Based on careful ieldwork, interviews and analysis this handbook ofers penetrating insights into problems plaguing the governance of the nation’s capital and practical steps to address them. It is essential reading for anyone interested in a better Delhi be it politicians, policymakers, planners or the aam aadmi. The Delhi Citizens’ handbook 2016 marks the 16th year of Researching Reality, one of the premier research-intensive internship programs of CCS. The Handbook illustrates how to make policies that afect countless citizens, successful and efective. A must-read for anyone who aspires to hold informed views on where policies on urban public utilities stand, and how they can be improved. My experience with the Researching Reality Internship Programme has been hugely rewarding. It is very encouraging to see and help bright young minds engage in rigorous research and have CCS nurture and give direction to their spirit of academic inquiry. Delhi Citizens’ hanDbook 2016 The handbook is a simple and eicient Democratic tool that advocates minimum government, optimal regulation and maximum eiciency in a market economy. The internship ofers students a irst hand experience with how real transactions happen and what enables the economy to function smoothly. I am sure this edition too will go a long way I strengthening democracy in Delhi state. DELHI Perspectives On Local Governance In Delhi CITIZENS’ HANDBOOK 2016 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN DELHI DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 20 16 Perspectives on Local Governance in Delhi Copyrigh t © 20 16 First publish ed in 20 16 by Cen tre for Civil Society Cover design an d layout by Ush a Son dh i Kun du, Cen tre for Civil Society Support by Friedrich Naum an n Foun dation For m ore inform ation and other requests, w rite to: Centre for Civil Society A-69, Hauz Khas, New Delhi – 110 0 16 Phone: +91 11 26537456 Em ail: ccs@ccs.in Website: www.ccs.in ISBN: 978-81-87984-26-9 II Contents Acknow ledgem ents Introduction 10 GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent Websites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index 26 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis 48 ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Swachh Bharat Mission 62 TRADE AND COMMERCE Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 82 URBANISATION Housing for low-incom e m igrants and the im pact of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 10 2 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households 130 HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: Will they address the health needs of Aam Aadm i in Delhi? 148 EDUCATION An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 III IV Acknowledgem ent Th e Delh i Citizen s' H an dbook 20 16 is th e product of th e perseveran ce, dedication an d zeal of 24 college studen ts wh o participated in th e Research in g Reality In tern sh ip Program organ ised an n ually by th e Cen tre for Civil Society (CCS). Ch oosin g th e swelterin g h eat over a com fortable sum m er break, th e in tern s braved th e reluctan ce an d in differen ce of th e govern m en t officials, covered vague an d far-flun g distan ces of office location s an d talked to th ose affected by th ese offices. Rigorously selected from 310 application s from all across In dia as well eleven in tern ation al studen ts, th e in tern s span n ed all academ ic backgroun ds, be it Econ om ics, H istory, Com m erce, Political Scien ce, J ourn alism , an d En gin eerin g from top colleges in In dia an d abroad. We salute an d con gratulate our in tern s Akshay Thakre, An shu Kum ari, Archit J ain , Devika Chopra, Devishi Dar, Keval Patel, Naom i H azarika, Nithya Srin ivasan , Parn ika Barara, Pragya J at, Prarthn a Tan don , Priyasha Chawla, Ragin i Khuran a, Rahul Sin gh Chauhan , Razi Iqbal, Rishabh Rekhade, San chi Gupta, Saum ya J oshi, Shaurya Arora, Shreshta Sharm a, Tan ya Seth, Tan ya Sharm a an d Tan ay Raj Bhatt. Research guides Am ir Ullah Khan , Chakshu Roy, Shan tan u Gupta, Shreekan t Gupta, Kan ika Malhotra, Sm riti Parsheera an d Debolin a Kun du gave con stan t guidan ce an d en couragem en t to help the in tern s through the ups an d down s of the research, an alysis and writing of their inal papers. Their comments and inputs helped improve the cogen cy an d clarity of each an d every chapter. We are than kful to the Friedrich-Naum an n -Stiftun g für die Freiheit for their belief, in terest an d lon g term support towards the in tern ship program . Throughout the internship program, a wide range of experts from diferent walks of life provided in puts to develop their skills in n ot just research, an alysis an d writin g but also the m ultiple dim en sion s of govern an ce prin ciples an d issues. Parth J Shah (Presiden t, CCS) in troduced them to the theory of Public Choice. Mohit Satyan an d (Chairm an an d Foun der, Team work Arts) an d Bhuvan a An an d (DFID) helped in tern s critically an alyse the challen ges an d opportun ities for civil society, an d the citizen an d volun tary sector in volvem en t in urban govern an ce. Som n ath Ban dyopadhyay (In tern ship Director, CCS) an d San n a Bedi (In tern ship Coordin ator, CCS) provided the overall structure, plan n in g, coordin ation an d supervision for both the in tern ship program an d the publication . The quality an d con sisten cy of the chapters were en sured by the tim ely in put of Srijan Ban dyopadhyay (Man ager Con ten t, Academ y, CCS), Arushi Vats (Project Associate, Academ y, CCS) an d Man asi Bose (Man ager, Program s, CCS) who pain stakin gly copy-edited the DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 V volum e. Sam ta Arora (Associate Director, Academ y, CCS), steered the project from begin n in g till the en d. The credit for the layout an d design of this publication goes to Usha Son dhi Kun du (Associate, Web & IT, CCS). The con stan t adm in istrative an d program m atic support from other CCS team m em bers was in valuable to the sm ooth run n in g of this program . We would like to express our gratitude to the Delhi Dialogue Com m ission for their support an d en couragem en t. We than k the m an y curren t an d form er govern m en t oicers, experts, academicians, activists and other contributors for their generosity of time and information and inally to you, the reader, for caring about the state of govern an ce in Delhi. VI Introduction New Delhi, India’s capital territory, is deined by unique complexities of governance that arise from the intersection of local, state, and national jurisdiction. According to the 20 11 Census, the population of Delhi stands at 16.8 m illion. The geographical area covered by Delhi is 1,484 square kilom etres. The Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD) is oicially a Union Territory, which has been granted special status by The Constitution (69th Am endm ent) Act, 1991. This provides for Delhi having a directly elected Legislative Assem bly (the Vidhan Sabha) and a Council of Ministers. The State Governm ent m anages transport, industrial developm ent, revenue adm inistration, power generation, food and civil supplies, and health and fam ily welfare. Wh ile th e Legislative Assem bly h as th e p ower to m ake laws with r esp ect to th e State List or in th e Con cu r r en t List of th e Con stitu tion , it d oes n ot h ave th e p ower to m ake laws r elatin g to p olice, p u blic or d er , or lan d ; as th ese ar eas r em ain th e p u r view of th e Par liam en t of In d ia. Th e fu n ction s vested with th e u n ion gover n m en t ar e looked over by th e con stitu tion al h ead of Delh i, th e Li e u te n a n t Go ve r n o r ( o r LG) of Delh i, wh o is ap p oin ted by th e Pr esid en t of In d ia. Th e D e lh i D e ve lo p m e n t Au th o r i ty ( D D A) establish ed in 1957, is a bod y of th e u n ion gover n m en t, an d is r esp on sible for all p h ysical p lan n in g an d d evelop m en t of lan d an d h ou sin g in Delh i. Delhi’s local government comprises of ive urban local bodies: the N e w D e lh i Mu n icip al Co u n cil ( N D MC) , the Delhi Cantonm ent Board (DCB), the North Delhi Municipal Corporation, the South Delhi Municipal Corporation, and the East Delhi Municipal Corporation. The New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) was established through the NDMC Act, 1994, am ended in 20 11, and includes about 3% of Delhi’s area under its jurisdiction. Its mission is to build eiciency in its service functions via transparent and participative m easures in order to create ‘A Model Well Planned Metropolitan City’. Established in 1914, the D e lh i Can to n m e n t Bo ard ( D CB) is legislated by The Cantonm ents Act, 1924. It also has about three per cent of Delhi’s area under its jurisdiction. The NDMC and the DCB are directly answerable to their union governm ent m inistry. This local m unicipal body seeks to carry out developm ental activities in the Delhi Cantonm ent area of 10 ,791.88 acres. A m ajority of Delh i’s lan d area falls un der th e jurisdiction of th e th ree Mun icipal Corporation s of Delh i (MCD). Establish ed th rough th e Delh i Mun icipal Corporation DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 1 GOVERNANCE IN DELHI CENTRAL GOVERNMENT STATE GOVERNMENT (COUNCIL OF MINISTERS) New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) CHAIRPERSON STATION COMMANDER 3 Members of Legislative Assembly 5 Oicers of Central Government 2 Members nominated by Central Government 8 elected Members 3 nominated Military Members 8 Ex-oicio Members 1 representative of Delhi Magistrate An Oicer of the Indian Defence Estate Services A Member Secretary of the Board 2 Introduction LOCAL GOVERNMENTS LAW AND ORDER Policing Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) NDMC Mayor SDMC Mayor Delhi Police EDMC Mayor Judiciary Supreme Court of India Delhi High Court 110 Ward 104 Ward 64 Ward Delhi District Councillors Councillors Councillors Court Act of 1957 as an auton om ous body, (in 20 11, an am en dm en t led to th e trifurcation of th e MCD in to th ree sm aller m un icipal corporation s; th e North Delh i Mun icipal Corporation , East Delh i Mun icipal Corporation an d th e South Delh i Mun icipal Corporation ). Its m ission is to give efficien t an d accoun table civic adm in istration to th e citizen s an d prom pt redressal of th eir grievan ces. Statehood of Delhi Bill, 20 16 Th e bill seeks to create a state of Delh i out of th e curren t NCT. It also seeks to bestow greater adm in istrative, executive, an d legislative powers to th e state of Delh i, by alterin g th e govern an ce structure in Delh i. Th e curren t scen ario of govern an ce in Delh i is com plicated for th e citizen s, an d is in efficien t. For exam ple, if a road n eeds repair, it is n ot clear wh ich auth ority sh ould be approach ed. Roads are looked after by six agen cies: Public Works Departm en t un der th e Delh i govern m en t, Mun icipal Corporation of Delh i, NDMC, DDA, Nation al H igh ways Auth ority of In dia (un der th e cen tral govern m en t) an d Delh i Can ton m en t Board (un der th e m in istry of defen ce). Sim ilarly, h ousin g is looked after by th e Mun icipal Corporation s of DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 3 CH AN GES PROPOSED BY TH E BILL • Tra n s fe r o f D e lh i P o lic e fro m Ce n tra l Go ve rn m e n t to S ta te Go ve rn m e n t: Th e Delh i Police Act 1978 gives powers of regulation to th e Lt Govern or of Delh i, appoin ted as Cen tre’s represen tative. Th e Stateh ood Bill seeks to am en d th ese provision s an d brin g th e Delh i Police un der th e purview of th e proposed state of Delh i. • Tra n s fe r o f D e lh i D e ve lo p m e n t Au th o rity fro m Ce n tra l Go ve rn m e n t to S ta te Go ve rn m e n t: Delhi Developm en t Authority Act 1957 gives the Cen tral Govern m en t con trol of urban developm en t in Delhi. The Statehood Bill seeks to tran sfer con trol of Delhi’s lan d an d housin g jurisdiction to the proposed State Govern m en t. • Tra n s fe r o f Mu n icip a l Co rp o ra tio n o f D e lh i fro m Ce n tra l Go ve rn m e n t to th e S ta te Go ve rn m e n t: The Delhi legislature m ay presen tly pass an am en dm en t, but for it to becom e law it would have to get the approval of the Lieuten an t Govern or, the Presiden t an d also the union ministries of Urban Development and Home Afairs. The Bill seeks to stream lin e this process. • Cre atio n o f s e p arate cad re fo r s tate o f D e lh i fo r State Go ve rn m e n t s e rvice s : Entry 41 of the State List em powers states to legislate on State Public Services and the State Public Service Com m ission, but does not apply to Union territories including Delhi. Part VIII of the Statehood Bill proposes the creation of a cadre for the state of Delhi as well as a Delhi State Public Com m ission. • Po w e rs re la te d to ta xa tio n : The Bill discussed increasing inancial auton om y of the state of Delhi as it curren tly depen ds heavily on the cen tre for fun d allocation . By givin g Delhi a larger share of the tax reven ues of NCT, Delhi would be less depen den t on the cen tre for its susten an ce. • Ch a n ge o f p o w e rs a n d title o f Lt Go ve rn o r o f D e lh i to Go ve rn o r o f S ta te o f D e lh i: Section 58 of Statehood Bill 20 16 seeks to chan ge the title of Lt Govern or of Delhi to Govern or of State of Delhi. • Ad d i ti o n o f s ta te o f D e lh i to fi r s t s c h e d u le o f th e Co n s ti tu ti o n i n th e li s t o f s ta te s : Par t II of th e Stateh ood Bill seeks to in clu d e Delh i in th e list of States in th e fir st sch ed u le of th e con stitu tion an d r em ove it fr om th e list of Un ion Ter r itor ies. 4 Introduction Delh i, DDA, Min istry of Urban Developm en t an d Min istry of H ousin g an d Urban Poverty Alleviation . Th ere is a discussion about th e arguably falterin g law an d order situation in Delh i wh en ever a case h igh ligh tin g th e sam e em erges. Th ere is a clear con flict in th e h an dlin g of th e Delh i Police; as th e Un ion con trols it, often it is th e Delh i govern m en t wh ich is h eld an swerable about th e Delh i Police. Im pact of th e Ch an ges Th e draft State of Delh i Bill aim s to em power th e State Govern m en t furth er th rough th e exten sion of its jurisdiction over lan d, police, bureaucracy an d m un icipal corporation s. Th e bill states th at th e Cen tral Govern m en t sh ould con tin ue to con trol th e New Delh i Mun icipal Coun cil (NDMC), wh ich adm in isters ‘Lutyen s’ Delh i’, th e cen tral zon e of th e city wh ich h ouses th e Un ion Govern m en t, Parliam en t, Suprem e Court, an d several em bassies. In tern ation al Com parison s It is, h owever, difficult to ascertain th e exact im pact of th e proposed ch an ges. For exam ple, if Delh i becom es a state, th en it will con trol th e Delh i police. Th is m ean s th at th e NDMC wh ich con trols th e area providin g govern an ce an d diplom atic m ission s of th e coun try will require a separate police force for its security. Th is m ay result in a con flict of in terest over territory an d jurisdiction . Th e budget presen ted by th e Govern m en t of th e NCT of Delh i n eeds prior approval of th e Presiden t, exercised by th e H om e Min ister, before bein g presen ted to th e Delh i Legislative Assem bly. Delh i m akes th e cut as a state in fiscal term s due to its h igh per-capita in com e levels– th ree tim es th e n ation al average– with an estim ated reven ue surplus of ₹5,543 crore in th e year 20 16– 17 (PRS. Delh i Budget An alysis 20 16-17 20 16). Delh i becom in g a state will lead to greater fin an cial auton om y. Delh i’s special status of bein g a Nation al Capital Metropolis gives rise to m ultiple an d overlappin g power structures. Th e Stateh ood of Delh i Bill 20 16 seeks to clear th e m uddled power structures an d stream lin e th em for th e ben efit of Delh i’s citizen s. Delhi Citizens’ Handbook 20 16 The D e lh i Citize n s ’ H an d bo o k 2 0 16 is a project undertaken by the Ce n tre fo r Civil So cie ty to identify the challenges and concerns of the citizens through an assessm ent DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 5 IN TERN ATION AL COMPARISON S CAN BERRA, AU STRALIA: The Mayor of Can berra fun ction s as the chief m in ister of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).There is n o separate adm in istrator, equivalen t to LGs in In dian UTs, for ACT, un like other federal territories. Laws passed by the Can berra assem bly can be reversed by the Australian parliam en t; earlier this could be don e adm in istratively by the federal govern m en t. Fun ction s of ACT adm in istration are lim ited to education an d train in g, health, econ om ic developm en t, en viron m en t an d justice; far less powers an d respon sibilities than Delhi’s elected govern m en t (J am es 20 12). PARIS, FRAN CE: The Paris region, comprising diferent municipalities is similar to the NCT of Delhi. The delegate-general of the Paris region is part of the oice of the presiden t of Fran ce (like havin g Delhi’s LG as part of PMO) with n o elected chief m in ister. The Paris region does n ot hold all adm in istrative powers, with the Fren ch Govern m en t reason in g that this is n ecessitated by "special diiculties posed by the physical planning of the capital". This is similar to the reason s successive cen tral govern m en ts in In dia have given for retain in g con trol over lan d in Delhi. The Fren ch police have a cen tralised structure un der the in terior (hom e) m in istry, with n o local con trol of elected authorities (Rober an d Schroter 20 0 4). W ASH IN GTON D C, U S: It is a curious case am on gst world capitals, bein g a federally dem arcated area for govern an ce. The H om e Rule Act, 1973 gave DC its own local govern an ce but the Con gress retain ed overridin g powers for an y legislative decision . Un like Delhi, DC citizen s do n ot have full votin g rights to elect their own represen tatives to Con gress. They have to pay federal taxes but have n o say in m an datin g their own taxes. There is a lon g-stan din g dem an d for DC statehood like in Delhi (E. A. H 20 16). 6 Introduction of various policies and schem es that are being im plem ented by the governm ent. The study is conducted by a group of interns recruited under CCSs lagship program called the Re s e arch in g Re ality In te rn s h ip . The Handbook features research papers assessing the im pact and relevance of policies that shape the lives of ordinary citizens in the national capital. Analyzing eight core areas of urban governance: Go ve rn an ce , W ate r, En viro n m e n t, Trad e & Co m m e rce , U rban is atio n , Po w e r, H e alth , an d Ed u catio n , it is envisioned as a critical resource for productive public intervention and a tool for ensuring an informed discussion on achieving efective and accountable governance. After concluding a comprehensive study of each thematic area, speciic issues of urban governance were identiied and ield research was conducted to provide key indings, a detailed analysis and long-term policy recom m endations. Tran sparen cy in go ve rn a n ce im plies open n ess an d ease of access to essen tial public in form ation , thereby con tributin g to good govern an ce. Un der the them e Govern an ce, the paper seeks to assess the Accuracy an d Con sisten cy of In form ation Displayed un der RTI Section 4, through an audit of 10 govern m en t websites in Delhi. The paper analyses the reasons behind the compliance scores of various departments and inds a large varian ce am on g departm en ts. It recom m en ds a reworkin g of Section 4 to in clude pen alties in case of n on -com plian ce an d em powerin g the Cen tral In form ation Com m ission to facilitate en forcem en t of the ‘Duty to Publish’. Delh i’s w a te r supply h as often been crippled by reason s oth er th an th at of dem an d an d supply. In fact th e m ajor risks for Delh i’s water supply system do n ot lie with in th e city’s borders, but outside. Th e paper seeks to develop a fram ework for assessin g th e citizen ’s vuln erability to water supply sh ocks an d th e h azards of raw-water extraction . Th e fin din gs sh ow th e n eed to bridge th e gap between perception an d a broader perspective of risks th at h ave been given a m iss in th e disaster m an agem en t plan s for Delh i’s water supply. Th e paper provides a con ceptual fram ework wh ich can be used for m ore detailed study, an d recom m en ds key ch an ges to Delh i’s water supply m an agem en t. Addressin g the problem s of s a n ita tio n , the cen tral govern m en t laun ched Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM). The paper exam in es the issue of open defecation an d access to toilets in Delhi in the con text of the SBM, by trackin g the fun ds allocated by the Cen tre to the ULBs in Delhi an d sim ultan eously assessin g access to toilets in JhuggiJhopri (JJ) Clusters. The results of the study point to inefective implementation of the Mission in Delhi with targets for the con struction of toilets an d solid waste m an agem en t bein g grossly un -m et. The paper proposes a n ew m odel for im plem en tation of the Mission in Delhi. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 7 One of the main problems faced in the ield of tra d e a n d co m m e rce in Delhi is the strin gen t labour regim e that govern s it. The paper on the Delhi Shops an d Establishments Act (1956) identiies a strong case for the repeal or signiicant am en dm en t of the Act an d argues that the Model Shops an d Establishm en ts Act, 20 15 is an insuicient improvement. It further explores alternative models of organising worker-em ployee relation ships, an d recom m en ds adoptin g a labour welfare system based on con tract law. Efficien t supply of h o u s in g for m igran ts in th e city is a m atter of param oun t im portan ce sin ce failure in h ousin g provision leads to illegal settlem en ts wh ich lack basic facilities. In order to address th e issue of h ousin g, particularly for low-in com e m igran ts, th e paper traces th e developm en ts an d an alyses th e Delh i Ren t Con trol Act 1958 . Th e study iden tifies th at th ere is an acute n eed to balan ce th e righ ts of th e ten an ts an d th e lan dlords, an d recom m en ds th e adoption of th e Draft Model Ten an cy Act, 20 15 as a solution . Th e Govern m en t of NCT of Delh i h as pledged to gen erate 1 GW of solar p o w e r an d recen tly passed th e Delh i Solar Policy 20 16. With th e objective of un derstan din g th e cost-ben efits an d receptivity towards th e Delh i Solar Policy 20 16 in city h ouseh olds, th e paper exam in es th e econ om ic viability of residen tial solar rooftop system s in Delh i for con sum ers from varyin g power con sum ption levels. Th e study fin ds th at adoption of rooftop solar system s will prove cost-ben eficial for h ouseh olds, an d also provides recom m en dation s for addressin g structural problem s such as balloon in g peak dem an d an d pollution . Iden tifyin g h e a lth n eeds of citizen s in Delh i, i.e. access to prim ary h ealth care an d th e lack of preven tive h ealth care, th e paper reviews th e effectiven ess of th e Moh alla Clin ics system . It furth er recom m en ds com m un ity participation for preven tive public h eath . Th e study proposes th at Moh alla Clin ics sh ift from bein g sub-cen tres with prim arily curative fun ction s to welln ess cen tres targetin g th e varyin g h ealth n eeds of respective n eigh bourh oods. The Right to Ed u ca tio n Act, 20 0 9 m an dates the creation of School Man agem en t Com m ittees (SMCs) in order to in crease the role of paren ts in the m an agem en t of schools. The paper assesses the fun ction in g of School Man agem en t Com m ittees (or SMCs) in Delhi’s Directorate of Education (DoE) Schools. The study identiies four key issues with the fun ction in g of Delhi SMCs an d m akes recom m en dation s for addressin g these: lack of clarity in the wordin g of the Delhi SMC rules; lack of awaren ess am on gst paren t m em bers of SMCs; irregularity of m eetin gs; an d lack of recogn ition preven tin g paren ts from con ductin g ran dom visits to schools. 