Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia by Robert W. Hefner Review by: Thomas Gibson Indonesia, No. 72 (Oct., 2001), pp. 197-204 Published by: Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3351487 . Accessed: 07/01/2012 13:03 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Indonesia. http://www.jstor.org RobertW. Hefner.Civil Islam: Muslimsand Democratizationin Indonesia. Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,2000.286pages,index. Thomas Gibson Thisbook is theproductoftenyearsof "studyingup" by an anthropologist who his in Hefner career more traditional and Robert fashion. Between 1977 1980, began conductedfieldwork amongone ofthelastgroupsofJavaneseto remain"Hindu,"the Tenggerwho livehighon themountainsofEastJava.Theirrelativeisolationfromthe maincurrents ofglobaleconomicand religiousactivity made themaccessibleto study the methods of traditional through anthropology, particularlythatof participant observation. In 1991,Hefnerbegana studyofthegroupmostinvolvedin globaleconomicand thepolitical,economic,and religiouselitesofthenationalcapital, religiouscurrents: of whom hold doctoraldegreesfromAmerican,European,or Middle Eastern many withkeyplayerson universities. Hefner'smethodwas to conducta seriesofinterviews "annual summervisitsto the nationaland international a of decade stage during Indonesia... to talkwithMuslimintellectuals, businesspeople, and activistsabout a remarkable achieved markets and social Hefner degreeofaccess democracy, justice." to influentialindividuals duringthe last decade of Suharto's rule, especially to NurcholishMadjid (PhD Chicago) and to the Chair of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), ofIndonesia.He uses thisaccessto Abdurrahman President Wahid,untilveryrecently in behind the scenesto discussthekeyplayers' effect the the reader book,taking good and theirown thinkingas they of the of their adversaries motives perceptions ponderedtheirnextmovesin thestruggleto defineIndonesia'spoliticaland religious future. Hefnernotesthatwhenhe beganhis study,Americananthropologists thoughtthat his central concepts-democracy and civil society-were too tied to Western civilizationtobe applicableto Indonesia.Whilethefirstresponseby Westernpolitical scientistswas to hail thebreak-upof theSovietbloc as thefinaltriumphof Hegel's soon became a new formofculturalrelativism universalvisionofliberaldemocracy, ethnicand religiousmovements fashionablein politicalsciencecircles.As intolerant tookoffaroundtheworld,authorslikeSamuelHuntington proclaimeddemocracyto West and not suited to other be the legacy of the "Graeco-Judeo-Christian" came to be as the1990sworeon,manyanthropologists "civilizations." Paradoxically, more open to discussions of transnationalphenomena under the rubric of hybridity." "globalization"and "post-colonial Hefner'sagenda is on globalization, theorizing Despitethisrecentanthropological than from science and of from the drawn more political disciplines sociology discussionin thelatterdisciplines to thecurrent His aimis to contribute anthropology. thesocialconditionsthatmakedemocracypossible.DuringtheCold War, concerning EasternEuropean intellectualswho yearnedforthe "normality"of the Western European democraciescalled fora "public sphere"and a "civil society"thatwere distinctboth fromthe monolithicstate and fromthe atomized private life that theSovietera.Thesenotions-publicsphere,civilsociety-canbe traced characterized suchas Burke,Tocqueville, back to WesternEuropeancriticsoftheFrenchrevolution, Indonesia72 (October2001) 198 ThomasGibson and Hegel. Theyacquireda new relevanceas theend game oftheRussianrevolution was finallyplayedout.Then,in the1990s,politicalscientists specializingin thestudy ofpost-colonialsocieties,formerly knownas the"ThirdWorld,"beganto applythese conceptsto theirown areasofexpertise.1 In thiscontext,Hefner's"immediateconcernis to explainthe emergenceof a in IndonesianIslam movement andboldlyreformist ecumenical, democratic, religiously in the 1980sand 1990s"(p. xvii).It would seem to be themosttellingexampleof a Islamicsocietytakingup thesevaluesin themodemworld.To explain predominantly thismovement, he turnsto sociologistslikePutnam,who