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Chapter 12
Policy-led virtue cultivation
Can we nudge citizens towards
developing virtues? 1
Fay Niker
Introduction
In recent years, policymakers have become increasingly interested in a set of
behaviour modification techniques, now commonly known as nudges, grounded
in and justified by reference to evidence from the cognitive and behavioural
sciences.2 This evidence suggests that a significant part of our everyday behaviour and decision-making is the result of the interplay of cognitive heuristics
and situational factors, making it more automatic and context-dependent than
classic accounts of human agency allow. Such knowledge has made it possible
to design “choice architecture” to work with the grain of these psychological
processes, with the aim of promoting individual and social well-being (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2009). The task for political theorists, in response to this new
policymaking logic, is to examine what forms of nudging are morally permissible, or even morally required, within a liberal-democratic state. Let’s call this
the permissibility question.3
One way of thinking about this question that has not yet received any attention is to examine the interaction between this trend in policymaking and
the move in moral philosophy toward a renewed interest in virtue and the
consequences of this for how we think about moral improvement. On a virtueethical account, arguably the most plausible answer to the permissibility question is that these interventions into citizens’ beliefs and behaviour would need
to be compatible with creating and sustaining the conditions conducive to
developing the virtues and leading a virtuous life. According to this view, the
welfare-promoting aim of nudges would be understood in terms of promoting
one’s ability to lead a flourishing life by supporting the cultivation of virtues.4
This chapter does not offer a defence of this controversial response to the permissibility question; nor does it offer a judgement on its merits. Rather, it examines
the possibility question: Can nudges play a role in the development of virtues?5 This
question is a good place to start for anyone who might wish to defend a virtueethical answer to the permissibility question. But, importantly, it is also of wider
interest. Our answer to the possibility question will be of interest to those who,
despite assessing the permissibility of nudges on different grounds, are attracted to
their potential as a means of cultivating liberal virtues, such as toleration, respect
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and reasonableness, which some deem necessary to ensuring the stability of liberal
political institutions (Rawls, 1971, Macedo, 1990).6 It will also have some relevance for the burgeoning philosophical debate over moral enhancement.7
A few scoping considerations need to be mentioned at the outset. The focus
of this chapter is on the possibility of using nudges to cultivate virtue in adult
citizens within liberal-democratic states. This differs, to some extent at least,
from the focus on virtue development in educational contexts taken by many
of the other contributions to this volume. For Aristotle, there are two main
institutions involved in the development of virtues: the family and the state.
In much of the contemporary debate, the role of the latter is discussed in relation to the character education of children, usually within schools.This chapter
leaves the issues relating to the upbringing and schooling of children, and the
attendant questions concerning the earliest stages of virtue development, to
one side. It explores how the ways in which the state designs its behavioural
policies may (or may not) be able to steer its adult citizens in the direction of
virtue development.8
Concentrating on adults in liberal-democratic states has an important implication for the kind of virtue development processes under investigation, namely,
it focuses our inquiry on the development of practical reason. Consequently, it
includes as part of virtue development only those habituating practices that can
be categorized as what Nancy Sherman (1989) calls critical habituation, i.e., those
that actively engage a person’s own critical capacities.9 There are some reasons
to be sceptical about choice architecture playing a role in virtue development of
this kind. For one thing, nudges tend to be understood as interventions designed
to modify our automatic behavioural responses, which thereby promote certain
targeted behaviours irrespective of the motivation or intentionality of the citizens on whom they act; this appears to be at odds with developing character
states that are “at once modes of affect, choice, and perception” (Sherman, 1989,
p. 5). It is also the case that advocates of choice architecture make no claims
about its potential for the conversion of behaviour into virtuous dispositions;
hence, any expectation of such might be demanding more than these policies
are able, or designed, to deliver (Connelly, 2014, p. 229).
Remaining sensitive to these worries, this chapter argues that choice architecture is able to play a role in the policy-led development of virtues. After
outlining the potential means and the proposed end of this inquiry in more
detail, it distinguishes between two types of choice architecture design –
automatic-behavioural and discernment-developing nudges – according to
their virtue-cultivating potential. By drawing a distinction between these two
ways in which such interventions might affect and shape their target’s automatic responses to situations, it is able to provide a more nuanced assessment
of the possibility question. The chapter then further examines the role that
discernment-developing nudges might play in critically habituating citizens
into better discerning the relevant particulars of a situation, while remaining
appropriately modest about the scope of this role.
