The Use of Thomas Aquinas as an Authority in ​Amoris Laetitia By: Luke Arredondo Dec. 16, 2016 Arredondo 1 Within Catholic moral theology, one of the great names and standard authorities cited by the magisterium, as well as by many theologians and scholars, is St. Thomas Aquinas. In the formation of priests in seminaries from the Council of Trent until well into the 20th century, Aquinas’ treatment ​ of morality from the ​Summa Theologiae played a major part in preparing priests to hear confession and, by extension, to consider the morality of human actions. The Second Vatican council called for a renewal of priestly formation and, specifically, for a renewal of the approach to moral theology. The document asked that moral theology’s “scientific exposition, nourished more on the teaching of the Bible, should shed light on the loftiness of the calling of the faithful in Christ and the obligation that is theirs of bearing fruit in charity for the life of the world.”1 For some, this at least signaled a move away from Aquinas and a new approach to connecting moral discourse to a wider and more properly theological context. ​ Yet, Aquinas’ authority, and his use as an authority in moral theology, has not disappeared. In some regard, John Paul II’s ​Fides et Ratio seemed to impart the enduring significance of the Angelic Doctor, and the magisterium has continued to rely on Aquinas to the present day. But what does this mean? How does the Catholic Church “utilize” Aquinas as an authority, and how does it impact their arguments and the development of doctrine? In this paper I will give an analysis of a recent document by Pope Francis, issued in April of this year, in which he attempts to show how the Catholic Church can accompany those in irregular marital unions. In the text, he refers to Aquinas in some interesting ways, and my analysis will examine the sources he points to, what Aquinas’ context was in those primary sources, as well as alternative approaches to the use of Aquinas. I will conclude by showing that 1 ​Optatam Totius, #16. Arredondo 2 the document in question, ​Amoris Laetitia, is left open to competing interpretations which seem to highlight the ambiguity of using Aquins as an authority. Part I: ​Amoris Laetitia and the Methodology of Pope Francis On April 8th, 2016, Pope Francis’ post-synodal apostolic exhortation, ​Amoris Laetitia (The Joy of Love) was finally released.2 Not only was the document highly-anticipated, it was also remarkably long, coming in at 256 pages in the Vatican’s official pagination.3 Far from addressing only the question of divorce and remarriage, ​AL treats subjects as wide-ranging as marriage preparation, the role of mercy in marriage, and even the idea of gender roles, with a particular emphasis on masculinity in marriage. Beyond the breadth of the document, one of the most interesting aspects of the text is the methodology that Pope Francis uses in shaping his argument. Whereas his predecessors, especially John Paul II, would take the final ​relatio of a Synod and use it as a sort of suggestion or a starting point to then compose their own text, Francis instead leans heavily on the ​relatio in his writing. Thus, while Pope Francis certainly could just make his own arguments or give his own reply to the questions raised at the synod, he instead largely agreed with the broad outlines of the bishops gathered at the synods, especially the Ordinary Synod in 2015. Often, he makes their conclusions his own. For instance, while speaking of the difficulty many marriages and families face in the modern world, Francis notes: “In resolving sincerely to forgive the other, each has to ask quietly and humbly if he or she has not somehow created the conditions that led to the other’s mistakes. Some families break up when spouses engage in mutual recrimination, but “experience shows that with proper assistance and acts of reconciliation, through grace, a great percentage of Although the document itself lists its promulgation as March 19th, this must be seen as a date of promulgation, not the actual release date. The choice of March 19th is due to its being the feast of St. Joseph. The document was not available to the general public until April 8th. 3 For comparison’s sake, ​Familiaris Consortio was only 76 pages in length. 2 Arredondo 3 troubled marriages find a solution in a satisfying manner. To know how to forgive and to feel forgiven is a basic experience in family life”. (​AL #236) This statement is pulled directly from the ​relatio of the 2014 Extraordinary Synod.4 He then goes on in the next sentence to quote a large section from the 2015 ​relatio. In many sections of the document, Francis’ ​primary source turns out to be the thoughts of the two final synod ​relatio. Francis thus proceeds in a more collegial fashion in the structure of ​AL than in an exercise of his own authority. In addition to sticking somewhat closely to the ​relatio, Francis also cites documents from bishops conferences around the world, often from less-developed nations.5 While he certainly does cite some traditional authorities and documents such as the Bible, Thomas Aquinas (who shows up frequently), ​Familiaris Consortio, Humanae Vitae, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Vatican II documents, etc., there is a noticeable change in approach between this document and earlier post-synodal apostolic exhortations.6Another very important methodological point is that Pope Francis is up front about the difficulty of providing universal solutions for many of the problems families face. In some respects, the expectation that ​AL would lead to a simple answer to the question of the reception of sacraments for divorced Under normal circumstances, the Catholic Church holds a synod of the world’s bishops every three to four years, a procedure instituted after Vatican II by Pope Paul VI. The synods are an opportunity for the bishops to discuss a major topic in order to formulate a plan of how to respond to the needs of the Church. In some extraordinary circumstances, an additional synod meeting may be called. One such occasion for an extraordinary synod was in 2014, when the bishops gathered to discuss contemporary challenges facing the family. 5 To give a few examples, he cites the bishops of Korea (​AL #42), Mexico (​AL #51), Argentina (​AL #51), Columbia (​AL #57), and Chile (​AL #135). 6 This is especially significant when comparing Amoris to ​Familiaris. At least according to my count, John Paul II only referred to the synod document which preceded ​Familiaris Consortio one time, choosing instead to refer to the traditional authorities or rely on his own argumentation. 