparency is necessar y for
government’s typical response to deaths of non-
equally to all civilians. For example, although
democratic accountability. The public, both in the
Western victims in Yemen and elsewhere. US
credible reports indicate that a US drone killed
United States and abroad, needs information to
strikes have killed hundreds of Pakistani and
twelve members of a Yemeni wedding party in
Yemeni civilians, but their families rarely receive
2013 and that the US government compensated
the victims’ families, 23 the US government has
never publicly acknowledged responsibility for
20 “Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren
Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto,” White House, 23 April 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-warren-weinsteinand-giovanni-lo-porto.
21
the strike nor offered an explanation for it.
Ibid.
22 Ibid.; Peter Baker, “Obama Apologizes After Drone Kills
American and Italian Held by Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 23 April
2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/2-qaedahostages-were-accidentally-killed-in-us-raid-white-house-says.html.
72
23 Lucy Draper, “The Wedding that Became a Funeral: U.S. Still
Silent One Year on from Deadly Yemen Drone Strike,” Newsweek,
12 December 2014, http://www.newsweek.com/wedding-becamefuneral-us-still-silent-one-year-deadly-yemen-drone-strike-291403.
24 UN Human Rights Committee, “General Comment No. 34,
Article 19, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression” at ¶ 3, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011.
judge the government’s claimed assertions of
legality and wisdom in using lethal force abroad.
Under international law, lethal force may only be
used outside recognised armed conflict as a last
resort in response to an imminent threat, when
non-lethal means are unavailable. Under the US
Constitution, both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments provide safeguards similar to those
found in human rights law. Unless there is a truly
imminent threat, the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the deprivation of life and the use of excessive
force in effecting seizures. In the absence of
such an imminent threat, the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause requires—at the ver y
least—fair notice and an opportunity to be heard
before such action is taken.
The targeted killing programme operates far from
any traditional battlefields and likely violates
both international and domestic law. But because
the US government has not disclosed the full
legal and policy standards governing it, an
informed and robust public debate about the
merits of the programme has been impossible,
creating “an accountability vacuum.”28 As it
stands, the public must primarily rely on the US
government’s selective disclosures, which are
often self-ser ving and designed to shape public
opinion on the government’s terms alone. When
the public is only privy to partial, biased, and at
times incorrect information, it is unable to ser ve
as a check on its representatives—a critical
element of representative democracy.
Finally, greater transparency may help the United
States reclaim some of the legitimacy and moral
25 UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding Observations on
the Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America” at ¶ 9,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/04, 23 April 2014.
authority it has lost with unsupportable claims of
26 Out of the Shadows: Recommendations to Advance
Transparency in the Use of Lethal Force, Columbia Law School
Human Rights Clinic & Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies, June
2017, https://www.outoftheshadowsreport.com..
public accountability. For example, the US
27 Ibid. The 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance, which describes
the policy constraints put in place by the Obama administration, is
available in PDF form at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/presidential_policy_guidance.pdf.
authority to kill in secrecy and with virtually no
28 Navi Pillay, “Pillay Briefs Security Council on Protection of
Civilians on Anniversary of Baghdad Bombing,” United Nations
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 19 August 2013,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=13642&LangID=E.
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government’s drone programme in Pakistan has
executive branch secrecy—and, often, excessive
the request of the government, the ACLU was
Some detail the government’s legal reasoning
for years been one of the government’s worst
judicial deference to those secrecy claims.
not aware that it had prevailed on this issue.
supporting its claimed authority to target US
When the government appealed that ruling, it
citizens abroad, and one—the “Presidential
keep secrets. Despite regular and detailed news
reports of US strikes there, current and former
Transparency litigation suffers from a
redacted from its briefs any reference to the
Policy Guidance” (“PPG”)—describes the
US officials’ statements about the programme,
fundamental challenge: the US government often
subject of the appeal, leaving the ACLU in the
executive branch’s approval process for targeted
and a district court ruling that apparently agreed
argues that its records are so secret that it
dark about the ruling at issue, the reasoning for
killings outside areas of active hostilities.
that this information has indeed been officially
cannot even disclose the reasons for keeping
it, and the government’s arguments for vacating
acknowledged, 30 the government still goes to
those records secret. In responding to FOIA
that ruling. 33 This secrecy creates problems not
extraordinar y lengths to maintain in court, to the
lawsuits, the government frequently informs the
just for the plaintiffs, but for the courts as well.
public, and to the international community that
plaintiffs that relevant documents exist, but then
When facts and legal arguments are withheld
gives a cursor y explanation of why it believes it
The ACLU submitted its first FOIA request
this programme is secret. Such claims of
from a party, this hinders the party’s ability to
concerning the targeted killing programme in
secrecy—when the programme is anything but—
can keep that information secret. When plaintiffs
respond, depriving courts of the full benefits of
Januar y 2010. Specifically, the ACLU requested
costs the United States legitimacy with the US
are not informed of the US government’s full
the adversarial process.
records pertaining to who the US government
public and abroad. As one report remarked,
arguments for keeping documents secret, they
29
are hard-pressed to argue that those arguments
Coupled with the deference courts often give to
degree of transparency, [they] send a meaningful
are incorrect. This purported need for secrecy
the US government’s own assessment of when
signal to foreign publics that the U.S. is
disfigures the adversarial legal process, violating
national security requires secrecy, this
committed to human dignity and human life.”31
principles of openness and fairness that are
characteristic of transparency litigation poses a
Conversely, the failure to do so sets a dangerous
embedded in the FOIA and in the judicial branch
significant challenge for plaintiffs seeking
precedent for other countries, further
as a whole.
disclosure and accountability.
This problem is perpetuated when even the
Targeted killing transparency
litigation and Obama
administration disclosures
“where [investigations] are conducted with a
undermining the rule of law.
The unique challenges of
the legal fight for transparency
Given the significant costs of the secrecy
surrounding the targeted killing programme, nonprofit organisations and media outlets have
turned to the courts to tr y to gain access to this
information. Litigants suing for information about
the targeted killing programme under the US
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) have had
critically important successes, but still face an
uphill battle and hurdles imposed by excessive
29 Anna Diakun, “The Drone Program in Pakistan Is One of the
Government’s Worst-Kept Secrets,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 18
July 2017, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/drone-programpakistan-one-governments-worst-kept-secrets.
30 The ACLU’s Second Circuit brief explaining why it appears
that a federal district court held this fact to be acknowledged is
available at https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-briefplaintiffs-appellees.
31 The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs,
Unanswered Questions, Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic
& Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012, http://www.law.columbia.
edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/
The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20Drones.pdf.
74
judicial opinions deciding these cases are
redacted, such that the court may rule for or
against the plaintiff without the plaintiff knowing
why. Plaintiffs must decide whether to appeal
Despite the challenges inherent in transparency
without knowing why the court rejected their
litigation, much of what the public does know
arguments or the ultimate basis for the court’s
about the US government’s targeted killing
reasoning. Even when the court rules against the
programme and its legal justifications is a result
government and holds that a particular fact or
of years-long FOIA litigation by the ACLU,
document may not remain secret, plaintiffs may
the New York Times, and other groups.
still not get the information they seek. If the US
These lawsuits have had var ying degrees of
government appeals, its briefs may be riddled
success, with some resulting in the release of
with redacted section headings, redacted topic
critical documents and others being denied in
sentences, redacted lists, and entirely redacted
their entirety.
pages. 32 As an extreme example, in one of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)’s recent
targeted killing FOIA lawsuits, the ACLU
prevailed on a certain issue before the district
court. But because this ruling was redacted at
32 See, e.g., ACLU v. DOJ, 844 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2016). The
government’s brief in this case is available at https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/field_document/105._govt_cross-appeal_
brief_2016.06.06.pdf.
The ACLU’s FOIA lawsuits have sought legal and
Overcoming the US government’s refusal to
acknowledge the programme in court
may target; how the government determined that
these individuals should be placed on the “kill
list”; what efforts the government made to
minimise civilian injur y and death before carr ying
out a strike; where these drone strikes occurred;
and which agencies were involved in executing
targeted killings. 34
Even though the US government had disclosed
some information—both officially and through
strategic leaks—the Central Intelligence Agency
(“CIA”) denied the request in full. 35 It asserted
that it was unable to either confirm or deny even
whether it had an “intelligence interest” in the
targeted killing programme. This exemplified the
hypocrisy of the government’s stance on the
issue: when it ser ved the government’s
purposes, it would disclose information about
the programme or coordinate unofficial leaks. All
the while, it would claim in court that the
programme was so secret that to even
acknowledge its existence would put the national
security of the United States at risk.
policy memoranda, statistics, and other
information concerning the targeted killing
programme, and the government has been
forced to disclose a few significant documents.
34 The ACLU’s 13 January 2009 FOIA request on predator drone
strikes is available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/2010-1-13-PredatorDroneFOIARequest.pdf.
33 The ACLU’s brief responding to the government’s secrecy in
the 2017 Second Circuit case ACLU v. DOJ is available at https://
www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-brief-plaintiffs-appellees.
35 The CIA’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary
judgment on the basis of its Glomar response is available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/15__
cia_s_motion_for_summary_judgment_10_01_10.pdf.
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The federal appeals court in Washington, DC,
Khan in Yemen. 41 Just weeks later, another US
after careful and extensive consideration, I
saw through the US government’s attempt to
drone strike killed Anwar al-Aulaqi’s son,
find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in
have it both ways.
sixteen-year-old US citizen Abdulrahman.
36
In a victor y for transparency,
42
Later
Presidential Policy Guidance
which I cannot solve a problem because of
While these cases were pending, the Obama
the court held that given the many public
that month, in October 2011, the ACLU
contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable
administration took initial steps toward
statements by senior administration officials
submitted a FOIA request seeking records
Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket
transparency and accountability, likely in
concerning the nature of the targeted killing
pertaining to the legal basis, factual basis, and
of laws and precedents that effectively allow
preparation for the possibility that a Republican
programme, the CIA’s refusal to confirm or deny
actual process by which the US government
the Executive Branch of our Government to
candidate could win the 2012 Presidential
even an intelligence interest was unreasonable
targeted and killed these three Americans.
proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions
election. 49 The administration began to develop
that seem on their face incompatible with our
the “Presidential Policy Guidance,” or “PPG,” a
In Februar y 2012, when the government
Constitution and laws, while keeping the
document that sets out the law and policy that
agencies once again refused to disclose
reasons for their conclusion a secret. 45
the US government must follow when it carries
and unwarranted. The court wrote that the CIA’s
arguments in favor of secrecy asked the court
“to give their imprimatur to a fiction of deniability
that no reasonable person would regard as
information, the ACLU sued, as did the New York
plausible.”37 In light of this, the Court ordered
Times. (Their cases were almost immediately
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
released a fact sheet describing the document in
the CIA to produce a list of all of its documents
consolidated.) The district court ruled against
reversed the district court’s decision, resulting in
2013, but refused to disclose the entire
that addressed the information sought through
the ACLU and the New York Times, while
a major victor y for transparency. 46 The court
document even after President Obama
the FOIA request, and to explain why it chose to
nonetheless expressing frustration that the
ordered the release of a redacted version of a
personally pointed to it to defend the targeted
withhold these documents. 38
government was seemingly not required to
41-page July 2010 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)
killing programme. 51
release any additional information under FOIA. 43
memorandum (the “Barron Memorandum”),
But this victor y only went so far. After several
The court pointed out that the targeted killings
which analyzed the legality of the proposed
Later that year, the ACLU filed a FOIA request
more years of litigation, the appeals court
“seem on their face incompatible with our
lethal strike operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi. 47
seeking, among other information, all records
out targeted killings. 50 The administration
ultimately held that the CIA had demonstrated
Constitution and laws,” but lamented that it
This document is the most in-depth legal analysis
pertaining to the US government’s process for
that it had properly withheld its records and that
could find no basis to compel the US
yet released about the government’s claimed
designating individuals or groups for targeted
government officials had not officially
government to explain the killings’ legality. 44
authority to target US citizens abroad, but much
killing. 52 The ACLU specifically sought the PPG,
acknowledged any of the information within
As the district court explained:
was still missing. 48 Significantly, throughout the
arguing that if the government was going to
Barron Memorandum, the author—who President
publicly describe and rely on this document, the
This Court is constrained by law, and under the
Obama later nominated to become a federal
PPG must be disclosed.
law, I can only conclude that the Government
appellate judge—conditions important legal
has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over
conclusions on “the facts represented to” the
While the ACLU’s first case was still in its early
the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and
OLC by other departments of the executive
stages, the ACLU filed a separate FOIA request
so cannot be compelled by this court of law to
branch. Because the discussion of those facts is
seeking information concerning the legal and
explain in detail the reasons why its actions do
redacted, it is impossible for the public to
factual bases for the killing of three US
not violate the Constitution and laws of the
evaluate whether the killing of al-Aulaqi meets
citizens. 40 In September 2011, a drone strike
United States. The Alice-in-Wonderland nature
the legal standards described in the memo.
killed US citizens Anwar al-Aulaqi and Samir
of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but
Moreover, key terms in the memo are undefined,
those records. 39
The legal basis for killing US citizens
41 Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year
Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” New York Times, 30
September 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/
middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html.
36
ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
37
Ibid. at 431.
38
Ibid. at 432.
39
ACLU v. CIA, 640 F. App’x 9 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
40 A PDF version of the ACLU’s 19 October 2011 FOIA request
is available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/awlaki_foia_
final_2011_10_19.pdf.
76
42 Craig Whitlock, “U.S. Airstrike that Killed American Teen in
Yemen Raises Legal, Ethical Questions,” Washington Post, 22
October 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-airstrike-that-killed-american-teen-in-yemen-raiseslegal-ethical-questions/2011/10/20/gIQAdvUY7L_story.html?utm_
term=.634f71a2dc35.
43
New York Times v. DOJ, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
44
Ibid. at 515-16.
so it is not even clear what exactly the legal
standards are and how they operate in practice.
45
Ibid. at 516-17.
46
New York Times v. DOJ, 756 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2014).
47
Ibid. at 124.
48 Brett Max Kaufman, “Five Takeaways from the Newly Released
Drone Memo,” ACLU Speak Freely Blog, 23 June 2014, https://www.
aclu.org/blog/five-takeaways-newly-released-drone-memo.
The government refused, so the ACLU again
sued. During the course of this lawsuit, the
government abandoned extremely broad claims
of executive privilege and released the PPG,
along with four Defense Department
49 Scott Shane, “Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone
Policy,” New York Times, 24 November 2012, http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-book.
html.
50 Brett Max Kaufman, “Court Considers Releasing Key
Documents Governing Secretive Targeted Killing Program,” ACLU
Speak Freely Blog, 26 February 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/
speak-freely/court-considers-releasing-key-documents-governingsecretive-targeted-killing.
51 “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy,” New York Times, 23 May
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/
transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html.
52 The ACLU’s 15 October 2013 FOIA request is available at
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-recordscasualties-targeted-killing-program-foia-foia-request.
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documents. 53 These documents, although
Similarly, in the Report on Associated Forces,
In July 2016, President Obama signed an
considerably from the estimates of human rights
partially redacted, revealed further details about
the government redacted information that
Executive Order on “United States Policy on Pre-
organisations and journalists. These figures were
how the targeted killing programme operates,
apparently indicates sources of legal authority
and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian
thus difficult to take seriously, and were only an
including information about the policy standards
on which the government is relying in addition
Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use
empty gesture toward transparency.
concerning the use of force outside areas of
to the AUMF in carr ying out the targeted
of Force.”
active hostilities. One document, the “Report on
killing programme.
Order was to “maintain and promote best
Despite the flaws, the Executive Order was an
practices that reduce the likelihood of civilian
advance. While much more needs to be done,
Associated Forces,” contains the government’s
59
The stated purpose of this Executive
assessment of the groups against which the
Notably, much of this redacted information
casualties, take appropriate steps when such
the Trump administration appears headed in
United States asserts it is at war. 54 The report
relates to the US government’s legal
casualties occur, and draw lessons from [the
exactly the wrong direction. The Obama
explains the US government’s view of the legal
justifications for the targeted killing programme—
government’s] operations to further enhance the
administration’s figures expressly excluded
difference between groups that are “associated
meaning that while government officials freely
protection of civilians.”60
forces” of al-Qaida, against which the
assert publicly that the programme is lawful, the
government claims it may use lethal force under
government at the same time refuses to back up
Although several of the commitments enshrined
and Syria were not counted, but deaths in
the 2001 Authorization for Use of Militar y Force
those broad assertions with its actual legal
in the Executive Order are positive developments
countries like Yemen and Somalia were counted
(AUMF), and groups that are merely “affiliates”
analysis. This refusal to disclose the rules by
toward transparency and accountability, it is
and at least minimally acknowledged. 63 Since
or “adherents” of al-Qaida, against which the
which the government is purportedly playing
unclear what effect that they will actually have.
taking office, President Trump has “temporarily”
government thinks it may not.
undermines the legitimacy of the US government
For example, the Executive Order instructs the
designated parts of Yemen and Somalia as areas
and its actions abroad and prevents the public
“civilian casualties” in “areas of active hostilities,”
meaning that civilian deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq,
“relevant agencies” to “review or investigate
of active hostilities, 64 meaning that the
But significant information was missing from
from holding the government accountable when
incidents involving civilian casualties”61 —a step
administration could plausibly exclude from the
these documents, hidden behind redactions or
it violates those rules.
for which civil society organisations have long
Executive Order-mandated tally any civilian
advocated. But ver y little information has been
deaths from bombing campaigns in those areas.
omitted entirely. For example, while the PPG
The Obama administration attempts to
entrench its policies
released to the public. What’s more, the
information that is released often conflicts with
More substantively, the Obama administration
feasible,” nowhere does the government explain
After the courts ordered the Obama
the independent assessments of outside groups.
likely hoped it would entrench policy safeguards
how “feasibility” is assessed. 55 And another
administration to release policy and legal
Investigations carried out in such a manner do
such as the requirement that there be “near
document, a so-called “Report on Process,”
memoranda, it made a public showing of taking
little to foster accountability, provide justice for
certainty” that non-combatants will not be
victims, or strengthen the rule of law.
injured or killed before approving a strike. But
states that “[l]ethal action should be taken . . .
only when capture of an individual is not
states that to be eligible for targeting, “the
“steps” toward transparency. 58 These efforts
proposed target [must] pose a continuing,
sought to institutionalize the administration’s
imminent threat to U.S. persons.”56 The
policies and practices—and asserted
document’s discussion of the “imminence”
safeguards—before the next administration took
standard merely repeats the vague
office. These attempts were incomplete,
considerations that had been laid out in prior
however, and often had the effect of
public speeches, without providing any sense of
emphasising the administration’s secrecy even
what this standard means in practice. 57
as it heralded its own transparency. Moreover, it
53 “U.S. Releases Drone Strike ‘Playbook’ in Response to ACLU
Lawsuit,” ACLU Press Release, 6 August 2016, https://www.aclu.
org/news/us-releases-drone-strike-playbook-response-aclu-lawsuit.
made clear just how precarious its steps were in
terms of setting a lasting transparency policy
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
78
Similarly, the Executive Order committed the
matter of policy rather than law, it left the door
government to releasing an unclassified
open for the Trump administration to sweep in
summar y each year of the number of US
with its own interpretations of loose policies and
government strikes outside areas of active
standards or to circumvent them altogether. This
hostilities and “assessments of combatant and
threatens to undo the victories for transparency
non-combatant deaths resulting from those
that have been won over the past few years and
strikes.”
make democratic accountability even more
62
As described above, however, the
government’s official statistics varied
difficult to achieve.
with respect to targeted killing.
54 This document is available at https://www.aclu.org/foiadocument/report-associated-forces-0.
55 Brett Max Kaufman, “Details Abound in Drone ‘Playbook’—
Except for the Ones That Really Matter Most,” ACLU Speak Freely
Blog, 8 August 2016, https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/
details-abound-drone-playbook-except-ones-really-matter-most.
because it articulated safeguards mostly as a
59 E.O. 13732, “United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike
Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations
Involving the Use of Force,” 1 July 2016, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/
executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures.
58 Toby Shepard, “Obama’s New Drone Policy Is a Step Forward
for Transparency,” Open Society Foundations, 15 July 2016,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/obama-s-newdrone-policy-step-forward-transparency.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid. at 1.
64 Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Administration Is
Said to Be Working to Loosen Counterterrorism Rules, New York
Times, 12 March 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/12/us/
politics/trump-loosen-counterterrorism-rules.html; Bonnie Kristian,
“Trump’s dangerous Expansion of Executive War Powers,” Politico,
3 April 2017, http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/04/
trumps-dangerous-expansion-of-executive-war-powers-000387.
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Conclusion
The lack of transparency surrounding the use of
drones in targeted killing programmes has
undermined the rule of law and caused
significant harms to civilian populations. Even
though the United States has carried out
Country case study:
The United
States
not have enough information to meaningfully
debate whether this use of lethal force is legal or
administration has increased the use of armed
drones, averaging one drone strike ever y 1.5
days versus ever y 5.4 days during the Obama
administration, according to data compiled by
the Council on Foreign Relations. 2 These
strikes have occurred in a growing number of
hundreds of lethal drone strikes, resulting in
hundreds of civilian deaths, the public still does
From a use standpoint, the Trump
Rachel Stohl is a Senior Associate with
theaters. The Trump administration has also
Stimson’s Managing Across Boundaries Initiative
demonstrated a willingness to increase the
and directs the Conventional Defense Program.
number of places in which drones can be used
Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to
with relatively fewer restraints. Previously,
wise. As the United States expands its use and
the international arms trade, including drones,
reliance on drones, the risk of officials acting
small arms and light weapons, and children in
these areas only included Afghanistan, Iraq,
with impunity and overstepping their bounds of
armed conflict.
and Syria, but may now include certain
provinces in Yemen and Somalia as well.
authority continues to grow. Moving for ward,
transparency will be as critical as ever in
Although a comprehensive US drone policy
preventing abuses from occurring and in
has yet to be developed, President Trump’s
holding the government accountable when
approach to drone export and use is coming
abuses do occur.
into focus. In short, the Trump administration
seems intent on undoing many of the policies,
procedures, and restraints put in place by the
Obama administration.
Current US drone policy rests on policies
established during the Obama administration,
perhaps most notably a 2013 Presidential
Policy Guidance (PPG) 1 that:
• Outlines parameters of drone use in
counterterrorism operations;
• Establishes a standard of “near certainty”
Reports also indicate that the Trump
administration has reestablished Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to conduct
lethal strikes, perhaps reflecting an inclination
toward a more hands-on CIA role in Yemen,
Libya, Somalia, and other areas where counter
terrorism operations are priorities. 3
In addition, the Trump administration seems to
be on track to rescind or relax certain
standards for drone strikes as detailed in the
2013 PPG including the necessity for targets
to pose a “continuing and imminent threat”
and for there to be “near certainty” that no
civilians be injured or killed in a given strike.
Such relaxation could put civilians at
that no civilians will be injured or killed in
heightened risk should the threshold for
counterterrorism strikes; and
conducting lethal strikes be lowered.
• Establishes a standard that targets of
drone strikes must pose a “continuing and
imminent threat.”
1 US Department of Justice, Procedures for Approving Direct
Action Against Terrorist Targets Located Outside the United
States and Areas of Active Hostilities, 22 May 2013, https://
www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/procedures_for_approving_
direct_action_against_terrorist_targets/download.
80
2 Micah Zenko, “The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power:
Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama,” Council on Foreign
Relations, 2 March 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-sopeaceful-transition-power-trumps-drone-strikes-outpace-obama.
3 Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris, “Trump broadens CIA
Powers, Allows Deadly Drone Strikes,” The Wall Street
Journal, 13 March 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumpgave-cia-power-to-launch-drone-strikes-1489444374.
81
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: U N I T E D S TAT E S
Less than a year into the Trump administration,
we are seeing an acceptance of greater
civilian casualties – and risk to civilians – and
Perspectives
a lower threshold for lethal strikes. As a
result, the United States could see greater
opposition to its drone programme by
partners and allies, as well as countries
targeted by American strikes.
The Trump administration does seem to be
committed to the Obama-era effort of
developing global norms and standards
however. The October 2016 launch of the
Joint Declaration for the export and
subsequent use of armed or strike-enabled
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) established
a process for the future development of these
global norms. 4 The Trump administration
decided in June 2016 that the United States
would remain a co-leader of this process and
engaged in its development.
The Trump administration’s current actions on
US drone policy, however, could undermine its
leadership on multilateral efforts to develop
international standards to guide drone transfer
and use. Governments will question American
motivations if US actions are in direct
contravention of the proposed global
framework that it is pushing simultaneously.
4 US Department of State, Joint Declaration for the Export
and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), October 28, 2016, https://2009-2017.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.htm
82
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
6. Human Rights Perspectives
Shahzad Akbar
Shahzad Akbar is a human rights law yer based in
Islamabad where he leads the Foundation for
Fundamental Rights, a pro-bono law firm that has
“In Pakistan, things fall out
of the sky all the time.”1
represented over 100 civilian victims of drone
The above statement was made by Per vez
strikes in Pakistan since 2010. His work focuses on
Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan
challenging human rights abuses such as rendition,
as a response to the first use of a drone by
enforced disappearances, and opposing the death
the CIA, to target and kill Nek Muhammad.
penalty in Pakistan. He is also a Legal Fellow with
Reprieve-UK.
In 1993, Muhammad was recruited to fight
alongside the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan’s
civil war against Ahmed Shah Massoud’s
Northern Alliance after the Soviet exit from
the countr y. Muhammad was known to be
the “host” for al-Qaeda operatives, who found
shelter in the mountainous regions of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. 2
However, he continuously denied the existence
of any “terrorists” living in the secluded rough
terrain areas. In 2004, Muhammad entered,
and conveniently broke a peace deal with, the
Pakistani government for a ceasefire on attacks
on Pakistani soil that evidently infuriated the
government. Soon after, through a back-door
agreement with the US’s Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Muhammad was targeted by
a Predator drone and a Hellfire missile, that
severed his left leg and left hand, leading to an
instantaneous death. 3 This was the first time a
drone strike was used in Pakistan.
1 Mark Mazzetti, “A True Pashtun”, The Way of The Knife, (New
Delhi: Penguin Books, 2013), p.109.
84
2
Ibid, p.108.
3
Ibid, p. 108-110.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S
At the time, Muhammad’s death seemed to be
presumed that the admitted and true figures on
called back from; there is no devastation
These civilians may be people who happen to
an exception, a mere derogation from the normal
the accuracy of this strategy will never be
experienced by family members who will not
be in the garb similar to that of the “enemy”.
rule, a nuisance of an ally to the terrorists who
publicly known. Succinctly put, there is no risk of
have to anticipate that their loved ones are
However, there have been instances of drone
had to be dealt with, but since then attacks by
harm for the one controlling the drone but all is
risking their lives while on duty; and
strikes where there is no room for mistaken
drones have become a daily practice. Hundreds
at risk for the ones on the ground. In an
predominately, no loss to American lives. This
identity; the elderly, women and children have
of innocent civilians have fallen victim to this
alternative view, while a drone pilot may be
suggests that the use of drones instead of
been unlawfully and cruelly targeted.
new era weapon of warfare, which has alarmingly
physically safe from harm and injur y, it has been
humans can create the perception of a costless
become the preferred choice of weapon of the
claimed that despite being removed from the real
war. The primar y reason for this is that these
Since 2004, according to the London-based
US and its allies in their “War on Terror”.
battlefield, drone operators have higher chances
strikes occur away from American eyes.