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Choice architecture and virtue
Before we can assess what role choice architecture might play in cultivating virtues, we need a clearer view of both the proposed means – nudging – and the
proposed end – virtue. Let’s begin with the former. To understand what choice
architecture is and how it works, it is important to have some knowledge of the
psychological evidence at the heart of the shift towards behavioural insight-led
policymaking, because this approach is grounded in, and is intended as a political response to, empirical discoveries.
The dual-process theory of cognition, which underpins much of contemporary psychology and neuroscience, maintains that the human brain functions in
ways that invite a distinction between two kinds of processes: the nonconscious
“fast thinking” of the automatic system and the conscious “slow thinking” of the
reflective system (Kahneman, 2012). The key finding is that, contrary to our
self-image, it is the automatic processes that are “the secret author” of much of
our behaviour (ibid., 13). This insight has spawned a large empirical literature
on the automaticity of behaviour, which refers, broadly speaking, to “the control
of our internal psychological processes by external stimuli and events in our
immediate environment, often without our knowledge or awareness of such
control” (Bargh and Williams, 2006, p. 1). The large and ever-growing body of
evidence from the cognitive sciences, as well as other disciplines such as behavioural economics, has provided the basis for a more “socio-ecological” account
of human behaviour (Hurley, 2011).
Although nonconscious, automatic processes have many advantages – e.g.,
they can act as “fast and frugal” short-cuts to the behavioural responses that
would have been selected via slower, deliberative processes (Gigerenzer and
Goldstein, 1996) – issues arise because these cognitive heuristics also make us
prone to producing biases in certain behavioural environments. These “predictable irrationalities” (Ariely, 2009) result from the interplay of numerous
different heuristics with seemingly trivial situational factors, such as the way in
which information is presented, options are arranged, or default rules are set.
They have thus been shown to affect important life decisions, as well as more
everyday ones.10 The way in which a risk is framed, for example, can affect
people’s choices about whether or not to have potentially life-saving surgery
(loss/gain framing effect).11 Similarly, whether or not people are saving towards
a pension has been shown to be heavily dependent on what type of default rule
their employer adopts, in particular, whether that scheme is opt-in or opt-out
(loss aversion bias).12 And a similar effect has been found with respect to organ
donation registration (status quo bias).13 These and many other examples have
shown us that seemingly insignificant changes to environmental settings can
have a significant impact on the choices people make.
With respect to political theory and policymaking, the crucial insight to take
from this is that the state, simply by virtue of its legitimate role and status, is
inevitably involved in the business of structuring “the landscape of choice” in
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which its citizens navigate their lives (Ben-Porath, 2010).14 Since the state cannot avoid influencing its citizens’ behaviour in this way, and since there may be
better or worse ways of designing public policies with respect to individual and
social welfare, advocates of choice architecture contend that the state should
carefully consider how it structures its policy landscape.15 Using behavioural
insights as a means of designing policies that are more effective at modifying
citizens’ behaviour in welfare-promoting ways seems to provide an attractive
middle road between the coercive and educative strategies in the policymakers’ toolkit. The contrast with coercion is made explicit in the definition of a
nudge as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour
in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing
their [. . .] incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, p. 6). The contrast with more
traditional liberal strategies, such as rational persuasion, is also clear: while some
nudges can be “educative”, choice architecture is distinguished by the fact that
it acts primarily on the automatic, rather than the deliberative, level of thinking.
Although this category of state influence has been linked with paternalism, it is
important to note that nudging can, in principle, be used as a means of modifying citizens’ beliefs and behaviour for both prudential and moral ends, that is,
as a way of making the target’s own life go better and as a way of guiding them
toward acting morally.