4 Arredondo 4 and civilly remarried Catholic turned out to be unrealistic. While the document offers much to consider with respect to marriage and contemporary challenges, Francis states plainly that “...neither the Synod nor this Exhortation could be expected to provide a new set of general rules, canonical in nature and applicable to all cases. What is possible is simply a renewed encouragement to undertake a responsible personal and pastoral discernment of particular cases, one which would recognize that, since “the degree of responsibility is not equal in all cases”, the consequences or effects of a rule need not necessarily always be the same. Priests have the duty to “accompany [the divorced and remarried] in helping them to understand their situation according to the teaching of the Church and the guidelines of the bishop.” (​AL #300) This approach, which focuses on the complexities of individual cases, will require some careful distinctions. Francis’ suggestion that decisions and pastoral judgements should be left to diocesan authorities, rather than by proposing a universal solution that is canonically binding on the entire Church, is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. But it also leaves open the very real possibility of competing, even contradictory interpretations and implementations. This has led to considerable debate about how to implement the “spirit” of ​Amoris Laetitia. Part II: Chapter Eight of ​Amoris Laetitia An Overview of Ch. 8 This chapter, the penultimate of the entire text, focuses specifically on those living in irregular situations with regard to marriage.7 Entitled “Accompanying, Discerning and Integrating Weakness,” the argument advanced in this section of the text led to considerable disagreement and, some would argue, confusion. In order to appreciate some of the debates, it will be helpful to review some of the chapter’s main themes. The term “irregular unions” refers to several groups of people: (1) those Catholics who have been canonically married, but have since divorced civilly and remarried civilly, (2) Catholics who, for whatever reason, have never married canonically, but have been married civilly, and (3) Catholics who have not married but are living with their boyfriend or girlfriend, but doing so as spouses (engaging in a sexual relationship) rather than as “brother and sister.” 7 Arredondo 5 Throughout the document, Pope Francis frequently refers to the Catholic Church as a “field hospital for sinners” but this image particularly shines through in chapter eight of ​AL.8 He opens by referring, not to mortal sinners, excommunicated members, those living in sin, or any such term, but rather by saying that he will address those who “participate in her life in an incomplete manner.”9 He makes clear throughout this section that even those who objectively are not living in cooperation with the Church’s moral teachings should still be considered a part of the Church. Francis also affirms the ideal of marriage in the Catholic understanding as sacramental reality, which is not temporary but life-long, and centered in a relationship of free, faithful and exclusive love, which is open to new life.10 Yet, he notes that both he and the synod fathers do not want to “disregard the constructive elements in those situations which do not yet or no longer correspond to her teaching on marriage.”11 Throughout this chapter, Francis shows some discretion is needed when discerning irregular situations. For instance, he argues that “some forms of union radically contradict” the ideal, but others “realize it in at least a partial and analogous way.”12 He does also seem to hope that this document, and pastoral reception and implementation of it, will lead in some cases “to the eventual celebration of the sacrament of marriage.”13 Francis points out that some situations, particularly cohabitation or civil marriage, may not indicate that the individuals or couples have rejected the Catholic view of marriage as a sacramental reality, but rather that they may live in circumstances which make the sacramental reality an impossibility. This could be due to In fact, he uses this image in the first paragraph of Ch. 8. Cf. AL #291: “Let us not forget that the Church's task is often like that of a field hospital.” 9 AL #291, notably quoting the 2014 extraordinary synod’s final ​relatio. (emphasis added) 10 Cf. AL #292 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 AL #293. 8 Arredondo 6 economic hardships or it may have to do with countries in which the Church is not given the freedom to marry people.14 For Pope Francis, the fundamental stance with regard to those who are not living in accord with the Church’s view on marriage is that they be reintegrated, and allowed to participate in the life of the Church in whatever way they can. He states that what is called for is a law of gradualness, in which there is a “gradualness in the prudential exercise of free acts on the part of subjects who are not in a position to understand, appreciate, or fully carry out the objective demands of the law.”15 This brief treatment gives us a sense of Pope Francis’ rationale and approach to irregular situations. But the heart of the matter is his view of discernment. To that issue we now turn. Part III: Thomas Aquinas and Discernment in Ch. 8 of ​Amoris Laetitia After the synod meetings were concluded in 2015, speculation immediately focused on whether or not the so-called “Kasper Proposal” would win the day.16 When ​AL was promulgated, that discussion began to focus on Ch. 8, and everything seems to hinge on how to interpret Pope Francis’ concept of discernment. For Francis, the key in discerning how to integrate people in irregular marital situations consists in distinguishing between their unique circumstances, taking account of the Church’s teaching and the demands of justice, as well as making sure that the pastors (who are called to lead this process of discernment) are keenly aware of the varying levels of culpability that can be at work. AL #294. AL #295. 16 ​Cardina Walter Kasper’s book, ​The Gospel of the Family (New York: Paulist Press, 2014), and his talk to the Synod fathers, advanced a thesis that, in some cases, mercy might require or allow the Church to admit to the sacraments those whose marital unions were irregular, without requiring them to live in sexual continence, which was the standard view most recently expressed by John Paul II’s post-synodal apostolic exhortation in 1981, Familiaris Consortio. 