ask whatculturaland social are most favorableto the developmentof democraticsentimentsand institutions actions. As Hefnersees it, democracyrests on three foundations:robust civic organizationsin whichpeople can learnthehabitsof voluntarismand tolerance;a a public culturewhichendorsespluralismand democracy;and,just as importantly, and individuals of the and able to statewilling protect rights strong,but self-limiting, minority groups. Hefnerbeginsby recallingthelegacyofpluralismin IndonesianIslam.In an early phase, Islam in Indonesia was characterizedby the coexistenceof a numberof autonomouscitystates,and in manyareasitspreadpeacefullyand was mixedin with pre-existinglegal and religioussystems.In a second phase, the Dutch East India merchant Companyalliedwithabsolutistmonarchsto put an end to theindependent class, and duringthisperiod Islam tendedto be dominatedby the needs of royal ordestroyed courts.In a thirdphase,theroyalcourtsweredelegitimated bytheDutch, and Islam was pushed out of thestateand intosociety.ThereIslam survivedin the and in variousSufiorders. ofthereligiousschool,orpesantren, extra-state organization and quite undemocratic on a hierarchical Althoughthesewere organizedinternally ofthestate. action of did an arena basis,they provide independent public The developmentof a public culturefavorableto democracyin the twentieth In thelate colonialperiod,thenationalistmovement centurywas moreproblematic. who likeSukarnoand Muslimmodernists includedbothsecularistcreolefunctionaries had in the way Christianity arguedthatIslam could notbe separatedfromthestate fromone anotheron whethertheIslamic differed been in theWest.Islamicmodernists form.All suchdebatesweresuspendedin or theocratic stateshouldtakea democratic the 1930s in the interestof achievingindependenceas quicklyas possible. They remainedin suspensionbetween1945and 1955,withall partiesagreeingto Sukarno's ofthestate. whichfinessedtheissueofthereligiousfoundations FivePrinciples, made by Muslimpoliticianswerecalledintoquestionwhen The accommodations receivedonly20.9percentofthevotein 1955.Islamic theMuslimpartiesunexpectedly discreditedby Islamicrebellionsin Sumatraand politicalmovementswere further Sulawesi in the late 1950s. In 1959,Sukarnodeclared thatIndonesia would be a "Guided Democracy,"and in 1960he bannedthelargestMuslimpoliticalparty,the at the influence PartyofIndonesia(PKI) enjoyedincreasing Masyumi.The Communist center. 1 See,e.g.,MahmoodMamdani,Citizen Princeton Press,1996). andSubject University (Princeton: Civil Islam 199 Muslim fortuneswere at a low ebb at the beginningof the 1960s,but the Communistsoverplayedtheirhand. Theylauncheda land reform campaignin 1963 thatdisproportionately threatenedtheinterestsof "traditionalist" Muslimclericsin Java,who had oftenaccumulatedlarge areas of land due to pious endowments (waqaf),mercantileprofits,and a generalethicof hard work.The organizationthat theseruralclerics-theNahdatulUlama--cemented an alliancewithelite represented in themilitary factions who opposedthePKI fortheirownreasons.Thisled to growing verticalcleavages withinthe stateitself,witheach state factionreachingout into societyforallies. Here Hefnerarrivesat a first,critical,conclusion.Wherepoliticalscientistslike BenedictAndersonsee "the state"as a coherententitystandingin oppositionto a democratic "society,"Hefnerarguesthattherelationbetweenthestateand democracy a statewillingto is not zero-sumgame.Democracyrequiresa strong, butself-limiting, ofthelaw, enforcetherulesofthedemocraticgame,includingequitableenforcement mass education,and controlof rivalleaders.None of thesewas a functionof prewhichunderminestateauthority extra-state modemstates.Conversely, organizations are as likelyto lead to the emergenceof a politicalnetherworld of patronageand democracy.Whenthe stateweakens vigilantismas theyare to bolsterparticipatory and dissolvesintoverticalfactionalism, it is thepoor,themarginal,and thepeasants who sufferthe most.The onlypeople who benefitfroma weakened stateare the membersofwhatHefnercalls"mobilizedpoliticalsyndicates." in 1965. One resultoftheseverticalcleavageswas themassmurderofCommunists the most in theaftermath of