With this in mind, let’s shift our attention briefly to describing the proposed
end in our present inquiry, virtue development. As noted above, there has been
a renewed interest in the role of virtue within moral philosophy in recent decades (Carr, Arthur and Kristjánsson, 2017). Those interested in the roles that
sensitivity, motivation, and character might play in morality and living well
often find Aristotle’s account of virtuous living a fertile starting-point for their
accounts. Interestingly, Aristotle’s conception of human psychology – which
forms the basis for his account of virtue – is also bipartite, in a manner that parallels the modern-day scientific theory outlined above. It posits a nonrational
part (to alogon echon), concerned with perceptive and affective response, and a
rational part (to logon echon), concerned with reasoned reflection.16 Both are
cognitive elements, as in the dual-process theory of cognition. For Aristotle, this
means that both are potential sites of virtue: in simple terms, the nonrational
part is the site of character (and the site of the virtues of character when its activity is “infused with reason”) and the rational part is the site of the intellectual
virtues. For our purposes, we are primarily interested in virtues of character;
but, as insinuated above, the process of developing these virtues cannot be separated from the intellectual virtue of practical reason (phronēsis), at least not in
the cases of adult citizens that are our focus.
According to Aristotle, virtue is a dispositional characteristic – a habit (hexis)
concerning actions and reactions involving choice (1106b36–39).17 So it cannot be attained through right action alone: to act rightly is to act rightly in both
affect and conduct, thereby requiring a certain level of perceptive and affective
engagement as part of the practical reasoning process. Virtuous behaviour is
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produced “according to the right reason” (kata ton orthon logon) (1138b24), and
this follows from a process of perceptive discernment (Nussbaum, 1990) that
means that the motivating reason is felt “at the right times, with reference to
the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the
right way” (1106b20–22). Accordingly, virtues are context-specific. The virtue of courage, for instance, consists in the right mix of caution and boldness,
with this golden mean being different in different situations (1116a10–15). It
is practical reason that determines where the mean lies in each specific context
and that, as a result, manages the other virtues by discerning which are required
by a specific situation and in which proportions (cf. 1144b16–17). There is
also “a humbler condition” that Aristotle does not hesitate to label virtue too
(1103a24): it is an êthos – that is, a character state – acquired via the process
of non-critical or “mechanical” habituation, which is a prerequisite for the
subsequent conversion into a full (or more global) virtue (Fortenbaugh, 1975,
pp. 51–52).18
Of particular interest in assessing the question of “how and by what sources
does virtue arise?” (EE 1216b 10–22), then, is the process by which we are to
discern the morally salient features of a situation that we take to be relevant to
our choice-making. The perceptive and affective responses of the nonrational
part – something akin to the processes of the automatic system – are simply
parts of expressing virtue, since “character is expressed in what one sees as much
as what one does” and “our emotions affect how and what we see” (Sherman,
1989, pp. 3–4, 49).19 ‘How to see’ becomes as much a matter of inquiry (zētēsis)
with respect to virtue cultivation as what to do (1112b22, 1142a35-b2); and
experience develops the faculty of practical perception by ‘giving us eyes to see
correctly’ (1143b10–14).20 Accounts of virtue based on this Aristotelian picture
are, as a result, concerned with educating both the deliberative and affective
sides of perceptive response through habituation.
Two types of nudge: automatic-behavioural and
discernment-developing
Our central question is: Can nudging have any role to play in this process,
namely, the practice of virtue education? At first sight, it might appear not.
The main problem, briefly highlighted earlier in the chapter, is that nudges are
behaviour-focused. Indeed some have described them as interventions that, by
operating on cognitive biases, “effectively change human behaviour in desirable
directions without changing their moral reasoning, dispositions, or motivation”
(van Ijzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2011, p. 23). Knowing that people tend to have a status quo bias, for instance, means that we can use this to
create defaults that “steer people’s behaviour in the right direction” (Sunstein,
2014, p. 17), e.g., we can change the printing default from single-sided to double-sided for environmental reasons.21 These types of nudges exploit automatic
cognitive processes in a way that does not provide an opportunity for virtue
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cultivation, because they seek to generate the ‘right behaviour’ apart from (or,
at the least, regardless of) the corresponding right motivation. More than this,
in such interventions the choice architect usurps the practical reasoning process: they assume the perceptive and deliberative tasks, and then present the
choice environment in a way that is conducive to bringing citizens’ automatic
responses into line with what the choice architect considers to be the right
behaviour (even while leaving the formal possibility of opting-out of such
behaviour intact).