14 15 Arredondo 7 As he notes, the priests “have the duty to accompany [the divorced and remarried] in helping them to understand their situation according to the teaching of the Church and the guidelines of the bishop.”17 Francis clearly does not want to impose a set of universal rules, binding in all cases. But neither does he want to suggest a relativism in which there are no rules, but only individual circumstances. In this desire to find a way between overly simplistic rules and a reckless relativism, Francis has an important ally: St. Thomas Aquinas. In the earlier chapters of ​AL, Pope Francis turns to Aquinas as a reference and authority, but the way he is invoked in chapter eight is particularly important. Though Francis is not explicit about his approach, he appears to want to challenge those who would be more comfortable simply saying that those living in an irregular marital union are guilty of mortal sin, or are participating in an intrinsic evil. Francis calls attention to Aquinas on two occasions in chapter eight.18 In both cases, the reference is more than a footnote. Discussion of Aquinas’ view, and its application to the context of chapter eight is spelled out, somewhat, in the body of the text. In this chapter, Francis is appealing to the way in which Aquinas’ account of moral action, which pays attention to passions, virtues, vices, inclinations, as well as the divine law and human reason, highlights the importance of a careful, and thorough analysis. More importantly, Francis shows that Aquinas was keenly aware of the difficulty of providing simple solutions to complex realities. First Reference to Aquinas in Ch. 8 The first reference to Aquinas is in paragraph 301 which, notably, is the first paragraph of a section entitled “Mitigating Factors in Pastoral Discernment.” The aim of this section is to 17 18 AL #300 Cf. AL #301, #304. Arredondo 8 help priests move beyond an overly-simplistic approach to discerning couples in irregular marriage situations. As Francis notes, there are always many factors which impact whether someone is fully culpable or an objective sin, thus “it can no longer simply be said that all those in any ‘irregular’ situation are living in a state of mortal sin and are deprived of sanctifying grace.”19 He goes on to argue that there is, of course the possibility of invincible ignorance with regard to the moral law, but there is also more: someone may know the rule, but fail to appreciate the reason for the rule, or may simply not have any options to go forward without committing further sin.20 Here, he looks to Aquinas, who argues that one may possess all of the infused virtues, and even the acquired virtues, but perhaps not always be able to act on them. Francis notes: “Saint Thomas Aquinas himself recognized that someone may possess grace and charity, yet not be able to exercise any one of the virtues well; in other words, although someone may possess all the infused moral virtues, he does not clearly manifest the existence of one of them, because the outward practice of that virtue is rendered difficult: ‘Certain saints are said not to possess certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, even though they have the habits of all the virtues.’”21 The full context of Aquinas argument, which Francis alludes to, has to do with charity and the accompanying virtues. In the ​Prima Secundae, Aquinas lays out an integrated and complex theory of moral action. The question quoted by Pope Francis comes from the section of the ​Prima Secundae known by many as the “Treatise on the Happiness.”22 Even the idea of AL #301 Throughout the document one of the examples frequently cited is those who have remarried and cannot leave their second union due to the justice required of the children which have been born. In that light, Francis seems to see some important distinctions that may not apply, perhaps, if an individual had merely divorced and remarried, but in which there were no children involved. In that regard, there may be some room for continuity with more traditional approaches to these scenarios. 21 AL #301, citing ST IaIIae, q. 65, a. 3, ad 2 22 Cf. John Oesterle, trans., ​Treatise on Happiness (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 19 20 Arredondo 9 distilling a separate treatise on virtues, happiness, and the law, though, somewhat counteracts the way that Aquinas wants to approach a moral analysis of human actions. Indeed, many theologians and scholars today criticize the tradition of reading isolated segments of Aquinas, in particular his moral treatments from the ​Summa, without attempting to connect these questions to his wider corpus and his broad view in which all moral questions must be more properly approached as theological questions that are related to human anthropology, creation, redemption, etc.23 In his wider context, Aquinas is working slowly through the interrelatedness of concepts like beatitude, virtue, grace, and even law. Thus the section quoted by Pope Francis highlights merely one particular discussion which shows the difficult nature of trying to analyze human actions and choices. It is important to point out that Aquinas here is discussing the infused virtues, saying that if one has the virtue of charity (which is infused), they cannot be without the acquired virtues. This is because “God does not act less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature.”24 It seems that Pope Francis wants to highlight that an individual (or a couple, in ​AL), may have infused virtues in their soul, even if their outward behavior suggests that they are not living in accordance with a life of virtue. If that is the argument Francis is trying to make, it is not clear if Aquinas’ position totally helps to advance the same point. Because, while Aquinas admits that an individual may well possess a given virtue, but have difficulty ​acting virtuously, he also makes plain that sometimes the reason for this difficulty is not just external causes, but also internal ones. Thus, Aquinas implies that if one has built up a See Stephen Pope, “Overview of the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas,” in ​The Ethics of Aquinas, ed. Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2002), 30-31. Cf. also Leonard Boyle, “The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas-Revisited in the same collection, p. 1-16. 24 ST IaIIae, q. 65, art. 3, Response. 23 Arredondo 10 habit of acting in opposition to virtue, even if they are to have the virtues infused in them by God through grace, they may still have difficulty responding correctly. Accordingly, he argues that “the habits of the infused moral virtues now and then have difficulty in operating because of certain opposing dispositions remaining from previous acts.”25 It appears from the context of ​AL that Pope Francis wants to highlight the sheer fact that, although someone isn’t necessarily acting virtuously, this need not imply that they have no virtue, or that they lack grace. Pastors, and the Church, therefore, shouldn’t rush to judgement of their situation. But Francis’ point is not made entirely clear by the reference to Aquinas, since Aquinas at least hints that personal decisions and habits (i.e. vices and sins) may be the reason why some individuals have difficulty acting on their virtues. Also interesting in this article from the ​Summa is that Aquinas argues that, while one may possess the infused virtues but have difficulty acting on them, there is no similar issue with the acquired virtues because “the exercise of the acts by which the virtues are acquired also removes opposing dispositions.”26 It appears that Francis is trying to show that pastors ought to carefully discern whether all those in irregular unions are really guilty of sin, since these situations can sometimes be complicated, and there may be factors mitigating culpability. But on my reading, Aquinas seems to be give a bit more room to the possibility of culpability arising out of habitual vice. In addition to the reference to the ​Summa Theologiae, Francis also points readers to Aquinas’ ​De Malo. In the section Francis refers to, Aquinas carries on a much more lengthy investigation into the question of the location of sin. His particular analysis in the second article is whether we may say that “sin consists solely of the will’s act.”27 A close reading of that article ST IaIIae, q. 65, art. 3, ad. 2. ST IaIae, q. 65, art 3. ad 3. 