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, between
of developing post-traumatic stress disorder. 4
Journalists typically cannot enter areas where
424 and 966 civilians primarily in the FATA have
drone strikes take place, and ver y few videos or
fallen victim to the wrath of the American “War
It has been claimed that the unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) or in more common parlance,
This perception of a costless war is further
photographs are available to the public, which in
on Terror” with complete impunity. 8 The whirring
the drone, fulfills a checklist of three P’s for
perpetuated by the fact that waging a war with
turn isolates Americans from the destruction
sound generated by a drone, and the
a successful strike: precision, precaution and
drones comes at no human costs to the United
these strikes can cause.
psychological effect of the near constant
planning. But in reality there is one factor that
States. As the New York Times columnist Roger
takes precedence over all others: safety. In this
Cohen stated, going to war can become difficult
new era of warfare, a member of the CIA or the
to distinguish from going to work. Without men
US militar y sits thousands of miles away safely
and women coming home in coffins, the
in a room, watching a screen through which
American public is less likely to object to war.
a drone’s cameras allow that person to see
The costless war is not subject to the political
One of the key targeted regions of US drone
Similarly, the joint Stanford-New York University
checks and accountability that are characteristic
strikes has been the Federally Administered
study, Living under Drones, has described the
intended target it just takes the push of a button
of waging war in a democratic society. Extending
Tribal Areas, or FATA, which make up Pakistan’s
waves of fear that a local population feels from
to lock on to the “enemy” and kill them. Just like
this argument to its logical extreme, a costless
northwestern boundar y with Afghanistan. FATA,
the constant presence of drones and the extent
war could potentially lead to an increased
a legacy of the colonial era in the subcontinent,
to which this fear has started to interrupt normal
willingness to use force, essentially invalidating
is a significantly underdeveloped area in
economic, political, and social life in these
the premise of the democratic peace theor y.
comparison with the rest of Pakistan. There is
countries.10
“virtual” surroundings, and when he sees his
that, the enemy’s body is shredded to pieces
and a battle of “War on Terror” is won.
It sounds safe and it sounds simple—lock on to
the target and push a button, just like a video
game, and then go home, have dinner with your
family and ask them how their day was. It almost
seems surreal that it can be this easy. Some
would suggest that costless is the appropriate
word; costless in more ways than the standard
monetar y implication. But what if you target the
wrong person? What if the person targeted is
5
6
day, he is blown to pieces along with the rest of
his family within the safety of his own home?
There are few checks and balances within the
drone warfare strategy; either you got the ‘bad
guy’ or you just targeted civilians. The CIA has
not disclosed any facts or figures and it is
86
The Federally Administered
Tribal Areas—where “things fall
out of the sky”
studied. The journalist David Rohde described
the effect of hearing drones above him for hours
at a stretch and called them a “potent unner ving
symbol of unchecked American power.”9
7
no well-established infrastructure, hospitals,
The lack of attention paid to the legal concerns
schools, or recreation facilities, and adherence
and civilian casualties surrounding the CIA’s
to custom, tradition and religion is of optimum
drone program underlies the indifference of the
importance. As the area is disconnected from
American public toward drone warfare. This is
the rest of Pakistan’s more settled areas in a
due to multiple reasons that all work in the
plethora of ways, it would be apt to assert
favour of a drone-use strategy; for example,
that FATA is a vulnerable area, and its
there is no debate over militar y expenditure and
vulnerability has in turn shaped it into a victim of
where the American troops should go or be
profound ignorance and the senseless killing of
innocent civilians.
returning home from a shift of chromite mining
and as he sits with his family to talk about his
presence on a wider population, has been
4 Rebecca Hawkes, “Post-traumatic stress disorder is higher in
drone operators”, The Telegraph, 30 May 2015, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/culture/hay-festival/11639746/Post-traumaticstress-disorder-is-higher-in-drone-operators.html.
5 Roger Cohen, “Of fruit flies and drones”, New York Times, 12
November 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/
opinion/13iht-edcohen.html.
6 Andrew Callam, “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles”, Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,
International Affairs Review, Winter 2010, 10 May 2017.
8
7 To date FATA has been targeted in at least 425 drone strikes,
see the ‘Strikes in Pakistan’ database from the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism, available at https://www.
thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war/charts?show_
casualties=1&show_injuries=1&show_
strikes=1&location=pakistan&from=2004-1-1&to=now.
Ibid.
9 David Rohde, “The Drone War”, Reuters Magazine, 17 January
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/davos-reutersmagazinedronewar-idAFL1E8CHCXX20120117.
10 Michael J. Boyle, “The Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone
Warfare”, The International Journal of Human Rights 2015, Taylor
& Francis, 10 May 2017, pp. 116-117, http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/13642987.2014.991210?src=recsys.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S
Humanity - an aspect absent
from drone strike dialogue
number of civilian casualties reported by the CIA
The anti-drone attacks in Pakistan protest against the US government that took place in Hong Kong on 2012.7.8.
were considered as accurate, exclusively taking
into account only the body count paints a
As various commentators have pointed out,11 it
misleading picture of the real effects of drones.
is the humanitarian side of the debate about
As Daniel Brunstetter and Arturo Jimenez
drone attacks that is most often absent in public
Bacardi point out, the principle of proportionality
discourse. The dialogue in policy circles often
is difficult to measure when the psychological
becomes focused on strategic and policy issues
consequences of drones are added into the
of the “war on terror” —whether drones are
equation. The majority of the discourse has
helpful in fighting terrorists, or whether they can
revolved around a narrow calculation of
be manufactured more cheaply and used more
proportionality, which measures only civilian
efficiently. The concerns being made by
deaths in comparison the militar y gains
international human rights organizations gets lost
associated with a strike, and engages in a form
in a befuddling interpretation of the language of
of “proportionality relativism”.12
international law. For example, whether the CIA,
the Taliban, or a more recent target, the Tehrik e
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are lawful combatants; or
Women, children, and the elderly:
justifiable “collateral damage”?
whether the killings were proportionate.
Including the aforementioned, there are many
questions and no plausible answers in the drone
strike dialogue. Furthermore, there is blatant
ignorance in both policy and legal circles with
regard to the human rights implications of drone
strikes. Seldom is the issue perceived from the
victim’s perspective. It is as if, in a world
governed by strategic imperatives and
international law, the human stories simply do
not matter.
With regard to whether the strikes are
proportionate or not, it should be considered
that the psychological effect that the deployment
of drones has on the affected populations could
result in a violation of the fundamental criterion
of proportionality. In his article, Michael J. Boyle
explains that the US administration has
employed a narrow calculation of proportionality,
focusing exclusively on the body count
associated with drones. Hence, even if the
11 See Madiha Tahir , “The Business of Haunting,” Wounds of
Waziristan, 2 September 2013, http://woundsofwaziristan.com/
business-of-haunting/; and T. Gregory, “Drones, Targeted Killings,
and the Limitations of International Law”, International Political
Sociology 9, 2015, pp. 197-212.
88
By focusing on a small number of victims, one
can deduce how egregious the covert drone
strike strategy is. For example, Sadaullah, 15,
was a student in the village of Machi Khel, Mir
Ali, North Waziristan, Pakistan. On 7 September
© Yu Pong, 2012
2009, two drones were obser ved hovering over
enter the house from the courtyard, the two
Justice and redress are important for the victims
the village throughout the day. This prompted
drones fired their missiles at the building.
of drone strikes. Justice may begin with an
fear and anger amongst the villagers, who
Sadaullah was hit by the debris that fell from the
acknowledgment of the strikes’ existence, but
viewed the drones’ presence as a threat and an
roof and was knocked unconscious.
for redress, immediate steps for compensation
interference with their religious obser vations of
the holy month of Ramadan.
of such victims ought to be taken.
He woke up in a hospital in Peshawar. Both his
legs had been amputated, and he had lost the
To cite another example, Kareem Khan, who now
In the evening, Sadaullah and his family,
use of one eye due to flying shrapnel. A number
resides in Islamabad was a permanent resident
including grandfathers, uncles, and cousins,
of his family members had been killed in the
of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. His
gathered at his grandfather’s house to celebrate
blasts: Mautullah Jan, his uncle, who had been in
family lives in the village of Machi khel, Mir Ali,
the breaking of their fast. Upon the ritual
a wheelchair for a decade and his cousins;
North Waziristan, Pakistan, in his ancestral
breaking of the fast, the family stepped outside
Kadaan ullah Jan and Sabir-ud-Din.
house. On 31 December 2009, at approximately
into the courtyard to offer Maghrib, the evening
prayer. Sadaullah joined the prayer late, as he
had been ser ving the guests. As his family
members finished their prayers, they returned
into the main room of the house. Sadaullah and
his elder cousin Ajman Ullah were the last to
finish their prayers. As they were about to re12
Boyle.
13
21:00, his home was attacked with missiles fired
Sadaullah died in 2013 due to an infection that
from a Predator drone. Three people inside the
developed from the wounds on his amputated
house were killed, and severely damaged Khan’s
legs caused by the wooden legs he was forced
house.14 The three killed were Asif Iqbal,
to use because he could not afford prosthetics.
Kareem’s brother and a secondar y school
teacher at a local public school; Zahin Ullah
13 Stanford University, Living under Drones 91, https://law.
stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/
publication/313671/doc/slspublic/Stanford_NYU_LIVING_UNDER_
DRONES.pdf. The author conducted additional interviews with the
victims, which have also been utilised as a resource.
Khan, Kareem’s son, a government employee
14 Case study: Kareem Khan, Reprieve, http://www.reprieve.org.
uk/case-study/kareem-khan/.
89
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S
working at the Government Girls Public School
devastation that has befallen upon the residents
know the true number of civilian casualties. At
claimed by the Bureau of Investigative
Mira Khan Kot; and Khaliq Dad, a mason who
of FATA.
least 172 of those killed were children. Over a
Journalism. Currently, the New America
thousand more have been injured and have lost
Foundation’s statistics state that the total
was working on construction of the village
mosque, and was staying with Khan’s family
For many years, there had been no
their property or livelihoods. 20 It has been
casualties of which pertain to civilians stand
in the house. None of the victims were
acknowledgement of these civilian deaths by the
claimed that for ever y militant killed, at least 10
between 245 and 303 persons. However, it is
involved in any terrorist activity or with any
United States but finally in July 2016 the Obama
to 15 civilians are killed.
A comprehensive
imperative to note that those deaths of those
terrorist organizations.
administration reluctantly released a vague
investigation by the Bureau for Investigative
attributed to an “unknown” status in the area
estimate of civilian deaths from 2009 to 2015.
Journalism found that only 12 per cent of those
amount up to 211 to 328 additional deaths. 25
On 24 October 2012, Momina Bibi, aged 67, was
The estimate was between 64 and 116 persons,
killed in Pakistan by drones over the past ten
working in a field in the village of Tappi, North
however, these figures encompassed a holistic
years were militants. As stated above, al-Qaeda
Moreover, a 2013 report submitted to the UN
Waziristan, collecting vegetables when she was
view of civilian victims of drone strikes in
members— the original intended targets of the
General Assembly by Ben Emmerson, the
struck by a drone missile which killed her and
multiple countries and not Pakistan specifically.
drone program— constituted only four percent of
Special Rapporteur on Counter Terrorism and
also the family’s livestock. A second drone
Moreover, these figures are in stark contrast to
those killed. 22
Human Rights, with the help of the Pakistani
strike soon followed the first and left her body in
the findings of organizations such as the Bureau
pieces. Momina Bibi is described by her son,
of Investigative Journalism that collect data
It seems that civilians are not just “collateral
casualties to be similar to those provided by the
Rafiq ur Rehman and her grandchildren as the
regarding drone strike victims.
damage” but in fact account for the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism:
16
life and light of their household and the organizer
of the festive events in the family. She was killed
in front of her grandchildren; Safdar ur Rehman,
Zubair ur Rehman, aged 13 and Kaleem ur
Rehman, aged 17, who were playing in the field
near her.15
Drones accuracy claims and
statistics – a paradox
According to estimates by independent sources
and at the time of writing, there have been at
least 425 drone attacks within the sovereign
territor y of Pakistan, 370 of which were
authorized by US President Obama.
17
These
On 17 March 2011, residents of Datta Khel,
drone strikes, over the two presidencies of
North Waziristan, Pakistan participated in a jirga,
George Bush and Barack Obama, killed, extra-
which is the Pashtun word for “grand council”.
judicially and illegally, between 2,501 and 4,003
The purpose of such mass meetings is to provide
people.
a forum for the tribal elders to resolve dispute
confirmed to be civilians.
and arrive at collective decisions. The jirga in
number is far higher than these figures but the
this instance was for the resolution of a chromite
difficulty in accessing the areas where the drone
mine dispute. As the meeting was under way a
strikes are being carried out to conduct
drone fired a missile at the group, killing
independent investigations and the covert nature
approximately fifty people. Among those killed
of the drone program makes it impossible to
was Malik Hajji Babat. Previously, Malik Hajji
Babat had ser ved as a police officer and was the
primar y earner in the family. After his demise,
his family continues to face difficulties in day to
day living and expenses. These victims and their
stories are only a handful of the havoc and
15 Case study: Momina Bibi, Reprieve, http://rightsadvocacy.
org/client_stories.html#.
90
government, found the statistics of civilian
over whelming proportion of drone strikes
aged 3, Asma Bibi, aged 5, Naima Bibi, aged 7,
Nabila Bibi, aged 8, Samad ur Rehman, aged 12,
21
18
Of these, between 424 and 966 were
19
FFR believes the real
16 Karen Deyoung and Greg Miller, “White House releases its
count of civilian deaths in counterterrorism operations under
Obama”, The Washington Post, 1 July 2016, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-releasesits-count-of-civilian-deaths-in-counterterrorism-operations-underobama/2016/07/01/3196aa1e-3fa2-11e6-80bc-d06711fd2125_
story.html.
17 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA and US military
drone strikes in Pakistan, 2004 to present, see above, note 2.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
victims. 23 According to a report conducted by a
[...] Government records showed that there had
London-based human rights charity, Reprieve, in
been at least 2,200 deaths caused by such
killing one targeted militant at least 128 people
strikes and that, in addition, at least 600
were killed. 24 However, what really belittles the
people had suffered serious injuries. Officials
concept of human rights is not just the lack of
pointed out that efforts to identify the exact
investigative journalism conducted into the
number of deceased (and therefore to establish
thousands of civilian casualties but the empty
the exact number of civilian deaths) were
claims of minimal civilian casualties coming from
hampered by security concerns and by
the White House and the CIA. In a contrasting
topographical and institutional obstacles to
view, the New America Foundation proposes
effective and prompt investigation on the
civilian casualties to be much less than those
ground by officials working on behalf of the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas secretariat,
20
Ibid.
21 D. Byman, “Do targeted killings work?” Brookings Institute,
14 July 2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2009/07/14-targeted-killings-byman; and “US Drone
strikes in Pakistan claiming many civilian victims, says campaigner”,
The Guardian, 17 July 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/jul/17/us-drone-strikes-pakistan-waziristan.
22 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Covert War on
Terror”, at http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/
projects/drones/drones-graphs/.
23 Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed:
US drone strikes – the facts on the ground”, The Guardian, 24
November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/
nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147.
24 You Never Die Twice: Multiple Killings in the US drone
program, Reprieve, 14 November 2014, http://www.reprieve.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014_11_24_PUB-You-Never-Die-TwiceMultiple-Kills-in-the-US-Drone-Program-1.pdf. Note that here we
refer to specific research concerning targeted killing, that follows a
different methodology than other research on militant-civilian killing
ratios referred to later in this chapter.
as well as by the cultural tradition of Pashtun
tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
of burying their dead as soon as possible.
Nonetheless, the Special Rapporteur was
informed that the Government was able to
confirm that at least 400 civilians had been
killed as a result of remotely piloted aircraft
strikes and a further 200 individuals were
regarded as probable non-combatants.
25 Statistics provided by the New America Foundation website,
available at: https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americascounterterrorism-wars/pakistan/.
91
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S
Officials indicated that, owing to
For this, Momina Bibi’s grandchildren, Nabila
underreporting and obstacles to effective
Rahman and Zubair ur Rahman travelled to the
investigation, those figures were likely to be an
United States and spoke with congressmen.
underestimate. 26
Another victim, Kareem Khan, visited German,
Despite the international community’s
drone strikes. This finding was based on physical
Dutch and British parliaments and met with
recognition of the plight of civilian victims of
verification by the civil administration authorities
members of the European Parliament to brief
these atrocities, the perpetrator of these drone
of North and South Waziristan Agencies on
them about the damage inflicted by drone strikes
strikes, the US, offers only a deafening silence.
orders of the Court.
in Pakistan. All these efforts finally yielded fruit;
It took a ver y long time for the US to admit that
they managed to have an impact on specific
it had been conducting the drone program and to
The PHC gave clear directions to the
segments of the international community.
date it has not recognized any deaths of
Government of Pakistan to protect the citizens of
Pakistani civilians.
Pakistan from any future drone strikes by
Campaigns against unlawful
targeted killings by the most
underprivileged
On 9 and 10 December 2010, Sada ullah, aged
15, Faheem Qureshi, aged 14, and Saddam
Selective compensation: Pakistani
victims do not qualify
1,449 Pakistani civilians were killed between
2008 and 2012 while a “negligible” number of
al-Qaeda operatives have been killed by the
Hussein, aged 13, traveled hundreds of miles
The first response to these efforts came from
from their native villages in North Waziristan
two American universities: Stanford University
In stark comparison to his response on the
or even shooting down the drones. This case
Agency, FATA, to protest outside the Parliament
and New York University. They issued a detailed
deaths of Pakistan civilians, President Obama
was filed on behalf of the civilian victims of the
in Islamabad against the atrocities committed by
report on the impact of drone strikes in Pakistan
apologized for the deaths by drone of two
March 2012 jirga strike that killed over forty
the CIA’s drone program. 27 This was their first
titled, Living under Drones.
western hostages in 2015 and not only
tribal elders and tribesmen who had gathered in
trip to the capital and they were accompanied by
report, other international human rights groups
recognized his mistake but also offered both
a public place to resolve a mining dispute
at least a dozen victims who had lost loved ones
also raised their voices. The efforts of victims
families his full support and compensation. He
between two tribes, as described earlier in this
to drone strikes. This was a long way from home.
were also vindicated in a judgment of the
also promised a full investigation to determine
article.
Yet these brave Waziris decided to register their
Peshawar High Court,
the cause of such a mistake.
protest and seek justice from their government
declared these strikes unlawful and a war crime.
and from the most powerful nation, the United
The UN Special Rapporteur on Counter
It is this selective approach which sends the
the Pakistani government to primarily protect the
States. This was the first occasion in Pakistan
Terrorism and Human Rights, too, recognized the
wrong message to Faheem, Saddam and
right to life of its citizens against any foreign
since the beginning of drone strikes in 2004 that
high proportion of civilian harm and the lack of
Saadullah, Nabila Bibi, Zubair ur Rehman and
power. Following the decision, the Pakistani
civilian victims had publicly protested against
redress for victims. 30 In 2014, the UN Human
other Pakistani victims of drone strikes. Does
government kept dragging its feet until the
these unlawful extrajudicial killings and
Rights Council convened a special session on
one need to be from the west to be publicly
petitioner went to the court again. This time it
demanded justice and redress.
drone strikes in Pakistan that recognized the
acknowledged as a human being worthy of an
was to indict the Prime Minister for contempt of
alarming proportion of civilian harm and called
apology, or for one’s family to receive
court for not implementing a clear direction of
on member states to address the issue of civilian
compensation for the unlawful death of their
the High Court. These actions taken by the
victims.
innocent loved ones?
victims, coupled with advocacy and public
The civilian victims’ campaign against unlawful
drone strikes in Pakistan struggled to gain
attention in Pakistan and internationally. The
29
28
Following this
which unequivocally
petitioning for their rights at international forums
31
The decision itself is a declarator y order, asking
campaigning by political parties and civil society
Legal challenges on home ground
protestors sought to highlight a daunting aspect
of drone strikes: that the drone strikes are not
drone strikes on Pakistani soil. However, the
conducted with the precision or accuracy that
On 11 May 2013, in its judgment titled,
the US and its CIA claimed to be a hallmark of
“Foundation for Fundamental Rights vs.
issue of accountability and redress remains
unresolved.
Federation of Pakistan & Four others”, 32 the
the technology.
28 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic
(Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic (NYU School of
Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, Trauma to Civilians from
US Drone Practices in Pakistan (September 2012).
26 Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 10 March 2014, UN Doc. A/
HRC/25/59.
29 Peshawar High Court, Judgement Sheet, Writ Petition No.
1551-P/2012, 11 April 2013, https://www.peshawarhighcourt.gov.
pk/image_bank/Mr_Justice_Dost_Muhammad_Khan/wp1551-12.
pdf.
27 “Drone victims stage sit-in outside Parliament”, Pakistan
Today, 11 December 2010, https://www.pakistantoday.com.
pk/2010/12/11/drone-victims-stage-sit-in-outside-parliament/
30 Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, 18 September 2013.
92
in 2014, finally brought down the frequency of
Peshawar High Court (PHC) found that up to
In 2014 the Islamabad High Court, on petition of
civilian drone victim Kareem Khan, ordered
31 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, “US to pay €1m to family of Italian
aid worker killed in drone strike”, The Guardian, 13 July 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/16/us-to-pay1m-euros-family-italian-giovanni-lo-porto-drone-strike.
32 Alice Ross, “Pakistani court rules US drone strikes are
illegal”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 9 May 2013,
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2013-05-09/
pakistani-court-rules-cia-drone-strikes-are-illegal.
Islamabad police to initiate criminal proceedings
against the CIA station chief in Islamabad and
against other CIA officials involved in drone
strikes. This decree from the High Court
vindicated the argument of victims of drone
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
H U M A N R I G H T S P E R S P EC T I V E S
strikes in Pakistan that drone strikes in Pakistan
The US did not officially recognize its drone
question that remains unanswered is, who are
are illegal and those involved in such killings
program until 2012. Before then it was referred
the local assets on ground? Tribal animosity or
could be held accountable for homicide.
to as the “alleged drone program”. To date the
fear of pointing out the real targets might impose
The US has adopted an approach to combat the
Conclusion
US has not publicly declared who has been killed
more of a threat than pointing out some
enemy without ever setting foot on enemy
Despite these efforts, the drones physically
apart from those rare occasions when a
irrelevant civilian or low-level militants who do
territor y. This has kept US troops safe and
remain in the skies over FATA, and their
prominent militant the victim. According to one
not meet the necessar y threshold. It is believed
minimized US militar y budgets but FATA’s
presence is felt by locals always. In recent years,
report
that there might have been some cooperation
residents have had to change their lifestyle in
the CIA unofficially claimed to have abandoned
ratio is that for ever y militant killed, 30 civilians
between Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and the CIA
order to protect themselves from falling victim to
the most troubling types of strikes, such as
are killed.
in the past. Does it still continue, or has it
drone strikes. Dispute settlements through local
ceased to exist since 2009?
jirgas have been minimized; children refuse to
35
and judicial findings in PHC
36
a rough
signature strikes and double tap strikes but
recent events show this assertion to be false.
One significant reason for secrecy around drone
The killing of two western civilian hostages
strikes is apparent from the outset: the lack of
To further highlight the vulnerability of
mountains to extract chromite and earn their
early 2015 is one example of continuity of the
intelligence and the fact that the United States
intelligence in remote territories such as FATA,
living in fear; and the constant whirring sound of
same old practice of signature strikes where
itself does not have any idea who they are killing.
in April 2011 in Afghanistan—where the US/
the drones has caused unrest and fear amongst
targets are selected on basis of their “pattern
Jonathan Landay, a well-known American
NATO are on the ground and can have access to
all factions of FATA’s society. There is a
of life”.
journalist writing for McClatchy reviewed the
better intelligence than in Waziristan—two
ubiquitous pipe dream for ever y day to be a
CIA’s leaked data on drone strikes carried out
American soldiers were killed by a drone after
cloudy day because drones do not fly on such
between 2010 and 2011. 37 His most important
being mistaken for Taliban fighters by US
days. 40
finding was that more than half of the people
troops. 38 Another such occurrence took place in
killed were not al-Qaeda but assessed to be
September 2010, when the intended
Recently, there have been increasing murmurs in
associates, probably Afghans, by the CIA. Only
assassination of Muhammad Amin, the then-
the parliament of merging FATA with the province
six top al-Qaeda leaders were killed, among the
Taliban deputy governor of Takhar province, went
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Politicians and
more than eight hundred drone casualties that
awr y and instead killed someone named Zabet
lawmakers alike believe that merging FATA with
year. Furthermore, the CIA has no on-the-ground
Amanullah, who was out campaigning in
the province will end FATA’s isolation from the
human intelligence in Waziristan.
parliamentar y elections. Nine of his fellow
33
in
Ambiguities surrounding secrecy
of the “only game in town” 34
As previously stated, one prominent issue that
remains with drone strikes inside Pakistan
pertains to secrecy. We never hear the names
or identities of those targeted, or the extent of
someone’s purported involvement in militant/
terrorist activity; instead we hear merely
play outdoors; chromite workers travel to the
election workers were also killed in the strike.
rest of Pakistan, and so far, a five-year plan has
39
been introduced. A question that remains
numbers and figures of the “bad guys” that have
The little information the CIA gathers is through
been killed. It seems that the citizens of Pakistan
unanswered is: what will this mean for the
local spies who are reporting in return for large
are expected to idly sit, wait, and watch as the
people of FATA? There is wide media coverage
sums of money and are thus hardly reliable or
push of a button continues to authorize another
of the development aid package that is going to
credible informants. There are hardly any
extrajudicial killing in FATA, which not only
be used for the region, which will in turn enable
(technical) intercepts in Waziristan as there is no
violates the ver y extent of its legal system but
better infrastructure, road networks, opening of
mobile phone ser vice or access to the internet.
completely disregards due process and
banks, and new schools. There is no debate on
Landlines are operated by the Pakistan militar y,
undermines the sovereignty of Pakistan as a
whether Pakistan’s sovereignty as a countr y will
which listens to each and ever y conversation of
nation.
be taken more seriously when FATA is no longer
the locals but the “bad guys” are well informed
of this practice of phone sur veillance. Another
33 See “US hostage deaths: Western captives held by al-Qaeda
were killed in US counter-terrorism operation, says White House”,
Independent, 23 April 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/americas/warren-weinstein-and-giovanni-lo-porto-westernhostages-held-by-al-qaeda-were-killed-in-us-counter-10198909.
html.
36
34 Statement by former CIA Director Leon Panetta to the Pacific
Council on International Policy in Los Angeles; and Gardner, Lloyd,
Killing Machine: The American Presidency in the Age of Drone
Warfare, p. 133.
37 “Obama’s drone war kills ‘others,’ not just al Qaida leaders”,
McClatchy, 9 April 2013, available at http://www.mcclatchydc.
com/2013/04/09/188062/obamas-drone-war-kills-others.html#.
Ue4Vm43I1RY.
94
35 Spencer Ackerman, “41 men targeted but 1,147 people killed:
US drone strikes – the facts on the ground”, The Guardian, 24
November 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/
nov/24/-sp-us-drone-strikes-kill-1147
Ross.
an underdeveloped and deserted part of the
38 “Two US soldiers killed in friendly-fire drone attack in
Afghanistan,” The Guardian, 11 April 2011, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/11/us-soldiers-killed-in-droneattack. While this occurred in Hemland Province, Afghanistan, it
underscores the dubious nature of the intelligence relied upon by
the US to carry out these strikes.
39 “How lawyers sign off on drone attacks”, The Guardian, 15
June 2011, available at https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jun/15/drone-attacks-obamaadministration; ‘The Takhar attack: Targeted killings and the
parallel worlds of US intelligence and Afghanistan,’ Afghanistan
Analysts Network, May 2011, available at http://aan-afghanistan.
com/uploads/20110511KClark_Takhar-attack_final.pdf.
countr y.
40 Karen McVeigh, “Drone strikes: tears in Congress as
Pakistani family tells of mother’s death”, The Guardian, 29 October
2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29/pakistanfamily-drone-victim-testimony-congress.