themurders,of Anotherwas theemergence, powerful, centralized,and ideologicallycohesive state to rule Indonesia since the Japanese invasionof 1942.ButSuharto'sNew Ordercontainedtheseeds offuturefactionalism. betweenfourfactionswithin Hefnergoes on to detailthebackgroundofand conflicts social democratsassociatedwith theNew Orderstate:anti-communist Fabian-style the SocialistParty(PSI); "nominallyMuslim" Javanistswho generallysupported secular nationalism;the "traditionalMuslims" of the NU; and the "modernist Muslims" of the banned MasyumiParty.He shows how Suhartomaintainedhis playingeach groupoffagainsttheothers.Untilthelate 1980s, hegemonyby skillfully Suhartofavoredthefirsttwo groups,recruiting manySocialistsintohis development to thinkhe and projects, favoringmysticalJavanistteachings,leadingcommentators ratherthanpoliticalcalculation. convictions was actingoutof"Javanist" In fact,however,SuhartoneverneglectedIslam. Religiouseducationwas made educationin 1966.The staffof the throughuniversity compulsoryfromelementary DepartmentofReligiongrewby 60 percentbetween1967and 1971,at a timewhenit was under the controlof "traditionalist"Muslims of the NU. The NU was toleratedby the army since its leaders had never supported the regional Islamic rebellions of the 1950s and had enthusiasticallyparticipated in the attacks on the PKI in the 1960s. NU leaders were embedded in an array of social and economic enterprises that supported their educational endeavors, and this led them always to take a more pragmatic political position than modernist Muslims. Hefner observes that their decentralizationand pragmatism could have provided fertilesoil forthe growth of ofSuharto'sstatesmotheredit. butthattheauthoritarianism democratic dispositions, 200 ThomasGibson The modernistIslamicMasyumipartyremainedbannedundertheNew Order. The elder turnedto predication. Havingbeen forcedoutofformalpolitics,modernists and saw Islamic state retreated into hard-line demands for an generation increasingly and middle class a in the old urban as means to this end. As their base predication eroded,theymovedtheirappeal downmarketto a newlyurbanized amongmerchants lowermiddleclass and increasingly tooktheircue fromtheanti-Western ideologiesof oftheArabMiddleEast. Maududi's PakistaniJamaat-i-Islami and theBrotherhoods moreas a meansofIslamizing saw predication A youngergeneration ofmodernists This than of the state. arguedthatgood Muslimshad to generation society Islamizing avoid the "low politics"of politicalpower and patronage,and to develop a "high politics"ofsocialjusticeand democracy.DuringthetenureofSjadzali as Ministerof Religionfrom1983-1993,manyof theirleaderswere sentto the UnitedStatesand likeFazlur ofliberalmodernists Europeto study,wheretheycameundertheinfluence these travelers of the most of Rahmanat theUniversity Chicago.Among prominent was NurcholishMadjid,who citedBellahand Cox in favorof thedevelopmentof a boundariesbetweenwhatwas trulysacredand what "secular"societythatdrewstrict shouldbe treatedas profane,includingthestateand partypolitics. foundtheirbase in a new middleclass ofstate-educated The youngermodernists Muslims who found employmentin the governmentand government-backed Muslimswho ofself-conscious businesses.Stateschoolsproduceda wholegeneration maintainedno formaltiesto titledclerics,Islamicparties,or Quranicschools.Literacy in Indonesiajumpedfrom40 percentto 90 percentbetween1965and 1990,and high school graduation went from4 percentto 30 percentbetween 1970 and 2000. Attendanceat stateschoolsforhigherIslamiceducation(Institut AgamaIslamNegeri, StateIslamic Institute, IAIN) quadrupledto 100,000between1979 and 1991.These attitudetoward authoritythan did the pupils of studentshad a very different mastersin pesantren. traditional By the early1990s,cosmopolitanmodernistslike Madjid were well situatedto versionofIslam.Suharto capturethisnew class as advocatesforan anti-authoritarian in ofthisgroup,and 1990he triedto cooptit also recognizedthepotentialimportance forhis regimeby sponsoringthe formationof All-IndonesiaLeague of Muslim ICMI (IkatanCendekiawanMuslimse-Indonesia).He also hoped to use Intellectuals, these new Muslims to increasehis