27 ​De Malo, q. 2, art. 2 25 26 Arredondo 11 makes it difficult to see what relationship there is between ​De Malo and question 65 from the Prima Secundae. Aquinas’ focus in ​De Malo is in showing that evil, sin, and moral wrongs, are all distinct. Many things, from incomplete or disordered actions, to natural deformities, could be called evil in the sense that they are a privation. They lack some perfection, and in this way are evil, but that doesn’t mean the same thing as calling something a sin or a moral wrong. Aquinas says for instance that “we can say that a crooked leg is a bad leg, but we cannot say that it is a sin, except perhaps in the manner of speaking whereby we call the effects of sin sin.”28 In his response to the question about sin’s location, Aquinas argues that sin is present not merely in external acts, but also in the will. Thus, “both external acts and acts of the will are sins.”29 However, the will is what leads to external acts which may be sinful. Thus, on Aquinas’ account, it is the will which bears primary responsibility for sin, even if the will to commit a sin is not lived out through an external act. Yet at the same time, he argues that God’s punishment toward those who merely ​will to sin (without actually doing so) will lesser than those who both will ​and actually sin.30 If the citation from the ​Summa was not particularly easy to pair with the text of ​AL when examined more closely, the reference to ​De Malo seems even more difficult. Thomas’ concern is about sin, but there is not any sustained discussion of virtue or the interaction of virtues in this text. This makes it a more challenging task to determine what the reference means for Pope Francis, or how it might impact the interpretation of his argument. I take his general point in ​AL #301 to be that one must look beyond the external behavior and outward appearance of those in irregular unions to determine where their conscience is, what their will is, and how they are De Malo, q. 2, art. 2, Answer. De Malo, q. 2, art. 2, sed contra. 30 Cf. De Malo, q. 2, art. 2, reply to objection 8. 28 29 Arredondo 12 understanding their particular circumstances. He clearly wants to move beyond merely labeling anyone who is in an irregular situation as thereby being in mortal sin, and in this regard the tradition of the Catholic Church is of course behind him.31 Francis goes on in the following paragraphs to talk about the limits of individual culpability for what constitutes objectively sinful behavior. He cites the ​Catechism’s discussion of mitigating factors which prevent someone from being held accountable for mortal sin, including “ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors” and later, “affective immaturity, force of acquired habit, conditions of anxiety or other psychological or social factors that lessen or even extenuate moral culpability.”32 This is a clear move to show how individual circumstances, even when they do not live up to the moral law, can sometimes be complicated. Yet, it is not immediately evident how exactly the texts cited from Aquinas contribute to that argument, since they focus too on the real possibility of persons choosing and causing evil, more than on the limiting factors. It seems to me that a better text from Aquinas would have been from IaIIae q. 18, where Aquinas discusses what makes an action good or evil. Aquinas in this section says that the moral object is the most important to consider when analyzing the goodness or evil of a particular action, but he seems to indicate that what he has in mind is not so much a raw action, but rather an action considered in terms of the circumstances one finds himself in. He notes, for example, that “the ​primary goodness of a moral act comes from the appropriateness of its object.”33 A reference to this question from Aquinas would work well to Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1793: “If-on the contrary-the ignorance is invincible, or the moral subject is not responsible for his erroneous judgement, the evil committed by the person cannot be imputed to him. It remains no less an evil, a privation, a disorder. One must therefore work to correct the errors of moral conscience.” Pope Francis seems to be putting emphasis on the possibility of someone being unaware of the demands of the moral law with regard to their irregular union, and thereby not fully culpable of sin. 32 ​AL#302 33 ST IaIIae, q. 18, art. 2, responsa, emphasis added. 31 Arredondo 13 advance what seems to be Pope Francis’ general argument in this section, namely that pastors must do more than merely answer the question of whether or not the individuals concerned have broken one of the Church’s moral rules. Aquinas, while putting emphasis on the moral object, doesn’t leave it as a simple issue. He highlights, in addition to the object (and its appropriateness), the role of circumstances, because in evaluating any particular act, we must keep in mind that “the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in what it is essentially, but also in additional things connected with the action as accidents of it.”34 Especially considering the fact that Pope Francis avoids the term “intrinsic evil” it seems that he is comfortable with some newer approaches to moral theology. Given that general aim, it is surprising that he wouldn’t turn to question 18 because in that and the following questions, Aquinas argues for a strong relationship between good and evil and the moral object chosen, but he stops short of saying that we can determine the good or evil of an action once we have identified the object. Second Reference in Ch. 8 Pope Francis’ second reference to Aquinas is his most significant reliance on the Angelic Doctor in Ch. 8. Discussing and elaborating about how irregular marital unions require careful discernment and often involve layers of complexity, Francis turns to the treatment on the natural law in the ​Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, q. 94, article 4. There, Aquinas makes the important clarification that the natural law, while certainly helpful for providing a consensus on fundamental principles, does have its limits. As Pope Francis notes, “It is reductive simply to consider whether or not an individual’s actions correspond to a general law or rule, because that 34 ST IaIIae, 1. 