95
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
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It is also pertinent to note that, with such
alarming statistics of civilian casualties and the
Experts have backed the claim that the
“collateral damage” of these attacks creates
Country case study:
Missile strikes from remotely piloted
“unmanned” aircraft, or “drones,” have
more time it takes for US officials to
more militants than they eliminate. According to
acknowledge their errors, resentment will grow
Andrew Exum and David Kilcullen of the Center
within the victims, their families and the society
for New American Security, the drone campaign
of FATA. It should not be forgotten that the
has created a siege mentality among Pakistani
pukhtoons value their self-dignity and integrity
civilians. They further add, “While violent
Waleed Alhariri heads the US office of the Sana’a
don’t know about it; if the United States has
ver y highly and they have suffered in silence for
extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened
Center for Strategic Studies (SCSS) in New York
built a hospital in Yemen, most Yemenis don’t
many years. Just as FATA’s geographic location
population they seem less ominous than a
City and is a fellow-in-residence at Columbia Law
know this either; but what almost ever y
is delicate in nature, so is the status of its
faceless enemy that wages war from afar and
for Strategic Studies (SCSS) is an independent
people. It is imperative that the US re-evaluates
often kills more civilians than militants.”
policy and research think tank that provides new
families, and homes of their countr yfolk blown
the merits of drone warfare as part of its
The drone program has been counter-productive
approaches to understanding Yemen and the
apart in drone strikes. With Yemen having
surrounding region, through balanced perspectives,
been central to the US “War on Terror” and
Yemen
become a defining symbol of the United
States for most Yemenis. If the United States
has built a school in Yemen, most Yemenis
School’s Human Rights Institute.The Sana’a Center
Yemeni has heard about are the children,
counter-terrorism strategy. Retired US Army
in the region and if the loss of innocent civilian
general, Stanley McChr ystal aptly recognized
victims is not acknowledged by the US
the risk factor attributed to the misuse of drones
government, the costless war may solidify
2002, the first thought that a generation of
when he stated:
popular support of Islamic militants and may
Yemenis now have when they think of the
prevent success in the FATA region.
United States is that of fier y death raining
“To the United States, a drone strike seems to
in-depth studies and expert analysis.
an early testing site for militar y drones since
down from the sky.
have ver y little risk and ver y little pain. At the
receiving end, it feels like war. Americans have
To this day, drones are a frequent visitor in
got to understand that. If we were to use our
the skies over Yemen, officially on the hunt for
technological capabilities carelessly—I don’t
members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
think we do, but there’s always the danger that
(AQAP) and its affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia.
you will—then we should not be upset when
However, ever yone on the ground knows that
someone responds with their equivalent, which
anyone can be a target of these weapons,
is a suicide bomb in Central Park, because that’s
which have shown the ability to strike with
what they can respond with.” 41
incredible precision and destruction, but
which also often leave those who pick through
the rubble demanding to know why their loved
ones were obliterated.
The nature of the US drone programme,
coupled with issues of secrecy and a
cooperative response from the Yemeni
government, have created the situation
described above. A deeply problematic
feature of the US drone programme overall
are its “signature strikes,” whereby the
decision to undertake a strike is based on a
potential target’s patterns of behavior. These
are obser ved from cameras in the sky, rather
than hard intelligence gathered on the
41 Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars,
p. 285.
96
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C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N
Saleh Mohsen al-Amari of Yakla shows photos of
nephew Shaif Abdullah Mohsen Mabkhut al-`Amri
(left) and cousin Saleh Mes`ad Abdullah al-`Amri,
who were killed in a US drone strike outside Rad `a,
Yemen, on December 12, 2013.
interconnected historical context and the
In Januar y 2017, the US government released
socio-political, tribal, security and economic
its casualty figures for 2016. Between
dynamics in Yemen through which AQAP has
Januar y 2009 and December 2016, the US
risen—they fired missiles into this social
government said its airstrikes, including
fabric, oblivious to the long-term fallout.
drones, killed between 2,867 and 3,138
people in places far from traditional
Another contentious aspect of the US drone
battlefields, specifically Pakistan, Somalia,
programme is the high level of its secrecy,
and Yemen. It claims that between 65 and 117
which leaves the ordinar y US citizen and
were “non-combatants.”4 The US
taxpayer unaware of the specifics and
government’s figures and estimates are
effectiveness of the drone program.
significantly lower, however, than those
(See Chapter 5 on Harm to Governmental
gathered by independent organizations,
Transparency for more details.) US
including those that use on-the-ground, fact-
mainstream media has little information on
finding missions to calculate casualty
drones sourced from places other than the
figures. 5
US militar y itself. Among the reasons for the
© 2013 Human Rights Watch
deliberately scant amount of available
Nonetheless, these efforts were steps toward
information may be the drone programme’s
transparency, though they came ver y late and
questionable legality under international law,
were ver y limited in definition and application.
in particular the employment of extra-judicial
The current US administration, under
lethal measures outside of active and
President Trump, has more recently, however,
declared war zones—such as Yemen was prior
made signs that it is against both increased
to the September 2014 civil war.
transparency and heavily in favour of
ground. Local and international human rights
While the drones have killed thousands of
groups have documented many cases of
AQAP leaders and members, the drones have
people with no relation to extremist groups
also actually created far more extremists
It is noteworthy that the US had not
frequency of strikes has increased during
being targeted, or killed because they were
seeking revenge. Drones might best be
acknowledged civilian deaths due to drone
President Trump’s first few months in office,
within too close a proximity to a targeted
described as a self-defeating tool that creates
strikes until shortly before former US
far outpacing his predecessor.
person. These innocent casualties have
the problem it is meant to counter. Today
President Obama left office. In July 2016,
come to signify, for many Yemenis, US
AQAP has become “arguably more powerful,
President Obama issued Executive Order
ruthlessness and has resulted in general fear
resource-rich, entrenched, and operating with
13732 regarding “United States Policy on Pre-
and public anger, which facilitates the
more institutional flexibility and adaptive
and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian
propaganda used as a recruiting tool for
capacity than ever before,” according a recent
Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the
AQAP in many affected communities.
Sana’a Center report. The report further
Use of Force,” acknowledging that there have
says that, “The use of militar y force alone will
indeed been civilian casualties in strikes, and
almost certainly fail to defeat AQAP.” This is
citing future steps to minimise casualties and
because both the drone programme and
acknowledge harm.
1
2
1 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a
Test of Obama’s Principles and Will”, New York Times, 29 May
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamasleadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html.
2 Out of the Shadows: Recommendations to Advance
Transparency in the Use of Lethal Force, Columbia Law School
Human Rights Clinic and Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies,
June 2017, https://www.outoftheshadowsreport.com.
98
3
similarly blunt and violent counter-terrorism
tactics not only overlook the complex and
3 Farea Al-Muslimi and Adam Baron, “The Limits of US
Military Power in Yemen: Why al-Qaeda in the Arabian
peninsula continues to thrive”, 27 March 2017, http://
sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/86.
increasing drone strikes in Yemen. The
4 “Summary of Information Regarding US Counter terrorism
strikes outside areas of active hostilities”, Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/
DNI+Release+on+CT+Strikes+Outside+Areas+of+Active+
Hostilities.PDF.
5 Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Sana’a
Center for Strategic Studies.
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C O U N T RY C A S E S T U DY: Y E M E N
7. International Law Perspectives
However, there is also culpability on the side
Thus, in the 15 years in which the US has
of the Yemeni government. Both its former
deployed militar y drones in Yemen, there have
and current presidents had reportedly
been hundreds of civilian deaths, untold
sanctioned American use of drones in their
suffering endured by the injured and loved
countr y, with the US government stating so
ones of the victims. This has deeply marred
officially in December 2016. 6 In return the
the image of the United States in the eyes of
Adriana Edmeades is the Legal and Policy
US had helped arm and train special militar y
Yemenis and enables recruitment for AQAP.
Director of Rights Watch (UK). She has over five
counterterrorism units, headed by the former
At the same time US policy surrounding
years’ professional experience in international
Yemeni president’s son, Ahmad Ali Saleh, and
drones has helped a repressive regime
helped develop a strong security and
repress its people, and then a corrupt regime
intelligence apparatus. This then happened to
Adriana Edmeades
Introduction
The prevalence of the use of armed drones in
human rights law research, advocacy, and litigation,
contemporar y warfare has been accompanied
with significant experience in the field in Turkey,
by a considerable body of concerned political
Uganda, Ghana, and Northern Ireland. Adriana has
and legal commentar y.1 The ability to conduct
remained corrupt. And despite the thousands
been responsible for litigation in the European Court
a worldwide campaign of strikes, with minimal
be the same security apparatus the Yemeni
of members of AQAP the drones have killed,
of Human Rights, the UK Supreme Court and Court
regime used to crackdown on political
the group today has never been so flush with
of Appeal, as well as submissions before
opponents, activists, and civil society
arms and loyalists.
immediate risk to ser ving personnel, has
parliamentar y committees and the UN human
fundamentally disrupted the calculus of risk
rights mechanisms.
and strategic reward associated with militar y
workers that questioned the conduct of the
inter vention. Their deployment from command
Yemeni state or policies of foreign
centres housed far from the relevant militar y
governments in Yemen.
theatre has proved irresistible. The United
After the 2011 uprising that ousted President
Ali Abdullah Saleh, transitional President Abd
Rabbuh Mansour Hadi continued to allow US
drones in Yemen’s airspace. This seemed a
clear attempt on Hadi’s part to increase his
Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, China, Russia,
and Saudi Arabia among others, have followed
the lead of America and Israel, with the result
that there is a now almost global campaign of
drone warfare.
political and security-related importance in the
“War on Terror” in the eyes of his US ally, and
to alleviate foreign pressure to address the
rampant corruption and ineptitude of his
administration—factors that ultimately
undermined his legitimacy with a large swath
of the Yemeni public and helped precipitate
the current civil war.
Much recent scholarship has considered the
challenges posed by the contemporar y use of
drones, including whether domestic human rights
law applies extra-territorially to the use of
drones, what legal regime applies (international
humanitarian law (IHL) or international human
rights law, or a combination of the two), and, if
IHL does apply, what is the threshold for its
application. Questions have also been raised
about whether international law yet recognises a
doctrine of anticipator y self-defence, and, if it
does, how this would apply to the use of drones.
An issue that has come into sharp focus recently,
6 Marty Lederman, “President Obama’s Report on the Legal
and Policy Frameworks Guiding and Limiting the Use of Military
Force [UPDATED],” Just Security, 5 December 2016, https://
www.justsecurity.org/35239/president-obamas-report-legalpolicy-frameworks-guiding-united-states-military-force-relatednational-security-operations.
100
1 See, for instance: Christof Heyns, Dapo Akande, Lawrence
Hill-Cawthorne, and Thompson Chengeta, “The International Law
Framework Regulating the Use of Armed Drones,” International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 65(4) (2016): 791-827; and
Michael J Boyle, “The Legal and Ethical Implications of Drone
Warfare,” International Journal of Human Rights 19(2) (2015), pp.
105-126.
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following recent speeches by the British and
This chapter sets out the various modes of
Australian Attorney-Generals, is whether strikes
liability in international law, which may attach to
undertaken in anticipator y self-defence must
different types of assistance states may provide
respond to imminent threats or whether the
to allies with armed drone programmes
Protesting for drone
victims in Chicago.
17 May 2012
criterion of imminence has been abandoned.
Participation in drone programmes
While those legal issues concern the conduct of
the state, which deploys a drone, there is the
Allied states may lend assistance and
additional issue of how we regulate other states
participation in the programmes of states
providing assistance to the state using drones.
operating armed drones in a variety of ways.
Assistance may be rendered by, variously: the
First, state security and intelligence ser vices
provision of locational intelligence on targets;
may provide intelligence to drone-operating
providing access to landing sites and other
states, with that intelligence used in the drone
logistical support for drone sorties; as well as
programme. Second, allied states may allow their
the manufacture, sale and ser vicing of drone
territories to be used by drone-operating states
hardware and software. That aspect of the
to house command centres or landing/launching
contemporar y use of drones is especially
facilities. Third, states may manufacture and
pernicious. By involving a multitude of states in
export drone components and ser vices to allies,
the support and facilitation of armed strikes,
which deploy the technology. Obviously, it is
states that are motivated to increase the use of
lawful for one state to assist another in pursuing
drones stimulate the development and
a course of action, which is lawful. But where, as
decentralization of necessar y technical and
set out below, there are serious questions as to
practical skill. The result is the dilution of
the lawfulness of the actions of states operating
domestic political and legal control over armed
drones in certain contexts (such as the US using
assisted being internationally wrongful – that is,
ASR relating to the liability of one state for
drone programmes, since necessar y constituent
drones outside of Iraq), the states that provide
being in breach of international law. The question
assisting another are: (a) responsibility for aiding
elements of drone programmes are increasingly
assistance face potential liabilities themselves.
as to how the conduct of armed drone strikes
or assisting another state in knowledge of the
programmes may violate international law is
circumstances of the unlawful act, as set out in
The responsibility of one state for the acts
beyond the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to
Article 16; and (b) responsibility for rendering aid
committed by another are not set out in the UN
say that armed drone programmes operated by
or assistance in maintaining a situation by which
Charter or expressly specified in any other
the United States to which other countries lend
another state commits a serious breach and/or
treaty: they are instead matters of customar y
assistance raise a series of concerns with
failure to cooperate to bring such a breach to an
international law. Much of customar y
respect to their compliance with the law of self-
end, as set out in Articles 40 and 41.
international law in the area of state
defence (since strikes occur against targets
responsibility is summarized and encapsulated in
other than those which currently threaten an
the International Law Commission’s (ILC)
imminent armed attack) and their compliance
Articles on the Responsibility of States for
with the conditions of proportionality and
Internationally Wrongful Acts (known universally
discrimination between civilian and militar y
as the Articles on State Responsibility, or
targets (crucial considerations in both IHL and
‘ASR’). 2 As is obvious from their title, these rules
international human rights law).
matters of diffuse or shared responsibility. But
while diffusion of control presents challenges to
regulation and oversight, it presents new
opportunities for those seeking to take steps to
restrict unlawful uses of drones. States assisting
in or facilitating unlawful armed drone activities
that are carried out by other states may well be
subject to liability for complicity – or equivalent
modes of responsibility – which may (depending
upon domestic constitutional and public law
arrangements) be actionable before domestic
courts.
© Debra Sweet
of State responsibility rely, as a condition
precedent, on the conduct, which is being
While not yet formally agreed as a treaty, it is
generally agreed that the key provisions of the
2 United Nations General Assembly, UNGA Resolution No 56/83
on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
28 January 2002, UN Doc. A/RES/56/83 (ASR).
102
ASR reflect customar y international law binding
Article 16 of the ASR provides that:
“A State which aids or assists another State in
the commission of an internationally wrongful
act by the latter is internationally responsible
for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the
circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act; and
upon all states. The significant provisions of the
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(b) the act would be internationally wrongful
if committed by that State.”
Article 16 enjoys wide acceptance as reflecting
Second, that the assistance provided by the
With regard to the first question, the decision of
genocide requires not only the carr ying out of
state as a matter of fact contributes to the
the International Court of Justice in the Bosnian
the immediate intentional acts of, inter alia,
commission of the unlawful act to the requisite
Genocide case is instructive. In that case,
killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm,
degree; 8 and
Article 16 was considered and applied to the
and/or forced sterilization, but also that, in doing
customar y international law. The International
alleged complicity of the Federal Republic of
so, the perpetrator acts in pursuit of a general
Court of Justice affirmed this in the Bosnia
Third, that the contemplated act “must be such
Yugoslavia (FRY) in the commission of genocide
objective of intending “to destroy, in whole or in
Genocide decision. The rule has also been
that it would have been wrongful had it been
by Republika Srpska forces. The Court applied
part, a national ethnical, racial, or religious
taken to reflect customar y international law by
committed by the assisting state itself.”
Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility
group, as such.”13 Against that exacting
by analogy in order to determine the meaning of
standard, a finding of liability for aiding and
3
the World Trade Organization Panel and the
9
4
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. 5 The
United Kingdom government has also
consistently stated that it considers Article 16 to
reflect customar y international law binding on
the UK. 6
The rule of responsibility under Article 16 entails
three main conditions (drawn from the wording of
the Article itself, together with the ILC’s
Commentar y on it). Those conditions are:
Exploring the three conditions: knowledge
The interpretation of the knowledge requirement
is not straightfor ward. The question has been
explored by a range of leading international law
academics,10 and recently discussed at length in
the November 2016 research paper published by
Chatham House.11 There are three key
questions:
• First, what the assisting state must know;
“complicity in genocide” under Article III(e) of the
Genocide Convention.
assistance, has “knowledge of the
• Second, what the degree of knowledge the
assisting state must have; and
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act”
carried out by the assisted state;7
held that, while the FRY knew that the Republika
Srpska intended to carr y out massacres, the
of Article 16, requires that the state providing
evidence did not establish that the FRY was
aid or assistance “acted knowingly, that is to say,
aware that the Republika Srpska held the
in particular, was aware of the specific intent
additional mens rea condition of intending, by
(dolus specialis) of the principal perpetrator. If
those massacres, to destroy a group “as such.”
that condition is not fulfilled, that is sufficient to
exclude categorization as complicity.”(emphasis
But it is crucial to bear in mind that ver y few
added).
internationally wrongful acts require specific
as to what the assisted party is about to do.
international law which might be entailed by a
proof of the state’s motivation as well as their
that the assisting state must have intended to
of the assisted state’s conduct as internationally
factual conduct.14 Accordingly, the facts that an
facilitate the wrongful act.
wrongful is an objective matter: there is neither
assisting state must know in most cases are
any requirement of prior determination to that
purely matters of objective circumstance: what
effect by a court, nor any requirement that the
the assisted state is doing, or plans to do.
assisting state must subjectively appreciate that
the conduct of the assisted state is wrongful.
What is required is that the assisting state has
5 Order of the German Second Senate in the constitutional
complaint of Mr. Al-M, 5 November 2003, 2 BVerfG 1506/03, [47].
9
104
intent: the vast majority of breaches of public
• Third, whether there is a separate requirement
Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 31 May 1999, [9.42]-[9.43].
7 ASR, Article 16(a); and International Law Commission, “Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, with commentaries” Yearbook of the International law
Commission II(2) [2001] (‘ILC Commentary’), ILC Commentary on
Article 16, [4].
have more than a hunch or speculative opinion
state conducting a drone strike do not require
8 This requirement does not appear expressly within the text of
Article 16. It is set out within the ILC Commentary on Article 16,
[5] and [10].
6 Her Majesty’s Government, “Allegations of UK Complicity in
Torture: The Government Reply to the Twenty-Third Report from
the Joint Committee on Human Rights,” Cm774, 2; and House of
Lords, House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights,
“The Government’s policy on the use of drones for targeted killing:
Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report of
Session 2015-2016,” Fourth Report of Session 2016-17 (HL Paper
49, HC 747) (19 October 2016), 17.
Essentially, the assisting party must
It is important to clarify that the characterisation
3 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v
Serbia and Montenegro) ICJ Rep (2007) 42 (‘Bosnia Genocide
case’), p. 420.
4 World Trade Organization dispute settlement, TurkeyRestrictions on Imports of Textile and
the majority of the International Court of Justice
The Court considered that liability, on the basis
12
First, that the assisting state, when it provides
assisting will be necessarily difficult to achieve:
knowledge, to the required degree, of the facts,
which constitute the elements of the assisted
state’s wrongful conduct.
ASR, Article 16(b); and ILC Commentary on Article 16, [4].
10 James Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Vaughan Lowe,
“Responsibility for the Conduct of Other States” Kokusaihō gaikō
zasshi [Japanese Journal of International Law and Diplomacy]
101 (2002) 1; Miles Jackson, State Complicity in International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Helmut Aust, Complicity
and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011); Vladyslav Lanovoy, Complicity and its
Limits in the Law of International Responsibility (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2016).
11 Harriet Moynihan, “Aiding and Assisting: Changes in Armed
Conflict and Counterterrorism,” Chatham House Research Paper,
November 2016.
Importantly, the pertinent facts will depend upon
the nature of the assisted state’s conduct. The
Bosnia Genocide case is an extreme example,
since the underlying wrongful conduct of the
Republika Srpska was the war crime of genocide,
which is a crime of specific intent. As set out in
the Genocide Convention, the commission of
12
Bosnia Genocide case, [420].
13 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951), 78 UNTS
277, Article II. The definition is rehearsed in Article 2(2) of the
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See:
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 955, 8 November
1994, UN Doc. S/RES/955, Annex, Article 2(2).
14 James Crawford, “Second Report on State Responsibility,”
51st Session of the International Law Commission, 1999, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/498, p. 50.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
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As to the second question, namely, the degree
evidence … [I]f a state has not made enquiries
article 16 makes it clear that no state may be
made by United States government
of knowledge required, it appears that
in the face of credible evidence of present or
liable on a strict liability basis purely because
representatives including Prof Harold Koh
constructive knowledge is not sufficient as a
future illegality, it may be held to have turned a
assistance rendered to another state has been,
(Legal Advisor to the Department of State,
matter of international law. During the
blind eye.” 18
for instance, unexpectedly diverted to wrongful
2009-2013) and John Brennan (Deputy National
or prohibited ends.
Security Advisor for Homeland Security and
negotiations on the text of article 16, the
21
Netherlands specifically suggested that the
Turning to the third question, the separate
article should provide for responsibility where a
criterion of the assisting state’s intention, it is
Accordingly, the intention requirement chiefly
Director of the CIA, 2013-Januar y 2017), 24
state “knows or should have known the
worth noting that the text of article 16 itself
functions to avoid a state being fixed with
a range of key issues affecting lawfulness
circumstances of the internationally wrongful
does not include any explicit requirement of
liability in circumstances where it cannot be held
are clear.
act,”
intention. However, the ILC Commentar y on
to have consciously supported or facilitated the
by the members of the ILC. In the absence of
article 16 states that the aid or assistance must
actions taken by the state to which it provides
First, the United States remains committed to
custom, specific guidance in the ASR, or
be given “with a view to facilitating the
assistance. But that does not mean that the
the “Bush doctrine” of pre-emptive strikes,
relevant case law, the dominant view of eminent
commission of that [wrongful] act, and must
intention requirement may be used by states as
rather than only strikes against imminent threats.
academics is that article 16 requires a more
actually do so.”
a means to shield themselves from liability in
But any use of force purportedly in self-defence
stringent degree of knowledge.
this requirement as limiting the application of the
circumstances where they are fully aware of the
must obser ve the limiting criterion that it be an
rule “to those cases where the aid or assistance
use to which their assistance will be put and of
action that requires, in the long-standing
Clearly, actual knowledge of the relevant facts
given is clearly linked to the subsequent
the actions the receiving state will take, but
formulation of the agreement between the
would be sufficient. In this regard, leading
wrongful conduct” and then notes that a state
where the assisting state subjectively does not
United States and Great Britain in 1838-1842 as
academics argue that “near certainty” or
will not be responsible for aid or assistance
consider that the course of action amounts to an
to the legal principles governing the seizure and
internationally wrongful conduct.
destruction of the vessel Caroline, “necessity of
15
however that suggestion was not adopted
“practical certainty” of the facts is sufficient to
determine actual knowledge.
16
There is also
19
Counterterrorism, 2009-2013, subsequently
The ILC Commentar y explains
“unless the relevant State organ intended, by the
aid or assistance given, to facilitate the
self-defence, instant, over whelming, leaving no
While the specific details of individual drone
choice of means, and no moment for
strikes are typically not released, arguably there
deliberation.”25 This formulation has traditionally
The question of what suffices to make out the
is sufficient detail publicly available regarding
been termed the criterion of imminence, and
assisting state’s intent in this context must be
the general operation of, for instance, the United
demands that action in self-defence is lawful
treated with some care. What is required is that
States’ drone programme to fix any state
only where it responds to pressing temporal
deliberate effort by the assisting State to avoid
the assisting state intends to provide the means
providing assistance to the United States with
necessity in light of an imminent armed attack.
knowledge of illegality on the part of the State
by which the perpetrator may realize its own
the requisite level of knowledge of certain key
A drone strike taken ‘pre-emptively’ against a
being assisted, in the face of credible evidence
intent to commit an unlawful act. There is no
problematic aspects of that programme. From
suspected terrorist who is involved only in a
of present or future illegality …where the
additional requirement that the assisting state
the reports of international non-governmental
preliminar y planning stage of action violates this
evidence stems from credible and readily
must itself share the assisted state’s intent.
organisations (NGOs),
principle and will not be lawful under the
available sources, such as court judgments,
Were it other wise, as Judge Bennouna obser ved
Nations Special Rapporteurs, 23 and statements
reports from fact-finding commissions, or
in his declaration in dissent in the Bosnia
independent monitors on the ground, it is
Genocide case, that “would be tantamount to
reasonable to maintain that a state cannot
equating an accomplice with a co-principal,”
escape responsibility under Article 16 by
an illogical outcome if any distinction between
deliberately avoiding knowledge of such
primar y liability and assisting liability for an
strong support for a “willful blindness” standard
occurrence of the wrongful conduct.”
in the absence of actual knowledge itself. 17
As the Chatham House research paper argues:
“(Willful blindness) might be defined as a
20
16 Moynihan, Research Paper, [39]; Jackson, State Complicity,
pp. 160-162.
17 See: Lowe, “Responsibility,” 10; and Jackson, State
Complicity, pp. 60-162.
106
The ILC’s reference in the Commentar y on
18
Moynihan, Research Paper, p. 14.
19
ILC Commentary on Article 16, [5].
20 Bosnia Genocide, Declaration of Judge Bennouna,
p. 359, p. 361.
two separate United
international legal doctrine of self-defence.
The official United States position in favour of
internationally wrongful act is to be obser ved.
15 Statement of the Netherlands, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission II(1) [2001] 52; and see Crawford, State
Responsibility, p. 406.
22
21 See the example given by Bernhard Graefrath of aid being
directed towards unlawful ends which, although foreseeable, are
specifically prohibited by the aid-providing state as a condition of
the grant: Bernhard Graefrath, “Complicity in the Law of
International Responsibility”, Revue Belge de Droit International 2,
1996, p. 371, p. 373; and the discussion of the same in Crawford,
State Responsibility, pp. 407-408.
pre-emptive action clearly carries with it,
therefore, the risk of drones being used in
circumstances outside the lawful bounds of selfdefence.
22 Amnesty International, Will I Be Next? US Drone Strikes in
Pakistan, October 2013.
23 Ben Emmerson, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 10 March 2014, UN Doc. A/
HRC/25/59; and Cristof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, 1 April 2014,
UN Doc. A/HRC/26/36.
24 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) pp. 7-20.
25 British and Foreign State Papers, 1840-1841, 1857, Vol 29,
p. 1129.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
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In the absence of justification pursuant to the
and that civilian impacts must be proportionate
doctrine of self-defence, the use of drones by
to the militar y gain of any use of force.
the United States overseas could be lawful
Considering the three factors: intent
Articles 40 and 41 apply to “the international
responsibility that is entailed by a serious
The final element of the test requires that a state
breach by a state of an obligation arising under a
where the states in whose territories they are
Against this factual backdrop, it is clear that
providing assistance may only be liable at
preemptor y norm of general international law.”29
deployed have provided consent for their use.
while the use of armed drones by the United
international law where the wrongful act
And article 40(2) establishes that:
The governments of Pakistan, Yemen, and
States may in theor y be lawful, in practice its
committed with its assistance is an act, which
Somalia all originally provided consent to the
armed drone programme, especially when
would have been wrongful if committed by the
inter vention of the United States. But the
justified as a “pre-emptive” strike, or a strike in
assisting state directly. Thus if, for example, the
preemptory norm] is serious if it involves a
consent of Pakistan has since been withdrawn,
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or against ISIS in
United Kingdom assists the United States in
gross or systematic failure by the responsible
and given the fragility of government control in
Syria, is ver y likely unlawful. That information is
breaching an obligation that the United States
state to fulfil the obligation.”
both Yemen and Somalia, the consent of those
public, and states providing assistance to the
owes to Canada by virtue of a bilateral treaty
regimes does not provide a firm basis for the
United States where such drone strikes occur
between those two countries, the United
Within that defined scope of “serious” – that is
lawfulness of the United States’ inter vention
must be taken to know the position.