leverageagainstthose in the armywho were criticalofthegrowingpowerofhiscroniesin thestatesectorof becomingincreasingly theeconomy. whomHefnergroupstogether a diversearrayofindividuals, ICMI broughttogether Official and independentintellectuals. as government bureaucrats, politicalactivists, government positions in the organizationwere dominatedby Western-educated bureaucratslike the Ministerof the Environment,Salim, a Berkeley-educated engineer. economist,and the Ministerof Technology,Habibie,a German-educated in of Muslims the of a as ICMI saw elites These government way increasing presence economic and thestateand theprivatesectorto offsetthedisproportionate political power of Christians and Chinese in those arenas. At first it was assumed the was onlya schemeto shoreup theIslamicvoteforthegovernment party organization in the 1992elections,but whenthreehundredICMI memberswere appointedto the rushedto join.Proone thousand-member assemblyin 1993,middlelevelbureaucrats Civil Islam 201 and anti-ICMI factionsdeveloped throughoutthe state and universitysystems, evidencingthefirst opensplitswithintherulingelitesincethe1960s. ofpoliticalactivistsbecameinvolvedin theorganization. Secondly,an assortment influence over One group,led by Adi Sasono,hopedto use Suhartoto reducemilitary the state and the economy.Sasono had an independentpoliticalbase in the noncontrolled sectorthatadvocatedeconomicdevelopment by governmental organization to an antisocialist from an Indonesians. Sasono evolved anti-imperialist "indigenous" Chinese nationalist.By 1995,he was Habibie's right-handman and had become MinisterofCooperatives.Sasono operatedthrougha thinktankcalled CIDES (Center forInformation and DevelopmentStudies).A second group of activistswas more toward the militaryand advocateda moregradual reformof the New conciliatory Order.A thirdgroupofactivistshopedto use ICMI to Islamizethegovernment party, Golkar,and had no problemallyingitselfwiththe "Green"(Islamic)factionin the armyto do so. Theyoperatedthrougha thinktankcalledCPDS (CenterforPolicyand DevelopmentStudies).Suhartosided withthe Habibie-Sasonofactionfrom1990to Golkarfactionfrom1994to 1998. 1994,thenturnedto theultra-conservative intellectuals. A thirdcategoryactivein ICMI includedindependent Hefnermakes theclosest had have he to seems and muchoftheirmoraland intellectual influence, rapportwith them.This is hardlysurprising,since many were educated at US to a pluralistdemocracy.While universities. Many of themwere openlycommitted in first threeyearsof theorganization, the role an theyapparentlyplayed important lostall influence to have seem like scholars Nurcholish by 1993. Madjid independent Internallyfactionalizeditself,ICMI also facedoppositionfromold-school,antiMuslimgeneralsin thearmyand fromMuslimleaderswho feareda returnto thelow politicsofstatepatronage.An uneasyalliancedevelopedbetweensome generalsand AbdurrahmanWahid,the leader of the NU. Wahid had withdrawnfromthe statemandatedMuslimpartyin 1984 and supportedthe government partyin the 1987 to support refused Wahid when elections.He was givena Golkarseatas a reward.But ICMI in 1990,Suhartoabruptlyturnedagainsthimand launcheda covertcampaignto removehimfromtheleadershipoftheNU. Fearing an alliance between the secular nationalist"reds" of the PDI (Partai and DemokratIndonesia,IndonesianDemocratic Party)underMegawatiSukarnoputri the"greens"oftheNU in 1994,Suhartoworkedto splitbothorganizations by creating withinthem.This task was undertakenby the "regimistMuslim" pseudo-factions CPDS factionin ICMI undertheleadershipof Abul Hasan, a wealthybusinessman tied to Suharto'sdaughter,Tutut,and GeneralHartono,the head of Sospol. Their campaignof dirtytrickshad inconclusiveresults,and in 1996the regimeturnedto trainedby Suharto'sson-in-law, moreextrememeasures,mobilizingparamilitaries GeneralPrabowo.ManyMuslimleaders,includingAmienRaisoftheMuhammadiyah, claimsthattheviolencefomented weretakenin by government by theparamilitaries was actuallyproducedby communists.Wahid was not takenin, and the slander escalatedtheviolenceby fomenting Paramilitaries campaignagainsthimintensified. riotsin late 1996.Wahidopenlyblamedtheviolence and anti-Chinese