18, art. 3, responsa. Arredondo 14 is not enough to discern and ensure full fidelity to God in the concrete life of a human being.”35 To support this point, Francis turns to Aquinas and quotes him at length: “I earnestly ask that we always recall a teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas and learn to incorporate it in our pastoral discernment: ‘Although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects… In matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles; and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all… The principle will be found to fail, according as we descend further into detail.’”36 The frank admission that “the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects” is perhaps the most intriguing argument in ​AL. When the question of irregular marriage unions was brought up in ​Familiaris Consortio, John Paul II’s method and approach to the issue was to counsel people toward living as brother and sister, and even then he said that admission to the sacraments would be something possible only in private, so as to avoid scandal.37 Franci changes the approach. Rather than focus primarily on those who are in regular marital situations, he wants to bring those ​irregular scenarios to the center of the discussion. In doing so, he wants to say that they should be given a careful discernment, that there are possible reasons why they may not be guilty of sin, and furthermore that he cannot issue any blanket rules to be applied to all situations. Of particular importance is that he refrains from mentioning the duty to live in continence or as brother and sister, thereby implying that there is another possibility. Of course, it is true that Aquinas admits that there is a chance, even perhaps a high one of disagreement or diversity in applying the fundamental principles of the natural law to particular ​AL #305 Ibid., quoting ST IaIIae, q. 94, art 4 37 Cf. ​Familiaris Consortio, #84 35 36 Arredondo 15 cases. And there is no denying that the pastoral concern at the heart of ​AL is a sensible one on which to turn to this passage from Aquinas. It remains to be seen, however, what exactly Francis meant by this assertion. For, even in Aquinas, there is some discussion about the ​ causes of varying interpretations of the natural law. In fact, in the same article Francis quotes, Aquinas says that the disagreement could have several causes: insufficient knowledge of the moral law, the perversion of reason by a passion or an evil habit, or even a natural disposition.38 At the very least, we can say that Aquinas is making clear the unavoidable difficulties of formulating moral rules based on the fundamental principles of the natural law that could always be applicable, no matter the circumstances. We do well also to remember that Aquinas’ view of the natural law occupies essentially just one question from the ​Prima Secundae (q. 94), but he carries on an analysis of the Old Law and the New Law which goes on for ten questions (ST IaIIae, q. 98-108).39 Aquinas as an Authority and the Possibility of Thomisms Nevertheless, the citation of the fourth article of q. 94 is a much more intelligible move on the part of Pope Francis. It gives attention to the complexity of Aquinas’ own account, and the limits of the natural law. There is a tendency, at some times explicit, others implicit, within Catholicism, to treat the natural law as a sort of cure-all for disagreements. Thomas Aquinas and his account of the natural law has been employed in the social encyclicals40 and moral theology,41 ST IaIIae, q. 94, a. 4, responsa As Clifford Kossel notes, the “Treatise on the Law” occupies only one third of Aquinas’ discussion of law; the rest is taken up by a much fuller treatment in q. 98-108. See “Natural Law and Human Law” in ​The Ethics of Aquinas, p. 169-193. 40 Especially in earlier ones like ​Rerum Novarum and ​Quadragessimo Anno. 41 See, among others, ​Veritatis Splendor 38 39 Arredondo 16 but the Angelic Doctor has also been referred to in recent years as a source that can be depended upon for his philosophical method and mastery of sources. Leo XIII, in 1879, noted in this regard that, “among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes, because ‘he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way seems to have inherited the intellect of all’” and he later claimed that Aquinas is”rightly and deservedly esteemed the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith.”42 More recently, St. John Paul II said that “the Church has been justified in consistently proposing Saint Thomas as a master of thought and a model of the right way to do theology.”43 What is interesting about these statements, and what we can see hints of in Pope Francis’ use of Thomas, is that merely using Aquinas as an example or as an authority can take on a wide range of meanings. While magisterial documents can cursorily point to Aquinas as an authority to make a point, many scholars of given attention to the fact that Aquinas may be interpreted in diverse fashions. Mark Jordan, for instance, accuses the neo-Thomists of the late 19th and early 20th century of not only misreading Aquinas, but of re-writing him and, more dangerous, creating a sort of mythical Aquinas. For Jordan, many so-called Thomists have created three powerful illusions: (1) the illusion of Thomas as the “supreme codifier of common sense” (2) the illusion that Thomas is “somehow universally persuasive across all centuries and all cultures” and (3) the illusion “that he is the ultimate encyclopedia.”44 Jordan argues that a careful consideration of the work Aquinas was attempting, specifically in the ​Summa, ought to show us that he (Aquinas) ​Aeterni Patris, #17 ​Fides et Ratio, #43. 44 Mark Jordan, ​Rewritten Theology: Aquinas after His Readers (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 13-14. 42 43 Arredondo 17 intended to go about the project of moral philosophy in a very different fashion from those contemporary approaches he was no doubt familiar with. He mentions as a key example Thomas’ structure of the ​Summa. For instance, Jordan sees a major shift in Aquinas’ placement of beatitude. Rather than merely describing the greatest good, Aquinas shows that any apparent earthly goods must pale in comparison to the joy of the beatific vision. He goes beyond both Albertus Magnus and Aristotle in showing the necessity and importance of aiming for the highest good, even though that good is beyond our immediate reach, because this is the only true way to happiness. As Jordan remarks, “The confident discernment of the highest good, of human happiness, at the beginning of ​Summa 1-2 is, just by itself, a decisive criticism of ancient philosophy. It announces that we stand at the doorway to a theologian’s treatment of ‘moral matter.’”45 Jordan’s view is that Aquinas, though deliberately attempting to approach moral questions in a very different fashion than his contemporaries, in the end is frustrated by his own Dominicans and those who lived shortly after he died. This early generation created the “myth” of Thomas as the great synthesizer, and did so first by copying only selective parts of the ​Summa (the ​Secunda Secundae was the most popular) and later by deliberately re-writing Thomas. What happens is that, over time, Thomas