Kingdom does not incur responsibility pursuant
to say, “gross or systemic” – breaches of jus
to the Article 16 rule, since the United Kingdom
cogens or preemptor y norms, article 41
is not itself bound by the provisions of that
provides, inter alia, that:
there by way of armed drone strikes. 26 States
that assist the deployment of drones in Pakistan,
Considering the three factors:
material contribution
Yemen, and Somalia must be taken to know that
“A breach of [an obligation arising under a
30
bilateral treaty. In the context of the provision of
“2. No state shall recognize as lawful a
such strikes are unlikely to be lawful on the basis
The second criterion of a factual contribution to
assistance for United States drone strikes, the
of international consent.
the unlawful act is relatively straightfor ward.
relevant provisions of international law binding
situation created by a serious breach within
While the ILC Commentar y is not uniform in its
upon the United States (namely the prohibition
the meaning of Article 40, nor render air or
The final basis upon which the use of armed
references to the level of contribution required,
on the use of force exception where justified by
assistance in maintaining that situation.” 31
drones overseas may be rendered lawful is if
most academics agree on a minimum threshold
consent or self-defence, and the IHL protections
specific authorization for the use of force has
of at least material contribution. 27
on civilians) bind the United Kingdom and other
States offering assistance just as directly.
been provided pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. But UN Security Council Resolution
Looking at the example of the United Kingdom’s
2249 (2015) on ISIS is not a resolution made
involvement in the United States programme, the
pursuant to Chapter VII and does not purport to
location intelligence provided by the UK’s GCHQ
authorise the use of force in Syria, whether by
spy agency, and other intelligence provided and
way of armed drone or other wise. Accordingly,
relayed from basis located within the UK (but
states assisting the United States must be aware
operated by the United States) may well be
that the United States’ deployment of armed
directly used in United States’ drone strikes.
drones against ISIS in Syria also lacks specific
That would clearly meet the requisite level of
UN authorization.
material contribution.
As to the status of this rule, like article 16 above,
there is considerable support for the conclusion
that this rule of international responsibility
also reflects customar y international law.
Responsibility under articles 40
and 41 of the ASR
The International Court of Justice, in its
Article 16 sets out a general rule of
principle that, in light of “the character and the
responsibility that applies in all circumstances of
importance of the rights and obligations
internationally wrongful conduct, however
involved” in that case, “all states are under an
serious. Articles 40 and 41 of the ASR, on the
obligation not to recognize the illegal situation”
other hand, provide a more narrowly-focused
and “are also under an obligation not to render
rule which applies only in circumstances where
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation
Further, the range of reports from NGOs and the
jus cogens (or “preemptor y”) norms of
created by such construction.”32 While not
UN makes it clear that the United States’
international law are concerned. Accordingly,
referring to Articles 40 and 41 by number, the
programme of drone use carries with it an
some academics have termed Articles 40 and 41
Court’s judgment clearly endorses the rule set
excessive civilian toll, which calls into question
as providing for “aggravated responsibility” at
out in those articles as the correct statement of
compliance with the key international
the international level. 28
international law. The UK House of Lords
humanitarian law standards that weapons must
distinguish between militar y and civilian targets,
26 See Max Byrne, “Consent and the Use of Force: An
Examination of “Intervention by Invitation” as a Basis for US Drone
Strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen,” Journal on the Use of
Force and International Law, 2016, p. 97.
108
27 James Crawford, “Second Report,” [180]-[182] and [188];
and Lowe, “Responsibility,” p. 5.
28
Aust, Complicity, Chapter 7, 319-375.
Palestine Wall advisor y opinion, affirmed the
29
ASR, Article 40(1).
30
ASR, Article 40(2).
31
ASR, Article 41(1)-(2).
32 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep (2004)
136, [159].
109
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S
referred to article 41 in its decision in A and
prohibition on the use of force. 37 The ILC,
The second key consideration in approaching the
from either “recognis[ing] as lawful a situation
others v Secretary of State for the Home
elsewhere in its Commentar y on the ASR,
rule of “aggravated responsibility” under Articles
created by a serious breach’ or ‘render[ing] aid
lists the prohibitions on “genocide, slaver y,
40 and 41 of the ASR is the meaning of the
or assistance in maintaining the situation [of any
Cassazione also relied upon articles 40 and 41,
racial discrimination, crimes against humanity
specific criteria of “systematic” or “gross”
serious breach].” 45
in that case explicitly, in its decision in Ferrini v
and torture”39 as jus cogens norms, together
breaches. The ILC Commentar y provides the
with the “right to self-determination”
following guidance:
Department (No 2),
33
while the Italian Corte di
Federal Republic of Germany,
34
as did the
40
38
also
to which
With respect to the first circumstance –
recognition, the ILC Commentar y explains that
Federal Constitution Court of Germany in a
should be added the basic rules of IHL, which
decision relating to claims for compensation
were termed “intransgressible” in character by
arising from expropriations in the Soviet zone in
the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear
have to be carried out in an organised and
the international community as a whole” not only
1945-1949. 35
Weapons advisor y opinion. 41 Further, as the ILC
deliberate way. In contrast, the term “gross”
refers to “formal recognition of these situations,
has obser ved, that list “may not be exhaustive”
refers to the intensity of the violation or its
but also prohibits acts which would imply such
The rule set out in articles 40 and 41 refers to
and does not prevent the emergence of new
effects; it denotes violations of a flagrant
recognition.” 46 That rule is supported by clear
jus cogens or preemptor y norms of international
rules of international law generally accepted
nature, amounting to a direct and outright
state practice at the international level, such as
law. Those terms denote, as the Vienna
by states as having a jus cogens character. 42
assault on the values protected by the rule.
the non-recognition by states of the Japanese
Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out, a
At present, the rules relevant to drone strikes
The terms are not of course mutually exclusive;
annexation of Manchuria in 1931, the Iraqi
rule of international law which is “accepted and
are the prohibition on the use of force and the
serious breaches will usually be both
annexation of Kuwait in 1990, and the unlawful
recognized by the international community of
basic rules of IHL.
systematic and gross. Factors which may
actions of the racist Rhodesian and South
states as a whole as a norm from which no
establish the seriousness of a violation would
African governments in the 1960s and 1970s. 47
derogation is permitted and which can be
include the intent to violate the norm; the
modified only by a subsequent norm of general
scope and number of individual violations; and
With respect to the second circumstance –
international law having the same character.”36
the gravity of their consequences for the
aid or assistance in maintenance – the ILC
victims.” 43
Commentar y explains:
“To be regarded as systematic, a violation would
this “obligation of collective non-recognition by
A number of features of this rule of state
“This goes beyond the provisions dealing with
responsibility need to be considered. The first is
Importantly, while the intent of a state to violate
the range of jus cogens or preemptor y norms
a preemptor y norm is a relevant factor in the
aid or assistance in the commission of an
potentially relevant to the actions of the states in
assessment of whether a particular violation will
internationally wrongful act, which are covered
conducting drone strikes. The foremost example
be “gross” enlivening the “aggravated
by article 16. It deals with conduct “after the
of such a norm, as the International Court of
responsibility” regime under articles 40 and 41,
fact” which assists the responsible state in
Justice recognized in the Nicaragua case, is the
what is clear is that intent is not a necessar y
maintaining a situation [of serious breach].
precondition to liability in ever y case. The
It extends beyond the commission of the
rationale for this appears to be that, while a
serious breach itself to the maintenance of
limiting factor such as an intention to assist may
the situation created by that breach, and it
be acceptable in article 16 where violations
applies whether or not the breach itself is
other than gross violations are at issue, the
a continuing one.” 48
33 A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
(No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221 (HL), 263
37 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) (Merits) ICJ Rep
14 (‘Nicaragua case’), [190]; see also ILC Commentary on Article
40, [4].
(Lord Bingham).
34 English translation available in: Ferrini v Repubblica Federale
di Germania, Decision No. 5044/04
(2004) 128 ILR 658.
35 Cases No. 2 BvR 955/00, 1038/01, Decision of 26 October
2004. A partial English translation is available in: United Nations
Secretary General, Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: Comments and Information Received from
Governments (9 March 2007), UN Doc. A/62/63,[33]-[40].
36 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155
UNTS 331, Article 53.
110
more serious subject matter of articles 40 and 41
38
ILC Commentary on article 26, [5].
demands a higher degree of vigilance on the part
39
See also the discussion at: ILC Commentary on article 40, [5].
of all states. 44 Against the background of the
40 See, for example, the recognition of the right by the
International Court of Justice in: Accordance with International
Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of
Kosovo (Advisory Opinion) ICJ Rep (2010) 403, [79] and [82]; and
Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v Australia) ICJ Rep (1995)
90, [29].
41 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory
Opinion) ICJ Rep (1996) 226, [79].
42
ILC Commentary on article 40, [6].
subject matter to which articles 40 and 41 are
directed, article 41 clarifies the type of conduct
which is prohibited. The most relevant aspects
are in article 41(2), which prohibits any state
45
ASR, article 41(2).
46
ILC Commentary on article 41, [5].
43
ILC Commentary on article 40, [8].
47
ILC Commentary on article 41, [6]-[9].
44
See: Aust, above n 86, pp. 341-342.
48
ILC Commentary on article 41, [11].
111
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S
As the Joint Committee on Human Rights
used by that other state for perpetrating an act
state. 54 Further, as a species of aggression, the
international law – be it via landing rights at their
obser ved in the context of the receipt by the
of aggression against a third state.”
provision of territor y only gives rise to liability
airfields or approved access through their
United Kingdom of information gained through
status of the rule, while the fact that it is
under this rule if the other state launches from
airspace – may well be judged complicit in the
torture by other states, “aid or assistance”
contained in a resolution of the General
that territor y an act of aggression (that is, an act
international crime of aggression
provided after the fact of a breach may take
Assembly provides a meaningful indication of its
in violation of the prohibition on the use of force),
many forms. In that context, even passive receipt
international acceptance, that is not conclusive
rather than simply any act which breaches
of that information “creates a market for the
from the perspective of customar y international
international law.
Conclusion: the implications
of state exposure to risk
information produced by torture”, thus
law. Eminent academics have argued that the
encouraging the maintenance of the situation in
contents of key aspects of the General
The other crucial ingredient of liability under this
The scope of legal liability for unlawful actions
which other states carr y out torture. 49
Assembly definition of aggression reflect
rule is that the complicit state must have
occurring in the context of armed drone
50
As to the
customar y law, 51 and the International Court of
“placed” the territor y at the disposal of the other
programmes operated by particular states,
On the recognition front, actions by states such
Justice in the Nicaragua case has certainly
state. The territor y being “at the disposal” of the
notably the United States, is thus potentially
as failing to recall, in protest, embedded agents,
specifically endorsed another sub-article of the
other state clearly conveys that the receiving
ver y wide indeed. States consciously providing
failing to cut off ongoing co-operation
definition (Article 3(g) on what constitutes as
state has the power to act for its own purposes
intelligence to the United States, for instance, in
on that section of territor y, as is the case with
the knowledge of the legal concerns raised by a
arrangements, and failing to deny landing rights
“armed attack”) as doing so. 52 Moreover, the full
to drone programme air force assets would likely
General Assembly definition – including liability
the analogous situation of state organs or
large proportion of strikes under the programme
violate the principle of non-recognition. In
for allowing territor y to be used by other states
officials being temporarily “placed at the
(those occurring pre-emptively, or in Pakistan,
respect of aid or assistance, a state keeping in
for aggressive purposes – has now been
disposal” of other states. 55 But the use of
Yemen, Somalia, and against ISIS); states
place information-sharing or other agreements
adopted as the standard for the crime of
construction “which it has placed” demonstrates
continuing to co-operate and recognize those
which mean that another state which uses
aggression for the purposes of the International
that the complicit state must have actively
programmes even after breaches of international
drones unlawfully is not put to the task of
Criminal Court. 53
decided to afford that assistance: it will not be
law; and states allowing their territor y to be
sufficient if, for instance, a part of a state’s
implicated in such drone strikes all face the
looking elsewhere for co-operation would likely
qualify as assistance sufficient to ground liability
In contrast to the more complex elements of the
territor y is used in a clandestine fashion by
prospect of being themselves held liable under
under articles 40 and 41 ASR.
rules on responsibility set out in the ASR, the
another state. 56
the international rules of complicity. That greater
scope of potential wrongdoing presents real
principle of liability for complicity in aggression
Responsibility through
complicity in aggression
In addition to the provisions of the ASR, which
are of general application to a variety of different
violations of international law, there is a specific
where territor y is placed at another state’s
The provision of territor y by one state to another
opportunities for those seeking to disrupt such
disposal is relatively straightfor ward. The rule is
in breach of this rule has occurred previously. In
drone programmes to bring strategic litigation,
only enlivened where physical territor y is
1986, the United Kingdom (in marked contrast to
which targets not the states actually launching
provided, and where that territor y is at least
France and Spain) permitted the United States
unlawful strikes, but any of the states, which
under the effective control of the providing
to fly airstrikes against Libya from United
unlawfully facilitate the same. This approach, of
Kingdom onshore airbases. The United Nations
targeting the concerning actions of a particular
additional rule of international law which
General Assembly condemned the airstrikes,
state indirectly, by focusing on the actions of
provides that a state must not allow its territor y
although the relevant resolution did not explicitly
those that enable that state, has had some
mention the United Kingdom’s role in them. 57
support previously. In R (Zagorski) v Secretary
In the same way, any states providing approval
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 58
and access for their territor y to be placed at the
the UK’s export of an ingredient used in lethal
disposal of a drone programme which breaches
injections overseas was challenged as a means
to be used as the launching pad for acts of
aggression by other states. This rule is codified
50 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on
the definition of aggression, 1974, article 3(f).
in article 3(f) of the United Nations General
51
Jackson, State Complicity, p. 143.
Assembly’s resolution on the Definition of
52
Nicaragua case, [195].
Aggression, which provides that “[t]he action of
53 The original Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
did not include a definition of aggression. The decision to adopt the
General Assembly definition was finally agreed at the 2010
Kampala Review Conference, which provided that the Court would
be entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
once thirty States ratified the amended definition, and the
Assembly of States Parties to the ICC Statute decided to allow
jurisdiction to be exercised. The thirtieth State ratification occurred
on 26 June 2016 with the ratification by Palestine of the Kampala
amendments, but the Assembly is yet to decide that jurisdiction
may be exercised.
a state in allowing its territor y, which it has
placed at the disposal of another state, to be
49 Her Majesty’s Government, “Allegations of UK Complicity,”
[42]. See also: Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism,
Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing Damage, Urging
Action, 2009, p. 85.
112
of disrupting capital punishment in the United
54 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 8th
edition, ed. James Crawford, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 105.
55
See: ASR, article 6; and ILC Commentary to article 6, [1]-[9].
56
Jackson, State Complicity, p. 141.
57 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 41/38 (20
November 1986), UN Doc. A/RES/41/38.
States; and, in early 2017, Rights Watch (UK),
together with Amnesty International and Human
58 [2011] HRLR 6; Case of Zagorski and Baze v Secretary of
State for Innovation, Business and Skills, [2010] EWHC 3110
(Admin).
113
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
I N T E R N AT I O N A L L AW P E R S P EC T I V E S
Rights Watch, challenged the UK’s complicity, by
means of the rules of state responsibility at
international law, in the unlawful conduct of
Saudi Arabia in the Yemen conflict on the basis
of the UK’s export of militar y materiel. 59
States throughout the world that are not
Regional case study:
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 3
Latin
America
Latin American militar y and police institutions
are using unarmed drones, especially for
sur veillance missions in border areas,
territorial waters, for crowd control and
particularly, in anti-narcotics operations. 4
Israel and United States remain the main
operating armed drone programmes are
becoming increasingly drawn into this highly
Hector Guerra is an international relations
suppliers, although there are locally
problematic innovation in modern warfare, which
analyst, and policy and advocacy practitioner in the
developed militar y and police drones, like
raises considerable legal and humanitarian
fields of humanitarian disarmament and human rights
Argentina’s Lipán M3 drone; Colombia’s
concerns. At the same time that a greater
worldwide involvement increases shared
multilateralism. He collaborates with global civil
society networks in diplomatic processes including
on the Arms Trade Treaty, the Convention on Cluster
expertise and facilitates operations with global
Munitions, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of
reach, it also exposes many more states to
Nuclear Weapons.
that complicit states may be challenged within
Ehécatl; or Uruguay’s Charrúa UAV. 5
“Non-lethal” armed drones are in their early
stages of development, but following a clear
potential legal liability for their complicity in the
international drone framework. For, it is clear
Navigator X2; Ecuador’s Fenix; Mexico’s S4
Introduction
their domestic courts for their own breaches of
While no countr y in Latin America currently
international law as assistants to wrongdoing
possesses armed unmanned aerial vehicles
(subject to domestic legal rules as to the
(UAVs), or armed drones,1 there are
justiciability of international law). Those seeking
conditions that could hasten their advent in
new means by which to slow the spread of
the region. Is the appearance of armed drones
armed drone programmes would be well advised
desirable? Is it inevitable? How would they
to consider this strategy of targeting complicity
be acquired and used? Drone technology is
as a means of cutting off the effectiveness of
rapidly evolving, leading to increased levels of
current and future drone programmes.
efficiency, versatility, and affordability.
path towards a potential expansion in design
for different uses in law-enforcement
activities. 6 These are types of UAVs that
could easily become attractive for police and
militar y institutions in Latin America, and
become the first types of armed UAVs in the
region. This could add to the existing global
controversy regarding the production, trade
and use of “non-lethal” law enforcement
equipment and weapons, globally, and in the
region, which is already affected by countless
of cases of abuse by such devices.7
The region has seen a general expansion in
the presence of unarmed drones for private,
commercial, and governmental uses. 2 They
are deemed legitimate and are widely sought,
There are even emerging producers such as
3 Rachel Glickhouse, “Explainer: Drones in Latin America,”
Council of the Americas, 19 April 2017,https://www.as-coa.
org/articles/explainer-drones-latin-america.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
4
Glickhouse.
5
Ibid.
thus making the region an important market.
1 Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Alyssa Sims, Albert Ford,
Christopher Mellon, “World of Drones: Examining the
Proliferation, Development, and Use of Armed drones,”
accessed 1 May 2017,https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/
world-of-drones/.
59 R (Campaign Against Arms Trade) v Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation, and Skills.
114
2 W. Alejandro Sanchez, “COHA Report: Drones in Latin
America,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 12 January 2014,
http://www.coha.org/coha-report-drones-in-latin-america/.
6 Bart Engberts and Edo Gillissen, “Policing from Above:
Drone Use by the Police,” in The Future of Drone Use:
Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal
Perspectives, ed. Bart Custers. Information and Technologies
series, IT & LAW 27 (The Hague: Springer), p. 103.
7 Amnesty International and Omega Foundation, The Human
Rights Impact of Less Lethal Weapons and other Law
Enforcement Equipment, (London: Amnesty International,
2015), pp. 3-4.
115
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: L AT I N A M E R I C A
Factors that could
drive proliferation
There are a variety of economic, technical,
producers to design, produce and sell them—
effectiveness is another factor to be
perhaps through joint ventures with
considered, vis-à-vis conventional alternatives.
companies from Israel, United States, Iran, or
Do the Latin American security institutions
even China and Russia.
have the necessar y financial resources to
Given the potential for the proliferation of
embark on armed drone operations?
armed drones in Latin America, this is the
political, human rights and security factors
Conditions for regulation and
normative development
that could drive the research and
Another accelerating aspect to consider is the
development, production, acquisition and use
deployment of US sur veillance drones in joint
Another factor is the recognition of the human
and institutional controls; deepen research on
of armed drones in the region.
anti-narcotics operations with the
cost of armed drones. Latin American media
risks and advantages; build capacity alongside
governments of Colombia, Dominican
and governments
and intra- and extra-regional cooperation,
Governments in countries affected by drug
Republic and Mexico.
armed drones in targeted killings since the
with a robust participation of civil society.
cartels and the so-called “War on Drugs”
joint operations will replicated throughout the
start of these operations in Asia and Africa in
Indeed, this must occur at the moment when
(such as Mexico), and by civil war (Colombia),
region or even that US drones in operation
2002. There has been awareness about their
the debate remains open regarding the
have resorted to “high-value targeted
over Latin America could become armed.
human rights and humanitarian consequences,
appropriate legal framework to govern drone
and on the need to address this matter to
use. 20
12
It is possible that such
killings”. Should this sort of operation
8
moment to establish and consolidate legal
17
have reacted to the use of
persist, be escalated, or replicated by other
Security, technical and market conditions thus
prevent further use in extrajudicial
countries, chances are that militar y or police
exist for lethal armed drones to be adopted in
executions.18
organisations could begin calling for the
Latin America; nonetheless, there are political
adoption and use of armed drones in targeted
and financial conditions which could delay
The current public security situation is
killings. If —following the steps of other non-
such presence.
complex as it is, in a context of growing
state actors 9 —organized crime and insurgent
organizations resorted to armed drones, this
would likely prompt states to also acquire
them. Countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico and Peru 10 are already using
Israeli-made Heron and Hermes drones for
sur veillance purposes, which are known to
have been armed and used in combat
operations outside the region.11 These aircraft
could potentially be refurbished as strikecapable UAVs. Even if militar y institutions
choose not to acquire them, there may be
interest from police forces to resort to less/
non-lethal models. If market opportunities for
armed violence related to the militarization of
Factors constraining proliferation
On the other hand, there are economic,
human rights and humanitarian implications
that could constrain any immediate drive for
drones have been useful tools,13 they are far
from a “panacea”.14 They are only as efficient
as the intelligence gathered that forms the
basis of their deployment.15 There are many
voices questioning their effectiveness in
precision strikes.16 Given the equipment,
infrastructure, and labour involved, cost12
possibility would open for Latin American
13 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries:
Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 282-283.
9
10
Bergen et al.
Ibid.
11 Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Civilians Killed by
Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles (Washington, DC: Human
Rights Watch, 2009), p. 11.
116
violations by the police and the militar y—
including torture, forced disappearances and
extrajudicial executions.19
14
Glickhouse.
Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries, p. 284.
15 Wim Zwijnenburg and Zorah Blok, “Victims of Drone
Warfare: Stretching the Boundaries of Conflict; Ethics and
Remote Control Warfare,” in ed. Bart Custers, The Future of
Drone Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal
Perspectives (The Hague: Springer, 2016), p. 214.
16
Ibid, p. 212.
lagging. 21 Exceptions exist, notably Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico, where regulations
focus on the right to privacy and air-traffic
security. 22 However, there are no references
to armed drones in these laws.
It is worth noting that the countries, whose
police and militar y institutions are using
drones, have as a minimum, sets of laws,
armed drones. While sur veillance and armed
armed drones’ transfers expand, the
8 Andrew Cockburn, Kill Chain: Drones and the Rise of HighTech Assassins, (London: Verso, 2016), pp. 93-108.
law enforcement and a wave of human rights
Generally, national UAV laws are still
rules or protocols on the use of force by law
17 Bolivia, http://www.embajadadebolivia.eu/es/noticias/
la-embajada-de-bolivia-en-ba-lgica-expresa-su-solidaridad-conel-pueblo-hermano-de-cuba ; Costa Rica, http://presidencia.
go.cr/blog-presidencia/2015/10/discursoonu2015/ ; Cuba,
http://www.minrex.gob.cu/es/intervencion-del-delegado-decuba-juan-antonio-quintanilla-roman-durante-el-debate-generaldel-tema ; Ecuador, http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec/ecuadorparticipa-en-segundo-ciclo-de-examen-periodico-universal-deestados-unidos-de-america/; Venezuela, http://www.eltiempo.
com.ec/noticias/mundo/5/316809/venezuela-vuelve-asuspender-el-dialogo-con-estados-unidos.
18 On 9 November 2013, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights organized a thematic hearing on use of drones
and its impact on human rights in the Americas, at the request
of the Torcuato di Tella University; the International Human
Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School;
and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice & Human Rights
(RFK Center), http://hrbrief.org/hearings/use-of-drones-andits-impact-on-human-rights-in-the-americas/, accessed 7
August 2017.
19 Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab, “Introduction”
in Fragile States in the Americas, ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and
Hanna S. Kassab (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017),
pp. xi-xvi.
20
Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries, p. 281.
21 Marguerite Cawley, “Drone Use in Latin America. Dangers
and Opportunities”, InSight Crime, 2014, accessed 1 May
2017.https://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/drone-usein-latin-america-dangers-and-opportunities.
22 Timothy Ravich, “A Comparative Global Analysis of Drone
Laws: Best Practices and Policies”, in The Future of Drone
Use: Opportunities and Threats from Ethical and Legal
Perspectives, ed. Bart Custers. Information and Technologies
series, IT & LAW 27 (The Hague: Springer, 2016), pp. 312, 313,
316.
117
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: L AT I N A M E R I C A
enforcement agents. 23 In close connection to
All the countries of the region are also states
Any development on disarmament, non-
It has shown less than a friendly approach
this, is a prohibition on torture. All the
parties to all Geneva Conventions and at least
proliferation, and arms control does not come
towards its southern neighbour 31 and
countries from the region are states parties to
to its Protocol I, 25 whose Article 36 regulates
in isolation. Latin America will be a sounding
chances are that Washington’s attention will
the Convention against Torture and other
the acquisition and new use of means or
board and actor in any multilateral process to
remain an extension of its wars on terror and
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
methods of warfare. This means that in
control or regulate drones, especially if any
on drugs. 32 There is also the possibility of an
Punishment. 24
considering the integration of armed drones
initiatives come from the United States.
extension of a global geopolitical
into their arsenals, these countries must make
What will be the effect of Washington’s call
confrontation with China, Iran, and Russia if
sure the legal means and methods of warfare
for a global control on international transfers
these countries escalate their presence in the
are respected. This will come at a moment
of armed drones to start a multilateral
Caribbean basin.
when there are serious doubts as to the
process resulting in a Code of Conduct?
legality of the use of armed drones. 26
This initiative was launched in 2016 through
The Latin American region has shown
the Joint Declaration for the Export and
leadership and norm entrepreneurship in
The membership of the Latin American States
Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled
previous disarmament and arms control
in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is paramount
UAVs and was endorsed by Argentina, Chile,
processes on nuclear weapons, landmines,
in regulating eventual armed drone transfers—
Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 29
cluster munitions, and the arms trade.