anti-Christian on Sasono's factionin ICMI, notdaringtonamethe"green"generalswho werereally behind them. Suddenly,in 1996, Wahid publicly reconciledwith Suharto,who distancedhimselffromHabibie and ICMI. Habibie was seen by Suharto'sdaughter, 202 ThomasGibson and she made overturesto Tutut,as hermain rivalforsuccessionto thepresidency, Wahid.Thegreengenerals, their Prabowo, including gave supporttoHabibie. This was how thefactionalline-upstoodwhentheeconomiccrisishitin August 1997. Wahid abruptlychangedcourse again, shiftinghis supportfromSuhartoto to resign.Theywerenowjoinedby Rais ofthe Megawati,and callingon thePresident who been had 1998, Muhammadiyah, expelledfromICMI earlierin theyear.In January disabledby a stroke.WhenSuhartoannounceda new cabinet Wahidwas temporarily full of croniesin March 1998,Rais stepped forwardas the leader of the Muslim democraticopposition,despitehis dubious recordof attackson the Chinese and Megawati. In desperation,Suhartoturnedto the most unsavorycharactersin the ultraconservativegroup. The CPDS/IPS (IPS, InstituteforPolicy Studies) thinktank circulateda bookletclaimingthatSuhartohad been undertheinfluenceofa Jewishcabal until1988,whenSuhartohimselfhad discoveredtheplotand brought Jesuit-US into government.In March, 1998, an assortmentof pro-Suharto Muslims good extremists,includingSasono of ICMI, Lukman Harun of Muhammadiyah,and LieutenantGeneralSyarwanHamid,calledfora campaignto eradicatethe"rats"that had broughtIndonesiato its knees,meaningtheChinesebusinessclass. The actual violencewas orchestrated by GeneralPrabowo,but the latterwas keptin checkby GeneralWiranto.Suhartowas forcedto resignon May 5, 1998byWiranto. In theelectionsofJune1999,Megawati'spartygot35 percentofthevote,and proreform Muslimpartieswon another25 percentofthevote,fora totalof60 percent.In the negotiationsthat followed,Wahid ended up as President,Megawati as Vice Presidentand Rais as head ofthePeople'sConsultative Assembly. In summary,Hefnerarguesthatall of Suharto'sattemptsto coopt the Muslim movementafter1984failed.From1984to 1990he workedwithWahid's NU. From 1990to 1994,he workedwithHabibie'sICMI. From1994to 1998he workedwiththe of the CPDS. In everycase, the Muslimswho were preparedto ultra-conservatives shoreup his authoritarian comparedwith regimeprovedto be in a smallminority thosein favorofdemocratic pluralism. Faced withstalemateamong the elite,in early 1998 the Prabowo clique had civiliansagainstitsrivals. reachedout intosocietyto mobilizeultraconservative neat no was there that showed action This desperate oppositionof stateand was not society's of cohesion societyin Soeharto'sfinaldays; the state'sloss resembledthatof 1948and 1965.In those in fact,theconflict gain. If anything, rival elites to exacerbateethnoreligious led state in the factionalism years, alliancesthatexploitedcommunal antagonismsin society,creatingsegmentary tensionsfortheirownnarrowends.(p. 212) In his conclusion,Hefnerreturnsto his argumentthatdemocracyrequiresthe trainingin civic virtuesprovidedby participationin civic organizations,thatthis experiencemustbe "scaled up" to the societyas a whole,and thata well-ordered statemustguaranteethepeace and orderrequiredfortheselessonsto be learnedand applied. The weakestof thesethreelinksin Indonesiawas the state.Faced witha threatto his power, Suharto deliberatelyfomenteda climate of incivilityand will last formanyyearsto come.But Hefneris optimistic intolerancewhose effects Civil Islam 203 solutions will makeauthoritarian thatin thelong runtheforcesof globalmodernity untenableand thatall societieswill have to evolvetheirown formsofpluralismand tolerance.Democracyis nottheproductofsomeessentialcivilizationalcultureofthe West,butofthebalanceofforcesin theworldtoday. Hefnercertainlyprovidesus withthebest available narrativeof the totalityof politicaldevelopmentsunderSuharto'sNew Order.He focusesto good effecton the and on thedifficulties roleoftheauthoritarian statein undermining tolerance, leading to meetthetask in in their activities had Muslims organizations voluntary "scalingup" of creatingthe pluralisticand tolerantculturerequiredfora democraticsociety.It would perhapsbe unfairto ask one book