is “rewritten” into an unending number of contexts, and each time the claim is that the “new” version of Thomas is just as good as the original. The result is Aquinas becomes “a name vaguely connected to certain doctrines or arguments are terms--which are then pressed into any service” rather than the author of a particular set of texts.46 Furthermore, once this floating authority is created, Jordan argues that a form of “police” 45 46 Jordan, 129 Jordan, 10. Arredondo 18 emerges which seeks to claim and defend a particular reading of Aquinas. Certainly, some of Jordan’s claims may be a bit over-emphasized, but the core of his argument cannot be easily dismissed. His strongest claim may be to point out the rivalries, sometimes bitter, between all the many folks who claim the mantle of “Thomist.” As he points out, “a principal Thomistic pastime has been casting doubts on the Thomism of one’s rivals. And there have been so many rivals!”47 If Jacob wants to advocate for a wholesale re-reading of Aquinas, a sort of ​resourcement, there are others who suggest a less drastic approach. Jean Porter, for instance, sees Aquinas as an important and valuable resource in engaging in dialogue about moral evaluation of human action, even in a contemporary setting.48 Porter is more comfortable with Aquinas’ perceived authority, but is not walking in the footsteps of ​Aeterni Patris, either. She points out many of the strengths of Aquinas’ work, such as his focus on the importance of reason, the relationship between reason and nature, and the apparent flexibility of his approach to the natural law.49 But, for Porter, the overriding value of Aquinas can be appreciated in a creative engagement with his ideas, not a slavish re-formulation of them. Thus, as she notes, “no one author, not even Aquinas, can fully represent the richness of an extended discussion such as the scholastics’ treatment of the natural law, and there is much of value there which is not included, or not given prominence, in Aquinas’ own thought.”50 Porter sees clearly that Aquinas is a valuable participant for dialogue, but he cannot be said to have actually inherited all the wisdom of the Jordan, 6. Cf. Jean Porter, ​A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 2005). 49 “The resultant account of the natural law will not provide a basis for deriving moral norms from indubitable first principles. It will, however, provide a framework for analyzing, critiquing, and developing norms and practices and defending innovations within a context of practical concerns.” Porter, 45-46. 50 Porter, 47. 47 48 Arredondo 19 ancients, as Leo XIII argued. Further, her view of the natural law is one that is not necessarily rationally compelling to everyone. Rather, she wants to present a theory of the natural law” that is fundamentally sound and widely defensible--not in its entirety to everyone, but in significant parts to a wide range of interlocutors.”51 It ought not to be surprising, then, that Porter’s discussion of virtue and indeed her approach to the natural law, emphasizes the capacity for diversity. For instance, in looking at the way virtues are spelled out in the moral lives of individuals, Porter argues that the means chosen as a way to the end of the human will, which virtue influences, are not set in stone. Rather, “the mean with respect to these virtues does have substantive content” but it is limited, and “reflects whatever configuration of desires and aversions best reflects the agent’s overall good, taking account of the proper place the objects of desire and fear have in relation to her life as a whole.” 52 If Aquinas’ Q. 94 of the ​Prima Secundae hints at the possibility for multiple interpretations of the natural law, Porter’s thesis shows the many forms that the natural law can take, but not in a way that diminishes the importance or significance of the natural law. Her argument shows one way of adopting Aquinas as a guide, but not perhaps as a “floating name” that Jordan had in mind. In any event, from the analysis so far, it is clear that merely using Aquinas as a reference, or even including some discussion of his views in the body of a text, may not give us a clear picture of what is being argued. I cannot claim that Pope Francis assumed that by footnoting Aquinas, or quoting him in Ch. 8, he would settle all disputes. But at the same time, closely analyzing the way Aquinas is used in this important chapter of the text highlights some of the difficulty of interpreting exactly what Francis is trying to advance in the document. 51 52 Porter, 46. Porter, 193. Arredondo 20 Part IV: The Debate Over Ch. 8 Part of the intrigue of this chapter is precisely the fine line Francis is trying to walk between merely repeating the admonitions of earlier documents, or totally changing the Church’s doctrine. Some of the debates over the implementation of ​AL, or perhaps most of them, stem from the difficulty in determining precisely what Francis has in mind. On the one hand, for instance, the Pope says that priests shouldn’t use the moral law as “stones” to throw at those living in irregular unions.53 But at the same time, Francis stresses that the Church will not cease presenting its doctrine of an ideal marriage because “to show understanding in the face of exceptional situations never implies dimming the light of the fuller ideal or proposing less than what Jesus offers to the human being.”54 It seems that Francis wants to show that the moral evaluation of individual actions should be guided by the analysis of Thomas Aquinas, which includes a discussion of the moral object, as well as circumstances, ends, intention, and more. But, in the key chapter of the document, while pointing to Aquinas’ notion of the complexity of individual cases, Francis stops short of giving a full-throated description of the limits and complexity of Aquinas’ approach. He could then be said to be referring Aquinas ​either as a traditional authority, to try and emphasize the previous doctrine of the Church, ​or as a way of indicating the possibility of a new approach. In the end, he leaves open considerable room for debate. 