8 Introduction Th e fin din gs of each paper create a stron g case for broaden in g our policy fram eworks. Moreover, th ey establish a sen se of urgen cy to address th e issues bein g faced by th e citizen s of Delh i. Th e objective of th e Delh i Citizen s' H an dbook is to place first an d forem ost, th e perspectives of ordin ary citizen s in th e discourse on public policy. Th ese essays capture h ow legislation s tran slate in to groun d realities, an d h igh ligh t n uan ces wh ich can on ly em erge from a sustain ed en gagem en t with citizen s an d th eir con cern s. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 9 GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent Websites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index Prarthna Tandon, Devishi Dar, Akshay Thakre EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Transparency in governance implies openness and ease of access to essential public information, thereby contributing to good governance. The Right to Information Act, 20 0 5 provides a comprehensive framework for transparency in Indian public systems. One of the most important parts of the Act is Section 4, which provides for proactive disclosure of information by public authorities. It lists out the points of compliance which provide for disclosure of essential information to be made public. An audit of 10 government websites in Delhi was conducted to assess their compliance with Section 4 guidelines. The paper analyses the reasons behind the compliance scores of various departments and inds a large variance among departments. It identiies the provisions of Section 4 of the RTI as vague and loosely worded, which allow government departments room for subjectivity in deciding what information to publish. It recommends a reworking of Section 4 to include penalties in case of non-compliance and empowering the Central Information Commission to facilitate enforcement of the ‘Duty to Publish’. KEY FINDINGS 1. Delhi J al Board (DJ B) is the m ost com pliant authority with a score of 81%. The Delhi Transport Corporation was found to be the least com pliant with a score of 31% 2. The Health Departm ent and Education Departm ent of all 3 levels of governance, MCD, NDMC and Delhi governm ent were audited. Delhi governm ent’s health departm ent perform ed the best out of the 3, with a score of 54%. MCD Health Departm ent perform ed the worst. NDMC Education Departm ent perform ed the best with a score of 59%. MCD Education Departm ent perform ed the worst. 3. Of the 10 websites audited, only 3 public authorities provide com plete inform ation about their budget allocation. 4. 8 out of 10 websites provide an incom plete organisational chart that does not outline the com plete hierarchy of each departm ent. 5. Inform ation is not labelled appropriately in 5 out of 10 websites, which m akes it diicult to navigate through the website and creates confusion. 6. 5 out of 10 websites do not have a provision of a helpline num ber on the websites to register a com plaint. 7. The websites of the Directorate of Vigilance and Delhi Com m ission for Wom en provide outdated inform ation. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 11 8. 2 out of 10 websites, nam ely Delhi Com m ission for Wom en and NDMC - Education Department, provide full contact details of the Public Information Oicers (PIOs). 9. A few oicials are unaware of the provisions of Section 4 of the RTI. This problem is m ost evident in Delhi Com m ission for Wom en. Introduction Transparency is generally deined as the open low of information (Park and Blen kin sopp 20 11). The presen ce of tran sparen cy in govern an ce processes implies that “oicial business is con ducted in such a way that substan tive in form ation is available to an d un derstan dable by people, subject to lim its protectin g security an d privacy” (J ohn ston 20 0 2). With tran sparen cy an d disclosure of in form ation , there is a better un derstan din g of the decision m akin g process an d therefore greater accoun tability of govern m en t (An sari 20 0 8 ). The “culture of secrecy” (An sari 20 0 8 ) is eradicated; every action has to be validated by a reason . The 20 15 m an ifesto of the Aam Aadm i Party, which curren tly form s the Govern m en t of the NCT of Delhi, lays stress on the idea of Sw araj or self-govern an ce an d how the citizen s of Delhi should be equal stakeholders in govern an ce (Aam Aadm i Party Man ifesto 20 15). An assessm en t of the status of govern an ce in Delhi foun d the m ain problems afecting the functioning of govern m en t bodies to be corruption , com plex bureaucratic structure, red tape, and jurisdictional conlict, which can be grouped un der the m acro-level issue of lack of tran sparen cy an d access 12 to in form ation . Without access to in form ation , it will n ot be possible for citizen s to kn ow about the dealin gs of govern m en t, what m on ey is goin g where, an d for what purpose (Tran sparen cy In tern ation al 20 12). When people are n ot aware of the decision m akin g processes of govern m en t, the opacity leads to red tape an d bureaucratic struggles. Govern m en t oicials have room to be lax regarding decision -m akin g when they kn ow that citizen s have n o clear way of m on itorin g their activities. In order to im prove ease of access with in th e website an d gen eral layout, departm en ts sh ould strive to com ply with Guidelin es for In dian Govern m en t Websites, set up by th e Stan dard Testin g an d Quality Certification (STQC) Directorate. In May 20 16 an audit revealed th at on ly 31 out of a total of 957 govern m en t websites com plied. For websites to becom e user frien dly, th is com plian ce is im perative (In dian Express 20 16). Righ t to In form ation Act, 20 0 5 In India, the primary law in place to combat the absence of transparency is the GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index Right to Information Act, 20 0 5. It was passed on 15 J une 20 0 5 as the mechanism for ensuring the Right to Information, a fundamental right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The Act provides for this in two possible ways: citizens can demand information from public authorities by iling an RTI application, and public authorities are required to proactively disclose information. Section 4 of the RTI Act is particularly im portan t as it sets guidelin es for disclosin g in form ation to the public on a proactive basis, m akin g the fun ction in g of public authorities m ore tran sparen t (Govern m en t of In dia 20 13). In addition , it aim s to reduce the n um ber of individual RTI applications iled, as most in form ation would be readily available. Section 4(1)(a) of the RTI Act recom m ends com puterisation of inform ation held and Section 4(3) m entions various ways in which inform ation can be disclosed and dissem inated. The con cept of suo m otu disclosure is deined in Section 4 of the RTI Act. It shifts the respon sibility of m ain tain in g tran sparen cy from citizen s to govern m en t. In stead of citizen s havin g to specially ile RTI applications to get in form ation , Section 4 seeks to m ake tran sparen cy the n orm rather than the exception (Aiyer an d An klesaria 20 0 4). The Duty to Publish refers to the provisions of Section 4 which require public authorities to autom atically publish inform ation, without citizens having to go through the arduous iling procedure. Compliance of Ten Government Websites in Delhi with Section 4 of the RTI The basic draft of the Index was drawn from a previous paper published by Centre for Civil Society. It was reviewed and modiied on the basis of ease of accessibility and wider dissem ination of inform ation. The websites were audited in order to assess the degree of disclosure of inform ation on the basis of the following 40 points of com pliance. Th e web sit es au d it ed a r e a m ix of Delh i St a t e Gover n m en t web sit es a n d local m u n icip a l b od y web sit es (Mu n icip al Cor p or at ion of Delh i an d Nor t h Delh i Mu n icip a l Cor p or a t ion ) a n d r ep r esen t essen t ial ser vice p r ovid er s t o cit izen s of Delh i: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Departm ent of Health & Fam ily Welfare Directorate of Education Delhi J al Board Delhi Com m ission for Wom en Delhi Transport Corporation Directorate of Vigilance New Delhi Municipal Council – Education Departm ent 8 New Delhi Municipal Council – Public Health Departm ent 9 Municipal Corporation of Delhi – Education Departm ent 10 Municipal Corporation of Delhi – Public Health Departm ent Each website was audited in order to check whether inform ation relevant to each point of com pliance was disclosed. Points were awarded thus: DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 13 Figure 1: Section 4(1)(b) of the RTI Act which provides for proactive disclosure. Subsection Parameter of the RTI Act 14 4(b)(i) The particulars of its organisation, functions and duties 4(b)(ii) The power and duties of its oicers and employees 4(b)(iii) The procedure followed in the decision making process, including channels of supervision and accountability 4(b)(iv) The norms set by it for the discharge of its functions 4(b)(v) The rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records, held by it or under its control or used by its employees for discharging its functions 4(b)(vi) A statement of the categories of documents that are held by it or under its control 4(b)(vii) The particulars of any arrangement that exists for consultation with, or representation by, the members of the public in relation to the formulation of its policy or implementation thereof 4(b)(viii) A statement of the boards, councils, committees and other bodies consisting of two or more persons constituted as its part or for the purpose of its advice, and as to whether meetings of those boards; councils, committees and other bodies are open to the public, or the minutes of such meetings are accessible for public 4(b)(ix) A directory of its oicers and employees 4(b)(x) The monthly remuneration received by each of its oicers and employees, including the system of compensation as provided in its regulations 4(b)(xi) The budget allocated to each of its agency, indicating the particulars of all plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made 4(b)(xii) The manner of execution of subsidy programmes, including the amounts allocated and the details of beneiciaries of such programmes 4(b)(xiii) Particulars of recipients of concessions, permits or authorisations granted by it 4(b)(xiv) Details in respect of the information, available to or held by it, reduced in an electronic form 4(b)(xv) The particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaining information, including the working hours of a library or reading room, if maintained for public use 4(b)(xvi) The names, designations and other particulars of the Public Information Oicers 4(b)(xvii) Such other information as may be prescribed; and thereafter update these publications every year 4(c) Publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing the decisions which afect public 4(d) Provide reasons for its administrative or quasi-judicial decisions to afected persons GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index Figure 2: The Index on the basis of which the audit was conducted Serial Subsection of Points of Compliance No. the RTI Act 1 4(b)(i) Aim or why was the department set-up? 2 4(b)(i) Organisation chart (Clearly deined oice hierarchy from director/secretary to clerk/peon) 3 4(b)(i) Functions and duties of public authority 4 4(b)(ii) Powers and duties of oicials and employees 5 4(b)(iii) Procedure followed for decision-making 6 4(b)(iii) Channels of supervision and accountability 7 4(b)(iv) Norms set by the public authority for discharge of its functions (personnel, inancial, administrative, etc.) 8 4(b)(v) List of rules/regulations/manuals used by employees of the public authority while discharging functions 9 4(b)(v) Links to rules/ regulations/manuals used by employees of the public authority while discharging function 10 4(b)(vi) Categories of records/documents held by/under control of the public authority 11 4(b)(vi) A detailed listing of the sub-heads/sub-categories of documentation 12 4(b)(vii) List of committees/councils/boards where the public is represented 13 4(b)(vii) Particulars of constituents of committees/councils/boards where the public is represented 14 4(b)(viii) List of internal boards, councils, committees and other bodies constituted as part of the public authority 15 4(b)(viii) Particulars of constituents of such internal boards, councils, committees and other bodies constituted as part of the public authority 16 4(b)(viii) Information regarding whether meetings of such boards, councils, committees and other bodies are open to the public? 17 4(b)(viii) Minutes of meetings of such boards, councils, committees and other bodies 18 4(b)(ix) Directory of oicers and employees 19 4(b)(x) Monthly remuneration including system of compensation received by oicers and employees 20 4(b)(xi) Budget allocated to each agency (all plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made) 21 4(b)(xii) Manner of execution of subsidy programmes DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 15 Serial Subsection of Points of Compliance No. the RTI Act 16 22 4(b)(xii) Amount allotted to subsidy programmes 23 4(b)(xii) Details of beneiciaries of subsidy programmes 24 4(b)(xiii) Particulars of recipients of concessions, permits or authorisations 25 4(b)(xiv) Information available to the public authority or held in an electronic form and available on its website 26 4(b)(xv) Particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaining information (working hours of the library/ reading room, internet, notice boards, newspapers) 27 4(b)(xvi) Name of the Public Information Oicer 28 4(b)(xvi) Designation of the Public Information Oicer 29 4(b)(xvi) Contact details of the Public Information Oicer (oicial phone number, e-mail address, postal address) 30 4(c) List of completed schemes/ policies/ projects 31 4(c) List of schemes/ policies/ projects underway 32 4(c) Procedures/ guidelines for the above schemes/ policies/ projects 33 4(c) Budget/ grants for the above schemes/ policies/ projects 34 4(c) Nodal oicers for the above schemes/ policies/ projects 35 4(c) Details of identiiable/ measurable outputs/ outcomes 36 4(c) List of administrative/ quasi-judicial decisions 37 4(c) Link to the full decision 38 4(3) Provision of screen reader for the visually impaired 39 4(3) Provision of helpline number or e-mail address for complaints on website 40 4(3) Appropriate labelling of information provided through RTI Section 4 • For full disclosure: 1 point • For partial disclosure: 0 .5 point • For no disclosure: 0 point • Percentage Score = (Total Score/ 40) x 100 Each website was given a score out of 40 and further, a percentage score was calculated by dividing the total score by 40 Oicials of a few public authorities were also in terviewed on the telephon e or in person to assess their awaren ess of and m ultiplying it by 10 0 . GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index Section 4 an d its provision s. Th e sam p le size ch osen is sm all an d t h er efor e n ot r ep r esen t a t ive en ou gh t o for m a gen er a lised view of t r an sp ar en cy an d d isclosu r e of in for m at ion in gover n a n ce p r ocesses wit h in Delh i. It sim p ly a im s t o p r ovid e an in d icat ion of t h e com p lia n ce of Delh i gover n m en t websit e t o Sect ion 4 of t h e RTI. Findings and Analysis DELHI J AL BOARD Score: 32.5 (81%) STREN GTH S: • Highest com pliance and regular updating of the 17 m anuals. • Provision of contact details of RTI Nodal Oicer mentioned on the website. • Clearly deined duties of Public Information Oicers (PIOs). • RTI Nodal Oicer showed maximum Figure 3: Findings from the Audit DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 17 • The website’s aesthetics and design m ake it easy to navigate it. DELHI GOVERNMENT HEALTH & FAMILY WELFARE DEPARTMENT Score: 23 (58%) W EAKN ESSES: • The nam es of PIO’s are not provided on the website. STREN GTH S: • This was the only website to provide for a screen reader for the visually disabled. • Full contact details of PIO’s are not provided on the site. W EAKN ESSES: • The website did not provide for a helpline or a complaint number for citizens. awareness of Section 4 and its com pliances. • Website does not have provision of screen reader for visually impaired people. DELH I TRANSPORT CORPORATION Score: 23.5 (59%) STREN GTH S: • Particulars of receipts of concessions and permits are mentioned clearly in detail. W EAKN ESSES: • The inform ation is incorrectly labelled on the website. • The inform ation provided on the website is outdated. 18 • Organisation chart is not disclosed. • Com pleted schem es undertaken by the departm ent are not provided DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION Score: 21.5 (54%) STREN GTH S: • The organization chart provided was com prehensive and extensively detailed. • The PIO showed satisfactory awareness of Section 4 and its points of compliance. • All m anuals are not provided on the website. W EAKN ESSES: • There was no provision of screen reader for the visually disabled. • Th e website layou t m akes it d ifficu lt to n avigate an d sear ch for in for m ation . • Inform ation provided is not com prehensive for all the branches of the departm ent. • No provision for screen reader for the visually disabled. • Subsidies provided for are only mentioned for some branches such as sports. GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index DELHI COMMISSION FOR WOMEN Score: 20 .5 (51%) STREN GTH S: • The fun ction s have been clearly m en tion ed an d its duties clearly deined. W EAKN ESSES: • Th e website h as n o provision for filin g of a com plain t. • Th e website was n ot disabled frien dly. • Clear dem arcation of the jurisdiction within which it operates. W EAKN ESSES: • The inform ation provided is outdated and irrelevant in m any m anuals. • In form ation is in correctly labelled in the m an uals. • Nam es and contact details of PIOs are not provided. • The site is diicult to navigate and is not user friendly. • Vital in form ation is m issin g from m an y m an uals, circulars, orders etc. • In form ation provided was outdated an d often irrelevan t. • No provision for a h elplin e for distressed wom en . • In form ation provided is n ot en ough to allow approach in g th e com m ission . • Officials were foun d to lack awaren ess of Section 4. • In form ation is provided on solicitation an d in ph ysical presen ce of applican t. DIRECTORATE OF VIGILANCE Score: 19 (48%) NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL – EDUCATION DEPARTMENT Score: 17 (43%) STREN GTH S: • The nam e and contact details of the respective Public Information Oicers have been clearly m entioned. • The in form ation is com prehen sive and detailed according to diferent categories. W EAKN ESSES: • The inform ation is not appropriately labelled, leading to confusion which causes diiculty in navigation. STREN GTH S: • Provision of 24 hour helpline to lodge graft com plaints. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 19 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI – EDUCATION DEPARTMENT: Score – 13.5 (34%) STREN GTH S: • Clearly deined decision making process. Comprehensive low chart is provided. W EAKN ESSES: • There is wrong labelling of inform ation among diferent departments of the MCD, and also within the MCD Education Departm ent • Information provided is not detailed enough and is not systematically organised. This makes it very diicult for a citizen to navigate through the website. NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL – PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT Score: 13 (33%) STREN GTH S: • Detailed list of adm inistrative/ quasi-judicial decisions • Links to rules/ regulations/ instruction m anuals used by the public authority while discharging functions was presented in a system atic m anner W EAKN ESSES: • Organization chart does not show the clear hierarchy present in the organisation. • No in for m ation r egar din g com m ittees/ coun cils/ boar ds wh er e th e pu blic is r epr esen ted. 20 • Procedure regarding schem es is not m entioned. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI – PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT Score: 12.5 (31%) STREN GTH S: • The aim and objective is deined clearly and well stated. • Directory of oicers and employees along with m onthly rem uneration is presented in a system atic m anner. W EAKN ESSES: • There is wrong labelling of inform ation among diferent departments of the MCD, and also within the MCD Public Health Departm ent. • Due to incorrect labelling of information, it is extremely diicult to navigate through the website. No Penal Clause in Case of Non-Com pliance The study shows that there exists great variation in compliance among the 10 websites. Delhi J al Board has the highest score of 81%, while Delhi Transport Corporation has the minimum score of 31%. This can be explained by the fact that Section 4 of the RTI, while m andatory, does not call for any penalty in case of non-com pliance. It provides the guidelines that governm ent bodies are required to follow, but does not provide instruction on how these guidelines are to be put GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index Com parison between MCD, NDMC and Delhi Governm ent Websites Rank Website Authority Percentage 1 Department of Health and Family Welfare Government of NCT of Delhi 53.75% 2 New Delhi Municipal Council - Public Health Department Central Government 47.50% 3 Municipal Corporation of Delhi - Public Health Department Central Government 33.75% Rank Website Authority Percentage 1 New Delhi Municipal Council - Education Department Central Government 58.75% 2 Directorate of Education Government of NCT of Delhi 57.50% 3 Municipal Corporation of Delhi - Education Department Central Government 52.25% into practice (Departm ent of Personnel and Training 20 13). Even though the Central Inform ation Com m ission has the power to direct a public authority to provide inform ation under Section 4, if it receives a com plaint about the sam e, it is virtually not possible to invoke Section 18 whenever there is non-com pliance. Public authorities therefore do not have the fear of a penalty in case of non-com pliance, and show varied levels of com pliance. which allows public bodies’ room for in terpretation on what in form ation is to be disclosed. Further, there is n o provision statin g that in form ation should be regularly updated, leadin g to variation in frequen cy of updates. Am biguity in Wording of Section 4 In m ost public bodies audited, it is the IT Division that is tasked with updatin g the website. H owever, it is n ot always clear which departm en t should en sure that the required in form ation is disclosed for Delhi Govern m en t websites, as each departm en t has a separate IT Division within the organ isation , which takes care of the website. In the NDMC an d MCD, there is on e cen tralised IT Departm en t which does this work. The common inding was that within the organ isation , these departm en ts shift the respon sibility an d blam e of n on com plian ce to each other. There is a great diference in the quality and type of inform ation provided on the diferent websites. Information regarding decision-m aking processes of public authorities is provided by m ost departm ents. While som e like the MCD Education Departm ent show a clearly deined hierarchy, others have not m entioned the decision m aking process. This is prim arily because of the am biguous wordin g of Section 4 itself Lack of Clear Ownership of Disclosure Duties DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 21 Com parison between MCD, NDMC and Delhi Governm ent Websites The H ealth an d Education departm en ts of all three levels of govern an ce, NDMC, MCD an d Delhi Govern m en t were audited in order to com pare the com plian ce am on g them . Best Practices Identiied The Delhi J al Board has the best perform in g website showin g a com plian ce of 8 1%. DJ B has been con sisten tly perform in g well in this aspect; the study con ducted by CCS in 20 0 6 (Californ ia State Auditor 20 15) also showed DJ B to be the highest perform in g body. This can be attributed to the fact that DJ B is the on ly body out of those studied to have an RTI Nodal Oicer appointed. The duty of this oicer is to direct RTI applications to the PIOs (Public Information Oicers) of the con cern ed departm en ts, apart from en surin g that the 17 m an uals of the RTI are updated.There is thus a clearer dem arcation of duties related to proactive disclosure when com pared to the system in other departm en ts. Upon in teraction with the oicials of the RTI Cell, it was observed that the organ isation prom otes an attitude of open n ess an d tran sparen cy, with most oicials having a clear sense of what is expected from them . The DJ B exam ple is eviden tly a step in the right direction , an d stan ds as a m odel that other departm en ts can look to follow. 22 Recom m endations Section 4 of the RTI Act, which lays down the guidelines for websites, should be reworked in order to ensure better com pliance. In the current version of the law, proactive disclosure (Section 4) is not given as much importance as the iling of RTI applications (Section 7) is. This needs to change in order for suo m otu disclosure to becom e a reality. There are two areas under which recom m endations can be given; those involving a reworking of Section 4 and those involving other holistic approaches of achieving transparency. Recom m endations for Provisions of Section 4 of the RTI • Curren tly, there is n o provision of a pen alty in case of n on -com plian ce un der Section 4. Section 20 , the section which deals with pen alties, should also in clude n on -com plian ce with Section 4 un der its purview. • There should be a provision in Section 4 specifying how frequently inform ation should be updated. • More powers should be given to the Central Inform ation Com m ission (CIC) regarding facilitation of Section 4 to ensure the following: GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index o In 20 13, the CIC issued certain guidelines to be followed under Section 4 (Departm ent of Personnel and Training 20 13) wherein departm ents were told to disclose inform ation regarding Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), RTI applications, citizen charters, foreign tours of m inisters and grants, am ong m any others. However, the follow-up to these guidelines rem ains to be seen as departm ents have not gone forward to disclose m ore inform ation. o Clearer instructions about what information is to be disclosed should be given. The CIC can play an important role in this respect, delineating the correct and standardised interpretation of each of the 17 subsections of Section 4(1)(b). Currently, each website has given diferent types of information corresponding to each subsection. A quality standard awarded on the basis of Section 4 compliance in order to incentivise departments to disclose more information should be set up. Presently, the STQC (Standardisation Testing and Quality Certiication) Directorate awards a ‘Certiied Quality Website’ on the basis of accessibility guidelines outlined in the GIGW (Guidelines for Indian Government Websites). o The position of a Transparency Oicer, who is in charge of ensuring implementation of Section 4 should be instituted. The CIC had issued a directive regarding the same, in 2010. However, with the CIC having insuicient powers regarding Section 4, it was not seriously followed (Edara 2015). Recommendations Involving Other Approaches to Transparency • A regular third party audit should be conducted in order to check compliance of websites with Section 4 and ind areas for improvement. In the US, State Auditors often conduct audits of government websites with respect to accessibility of information (California State Auditor 2015). • Apart from measures focussing on improving disclosure, authorities should seek to bridge the gap between the providers and the users of information. In addition to raising awareness about the ‘duty to publish’ through Section 4, public bodies should aim to make their websites more user-friendly. Conclusion Section 4 of the RTI is a tool to bring about transparency and accountability at all levels of governance. It was the irst to oblige public authorities to publish information into the public domain and increase ease of access to information. Our study demonstrates, albeit with a limited sample size, that there is a clear diference in the degree of disclosure of information among various public authorities in Delhi. This variation arises as the law does not lay down clear guidelines on what is to be published and in what time frame. While some authorities such as Delhi Jal Board show signiicant compliance with Section 4, others such as Delhi Transport Corporation fail to provide even basic information such as its functions and duties. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 23 Bibliography Delh i Dialogue Com m ission . M an ifesto, Delhi Assem bly Election s 20 15. New Delh i: Aam Aadm i Party, 20 15. Aiyer, Swam in ath an S An klesaria. "Case for a Duty to Publish Act". sw am in om ics.org, Decem ber 12, 20 0 4. h ttp:/ / swam in om ics.org/ case-for-a-duty-to-publish -act/ (accessed J uly 16, 20 16). An sari, M. M. R ight to In form ation an d its R elation ship to Good Gov ern an ce an d Dev elopm en t. 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Milan o: Diritto Di Sapere, 20 14. 24 GOVERNANCE An audit of Governm ent W ebsites Based on a Revised Duty to Publish Index State of Delhi Bill. 20 16. h ttp:/ / delh i.gov.in / wps/ wcm / con n ect/ 6322318 0 4cce0 b198 a75faabb17f67bc/ Th e+State+of+Delh i+Bill+20 16.pdf?MOD=AJ PERES&lm od=10 27690 955&CACH EID=6322318 0 4cce0 b1 98 a75faabb17f67bc (accessed J uly 16, 20 16). Araki, et al. Tran sparen cy an d accoun tability in dev elopm en t: w here do w e stan d? Tran sparen cy In tern ation al, Novem ver, 12 20 12. h ttp:/ / www.tran sparen cy.org/ n ews/ feature/ tran sparen cy_ an d_ accoun tability_ in _ developm en t_ wh ere_ do_ we_ stan d (accessed J uly 16, 20 16). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 25 WATER Water Supply Shocks in Delhi: Hazard Identiication, Risk Assessm ent & Vulnerability Analysis Tany a Sethi, Anshu Kum ari, Rahul Singh Chauhan EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Delhi’s water supply has often been crippled by reasons other than that of dem and and supply. In fact the m ajor risks for Delhi’s water supply system do not lie within the city’s borders, but outside. This paper aim s to develop a broad conceptual fram ework for risk detection and identiication, its assessment and estimation, and propose a comprehensive risk mitigation framework for Delhi’s water supply. The study identiies the major risks as reduced availability of groundwater due to insuicient recharge and disappearing water bodies, and the occurrence of contam inants such as am m onia and heavy m etals at intake points. It also conducts a com prehensive vulnerability assessm ent and analyses the risks posed to the water treatm ent plants based on the hazards it faces due to geographical and physical proxim ity to the sites of hazards. KEY FINDINGS 1. The trend of average precipitation in the city shows decline of nearly 2.28 m m per year. This im plies that the seasonal rainfall has reduced by over 20 % over the past half a century. 2. Water depth in Yam una has been declining over the years, and this has a serious im pact on the total water resource availability. The likelihood of risks is “likely” and the severity of this hazard to Delhi’s water supply is high. 3. The rate of extraction of groundwater in the city is estim ated to be 145% higher than the rate of replenishm ent, although groundwater is a contingency m easure for Delhi’s water supply. In such a situation a falling groundwater table m ay spell disaster to the city’s livelihood and econom y. (Likelihood: “likely” and severity: high) 4. In 20 16 itself, Chandrawal and Wazirabad Water Treatm ent Plants had to be shut down thrice owing to hike in concentration of am m onia at Wazirabad pond (19, 20 J an; 16 Feb; 29 Feb). In last 5-6 years, it has happened 7-8 tim es, based on news report and visits to DJB oicials, it is understood to be rather frequent. (Likelihood: “high” and severity: very high) 5. TERI (20 12) has pointed out to accum ulation of heavy m etals in Yam una at various locations in Delhi and Haryana (Christopher, Kaur and Singh 20 12). (Likelihood: “likely” and severity: high) DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 27 About the Study H AZARD ID EN TIFICATION : For th e purposes of H azard Iden tification , a com preh en sive list of all th e plausible h azards was m ade th rough readin g case studies of water supply sh ocks across th e world. RISK ASSESSMEN T: The risk was assessed qualitatively by gauging the likelihood of the occurrence of identiied hazards and associated severity of their consequences. D ESCRIPTION OF LIKELIH OOD : Likelihood in the context of the present study means the probability of occurrence of the hazard. The paper utilises a qualitative assessment of grading the likelihood under ive heads. In a qualitative assessment, likelihood may be determined using one or more of the following: a H is to rical D ata: In this m ethod historical data is utilized to calculate likelihood from the incidence of occurrence in the past, and calculating the aggregate frequency of occurrence. 28 All the three m ethodologies have individual lim itations. In the case of historical data, the analysis may not relect present likelihood of occurrence, m ay have sam pling and reporting errors due to change in technology, and may not relect changes in the conditions under which the hazards occur. In the case of calculation through anecdotal evidence, we encounter the problem s of arbitrary judgm ent. Further, the robustness of the anecdotal evidence m ay also be a lim itation. The diference between historical data analysis and trend analysis is that we take a m oving average trend of previous year’s data and extrapolate the trend line to get a forecast of an approxim ate frequency of occurrence. In the present case we use a logarithm ic trend line to calculate the m oving average and extrapolate. In this case we m ay see an increasing trend of occurrence of the hazard. However this does not m ean a higher prediction of future frequency. The reasons are: b Tre n d An alys is an d Fo re cas t: Tren d an alysis takes in to accoun t the tren d of historical occurren ce of hazards an d forecasts the tren d by extrapolation. I. The logarithm ic fun ction is a m on oton ically in creasin g fun ction . Sin ce it m ay be used to calculate the tren d of m axim um values of a fun ction s, in this case it gives us the approxim ate m axim um likelihood of occurren ce. c An e cdo tal Evide n ce : Opinion-based likelihood calculation is based on expert opinion on the tendencies of occurrences, which does not take into account numeric empirical evidences of occurrences but rather anecdotal evidence. II. Due to im provem ent in the instrum ents of m easurem ent, we m ay see a rise in the frequency of observed hazardous events. Hence in this case, it does not indicate a prospective rise in the frequency of the hazard. WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis Point Risk: A point risk relects the risk posed by abrupt and unpredictable events that last for a short duration but m ay endure larger and long term dam age. Level Description Highly Unlikely Probability or Past Frequency below 2% in a given time period Unlikely Probability or Past Frequency between 2-10% in a given time period Somewhat Likely Probability or Past Frequency between 10-25% in a given time period Likely Probability or Past Frequency between 30%-50% in a given time period Highly Likely Probability or Past Frequency above 50% in a given time period Severity Index Extent of Shortage in Water Supply Severity of Risk Major part of water cut for 30 days or more Extreme Minor part of water cut for 30 days or more; Major part of water cut for ive days or more Very High Minor part of water cut for 15 days or more; Major part of water cut for 1 day or more High Minor part of water cut for 7 days or more; Major part of water cut for 1 day or more Average 1-5% of water cut Low Risk Matrix Score RISK SCORE Low Average High Very High Extreme Highly Likely 11 16 20 23 25 Likely 7 12 17 21 24 Somewhat Likely 4 8 13 18 22 Unlikely 2 5 9 14 19 Highly Unlikely 1 3 6 10 15 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 29 Risk Prioritisation RISK SCORE Low Average High Very High Extreme Highly Likely 15 10 6 3 1 Likely 19 14 9 5 2 Somewhat Likely 22 18 13 8 4 Unlikely 24 21 17 12 7 Highly Unlikely 25 23 20 16 11 Hazard Identiication and Risk Assessment Hazard Type Likelihood Severity Risk Score Earthquake Low Intensity <3.5 Highly Likely Low 11 Medium Intensity 3.5 - 4.5 Likely Average 12 High Intensity > 5.5 Somewhat Likely High - Very High 13-18 Major water levels above 205m Unlikely High 9 Reduced river low Persistent and constant rate of decline: Likely High 17 Reduced groundwater recharge Persistent and Increasing rate: Likely Very High 21 Disappearing water bodies Persistent, Irreversible and Increasing rate: Highly Likely Average 16 Ammonia Highly Likely Very High 23 Heavy metals Likely High 17 Eutrophication Somewhat Likely Average 8 Organic contamination Somewhat Likely Average 8 Mining Floodplain and riverbed Persistent and Constant rate High 17 Accidents Drowning water tragedy Somewhat Likely Average 8 Chlorine leakage Somewhat Likely Average 8 Fire Highly Unlikely Very High 10 WTPs, Tube wells Likely High 17 Flood Climate Change Contamination Power cut 30 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis Hazard Type Likelihood Severity Risk Score Non-water related acts of violence Deliberate Sabotage Somewhat Likely High-Very High 13-18 International water development disputes Highly Unlikely Extreme 15 Intra-national water development disputes Unlikely High-Very High 9-14 Inter-state Yamuna-water sharing Highly Unlikely Extreme 15 International sharing of Indus river basin Highly Unlikely Extreme 15 Inter-state sharing of Ravi-Beas river Highly Unlikely Extreme 15 Inter-state Ganges water sharing Highly Unlikely Extreme 15 Water Development Disputes Adverse change in inter-state water sharing agreements From this analysis of the likelihood of occurrence and severity of hazards, it is evident that the m ajor risks stem from reduced availability of groundwater and occurrence of am m onia at the intake points. The analyses of these two risks are presented in detail. Clim ate Change & Resource Depletion Clim ate chan ge is a com plex phen om en on linked to global events. Most signiicantly, El Nin o an d La Nin a are kn own to im pact both the Southwest Mon soon s as well as the Western Disturban ces that are respon sible for precipitation in Delhi. H owever, for the purposes of this research paper, it is suicient to analyse the tren ds in the average total rain fall in the city. per year. Th is im plies th at th e season al rain fall h as reduced by over 20 % over th e past h alf a cen tury. Th e tren d of average precipitation in th e city sh ows declin e of n early 2.28 m m 3 Drying up of the city’s internal water bodies. Reduced precipitation poses the following risks to the water supply of the city 1 Alteration of Yamuna River’s stream low. 2 Decline in Groundwater Recharge. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 31 Trend of seasonal rainfall in Delhi (After Kharol 20 13) TREND OF SEASONAL RAINFALL IN DELHI (AFTER KHAROL 2013) Alteration of Yam una River’s Stream Flow Water depth in the Yam un a has been declin in g over the years. The graph in dicates a declin in g tren d of aggregate water levels in the river. Such a declin e has a serious im pact on the total water resource availability. Sin ce the rate of declin e is persisten t, the likelihood of risks is 'likely' an d sin ce the rate of declin e is rapid, the severity of this hazard to Delhi’s water supply is high.The tren d of average precipitation in the city shows declin e of n early 2.28 m m Aggregate Level of Yam una at Delhi Source: Agraw al, Khary a and Gupta 20 0 6 32 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis Insuicient Groundwater Recharge Risks Due to Excessive Groundwater Abstraction ● ● ● ● Th e rate of extraction of groun dwater in th e city is estim ated to be 145% h igh er th an th e rate of replen ish m en t. In th e case of Delh i, groun dwater is a con tin gen cy m easure for th e water supply system , wh ich is crucial n ot on ly to dom estic con sum ers, but also in dustries in th e city. In such a situation a fallin g groun dwater table m ay spell disaster to th e city’s livelih ood an d econ om y. Th e severity of th is h azard is accorded as 'h igh '. ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● Cen tral Groun d Water Board’s lon g-term groun dwater level tren d an alysis in the district over the last ten years period shows the followin g statistics in four districts of Delhi (Shekhar, Purohit an d Kaushik 20 13) Increase in pum ping/ lifting costs Reduced borehole yield Reduced spring low/river base low Phreatophytic vegetation stress (both natural and agricultural) Aquifer com paction/ transm issivity reduction Saline water intrusion/ Ingress of polluted water (from perched aquifer or river) Land subsidence and related im pacts Aquifer difusivity characteristic Aquifer storage characteristic Drawdown below productive horizon Depth to groundwater table Aquifer com pressibility Proxim ity of saline/ polluted water Vertical com pressibility of overlying/ inter bedded aquitards District-wise Aggregate Depth Level Pre-Monsoon Depth Level (in meters below ground level) Post-Monsoon Depth Level (in meters below ground level) District 2002 2012 2002 2012 South West 0.30 6.90 0.07 6.08 New Delhi 0.04 2.58 0.03 3.11 West 0.18 2.20 0.53 2.12 North East 0.51 1.68 0.96 2.34 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 33 Figure 2: Annual Net Groundwater availability and Annual Gross Groundwater draft (ha m) Source: Shekhar, Purohit and Kaushik 20 13 With the rate of decline of water table ranging between 0 .17 - 0 .66m per year, the rate of harm to the water resource is persistent and at an increasing rate, which gives a likelihood of risk as 'likely'. Disappearing Water Bodies Estim ates of the num ber of water bodies in the city vary from 674 to 1,0 12 (Sharm a and Singh 20 16). However, according to MCD data, nearly 190 to 274 of these water bodies have dried up due to scanty rainfall, encroachm ent and construction in the catchm ent area. This shows a persistent, irreversible and increasing rate of decline and dam age to the water resource (Roychowdhury 20 14). 