23 Examples of these laws, protocols and regulations are:
Argentina, “Regulación y Control del Uso Policial de la
Coerción y la Fuerza en Argentina”, accessed 1 May
2017,http://escuelasuperior.com.ar/instituto/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/Regulacion_y_control.pdf; Brazil, “Diretrizes
sobre o Uso da Força pelos Agentes de Segurança Pública”,
accessed 1 May 2017, http://download.rj.gov.br/
documentos/10112/1188889/DLFE-54510.pdf/
portaria4226usodaforca.pdf; Chile, “Protocolos para el
Mantenimiento del Orden Público”, accessed 1 May
2017,http://deptoddhh.carabineros.cl/assets/protocolos_
mantenimiento_del_orden_publico.pdf; Colombia, “Reglamento
del uso de la fuerza y el empleo de elementos, dispositivos,
municiones y armas no letales, en la Policía Nacional”
accessed 1 May 2017,http://www.policia.edu.co/documentos/
normatividad_2016/reglamentos/Reglamento%20para%20
el%20uso%20de%20la%20fuerza%20y%20el%20empleo%20
de%20elementos%20dispositivos,%20municiones%20y%20
armas.pdf Ecuador, “Reglamento de uso legal, adecuado y
proporcional de la fuerza para la policía nacional”, accessed 1
May 2017,https://www.eempn.gob.ec/documentos_2014/
reglamusofuerza.pdf; Mexico, “Manual del uso de la fuerza, de
aplicación común a las tres fuerzas armadas”, accessed 1 May
2017 https://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.
php?codigo=5346857&fecha=30/05/2014 Paraguay, “Manual
del uso de la fuerza de la policía nacional”, https://www.scribd.
com/doc/56475126/Manual-de-Uso-de-la-Fuerza-de-la-PoliciaNacional-del-Paraguay; Peru, “Decreto legislativo que regula el
uso de la fuerza por parte de la policía nacional”, https://www.
slideshare.net/armandoreyesmendoza/decreto-legislativo-queregula-el-uso-de-la-fuerza-por-parte-de-lapolicia-nacional-delperdl-1186; Uruguay, “Ley de procedimiento policial”, http://
unasev.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/unasev/7f1623a5-6da6492f-b4f1-86679c330808Normativa+de+Tr%C3%A1nsito+y+S
eguridad+Vial_Compilado2016.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=7f1623a56da6-492f-b4f1-86679c330808; Venezuela, “Normas y
Principios para el Uso Progresivo y Diferenciado de la Fuerza
Policial por parte de los funcionarios y las funcionarias de los
Cuerpos de Policía en sus diversos ámbitos
político territoriales”. Accessed 1 May 2017 https://
aldiavenezuela.microjuris.com/2010/03/22/normas-yprincipios-para-el-uso-progresivo-y-diferenciado-de-la-fuerzapolicial-por-parte-de-los-funcionarios-y-las-funcionarias-de-loscuerpos-de-policia-en-sus-diversos-ambitos-politico-territoriale/.
24 “Committee Against Torture”, accessed 1 May 2017,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx.
118
28
Perhaps that pool of expertise and
including transit and transhipment. Only 11
countries of the region are states parties to
It is left to be seen what will be the continuity
commitment could ser ve as a resource to
the ATT, which include drone producers
given to the Global Control, an Obama
drive the control of armed drones in the
Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and
initiative, by the new US Administration
region and beyond. But Latin American states,
Uruguay, as well as Costa Rica, Dominican
under President Trump, and as a
civil society, academia, and media must take
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
consequence, whether there will be
this window of opportunity to discuss and act
Panama. 27
continuous and additional support by the
on a regulation or ban of armed drones before
Latin American nations.
use of the weapons is entrenched by militar y
Development of and compliance with the
and police, and export by arms manufacturers.
discussed legal regulations should ser ve as
This requires due consideration at a time when
an initial framework—along with progress in
the Trump Administration will not pay more
international aviation law—to prevent eventual
attention to Latin America than the Obama
armed drones from being used in violation of
presidency. 30
IHL and IHRL standards and principles, or
from falling in the hands of end users, in or
outside the region, involved in crimes against
humanity, genocide or war crimes.
25 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report
2013, (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross,
2013), pp. 610-611.
28 Chris Cole, “A New International Control Regime on
Armed Drones Led by the US? What is Going on?”, Drone
Wars UK, accessed 1 May 2017, https://www.dronewars.
net/2016/09/02/a-new-international-control-regime-on-armeddrones-led-by-the-us-what-is-going-on/.
26 Laurie Calhoun, We Kill Because We Can. From Soldiering
to Assassination in the Drone Age, (London: Zed Books, 2015),
pp. 306-307.
29 US Department of State, “Joint Declaration for the Export
and Subsequent Use of Armed or Strike-Enabled Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)”, accessed 19 April 2017
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/10/262811.
htm.
31 Alexander Main, “Ce qui attend l’Amerique latine“, Le
Monde Diplomatique, No 754, January 2017, pp 8-9.
27 United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, “Table of
States Parties of the ATT”, last updated 1 May 2017.https://
s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/
Table-of-States-parties-April-10-2017.pdf.
30 Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Obama Administration’s
Foreign Policy Challenges in the Americas” in Fragile States in
the Americas, ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab
(Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p. 274, p. 279.
32 Eric L. Golnick, “United States Defense Policy in Latin
America and the Caribbean”, in Fragile States in the Americas,
ed. Jonathan D. Rosen and Hanna S. Kassab (Lanham,
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017), p. 317.
119
R EG I O N A L C A S E S T U DY: E U R O P E
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Regional case study:
overall cost in comparison to other platforms,
Additionally, there are concerns that drone
related technology, a strict interpretation of
Europe
the ability to loiter over targets for long periods
strikes increase recruitment for terrorist
and adherence to the relevant legal
of time, to strike particular targets and to not
organisations, concerns about related
framework for the context of any particular
place service members in harm’s way. As Chris
effects that the use of armed drones has on
use of armed drones is in the strategic
Cole notes in Chapter 4 on ‘Harm to global
long-term militar y strategy, and the continued
interest of all states. It is especially so for
peace and security’ these perceptions and
risk and reality of the proliferation of armed
those states touting the importance of
factors are harmful in that they contribute to
drones.
relevant international legal principles and their
Jessica Dorsey is a law yer specializing in
international humanitarian law and international
human rights law. She is also a Project Officer in
the Humanitarian Disarmament department at the
5
6
unbridled commitment to the rule of law and
lowering the threshold for policymakers to
Dutch NGO PA X, where she carries out research
approve the use of force.2
These issues make this ever more urgent a
fundamental freedoms, such as Member
and advocacy related to the controversial use and
In a 2015 publication, the United Kingdom’s
topic demanding comprehensive address by
States of the European Union.
Ministry of Defense acknowledged that the
states around the world. Because of the
acquisition of armed drones; the Coordinator of
the European Forum on Armed Drones; and an
Associate Fellow at the International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism—The Hague, where her research
“increased use [of remote and automated
systems] in combat and support functions will
focuses mainly on issues related to foreign fighters
reduce the risk to military personnel and thereby
and countering violent extremism.
potentially change the threshold for the use of
force. Fewer casualties may lower political risk
and any public reticence for a military
As the contributions in this publication
response.”3 It is this impact on decisions
articulate, recent years have seen a steep
regarding the use of lethal force, especially
increase in the use of extraterritorial force
outside of armed conflict, and the current use of
coupled with a large number of civilians
armed drones in a way that challenges relevant
having been killed, seriously injured or
legal standards,4 that make the use of these
traumatized by drone strikes within and
technologies problematic.
outside of recognized areas of armed
conflict.1 Much critique is (rightly) aimed at
the United States (US) as the de facto leader
in carr ying out drone strikes all over the world.
However, the US is not the only active drone
user. Worr yingly, several European countries
may not be far behind the US in terms of the
acquisition of drones and drone-related
technology—and may not be far from the
US in their application of standards for the
use of drones.
Compared to other weapons systems,
advocates consider drones to have inherent
advantages, such as the perceived lower
1 Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the use of armed
drones, (2014/2567 (RSP), European Parliament, 2014,
accessed on 26 May 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-20140172+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
120
2 Micah Zenko, ‘Meet the Press Transcript’, NBC News, 26
April 2015, accessed on 26 May 2017 http://www.nbcnews.
com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-april-262015-n350661.
3 UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends Programme:
Future Operating Environment 2035, 15 December 2015, 31-2,
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/607612/20150731-FOE_35_Final_v29-VH.
pdf.
4 James Igoe Walsh and Marcus Schulzke, The Ethics of
Drone Strikes: Does Reducing the Cost of Conflict Encourage
War?, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 2015,
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1289.pdf; Christof
Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, A/68/382, 13 September
2013, para 17, https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/10/UN-Special-Rapporteur-Extrajudicial-ChristofHeyns-Report-Drones.pdf; Chris Cole, “Drones do ‘lower
threshold for use of lethal force’ academic study finds,”
DroneWars UK, 12 February 2016, https://dronewars.
net/2016/02/12/drones-do-lower-threshold-for-use-of-lethalforce-academic-study-finds/; Jelena Pejic, “Extraterritorial
targeting by means of armed drones: Some legal implications,”
International Review of the Red Cross, 96(893), 3, 7 May
2015, https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jelena-pejicextraterritorial-targeting-means-armed-drones-some-legalimplications.
existence of counterproductive consequences
This case study briefly outlines the state of
that may arise from misusing armed drones or
affairs in European countries with regard to
the acquisition and use of armed drones,
5 Hassan Abbas, “How Drones Create More Terrorists,”
The Atlantic, 23 August 2013, https://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2013/08/how-drones-create-moreterrorists/278743/; Ed Picklington and Ewen MacAskill,
“Obama’s drone war a ‘recruitment tool’ for Isis, say US Air
Force whistleblowers,” The Guardian, 18 November 2015,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/18/obamadrone-war-isis-recruitment-tool-air-force-whistleblowers.
6 Wim Zwijnenburg and Cor Oudes,, Does Unmanned Make
Unacceptable?, PAX Report, 2015, 18-22, http://www.
ikvpaxchristi.nl/media/files/does-u-make-ulowspreads_0.pdf;
Report on Government’s policy on use of drones for targeted
killing, UK Parliament Joint Committee on Human Rights, 2016,
paragraph 1.36, accessed on 10 February 2017, https://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/
jtrights/574/574.pdf; Drones and targeted killings: the need
to uphold human rights and international law, Reply to REC
2069 (2015), Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 8
December 2015, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/XrefXML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=22301&lang=en; Anthony Dworkin,
Europe’s New Counter-Terror Wars, European Council on
Foreign Relations 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/
ECFR192_-_EUROPES_NEW_COUNTER-TERROR_WARS_
FINAL.pdf; Larry Friese., Nic Jenzen-Jones and Michael
Smallwood, Emerging Unmanned Threats: The use of
commercially-available armed UAVs by non-state actors,
Armament Research Services, February 2016, http://www.
paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/pax-ares-special-report-no-2emerging-unmanned-threats.pdf; Nils Melzer, Human Rights
Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in
Warfare, European Parliament Directorate-General for External
Policies of the Union, Directorate B, Policy Department, 2013,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/
join/2013/410220/EXPO-DROI_ET(2013)410220_EN.pdf;
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “ISIS used an armed drone to kill two
Kurdish fighters and wound French troops, report says,”
Washington Post, 11 October 2016, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/10/11/isisused-an-armed-drone-to-kill-two-kurdish-fighters-and-woundfrench-troops-report-says/?utm_term=.6eb5349a7a7a; Eric
Schmitt, “Papers Offer a Peek at ISIS’ Drones, Lethal and
Largely Off-the-Shelf,” New York Times, 31 January 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/middleeast/
isis-drone-documents.html?_r=0.
highlights recent efforts made by European
institutions to discuss their regulation, and
finally describes the work of civil society
organizations in the European Forum on
Armed Drones (EFAD), to contribute a
perspective on engagement in Europe with
respect to armed drones.
State of affairs on drones
in European countries 7
At the time of writing, the United Kingdom
(UK) is the only European countr y to have and
use armed drones. However, many questions
remain about how these drones are being
deployed, against whom, and the legal
7 For more, see, Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed
drones policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in
Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of
Remote Killing, European Center for Constitutional and Human
Rights, May 2017, pp. 28-55, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/
documents/publications/articles/litigating-drone-strikes-engneu.html; Chris Cole, “European use of military drones
expanding,” DroneWars UK, 19 July 2016, https://dronewars.
net/2016/07/19/european-use-of-military-drones-expanding/;
and Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, Towards a
European Position on Armed Drones and Targeted Killing:
Surveying EU Counter-Terrorism Perspectives, International
Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague Research paper,
April 2015, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-DorseyPaulussen-Towards-A-European-Position-On-Armed-DronesAnd-Targeted-Killing-Surveying-EU-CounterterrorismPerspectives.pdf.
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framework governing their use, given that
United States and its drone programme.11
integral issues such as invoking self-defence
This sheds light on how France interprets its
as a justification, using a similar standard to
legal authority when it comes to using lethal
the US’ expansive notion of imminence, and
force, including with armed drones, and is a
the expansive geographical interpretation
major cause for concern.
about where force could be used sparked
public debate in the UK. Several attempts by
Italy also possesses Reaper and Predator
civil society to obtain more clarity on the
drones, but they are unarmed pending
policy and framework have been met with less
budgetar y confirmation to allow for them to
than satisfactor y answers. 8 At the time of
be equipped with Hellfire missiles. Currently,
writing, litigation against the UK is ongoing in
Italy uses the drones it has in sur veillance
order to obtain more clarification on the UK’s
missions. Italy also hosts US drone
perspective, with civil society actors seeking
operations led out of Sigonella Air Force Base
to keep the UK from hiding behind a national-
in Sicily, which has given rise to controversy
security rationale in order to shroud its drone
over the past year. Litigation efforts are
programme in secrecy. 9
under way to elucidate more information about
this agreement.12
France currently has a fleet of Reaper and
Harfang drones that are being deployed for
Germany has been using unarmed Heron
ground troop support and sur veillance
sur veillance drones in operations in
purposes in certain operations in Africa, and
Afghanistan, and has recently ordered a new
is slated to receive additions to its fleet in
fleet that will reportedly “be ordered directly
2019. At the time of writing, France is only
with ammunition.”13 Additionally, Germany is
using its drone fleet in a sur veillance
capacity.10 However, reports as recent as
Januar y 2017 show that the French
government has performed targeted killings—
though not using drones—via the operation
“homo” (short for homicide), some of which
were carried out through French special
forces and some reportedly outsourced to the
8 See, for example, Report on Government’s policy on use of
drones for targeted killing, UK Parliament Joint Committee on
Human Rights, accessed 1 August 2017, https://publications.
parliament.uk/pa/jt201516/jtselect/jtrights/574/574.pdf.
9 See, e.g., “Rights Watch (UK) taking UK to court over
refusal to disclose legal basis for targeted killings,” Rights
Watch UK, 20 July 2017, http://www.rwuk.org/rights-watchuk-taking-uk-government-to-court-over-refusal-to-disclose-legalbasis-for-targeted-killings.
10 Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, “A Perspective on
France,” Center for a New American Security, 2016, http://
drones.cnas.org/reports/a-perspective-on-france.
122
11 See Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed drones
policy in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in European
Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Litigating Drone
Strikes: Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing,
May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/
articles/litigating-drone-strikes-eng-neu.html, footnotes 36-39,
specifically, cf “Comment Hollande autorise ‘léxécution
ciblée’de terroristes”, Le Monde, 4 January 2017, http://www.
lemonde.fr/societe/article/2017/01/04/comment-hollandeautorise-l-execution-ciblee-de-terroristes_5057421_3224.html.
12 Adam Entous and Missy Ryan, “U.S. has secretly
expanded its secret global network of drone bases to North
Africa,” The Washington Post, 26 October 2016, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-has-secretlyexpanded-its-global-network-of-drone-bases-to-northafrica/2016/10/26/ff19633c-9b7d-11e6-9980-50913d68eacb_
story.html?utm_term=.e52535705f75.
13 Srdjan Cvijic and Lisa Klingenberg, “Armed drones policy
in the EU: the growing need for clarity,” in European Center for
Constitutional and Human Rights, Litigating Drone Strikes:
Challenging the Global Network of Remote Killing, May 2017,
https://www.ecchr.eu/en/documents/publications/articles/
litigating-drone-strikes-eng-neu.html, footnote 52, cf “Die
bewaffneten Drohnen kommen”, Spiegel Online, 31 March
2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundeswehrursula--von-der-leyen-laesst-kampfdrohnenentwickeln-a-1026373.html.
European Parliament discusses drone policy.
© The European Parliament
leading on the process to build a European
constraints. At the time of writing, the Dutch
drone (medium altitude long endurance
government has yet to be formed after March
remotely piloted system, MALE RPS), joined
2017 elections but it is likely that when that
by Italy, Spain, and France, planned to be
happens in late 2017, the Dutch will likely
operational by 2025.
move to acquire and arm the Reapers,
14
It also hosts US drone
operations out of Ramstein Air Force Base,
according to statements from a number of
the subject of ongoing litigation.
politicians as well as the armed forces.16
15
Civil society has voiced concern about the
The Netherlands received the green light from
lack of clarity regarding the legal framework,
the US to purchase four Reaper drones, but
whether drones will be armed and where and
has yet to go through with the next steps of
how the drones will be used in Dutch
the acquisition phase due to budgetar y
operations,17 and will continue to monitor the
14 See Dassault Aviation, “European MALE RPAS (medium
altitude long endurance remotely piloted system) Programme
takes off, ”accessed on 1 August 2017, https://www.dassaultaviation.com/en/group/press/press-kits/european-male-rpasmedium-altitude-long-endurance-remotely-piloted-aircraftsystem-programme-takes-off.
15 European Litigating Drone Strikes: Challenging the
Global Network of Remote Killing, Center for Constitutional and
Human Rights, May 2017, https://www.ecchr.eu/en/
documents/publications/articles/litigating-drone-strikes-engneu.html.
situation as necessar y.
16 Jessica Dorsey, “Wat wil Hennis echt met de Reaper
drone?” NRC Handelsblad, 9 May 2017, https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2017/05/09/wat-wil-hennis-nu-echt-met-de-reaper8754175-a1557852.
17 Jessica Dorsey, “Wat wil Hennis echt met de Reaperdrone?” NRC Handelsblad, 9 May 2017, https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2017/05/09/wat-wil-hennis-nu-echt-met-de-reaper8754175-a1557852.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
It has been reported that Spain will acquire
foreign policy subcommittees of the EP
rule of law, human rights, and fundamental
Armed Drones (EFAD). As stated in its Call to
four Reaper drones from the US, with two
(Human Rights and Security and Defense)
freedoms. The proposed elements are in line
Action, EFAD “is a civil society network of
arriving as soon as 2017, and all acquisitions
held a hearing on the use of drones and the
with objectives advanced by the 2016 EU Global
organisations working to promote human rights,
to be in place before Januar y 2019.
fight against terrorism in June 2016, focusing
Strategy and are largely based on elements
respect for the rule of law, disarmament and
Switzerland is also awaiting deliver y of six
on the grave impact that drones have on
found in the 2014 resolution in addition to
conflict prevention.” The Forum was “formed to
Hermes 900 drones to be delivered by 2020
human rights. 21 In September 2016, all 28
existing international standards and
challenge the growing global use of armed
and Poland has plans to acquire approximately
national parliaments of the EU called upon
recommendations at the EU and United Nations
drones and to address key concerns regarding
60 drones to be stationed at a dedicated base
the EU High Representative Federica
(UN) levels
their deployment and proliferation, through
in the northwest of the countr y. So far, plans
Mogherini and EU member states to “work
for these countries’ drone fleets only include
towards common guidelines for the use of
sur veillance and reconnaissance missions.
armed drones.”
18
Recent initiatives by
European institutions
European Parliament
In 2014, the European Parliament (EP) passed
a resolution on the use of armed drones,
expressing concern over the use of such
technology outside the applicable legal
framework.19 It called for a common
European position on using of armed drones,
for European Union (EU) member states to
oppose extrajudicial targeted killings, and for
more transparency and accountability in the
use of armed drones. Following the 2014
resolution, in April 2016, the EP adopted
another resolution that reiterated its grave
concern over the use of armed drones
“outside the international legal framework”
and insisted on the adoption of an EU
common position. 20 Additionally, the two
18 Chris Cole, “European use of military drones expanding,”
DroneWars UK, 19 July 2016, https://dronewars.
net/2016/07/19/european-use-of-military-drones-expanding.
19 Resolution of 27 February 2014 on the use of armed
drones, (2014/2567 (RSP)), European Parliament, 2014, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2014-0172+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
20 Resolution of 28 April 2016 on attacks on hospitals and
schools as violations of international humanitarian law,
(2016/2662 RSP), European Parliament, 2016, http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&r
eference=P8-TA-2016-0201.
124
engaging with governments, European
Council of Europe
22
In 2015, after several debates on the matter, the
institutions and civil society, and by promoting
political and public debate.” 25 The five areas
EFAD focuses its advocacy on are as follows:
In June 2017, the Human Rights subcommittee
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
of the EP published “Towards an EU Common
Europe unanimously adopted a resolution on 27
position on the use of armed drones,”23
January 2015 recognising several legal issues
written by the present author. This publication
that member and observer states still needed to
proposes relevant elements for a legal and
address with respect to the use of armed
policy framework outlining the contours of a
drones. These included national sovereignty,
common position on the use of armed drones.
human rights concerns, and the problematic
The main principles of the document elucidate
broadening of international humanitarian law
principles on requirements for member states
principles. The resolution called for member and
with respect to transparency, accountability
observer states to establish clear procedures
mechanisms and processes, export controls
that respected the limits under international law
and restrictions on assistance provided to
on targeted killing, including investigating deaths
other states, and urges member states to take
caused by drones and openly publishing
up such proposals at national levels for
procedures related to targeting.24 The
EFAD member organisations undertake this work
inclusion in relevant policy and legislation in
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights
in several ways, including through lobbying and
order to reflect the EU’s commitment to the
remains seized of the matter.
advocacy efforts pertaining to the five action
articulate clear policies on the use of armed and
surveillance drones that echo standards already
prescribed by international law; prevent
complicity in unlawful drone strikes; ensure
transparency through information sharing and
providing timely public information; establish
accountability, ensuring the rights of drone strike
victims are upheld; and finally, control
proliferation by strengthening arms exports
regimes and encouraging more open discussion
about stricter control of transfers of drones and
drone-related technology.
points outlined above, carrying out research,
21 “Joint SEDE/DROI public hearing on ‘The use of drones
and the fight against terrorism - the impact on human rights’,”
European Parliament, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
committees/en/droi/events-hearings.
html?id=20160623CHE00021.
European civil society engagement
There is a robust network of civil society actors
within Europe and beyond working on several
issues related to armed drones.
22 “Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence
Policy, 2-4 September 2016, Bratislava, Final Conclusions,”
European Council, 2016, http://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/
Download.aspx?DocID=429373.
One such network is the European Forum on
23 Jessica Dorsey, “Towards an EU common position on the
use of armed drones,” European Parliament DirectorateGeneral for External Policies, June 2017, http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578032/EXPO_
STU(2017)578032_EN.pdf. See also “Subcommittee on Human
Rights Workshop: Towards a European common position on the
use of armed drones?” European Parliament, 22 March 2017,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/committees/
video?event=20170322-1500-COMMITTEE-DROI.
24 Resolution 2051 (2015): Drones and targeted killings:
the need to uphold human rights and international law,
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, 2015, http://
semantic-pace.net/tools/pdf.
aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncve
G1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD
0yMTc0NiZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZ
S5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERG
LnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTIxNzQ2.
engaging with relevant states and non-state
actors, undertaking strategic litigation efforts,
and hosting workshops and conferences to
provide more opportunities for dialogue with
policy makers and legislators at the at the
national, European, and UN levels. EFAD also
engages with transatlantic and global partner
organisations on related initiatives.
25 “Call to Action,” European Forum on Armed Drones,
2016, https://www.paxvoorvrede.nl/media/files/efad-call-toaction.pdf.
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T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
Civil society engagement on armed drones is
such as liberty, democracy, the universality and
more vital now than ever—both in Europe and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
beyond. European countries are generally more
freedoms, the rule of law, preserving peace
opaque in many respects than even the US.
and strengthening international security in
26
Calls by civil society organizations for more
accordance with the UN Charter, and respect for
transparency are largely met with a resounding
principles of international law.30
Ray Acheson
Writing in the mid-20th centur y, the philosopher
Ray Acheson is the Director of Reaching Critical
Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s
silence. This is particularly concerning as
reticence with respect to these issues can give
Recent developments that have seen shifting
the impression of European states’ implicit
geopolitical dynamics due to the posturing of
consent to controversial uses of armed drones.
the US and Russia, alongside the changing
This may in turn lend such activities more
legitimacy.27 As the author Paulussen point out:
“In theory, this lack of public discourse even
8. Gendered Perspectives
International League for Peace and Freedom
Simone Weil encouraged the examination of
technology and means of warfare, rather than
(WILPF). She leads WILPF’s advocacy and research
the ends pursued by armed violence. She argued
on weapons and militarism, which always includes a
that to understand the consequences of war one
gender perspective. Her work also includes
undercurrents within NATO and other alliances,
needs to take apart the mechanism of the
monitoring and analysing international processes
offer European countries and institutions a
and forums related to disarmament.
militar y struggle and analyse the social relations
chance to take a stand and recommit to the
it implies under given technical, economic, and
social conditions.1
could lead to the formation of customary norms,
fundamental freedoms that form the basis of
‘as evidence of a general practice accepted as
the European identity. One way this could be
One consistently underexplored aspect of social
law’…[and a]bstention of protest could also
done is through mechanisms that regulate the
relations in the context of weapons and war is
assist in the process of law-making.” 28
use of armed drones. However, time is running
gender. This chapter, building on the work
out to take any kind of leading role or moral
undertaken by feminist activists and scholars in
high-ground that stays true to the fundamental
the context of the women, peace, and security
rights Europe purports to uphold, before
field as well as those looking at gender and
drone technology has proliferated and the
militarism and gender and technology more
standards of use are far afield from the notions
broadly, seeks to examine the gendered
of international law we know today. If various
implications of the use of armed drones. How do
European countries continue their general
armed drones, as a specific technology,
silence with respect to armed drones, or if they
perpetuate gender essentialisms, including
begin to follow the controversial lead of the US,
violent, militarised masculinities? How, in turn,
they risk being complicit actors in the erosion of
does the development of this form of
the international legal principles and fundamental
mechanised violence affect masculinities?
rights and freedoms upon which the European
How are drones used to commit acts of gender-
identity is built. Civil society engagement,
based violence?
Conclusion
Fundamental rights are at the very core of
the European identity. The EU’s 2016 Global
Strategy serves as a reminder that the EU is
tasked with “promot[ing] a rules-based global
order with multilateralism as its key principle and
the United Nations at its core.”
29
This echoes
the objectives of the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy, which include adhering to values
26 Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, Towards a
European Position on Armed Drones and Targeted Killing:
Surveying EU Counter-Terrorism Perspectives, International
Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague Research paper,
April 2015, https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-DorseyPaulussen-Towards-A-European-Position-On-Armed-DronesAnd-Targeted-Killing-Surveying-EU-CounterterrorismPerspectives.pdf.
27 Anthony Dworkin, “Drones and Targeted Killing: Defining
a European Position,” European Council on Foreign Relations
Policy Brief, July 2013, 2, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR84_
DRONES_BRIEF.pdf; Art. 38, para. 1 (b) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
28
through the EFAD network and beyond, is
a crucial element in engaging governments
This chapter first discusses how genders, in
on these issues in order to reiterate their
particular hegemonic norms of “militarised
commitment to the rule of law and to lessen the
masculinity,” are constructed. It then briefly
human impact of drone strikes.
examines the relationship between gender and
militar y technology, turning to armed drones as a
particularly poignant study in how weapons can
both reinforce and simultaneously undermine
Jessica Dorsey and Christophe Paulussen, above note 7.
29 “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security
Policy,” European Union, 2016, https://europa.eu/
globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/regions/files/eugs_
review_web.pdf.
126
hegemonic gender norms, and what implications
30 Ramses Wessels, The European Union’s Foreign and
Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), p. 59 et seq.