53 54 AL #305 AL #307 Arredondo 21 Almost immediately after its publication, Catholic theologians, including Bishops and Cardinals, began debating whether or not the document was calling for a change in doctrine. With some exceptions, most of the blogs and news articles focused on chapter eight.55 One of the quickest to voice concern and caution over the arguments of Ch. 8 was an American cardinal, Raymond Cardinal Burke, former Archbishop of St. Louis. In an interview published less than a week after the release of ​AL, Burke argued that the document was not an act of the magisterium. He argues that, by its very nature, a post-synodal apostolic exhortation, is better categorized as a personal reflection of the Pope, and not a formal act of teaching. He goes on to claim that “The personal, that is, non-magisterial, nature of the document is also evident in the fact that the references cited are principally the final report of the 2015 session of the Synod of Bishops and the addresses and homilies of Pope Francis himself. There is no consistent effort to relate the text, in general, or these citations to the magisterium, the Fathers of the Church and other proven authors.”56 This is a somewhat remarkable development, especially in light of the way previous post-synodal exhortations have been consistently used and referred to with the implicit assumption that they constitute a contribution to the magisterium’s official teachings. Burke highlights also the non-infallible nature of an exhortation, but this is a strange move given that the Catholic conception of authority of papal teachings does not hinge on their inherent infallibility. It also obscures what many times is referred to as the infallibility of the ​ordinary The Catholic Herald in the UK was one example. See Stephen Bullivant’s initial reaction: http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2016/04/08/amoris-laetitia-is-kitchen-sink-theology-and-all-thebetter-for-it/​ . The New York Times also described the document as a “Rorshark test for Catholics.” See Laurie Goodstein’s article: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/world/europe/catholics-express-hope-and-disappointment-over-popes-statemen t-on-families.html?_r=0 56 Cardinal Burke, Amoris Laetitia and the Constant Teaching and Practice of the Church, National Catholic Register, 12 April 2016: http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/amoris-laetitia-and-the-constant-teaching-and-practice-of-the-church 55 Arredondo 22 magisterium. Recently, Cardinal Burke along with three other prelates, have publically published a letter asking the Pope to answer four questions about the interpretation of ​Amoris Laetitia. In their letter, they state that they “have noted a grave disorientation and great confusion of many faithful regarding extremely important matters for the life of the Church. We have noted that even within the episcopal college there are contrasting interpretations of Chapter 8 of ​Amoris Laetitia.”57 Where this discussion will end up unfortunately remains to be seen, but it highlights the central issue of this paper, which is the possibility of divergent and diverse interpretations of moral doctrines made possible by the use of St. Thomas Aquinas. Now let us turn to some of the initial formal implementations of the text to see how this diversity is playing itself out. As I noted above, Pope Francis leaves the final decisions and practical consequences of AL in the hands of the bishops on a local level. This collegial move thus requires bishops or bishops conferences to issue any guidelines in order for their flocks to know what impact the exhortation will have on their lives. Since the release of ​AL, only a small number of dioceses have issued official responses and guidelines to implement the document. But even with the small sample size available at this somewhat early junction, there is plenty of evidence that the document is both an act of the magisterium, and also that it is open to very different types of implementation and interpretation. Implementation in Philadelphia In the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, a document entitled “Pastoral Guidelines for Implementing ​Amoris Laetitia” was issued on July 1, 2016. 58 The document, just over six pages 57 http://www.ncregister.com/blog/edward-pentin/full-text-and-explanatory-notes-of-cardinals-questions-on-amoris-lae titia 58 It is difficult to determine if this was the first diocese to formulate official implementation guidelines of ​AL, but Philadelphia certainly was the first diocese whose guidelines garnered media attention. Arredondo 23 in length, offers a framework of interpretation for ​AL that includes a general introduction, then features sections devoted to Catholic married couples, divorced (and not remarried) couples/persons, divorced and remarried persons, cohabitating couples, persons with same-sex attraction, and the pastoral situation of same-sex couples. Obviously due to the brief length of the document, each section is relatively short, but the most sustained attention is given to the situation of those who have been in a valid marriage, only to later divorce, and enter into a new civil marriage. Archbishop Charles Chaput, the author of the text, structures his entire view of ​AL on the assumption that the best way to interpret the exhortation of Pope Francis is by viewing it in continuity with previous Catholic doctrine. To that end, he leans heavily on Pope John Paul II’s notion of the relationship between conscience and truth, and argues that it is a great act of mercy to faithfully proclaim the truth of marriage and sexuality, even to those who are in confusing circumstances, and who may struggle to live up to the vision set forth by the Catholic church. In his discussion of divorced and civilly remarried Catholics, Chaput says that they should not feel as though they are “outside the Church.”59 Rather, they are called to participate in the life of the Church by attending Mass, and taking part in the various activities of the parish, especially mentioning that their children are welcome and important to parish life. This does not mean, however, giving implicit or explicit approval to their irregular marital situation. Rather, Chaput calls pastors to help such couples “form their consciences according to the truth.”60 The purpose of this approach is “not condemnation, but the opposite: a full reconciliation of the person with God and neighbor, and restoration to the fullness of visible communion with Jesus 59 60 Philadelphia Guidelines, p. 3. Philadelphia Guidelines, p. 4. Arredondo 24 Christ and the Church.”61 The fruit of this accompaniment and discernment, from Chaput’s view, is to encourage those in irregular unions to both realize their objective state and, perhaps moreso, to encourage the couples to live in accordance with the Catholic Church’s teaching that sexual intimacy is to be reserved for canonically and sacramentally valid marriages only. Thus, the Philadelphia guidelines make essentially the same point that John Paul II did in ​Familiaris Consortio; they call for the civilly-remarried persons to “refrain froms exual intimacy. This applies even if they must (for the care of their children) continue to live under one roof. Undertaking to live as brother and sister is necessary for the divorced and civilly-remarried to receive reconciliation in the Sacrament of Penance, which could then open the way to the Eucharist.”62 The key, for Chaput, is to remember that ​AL can be a genuinely pastoral document which extends mercy to couples and individuals living in difficult situations, but that need not necessitate any fundamentally new ideas. His interpretation, and the guidelines for his diocese, take a more conservative reading to the text of ​AL. In presenting the idea that living in continence and avoiding sexual intimacy may be a challenge, he notes that all Catholics are called to sexual chastity, and that there is furthermore a great need for the frequent reception of the grace of the sacraments in order to assist people to live out the Catholic Church’s vision of human sexuality. The Philadelphia guidelines thus lean on continuity with traditional norms, rather than focusing on what others see as a possibility for development, or new ways of ministering to those in irregular unions. 