to do morethanthis.Butitwould be niceto and attitudesofthepoliticaland religiouseliteshe knowmoreabouthow theinterests those of articulate with discusses Indonesians,and how therapidlychanging ordinary world of politicalintriguearticulateswithmore stable featuresof the Indonesian and Christianmission NU pesantren landscape,such as Muhammadiyahmadrasahs, schools. ofDutch,Dutchcolonial,and withsomeofthepeculiarities A fullerconfrontation of thanthegeneralities better served have Indonesian"modernization" Hefner might on work Recent his narrative. to frame he uses "civilsociety"theory byanthropologists Dutch colonialmissionshas seen in theman equivalentof the religiouslyinflected century. political"pillars"thatdevelopedin the Netherlandsin the late nineteenth Schrauwers argues that these pillars represent a peculiarly Dutch form of claimedby thesecular functions Certain"governmental" modernization.2 militantly USA and France-such as schooling,reliefforthe poor, statein post-revolutionary to ruralreligiouselitesand ostensibly and healthcare-were ceded in theNetherlands with the "disciplining"of working associated are These functions depoliticized. which fromagrarianto industrial economies,a transition populationsin thetransition tookplace onlyat theend ofthenineteenth centuryin theNetherlands.Dutchrural elitesweresimultaneously religious,political,and economicleadersin a mannerthat resemblesthesituationoftheruralJavaneseulamawho makeup NU's constituency. LiberalProtestant, ParallelConservativeProtestant, Catholic,and secular "pillars" thestateitself. developedoutsidethestate,and,in 1901,tookoverand transformed The "EthicalPolicy"applied in Indonesiaafterthe electoralvictoryof the Antigrewoutofthe"EthicalTheology"ofthenew Partyin theNetherlands Revolutionary Christianmissions.Finallyliberatedto workfreelyamongthenon-Muslimpeoples of whole ethnicgroupsby ofconverting Indonesia,thesemissionsadoptedthestrategy and structure into the Church elites existing"tribal byChristianizing cooptingexisting imbricated was thoroughly churchesin whichChristianity custom."Micro-national withlocal culturewas theresult,withdivisivepotentialsthatare onlybecomingfully apparenttoday. Afterthenationalistuprisingsof 1927in Indonesia,overtnativepoliticalactivity ModernistMuslim,and aimed at capturingthestateitselfwas banned,but Christian, Muslimpillarswereallowedto developand to engagein schoolingand Traditionalist and Christian madrasahs Afterindependence, socialwelfareactivities. Muhammadiyah 2 AlbertSchrauwers, 1892-1995 in theHighlands Colonial"Reformation" ofCentralSulawesi,Indonesia, (Toronto: Universityof TorontoPress,2000). 204 ThomasGibson mission schools had remarkablesuccess in placing theirgraduates in the state A fourth"pillar" was pesantrens. apparatus,to the detrimentof the traditionalist createdwith the introduction of moderneducationand text-bookbased religious instruction on a massivescaleundertheNew Order.Itremainstobe seenwhetherthis last pillar will absorb the Modernistone. But what Hefnersees as the healthy developmentof "extra-state organizations"in civil societycan also be seen as the ofhierarchically institutionalization pillars. organizedsocio-religious Secularist-Christian(PNI/PDI), Modernist Muslim (Masyumi/PPP-PAN), Muslim (NU/PKB)3and now RegimistMuslim(Golkar)aliran/pillars Traditionalist to remain stable featuresof the Indonesianlandscape,each jockeyingfor promise positionsin the statebureaucracyand seats in theDPR (Dewan PerwakilanRakyat, whatevertheoutcomeofthecurrent IndonesianParliament) intotheforeseeable future, would seemto insurethesurvivalofsome crisis. The of these existence pillars political ofauthoritarian is a recurrence if there in even of degree politicalpluralism Indonesia, or militaryrule. This has as much to do withthe "non-political"educationaland of as itdoes withthedevelopment ofreligiously based organizations welfarefunctions culture. a tolerantand pluralistic political 3 PNI is PartaiNasionalIndonesia,theIndonesianNationalParty.PPP is PartaiPersatuanPerbangunan, Party.PAN is PartaiAmanatNasional,PartyoftheNationalMessage.PKBis Unityand Development oftheNation. PartaiKebangkitan Bangsa,PartyoftheAwakening