34 Although these water bodies were not the present sources of the city’s water supply, they do have the potential to hold surface water for contingency, and their decline m eans a lost opportunity in watershed m anagem ent. Water bodies form an im portant ecosystem in the city’s hydrology, and their decline signiies a worrying trend. The severity of the risk is hence accorded as 'Average'. Contam ination Water in the Ganges and Yam una are no longer the pristine water lowing down from the Him alayas. It is today m ostly the sewage and agriculture runof in the upper basin. Various forms of WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis contam ination are evident with both short as well as long term im plications. A few of these are discussed below. This has therefore been characterised as 'likely' with 'high' severity. Am m onia Heavy Metals Heavy m etals are chem icals which becom e toxic after a certain level of concentration. Increase in concentration happens in individual organism s through bioaccum ulation (since the body is unable to reject these chem icals), and biomagniication (increase over the food chain), leading to m ajor ailm ents. Som e of these, like m ercury and lead, are particularly harm ful. TERI (20 12) has pointed out to accum ulation of heavy m etals in Yam una at various locations in Delhi and Haryana (Christopher, Kaur and Singh 20 12). At present, the treatm ent process at WTPs does not consider heavy m etals as Heavy Metals in Yam una param eters for contam ination. In the com ing years, when these heavy m etals will begin crossing the tolerable level, if the treatm ent technology is not upgraded, the supply of water will be afected greatly. Thus, heavy m etals pose persistent dam age with their concentration increasing over tim e. The desirable level of am m onia for drinking water, as per CPCB standards, is 0 .5ppm . However the level of am m onia has gone beyond this level in the past at Wazirabad pond due to discharge of industrial and sewage low, combined with natural ammoniication process. A high level of am m onia is not suitable for hum an consum ption. The Chairm an of the Delhi J al Board, Kapil Mishra, inform ed us that “if the quantum of am m onia in raw water increases to 0 .5/ ppm or m g/ l and beyond, the operation of raw water has to be suspended as am m onia when m ixed with the treating agent chlorine gives rise to Trihalom ethane which is carcinogenic in Source: Toxic Links, from Indpedia.Com DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 35 nature”. Thus in the absence of technology to treat high concentration of am m onia, WTPs at Wazirabad and Chandrawal are som etim es shut down. Together, these WTPs supply 340 MGD water. Apart from WTPs, the production Ranney wells situated in the Yamuna loodplains are also afected due to rising ammonia levels. However, the dam age caused by am m onia contam ination is tem porary in nature. Thus the severity of high am m onia level has been classiied as 'very high'. Eutrophication The likelihood of occurrence of this hazard is 'very likely'. In 20 16 only, Chandrawal and Wazirabad WTPs had to be shut down thrice owing to hike in concentration of am m onia at Wazirabad pond (19, 20 J an; 16 Feb; 29 Feb). In the last ive to six years, it has happened at least seven to eight tim es 1. Due to frequent incidents, it has also been considered as inter-state river water dispute by CBCP. A paper on ‘Accelerated phosphate and nitrate level: factors to blam e for Eutrophication in Yam una River’, shows the level of nitrate and phosphate in Delhi’s Yam una to be high and increasing over tim e (Kaur and Singh 20 12). Eutrophication is the increase of nutrient levels in water, which can lead to the form ation of algal bloom s. The growth of these algae leads to reduced oxygen and release of som e toxic chem icals into the water. The factors responsible for eutrophication are phosphate and nitrate levels, which arise due to the presence of detergents, agricultural runof, and industrial waste and dom estic sewage. The igure below reveals that the level of dissolved oxygen for Delhi’s stretch of Yam una is lower than the standard level 1 Based on news report and visits to DJB oicials, it is understood to be rather frequent. 36 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis for 1999 -20 0 5. The dissolved oxygen concentration is now alm ost zero. Thus there is persistent, reversible, increasing rate of dam age due to Eutrophication. Organic Contam ination The large quantity of sewage being disposed into the Yamuna through various drains has constantly deteriorated the quality of river water (BOD2 graph). Even the level of total coliform and faecal coliform for the river Yamuna reveals the same pattern. Thus it is persistent, reversible and has constant rate of contamination. However, the high level of biological waste increase only after the water is extracted for treatm ent purposes. The raw water intake at treatm ent plants doesn’t dem onstrate such high level of contam ination. Even the biological contam ination is treated at WTPs through chlorination of water and does not lead to any cut in water supply. Organ ic con tam in ation has therefore been characterised as 'som ewhat likely' with low severity'. Source: CPCB Source: DPCC 2 Biochemical Oxygen Demand is the amount of dissolved oxygen needed by aerobic biological organisms to break down organic material present in a given water sample at certain temperature over a speciic time period. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 37 Vulnerability Assessm ent An y risk assessm en t is in com plete without takin g in to accoun t the ‘degree of toleran ce’ to the im pact of the particular hazard. A com prehen sive vuln erability assessm en t has been attem pted through a four-level design —the city level, the com m an d areas of water treatm en t plan ts, the colon y level, an d the household level. an d physical proxim ity to the sites of hazards. We derive it from the gradation given un der the risk m atrix. Spatial vuln erability assessm en t takes in to accoun t the vuln erability of water treatm en t plan ts an d their correspon din g com m an d areas due to the virtue of their location . H ere, we an alyse the risks posed to the water treatm en t plan ts based on the hazards they face due to geographical Vulnerabilities at the WTP level Production WTP Chandrawal Source of Raw Water (Proportion of Total Supply) Wazirabad Pond 10.43% Vulnerabilities Risk Points 5 High earthquake vulnerability zone , Flood prone zone Efect of climate change on Yamuna, Ammonia, Power cut, Accident (all), Heavy metals, Mining, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns Wazirabad Wazirabad Pond 14.98% High earthquake vulnerability zone, Flood prone zone, Efect of climate change on Yamuna, Ammonia, Power cut, Heavy Metals, Accident (all), Mining, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns Total Risk 3 Total 4 Exposure Impact 13 -18 +9 +13 +23 +17 +8 +8 +10 +17 +15 135.5 14.1 13-18 +9 +13 +23 +17 +8 +8 +10 +17 +15 135.5 20.3 3 Taking average risk in case of range Total impact is deined to be Risk Points*Production proportion of Severity 5 With reference to the Zonal Seism ic Hazard Map 4 38 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis Production WTP Source of Raw Water (Proportion of Total Supply) WYC Vulnerabilities Risk Points 25.08% Moderate earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accidents (all), Heavy Metal, Non-water related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns Sonia Vihar Upper Ganges Canal 15.64% Nangloi WYC Bhagirathi Total Risk 3 Total 4 Exposure Impact 12 +17 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +15 114 28.6 High earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Non-water related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns 13 -18 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +15 100.5 15.7 4.43% Moderate earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Heavy Metals, Non-water related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns 12 +17 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +15 114 4.9 Upper Ganges Canal 11.87% High earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Non-water related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Change in inter-state water sharing pattern 13 -18 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +15 89 10.6 Dwarka WYC 4.77% Moderate earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Nonwater related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Heavy metals, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns 12 +17 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +17 +15 131 6.3 Bawana WYC 1.66% Moderate earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Nonwater related act of sabotage, Water development conlicts, Heavy metals, Change in inter-state water sharing patterns 12 +8 +8 +10 +17 +13 -18 +9 -14 +17 +15 114 1.9 Okhla Recycled Water from 2.21% Low earthquake vulnerability zone, Power cut, Accident (all), Eutrophication 11 +8 +8 +10 +17 54 1.2 Haiderpur Chandrawal DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 39 Caveats: ● Ranney wells (12 in number) and Tube wells (4,400 in number) are used in DJ B water supply and form nearly 11 % of the total water supply. However due to their presence across the city, a location speciic vulnerability assessment is diicult. However, zones of over-exploitation, increasing rate of extraction and the issues associated with groundwater recharge help make an assessment. ● The diference in functioning of WTPs is ignored. Vulnerability at Household Level To gauge vulnerability to water supply shocks vis-à-vis water procurement method of the households, two assessments were conducted. In the irst assessment, telephonic interviews of RWA’s presidents were conducted and the general response mechanism of the colony was recorded. In the second assessment, household-level data was collected through in-person interviews. Assessm ent I For the survey, a random sample of 50 Residence Welfare Associations (RWA) from Central and South West districts of Delhi was taken. Both these districts were afected by the sabotage (DJ B press release). RWAs of both planned and unplanned colonies were chosen through methods of random sampling from telephone directory. All the RWAs interviewed were registered 40 with the governm ent. Out of the 41 localities that get piped water supply from DJ B, 15 had reported either som e serious concern about quality, or regularity. Of the nine colonies that did not get piped water supply from DJ B, six were either UACs or J J . Of the sam e 9 localities, 6 received water through DJ B tankers. Of the total colonies interviewed, 41 colonies had access to groundwater. At least som e houses of 38 localities had provision of individual borings. 12 localities had com m unity boring provision either in the form of DJ B boring connected to households through pipeline, boring at parks, or boring at other com m unity areas. Im pact of J at Agitation All the colonies of the sample with access to DJB’s piped water supply were afected by the water supply cut during the J at agitation in Haryana in February 20 16. Localities without access to DJ B’s piped water supply or those who were not dependent on them were also afected during the J at agitation, although to a lesser extent. The intensity varied for diferent colonies: for 42 localities, the supply cut lasted for a maximum of one week, while for four localities, it lasted for more than one week. Coping Strategy The typical response for 72% of the localities was the use of underground water from boreholes. Localities without access to groundwater were worst hit. Out of the eight localities without access to groundwater, 5 had to incur additional WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis costs for cans and private tankers, spending additionally in the range ₹280 to ₹780 . Seventeen localities procured water from tankers, of which 7 localities were served by private tankers, incurring costs above ₹50 0 for individual households. The cost was prim arily incurred for procuring drinking water in m ost localities. For non-potable purposes water was either available free or at low cost from boring or tankers, for m ost houses. The following factors seem ed to have determ ined the vulnerability of localities facing water cut: Availability o f Bo re h o le s in th e Lo cality: Though 25 of the 40 localities that had access to boreholes depended prim arily on external water supply during the water cut, the average out-of-pocket paym ents for households were lower than colonies without access to groundwater. This was because the dem and for non-potable water was m et by the underground water. Eas e o f Acce s s in g D JB tan ke rs : Ease an d assuran ce of access to groun dwater is certain ly greater than the DJ B tan kers. A few localities com plain ed that they did n ot get a DJ B tan ker durin g the period even after repeatedly callin g the DJ B em ergen cy service n um ber. They either had to in cur addition al costs of private tan ker services or lim it their water con sum ption . There were incidents of public servants and people’s representatives facilitating procurem ent of DJ B tankers, usually at the insistance of the RWA oice bearers. However, there were also instances of violence and extortion. Since tankers form an im portant contingency m easure, lack of transparency and deep political interests further increases the vulnerability of localities, especially for those lacking political power. Unsustainability of Contingency Measures It is evident that groundwater can be helpful even when there is a piped supply of water. However, once the access to groundwater is lost, there is no contingency measure in case of any shock to the supply system. Even in the present situation, since the groundwater has depleted in many regions and is not it for drinking, households are forced to buy drinking water, adversely afecting the poor. Assessm ent II Three diferent kinds of localities were visited for interviews. It was observed that if water was provided by tankers once or twice a week, people becam e habituated to consum ing less water. During the J at agitation, water tankers in Bharat Vihar were delayed by a day or two. Though som e people had to buy drinking water cans, the com m unity as a whole did not face m uch of problem . People habituated to piped water supplies faced a lot of problem when the supply is cut of. However, living in a society reduced the vulnerability, as collective action helped. Most societies have boreholes to access water for non-potable consumption. The only cost involved, then, relates to procuring drinking water, that too for households without an RO iltration unit and no access to groundwater. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 41 Vulnerability Assessment OUT-OF-POCKET PAYMENTS SCARCITY OF WATER Low (0-2) Low (0-2) Houses with Borings (-) (-) Houses with Borings in Neighbourhood Moderate (2-4) High (4-6) Jhuggi Jhopris Policy Recom m endations The objective of the study is to con ceptualise a fram ework of risk assessm en t for Delhi’s water supply. The results establish the priority of in terven tion s, align in g them to disaggregated vuln erabilities, an d showin g the n eed to bridge the gap between perception an d a broader perspective of risks that have been given a m iss in the disaster m an agem en t plan s for Delhi’s water supply. The given con ceptual fram ework is however lim ited in term s of available data an d the choice of qualitative an alysis over quan titative an alysis, highlightin g the scope for further study in the area. Dynam ic and Periodic Risk Assessm ent of Delhi’s Water Supply Water supply of Delhi is exposed to m ultiple hazards, m an y of which were either un discovered or n eglected. The 42 Moderate (2-4) (-) High (4-6) (-) Society Colonies without Borings city n eeds to have a periodic an d real tim e risk an alysis of its water supply an d resources. Such an an alysis will utilise real-tim e data; to assess the dyn am ics of these hazards, an d also to collate policy correspon din gly. Creation of Water Inventories and Contingency Storages The rationale of creating water inventories is to address the dynam ic variability in water dem and of the city, when supply is in deicit or the risk of supply disruption is high. Water storage is a quintessential issue in the developm ent of contingency arrangem ents in the city. These inventories m ay be constructed: 1 At or near the water treatm ent plants, where water, on increasing dem and, m ay be treated im m ediately and supplied through the existing network. 2 By rejuvenating water bodies for surface storage. The measures include protection of existing water bodies from encroachment and construction, WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis investment in watershed development to rejuvenate dried-up water bodies, and maintenance of existing water bodies. 3 Through com m unity-level storages. This is a further decentralised m ethod of creating inventories at the colony/ local level as a com m on-pool resource. network, leading to further problems. A functional storm water system, as part of a larger ‘green infrastructure’ plan for the city, has the potential to recharge groundwater, provide public waterscapes and add to water security. Em powering RWAs 4 Keepin g in m in d th at storage itself is vuln erable to structural dam age caused by h azards like earth quakes, an d h en ce th ey n eed to be sufficien tly robust in order to provide water in an y kin d of em ergen cy. Utilising Storm Water Drains for Groundwater Recharge rather than Sewage Treatm ent Rainwater harvesting is often restricted solely to rooftop harvesting. However, a grossly dysfunctional storm water drainage network often leads to urban loods and wastage of water. In many places, the storm water drains are connected to the sewage Problem s related to water are norm ally addressed to the local representative (MLA) and the DJB oicials. 62% of RWAs interviewed faced problem s in reaching out to them . Further, half of the RWAs either haven’t met the oicials or felt the m eetings were a form ality, while the other half argued against the closure of Bhagidari and weakening of RWAs. Indeed, the closure of Bhagidari took away the relevance of RWAs, rendering them inefective. When it comes to mitigating risks, eforts at the societylevel rather than individual level can yield better results. Conducting m eetings of RWAs regularly and strengthening them will enable citizens to solve problem s related to water supply shocks. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 43 Bibliography Agrawal, SK, AK Kharya, and PK Gupta. “Flood Forecasting In River Yam una: A Mathem atical Model Approach.” Indian Disaster Managem ent Congress, 20 0 6. Bhaduri, Am ita, Bhim , Hardeep Singh, Manoj Misra, Pushp J ain, and Prem Prakash Bhardwaj. On the BrinkW ater Governance in the Yam una River Basin in Hary ana. PEACE Institute Charitable Trust, 20 10 . Bhakra Beas Managem ent Board. About Us, Bhakra Beas Managem ent Board. http:/ / bbm b.gov.in/ english/ m enu1.asp (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). Central Ground W ater Board Report on Delhi’s Ground W ater. 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J afri, Afsar, and SA Naqvi. “Water reform s in Delhi fraught with corruption”. India W ater Portal. http:/ / www.indiawaterportal.org/ articles/ water-reform s-delhi-fraught-corruption (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). Kau r Sim er jit, an d In d u Sin gh . Acceler a ted Phosp ha te a n d N itr a te Lev el: Fa ctor s to Bla m e for Eu tr op hica tion in Ya m u n a R iv er . In ter n ation al J ou r n al of Plan t, An im al an d En vir on m en tal Scien ces, 20 12: 18 4-18 7. Khan B, Kum ar Khalid, Ahm ed Sirajuddin and Ali, Am ir. Flood Risk Mitigation & Managem ent Practices in Delhi. New Delhi: National Institute for Disaster Managem ent, 20 0 1. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 45 Ministry of Water Resources, River Developm ent & Ganga Rejuvenation. Upper Yam una River Board. http:/ / uyrb.gov.in/ (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). Nath, Damini. “Renewed J at stir to spread to U.P., Delhi.” The Hindu. J une 6, 20 16. http:/ / www.thehindu.com/ todays-paper/ tp-national/ renewed-jat-stir-to-spread-to-up-delhi/ article8694762.ece (accessed J une 28, 20 16). Piesse, Mervyn. “The Indus Treaty Revisited: India-Pakistan Water Sharing.” Future Directions W ebsite. October 29, 20 15. http:/ / www.futuredirections.org.au/ publication/ the-indus-treaty-revisited-india-pakistanwater-sharing/ (accessed J uly 2, 20 16). Roychowdhury, Shibaji. “Lakes left high and dry: Study inds Delhi has lost over 190 of its 611 water bodies... and is doing nothing to save the rest” . Daily m ail. February 28, 20 14. http:/ / www.dailym ail.co.uk/ indiahome/indianews/article-2570563/Lakes-left-high-dry-Study-inds-Delhi-lost-190-611-water-bodies-doingsave-rest.htm l (accessed J uly 2, 20 16). SANDRP. Unabated Riverbed Mining in Saharanpur, UP, Puts Delhi’s W ater Supply under Threat. March 2, 20 16. https:/ / sandrp.wordpress.com / 20 16/ 0 3/ 0 2/ unabated-riverbed-m ining-in-saharanpur-up-puts-delhiswater-supply-under-threat/ . Satpal Kapoor vs State Of Punjab. AIR 10 7 (Suprem e Court of India, February 9, 1996). Service, Indi-Asian News. “Haryana Protests: Delhi Schools To Rem ain Closed Today Due To Water Crisis.” N DTV. February 22, 20 16. http:/ / www.ndtv.com / delhi-news/ delhi-schools-to-shut-on-m onday-due-to-water-crisis-1279637 (accessed J une 28, 20 16). Sethi, Abhijeet. “Why Uttar Pradesh is India’s com m unal tinderbox.” Business Standard. October 15, 20 15. http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-afairs/why-uttar-pradesh-is-india-s-communal-tinderbox-11510 0 70 0 361_ 1.htm l (accessed J une 30 , 20 16). Shailesh Kum ar Kharol, D. G. Kaskaoutis, Anu Rani Sharm a, Ram esh P. Singh. “Long-Term (1951– 20 0 7) Rainfall Trends around Six Indian Cities: Current State, Meteorological, and Urban Dynam ics.” Advances in Metereology , 20 13. Sharm a, Richa, an d Sum it Sin gh. The Sun day Stan dard. April 10 , 20 16. http:/ / www.n ewin dian express. com / thesun daystan dard/ The-Death-of-Delhis-Water-Bodies/ 20 16/ 0 4/ 10 / article33720 19.ece (accessed August 6, 20 16). Sharm a, Sudhirender. “Infochange: Water Resources.” infochangeindia. 20 0 5. http:/ / infochangeindia.org/ water-resources/ features/ the-ganga-viewed-from -delhi.htm l (accessed J uly 4, 20 16). Shekhar, Shashank, Raja Ram Purohit, and YB Kaushik. Groundw ater Managem ent in the NCT of Delhi. Central Ground Water Board, 20 13. Singh, Rajesh Kum ar. “News.” Hindustan Tim es. February 9, 20 14. http:/ / www.hindustantim es.com / india/ uttar-pradesh-threatens-to-stop-water-supply-to-delhi/ story-yQrtPYNTQbl7j6MPQbsLpK.htm l (accessed J uly 4, 20 16). Staf Reporter. “New water scheme to beneit coastal families.” The Hindu. Decem ber 18, 20 16. 20 16 (accessed J uly 26, 20 0 9). 46 WATER Water supply shocks in Delhi: Hazard identiication, risk assessment and vulnerability analysis World Bank. “The Indus Waters Treaty.” Site Resources, World Bank, 1960 . http:/ / siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTSOUTHASIA/ Resources/ 223497-110 5737253588/ IndusWatersTreaty1960 .pdf (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). The Planning Com m ission. Chapter 1: Upper Ganges Canal Sy stem . New Delhi: Governm ent of India, 20 12. http:/ / planningcom m ission.nic.in/ reports/ sereport/ ser/ ugc/ ch1.pdf (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). Union Ministry of Water Resources & ganga RejuvenationOutcom e Budgets20 16-17http:/ / wrm in.nic.in/ form s/ list.aspx?lid=490 Wolf Aaron T., and T. Newton Joshua. “Water conlict management” .Oregon State University . 20 0 8. http:/ / www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/ research/ case_ studies/ Indus_ New.htm (accessed J uly 3, 20 16). Sethi, Neha. “Yam una’s Sewage Burden”. Livem int, Hindustan Tim es. March 22, 20 13. http:/ / epaper.livem int.com / epaper/ viewer.aspx (accessed J uly 26, 20 16). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 47 ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Swachh Bharat Mission Keval Patel, Prateek Pillai, Sanchi Gupta EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The central governm ent launched the Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM) with the aim of creating an ‘Open Defecation Free’ nation by 20 19, with Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) entrusted with im plem entation of the Mission (SBM-Urban). The Swachh Bharat Cess has been introduced to fund the m ission, by im posing a levy of 0 .5% on taxable services, raising the Service Tax rate from 14% to 14.5%. This paper exam ines the issues of open defecation and access to toilets in Delhi in the context of the SBM, by tracking the funds allocated by the Centre to the ULBs in Delhi and sim ultaneously assessing access to toilets in J huggi-J hopri (J J ) Clusters. During the course of this study, various stakeholders were interviewed such as government oicials, citizens living in JJ Clusters and private players. The results of the study point to inefective implementation of the Mission in Delhi with targets for the construction of toilets and solid waste m anagem ent being grossly un-m et. The reasons for the failure of the Mission can be traced to policy weaknesses within the SBM Guidelines and Delhi’s com plicated and fragm ented governance structure. Finally, taking forward the them atic focus on sanitation, a com parative study was carried out between publicly and privately m aintained public toilets in Delhi. The paper concludes by proposing a new m odel for im plem entation of the Mission in Delhi. KEY FINDINGS 1. Delhi will receive a total of ₹360 .0 1 crores over the course of the entire Mission Period (Oct 20 14-19). As of May 20 16, Delhi has received ₹139.60 crores. 2. For the inancial year 2015-16, the North Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) received ₹46.28 crores under the SBM. Currently, the entire corpus of these funds is lying unutilised. Out of the ₹31.63 crores received by the South Delhi Municipal Corporation (SDMC), only 0 .25% (or ₹7.93 lakhs) has been spent. 3. The SBM Guidelines were form ulated with the assum ption that ULB(s) are consolidated organizations, holding considerable power. In Delhi however the ULB(s) do not control water supply or sewage. Furtherm ore, slum s and J J Clusters do not lie within their jurisdiction. 4. DUSIB is not an ULB and thus, is not entitled to funds under the SBM. However, the State Mission Directorate has re-allocated funds worth ₹51 crore by transferring them from the ULB(s) to DUSIB. This am ounts to 36.5% of the total m oney allocated to Delhi till May 20 16. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 49 5. Since the beginning of the Mission (October 20 14), no Household Toilets have been constructed (as against a target of 30 ,10 7 by 31st Mar 20 16). Delhi was supposed to build 1,982 Com m unity Toilets by the end of the Mission Period, but has far exceeded this target by building 4,656 Com m unity Toilets (the num bers are in term s of toilet seats, and not com plexes). However, a m ajority of these Com m unity Toilets have been constructed by DUSIB. Open Defecation: Health and Environm ental Hazard A 20 13 Delhi Governm ent report found that 79% of children (below the age of three years), living in slum s and poor settlem ents, defecate in the open (Saxena and Singh 20 13). Expressing concern over open defecation in the national capital, the Delhi High Court has said the lack of public toilets in the city was “disgraceful” (Iqbal 20 16). Both problem s of open defecation and urination can be linked to the lack of sanitary public or com m unity toilets in Delhi. Lack of household toilets is a com paratively sm aller problem in the city—conined chiely to the Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters where only a quarter have access to individual toilets (Pandit 20 16). Th e r iver Yam u n a fu lfils 70 % of Delh i’s water r equ ir em en ts. H owever , Delh i is r esp on sible for 8 0 % of th e p ollu tion of th e r iver wh ile accou n tin g for ju st 2% of its catch m en t ar ea (Cen tr e for Scien ce an d En vir on m en t 20 0 9). Over 11 m illion p eop le ar e d ir ectly affected by th e p ollu tion of th e r iver . An RTI r ep ly r evealed th at 60 % of th e total sewage gen er ated by Delh i r em ain s u n tr eated (PTI 20 15).Th ese u n tr eated faeces eith er seep in to th e gr ou n d or flow in to th e Yam u n a, even tu ally p ollu tin g th e water r esou r ces. Pr obable r eason s for th is in efficien t sewage system in clu d e 50 th e p r actice of op en d efecation an d th e wid esp r ead u se of in san itar y toilets (toilets th at ar e n ot con n ected to a sewer lin e). Mor eover , open defecation is an en vir on m en tal h azar d th at also h as dir ect con sequen ces on h ealth . Recen t studies h ave foun d th at open defecation leads to m al-n our ish m en t an d stun tin g in ch ildr en . A ch ild in In dia is, on aver age, sh or ter an d m or e m aln our ish ed th an a ch ild livin g in a poor er Afr ican n ation (H ar r is 20 14; Spear s, Th e lon g an d sh or t of open defecation 20 13). Despite effor ts of th e In dian gover n m en t to subsidize food, m aln our ish m en t con tin ues to per sist as th e bacter ia r eleased in to th e en vir on m en t fr om th e un tr eated faeces h am per s ability to absor b n utr ien ts fr om food in th e lon g ter m (Spear s, Th e n utr ition al value of toilets 20 13). Accor din g to a Delh i Gover n m en t r epor t, “th e fact th at excr eta is out in th e open an d n ot con fin ed in a safe m an n er poses a h ealth r isk to th e sur r oun din gs. So wh eth er 10 % or 20 % of m em ber s defecate in th e open , th e r isk is th e sam e for an y h ouseh old” (Saxen a an d Sin gh 20 13). Alar m in gly, polio in fection s occur th r ough th e fecal-or al r oute an d th ey ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission ar e str on gly cor r elated with lack of san itation an d per son al h ygien e. Table 1: Percentage of household m em bers using open spaces for defecation in Delhi Total Households Surveyed 19,683 Adult Male 11% Adult Female 9% Boys above 3 years 48% Girls above 3 years 56% Children below 3 years 79% Source: Saxena and Singh 20 13 About the Study The objective of the study is to track the fun ds allocated by the Cen tre to the ULBs for the im plem en tation of the Mission in Delhi. Two parallel approaches have been em ployed: a top-down approach to track the fun ds allocated by the Cen tre (Nation al Mission Directorate) to the State (State Mission Directorate), the State to the ULBs and inally, the utilisation of the fun ds by the ULBs; an d a bottom -up approach to evaluate the con dition of toilets in Delhi from Com m un ity Toilet Com plexes in J J Clusters to public toilets. The study draws upon qualitative data collected by interviewing state and local level government oicials and citizens living in J J Clusters in the city of Delhi. The data collection tools include indepth unstructured interviews and direct observation. In essence, every interview conducted was unique and all conversations were transcribed verbatim for later analysis. It is to be noted that the sam ple size of the num ber of J J Clusters visited is fairly small and the indings cannot be generalised for all of Delhi. These ield visits however do provide a glim pse of the ground realities. The Swachh Bharat Mission (SBM-Urban) With the aim of elim inating open defecation in India, the central governm ent launched the SBM to achieve two objectives during the ‘Mission Period’ (2 October 20 14-19): • An ‘Open Defecation Free’ Nation through the Construction of Toilets • Modernisation of the Municipal Solid Waste Managem ent System s Th e Mission also aim s to effect a beh aviour al ch an ge an d gen er ate awar en ess r egar din g san itation pr actices. Fund Allocation for SBM The estim ated cost of the im plem entation of SBM (Urban) is ₹62,0 0 9 crores. The Centre’s share, as per approved funding DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 51 pattern, am ounts to ₹14,623 crores. In addition, a m inim um additional am ount (equivalent to 25% of the Centre’s share), am ounting to ₹4,874 crores shall be contributed by the States. The balance funds will be generated through various other sources such as private sector participation, additional resources from State Governm ent/ ULBs, user charges, Swachh Bharat Kosh, Corporate Social Responsibility etc. These have been set up to attract Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds from Corporate Sector and contributions from individuals and philanthropists to carry out the efective im plem entation of the SBM. This sum is given out in two instalments of ₹2,000 each. The irst instalment is made to the beneiciary’s bank account on the approval of an application to the ULB. The second instalment is made once construction is veriied as per the directions of the respective State Government. Com m unity Toilets Th e Cen tr e p r ovid es an in cen tive for th e con str u ction of each com m u n ity toilet block in th e for m of a 40 % gr an t. Th e r em ain in g fu n d s ar e to be gen er ated by th e State/ ULB(s). All com m u n ity toilets con str u cted u n d er SBM m u st h ave a m in im u m five-year m ain ten an ce con tr act. To fund the Mission, the central governm ent has levied a ‘Swachh Bharat Cess’ of 0 .5% on all taxable services, efectively raising the Service Tax rate to 14.5%. It is estim ated that the cess will raise close to ₹10 ,0 0 0 crore per year for im plem entation of the Mission. Public Toilets The Mission has laid out guidelines for the construction of three types of toilets (Ministry of Urban Developm ent 20 14). Individual Household Toilets The Centre provides an assistance of ₹4,000 for every household toilet identiied. The Centre does not allocate any funds for the construction of public toilets. State and ULBs are to identify land for public toilets and encourage the private sector to construct and manage public toilets through a PPP (Public-Private Partnership) agreement. The projects are to be prepared, sanctioned and implemented by the ULB(s). All public toilets constructed under SBM must have a minimum ive-year maintenance contract. Table 2: Patterns of fund sharing between the Centre and the State Centre 52 75% 25% States (excluding North Eastern States) 90% 10% North Eastern States 100% 0% Union Territories ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission Structure and Process The prim ary im plem enting agency of the SBM (Urban) is the ULB. The Centre has set ‘physical targets’ (for exam ple: num ber of household toilets to be constructed) for each ULB, across the nation, basis the 20 11 Census Report. The Centre allocates funds to the states in the form of instalm ents, m ade after the assessm ent of the ‘Utilization Certiicate’ provided by the state to the Centre, the contents of which are based on the utilisation certiicates provided by each ULB to the state. Thus, the responsibility of the state governm ent is lim ited to transferring funds and m onitoring the activities of the ULBs. Im plem enting the Swachh Bharat Mission in Delhi The Delhi governm ent, as a part of its plan to create an open defecation-free capital, has set a target of building the required num ber of toilets by 20 18. The governm ent has allocated about ₹10 0 crore for this purpose. However, the linkage of individual and private household toilets with sewer lines rem ains a huge challenge. GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE Ministry of Urban Development (Centre) National Mission Directorate National Advisory and Review Committee Department of Urban Development (State) State Mission Directorate High Powered Committee URBAN LOCAL BODIES North Delhi Municipal Corporation South Delhi Municipal Corporation East Delhi Municipal Corporation New Delhi Municipal Council Delhi Cantonment Board DUSIB [Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board] DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 53 Financial Allocations Delhi is to be allocated a total of ₹360 .0 1 crore over the Mission Period (2 October 20 14-19). Out of this total am ount, ₹10 .25 crores will be retained by the Central governm ent. The rem aining ₹349.79 crores will be allocated to Delhi in instalm ents. In the irst instalment (2014-15), Delhi was allocated ₹8.0 5 crores. In the second instalm ent (20 15-16), ₹96.7 crores was allocated to Delhi. During the irst two years, Delhi was classiied as a ‘state’ under the Mission fund-sharing pattern, and was obliged to contribute₹34.85 crores to the SBM efort. However, from 20 16 onwards, Delhi has been re-classiied as a Union Territory and no longer obliged to contribute funds. As a result Delhi has received a total of ₹139.60 crores under the Mission. The indings listed in Table 3 are based on interviews with government oicials at the State Mission Directorate (SBM), Delhi. Unspent Money, Unmet Targets As can be observed from Tables 5 the targets for the SBM in Delhi have not been m et. Indeed, in the case of Household Toilets the work is yet to begin whilst the progress on Public Toilets has also fallen behind. The construction of Com m unity Toilets has far exceeded the targets: 4,656 Com m unity Toilets have been built, which is roughly four tim es the overall m ission target of 1,982. The East, South and North Corporations have not utilised the Mission Funds for 54 the construction of toilets for sim ilar reasons. The SBM guidelines m ention that to use the funds, the ULB m ust raise a proportion of the required funds on its own. Further, SBM funds can be used only for new projects, and cannot be utilised for the m aintenance of existing toilets. SBM directives m andate the ULBs to construct Individual Household Toilets, Com m unity Toilet Com plexes and Public Toilets, but the corporations claim there is no dem and for Household and Com m unity Toilets within their jurisdiction. While constructing Public Toilets lies within their sphere of responsibility, central funds cannot be used for the construction of these toilets. Instead, they choose to outsource the construction and m aintenance of Public Toilets to private irms. To achieve the physical targets laid out by the Centre, these corporations use CSR funds or builds toilets on a BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) basis. Since a m ajority of the m unicipal corporations in Delhi face a severe cash crunch, these m odels prove to be m ore feasible, and hence, m ore popular. However the situation at the New Delhi Municipal Council, considered to be one of Asia’s richest m unicipal bodies, was diferent. NDMC oicials claimed that they had not received any funds under the SBM, despite a proposed allocation of ₹3.72 crores in the Financial Targets (Table 3). Whatever the allocations— NDMC has the lowest and the North Corporation has the highest—the corpus of funds allocated in the inancial year 201516 is lying largely unutilised. ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission Table 3: Financial targets for the entire Mission period (in crores) Household Toilets Community Toilets Solid Waste Management Information, Education and Communication (IEC) Capacity Building Total Delhi 50.16 5.15 263.68 24.61 6.15 349.76 North Delhi Corporation 13.07 2.67 118.53 10.36 2.59 147.21 East Delhi Corporation 2.69 0.50 56.78 6.178 1.54 87.69 South Delhi Corporation 10.21 1.87 78.58 6.99 1.75 99.40 NDMC 0.16 0.03 3.20 0.26 0.07 3.72 Delhi Cantonment Board 4.68 1.06 6.58 0.95 0.24 13.51 Table 4: Physical targets for the entire Mission period Household Toilets Community Toilets Delhi 1,25,398 1,982 North Delhi Corporation 32,663 1,027 South Delhi Corporation 25,515 718 East Delhi Corporation 56,734 91 NDMC 399 13 Delhi Cantonment Board 11,694 408 Table 5: Utilisation of SBM funds for 20 15-16 (in lakhs) Total Funds Allocated Expenditure Expenditure (in Percent) North Corporation 4,627.66 0.00 0.00 South Corporation 3,162.66 7.93 0.25 East Corporation 4,198.66 N/A N/A DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 55 TH E OD D CASE OF D U SIB DUSIB is a state body responsible for the provision of civic am enities in J J Clusters. It was earlier a part of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) as its Slum and J J Rehabilitation Departm ent and later carved out as a separate departm ent of the Delhi Governm ent under the DUSIB Act, 20 10 . Although DUSIB undertakes the construction of com m unity toilets in J J clusters, it is not entitled to SBM funds since it is not a ULB. Thus, it was not included in the Financial Targets set by the central governm ent (Table 3). According to DUSIB oicials, ₹51 crores has been re-appropriated to it under the SBM, because of the non-utilisation of the Household and Com m unity Toilet funds by the ULBs in Delhi. ULB oicials claim that the funds have not been transferred. There are other discrepancies with this igure such as the fact that combined funds for Household and Community Toilets under the SBM till 20 19 amount to a little over ₹55 crores and Delhi has received ₹139 crores till date. Further, DUSIB does not construct Household Toilets despite there being strong demand for them in the J J Clusters. According to oicials, DUSIB’s mandate, which is set by the Urban Development Department of the Delhi Government, only outlines the construction of Community Toilets. 56 The Elephant in the Room – J J Clusters Inform al settlem ents in Delhi are of three types: Rural Villages, Unauthorized Colonies and J J Clusters. The estim ated population in: • Unauthorised Colonies is 7.40 lakhs (5.3% of the total estim ated population) • Rural Villages is 7.40 lakhs (5.3% of the total estim ated population) • J J Clusters is 20 .72 lakhs (14.8% of total estim ated population) Source: (Centre for Policy Research 20 15) While the irst two have access to basic m unicipal services, the inhabitants of J J Clusters have to struggle to gain access to basic civic am enities such as water supply and sewerage. A quick ield assessment conirmed the oicial data on individual household toilets and provided insights on private spends on toilets and sanitation infrastructure. ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission Table 6: Data from ield visits Name of Settlement Type of Settlement Governing Agency Number of Households Ekta Vihar JJ Cluster DUSIB 1,856 Indira Camp JJ Cluster DUSIB 522 Tigri Village Rural Village SDMC Sanjay Camp JJ Cluster DUSIB Dakshin Puri Extension Unauthorised Colony SDMC 915 Number of People (approx.) Individual Household Toilets 4,000 + 0 1,700 -1,800 Richer houses have toilets Everyone has household toilets 0 Community Toilet Complexes 1 1 0 2 Everyone has household toilets SAN ITATION SERVICES IN JJ CLU STERS EKTA VIH AR: J J Cluster in R.K Puram where over 4,0 0 0 people use one Community Toilet Complex constructed approximately 20 years ago and is maintained by a family that lives in the J J cluster. It remains open from 9 am to 10 pm and charges a fee ranging from ₹2 to ₹10 . Users had several complaints with regard to the toilet such as an irregular cleaning schedule and restricted timings that sometimes force them to defecate in the open. Households within the cluster are not connected to the sewage lines and they do not get water supply. Furthermore, though Ekta Vihar is listed as a J J Cluster on the DUSIB website, DUSIB oicials claim that it no longer lies within its jurisdiction. IN D IRA CAMP: With a population of approximately 1,70 0 -1,80 0 , it is a relatively better of JJ Cluster. Richer households have constructed toilets within their homes and set up sewer lines by pooling money. However, poorer households continue to use the sole Community Toilet in the area. Maintained by DUSIB, this toilet is both cheaper (₹1-₹3) and remains open for longer (4:30 am-10 :30 pm) than the one in Ekta Vihar. Indira Camp is a good example of the viability of constructing Household Toilets in J J Clusters. While the SBM encourages the construction of Household Toilets in unauthorised settlements or slum areas, the agency responsible for J J Clusters in Delhi (that is, DUSIB) claims that the construction of these toilets does not fall within its jurisdiction. SAN JAY CAMP: Compared to the previous examples, Sanjay Camp has seen some progress since the launch of the SBM. Two Community Toilet Complexes were recently built by DUSIB to serve the needs of the 915 households in the area, charging a fee of ₹1-2. Before these were constructed, citizens of Sanjay Camp had to defecate in the open. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 57 Maintaining clean and usable public toilets in Delhi According to SBM Guidelines, a Public Toilet is a facility provided for the general public in areas where there is considerable footfall such as m arkets, train stations, tourist places, near oice complexes, etc. States and ULBs have to ensure that a suicient number of Public Toilets are constructed in each city, with facilities for m en, wom en and the disabled. Under the SBM, the Centre provides no inancial support to the ULBs for construction of public toilets. Instead, the guidelines encourage participation from the private sector “to construct and manage public toilets through a PPP agreement”. The inancial incentives for the private players will be the revenue generated from advertisements displayed on the toilets. result, there is no incentive to ensure that the toilets are clean, sanitary and usable. The Privately Maintained Model The ULB outsources construction and maintenance of the toilet to a private irm on a BOT (Build, Operate, and Transfer) basis. The private irm that acquires the tender will construct the toilet using their own funds and maintain it for a minimum of ive years. While the toilets are free of charge, they are constructed with designated spaces for advertisements and irms earn revenue from these. If the toilet is not maintained, the irm is at risk of losing the contract and the corporation will transfer the contract to a competing irm. As a result, there is an incentive to ensure that toilets are clean, sanitary and usable. Th e fin din gs of th is study in dicate th at: The Publicly Maintained Model The ULB is responsible for the construction and maintenance of public toilets. Since these toilets are free of charge and do not have designated spaces to display advertisements, the ULBs do not generate much revenue under this model. As a • Privately m ain tain ed toilets rem ain open to th e public for lon ger h ours each day. • Availability of soap and dustbins are more likely in privately maintained toilets. • Publicly m ain tain ed toilets are m ore likely to be free, wh ile th e privately m ain tain ed on es are m ore likely to be clean , an d h en ce m ore usable. Table 9: Targets for public toilet in Delhi Number of Public Toilets built in Delhi (till 31 March 2016) Number of Public Toilets required in the SDMC area (as of 7 April 2016) 1,120 5,318 Number of Public Toilets Number of Public Toilets required in the NDMC required in the EDMC area area (as of 7 April 2016) (as of 7 April 2016) 3,311 Source: The Hindu 20 16 58 ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission 2,508 Facilities Available at Public Toilets Analysis and Recom m endations According to various public oicials, governance in Delhi sufers from two basic problem s: a) lack of political cooperation, and b) existence of m ultiple civic agencies. Coupled with these deicits in governance, the ‘Mission Guidelines’ that guide all SBM-related activities themselves sufer from policy weaknesses. Why Budgets rem ain Unspent Since the Centre allocated funds to each ULB in Delhi on the basis of the 20 11 Census, an accurate assessm ent of how and where to use these funds could not be m ade. The top-down approach em ployed by the Centre failed to take into account the fact that the ULB(s) in Delhi are not as powerful as other ULB(s) across the country, since water supply, sewerage and J J Clusters do not fall within the am bit of their responsibilities. Furthermore, ULB oicials from the North, South an d East Mun icipal Corporation s claim ed that while a sizeable sum of m on ey had been assign ed for the con struction of H ousehold Toilets, this m on ey could n ot be utilised due to a “lack of dem an d or n eed for such toilets in their jurisdiction ”. In fact, they claim ed that the n eed for such toilets existed on ly within J J Clusters, which lie within the jurisdiction of DUSIB. There are several other restrictions on the use of the m oney provided under the SBM to the ULB(s). The funds provided under the SBM can only be used if the respective ULB raises its own share of DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 59 funds for the project,but m ost of the corporations do not have such fundraising capacity. Moreover, som e of the ULBs already face a severe cash crunch and are unable to provide salaries for their em ployees (NDMC and EDMC) and thus any additional funds raised are irst used to pay rem uneration for their em ployees. Th e SBM guidelin es em ph asise th at fun ds can on ly be used for th e developm en t of “n ew assets” an d n ot for th e m ain ten an ce or upkeep of existin g facilities. Th us th e fun ds effectively rem ain frozen with th e ULB. Wh y J J Cluster s r em ain Un -Ser ved The bulk of the households which require Household and Com m unity Toilets live in J J clusters and slum areas. Due to Delhi’s convoluted governance structure, these do not fall within the purview of the ULBs. Instead, the jurisdiction of these areas rests under DUSIB, which is under the state governm ent and not a ULB, and thereby not supposed to receive any funds from SBM. Money transferred to DUSIB has been in reaction to the non-utilisation of funds by the ULBs. Such a discrepancy exists because SBM Guidelines have been applied unilaterally across the country. While ULBs in other states are powerful bodies with control over water supply, sewage and slum s, ULBs in Delhi share overlapping responsibilities with the state governm ent. houses,without which toilets cannot function. The SBM does not provide any funds to the Delhi J al Board for laying sewage lines. Even if Household Toilets were built, individuals would have to pay the Delhi J al Board separately for laying sewage lines to their house. The following recom m endations aim to overcom e Delhi’s com plex governance structure by including all the relevant institutions and identifying a clear chain of responsibility and accountability for their im plem entation: 1 ULBs are authorised to use SBM funds for activities other than the creation of ‘new assets’, such as the m aintenance of existing toilets and facilitation of the existing Municipal Solid Waste Managem ent system . 