So we might understand some nudges as operating in the following way:
The prudentially and morally salient features of a certain situation have been
discerned ahead of time by the policymaker, who has then designed policy
according to relevant behavioural insights that specify how the target behaviour can be predictably achieved. Essentially, in decreasing the sizes of plates in
order to reduce people’s calorie intake, the choice architect is hoping that the
resulting behaviour parallels the outcome that would have resulted if customers
had acted out of the virtue of temperance. Similarly, in using visual illusions
in traffic control measures (i.e., narrowing the side-lines on a road to produce
something akin to an optical illusion that results in drivers automatically reducing their speed), policymakers are seeking to replicate in these road-users the
driving behaviour of those possessing the virtue of prudence.
The problem, with respect to virtue cultivation, is that this behaviour is ecologically-dependent: the policy modifies our (automatic) behaviour when we are
in the particular environments to which the policy applies, but it does not outlast this because it fails to modify how we see the reasons for behaviour. Such
policies alter the way we automatically respond to the situation at hand, but
not in a manner that requires or develops the exercise of the aspects of practical
reason that are characteristic of virtuous action and reaction. Accordingly, these
automatic-behavioural nudges, as we might collectively call them, are ruled out as
candidates for policy-led virtue cultivation.
Nonetheless virtue, and its cultivation, has an interesting and complex relationship with automaticity (Snow, 2009, especially Chapter 2). Although Aristotelian moral psychology specifies that virtue requires a particular link between
motivation and action, which is not met in the case of automatic-behavioural
nudges, Aristotle also claims that virtues entail (automatic) perceptive and affective responses to salient situational factors and that virtuous dispositions to see,
feel, and act in particular ways need to be habituated so that they become stable
dispositional responses which are triggered automatically in relevant situations.
Some nudges could have a role to play in educating these processes by altering
how a person sees a situation – perhaps by making relevant reasons more salient,
so that they are more easily perceived, and/or by helping to obscure some distracting features of the situation, thereby “hinder[ing] hindrances” to practical
reasoning (Connelly, 2014, p. 228).
One example of a nudge that works in this way is the traffic-light system
for displaying the nutritional information of food items. This design-based
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intervention aims to alter the way in which we consume by providing relevant information via a means that can be more easily noticed, absorbed, and
interpreted (vis-à-vis traditional back-of-the-box methods). It works by engaging our automatic cognitive processes in a way that can directly activate more
deliberative processes: the colour red elicits a feeling of danger and invokes the
mental picture of a red traffic light, thereby denoting the message ‘stop’; while
green has the opposite effect, signalling ‘go’ and including an impression of
health. In such cases, our automatic reasoning calls on our deliberative reasoning processes “to support more detailed and specific processing that may solve
the problem of the moment” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 24), essentially asking it
what, if anything, should be done in light of this information.The aim is to trigger deliberation and, in so doing, to make consumers’ reasoning and resultant
decisions more informed. This process may result in the formation of healthier
eating habits that are not reliant on environmental support of this kind. This
type of informative nudge might be considered an example of educating the
deliberative side of perceptive response.
Another way of altering how a person sees a situation relates to the affective side of perceptive response. On the Aristotelian account, it is assumed
that emotional responses are ways of perceiving or being sensitive to particular circumstances, which makes them an indispensable part of recognizing the
prudentially and morally salient features of a situation. So-called active choosing
nudges might offer a good candidate, in certain circumstances, for bringing this
affective perception into play when it might otherwise have remained inactive.
For instance, prompted choice policies for organ donation registration might
be so effective at changing people’s behaviour because the simple act of asking
people to choose may support practical reasoning, often with emotions playing
a role in the process of reasons-responsiveness.22
Similarly, in a recent study Hedlin and Sunstein (2016) tested experimentally
how active choosing policies fare in terms of their effectiveness at bringing
about pro-environmental behaviour, as compared with automatic enrolment
in green energy. They report that: active choosing led to higher enrolment in
the pro-environmental behaviour; active choosing caused participants to feel
more guilty about not enrolling in the green energy program; and the level
of guilt was positively related to the probability of enrolling. Although at first
sight these findings might be taken as showing that this behaviour change is
motivated by a desire for guilt-avoidance, it can be argued that they are best
understood as demonstrating that active choosing nudges place people in an
environment in which the affective side of their perceptive response brings
their behaviour in line with “whatever they believe morality requires” (Hedlin
and Sunstein, 2016, p. 137). On an Aristotelian interpretation, the emotions experienced – anticipated guilt, in this case – led people to recognize and care about
the objects of moral consideration (e.g., activating their latent environmental concerns). Thus, this kind of choice architecture might be considered an
example of developing the affective side of perceptive response. This affective
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response can in turn lead people to form evaluative beliefs about what morality
requires, and these beliefs “yield reasons for action which fall within the motivational structure of specific virtues” (Sherman, 1989, p. 31). In so far as this is
the case, such interventions would also support the deliberative dimension of
perceptive response.