61 62 Ibid. Ibid. Arredondo 25 Implementation in Argentina In the beginning of September, the Bishops Conference of Argentina, motivated by AL #300, issued a series of guidelines for the interpretation of Amoris Laetitia, referring specifically to Chapter 8.63 The full title of their document, “Criterios básicos para la aplicación del capítulo VIII de Amoris laetitia” makes clear the intention of the Argentine bishops; they are providing basic criteria for applying Chapter 8 to their diocesan context. In keeping with the notion of “basic criteria,” their document simply lists ten bullet points for pastors to consider. One of their primary concerns is that the pastors should understand that the process of discernment, accompaniment, and integration, cannot take a one-size-fits all approach. Rather, each situation, each case, must be carefully evaluated so that distinctions can be drawn between spouses who were perhaps never in a valid marriage, those situations in which a new union is the result of a recent divorce, and those who have failed multiple times in their familial promises. In a certain sense, one might call this approach a nuanced casuistry. There is a clear intention not to devolve into relativism, but there is also real concerns to attend to the unique circumstances facing each couple. Thus, the bishops note that “Lo que se propone es un discernimiento que distinga adecuadamente cada caso.”64 Though their guidelines are short, they focus on several key areas. In addition to calling for careful discernment, they also highlight the importance of not assuming that every method of integration automatically leads to the sacraments.65 Cf. ​http://www.forumlibertas.com/criterios-basicos-la-aplicacion-del-capitulo-viii-amoris-laetitia/ My translation: What we propose is a discernment which distinguishes each case adequately. 65 Este camino no acaba necesariamente en los sacramentos, sino que puede orientarse a otras formas de integrarse más en la vida de la Iglesia: una mayor presencia en la comunidad, la participación en grupos de oración o reflexión, el compromiso en diversos servicios eclesiales, etc. (cf. 299). Translation: This way does not necessarily end in the sacraments, but can lead to other forms of integration into the live of the Church: a greater presence in the community, participations in prayer and reflection groups, and diverse forms of ecclesiastical service. 63 64 Arredondo 26 While the Argentine guidelines are somewhat nuanced and seek to avoid any radical interpretations of ​AL, they do nonetheless make a clear recognition that, in their view of Chapter 8, Pope Francis has opened “several doors.”66 One of the doors is certainly access to the sacraments of Confession and the Eucharist, but there remains some difficulty with regard to avoiding scandal. To that end, the bishops propose that if appropriate discernment and accompaniment has led to a decision to admit an individual or a couple to the sacraments, they might best be restrained to receiving them in private, rather than in a public setting.67 It is clear that the bishops envision at least ​some possibility of admitting Catholics in an irregular marital situation to go to confession and receive the Eucharist. More interestingly, there is no insistence that couples who are in an irregular union of some sort must decide to live in continence in order to receive these sacraments. That possibility is mentioned, but it is also noted that this may not be a realistic possibility. To that end, it is important to note that, in Pope Francis’ personal view, the Argentine bishops have correctly interpreted his words. In a personal letter to the bishops of his home country, Pope Francis said that their letter “was very good and explained precisely the sense of Ch. 8 of ​Amoris Laetitia. There are no other interpretations.”68 Conclusion In the intervening months since the promulgation of ​Amoris Laetitia, a great deal of competing claims and interpretations have been advanced. Pope Francis has not yet given a definitive explanation of exactly how to interpret his text, aside from some personal letters and ​Cf. Introduction to Criterios Básicos: “Francisco ha abierto varias puertas en la pastoral familiar y estamos llamados a aprovechar este tiempo de misericordia, para asumir como Iglesia.” 67 Puede ser conveniente que un eventual acceso a los sacramentos se realice de manera reservada, sobre todo cuando se prevean situaciones conflictivas. 68 Translation mine. Cf. letter of Pope Francis to Argentine Bishops: “El escrito es muy bueno y explica cabalmente el sentido del capítulo VIII de Amoris Laetitia. No hay otras interpretaciones.” 66 Arredondo 27 informal statements during interviews. Still lacking is a formal and public statement about the document. At this stage, it is not easy to see how the debate and disagreement will be resolved. But it is precisely through this tension that one important point has emerged: providing ​concrete moral guidelines doesn’t seem to be a major concern for Pope Francis. And in a certain way, there is a relationship to Aquinas in that he was aware of the limits of universal and specific rules, preferring to emphasize general and fundamental precepts. At the very least, Francis is aware of the complexity of individual cases and wants to allow a great room for mercy and pastoral solutions at a localized level. Especially when one compares the guidelines of ​AL to the more stringent demands of a text like ​Familiaris Consortio, there appears to be a new approach to moral theology at use by the magisterium under Francis. At least, that is the appearance. Indeed, even a charitable interpretation of Ch. 8 makes it difficult to show a seamless continuity with other documents and earlier formulations of doctrine with regard to irregular marital situations, though that is the direction some are taking the document. The Philadelphia guidelines are an example of this way of reading the text. Equally possible is a more open-ended interpretation like that of the bishops of Argentina. A final takeaway from this analysis is that a close and careful attention to the sources used in magisterial documents may not always help to resolve disputes about how to interpret them. Aquinas role in the building up and maintaining of authority, as Jacob argues, is somewhat mythical within Catholicism and approaches like his and Porter’s can help show the flexibility and diversity of even a medieval source. In the end, it will unfortunately take more time to see how the ​Amoris Laetitia debate is settled, and the consequences could be major, no matter if a traditional or more progressive interpretation is reached.