1 Simone Weil, Formative Writings, 1929–1941 (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1987): 174.
127
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S
this has for gender-based violence, gender
transgendered, transsexual, and other sexed
between gender identities and hegemonic norms
debates, popular culture, and family relations. 8
essentialisms, and gender equality.
people are different ages, races, ethnicities,
within and between genders. “Hegemonic
This process also takes place through the
religions, and sexualities; are differently abled;
masculinity” is a “particular idealized image of
marketing of war and weapons culture through
It is important to examine drones through a
have different political views and socioeconomic
masculinity in relation to which images of
toys, stories, films, and social norms. In the
gendered lens not merely as an academic
statuses; and have vastly different experiences
femininity and other masculinities are
United States, for example, “video game and
exercise but as a means to making specific
in the world, in societies, communities, and at
marginalized and subordinated.” In many cultures
film industries both take money from companies
policy recommendations. Understanding the
home. Yet this is rarely recognised by gender
today, hegemonic masculinity is represented by
that make firearms to feature their products”
gendered context and implications of drones is
stereotypes, expectations, and norms. 2
a heterosexual man who is independent, risk-
and then the militar y uses these games and
useful for developing more cogent,
taking, aggressive, rational, physically tough,
films for recruitment. “These extreme examples
comprehensive responses to their use and
courageous, and unemotional.
intersect with the ever yday, mundane lessons
development—just as a gendered lens is useful
for understanding militarism more broadly.
An examination of the gendered aspects of
armed drones does not imply that other means
of warfare are more acceptable, or that policies
such as targeted killings are acceptable by other
means. Instead, an investigation of the ways in
which gender constructions motivate or are in
turn impacted by the use of armed drones can
help policymakers, militar y operators, and
activists confront the unique challenges that
armed drones pose to peace, security, and
gender equality as well as the relationship
between these challenges and militarism more
broadly. Gender analysis should not be a
footnote. It offers specific tools that can help
unpack or understand more fully the ways
drones are perceived by users and victims; the
physical and psychological responses to the use
of armed drones; and the situational context of
Gender is a process constructed by human
societies. Ideas about gender can change
over time. Socially constructed understandings
of gender affect perceptions of social roles,
behaviour, and identity, and have implications
for relations between people. Gender is,
in principle, about social organisation. It
“structures social relationships and upholds and
The construction of gender
Gender does not refer to biological sex, but
rather to socially constructed ideas that attribute
meaning to and differentiate between sexes.
Questions of gender do not exclusively concern
women, but all sexes and sexual and gender
identities. It is also important to recognise that
individuals within a certain sexed or gendered
group are not homogeneous. Women, men,
128
about the importance of being ‘real men’
As the process of constructing gender is based
that boys and men receive from the media and
on differentiation, people other than
their peers, parents, coaches, and more.”9
heterosexual men are considered to be
dependent, risk-averse, passive, irrational, weak,
timid, and emotional.
The militar y, scholars have argued, plays a
primar y role in shaping images of masculinity in
Violent and militarised
masculinities
the larger society,10 to the point where “the
expectations with these actions, they not
This “hegemonic masculinity” is also associated
have linked the development of militarised
only reinforce the gender essentialisms built
with the capacity, willingness, and propensity for
masculinities with the development of the nation-
up by socities and cultures, but they also
violence. Boys come to learn—through parenting,
state, arguing that the sur vival of the state relies
contribute to the establishment and
media, and schooling—to define themselves as
on its ability to consolidate the men, money, and
reinforcement of power relations between
men through violence. The norms of hegemonic
machines required for war. “Citizenship rights,
gender categories.
masculinities—toughness, strength, bravado—
most notably the right to political participation,”
teach boys to excercise dominance through
became linked with bearing arms and violent
Power relations, as Michel Foucault explained in
violent acts and rely upon violence as a form of
masculinity. “In the nineteenth centur y, the
1977, are embedded in processes of
communication.
conscript militar y became the central state
reproduces rules and patterns of expectation.”3
As individuals act out gender norms and fulfill
4
7
categorisation and differentiation. In terms of
5
gender, these processes produce a hierarchy
Boys and men are in particular socialised into
militarised gender identities—and women and
drones in terms of militar y technology as well as
gender relations.
6
2 The fact that there are differences of class, race, culture,
ability, etc. between women and between men and between others
adds complexity to this analysis, but it does not make a gender
perspective theoretically unimportant or politically irrelevant. “In
virtually every culture,” notes Sandra Harding, “gender difference
is a pivotal way in which humans identify themselves as persons,
organize social relations, and symbolize meaningful natural and
social events and processes.” See Sandra Harding, The Science
Question in Feminism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1986): 18.
3 Franck Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic
Masculinity: The Case of the US Navy,” Gender, Work and
Organization 3, no. 3 (1996): 130.
4 Judith Lorberg, Paradoxes of Gender (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1994): 6.
5 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(New York, Vintage Books, 1977).
girls and others are socialised to support such
identities. Militarised masculinities are produced
dominant adult male role model could largely be
the product of the militar y.”11 Some historians
institution establishing and sustaining militaristic
gender ideologies, that is, ideals of women as
weak, in need of protection, passive and
peaceful, and men as rational, war prone and
in various sites, including through the policies
of states, security discourses, education, media
6 Franck Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic
Masculinity”; Maya Eichler, “Miltarized Masculinities in
International Relations,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume
XXI, Issue I (Fall/Winter 2014); R.W. Connell, Masculinities
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
7 Soraya Chemaly, “Why Won’t We Talk About Violence and
Masculinity in America?, Ms. Magazine, 17 December 2012,
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2012/12/17/why-wont-we-talkabout-violence-and-masculinity-in-america.
8 Eichler, “Militarized Masculinities in International Relations”,
op. cit.
9 Lisa Wade, “Tough Guise 2: The ongoing crisis of violent
masculinity,” The Society Pages, 15 October 2013, http://
thesocietypages.org/socimages/2013/10/15/tough-guise-2-anew-film-on-the-ongoing-crisis-of-violent-masculinity.
10 Michael S. Kimmel and Michael A. Messner, Men’s Lives
(New York: Macmillan, 1989): 176-83; David H. J. Morgan,
“Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities,” in Harry
Brod and Michael Kaufman (eds.) Theorizing Masculinities
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994).
11 William Arkin and Lynne Dobrofsky, “Military socialization and
masculinity,” Journal of Social Issues, 34,1 (1978): 151–168.
129
T H E H U M A N I TA R I A N I M PAC T O F D R O N E S
G E N D E R E D P E R S P EC T I V E S
No drones protest in San Diego, organized by Code Pink.
practice and institution,” argues Kimberly
This brings us to armed drones. These weapons
Hutchings.
are literally gendered by their fuller name,
16
At the same time, “war plays a
special role in anchoring the concept of
“unmanned aerial vehicles”. In the context of a
masculinity, providing a fixed reference point
culture of militarised masculinities and
for any negotiation or renegotiation of what ...
masculinised technological development, these
hegemonic masculinity may mean.”
tools of violence and of war have specific
The standards of conduct or ways of being that
characteristics that simultaneously reinforce and
are adopted by men that value and conform to
undermine hegemonic gender norms. This in turn
the hegemonic masculinity are consistent with
has implications for the notion of men as
the standards and ways of those engaged in war.
expendable and vulnerable, as predators and
17
protectors, and poses serious challenges for
Gender and military technology
breaking down gender essentialisms or
achieving gender equality in a broader context.
They are also consistent with the technological
means created to conduct warfare. Gender
relations are “materialised in technology”,
“Projecting power
without vulnerability”
through which the meaning and character of
masculinity and femininity are further developed
“through their enrolment and embeddedness in
projecting vulnerability in the same ratio has
working machines,” argues scholar Judy
favoured the development of aerospace
Wajcman.
capabilities resting firmly in the ever-evolving
18
© 2013 Steve Rhodes,
The ability to project “distance influence without
Wajcman argues that the ver y
definition of technology is cast in terms of “male
foundation of modern technology,” wrote Major
activities”—activities associated with the
General Charles D. Link of the US Air Force in
aggressive.”12 Primacy in the militar y was,
institutions. The practices of militar y institutions
hegemonic masculinity. The traditional
2001. 20 The quest for “deploying militar y force
and still is, awarded to “toughness, skilled use
engage actively in the processes of
conception of technology, in this regard, is
regardless of frontiers” and “extending imperial
of violence, presumption of an enemy, male
differentiating and “othering” that reinforces the
industrial machiner y and militar y weapons—tools
power from the center over the world that
camaraderie, submerging one’s emotions, and
ideal of masculinity and gendered hierarchies.
of work and war.
constitutions its peripher y” 21 long precedes the
discipline (being disciplined and demanding it
For example, there is a tradition in the militar y of
of others).”
reser ving the labels associated with femininity
Because of this, technology and gender have
has found a solution to this challenge in the
13
armed drone. But the militar y seems to believe it
for the “other”. Many militaries insult a potential
become interlinked in terms of the process of
The dominant form of militarised masculinity is
armed drone. As US Air Force official David
or defeated army by calling him a woman;
their development and their use. Technological
not universal—it can be crafted to ser ve
Deptula stated, “The real advantage of
recruits in training that do not keep up are
products bear their creators’ mark, argues
peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, or combat
unmanned aerial systems is that they allow you
subject to gendered insults: they are called girls
Sandra Harding. If technology is developed and
roles; it can var y based on nationality; and it can
to project power without projecting vulnerability.”
and pussies by their instructors.
utilised primarily by men operating within a
15
var y when wielded in domestic and foreign
framework of militarised masculinity, their
Drones have an ethos of invulnerability to them.
operations.14 But these militarised masculinities
The ideals of the hegemonic masculinity “provide
creations will be instilled with their framework of
They enable their operators to strike targets far
are embedded within the institutions of violence
a framework through which war can be rendered
thought, knowledge, language, and interpretation.19
away at a moment’s notice without any warning.
and perpetuate that culture beyond these
both intelligible and acceptable as a social
12 Saskia Stachowitsch, “Military Privatization and the
Remasculinization of the State: Making the Link Between the
Outsourcing of Military Security and Gendered State
Transformations,” International Relations, 27(I) 74–94: 78.
15 Ibid.; Penny Strange, It’ll Make a Man of You: Feminist View
of the Arms Race (Nottingham: Five Leaves Publications, 1983). As
Barrett, “The Organizational Construction of Hegemonic
Masculinity,” p. 134, argues, integrating women in military isn’t
going to “dilute the tough image associated with the ideology of
masculinity.” They are often seen as having been cut a break by
being “allowed” in without having to go through the same rigorous
training as men.
13 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990): 150.
14
Ibid.
130
In the 1980s, Donna Haraway described what
she called the “god-trick” of Western scientific
16 Kimberly Hutchings, “Making Sense of Masculinities and War,”
Men and Masculinities, vol. 10, no. 4, June 2008, 389–404, p. 389.
17
Ibid., p. 390.
18 Judy Wajcman, “Feminist theories of technologies,”
Cambridge Journal of Economics 2009, p. 2.
19
epistemologies—the illusion of the panopticon,
Sandra Harding, op. cit.
20 Charles D. Link, “Maturing Aerospace Power,” Air and Space
Power Journal, 4 September 2001.
21
Chamayou, p. 12.
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the ability “to see ever ywhere from a
underpinned with cultural dispositions that
disembodied position of ‘nowhere’ as an
determine what is seen and how it is seen.
generally.”
25
integral component of histories of militarism,
29
Furthermore, they are seeking to
The imager y of rape and nonconsensual activities
“emasculate” those they have determined are
is not an aberration. A culture of sexual
“enemies” in a racist, sexist, and sexualised
violence—and subsequent immunity—is part of
capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy.”22
Despite this, the US militar y and others using
approach to armed violence. The “Sky Raper”
the culture of dominance and invulnerability that
More recently, Lauren Wilcox has described how
drones continue to project the god-like qualities
represents the “white Western phallic
is ingrained within the militar y’s purposeful
this “is seemingly perfected in the weaponized
of drones—including their invulnerability and
power” enforcing power and masculinity over
development of violent masculinities and a
drone, with its global sur veillance capacities and
omnipotence. “Ever ywhere and nowhere,” Ian
purported efficiency and accuracy in
Shaw warns, “drones have become sovereign
targeting weapons.”
tools of life and death, and are coming to a sky
This can perhaps become particularly true in
female soldiers are often subject to sexual
near you.”26 Armed drones “have become so
relation to the use of armed drones in countries
assault. In 2012, an estimated 26,000 US
In reality, drones have proven to be neither as
prolific that they are now a standard part of U.S.
without the “host” government’s consent. A
militar y personnel were sexually assaulted by
efficient or accurate as their users may like their
militar y culture,” write investigative journalists
2013 US Justice Department white paper
their colleagues. Women, at the time making up
publics to believe. The tools and procedures
Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald.
declared that a drone strike can proceed “with
15 percent of US active-duty forces, were
used for determining targets for “signature
of this is that they are often given nicknames.
the consent of the host nation’s government or
disproportionately attacked. The 2013
strikes”—attacks based on “producing packages
One of these, according to a former Joint Strike
after a determination that the host nation is
documentar y film The Invisible War revealed that
of information that become icons for killable
Operating Command (JSOC) drone operator
unable or unwilling to suppress the threat.”
a female soldier in a combat zone is more likely
bodies on the basis of behavior analysis and a
inter viewed by The Intercept, is “Sky Raper”. He
Academic Lorraine Bayard de Volo argues that
to be raped by a fellow soldier than killed by
logic of preemption”—have resulted in hundreds
said it is called this “because it killed a lot of
this “demasculizes” the governments of host
enemy fire. 33 In 2015, the UN Human Rights
of civilian casualties in drone strikes. Documents
people.”28 The nickname goes beyond that given
nations, which are “unable to protect their own
Council’s Universal Periodic Review panel urged
leaked to The Intercept in 2015 show how
to a tool for killing, however. It perpetuates the
borders against penetration by U.S. drones.”
the US militar y to take action to prevent sexual
“signature strikes” are conducted on the basis of
culture of domination that, as argued earlier,
She also says it suggests the United States is
violence, ensure prosecution of offenders, and
“intelligence” collected from video feeds, email,
is a key component of the development of
the “self-appointed patriarch” and that “nations
offer redress for victims. 34 However, as the most
social media, spy planes, and mobile phones.
militarised masculinities. It also reinforces the
that do not consent are rendered, in effect,
recent Department of Defense report has shown,
The “intelligence” is analysed for patterns
institutionalisation of rape as a tool of war.
legally incapable of consent.”
75 per cent of those who have been sexually
23
through the use of algorithms. This process is
27
One sign
“By nicknaming a drone ‘Sky Raper’ operators—
“the other”.
“warrior ethos,” as described above. One
30
immediate consequence of this culture is that
31
32
It would also
seem to suggest that the US government could
assaulted in the militar y lack the confidence in
unique to drone strikes. 24 (Part of this process,
who are actors of the State—own the use of
decide to bomb in such countries without their
the militar y justice system to even report the
as will be seen below, is gendered.)
rape for domination and to defeat a target, while
government’s—which sounds ver y much like an
crimes against them. 35
simultaneously participating in the normalization
allegor y for rape.
This process is not immune to interpretation,
of rape as a larger systemic issue,” argues
bias, or mistakes by those using the information
researcher Erin Corbett. “Not only are operators
Of course such actions are not necessarily
to determine targets for drone strikes. As Kyle
suggesting that it is appropriate to use rape as a
unique to armed drones. Other weapons can and
weapon against individuals in a time of war, they
have been used to “penetrate” borders without
to be used by men in ways that allegedly confirm
are also making light of sexual violence more
consent. However, such practices seem to have
their own manhood and simultaneously preser ve
reached the level of official policy with the use of
the masculinized atmosphere in certain
armed drones.
institutional spaces.”36
Grayson explains, targeted killings, including
with drones, depend on the identification and
sur veillance of a target, but these processes are
22 Lauren Wilcox, “Embodying algorithmic war: Gender, race,
and the posthuman in drone warfare.” Security Dialogue, 48, no. 1,
p. 13, describing Donna Haraway, “Situated knowledges: The
science question in feminism and the privilege of partial
perspective,” Feminist Studies 14(3): 575–599.
23
Lauren Wilcox, op. cit. p. 13.
24 For details of these processes, see Cora Currier, “The kill
chain: the lethal bureaucracy behind Obama’s drone war,” The
Intercept, 15 October 2015, https://theintercept.com/dronepapers/the-kill-chain.
132
Cynthia Enloe connects this violence by male
25 Kyle Grayson, “Six These on Targeted Killings,” Politics
32(2): 120–128.
26 Ian Shaw, “Intervention – From Baseworld to Droneworld,”
AntipodeFoundation.org, 14 August 2012, https://
antipodefoundation.org/2012/08/14/intervention-from-baseworldto-droneworld.
27 Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald, “The NSA’s secret role
in the U.S. assassination program,” The Intercept, 10 February
2014, https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/.
28
Ibid.
soldiers toward women inside the militar y to
“the masculinized idea that women are property
33
29 Erin Corbett, “On Nicknaming Predators,” The Feminist Wire,
22 June 2015, http://www.thefeministwire.com/2015/06/onnicknaming-predators/.
30 Jasbir K. Puar and Amit Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The
War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots,” Social
Text 20, no. 3 (2002): 137.
See http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/films/invisible-war.
34 Jenna McLaughlin, “The US Military’s Sexual-Assault Problem
Is So Bad the UN Is Getting Involved,” Mother Jones, 14 May
2015, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/un-humanrights-council-us-military-do-better-victims-sexual-violence.
31
Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 63.
35 Department of Defense Annual Report on Sexual Assault in
the Military, Fiscal Year 2015, Department of Defense, 2 May
2016, http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY15_Annual/FY15_
Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf.
32
Ibid.
36
Enloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: 156.
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There is a direct relationship between sexual
technologies of war that undermine the ethos
interception system are not stereotypically
There are reports of high levels of stress and
violence in the militar y and nicknaming a drone
that sustains such masculinities raises significant
male leaders.”
even post-traumatic stress disorder amongst
“Sky Raper”: this is about violent masculinities
40
questions for the gendered hierarchies upon
drone pilots. The psychological injuries suffered
which the militar y relies. If machines come to
The alternative to accepting “feminization” is to
by drone operators “often revolve around
undermine the masculinity of its operator, is the
change the goal posts altogether. Some media
gendered and raced associations of guilt and
operator being “feminised”?
reports, based on the language of militar y
innocence of drone victims,” argues Bayard de
officials, have come to laud technical proficiency
Volo. 45 Killing “women and children” is
Undertaking a gendered discourse analysis of
as a warrior skill. In terms of cyber security,
ostensibly avoided and, as some operator
inter views with drone pilots, PhD candidate
soldiers are described as “cyber warriors” by
transcripts demonstrated, acknowledgement of
Lindsay Murch found that one drone pilot’s claim
their commander; technical prowess is elevated
However, the projection that drones are
such deaths is also avoided. 46
to “emotional disturbance”—which ran counter
to a militaristic skill. Meanwhile, “Profiles in
invulnerable does not necessarily imply that
to the expected narrative for him as a man
sources like Wired reinforce the connection
However, such psychological harms may now be
those who operate them are. In contrast, the
operating in a militar y capacity—was causing
between technical prowess and masculinity
seen as a “badge of honour” and a mark of
supposed invulnerability of drones is based on
him to consider “getting out of” the role.
through featuring pictures of the new ‘geek
masculine courage: while drone pilots are not
the dislocation of their operators from danger.
He claimed, “he just wanted to be a ‘hero’
warriors’ in militar y gear, posing next to the
risking their physical bodies in combat, they are
The user is protected by distance from the
and that the role of drone pilot was not enabling
weapons which they pilot remotely, along with
risking their mental health. “This would be a
subjects it is targeting with the drone. This
him to reach this goal.” Murch suggests this
statistics about their kill ratios.”
specific form of braver y,” writes Chamayou,
separates the “warrior” from war, the body from
could be construed as a sense that he was
the battlefield. This has important implications
being “feminised”. 38
dominating and directing the conduct of
soldiers—invulnerable warriors, immune from
prosecution for rape and war crimes—on and off
the battlefield.
“Emasculating” the warrior
for militarised masculinities.
“One of the troubles with unmanned aerial
41
“defined no longer by the exposure of one’s
This requires a switch in ethic—from one of self-
physical vulnerability to enemy violence, but
sacrifice to one of self-preser vation. What was
exposure of one’s psychic vulnerability to the
once considered cowardice must now been seen
effects created by one’s own destructiveness.”47
Mechanising warfare and protecting the soldier
vehicles is literally the peril of becoming
as courage. 42 The notion that killing someone
from risk of bodily harm seems to be in
‘unmanned’ in ever y sense of the term,” argues
remotely involves a kind of braver y, even without
In World War I, both physical and psychic
contradiction to the ethos of militarised
Chamayou. “That also is why those Air Force
any risk to oneself, requires this switch. It
vulnerabilities played a role in anti-war activism.
masculinity. Engaging an “enemy” from a
officers initially put up such resistance to the
requires an argument that this act itself has a
Jane Addams, founder of the Women’s
distance to which he or she cannot respond is
general adoption of the drones. Obviously the
cost. “One has to make an effort to force
International League for Peace and Freedom,
like shooting someone in the back. It is the
drones threatened their own employment, their
oneself to overcome one’s original repugnance
spoke about the nightmares of soldiers in which
antithesis of methods of warfare that celebrate
professional qualifications, and their institutional
at doing it and seeing it and, perhaps above all,
they relived killing on the battlefield, or acts of
braver y, courage, and sacrifice.
position, but the threat was also to their own
seeing oneself do it,” explains Chamayou.
resistance against “the horror of killing”. But as
“The attempt to eradicate all direct reciprocity in
any exposure to hostile violence transforms not
only the material conduct of armed violence
technically, tactically, and psychically, but also
the traditional principles of a militar y ethos
43
virility, which was largely associated with the
Chamayou remarks, “this theme of soldiers as
This appears to lend to the psychological strain
victims of the violence they were forced to
“media portrayals of the new ‘technogeek warrior’
on drone operators now being seen amongst US
commit,” which was once a criticism of the
have noted that the men who command systems
militar y personnel. “These seemingly omnipotent
institutions that made them do so, “is now being
like Israel’s Iron Dome mobile anti-rocket
killers who cannot be killed are vulnerable to
recycled, in a modified form, in order to promote
psychological injur y,” writes Bayard de Volo. 44
the legitimization of dronized homicide.” Rather
taking of risks.”
39
Mar y Manjikian suggests that
officially based on braver y and a sense of
than drawing attention to soldiers’ “psychic
sacrifice,” argues Chamayou. “Judged by the
yardstick of such classical categories, a drone
looks like the weapon of cowards.”37
The tension between the preser vation of
militarised masculinities and the development of
37
Chamayou, p. 88.
134
wounds” in order to critique the militar y,
38 Lindsay Murch, “Sex and gender in drone pilot interviews,”
Security Dilemmas, 27 January 2015, https://securitydilemmas.
wordpress.com/2015/01/27/sex-and-gender-in-drone-pilotinterviews.
39 Chamayou, op. cit., p. 100. Also see Frank Sauer and Niklas
Schörnig, “Killer drones: The ‘silver bullet’ of democratic warfare?”
Security Dialogue 43 (4): 363–380 and Mary Manjikian, “Becoming
Unmanned: The gendering of lethal autonomous warfare
technology,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 16 (1):
48–65.
40
Mary Manjikian, op. cit., pp. 52–53.
41
Mary Manjikian, op. cit., p. 53.
42
Chamayou, op. cit., p. 101.
43
Chamayou, op. cit., p. 102.
44 Lorraine Bayard de Volo, “Unmanned? Gender Recalibrations
and the Rise of Drone Warfare,” Politics & Gender, 12 (2016),
p. 52.
“nowadays it ser ves to bestow upon this
45
Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 52.
46 Lauren Wilcox, op. cit.; Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., pp.
67–69.
47
Chamayou, op. cit., p. 103.
135
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unilateral form of violence an ethico-heroic aura
This aspect of the warrior ethos of hegemonic
violence and physical domination over others
basis of their sex then this constitutes a
that could not other wise be procured.”
masculinity—unemotional, detached, serious,
portrayed as weaker.
form of gender based violence (GBV). 54
Hierarchy is fundamental to militar y training.
Beyond the immediate moral and legal problems
“cowardice” of hiding behind a machine to kill,
Teaching human beings to kill other human
of such an approach, the use of sex as a signifier
directed and guided by the norms of masculinity
armed drones can also “project a predator y
beings “requires dehumanizing others by
of identity in targeting or analysing strikes
that are already embedded in the culture.
masculinity, a powerful and abusive machine that
promoting the belief that another human is
contributes problematically to reinforcing gender
Lindsay Murch’s analysis of drone pilot
emasculates targeted men.”50 To some extent,
somehow a ‘lesser’ creature,” Cynthia Enloe
essentialisms, in particular notions of women as
inter views found that showing emotion in the
this goes against the masculine “protector” role
explains. “One of the central forms of
passive and weak. The construction of a “weaker
face of these “psychic wounds” was, not
the US militar y in particular has projected
dehumanization promoted by militar y training and
sex” in “need” of protection is not just about
surprisingly, coded as feminine and associated
throughout histor y. However, in the case of
the culture of daily life in the militar y has been
women being physically weaker but also socially
with instability. “No one talked about it. No one
armed drones, the association of the technology
the supposed inferiority of women—that women
weaker—it suggests that it is worse if women
talked about how they felt after anything. It was
with predators and grim reapers may be what is
are less than men.”
are killed than men. This in turn produces a
like an unspoken agreement that you wouldn’t
necessar y to maintain the violent, militarised
talk about your experiences,” said one pilot.
masculinities that are relied upon to conduct war.
Another inter viewee denied any emotional
It also, as Bayard de Volo points out, “invites
response but referred to “seriousness” in
and legitimates a masculine response.”51
undertaking any lethal action. “The tone of the
Affected populations, viewing the perpetrators of
inter viewee is staunchly masculine,” writes
drone strikes as a predator y male, are
Murch, “relying heavily on the rational (there are
incentivized to adopt the masculine protector
no emotional calls for revenge against targets or
role in their communities, to fight back against
tenderness in reflecting on the target’s children),
the aggressor.
48
rational—is protected. Furthermore, at the same
But while this emerging form of “braver y”
reinforces traditional masculinities, it is also
time that operators seem to struggle with the
referring to the rules of engagement and laws of
armed conflict as a means of justifying killing
Subordination and expendability
53
widespread acceptance of relative expendability
This leads not only to violence against women in
the militar y, as described above, but also to
gender-based violence more broadly, targeting
The idea that women are weaker and thus
women but also men or others who do not
deser ving of special protection in wartime due to
properly exhibit hegemonic masculinity. Of
48
Chamayou, op. cit., pp. 104–105.
49
Murch, “Sex and gender in drone pilot interviews,” op. cit.
136
“inherent vulnerabilities”56 is to an extent
interest to this study on the gendered impacts of
embedded within international humanitarian law
armed drones, however, is that militarised
(IHL). The Geneva Conventions evidence an
masculinities also lead to acts of gender-based
androcentric approach such that where they
violence in which men are targeted in so-called
address women specifically they tend to frame
signature strikes just for being men.
them as objects needing “protection,” rather
than as actors. 57 For example, the Conventions
(masculine both on the basis of being active and
acting as a warrior/soldier in killing).”49
of men. 55
The maintenance and perpetuation of militarised
While drone strikes are not necessarily targeting
note that in all circumstances “women shall be
masculinities is key to the maintenance of
individuals solely because they are men of a
treated with all the regard due to their sex”58
militarism. “The ideology of hegemonic
certain age, those executing the strikes appear
and state that women should “be especially
masculinity (and the various hierarchical
to be using sex as a signifier of identity for the
protected against any attack on their honour, in
discriminations it permits) is presented as
purpose of assessing whether or not a subject is
particular against rape, enforced prostitution or
underpinning the kinds of value systems,
targeted, and/or whether a strike is allowed (i.e.
divisions of labor, institutions, and subjectivities
taking into account the sex of others in the
that sustain war as a practice,” writes Kimberly
vicinity of the strike), and/or to determine the
Hutchings. 52 But part of what is necessar y to
impact of a strike subsequently. The sex of the
sustain war as a practice is the killing of human
subject is not the motivation for the attack, but it
54 For more on the relationship between drones and genderbased violence, see Ray Acheson and Richard Moyes, Sex and
drone strikes: gender and identity in targeting and casualty
recording, Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom and Article 36, October 2014.
beings. Turning men into warfighters requires
is being used as one proxy for another identity—
55
breaking down their sense of ethics and morals
militant—which in turn provides the motivation. If
and building up a violent masculinity that is
people are targeted, or considered to be
lacking in empathy and glorifies strength as
militants when proximate to other targets, on the
56 R. Charli Carpenter, “Women, Children and Other Vulnerable
Groups: Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians
as a Transnational Issue,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49,
No. 2, June 2005, p. 308.