Together, the nudges that could work to develop perceptive response, in
order to better discern the aspects of a situation that are relevant to choicemaking, offer a category that we might call discernment-developing nudges.23 What
unites this category, as well as what distinguishes them from automatic-behavioural nudges, is that they focus on behaviour modification by inducing active,
rather than passive processes in the target. Recall that virtue is a hexis concerned
with choice. The active/passive distinction parallels another important distinction with respect to our understanding of the term choice: on the one hand, it
is common to regard a choice as the particular behaviour, among the set of
behaviour-options available to her, that the agent in fact undertakes, regardless
of the process by which this came about; on the other hand, a choice is also
commonly used to refer to the behavioural outcome that follows from the
process of the agent making a choice or choosing, which, in the case of virtue,
requires perceptive and affective engagement to discern the particulars relevant
to this practical reasoning process. Automatic-behavioural nudges can improve
choices in only the first sense; the situational improvements produce certain
behaviours in individuals via a process that they are only passively engaged
in. Discernment-developing nudges, by contrast, aim to improve choices and
choice-making in the second sense, by using choice architecture to create conditions that allow people to be actively involved in the process of choosing how
(or whether) to modify their behaviour in light of the salient reasons as they
relate to them. This active dimension is crucial in making the case in favour of
the virtue-cultivating potential of this kind of choice architecture, which is the
focus of the next section.
Virtue-cultivating nudges: a socio-ecological
account of critical habituation
Distinguishing between different kinds of nudges in this way supports an
account of critical habituation (Sherman, 1989), contra a mechanical conditioning theory of habituation (Curzer, 2002). On this view, Aristotle’s statement
that “we become just by doing just actions, and temperate by doing temperate
actions and brave by brave actions” (1103a1–2) is seen as an abbreviation of
a series of stages that he takes to be required for the habituation of character,
since:
action presupposes the discrimination of a situation as requiring a response,
reactive emotions that mark that response, and desires and beliefs about how
and for the sake of what ends one should act. We misconstrue Aristotle’s
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notion of action producing character if we isolate the exterior moment of
action from the interior cognitive and affective moments which characterize even the beginner’s ethical behaviour.
(Sherman, 1989, p. 178)
It is for this reason that automatic-behavioural nudges, such as those which
automatically enrol us as pension savers or organ donors or green energy users,
fail to have the virtue-cultivating potential that is available to discernmentdeveloping nudges (hereafter, ‘DDNs’). But more needs to be said about precisely how DDNs can help in the process of cultivating virtue. This is because
a sceptic might ask: how does, for instance, recognizing the reasons to choose
the green energy program over the standard one help to cultivate (pro-environmental) virtue? And how does this make it more likely that people will display
that virtue in different choice contexts, e.g., in recycling or transport choices?
These questions get to the heart of an issue that has been exercising those
interested in the Aristotelian model of the theory and practice of virtue education. Much attention has recently been directed toward specifying the oftenoverlooked developmental stages of this theory (Sanderse, 2015). For present
purposes, part of this requires addressing the potential situation-specificity of
the virtuous actions that result from DDNs; for, even if these kinds of choice
architecture can direct people towards (actively) acting rightly, there is a certain
modularity to this behavioural learning which makes any resultant virtue only
a “local virtue” (Chen, 2015).
The distinction we have drawn between different kinds of nudges offers one
type of response to the sceptic, because it naturally situates the role that choice
architecture could play in virtue cultivation within a developmental account of
perceptive and affective capacities. DDNs aim to cultivate the specific virtues
primarily through supporting the conditions for the development of practical
reason. Practical reason is the virtue needed to manage the other virtues, since
it discerns and judges which virtues are required by a specific situation and in
what proportions. If nudges are able to support the development of this intellectual virtue, this offers a means of converting local traits into more global
traits, by enabling people better to perceive that “this is a that”, i.e., that the current situation (e.g., concerning recycling) is an instance that demands a similar
response to a previous situation (e.g., concerning energy programs) (Sherman,
1989, p. 41).