2 DUSIB and the Delhi J al Board are brought within the purview of the SBM. 3 Th e m an date of DUSIB is expan ded to in clude buildin g/ facilitatin g H ouseh old Toilets. A regulatory body is set up by the Centre to periodically evaluate the progress of construction and m aintenance of toilets. Additional funding is approved by the regulatory body on the basis of perform ance and outcom e. It is the Delhi J al Board that has the authority to lay down sewer lines to 60 ENVIRONMENT Toilets in Delhi: Evaluating progress of the Sw achh Bharat Mission Bibliography Sheikh Shahana and Banda Subhadra. “Categorisation of Settlem ent in Delhi”. Centre for Policy Research Policy Brief, 20 15. “State of Pollution in the Yam una”. New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environm ent, 20 0 9. Harris Gardiner. “Poor Sanitation in India may alict well-fed children with malnutrition” New York Tim es, J uly 13, 20 14. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/world/asia/poor-sanitation-in-india-may-alict-wellfed-children-with-m alnutrition.htm l?_ r=0 (accessed J une 20 16). Moham m ed Iqbal. “HC concerned over open defecation in Delhi” The Hindu, J anuary 10 , 20 16. http:/ / www. thehindu.com / news/ cities/ Delhi/ hc-concerned-over-open-defecation-in-delhi/ article80 870 40 .ece (accessed J une 20 16). “Guidelines for Swachh Bharat Mission” Ministry of Urban Developm ent. Decem ber 20 14. http:/ / www. swachhbharaturban.gov.in (accessed J une 20 16). Pandit Ambika. “234 open-defecation spots in the city, inds survey” The Tim es of India. April 25, 20 16. http://timesoindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/234-open-defecation-spots-in-city-inds-survey/articleshow/ 51971363.cm s (accessed J une 20 16). “60 % of Sewage rem ains untreated in Delhi” Daily New s and Analy sis. March 22, 20 15. http:/ / www.dnaindia.com / delhi/ report-60 -of-sewage-rem ains-untreated-in-delhi-20 70 947 (accessed J une 20 16). Saxena Shipra and Singh Kam lesh, W ater, Sanitation and Hy giene in Poor Settlem ents of Delhi. Delhi: USAID India, 20 13. Spears Dean. “The long and short of open defecation” The Hindu, March 14, 20 13. http:/ / www.thehindu.com / opinion/ lead/ the-long-and-short-of-open-defecation/ article450 5664.ece (accessed J une 20 16). --“The nutritional value of toilets” w w w .riceinstitute.org. 20 13. http:/ / riceinstitute.org/ wordpress/ wp-content/ uploads/ downloads/ 20 13/ 0 7/ Spears-height-and-sanitation-6-20 13.pdf (accessed J une 20 16). “Delhi gets 20 m odern public toilets” The Hindu. April 7, 20 16. http:/ / www.thehindu.com / news/ cities/ Delhi/ delhi-gets-20 -m odern-public-toilets/ article8443359.ece (accessed J une 20 16). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 61 TRADE & COMMERCE Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 Ragini Khurana, Priy asha Chaw la, Tanay Raj Bhatt EXECUTIVE SUMMARY One of the main problems faced in the ield of trade and commerce in Delhi is the stringent labour regim e that governs it. This study analyses the relationship between labour laws and the ease of doing business in Delhi by exam ining the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954, and presents key indings from interviews conducted with the two main stakeholders of the sector: oicials from the Oice of the Labour Commissioner of Delhi, and shop-owners. Finally, it explores alternative m odels of organising workerem ployee relationships. On the whole, the study identiies a strong case for the repeal, or signiicant amendment of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, and argues that the Model Shops and Establishments Act, 2015 is an insuicient improvement. The study suggests that moving to a more lexible and pertinent labour regime can be achieved by adopting a labour welfare system based on contract law. KEY FINDINGS 1. A key purpose of the Act is to collect data on the num ber of shops and establishm ents in Delhi, yet the inform ation currently available with the governm ent is inconsistent and unreliable. As per Econom ic Census of 20 13, 8.93 lakh establishm ents were found to be operating in Delhi, which is in conlict with the igure obtained from the Labour Commissioner’s oice in Delhi which claimed that only 340,000 shops and establishm ents are registered under the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act 1954. 2. There is close to little awareness about the existence and provisions of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act am ongst shopkeepers interviewed. Despite this, there is a high degree of self-regulation am ongst shopkeepers with regards to m aintenance of registers, provision of workers’ rights, etc. 3. A large m ajority of the shopkeepers interviewed claim ed that they would not like to keep their shops open till late or open their shops on Sunday even if they were allowed to do so under law. 4. All provisions of the Act are covered by central laws governing employment, mainly the Minimum Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, thereby rendering it redundant. 5. Certain provisions of the Act are excessively cum bersom e and unnecessary, and therefore unenforceable. For instance, occupiers of establishm ents are required to notify the Chief Inspector in case of any change in the inform ation that was provided in the registration form within 30 days of such change and give three days of advance intim ation to the inspector when an em ployee is required to work overtim e. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 63 Introduction Trade and commerce are the drivers of the modern international economy. They are essential, not only for growth and prosperity, but also for the mere survival of a society. These blanket terms include everything from the local kirana store and paanw aala to countries negotiating free trade agreements. In light of the prominence of this sector, the Government of India and the Delhi government have taken several initiatives to improve the ease of doing business in India. The need for these measures were highlighted by India’s ranking as 142nd in the World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2015, which examines the ease of doing business in 189 economies. Businesses and traders in Delhi face several obstacles that lim it their econom ic freedom , reduce the ease of doing business, and prevent them from expanding their capacities. Reform ing India’s business environm ent to m ake it easier and more attractive for irms to operate here is a priority for the governm ent. In order to achieve this, it is im perative that there is an overhaul of the country’s labour regulations. Labour laws afect employment generation, productivity, proitability, and labour rights, and therefore have a signiicant role to play in a country’s economic and social development. The anachronism of the static labour legislations in India becomes all the more evident when it is juxtaposed with the changes that have emerged in the nature of the workplace. The prevalence of part-time, temporary, home-based work, and self-employment; the shift to longer and unconventional working hours; and a decline of the regular working week are some of the phenomena that necessitate a review of the current approach to regulating work. Labour laws should no longer be viewed merely as a negative restraint on the employers’ powers, but as an enabling medium of achieving worker and business 64 TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 eiciency and supporting the development of a competitive and successful economy (Mitchell 2007). Labour Regulation in India Indian labour laws have been characterised by three main features: they are numerous, over-lapping, and inefective. According to a report by FICCI (Note on Labour Policy Reforms 2014), there are around 44 central and 100 state laws governing labour in India. The abundance of labour laws can partly be attributed to the fact that the constitution lists labour under the concurrent section, which means that both the state and central governments have the power to legislate on it. Both levels of government have used this power extensively, which has resulted in a “maze of overlapping rules, regulations, compliance requirements and regulatory authorities” (Arvind 2014, 3). A second reason for this multiplicity is the piecemeal way in which these regulations were formulated. Each new law came up in response to some speciic need for regulation. Since these laws were drafted independently of each other, not only did labour regulation proliferate, but also provided various, and often contradictory deinitions of the same terms (The Challenge of Employment in India 2009). This behemoth of regulations is undesirable and has several repercussions for both irms and employees. The Firm s Over-regulation of business can stile growth, as irms get caught in keeping track of various laws and obligations—a task that costs them time and money. The existence of very speciic and trivial obligations also increases the probability that irms will end up not fulilling some requirement or the other, albeit unintentionally. This makes businesses more vulnerable to harassment and extortion by inspectors (Pachauri 20 14). Combined, these factors incentivise irms to restrict expansion and function in the informal sector in order to circumvent over-regulation, a fact that has been proven by Besley and Burgess (20 0 4) in their study on the relation between state-level labour regulations and employment in the formal manufacturing sector. The Workers The rigidity an d abun dan ce of labour laws has led to the in creasin g in form ality of the labour m arket—94% of In dian s work in the in form al sector—coun tervailin g the very purpose of the laws. Accordin g to the World Ban k, labour regulation s that are too strict or too loose can be coun terproductive as they could lead to losses of em ploym en t. A 20 13 study by H asan , Mitra an d Sun daram shows that, “In dia uses m ore capital-in ten sive techn iques of production than predicted by its level of developm en t” (H asan et al 20 16, 22). Con versely, an other study inds that labour reforms leading to more lexible labour requirements could in crease em ploym en t in In dian retail stores by 22% of the curren t level for an average store (Am in 20 15). Given these factors, it is certain that labour reforms will beneit both irms and workers in India. The Central government has already taken heed of the situation described above and initiated the process of simplifying the DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 65 labour laws of the country. The table below enlists some of the reforms that have been proposed by the government so far. As emphasized by Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Secretary Amitabh Kant however, “the big ticket labour changes are still due” (PTI 20 15, 29). Reform s in India’s labour laws ACT PROPOSED AMENDMENTS Labour Code on Industrial Relations Bill, 2015 Integrates three laws- Trade Unions Act, 1926; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Employers with up to 300 workers would not require government permission for retrenchment, layofs, closure; 30% of workers required to sign for creation of labour union against current requirement of 10%. 66 Labour Code on Wages Bill, 2015 Integrates four laws- Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Equal Remuneration Act, 1976. The Small Factories (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Bill, 2014 Exempts small factories with up to 40 workers from 14 labour laws including Factories Act, Industrial Disputes Act, Shops and Establishments Act. Child Labour (Protection and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2012 Children below 14 years of age are allowed to work in family enterprises. Contract Labour Act Exempts companies employing less than 50 workers from provisions of the Act. Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment) Bill Positions National Pension System as alternative to Employees’ Provident Fund. Payment of Bonus (Amendment) Bill, 2015 Raises salary ceiling for bonus payments to ₹ 21,000 per month. Maternity Beneits Act, 1961 Increases maternity leave to 28 weeks from current 12 weeks. Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015 Sets 12 month time-limit for arbitrators to rule on disputes Model Shops and Establishments Act, 2015 Allows shops to stay open 24x7 TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act (DSEA), 1954 Of th e laws th at h ave been listed in th e table above, on ly th e Sh ops an d Establish m en ts Act is a state law. Th e purpose of th e act is to regulate th e con dition s of service of em ployees in sh ops an d establish m en ts, with th e Act defin in g wh at qualifies as a sh op or establish m en t. The m ain provisions laid down under the Act pertain to the following categories: i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) vii) Registration of establishm en ts Maxim um workin g hours Con dition s of paym en t of wages Paym en t of overtim e wages In tervals for rest an d m eals Procedure for dism issal of workers Restriction s on em ploym en t of women and young persons (deined un der the Act as those aged between 12-18 years) viii) Open in g an d closin g hours of establishm en ts ix) Com pulsory weekly close day x) Main ten an ce of records listin g out details of em ployees as well as their con dition s of em ploym en t xi) Clean lin ess, lightin g, ven tilation and precautions against ire in the workplace Section 4 of the Act gives the State Govern m en t power to exem pt an establishm en t or a category of establishm en ts from som e or all provision s of the Act, a power that has been used liberally. Schedule 1 of the law lists the establishm en ts that have obtain ed exem ption un der the Act, the obligation s from which they are exem pted an d the validity of this exem ption . The enforcem ent of the Act is the responsibility of the Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments, an oice that is usually ascribed to a Deputy Labour Com m issioner of Delhi, according to the System Analyst of the Oice of the Labour Com m issioner, Delhi. In addition, nine district inspectors are appointed under the Act, who are accountable to the Deputy or Assistant Labour Com m issioner of their respective district (Governm ent of NCT of Delhi 20 14). Th e Delh i Sh op s an d Establish m en ts Act con tain s m ost of th e flaws th at ch ar acter ise In d ia’s labou r r egim e in gen er al. Th e Act, wh ich was p assed in 1954, h as n ot been am en d ed sin ce an d h as th er efor e lost m u ch of its r elevan ce in th e p r evailin g en vir on m en t. Mor eover , it allows for little flexibility in d ecid in g th e con d ition s of wor k. An d fin ally, sever al p r ovision s of th e Act over lap with or con tr ad ict sim ilar p r ovision s in oth er laws. Th e followin g section seeks to exam in e th ese d eficien cies in gr eater d etail. Th e section is based p r im ar ily on in sigh ts gain ed fr om an in ter view with a for m er Dep u ty Labou r Com m ission er of Delh i. The DSEA derived its relevance from three m ain provisions: 1. Op e n in g a n d Clo s in g H o u rs : Section 15 of th e law provides for com pulsory open in g an d closin g h ours for sh ops an d establish m en ts. Accordin g to th e form er DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 67 Commissioner, these timings became a way for the government to deal with the power shortages in Delhi. Shops were required to shut down around the time that people came home from work, so that demand could be controlled and scarce electricity could be supplied to households. 2 . Co m p u ls o ry Clo s e D a y: Th e DSEA was th e on ly Act th at m an dates a com pulsory close day for establish m en ts un der Section 16. H owever, with sh oppin g m alls bein g allowed to stay open all seven days of th e week an d th e rise of e-com m erce firm s, th ese provision s in creasin gly disadvan tage tradition al sh ops again st th eir n ew com petitors. In terestin gly, m ost of th e exem ption s gran ted by th e govern m en t un der th e Act relate to Section s 15 an d 16, wh ich is in itself an in dicator of th e im practicality of th ese provision s. 3 . Re gis tratio n : The Act prescribes the registration with the Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishm ents under Section 5. The provision was included prim arily to m eet the governm ent’s need for data on the num ber of shops in Delhi and the num der of people em ployed there. Since 20 0 9, registration has been shifted online. However, there was never any procedure for veriication of the inform ation provided via the registration form , which m eans that a registration certiicate can be obtained even with ictitious or false information. This has led to several discrepancies over the years. 68 Relevance Or igin ally, r egistr ation u n d er th e Act was to be r en ewed ever y year , bu t th e valid ity of th e cer tificate was con tin u ou sly exten d ed , given th e ted iou sn ess of r en ewal, an d stan d s at 21 year s tod ay. Accor d in g to th e for m er Com m ission er , r egistr ation cer tificates issu ed u n d er th e act wer e m isu sed by p eop le, esp ecially in th e Ch an d n i Ch owk an d Mor i Gate ar eas of Delh i, to attain com m er cial statu s for th eir r esid en tial p r op er ties. Th is led th e gover n m en t to keep th e r equ ir em en t of r egistr ation u n d er abeyan ce in Novem ber 198 9. Bu t th e n eed for d ata r esu r faced an d th e gover n m en t d ecid ed to m ake r egistr ation m an d ator y on ce again . Un for tu n ately, th e con cer n s abou t au th en ticity p er sisted , a fact th at cam e u p in ou r in ter view with th e System An alyst at th e Office of th e Labou r Com m ission er of Delh i. H e in for m ed u s th at 340 ,0 0 0 sh op s wer e cu r r en tly r egister ed , bu t th er e was n o way to be su r e th e d ata was r eliable. Even assu m in g th e n u m ber to be gen u in e, h e ad m itted th at it was a gr oss u n d er -estim ation of th e actu al n u m ber of establish m en ts in Delh i. Th er efor e, it is safe to say th at th e d ata collection p u r p ose of th e Act h as been lar gely u n su ccessfu l. Overlap and Redundancy Brown (1994) deines “overlap” as a situation where we have more than one government operating in the same policy TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 domain. Such overlap is quite evident in the case of the DSEA and results in redundancy, which means that the involvement of an additional level of government is of no beneit at all. Apart from those mentioned above, all provisions of the Act are covered by central laws governing employment, mainly the Minimum Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes Act. Min im u m W age s Act, 19 4 8 • Article 13 of the Act provides for ixing the maximum number of working hours in a day, inclusive of speciied intervals of rest, and for a compulsory day of rest in every period of seven days. Rule 24 of Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950, sets the maximum working hours at nine hours for adults. • Article 14 of the Act provides for the paym ent of overtim e wages, while Rule 25 of Minim um Wages (Central) Rules, 1950 , states that overtim e is to be given at double the rate of ordinary rate of wages. • Article 18 of the Act provides for the m aintenance of registers enlisting the particulars and conditions of work of em ployees. In d u s trial D is p u te s Act, 19 4 7 • The Act provides for com pensation of workers in case of lay-ofs or retrenchm ent and also provides an institutional m echanism to resolve disputes arising between em ployers and em ployees. Furtherm ore, several laws, such as the Factories Act, 1948, the Shops and Establishm ents Act and the Paym ent of Wages Act, 1936 provide for nearly the same rights but for diferent classes of workers. This is indicative of the piecem eal nature of Indian labour legislation. Integration of these several laws under a com m on com prehensive law would sim plify the labour regim e and m ake enforcem ent easier. Unenforceability Fin ally, certain provision s of the Act are excessively cum bersom e an d un n ecessary. For in stan ce, occupiers of establishm en ts are required to n otify the Chief In spector in case of an y chan ge in the in form ation that was provided in the registration form within 30 days of such chan ge, an d give three days of advan ce in tim ation to the in spector when an em ployee is required to work overtim e. Thus, it is n ot on ly in evitable but also desirable that the Act rem ain un en forced, for if these obligation s were to be fulilled, they would sufocate business. Th e im p r a ct ica b ilit y of t h e la ws h as b een r ecogn ised b y t h e gover n m en t it self an d h a s p r om p t ed it t o lar gely d o a way wit h in sp ect ion s r eq u ir ed u n d er t h e la w a n d m ove t o com p lain t -b ased en for cem en t in st ea d . Th e Cen tr al Gover n m en t h as also r esp on d ed to th e ir r elevan ce of th e Act by in tr od u cin g th e Mod el Sh op s an d Establish m en ts Act, 20 15, th e p r ovision s of wh ich h ave been exam in ed in th e box below. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 69 TH E MOD EL SH OPS & ESTABLISH MEN TS ACT The Model Shops an d Establishm en ts (Regulation of Em ploym en t an d Con dition s of Service) Act, 20 15 was form ulated by the Min istry of Labour after three-way con sultation s between the govern m en t, trade un ion s an d em ployers’ association s (AK 20 16). It was approved by the Cabin et on 29 J un e 20 16 an d will fun ction as a recom m en dation to all states, which can choose to adopt the law as it is, or am en d it. So far, states like Rajasthan , Maharashtra an d Gujarat have m oved towards align in g their respective Shops an d Establishm en ts Acts with the Model Act. The Model Act has don e away with some of the superluous and irrelevant aspects that exist in the Delhi Shops an d Establishm en ts Act: - Registration un der all labour laws in tegrated by the in troduction of the Shram Suv idha Portal, which requires irms to obtain a unique Labour Identiication Number. - Wom en have been allowed to work n ight shifts i.e. between 9 pm an d 6 am on the con dition s that the em ployer provides a rest room , a n ight crèche, a ladies toilet an d tran sportation from place of work to the fem ale em ployee’s residen ce. 70 - H as allowed for work to be organ ised in shifts. - Allows shops to rem ain open on all days of the week. - Requires that the workplace provide drin kin g water, urin als an d latrin es, crèches, canteens and irst aid. - H as replaced in spectors with facilitators. While these are deinitely steps in the right direction , the Model Act has n ot gon e far en ough. It con tin ues to dictate the term s of work as well as the n ature of the relation ship between em ployers an d em ployees to a large exten t. It sets down the m axim um workin g hours as well as the perm issible am oun t of overtim e; it con tin ues to require the m ain ten an ce of registers an d records, an d explicitly details the leaves that workers have a right to. In the last section of this paper, we in vestigate whether it is possible to have a labour regim e wherein em ployers an d em ployees have the lexibility to negotiate on all the term s of work, while also en surin g that workers’ rights are protected. TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 Com parison of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act and the Model Shops and Establishm ents Act SECTION PROVISION OVERLAP WITH MODEL SHOPS & ESTABLISHMENTS ACT Section 5 Registration Registration required under DVAT Act, 2014 Common online registration on Shram Suvidha Portal to obtain Labour Identiication Number Section 8 Hours of Work Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Same as DSEA, 1954 Section 8 Overtime Wages Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Same as DSEA, 1954 Section 10 Intervals for rest and meals Similar provisions in the Factories Act, 1948, but covers only workers in factories, not those in shops and establishments No provisions Section 14 Restrictions on work of young persons & women None Women allowed to work in night shift provided certain conditions are fulilled by the employer Section 15 Opening and Closing hours None No provisions Section 16 Close Day None Shops and establishments allowed to stay open on all days of the week Section 17 Weekly Holiday Minimum Wages Act, 1948 Same as DSEA, 1954 Section 19, 20, 21 Payment of wages and related claims Minimum Wages Act, 1948, Payment of Wages Act 1936 (does not cover workers in shops and establishments) & Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 No provisions Section 22, 23 Leave Similar provisions in Factories Act, 1948 Same as DSEA, 1954 Section 25, 26, 27, 28 Basic conditions of work None Adds provisions for drinking water, latrines and urinals, crèches, irst aid and canteens, but no speciications for ire safety , lighting and ventilation as these have been replaced by a general obligation to protect the health and safety of workers Section 30 Dismissal Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 No provisions Section 33 Maintenance of Records Minimum Wages Act, 1947 Gives state governments the power to prescribe maintenance of registers & records DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 71 Exploring the Field: Methodology, Assumptions and Limitations Labour Commissioner’s oice. Secondary inform ation was collected from sources available online such as the Econom ic Survey of Delhi 20 14-15. Wit h an object ive t o assess t h e d egr ee of efficien cy of t h e Act , a field st u d y was con d u ct ed on t h e basis of t h e followin g p r em ises: 25 owners of diferent shops and establishm en ts were in terviewed to gauge the presen t-day situation an d get an array of opin ion (Question n aire attached in Appen dix 1).The shopkeepers in terviewed were based in four areas: Chan dn i Chowk, Con n aught Place, Sadar Bazaar an d Rajouri Garden . The areas were n ot selected ran dom ly an d are therefore n ot statistically represen tative of the shops an d establishm en ts in Delhi. The aim of the ield research was to get a qualitative idea of the curren t situation in Delhi, which is why shopkeepers in the cen tral tradin g districts of Delhi were chosen. The ield study is not quantitative in n ature. 1 Awareness and the extent of enforcement of the Act with respect to i) Registration an d ren ewal of registration of sh ops an d establish m en ts un der th e Act. ii) Prom in en t display of certificate of registration in th e prem ises of th e sh op or establish m en t. iii) Main ten an ce of records an d registers as prescribed un der Section 33 of th e Act by th e occupier of sh op or establish m en t. iv) Open in g an d closin g h ours dictated by th e govern m en t. v) Com pulsory close day for certain sh ops an d establish m en ts an d. vi) In spection s of sh ops an d establish m en ts con ducted by labour in spectors appoin ted un der th e Act. 72 The lim itatio n s of this paper could include: 1 The possibility that in form ation shared by shopkeepers in person al in terviews was n ot accurate. 2 The extent to which following the provisions of the Act conine the ease of doing business for owners of shops and establishm ents in Delhi. 2 The con versation al n ature of the in terviews which did n ot follow a strict structure. Therefore, there was n ot a high degree of un iform ity in the way question s were posed in the person al in terviews. For the purpose of collecting prim ary data, in-depth personal and em ail interviews were conducted of owners of shops and establishm ents in Delhi as well as government oicials at the 3 In som e cases, sensitive questions were posed in an indirect m anner to shopkeepers. Consequently, we had to deduce the answers on the basis of responses to indirect questions. TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 Findings and Analysis registered th eir sh ops un der th e Act, on ly 2 adm itted to h ave applied for ren ewal of registration certificate. • As per Econ om ic Cen sus of 20 13, 8 .93 lakh establish m en ts were foun d to be operatin g in Delh i. Th ese exclude th e 911,697 un in corporated trade an d service sector en terprises. Th is is in con flict with th e figure obtain ed from th e Labour Com m ission er’s office in Delh i. As per th e Sen ior System An alyst at th e office, on ly 340 ,0 0 0 sh ops an d establish m en ts are registered un der th e Delh i Sh ops an d Establish m en ts Act 1954. Sin ce th e on lin e registration process in troduced in 20 0 9 lacks an y m ech an ism to attest th e in form ation provided durin g registration , th e database lacks auth en ticity an d validity. • When asked whether they would open their shops for longer hours if the governm ent no longer dictates the opening and closing hours of shops and com m ercial establishm ents, only 3 of the shop owners interviewed said that they would. Those who said they would not do so reasoned that since the entire m arket closes down at the sam e tim e, it would not be proitable for them to keep their shop open till late. • Majority of the shop owners keep their shops closed on one day of the week. All these shop owners claim ed that they take a day of because of personal reasons and not because they are bound to, by law. • 9 out of the 25 shop owners interviewed said they did not get their shops registered under the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act 1954 since it was not m andatory according to them . • Out of the 16 shop owners who said they had gotten their shops registered under the Act, only 4 said that they had displayed the registration certiicate in their shops since it was com pulsory for them to do so under the law. • Th e Act requires sh ops an d com m ercial establish m en ts to apply for ren ewal of application s every 21 years sin ce th e validity of th e registration certificate expires after th at period. H owever, alth ough 20 sh op own ers alleged th at th ey h ave been run n in g th eir sh ops for over 21 years an d 16 con firm ed th at th ey h ad • More than half of the total shop own ers m ain tain daily records an d registers as prescribed un der Section 33 of the Act. All of them do so because they feel it simpliies the process of keepin g track of their workers an d hence it is beneicial and not because it is a m ere obligation . • While the Act provides for appointm ent of one Labour Inspector in each of the nine districts of Delhi, 16 shop owners conirmed that no Labour Inspector visited their shop to conduct an inspection. Inform ation obtained from the government oicials at the Labour Commissioner’s oice revealed that inspections are conducted only when a complaint is iled by a worker. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 73 These indings lead to the following deductions: a ) La ck o f a w a re n e s s There is little to n o awaren ess about the existen ce an d provision s of the Act am on gst shop own ers in terviewed. A lot of shop own ers do n ot com ply with the provision s of the Act an d those who do, do so because it is in their best in terest. From these in terviews, it becam e clear that, for stan dalon e shops in cen tral trade districts of the city, the Delhi Shops an d Establishm en ts Act holds n o relevan ce. b) S e lf-En fo rce m e n t As poin ted out above, certain obligation s un der the Act, such as the m ain ten an ce of registers an d closin g of shops on ce a week, are observed by shop keepers as m atters of practicality an d self-in terest. Thus, there is little n eed for a law n ecessitatin g these practices. Moreover, for shops em ployin g two or three em ployees, provision s about m ain ten an ce of registers an d sim ilar regulation s were m ean in gless. c) In va lid D a ta ba s e The on ly purpose that registration of shops an d establishm en ts un der the Act served was to develop a database of the n um ber an d category of the shops an d establishm en ts operatin g in Delhi. H owever, the on lin e system of registration in troduced in 20 0 9 lacks a m echan ism to verify the in form ation provided by the occupier of shop/ establishm en t. As a result, the on lin e database fails to serve its purpose an d gives a false picture of the curren t situation in Delhi. 74 TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 LABOU R FREED OM & EMPLOYMEN T CON TRACTS: TH E SW ISS MOD EL The Global Com petitiven ess In dex m easures the set of in stitution s, policies, an d factors that set the sustain able curren t an d m edium -term levels of econ om ic prosperity (Schwab 20 16). On e of the factors on which the competitiveness index is measured is “labour market eiciency” and Switzerland has been securing irst rank in overall competitiveness as well as labour market eiciency consistently. Switzerland is also ranked among the top ive countries with highest level of economic freedom by Heritage Foun dation , which m ain tain s Econ om ic Freedom In dex (In dex of Econ om ic Freedom : Coun try Ran kin gs 20 16). Swiss labour legislations are not codiied. A distinction can be drawn between private labour law, whose provision s pertain to the em ploym en t con tract, public labour law, which im poses m in im al stan dards for worker protection , an d collective labour law. Collective agreem en ts an d stan dard con tracts play a key role. Em ploym en t con tracts are govern ed by Articles 319-362 of Code of Obligation s. Moreover, the scope an d applicability of collective agreem en ts are also laid out by the Code of Obligation s. The collective labour law is just govern ed by two provision s viz. the provision s for collective labour agreem en ts an d in dustrial disputes. No special form is required for an in dividual em ploym en t con tract. H owever, when the duration of em ploym en t relation ship is un lim ited or of m ore than on e m on th, the em ployer m ust inform in writing to the worker about speciied work conditions such as name of the parties, the date of the begin n in g of the em ploym en t relation ship, job description , salary con dition s an d weekly n um ber of work hours. All these provision s are agreed upon an d set by the parties to the con tract. On the con trary, basic legislation s regardin g protection of workers, em ploym en tworker relation ship, un em ploym en t assuran ce an d social security are set by the Con federation . Moreover, the con stitution prohibits m an oeuvres like discrim in ation on an y groun d an d paym en t of un equal wages for equal work. It also guaran tees free choice of occupation an d free access to an econ om ic activity (Peterson an d Muller 20 0 7). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 75 Conclusion and Recom m endations As discussed above, th e Model Sh ops an d Establish m en ts Act does address som e of th e weak poin ts in th e Delh i Sh ops an d Establish m en ts Act, but like m ost oth er labour reform s bein g un dertaken , it reflects an outdated an d patron isin g approach to securin g labour welfare, with th e govern m en t largely dictatin g th e con dition s of work. Curren tly, sh op or establish m en t own ers in Delh i face th ree m ajor problem s with regard to labour: i. Variation in dem an d for labour ii. Lack of skilled labour iii. Lack of flexibility in h irin g On th e oth er h an d, th e m ajor con cern of workers in sh ops an d establish m en ts is poor wages. But n eith er th e presen t Act, n or th e Model Act adequately addresses th is issue. Moreover, th e attem pt by th e Acts to dictate th e con dition s of work is m isguided an d un likely to result in a situation ben eficial to both workers an d em ployers. Term s an d con dition s of work are n ot som eth in g wh ich can , or sh ould, be im posed upon th e sh op own ers or workers. In stead, th ey sh ould be n egotiated an d agreed upon directly by th e con cern ed parties. Th e sequen ce an d system of affairs m ust be left at th e discretion of th e direct parties in volved (Epstien 1995).Th is n egotiation an d agreem en t between th e sh op own er an d th e workers would en tail a legal con tract. An d it is perh aps a better way to go about em ployerworker relation sh ips, as it gives greater auton om y to th e parties wh o are directly in volved in th e fram ework. 76 Moreover, th is would also accoun t for th e issues actually faced by sh op own ers an d th eir em ployees, such as th ose discussed above. Settin g up a n ew con tract-based system would also reduce adm in istrative costs th at h ave to be born e by th e govern m en t in order to im plem en t th ese term s on th e on e h an d an d on th e oth er, set desirable in cen tives for both th e parties (Epstien 1995). Certain ly, th e govern m en t can an d sh ould set som e custom ary rules to en sure th at parties select on ly th at sequen ce of affairs wh ich m in im ises th e likelih ood of breach of con tract by eith er party, but th at sh ould be th e lim it of govern m en t in terven tion . Th e idea of repealin g such legislation on sh ops or establish m en ts m ay soun d outrageous, but th ere are in stan ces wh ere such steps were taken . Britain is perh aps th e m ost illustrative exam ple. Un til 1950 , n in e to ten legislation s regardin g open in g or closin g of differen t types of sh ops persisted in Britain . Th ese were repealed an d replaced with th e Sh ops Act 1950 , an act sim ilar to th e Sh ops an d Establish m en ts Acts. By th e en d of 1994, th e Sh ops Act was repealed an d replaced with th e Deregulation an d Con tractin g Out Act, 1994. An application of a law of con tract would be a better altern ative th an an y Model Sh ops Act for th e sole reason th at th e en tire approach beh in d a con tractbased system is far m ore in n ovative, yet sim pler to en force. TRADE AND COMMERCE: Assessm ent of the Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act, 1954 Looking at the Bigger Picture Labour legislation can essentially be distinguished as collective labour law, individual labour law and labour standards. Individual labour law pertains to relationship between an individual em ployer and a worker. Collective labour law pertains to a group of em ployees. Labour Standards are statues regarding protection of workers and related issues. An ideal labour regim e would be so designed that it is based on individual labour law, regulated through m inim al labour standards, while providing for collective labour law in certain areas. This approach towards labour legislation would ensure a higher degree of labour freedom which is positively correlated with labour market eiciency. On the contrary, econom ies with tighter labour standards and m ore collectivist laws such as India tend to have weak labour m arkets. In dividual labour laws provide a better labour regim e because each in dividual member of society has a diferent set of n eeds, views an d objectives. The rules set by the govern m en t are based on a sin gle set based on its un derstan din g of in dividuals in a society. H owever, this sin gle set would n ever be able to satisfy each an d every in dividual that is a part of the society. In fact, it will satisfy a very sm all share of in dividuals whose set of n eeds, views an d objectives happen to coin cide with that of the “m odel in dividual” that the govern m en t assum ed for layin g out the rules which are n ow bein g im posed over in dividuals who are far diferent from each other. The status quo is so that the govern m en t can function eiciently only so far as it plays the role of a m ediator, allowin g the m em bers of society to set the rules DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 77 them selves by directly in teractin g with each other an d thereby reachin g a negotiation which satisies both ends. The problem s discussed in this paper would be addressed to a signiicant exten t if on e could alter the com position of labour legislation s from a static set of rules to a dyn am ic decision -m akin g process directly in volvin g the parties which are m ost con cern ed. The m ost rudim en tary attribute of a con tract is that it treats the parties in volved as equals, ign orin g the respective roles they play in a society. It would then n ot m atter to the law that on e en d of this con tract is em ployer an d the other is em ployee. Oppon en ts of con tract law argue that ign orin g the in heren t features of social relation ships could n ever lead to a thorough un derstan din g of how labour m arkets work, but they fail to address the fact that treatin g the parties in volved as equals would im ply that these parties act in their self-in terest, rather than leavin g the em ployee at the disposal of govern m en t to direct the em ployers action s (Epstien 1995). APPENDIX 1: Questionnaire 1 Since when have you been running the shop/ establishm ent? 2 Is the shop/ establishm ent registered under Shops and Establishm ent Act? 3 Is the Certiicate of Registration (obtained under Delhi Shops and Establishm ents Act 1954) displayed in the shop? 4 Have you applied for renewal of registration? 5 Did you get th e sh op / establish m en t r egister ed on lin e or offlin e? Did you d o it you r self? 6 What are the opening and closing hours of the shop? 78 7 If you were allowed to open earlier and stay open till late, would you do that? If not, why? 8 Do you have a close day? If yes, have you applied for an exem ption? Why do you prefer to close your shop/ com m ercial establishm ent on one day of the week? 9 Do you m aintain records to keep a track of your workers (leaves, in and out tim e etc)? 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DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 81 URBANISATION Housing for Low-Incom e Migrants and the Im pact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Parnika Barara, Razi Iqbal, Shaury a Arora EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted in 1959. Though there m ay have been justiication for such a legislation at the time of its constitution, today its provisions are m arkedly obsolete, violating Articles 14, 19(1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution due to changed circum stances (J ain 20 12). This paper seeks to address the issue of housing through an analysis of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and its im pact on the housing industry in Delhi, particularly for poorer m igrants. The study inds that there is an acute need to balance the rights of the tenants and the landlords. It argues that if rents rem ain shackled to low levels and eviction of tenants remains diicult, the desired results will not be achieved. Finally, it analyses the Draft Model Tenancy Act, 20 15 as a solution to the problem s created by the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The paper inds that the adoption of the MTA would establish a better fram ework for regulation of rent by balancing the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants, and provides for faster adjudication in resolving disputes. KEY FINDINGS 1. Every year 78,0 0 0 people m ove to Delhi in search of econom ic opportunities and to elevate their socio-econom ic status (Planning Departm ent 20 13). 