50
Lorraine Bayard de Volo, op. cit., p. 65.
51
Ibid.
52 Kimberly Hutchings, “Making Sense of Masculinities and
War,” op. cit., p. 393.
Acheson and Moyes, Sex and drone strikes, op. cit.
57 Women and explosive weapons, Reaching Critical Will of the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, February
2014.
53 Cynthia Enloe, “Beyond ‘Rambo’: Women and the Varieties of
Militarized Masculinity,” Women and the Military System, edited by
Eva Isaakson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), pp. 71–93.
58 Article 12, C.I and C.II, Article 14, C.III; F. Krill, The
Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law (1985),
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 249, http://www.icrc.
org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmfj.htm
137
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any form of indecent assault.” 59 Pregnant
the vulnerability of men in the immediate term,
longer recognizable as human remains?” 65
case of drone operators it is rendered manifest
women also receive particular protection,
exacerbating other “gender-based vulnerabilities
While this may be true of any act of war, with
and permanent as a result of the superimposition
wherein “maternity cases and pregnant women,
that adult civilian males face, including risks of
any weapon or technology, the unique ways in
of two worlds separated at ever y count. The
who refrain from any act of hostility, shall enjoy
forced recruitment, arbitrar y detention, and
which signals intelligence is used to disembody
drone operators are in a sense both in the rear
the same general protection as that accorded to
summar y execution.”
the target before that person is physically
and at the front, caught up in two ver y different
the sick and wounded.”
of violent masculinities—men are treated as
disembodied by the strike is significant. It points
moral worlds that pull their lives this way and
Michelle Jar vis note in their publication Women,
expendable by an opposing force and by their
to an increasing remoteness and abstraction of
that. They epitomize the contradiction of
Armed Conflict and International Law that nearly
own societies, which can lead to increased
violence, an execution of human beings by
societies at war outside by living inside as
half of the 42 specific provisions relating to
militarisation of men in affected populations on
machines that, as autonomy and the use of
though they are at peace. Only they are in both
women in the Geneva Convention and the
the understanding that they need to “protect”
algorithms are increased in the development and
worlds, exactly at the hinge of the contradiction,
Additional Protocols deal with women only as
their communities by engaging in violence.
operation of weapons, is likely to lead to
pulled asunder between the two poles. They live
increasing civilian casualties and also to the
out the duplicity of the moral regime of so-called
The phenomenon also reproduces the power
further erosion of the sense of value of human
democratic states that are also imperial militar y
The framing of women in IHL as vulnerable and in
asymmetries and gendered hierarchies that
life when it pertains to “the other”.
powers. 67
need of protection reproduces the idea that
underpin many acts of gender-based violence
against women and others. More broadly, it
The “erasure of human suffering in war,” as
This contradiction described by Chamayou in
men are not. It runs the risk of turning “women
reinforces established gender hierarchies that
Gregor y puts it, which is an element throughout
relation to drone operators is significant—but
and children” into a proxy for “civilian” and
are recognised to work against the
histor y in official accounts of conflict, is arguably
when gender is taken into account, it is only one
establishment and sustainment of a more
enhanced with the violence perpetrated with
of the contradictions armed drones create. The
equitable society. Framing women as weak
armed drones. Drawing on the work of Cavarero,
contradiction between drone operators as
where women constitute a high ratio of
and in need of protection continues to enable
he suggests that the destruction of the body
combatants, sex is used “as a shortcut to
their exclusion from authoritative social and
caused by armed drones “is morally significant
also a contradiction between drones as tools
distinction” between civilians and combatants. 63
political roles.
because it targets the ver y individuality of the
that “emasculate” their users whilst reinforcing
60
Judith Gardam and
64
It also reinforces notions
expectant or nursing mothers. 61
“women and children” are “innocent” while adult
“obfuscating the existence of men in the civilian
population,” notes Charli Carpenter.
62
Even
“warriors” and as “cowards” is another; there is
human being, reducing them— quite literally—to
the militarised masculinity of their victims, or as
Furthermore, marking certain populations as
mounds of flesh and bone.” Of course, other
tools that project a “predator y” masculinity
threats simply because they are men of a certain
airstrikes or missile strikes can cause the same
whilst triggering a local “protectorate”
Thus the establishment and reinforcement of
age in a certain location or exhibiting behaviour
devastation. But when coupled with the
masculinity. Either way, armed drones victimise
violent masculinities is really in no one’s interest.
deemed by algorithms to be suspicious has
remoteness of the operator, the “cowardly”
and make vulnerable men and hegemonic
Associating maleness with violence increases
implications for the normalisation and abstraction
method of warfare described above, a moral or
masculinities. All of this has practical
of violence. As Thomas Gregor y explores, it
ethical perspective on armed drones may
implications for war and peace, for violence and
ignores the people that are affected—their
suggest a particularly repugnant character of
security, and for gender equality. The culture of
bodies and their embodied experiences. He asks,
this violence.
armed drones, embedded within the technology
This ser ves to reinforce men’s expendability and
makes them more vulnerable to attack.
59 Art. 27; C. IV; Art. 75 and 76, P.I.; F. Krill, Ibid. Describing
rape and enforced prostitution as attacks on women’s honour,
rather than on their physical integrity or freedom or agency, is
extremely problematic. The perception of women’s sexuality as a
symbol of honour belongs to patriarchal cultures and is the very
reason why rape and enforced prostitution are so common during
armed conflict.
Art. 8; AP. I ; F. Krill, Ibid.
66
“What happens to the bodies of those who are
targeted by drones? What do their experiences
and its use, and within the broader norms of
Conclusion
tell us about the limitations of language for
challenges for preventing violence, protecting
thinking about the pain and suffering caused in
Men at war need to forge for themselves a
61 H. Durham & K. O’Byrne, “The dialogue of difference: gender
perspective on international humanitarian law,” International
Review of the Red Cross, Volume 92 Number 877, March 2010.
war? What does it mean when violence
special moral world in which, unlike in the civilian
overshoots the more elementar y goal of taking a
world, killing is a virtue, not something
62 R. Charli Carpenter, 2005, op. cit., pp. 303–304. Carpenter
cites examples from literature and photographs of the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and humanitarian aid
organisations to demonstrate the ubiquitous nature of gendered
references to civilians.
life, dedicating itself to destroying the body as
prohibited. There is always a latent contradiction
body, so that the remains of the victims are no
between these normative regimes, but in the
60
63 R. Charli Carpenter, “Recognizing Gender-Based Violence
Against Civilian Men and Boys in Conflict Situations,” Security
Dialogue vol. 37, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 89–90.
138
militarism and militar y practice, creates new
civilians, and breaking down gender
essentialisms or discrimination.
65 Thomas Gregory, “Drones, Targeted Killings, and the
Limitations of International Law,” International Political Sociology
2015, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 207.
64
R. Charli Carpenter, 2005, op. cit., p. 296.
66
Ibid., p. 208.
67
Chamayou, op. cit., p. 121.
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9. Moral and Ethical Perspectives
These problems are not insignificant or
It could also include an understanding that the
inconsequential. The gendered tensions,
predator y, aggressive nature of armed drones
contradictions, and oppressions that manifest
operated without consent and resulting in civilian
through the use of armed drones need to be part
casualties, psychological harm, and destruction
of the core understandings and considerations in
of civilian infrastructure will result in a militarised
determining policies and practices for arms
masculine response from affected communities.
control and disarmament in relation to these
Such an understanding should have significant
weapons. Understanding how drones are
implications for curtailing at least some policies
perceived in a gendered way by their operators
around the use of armed drones that exacerbate
and the ways in which technology mediates social
importance. This appears to be the case with
and their victims is crucial to developing policies
this response, such as using armed drones
relations and shapes our experience of the world.
drones. Armed drones share similarities to
that can help break the cycle of violence.
outside of armed conflict or not sufficiently
His current research focuses on the social, cultural,
guided missiles and torpedoes, which have been
For example, acknowledging that current
protecting against civilian causalities or of the
political, legal and ethical dimensions of militar y
policies—which enable the use of armed drones
open-ended overhead sur veillance. Similarly,
without consent in host countries or in ways that
understanding how “signature” strikes can be
undermine the dignity and value of human lives—
acts of gender-based violence, and the
have gendered motivations as well as impacts on
reverberating effects this has on gender equality
gender equality and on peace and security
in other areas, could help change policies around
technologies in a new light. In part this is tied to
suggests that a more holistic approach to the
targeted killings with the use of armed drones or
the complex moral facets of the armed conflicts
legal, political, operational, and moral questions
other weapon systems.
in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria,
around drones is necessar y. This could include
Peter Asaro
In general, morality does not have much to say
Dr. Peter Asaro is a philosopher of science,
technology and media. His work examines artificial
intelligence and robotics as a form of digital media,
robotics and UAV drones, from a perspective that
about new technologies, unless their use
impinges upon principles that have a long held
used in warfare for more than a centur y. Armed
combines media theor y with science and technology
remote control planes have been in use since
studies. He has written widely-cited papers on lethal
World War II. However, the use of armed drones
robotics from the perspective of just war theor y and
in recent armed conflicts, particularly in the
human rights.
Middle East and Central Asia, have cast these
Somalia, and Yemen. It is also tied to the
investigations into the psychological harm
These are some of policy implications that could
changing nature of warfare, particularly in
of operators that contains an assessment of
come from a systematic gender assessment of
occupied territories and against non-state actors.
whether these harms are produced by the
armed drones; there are more possibilities. Such
conflict between the “emasculation” caused
work is important from a legal, political, and
In the context of this recent histor y, much of the
by “cowardice” or the inflation of a “predator y
operational standpoint, for those that want to
focus on the use of drones stems from the
masculinity”—which may have serious
continue to use armed drones to achieve militar y
policies and tactics developed by both Israel and
implications, among other things, for
objectives. It is also important for those that
the United States for “targeted killing”. Targeted
interpersonal relations when the operator
want to end the use of armed drones or that
killing involves seeking out specific individuals
leaves the base.
want to address the problems of militarism and
for their role in militar y or terrorist operations
violent masculinities more broadly.
and launching a “precision” militar y attack on
that person, often (but not always) from a
drone.1 Targeted killing raises numerous issues
on its own, and while drones enable this strategy,
the final attack could also come from a
traditional plane or other source. Still, the
novelty of this practice, its technological
complexity, and the powerful cultural image of
the drone itself, has led to a great deal of public
attention and concern other the use of drones in
recent years. But targeted killing is not identical
1 Gregoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone (New York: The
New Press, 2015).
140
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to drones, nor is it only the application of them
The morality of warfare is challenging to most
deemed acceptable in warfare for militar y
attack, and whether it is justified given the
that raises moral concerns.
moral theories. According to most moral
professionals. The modern restatement of just
purpose of the attack, and whether it presents a
theories, the use of violent and lethal force is
war theor y was written by Michael Walzer in
disproportionate risk of harm to non-combatants.
This chapter will consider the main moral
permissible (if at all) only under certain
1977, 2 and while the finer points of the theor y
responses to armed drones, particularly from
exceptional circumstances, such as in self-
are still debated by philosophers, the general
In general, just war theor y does not really
scholarly publications. While the article cannot
defence, the defence of another person, or,
principles are well established.
consider the morality of any particular weapon.
speak for all ethicists, it provides some of the
more debatably, in order to achieve a higher
prominent moral and ethical concerns that have
moral good or humanitarian benefit. Most moral
Just war theor y divides war into three temporal
weapon (is the target of an attack justified?), and
been raised. Given the magnitude and scope of
theor y considers the moral judgement and
stages named in Latin terms, and considers each
the expected effects of the use of the weapon
concerns over drones, and the sheer amount
actions of individuals, while warfare is often
morally independent (though this is also
(does it pose disproportionate risks to non-
written about them, no comprehensive review is
viewed as a collective action, or individual
debated). 3 Jus ad bellum concerns whether it is
combatants?). The use of certain weapons has
feasible. Instead, this assessment focuses on
actions towards the common defence of a
just or moral to go to war, jus in bello concerns
been deemed immoral, and in some cases also
the main themes, perspectives, and arguments
society. Most moral traditions have their roots in
the morality of how war is fought, while jus post
illegal, because their use necessarily fails to
presented to date. The research has been
religion and theology while modern moral
bellum concerns the morality of how a war is
conform to the principles of distinction and
confined to materials written in English.
theories generally seek to reach the same moral
ended (including terms of surrender, armistice,
proportionality. Thus, because landmines and
conclusions on purely rational arguments that do
reparations, and reconciliation). Most of the just
cluster munitions have uncontrolled and deadly
not depend on religious belief or faith. In
war theor y literature focuses on jus in bello, but
effects on civilians during and long after
European philosophy there is a long tradition of
there are important debates on when
conflicts, they have been deemed indiscriminate
considering the morality of warfare initiated by
humanitarian concerns, rather than strict self-
by nature. Similarly, the effects of fragmentar y
St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, which is
defence, justify militar y inter vention, as well as a
and incendiar y bullets, and permanently
based in Christian theological justification of
growing literature on just resolutions of violent
blinding lasers are disproportionate to their
warfare and called just war theor y. (See Chapter
conflicts and ensuring long-term peace. The
militar y advantages (in legal terms they
10 for further investigation of religious
moral consideration of jus in bello relies on two
cause “unnecessar y suffering and superfluous
perspectives on drones.) Asian philosophers
fundamental moral principles: the principle of
injur y to combatants”), while chemical,
have also considered the morality of warfare
distinction and the principle of proportionality.
biological, and nuclear weapons are both
(such as in the Mahabharata), but primarily in
The principle of distinction holds that enemy
indiscriminate and disproportionate. All of these
terms of warrior duty (such as in the Bhagavad
combatants are morally liable to be killed, while
weapons have been prohibited through
Gita) or leadership (such as in the writings of
civilians and non-combatants are not liable to be
international agreements.
Confucius) and strategy (such as in The Methods
intentionally killed, and there is a moral duty to
of the Sima and Sun Tzu’s Art of War).
make this distinction and to avoid harming non-
The morality of warfare
and weapons
The use of any weapon, or the use of any object
as a weapon, raises moral considerations. In
general, morality prohibits causing harm to
others, and even threatening such harm. When
discussing morality, it is necessar y to reflect
upon the question of what moral theor y and
whose morality should be considered. While
philosophers usually restrict their considerations
to a preferred moral theor y, there are serious
disputes about which theor y should be preferred.
We will not attempt to resolve such issues here,
but rather will address the main moral theories
that have the greatest influence in shaping law
and policy. In addition to moral philosophy, we
will also consider moral psychology. Morality
shapes human judgment and behaviour in
powerful ways that are only approximated by
formal moral theories. Yet, we can study such
moral behaviour and its psychological
consequences empirically. The impact of
psychological states such as sympathy, empathy,
and guilt can thus be considered through this
lens, without assuming the primacy of any
particular moral theor y.
142
Morality concerns the decision to use the
combatants. It is morally permissible in some
It is important to note the different notions of
“weapon” in discussions about drones. They have
This chapter will focus on the Western moral
cases to kill civilians and non-combatants, but
been developed and used in recent years,
tradition of just war theor y, and how it views
only unintentionally or as an undesired (even if
particularly by the Israeli and US militaries, as
drones and remote operated weapons. Much of
foreseeable) consequence of attacking a
remotely operated weapons platforms. That is to
the international humanitarian law (IHL)
legitimate militar y target. This is the long
say, militaries view the “weapon” as a system
framework that came into effect after the
debated Doctrine of Double-Effect (wherein the
that can include not just the final projectile,
Second World War—including the United
intended effect is on enemy combatants, and the
munition, or energy release, but also the
Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and the legal
undesired effect is on civilians). The principle of
launching system, the transport and deliver y
precedents of the Nuremberg tribunals—have
proportionality considers the magnitude of an
platform, and even the maintenance, logistical,
and intelligence support networks necessar y to
their conceptual roots in just war theor y. This is
the underlying moral basis of the legal
framework that governs international armed
conflict and that informs the training of what is
2 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with
Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
3 Jeff McMahan, “The Sources and Status of Just War
Principles,” Journal of Military Ethics 6(2), 2007, pp. 91–106.
execute an attack with the system. Accordingly,
it is best to consider all weapons as “weapons
systems,” and to also consider the human
143
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operators, their training, their situational
awareness, and the larger command and control
structure around them as significant elements of
the weapons system. Thus, a weapons system
Drones and just war theory
When we look at drones through the lens of
just war theor y, we can consider a variety of
likely that other types of forces and weapons will
weapons, rather than the much riskier use of
become involved in the conflict, thus putting
ground forces, may be such a case. Of course,
combatants at risk.
drones are not unique in offering reduced risks.
Many weapons that give a decisive militar y
moral questions. In terms of jus ad bellum, the
The second empirical claim is that lowering the
justification of going to war, the use of drones
advantage could be argued to reduce such risks,
risk to combatants makes war more likely, or
raises the question of whether they lower the
along with militar y superiority in general.
might make it easier for political leaders to
thresholds of going to war. 4 That is, if we accept
Moreover, just war theor y does not require
choose militar y action over other diplomatic
the view that remotely operated weapons greatly
combatants to put themselves at risk in order to
options. This claim appears to have significant
reduce the physical risks to the combatants
be morally justified in killing enemy combatants,
evidential support from the United States’ use of
who operate them, then this should reduce the
nor is there any requirement to avoid radical
drones for targeted killings, particularly in
political risks for leaders to start a war. If true,
asymmetries in militar y strength. So while it may
Pakistan and Yemen. Because Pakistan and
this is what philosophers and economists call
be true that armed drones and other remote-
Yemen are allies of the United States, and do not
a “moral hazard”–a situation in which one can
operated weapons make it easier for politicians
wish to have a large US militar y presence in their
systematically avoid negative consequences
to go to war, it still matters whether or not those
territor y, it is politically difficult to launch a full-
for one’s actions, thus eliminating the normal
wars are moral.
scale militar y operation in these areas. While
disincentives for taking those actions. The
suspected enemies could be attacked with
Jus in bello and the moral
argument is that drones provide a “risk free”
traditional aircraft or special forces operations,
predators debate
form of warfare, or militar y inter vention, and as
those carr y significant risks of pilots or
such make warfare more likely. Assuming that
commandos being killed or captured. In this case,
Once at war, there are various questions to ask
making warfare more likely is bad, then one
drones provide a means for militar y attacks with
regarding the jus in bello morality of the use of
The armed drones of most moral concern have
could argue that drones have a negative effect
reduced risks, and so we have seen their
drones and remotely operated weapons. One
been those operating towards the more complex
on the moral reasoning and actions of political
increased use in this manner. Such
way of approaching the question of the morality
end of this spectrum. As we will see below, the
leaders by making it easier for them to go to war.
considerations may or may not weigh on the
of a particular weapon or means and method of
politicians who actually make the decisions to
warfare is to consider whether its use is in
use militar y force.
principle better or worse than other weapons, or
might be as simple as soldier and gun, within a
traditional militar y command and control
hierarchy. Or a weapons system might be far
more complex, such as a remotely operated
drone firing a steerable missile, launched from a
remote logistical support base, monitored and
controlled from thousands of miles away by a
small team of operators, through a network of
satellite, ground and radio communications
networks, supported by remote intelligence
analysts and databases, operating within
command structures that may switch between
major militar y commands, joint force structures,
covert and traditional militar y operations, or even
between command hierarchies of coalition and
treaty partner nations.
complexity of the weapon system itself, and it’s
distributed, compartmentalised, and mediated
There are several problems with this line of
structure, lends itself to a set of moral concerns
argument, however. First, this argument depends
that cannot be easily reduced to a single element
on two significant empirical claims, which may or
The other assumption behind the argument that
an assumption that an attack is morally
of the larger whole.
may not be true. The first empirical claim is that
drones make armed conflict more likely is that
justifiable, and that the target of the attack is
drones reduce the physical risks to combatants
such conflicts are morally wrong, or that the use
morally and legally justified, we can greatly
Given this over view of the morality of weapons
in warfare. While this seems easy to argue for
of armed force should be an option of last resort.
constrain the number of moral factors involved in
and warfare, and just war theor y, we turn to the
the remote operators of drones, it is not
But according to jus ad bellum there are morally
choosing one weapon over another with which to
question of whether the use of drones as a
necessarily true. Remote operators could still be
justifiable reasons to become involved in armed
attack the target.
weapon, or as a weapons platform, raises any
attacked at their remote locations, by traditional
conflict, namely self-defence, defence of an ally,
unique moral questions, or challenges our
militar y means or by guerilla or terrorist tactics.
or to inter vene to avert a humanitarian crisis,
Assuming that the war is justified, and the attack
standard understanding of the justified use
Moreover, once a war is started, it may escalate
genocide, or crimes against humanity. If a
is made by one combatant against a legitimate
of weapons. That is, what special moral
or expand, and it may not be easily contained to
government is deciding whether to inter vene to
enemy combatant, the main moral criteria to
considerations are raised by the use of
a single means of warfare, or a constrained
aid an ally who is under attack, or to inter vene
targeting and attack are discrimination,
armed drones?
geographic area. As such, it quickly becomes
for humanitarian reasons, then the reduced risks
proportionality, and militar y necessity.
of that inter vention would be good. Arguably, the
Discrimination concerns whether the attack will
ability of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
discriminate between combatants and non-
(NATO) forces to inter vene on behalf of Libyan
combatants. Proportionality concerns whether
rebels using remote operated and long range
the nature and magnitude of the attack is
4 Peter Asaro, “How Just Could a Robot War Be?” in Adam
Briggle, Katinka Waelbers and Philip A. E. Brey (eds.), Current
Issues in Computing And Philosophy (Amsterdam, The
Netherlands: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 50–64.
144
means and methods of warfare. If we start from
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justified, as well as the magnitude of risk posed
Remotely operated drones are not themselves
It would seem at first look that any weapon
Within US use of drones for targeted killing,
to non-combatants and civilian infrastructures is
forbidden under any such moral or legal rules—
system that improved decision making and
there are two types of targeting: personality
warranted. Militar y necessity concerns the
they are not intrinsically or by their nature
precision in attack would be morally preferable,
strikes against a known person and signature
strategic value of a target, the risks of failing to
indiscriminate or disproportionate, while like
in general. Presumably fostering better informed
strikes targeting people or groups based on
attack it, and figures into the proportionality
many weapons they could be used
and considered decisions leads to better
behaviour obser ved through the sensors of the
calculation that weighs the value of eliminating a
indiscriminately or disproportionately. Insofar as
decisions. Allowing more time for determining
drone as hostile or suspicious. Determining
target against the risks to non-combatants.
they deploy weapons or munitions that are
when to strike a target also presumably allows
which behaviours seen on aerial video constitute
considered morally and legally legitimate in other
for choosing times that reduce the risks of
hostile activities can be challenging, particularly
When militar y commanders and their
contexts, there is no prima facie reason to think
civilian impacts. Using smaller munitions with
in cases where the targets are not actively
subordinates are selecting militar y objectives
that this might be problematic.
more accurate targeting ought to reduce civilian
engaged in fighting or clearly conducting militar y
impacts compared to larger munitions with less
operations. Similarly, there are various cases
control.
where farmers working their land, or fixing a
5
and strategies, the choice of a particular weapon
features as only one element of the overall
Insofar as drones and remote operated weapons
determination. While certain weapons may be
enhance the discrimination and proportionality of
unilaterally forbidden on legal or moral grounds,
attacks compared to other weapons platforms, it
As with other empirical claims, whether the use
as combatants planting a roadside bomb.
such as chemical or biological weapons, there is
could even be argued that they are morally
of drones actually provides more time for
The “soda straw effect” of looking at a zoomed
great discretion in the selection of the best
superior or desirable weapons. Indeed, it has
deliberation processes in practice depends on
in image can cause operators to misunderstand
tactics and weapons to achieve an effect or
been argued that remotely operated drones
how they are actually used—it is not a necessar y
a larger overall scene. This phenomenon has
objective. Within the militar y, there will be
permit both the use of smaller and more
feature of their use. Insofar as they are actually
been blamed to some mistaken “friendly-fire”
strategic decisions as to which weapons
precisely-guided munitions (thus reducing
used in a manner that provides this additional
incidents with drones.
platforms and assets are available and capable of
unintended civilian harms and collateral damage)
time for deliberation, there are further empirical
achieving the desired results—such as whether
and permit more information gathering and
questions of whether that time is actually used
Related to the limits of drone sur veillance for
to launch a long-range guided missile, or use a
longer deliberation on whether to attack a given
and used effectively, and if it actually results in
making moral decisions, it has been argued that
target. Strawser argues that these two factors
improved targeting decisions that reduce the
the extreme remoteness of drone operators, and
munition. At a tactical level there is
makes the use of drones morally superior to
impacts of attacks on civilians overall. It has
the consequent moral and emotional distance
weaponeering—the job of selecting an
other weapon systems, and even argues that if
been argued that the use of precision guided-
from their targets poses its own kind of moral
appropriate weapon or munition to achieve the
so we may have a moral obligation to use such
munitions has actually resulted in longer
problem. It is to this we now turn.
desired effect—determining the size of the bomb
weapons. 6
targeting lists because they greatly reduce the
“manned” or “unmanned” platform to deliver a
ditch, have appeared to drone operators
to drop from an aircraft to destroy a target, or
cost of bombing any given target. So while the
how to steer a missile to direct its blast effects
risks to civilians from any particular attack might
away from vulnerable civilians. There are explicit
be reduced, the total number of attacks might
and implicit moral elements to all of these
increase enough to result in a greater overall risk
strategic and tactical decisions insofar as they all
to civilians.
involve questions of discrimination,
There are also significant concerns over whether
proportionality, and militar y necessity.
the kind of aerial sur veillance offered by drones
is appropriate or sufficient to accurately identify
legitimate targets. Traditionally, the selection of
5 Indeed, the U.S. military determined that no additional Article
36 review of armed Predator drones was necessary as the both the
unarmed versions of the Predator and the Hellfire missiles with
which it was being armed had already been reviewed and approved.
See Noel Sharkey, “Killing Made Easy: From Joysticks to Politics,”
In Sibylle Scheipers and Hew Strachan (eds.), The Changing
Character of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
6 B. J. Stawser, “Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles,” Journal of Military Ethics 9 (4),
2010.
146
bombing targets rests on a variety of intelligence
sources. Because drones are essentially
sur veillance platforms carr ying weapons, there
may be a tendency to rely solely upon the
drone’s sensors to determine targets, which
may result in distortion or bias in targeting.
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Militar y psychologist Lt. Col. Dave Grossman
Some have argued that drone operators might
In addition to PTSD, there is growing interest in
spent many years studying new recruits in basic
become “playstation warriors”. This implies on
the related, though distinct, phenomena of moral
Beyond the morality of using a drone, one can
training and their willingness to kill the enemy in
the one hand that drone operators are not true
injur y. While the psychological diagnosis of
ask how the use of drones and remotely
combat. Grossman published an often
warriors, located so far away from the battlefield
PTSD is generally framed in terms of the direct
operated weapons impacts the psychology of
reproduced graph of the willingness of
and not taking the risks of those on the ground.
experience of a significant bodily trauma, moral
drone operators, and what moral consequences
combatants to kill based on physical distance.