It is true that DDNs will only play a limited role in this process over the
course of a person’s lifetime. As was mentioned in the introduction, Aristotle
views the family and the state as the two main institutions involved in virtue
development (1142a9–11). Choice architecture represents only one part of the
state’s policy toolkit. But as part of this wider state approach, and in the particular contexts in which the nudge approach is favourable vis-à-vis alternatives, DDNs can support the process of critical habituation of character. This
policy-led process of virtue development is supported by Aristotle’s claim that
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habituation is an indispensable part of learning at all ages: “they [i.e., citizens]
must, even when they are grown up, practice and be habituated to [virtue]”
(1180a2–3).
In my view, the psychological evidence on which choice architecture is based,
rather than showing that we are irrational, as some contend, supports Aristotle’s
claim that “[o]ne’s own good cannot exist [. . .] without a form of government”
(1142a9–10; also, see Curren, 2000). This claim follows from the collaborative
nature of his account of practical reason: among other things, the practical wisdom of individual citizens comprises, to some extent, the political wisdom of the
state (1141b23). And this acknowledgement has “obvious implications for the
resources available for ethical perception and choice” and its policy-led development (Sherman, 1989, p. 54). In particular, this collaborative model allows
that the experience and expertise required for virtuous action can be borrowed
exogenously from others (1143b13), which is something that plays a significant
part in the critical habituation process. It supports the idea that there might be
a “public ecology” of virtue (cf. Hurley, 2011); and that “structures of virtue”
might be incorporated to some degree into the design of public policy frameworks (cf. Rozier, 2016 on this idea within public health ethics).
DDNs appear, therefore, to offer one means by which the state could critically
habituate character. As highlighted in the previous section, this socio-ecological
account of critical habituation has two interrelated dimensions: the deliberative and
affective sides of evaluative perception – the shaping of our propensities to think
and feel, and therefore to act, in ways that better promote prudential goals and
moral norms. The first dimension habituates deliberative processes relating to our
ability to perceive the reasons that apply to us in particular situations. By presenting information in particular ways, the state can guide people towards being more
aware of and sensitive to the salient aspects of a situation. The second dimension
relates to emotion education: the process of affective sensitization plays a decisive
role in the gradual consolidation of moral character – and the situational modification used by DDNs can constitute an important facet of such a sensitization process.
In this way, we can respond adequately to the sceptic, while at the same time
retaining a level of modesty concerning the limitations of virtue-cultivating
nudges. Certainly, the virtues cultivated by DDNs will fail to meet the conditions necessary for full virtue. But this does not undermine their virtuecultivating potential: for, it is part of having virtue to be able to perceive, and
affectively respond to, the circumstances necessary for the specific virtues; and
it is this that DDNs can help to develop.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the issue of when, if at all, choice architecture might
be used as a means of policy-led virtue development. It has argued that certain nudges, namely, those that are able to develop our critical ability to discern the particulars of a situation (discernment-developing nudges), do have
virtue-cultivating properties, while others act on their target in ways that are
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not compatible with them playing an educative role in the development and
exercise of practical reason (automatic-behavioural nudges). It has argued that
DDNs offer a means by which the state could critically habituate character, and
has labelled this the socio-ecological account of critical habituation.
The chapter has remained agnostic concerning the question of whether, or
under what conditions, DDNs (or any other nudges, for that matter) might permissibly be employed by governments in liberal-democratic states for the purpose of virtue development, or moral education more generally. It has focused
on the use of nudges with respect to adult citizens, and so has not discussed the
potential role that nudges might play, and do already play, in the educational
contexts in which the discussion of character education most often takes place.
This, of course, was the purpose of the chapter; but, nevertheless, there are interesting questions to be explored, both empirically and philosophically, relating
to the possible classroom uses of choice architecture in developing whichever
character traits are deemed morally and civically desirable qua members of society and intellectually necessary as regards educational performance.24 This case
is interesting because, since the interventions would be aimed at children and
young people, it might allow both automatic-behavioural and discernmentdeveloping nudges. As a result, there would need to be some discussion about
how to weigh purely mechanical conditioning processes against other options
that tap into and develop students’ critical reasoning abilities, which would
return us to the ongoing debate of the nature of habituation briefly discussed
earlier in the chapter (Kristjánsson, 2006, p. 108; see fn.9).
Notes
1 I would like to thank Matthew Clayton, Adam Swift, Kimberley Brownlee, and Kristján
Kristjánsson for helpful comments on earlier drafts. It is also with thanks that I acknowledge that this research has been partially supported by a grant from the Horowitz
Foundation of Social Policy, and that my attendance at the ‘Cultivating Virtues: Interdisciplinary Approaches’ conference at Oriel College, Oxford in January 2016 was supported by funding from the Economic and Social Research Council.
2 In May 2010, the United Kingdom established the Behavioural Insights Team within the
Cabinet Office, its mandate being “to help the UK Government develop and apply lessons
from behavioural economics and behavioural science to policymaking” (it was semiprivatized in early 2014). In late 2015, President Obama issued an Executive Order directing federal agencies to incorporate behavioural and social science into their policymaking
logics; and the establishment of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Team followed soon
after. Other countries, such as Germany and Australia, have created similar policy teams.
3 Much work has been done in this regard, e.g., Bovens (2009), Hausman and Welch
(2010), Sunstein (2016).
4 This is very different to the standard view in the nudge literature, which views these
interventions as a means of helping people to satisfy their (informed or rational) preferences (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).
5 Some have recently addressed a similar question with respect to the law. Brownlee
(2015), for instance, argues that the law can set a moral example that we have good reason to emulate – a conclusion that she claims is noteworthy given the law’s potential to
shape our moral thinking. The question about choice architecture has a similar claim to
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significance given what we now know about how “socio-ecological” factors can shape
our beliefs and behaviours (Hurley, 2011). Indeed, part of a complete answer to the question concerning the law as a model of virtue would need to consider the issue of how
legal institutions are structured, which would overlap to some extent with the question
of this chapter.
Also, see the debate between McTernan (2014) and Callan (2015).
This has focused nearly exclusively on biomedical forms of moral improvement, thereby
neglecting the institutional options that have also been opened up by the cognitive science evidence.
There is, of course, the interesting question about using choice architecture within traditional educational contexts in order to develop virtues during childhood. I leave this
issue aside for the purposes of this chapter, with the expectation of a few indicative
remarks in the conclusion.
I accept that this view is not uncontroversial. It departs from what some would consider the standard interpretation of Aristotelian virtue development, which views it as a
two-part process: the first part, during childhood and youth, focuses on non-intellectual
habituation and the second, directed at (well-raised) adults, focuses on the development
of the intellectual virtue of practical reason (Burnyeat, 1980; Curzer, 2002). On this
interpretation, the period of habituation has ended once you become an adult and from
then on virtue cultivation is all about intellectualization via practical reason. This draws
the distinction too starkly in my view and, as a result, this interpretation would incorrectly rule out certain means of learning that would fall into the category of critical
habituation. Furthermore, contra Burnyeat (1980), Aristotle seems clearly to speak against
this temporal confinement of habituation to childhood when he states that “they [i.e.,
citizens] must, even when they are grown up, practice and be habituated to [virtue]”
(1180a2–3). Of course, this brief justification will not be found satisfactory by those
committed to a different view. But, it is not clear how much is at stake here, at least for
our purposes in this chapter. Both Burnyeat’s and Sherman’s interpretations contend that
virtue cultivation in adults is characterized primarily by the development and exercise
of practical reason. The difference lies with the fact that Sherman thinks this (ideally)
characterizes all virtue development, while Burnyeat thinks it only characterizes virtue
development at the more advanced stage, that is, after the person has formed good habits
via non-intellectual habituation during his or her childhood and youth. For more on the
conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s account, see Kristjánsson (2006, pp. 108–115).
I thank Kristján Kristjánsson for pressing me to clarify this point.
Blumenthal-Barby and Krieger (2014) identified 19 distinct types of cognitive biases and
heuristics in a recent review of 214 empirical studies.