And on the other hand this implies that drone
injur y focuses on the psychological impacts on
this might have. The literature on drones has
According to this graph, it is psychologically
operators engage in warfare through a
soldiers who violate their own morality.10
focused on two key issues of the psychological
easier to kill from great distances, such as with
videogame-like interface, and as such treat their
While a soldier might experience PTSD after
impacts on a drone operator. One issue is
long-range missiles or artiller y, somewhat more
work as they would a videogame—trivializing the
seeing their best friend killed beside them,
whether the physical distance of drone operators
difficult with mid-range weapons such as guns,
killing and destruction they might do as if it were
another soldier might experience a moral injur y
from their targets implies a moral and
and hardest to kill in close range with knives or
merely a game. Studies of the effects of
from mistakenly killing a civilian. The realization
psychological distance. Closely related to this is
in hand-to-hand combat. The empirical data to
engaging in videogame violence on real world
of one’s own morally wrongful actions can carr y
whether the videogame-like nature of drone
back up this graph is lacking, but it carries a
aggression and violence have shown only weak
a heavy psychological weight beyond simple
operations leads operators to treat drone
powerful intuitive force as it seems to most
effects on behaviour. Moreover, most people
guilt, and can undermine one’s sense of identity,
operations like a game, or whether the mediation
people to be much easier to “pull the trigger” of
are quite capable of distinguishing reality from a
of self-worth, and disrupt personal and
of obser ving people through the cameras of a
a weapon if one cannot directly see the potential
game, and disciplined professional drone
professional relationships. While psychologists
drone tends to dehumanise the people obser ved.
victims of one’s attack.
operators do not take their combat duties lightly.
debate the appropriate diagnostic criteria for
Drones and moral psychology
7
8
both PTSD and moral injur y, it is clear that drone
The other issue concerns the psychological
health of drone operators themselves, and
According to moral psychology, our reluctance
Recent studies of drone operators have found
operators along with other combatants,
whether they can experience combat trauma
to cause pain and suffering to others is related
evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder
experience psychological effects from the
remotely, and whether they are susceptible to
to our ability to sympathise and empathise
(PTSD). While at slightly lower levels than most
morality of their choices and actions—effects
post-traumatic stress and moral injuries.
with others. To the extent that we distance
combat militar y personnel, they are somewhat
that can remain for a lifetime and sometimes
ourselves physically and emotionally from
higher that non-combat militar y personnel. This
require professional treatment.
people, the easier it is for us to take actions that
suggests that drone operators do experience
harm them. As drones allow a vast physical
combat trauma despite their physical distance
distance between operators and victims, it
from the battlefield, and despite not being
has been argued that there must be a similar
subject to personal bodily risk themselves. This
moral distance.
also suggests that the technological mediation of
9
drones is sufficient to communicate the trauma
of combat.
8 Craig A. Anderson, “Violent Video Games: Myths, Facts, and
Unanswered Questions,” American Psychological Association
Science Briefs, 2003.
7 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of
Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and
Company, 1995).
148
9 Wayne Chapelle et al., “Symptoms of Psychological Distress
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in United States Air Force
‘Drone’ Operators,” Military Medicine 179, 63 (8), pp. 63-70;
Wayne Chapelle et al, “An Analysis of Post-Traumatic Stress
Symptoms in United States Air Force Drone Operators,” Journal
of Anxiety Disorders 28, 2014, pp. 480-487.
10 Maguen, Shira, and Brett Litz,“Moral Injury in Veterans of
War,” PTSD Research Quarterly, Vol 23 (1), 2012, pp. 1-6; The
Moral Injury Project. (n.d.) “What Is Moral Injury,” http://
moralinjuryproject.syr.edu/about-moral-injury/.
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10. Religious Perspectives
No drones protest at General Atomic CEO Neal Blue’s house in San Diego, organized by Code Pink.
Emily Welty
Religious actors, both as individuals and in an
Dr. Emily Welty is the Director of Peace and
Justice Studies in the Dyson College of Arts and
Sciences at Pace University in New York City. She
organisational capacity, have been important
voices in the emerging critique of drone warfare.
teaches classes about nonviolent social movements,
These voices are not always respected in policy
humanitarian aid, reconciliation, transitional justice,
debates, especially in those spheres dominated
and peacebuilding and the arts. She currently ser ves
by militar y and political elites. In broadening the
as the Main Representative of the International
discourse on armed drones, the moral and
Peace Research Association to the United Nations
and as the Vice Moderator of the World Council of
ethical questions of religious communities has
Churches Commission on International Affairs.
the potential to enrich an often narrow
discussion which tends to focus on the strategic
value of remote warfare. Religious traditions
have a long histor y of advocating for the dignity
of the human being and valuing the precious
worth of each individual life even in the face of
utilitarian arguments. This chapter examines the
responses of religious communities to the
increasing use of armed drones in conflict and
analyses the objections that have been raised in
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and
© 2013 Steve Rhodes,
Methodology
one of their demographic markers.1 This chapter
therefore has used statements by religious
Buddhism. Ongoing discernment about the
This chapter contains an over view of the
groups as its primar y analytical focus. This
morality of armed drones have taken place in
particular objections of religious individuals,
research has been confined to materials written
interfaith as well as ecumenical settings and
bodies, and organisations to the use of drones in
in English, which means that most of the
have been the subject of position papers and
armed conflict. Not all individuals within any one
organisational responses come from religious
policy recommendations at the national/
of these faith traditions would claim to share
constituencies responding to drone use by the
denominational level.
these objections to armed drones and many
United States and the United Kingdom.
individuals or organisations may even support
their use. However, I was unable to find any
religious organisation that had issued a
statement supporting the use of armed drones,
so this review necessarily contrasts the more
subtle differences within the objections to
drone warfare.
The Pew Research Center, which has conducted
“Just war” or “just peace”
frameworks
Traditionally, religious responses to the ethics of
war and limiting the use of violence have been
framed by the just war tradition, a theoretical
framework that suggests that killing in the
context of war may be ethically permissible if
some of the most comprehensive polling about
US demographics and opinions about drone
strikes, has not used religion or religiosity as
150
1 “Public Continues to Back US Drone Attacks” Pew Research
Center, February 2015, http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/5/2015/05/5-28-15-Foreign-Policy-release.
pdf
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certain conditions have been met, including
The “just peace” paradigm moves from focusing
Applying the just peace framework to the issue
The statement calls on all governments to be
legitimacy of the target, proportionality of the
on exclusive concepts of national security to an
of armed drones means understanding that
transparent about their participation in the
response, legitimacy of the body using force,
understanding of shared human security, which
drones not only fail to resolve root causes of
development, acquisition, and use of armed
morality of the objective, and limitations on the
includes economic security, ecological security,
conflict but also destroy the planet, erode trust
drones, while highlighting the particular
harm to innocent life. This tradition is rooted in
social justice, and human rights. As
between communities, and create both
responsibility that the US government should
the early religious writings of Saint Augustine
conceptualised by the Ecumenical Call to Just
irreparable physical and moral harm in
have to the innocent civilian victims of armed
and Thomas Aquinas and in the more recent
Peace:
individuals. This framework insists that only
drone strikes in Pakistan.
approaches that further the requirements of
reflections of theologians like Paul Tillich and
Within the US context, there is an Interfaith
Reinhold Niebuhr. For many years, this
Just Peace might be comprehended as a
represented the official position of the Catholic
collective and dynamic yet grounded process of
Church. When sur veying the plethora of
freeing human beings from fear and want, of
responses on armed drone warfare, this is one
overcoming enmity, discrimination and
of the predominant frameworks employed. In this
oppression, and of establishing conditions for
context, drone warfare as currently carried out is
just relationships that privilege the experience
The World Council of Churches (WCC) issued an
religious impetus that forms the basis of their
viewed as immoral because of the lack of
of the most vulnerable and respect the integrity
Executive Committee statement on armed
work together is the idea that people of faith
drones in 2014, denouncing drone strikes as
should respond to the increasing use of drones
transparency in selecting targets and the number
of creation.
2
resort and in the case of usage in Somalia and
Yemen, for example, are being used in places
where war has not been formally declared. Just
war theor y might also suggest that the likelihood
for success is low given that many people
believe the use of armed drones is actually
ser ving as a recruitment strategy for terrorism in
communities that feel terrorised by drones.
Working Group on Drone Warfare, which meets
Ecumenical and interfaith
responses to armed drones
regularly in Washington, DC and highlights the
moral and religious concerns of people of faith
about armed drones. The central moral and
“counter-productive,” causing the “loss of
of innocent people who have been executed by
drone strikes. Drones do not represent a last
justice are capable of creating true peace.
in war.
This framework is rooted in the Jewish concept
innocent civilian lives” and having “human rights
of shalom, a conception of peace that goes
and humanitarian implications”. 4 The WCC
In 2015, the Working Group hosted an Interfaith
beyond the absence of war and defines peace as
statement centered its critique of armed drones
Conference on Drone Warfare at Princeton
including a broad sense of welfare and well-
around the fact that they deny human beings the
Theological Seminar y, which was attended by
being of individuals, communities, creation, and
basic right to life. The statement notes,
150 faith leaders from a range of religious
traditions. The outcome document of the
G-d. Theologian Fernando Enns writes,
The right to life is a moral principle based on
conference calls on the United States to
The simultaneous reality of being safe and
the belief that a human being has the right to
immediately halt all targeted drone strikes as
experiencing an open space for self-
live and, in particular, should not to be unjustly
well as to acknowledge and take responsibility
development within a community are the
killed by another human being. It is also our
for previous strikes and their impacts on civilian
preconditions for building cultures of peace….
firm belief that the measures taken by any
victims. The statement specifically calls for the
Just peace cannot be established or
State threatening the life and dignity of the
repeal of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
experienced apart from people of other faiths.
human person cannot be justified. In this
Militar y Force and limitations on the authority of
Today all theological reflection and concrete
context, the use of extraterritorial force within
the Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Special
action takes place in the context of plural
another State’s territory and sovereignty
Operations Command, and all other government
societies and increasing globalization of all
cannot be justified when it threatens the life of
contractors that might authorise the use of
innocent people. We believe the sanctity of life
armed drones. The group authored a letter to
and the biblical message call us to protect the
President Obama emphasising the opposition of
right to life; deliver those who are drawn toward
faith leaders and in early 2017, the group
death, and hold back those stumbling to the
published a joint letter to the Trump transition
areas of life.
3
slaughter (Proverbs 24:11).
5
team outlining the concerns and opposition
of 21 different religious groups to the use of
2 “An Ecumenical Call to Just Peace,” World Council of
Churches, 2011.
3 Fernando Enns, “Towards an Ecumenical Theology of Just
Peace,” in Just Peace: ecumenical, intercultural and
interdisciplinary perspectives edited by Fernando Enns and
Annette Mosher (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers,
2013).
152
4 “Statement on the use of drones and denial of the right to life,”
World Council of Churches Executive Committee, 12 February
2014, https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/
executive-committee/geneva-february-2014/statement-on-the-useof-drones-and-denial-of-the-right-to-life.
5
armed drones.
Ibid.
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Materials produced by the group for study and
denounce all forms of violence—a position that
reflection draw on the just peace tradition as their several of the signatories, particularly the
primar y moral framework. While the groups
Christian responses
to drone warfare
historic peace church traditions would prefer.
shares some of the same objections to drone
Also in 2014, the US Conference of Catholic
Bishops presented a range of religious and
moral reser vations about drone warfare to
Drawing on the just war tradition, the Catholic
national security advisors and members of
usage as many human rights groups (e.g.
One of the religious questions that drives the
Church, while not calling of a cessation of their
Congress about “imminence of the threat,
extrajudicial killings authorised in non-transparent
group’s common vision is whether acceptance of
use, often raises questions about armed drone
discrimination, proportionality and probability of
processes, civilian deaths, covert operations),
drones represents a problematic contortion of
use. Archbishop Silvano Tomasi, the Holy See’s
success.”9
they also have an objection not as frequently
what it means to be human. The recognition that
permanent representative to the United Nations
voiced by other sectors, but which reflects their
many of the same people who authorised the
in Geneva, in testimony before the UN in 2014
The United Methodist Church adopted a
shared moral values. They frame their concern in
use of torture have also authorised the use of
noted:
resolution in 2012 calling for “an immediate end
this way:
drones represents a worr ying trend in the
to drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan”
erosion of respect for human dignity. In a
Decisions over life and death are uniquely
and “independent investigations into all such
As faith leaders, we are deeply concerned that
document outlining the group’s common vision,
difficult decisions, a heavy responsibility for a
bombings to account for civilian casualties.”10
by distancing people from kill decisions, drones
they agree to be guided by the question, “what
human being, and one fraught with challenges.
lower the political and psychological costs of
kind of people are we becoming as a
Yet it is a decision for which a person, capable
In 2014, the Advisor y Committee on Social
killing…. As drone technology advances and
society?”—a quer y that reflects their religious
of moral reasoning, is uniquely suited. An
Witness Policy of the Presbyterian Church, USA
drones (and other pieces of military hardware)
concerns. They note,
automated system, pre-programmed to respond
issued a report entitled Drones, War and
to given data inputs, ultimately relies on its
Surveillance, which assessed the ethnical
become increasingly autonomous, humans, even
at the operator level, may end up largely
The question helps us to focus in on the kinds
programming rather than on an innate capacity
implications of militar y drones and reflected an
removed from what becomes a mechanized
of habits we are perpetuating and developing,
to tell right from wrong. Thus any trend toward
ongoing debate in the Presbyterian Church. The
process of killing. We believe strongly that while
as well as relates to the deeper issue of
greater automation of warfare should be
report identifies seven different key ethical
drones lower the political and psychological
spiritual formation. Examples given were moral
treated with great caution…In this context of
issues that should influence Christian reflection
costs of killing, they do not lower the moral
injury, lowering participatory process,
dehumanised warfare with remotely-operated
on armed drones: just cause, last resort,
costs. We believe that those who order,
increasing fear in communities, increasing the
weapons and low risk on one side, a key ethical
legitimate authority, intent and likelihood of
authorize, or operate the remote killing of
automatization (de-humanization) in engaging
question thus is whether this lowers the
success, conduct of war, protection of civilians,
targeted people in a far off land ought to
conflict, lowering empathy, lowering sense of
threshold of conflict, making it seem more
and moral harm to soldiers.11 These themes
wrestle with the moral consequences of that
dignity in the other, lowers key virtues,
attractive to enter into war. Considering this
largely echo traditional debate about just war
question with the near inevitability in modern
criteria within Christian ethics.
decision every bit as much as a commander who
7
increases vice of arrogance….
has just ordered his or her troops into battle.
warfare of massive civilian casualties should
Killing should not be an abstraction to those
When one compares the interfaith and
who are ultimately responsible for it. 6
ecumenical statements to denominational
give pause. 8
statements, it becomes clear that stronger
This objection reflects the human-centered
approaches rooted in the just peace tradition are
orientation of all religious traditions—the
more likely to be adopted when religious groups
insistence that human life is precious and that the
come together to speak with one voice rather
decision to end human life should only be
than speaking individually.
undertaken with gravity and deep deliberation.
This statement is striking because it also
represents common ground between radically
different orientations to violence from different
faith communities, as the statement does not
6 “Recommendations for the Next Administration,” Interfaith
Working Group on Drone Warfare, January 2017, https://www.
interfaithdronenetwork.org/action/public-policy.html.
154
7 Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare, “Leading with a
JustPeace Approach” July 2015, Available: https://www.
interfaithdronenetwork.org/images/docs/
DronesWorkingGroupJPAgreements4web.pdf
8 Statement by H.E. Archbishop Silvano M. Tomasi, Permanent
Representative of the Holy See to the United Nations and Other
International Organizations in Geneva at the Annual Meeting of the
High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), 14 November 2013, http://
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/
MSP-2013/Statements/14Nov_HolySee.pdf.
9 “Background on Armed Drones,” Office of International Justice
and Peace- US Conference of Catholic Bishops, January 2014,
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/
war-and-peace/upload/background-on-armed-drones-2014-01.pdf.
10 “Seeking Peace in Afghanistan.” Resolution 6128, UMC Book
of Resolutions, 2012.
11 Drones, War and Surveillance, The Advisory Committee on
Social Witness Policy, 2014, https://www.interfaithdronenetwork.
org/images/docs/drones,_war_and_surveillance.pdf.
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A resolution adopted by the Presbyterian
When this resolution was discussed by
Other organisations such as Pax Christi
The 2013 Annual Conference of the Church of
General Assembly in 2014 does not outright
delegates later, it was usually described as
International have taken a more clearly just
the Brethren, one of the historic peace churches,
condemn armed drones but rather urges further
calling for more transparency regarding drone
peace approach to armed drones. The
issued a resolution against drone warfare. The
study by the Church, further legislation
use and criticising secrecy in the US militar y’s
organisation’s statement on armed drones
statement frames opposition to drones against
governing the oversight of drones by Congress,
use of armed drones, not calling for the outright
highlights the ongoing terror that hovering
the church’s larger opposition to all forms of
further evaluation of international law limiting the
ban on their use or denouncing the civilian
drones have caused communities, resulting in
lethal force and violence however, it specifically
use of drones by the legal community, and
deaths they cause. The official Presbyterian
further judicial review of targeted killings of
News Ser vice and Office of the General
suspected terrorists. There is a call for the
Assembly said that the Assembly “declared its
outright prohibition of the use of fully
opposition to targeted killings by drones unless
school and tribal dispute-resolution efforts.”17
Drone warfare embodies the fundamental
autonomous drones but not for armed drone use
due process is followed” (emphasis added).15
Pax Christi’s opposition to armed drones is
problems that covert warfare entails. The
generally. The statement does not concentrate
This reinforces the just war framework that
based in its concern about the rule of law as well
process for determining who is targeted by
on the civilian casualties or psychological trauma
suggests that it is not the drone usage per se
as its fundamental faith commitments to
drones, and why, is decided by a small group of
caused by drone strikes except to say that the
that presents a moral/religious problem for the
preser ving human life. The statement highlights
government officials who are not accountable
Church “opposes in principle the targeted killing
Church, but rather the procedure by which they
the way that remote killings “lower the threshold
to Congress or the American people for their
or assassination of suspects these weapons
are being deployed.
for resorting to violent force to resolve complex
actions… Concealment of covert activities
conflicts” and emphasises that “killing by remote
generates confusion, results in the deaths of
However, the statement also identifies the ways
control is deeply offensive to Pax Christi’s belief
countless targeted people and bystanders, and
that drone operators suffer from post-traumatic
in active nonviolence that is committed to taking
undermines international law and
The General Assembly’s 2014 Peace Breakfast
stress disorder (PTSD) and indicates that this
on violence rather than inflicting it on others.”
cooperation.19
featured a speech by Medea Benjamin, who had
represents a form of “moral harm” that stems
Pax Christi International also expresses
addressed the topic of armed drones as part of
from their awareness that “they have done
concerns about “the invasion of privacy using
a “militar y-industrial-congressional-security
something immoral and violated something
drone technology for human sur veillance,
complex”.13 During the debate on the resolution,
sacred,” which results in a “sense of moral
including civilian purposes such as law
one person paraphrased Luke 9, asking, “Do you
discontinuity”.16 This objection is rooted in a just
enforcement or border control”.18
want us to send killer drones from heaven to
peace rather than the just war framework that
immediately cease all use of armed drones both
destroy them?” However, another delegate and
seems most regularly employed by the
domestically and abroad as well as commit to
former Air Force member dismissed the
Presbyterian Church, USA.
greater transparency and accountability about
facilitate and grieves the deaths these weapons
facilitate.”12
“tremendous anxiety and psychological trauma
among civilian communities” as well as
identifies the evil of “covert warfare” as
particularly problematic in this case:
“disrupted essential community activities such as
In addition to calling for more careful study of
the issue and continual prayers for peace, the
Brethren statement asks that members call upon
both the US President and Congress to
statement as “naïve” and obser ved, “for the
secret kill lists and the decision-making
church to say ‘no’ to drones shows that civilians
processes around drone deployment.
don’t understand how the militar y works.”14
12 Pat Cole, “Assembly asks government to follow due process
when drones are used,” Presbyterian Church USA, 21 June 2014,
http://www.pcusa.org/news/2014/6/21/assembly-asksgovernment-follow-due-process-when-d.
13 “Excerpt from Medea Benjamin’s Speech at the 2014 Peace
Breakfast,” Presbyterian Peace Fellowship, 15 September 2014,
http://presbypeacefellowship.org/content/excerpt-medeabenjamins-speech-2014-peace-breakfast#.WJz4E1fbc28.
14 Jana Blazek, “Assembly passes resolutions on Cuba and
drones,” Presbyterian Outlook, 21 June 2014. https://presoutlook.org/2014/06/assembly-passes-resolutions-cuba-drones.
156
15 Jerry Van Marter, The Assembly in Brief, General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church (USA), 2014, http://images.
acswebnetworks.com/1/2494/PCUSAassemblyinbrief.pdf.
16 Advisory Committee on the Social Witness Policy of the
General Assembly Mission Council of the Presbyterian Church,
USA, Drones, War and Surveillance. Louisville, KY: Office of the
General Assembly, 2014.
17 “Military Applications of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPAS): Statement of Pax Christi International on Drones,” Pax
Christi International, 28 November 2012, http://
interfaithdronenetwork.org/images/docs/PCI%20on%20drones.
pdf.
18
Ibid.
19 “Resolution Against Drone Warfare,” Church of the Brethren
Resolution, 2013, http://www.brethren.org/ac/
statements/2013resolutionagainstdronewarfare.html.
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R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S
Jewish responses
to drone warfare
Professor of rabbinics and bioethics Rabbi Ar yeh
Klapper examined the Jewish response to armed
Muslim responses to
armed drones
In a time of increased Islamophobia, Muslim
communities are under increasing pressure to
speak out against terrorism and acts of violence
drones in the context of existing halakha (Jewish
Some of the Jewish response has been shaped
law) while obser ving, “so long as a plausible
One of the most complicated aspects to
by fellow Muslims. This untenable position of
by the role drone warfare has played in the state
argument exists for the legality of drone warfare,
examining armed drones from a distinctively
shifting the burden of denouncement onto these
of Israel. Drones were used as early as the 1982
Jewish law would avoid ruling on it so as to avoid
religious framework is that drone strikes
communities places them in a difficult position to
Lebanon War and continue to be a part of
an excessive entanglement of religion with
themselves have been used in a way that
denounce or even publicly debate the ethics of
Israel’s approach to security. To that end, the
politics.” Ultimately, Klapper argues,
forefronts religion. For example, the US use of
drone use as to do so places them in an even
armed drones has largely targeted Muslim
more charged position of critiquing what the US
highest level of government. A landmark Israeli
I see no Jewish reason to object intrinsically to
people. The literature responding to these
has used as a central tactic in the War on Terror.
Supreme Court decision on targeted killing
warfare by remotely piloted vehicle. However, I
attacks does not take drone strikes as their own
To publicly criticise drone use is to risk being
provided ethical foundation for Israeli Defense
see reasonable arguments for believing that the
entity but rather as one part in a much more
framed at best as unpatriotic and at worst as
Forces (IDF) drone operators, which allowed
availability of drones makes certain forms of
troubling overall pattern of Islamophobia in the
dangerous or sympathetic to terrorism.
usage if three ethical markers were met:
problematic policy choices more likely, and that
so-called War on Terror. There are not many
legitimate target, based on verifiable evidence,
in the absence of proactive regulation, drone
Muslim scholars or Muslim organisations writing
Therefore, there are Muslim leaders who have
with independent oversight. 20
warfare will have more pernicious consequences
in a way that chiefly connects Islam and a
signed interfaith declarations against drone
as the technology becomes more widely
prohibition against the use of armed drones.
usage but there is little public work in the form
Instead, the broader argument that Islamophobia
of statements or publications by Muslim
shapes the entire context of the conflict and
organisations independently of such group
response is more common. Scholars weighing in
proclamations. For example, while Dr. Sayyid
on the use of armed drones and using religion as
Syeed of the Islamic Society of North America
a framework scaffold their research in one of
(ISNA) signed the 2017 statement to the Trump
two ways: either examining the roots of
transition team and a 2016 letter to President
Islamophobia in the United States and Europe or
Obama urging the cessation of armed drone use,
as positioning themselves as experts on
ISNA as an organization has not issued a policy
religious militancy. There is a need for more
statement on the issue.
ethics of drone use have been debated at the
Debate in the Jewish community about armed
available.
21
drones has often referenced larger debates
about limitations on the use of force generally as
Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz writes about the role of
well as the interface between Judaism and
privacy in Jewish law and its relationship to
international law. However, in the absence of
sur veillance drones by obser ving that there are
clear international law on drone use, much of the
relevant pieces of halakha that prohibit damage
debate has relied on arguments about the
caused by watching someone else and damage
practicality and ethics of drone deployment as
caused by listening. He references hezek re’ iah
harm mitigation (e.g. preventing terrorism or
as a prohibition against visual sur veillance and
reducing combat fatalities).
hezek shemiyah as a prohibition against aural
sur veillance. 22
While individual Jewish leaders have come out
strongly against the use of armed drones or
scholars to examine how Muslims are
responding theologically and sociologically from
a position of faith beyond the obvious impacts of
trauma and loss in affected communities.
signed interfaith statements against drone
attacks, there do not seem to be institutional
responses to armed drones from Jewish
organisations or communities.
20 Rob Eshman, “The Torah of Drones: examining the complex
morality of drone warfare,” Jewish Journal, 6 November 2013,
http://jewishjournal.com/news/nation/123974.
158
21 Rabbi Aryeh Klapper, “What Judaism Says About Drones,” 5
March 2013, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-andpolitics/125905/what-judaism-says-about-drones.
22 Rabbi Shmuly Yanklowitz, The Soul of Jewish Social Justice
(Jerusalem: Urim Publications, 2014).
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R E L I G I O U S P E R S P EC T I V E S
Buddhist and Hindu
responses to armed drones
Conclusion
There are ver y few published reflections
efficiency, cost effectiveness, or efficacy of
on armed drones from a Buddhist or Hindu
drones from a militar y or political standpoint,
perspective and no formal statements by
this chapter has reviewed how drones might be
organisations either denouncing or supporting
evaluated from a religious standpoint. While it is
them. From a Buddhist standpoint, all killing
possible to engage different moral frameworks
represents an infraction of the religious code
to reflect on the inherent right or wrong of drone
against taking life so perhaps it is not surprising
usage, it seems that most religious traditions
that Buddhists may not feel a need to take
that have taken a position on armed drones
particular stands on ever y form of lethal
have opposed them. However, there has also
technology. However, since some people take
been silence from many religious sectors and
the position that armed drones reduce casualties
groups on this issue. It is likely that as drone
in war (at least from the side of those operating
usage increases, discussions in sectors outside
the drones) it does seem that more religious
of militar y circles will also increase, which will
reflection is warranted here.
likely spur increased discernment and reflection
Beyond the pragmatic calculations of the
among religious thinkers and theologians. Such
Zen Roshi Norman Fischer opens up this line of
deep mindfulness and moral reckoning about
inquir y asking,
these weapons should be a hallmark of our times.
Are they good or evil? Do they kill innocent
civilians? Yes they do. But even when they don’t,
are they targeting the right people? Who are
the “right people”? If someone is forced, by
social pressure and the threat of murder, to
harbor a so-called terrorist, or even to commit
so-called terrorist acts, is such a person
worthy of being targeted? Is anyone? And who
decides? On what basis?
23
These questions seem to reflect the questions
raised above about the morality of drones.
23 Norman Fischer, “The Problem of Evil,” Lion’s Roar, 17 April
2017, https://www.lionsroar.com/the-problem-of-evil.
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