Studies have shown that patients are more likely to choose surgery if the risk is given
as “90 percent survival rate” rather than “10 percent morality rate”, even though these
are rationally equivalent. This is because: “In terms of the associations they bring to
mind – how System 1 reacts to them – the two sentences really ‘mean’ different things”
(Kahneman, 2012, p. 363).
For more information, see the “Save More Tomorrow” programme developed by Richard Thaler (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, ch. 6). The Pensions Act 2011 made this type of
programme part of the law in the UK, amending the legislative framework to require
employers to automatically enrol employees in a pension system and to make contributions to that scheme.
This is illustrated well by the difference in organ donation rates between two similar
European countries, Germany and Austria. In Germany, which has an opt-in system,
only 12 percent of citizens have given consent; whereas in Austria, which uses a presumed consent (opt-out) system, 99 percent of people are on the register.
As, of course, are other actors; but these are not our focus here. Note an important
difference here from Sunstein’s claim that “Choice architecture is inevitable” (2014, p. 118,
emphasis in original). The term choice architecture seems appropriate only when a choice
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environment has been deliberately designed. There is a morally-relevant difference
between the landscape of choice being deliberately created the way it is and its being
deliberately created the way it is as a landscape of choice, i.e., with the aim of nudging
people’s behaviour in a particular direction. Choice architecture suggests, and requires,
the latter. Hence, governments could inevitably be involved in structuring the landscape
of choice without being inevitably involved in choice architecture.
This structuring sometimes occurs directly, via the intentional shaping of the policy
landscape (as with nudging), and sometimes indirectly, due to the social and economic
arrangements that the state permits through its laws.
My argument does not require or rest on this similarity; though it is interesting to note
the apparent parallels. Others have argued that modern neuroscience vindicates Aristotelian ethics (Thiele, 2012).
All in-text references relating to Aristotle are to his Nicomachean Ethics (2009), unless
otherwise specified.
Also discussed at Pol. 1340a15 and Rhet. 1389a35. More will be said about this in the
next two sections.
For example, the phronimos not only avoids discriminating against people of other races;
she perceives the reason for not acting in this way because she feels the wrongness of
race-based discrimination.
The significant role given to this perceptive aspect of practical reason is stated most
clearly at the end of NE II: “But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning [. . .]; such
things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception” (1109b18–23).
As an example, Rutgers University’s paper consumption fell by 44 percent when it
adopted this policy (Egebark and Ekström, 2016).
Aristotle understands affective responses as cognitive phenomena that are open to reason
(1102b14, 1102b26–1103a3); the process of cultivating the dispositional capacities to feel
emotions such as guilt, compassion, and fear appropriately is bound up with learning
how to discern the particulars of situation that warrant these affective responses (Sherman, 1989, p. 167).
It may be the case that, for some, this category of choice architecture would appear to
fall foul of what R.S. Peters has called the “paradox of moral education”: habituation and
intellectual training are both inevitably needed in the process of virtue development, but
yet there is an apparently inevitable opposition between them (Peters, 1981; see Curren,
2000, pp. 205–212). Peters himself thinks that this paradox is resolvable, however; as do
others (e.g., Curren, 2000; Sherman, 1989). Of course, the idea of critical habituation
is based on the view that the skills of critical reasoning can, to some extent at least, be
learned via the habituation process (more on this in the following section). For more
on this issue, and the potential for resolutions to the paradox within Aristotle’s work, see
Kristjánsson, 2006.
The Behavioural Insights Team have established an ‘Education and Skills’ team who
have been exploring, empirically, ways in which choice architecture might positively
affect student outcomes; though, this has mainly been focused on reducing absenteeism
in schools and drop-outs rates at colleges and improving results, rather than developing character traits (with the exception of their interest in cultivating what Duckworth
(2016) calls grit, which she describes as having two elements, perseverance and passion).
Though it has a slightly different focus, arguably the most explicit statement of the educational goals to result from the psychological evidence has been outlined by Gigerenzer,
who has argued that school curricula should be reformed so that statistical and risk
literacy are “taught as early as reading and writing” (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 79). Although
he does not frame it in these terms, this is because, given our heuristic-based thinking,
the development and exercise of practical reason requires that people have the relevant
competencies necessary to understanding the particulars of a situation and to decisionmaking in conditions of uncertainty.
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