2. 3 types of unplanned settlements house nearly 40% of Delhi’s population: Slum Designated Areas, J huggi J hopri Clusters and Unauthorised colonies (Heller, et al. 2015). 3. The provisions dealing with standard rent do not take into account the ever-rising consumer price index and the huge costs required for maintaining the tenanted premises. 4. The increase in rent under Section 6A is not com m ensurate with the dwindling value of rupee. There is a huge diference between the value of rupee in 1939, 1944, 1947 and 1958, etc. on one hand and its present estim ation. 5. There is also no justiication for not updating the near-frozen rents in view of the returns from alternative investments. Frozen rents and diiculty of securing eviction of tenants have resulted in illegal transactions like ‘key m oney’ and pugree. 6. Section 14 of the Act, which deals with protection of tenants from eviction, im plicitly turns a contractual contract into an obligatory one, and jeopardises the right of the landlord to act according to his own wishes with respect to his property. 7. Every year 10 ,0 0 0 fresh cases are registered under the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958, and 10 .5% of all cases pending before districts courts are a result of this Act (Garg 20 16). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 83 Sh ortage of Low-Cost H ousin g Eicient supply of housing for migrants in the city is a m atter of param ount im portance since failure in housing provision leads to illegal settlem ents which lack basic facilities like sewage system s, electricity, water supply, and waste disposal. There are seven categories of unplanned settlem ent as per the governm ent of Delhi, out of which three (Slum Designated Areas, Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters and Unauthorised colonies) house nearly half of Delhi’s population. Num ber of Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters (J J Cs) in Delhi is approxim ately 675 (Heller et al. 20 15). Developing afordable housing in Indian cities faces signiicant challenges due to econ om ic, regulatory, an d urban issues. While lack of availability of lan d, risin g costs of con struction , an d regulatory issues are supply-side con strain ts, access to housing inance on the part of low in com e groups is a m ajor dem an d-side con strain t. The above factors lead to un plan n ed housin g on the periphery of cities, like Jhuggi Jhopri Clusters an d slum s. 84 u n d er go a len gth y ap p r oval p r ocess wh ich r esu lts in escalatin g con str u ction costs. In d ia is r an ked 177 ou t of 18 3 cou n tr ies with r esp ect to d ealin g with con str u ction p er m its (Doin g Bu sin ess In d ex, Wor ld Ban k). Private developers, due to the above factors, have focused on luxury and highincom e housing, leaving the developm ent of housing for LIG (Lower -Incom e Group) and EWS (Econom ically Weaker Sections) to the governm ent. At the sam e tim e, governm ent agencies have been unable to cope with the rising dem and for housing, leading to growth of slum s and J J Cs (J ones Lang Lasalle 20 11). In urban India, 1.2 crore com pleted hom es are lying vacant while at the sam e tim e, the present urban housing shortage is at 1.88 crore units (Ministry of Finance 20 14-15). The num ber of houses vacant in Delhi is 26,759 (Sharm a 20 16). The shortage of urban land for housing has been exacerbated by poorly conceived national and local policy fram eworks. In Delhi, the developm ent of land and m arketability of land parcels becom es diicult due to overlap of jurisdictions am ong organizations such as DDA, NDMC, MCD and PWD. In vestors con trol the real estate m arket in In dia. The n ature of this activity results in to in crease in housin g dem an d owin g to in vestm en t. H owever, in crease in house own ership does n ot lead to in crease in availability. The ren tal yield (i.e. an n ual ren t dividen d by the m arket price of the hom e) curren tly varies between 2-4% (Kaul 20 15). H en ce, the return is n ot good en ough to com pen sate for the risks in volved in lettin g the house out on ren t. Regu lator y m ech an ism s also in h ibit th e gr owth of low-cost h ou sin g in Delh i. Real estate d evelop m en t h as to It h as been estim ated th at between 20 0 3 an d 20 12, th e total am oun t of black m on ey leavin g th e coun try jum ped from URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 $ 10 .1 billion to $ 94.8 billion (Kar an d Span jers 20 15), a jum p of m ore th an n in e tim es, an d th at a lot of th is black m on ey h as foun d its way in to real estate, due to th e ease of parkin g it th ere. Th is h as push ed up real estate prices. About th e Study Pr ovision of low-cost h ou sin g for EWS h as been on e of th e biggest bottlen ecks to su stain able u r ban isation in Delh i. Th e cu r r en t h ou sin g d eficit in In d ia is 22 m illion u n its, 95% of wh ich is in th e EWS section (PTI 20 15). Th e p olicy focu s so far h as been to im p r ove th e livin g con d ition s of th ose in u n p lan n ed h ou sin g, r ath er th an a for war d -lookin g ap p r oach wh ich tackles th e r oot of th e p r oblem . Wh ile p r ovision in g of basic ser vices to J J Cs an d slu m s is an im p or tan t m an d ate of DDA an d DUSIB, it is im p er ative to look at th e lacu n ae in r egu lation s an d wor kin g of th e r eal estate sector for a h olistic ap p r oach towar d s th e solu tion . Source: CREDAI-Jones Lang LaSalle Real Estate Transperency Survey 20 11 Note: The stages - Pre-construction approvals from state-level bodies and central bodies can happen sim ultaneously DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 85 Delh i Ren t Con trol Act (DRC), 1958 The Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 seeks to “provide for the control of rents and evictions”. The DRCA has been am ended six tim es since its inception, m ost recently in 1988. Due to the archaic nature of the law, which gave m ore than proportionate rights to tenants and was deem ed to be out of sync with the needs of a healthy housing m arket in the city, the Delhi Rent Act 1995 was passed. The proposed Act obtained the assent of the President but could not be notiied due to opposition from various stakeholders viz. tenants. Subsequently, it was decided that the Act would be brought into force after certain am endm ents. The Delhi Rent (Am endm ent) Bill, 1997 was introduced in Parliam ent but could not be passed because of the dissolution of the 11th Lok Sabha. In March 20 12, in a m eeting between the Governm ent of the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the Union Ministry of Urban Developm ent, it was decided that a new Bill was to be drafted and placed in the public dom ain for discussions. The Delhi Rent Act, 1995 was to be repealed through the Delhi Rent (Repeal) Bill, 20 13. The Delhi Rent (Repeal) Bill, 20 13 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha on 29 August 20 13 by the Minister of Urban Developm ent, Mr. Kam al Nath (PRS Legislative Research 20 13). The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, with am endm ents, is thus still in force. 86 The Act was supposed to serve two m ain purposes: 1 To protect the tenant from eviction from the house where he is living except for deined reasons and on deined conditions; and 2 To protect him from having to pay m ore than a fair/ standard rent. The Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 is, thus, skewed towards tenant protection, and is an archaic law aim ed at controlling rents in the capital. It tries to protect tenants from eviction and from having to pay m ore than a fair/ standard rent am ount. In 20 15, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation tabled the Model Tenancy Act in Parliam ent. The Model Tenancy Act proposes to establish a fram ework for the regulation of tenancy m atters (residential and com m ercial) and to balance the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants, including a provision of fast adjudication process for resolution of disputes. It is envisaged as a Model Act to be adopted by state legislatures across the country. Aligning their rent control laws with the Centre’s Model Act is one of the m andatory provisions for states under the ‘Housing for All’ schem e. URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 H ISTORY OF REN T CON TROL LEGISLATION IN IN D IA Bombay’s Rent Control Act 1918 was passed Calcutta and Rangoon passed their rent controls in 1920 Outbreak of the Second World War led to Defence of India Rules, 1939 Provisions of Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1941 were implemented in1942 Defence of India Rules, 1944 supplemented the previous Act The Delhi and Ajmer-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947 Parliament passed Delhi Rent Control Act, 31 December 1958 This was enacted on 9 February 1959 1988 Amendment in DRC Act, 1958 adding Section 6A which allows 10% increase in standard rent every three years DRC (Amendment) Bill 1997 was introduced in the Parliament but was NOT passed Repeal to the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 was introduced in 2013 Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation tabled the Model Tenancy Act in the Parliament DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 87 Fixin g Stan dard Ren ts for Residen tial Prem ises Section 6(1)(A) deals with th e fixin g of stan dard ren ts for residen tial prem ises. It creates a distin ction between residen tial properties: th ose let out before 2 J un e 1944 an d th ose ren ted out after. For th e form er, th e stan dard ren t is fixed at th e value of th e basic ren t for properties wh ose basic ren t was less th an ₹60 0 . If ren t was greater th an ₹60 0 , th en stan dard ren t is basic ren t plus 10 % of basic ren t. For properties let out after 2 J une 1944, there is another sub-distinction m ade: those whose rent had been ixed under the Delhi and Ajm er-Merwara Rent Control Act, 1947, or the Delhi and Ajm er Rent Control Act, 1952; and those properties which were not. For th e on es un der th e Acts of 1947 an d 1952, th e stan dard ren t is th e ren t as fixed un der th ose Acts if th e ren t was less th an ₹1,20 0 . For ren t above ₹1,20 0 , th e stan dard ren t will be th e base value plus 10 % of such ren t. If th e property does n ot com e un der eith er of th e two Acts, th en stan dard ren t will be 7.5% of ‘reason able cost of con struction ’ plus m arket price of th e lan d, but if such calculation results in to stan dard ren t of m ore th an ₹1,20 0 , th e stan dard ren t will be 8 .25% of th e sam e. The Act m akes further sub-divisions in Section 6(2). For prem ises constructed on or after 2 J une 1951 but before 9th J une, 1955, annual rent for the m onth of March, 1958; or if property was not let out at that Standard Rent for Residential Premises Let out before 2 June 1944 Basic Rent greater than ₹600 Let out on/after 2 June 1944 Basic Rent below ₹600 Under DAMCRA, 1947 or DARCA, 1952 Rent under Act greater than ₹1,200 88 Otherwise Rent under Act less than ₹1,200 URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 point of tim e, rent when the prem ises was last let out shall be the standard rent for seven years from the date of com pletion of such prem ises. For pr em ises con str ucted after 9 J u n e 1955, r en t agr eed upon between lan dlor d an d ten an t wh en th e pr em ises was fir st let out sh all be th e stan dar d r en t for five year s. Lawful In crease in Stan dard Ren t Section 7 of th e Act per m its in cr ease in r en t on ly in th e even t of th e lan dlor d in cur r in g an y expen ditur e on im pr ovem en t, addition or str uctur al alter ation in th e pr em ises an d th at too with th e appr oval of th e Ren t Con tr oller . Th e lawfu l in cr ease can n ot exceed m or e th an 10 % of such cost, a figur e r aised fr om 7.5% in 198 8 . By far th e m ost con ten tious part of th is Act is Section 6A, an am en dm en t (Act 57 of th e parliam en t) wh ich took effect in 198 8 . It states: “Notwith stan din g an yth in g con tain ed in th is Act, th e stan dard ren t, or, wh ere n o stan dard ren t is fixed un der th e provision s of th is Act in respect of an y prem ises, th e ren t agreed upon between th e lan dlord an d th e ten an t, m ay be in creased by ten per cen t. Every th ree years.” Th e oth er m ajor facet of th is am en dm en t was th at th e prem ises for wh ich th e m on th ly ren t exceeded ₹3,50 0 were taken out of th e purview of th e Act. Procedure to Increase the Rent Accordin g to th e Act, an y in crease in stan dard ren t as per Section 7 h as to be don e th rough an application to th e Ren t Con troller, before wh ich h e can n ot in crease th e ren t. Section 9 lays down th e exact procedure for th e sam e. On an application m ade to h im by eith er th e lan dlord or th e ten an t, th e Ren t Con troller sh all fix th e stan dard ren t in accordan ce with th e provision s m en tion ed un der Section 6. H owever, if for an y reason , it is n ot possible to determ in e th e stan dard ren t of an y prem ises on th e prin ciples set forth un der Section 6, th e Con troller m ay fix such ren t as would be reason able h avin g regard to th e situation , locality an d con dition of th e prem ises. H e sh all also look in to th e am en ities provided th erein an d wh ere th ere are Sim ilar, or n early sim ilar prem ises in th e locality, h avin g regard also to th e stan dard ren t payable in respect of such prem ises. Charging Rent in Excess of Standard Rent Section 4 disentitles the landlord from claim ing any rent in excess of standard rent of the premises as deined and to be ixed under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act. Provisions Regarding Control of Eviction of Tenants Section 14 prohibits landlords from recovering possession from the tenant DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 89 save on the grounds m entioned therein and after satisfying the Rent Controller. The grounds for eviction are narrow and include the following (not the exhaustive list): 1 Rent has not been paid since two m onths of serving a notice for nonpaym ent of rent. At the sam e tim e, Section 15(1) says that the Controller shall hear both the parties and then order the tenant to pay the rent upto the preceding m onth of the order. Only when the tenant defaults on the paym ent of rent for three consecutive m onths again can the eviction under 14(1) (a) actually take place. 2 The ten an t has been usin g the prem ises for purpose other than for what they were let. H owever, Section 14(5) says that the lan dlord has to give a n otice in the prescribed form at to stop such m isuse an d eviction is possible if the ten an t fails to com ply within on e m on th of n otice. No order of eviction will be m ade un less the Controller is satisied that such misuse leads to public n uisan ce, or dam age is actually don e an d is detrim en tal to the lan dlord’s in terests. 3 Th e prem ises are required bon a fide by lan dlord for addition s or alteration s wh ich can n ot be don e with out th e prem ises bein g vacated. Th e con dition attach ed to th is clause, as described by 14(8 ) of th e Act, is th at eviction will n ot h appen un less th e Con troller is satisfied th at th e proposed recon struction will n ot 90 radically alter th e purpose for wh ich th e prem ises were let, or th at such radical alteration is in th e public in terest, an d th at th e plan s an d estim ates of such recon struction h ave been properly prepared an d n ecessary fun ds for th e sam e are available with th e lan dlord. 4 The m ost con troversial section of this Act is the Section 14(1)(e). Eviction can on ly be don e if the lan dlord n eeds the residen ce for him self or an y other m em bers of the fam ily who are depen den t on him , but this can be don e on ly if the lan dlord or such person has n o other ‘reason ably suitable’ residen tial accom m odation . Addition ally, the lan dlord is n ot en titled to obtain possession before the expiration of a period of six m on ths from the date of the order of eviction . Case Studies In February, a ben ch com prisin g of J ustices B D Ah m ed an d San jeev Sach deva sough t a list of properties un der ren t con trol in th e city an d it was observed th at m ost of th ese properties were located in th e prim e areas of th e city. Alm ost every colon y in Delh i h as h ouses fetch in g ren ts lower th an ₹3,50 0 even wh en m arket ren ts h over above 15-20 th ousan d (Garg 20 16). Th e issue is n ot specific to a particular area, an d h en ce case studies of varyin g circum stan ces are able to provide valuable in sigh ts. URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Case Study 1 A district court advocate, Mr. Kapil Kumar (name changed), is currently representing various landlords in the court cases iled under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. One of his clients, Mr. Atul Marwaah (name changed) is a freehold owner of a threestorey residential building spread over 20 0 sq. yards in Kamla Nagar area of North Delhi (Category D, Civil Lines Zone). The building was constructed in 1967 by his father, Manohar Lal (name withheld). Four years after the building was constructed i.e. in 1971, the irst and second loors were rented out to a business class family who migrated to Delhi in the same year. An informal written agreement was laid between the tenant and the landlord that speciied all the negotiations and terms and conditions, such as standard rent and their parts of liabilities. The m on thly ren ts of ₹20 0 an d ₹140 for irst and second loor respectively were decided as stan dard ren ts. But n o ten an cy period was speciied before the property was let out. Despite several requests in the con secutive years, there was n o in crease in stan dard ren t. This con tin ued till 198 8 , when 10 % in crease every three years was m an dated by an am en dm en t in Section 6 of the DRC Act, 1958 . By the year 1997, the stan dard ren t for the sam e property had becom e ₹28 0 an d ₹200 for each loor respectively, a mere 40 % in crease in 26 years. In order to get better return s from the property, Mr. Atul asked the ten an ts to vacate both the apartm en ts on the refusal of which Mr. Atul iled a legal suit. Since lim its on rent increase had kept the rent below the ₹3,50 0 m ark, the Act continued to govern the property. Other than im posing restrictions on increase and correction of rent, the Act through Section 14 also controlled eviction of the tenants. Mr. Atul is now stuck in a cycle of low rents due to the Rent Control Act. He has requested eviction of the tenants under Section 14(1)(e) putting forward his need of the property as a bona ide need. A large amount of money and time has gone into ighting the case but even today the case remains pending in front of the district court. According to Mr. Atul, about ₹3 lakhs has been spent on the court case. Moreover, a stay has been put on the property which inhibits the landlord from selling it further. Th e m ain ten an ce cost of th e property turn s out to be as h igh as 8 -10 th ousan d per year. Th is cost in cludes expen diture on plum bin g, pest con trol, m ain ten an ce of com m on areas such as staircase, ven tilation sh aft etc. Due to low ren ts, th e lan dlord, Mr. Atul, is h igh ly reluctan t to in cur th ese costs. As a result, th e quality of h ousin g as well as th e property h as deteriorated sh arply. After four decades, the rent igure has reached ₹856 and ₹482 respectively for the irst and second loor, a mere fourfold increase; whereas the land prices in sam e area have increased m ultiple-fold leading to sim ilar m ultiple-fold increase in m arket level of rents. Surprisingly, the third-storey of the sam e building was let out in 20 0 8 and is fetching rent m ore than ₹22,0 0 0 per m onth. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 91 Mr. Atul could not (a) derive rent equal to m arket rates; (b) evict his tenants; (c) conduct essential upkeep and m aintenance; and, m ost dam agingly, (d) sell his property. The Act in this case prevents the m atching of standard rents of the properties (specially those which were let out decades ago) with the present-day m arket rents. Case Study 2 Another case dem onstrates how tenants have gathered undue legal strength from the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and how they try to m isuse it. Mr. Rajeev, aged 79, (n am e with h eld) is located in Pun jabi Bagh Colon y of West Delh i, an d own s (freeh old) a fourstorey residen tial property in th e sam e area. Th e buildin g, wh ich is spread over 28 0 sq yards, h ouses Rajeev’s own fam ily, an d on ly th e upper-m ost storey is occupied by ten an ts. Th e th ird floor was ren ted out in 1994 with a written agreem en t specifyin g th e stan dard ren t as ₹1,60 0 subjected to 10 % in crease every th ree years. Th e property fell un der th e purview of th e DRC Act 1958 . Th e ren t was in creased to ₹2,0 0 0 by th e year 1999, wh en th e ten an ts felt a n eed of an extra room on th eir floor an d requested Mr. Rajeev to get it con structed in th e open area. After the room was constructed, the standard rent through negotiation and joint consent was set at ₹4,0 0 0 . The tenants soon becam e irregular in paying 92 their m onthly rents. The rent was further increased to ₹4,40 0 in 20 0 3 and ₹4,90 0 in 20 0 6. By 20 0 8, the arrears went up to ₹136,0 0 0 . The tenants also stopped paying their water bills, the burden of which was borne by the landlords due to a shared water connection. Several notices were sent requesting the tenants to vacate the property, to no efect. Ultimately, Mr. Rajeev had to ile a legal suit in 2009. Although the Act does not govern property with rent over ₹3,500, the legal agreement was not renewed in 1999 and still contained the standard rent igure as ₹2,000. The tenant has denied in court of law that the standard rent he is paying is over ₹3,500. In th e last eigh t years, th ere h ave been n o proceedin gs in th e lawsuit. With th e grace of Section 14 (Con trol of Eviction of Ten an ts) of th e Act, th e ten an ts are still en joyin g a m arket ren t free sh elter in on e of th e prim e colon ies in Delh i. Th e lan dlord can n eith er sell n or ren ovate th e property un til th e court case settles. Nor h as h e been receivin g an y fair ren t for h is property for over a decade. Market ren t in East Pun jabi Bagh for th ird storey 28 0 sq. yards floor is approxim ately ₹20 ,0 0 0 . Moreover, th e cum ulative expen diture in curred again st th e court activities in last 8 years stan d at ₹2.5-3 lakh s. The pro-tenant stance of the Act has excessively em powered tenants and m ade renting activities an unattractive afair for landlords. Behaviour of the tenant in this exam ple exhibits their awareness of the bias in the Act. URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Case Study 3 A nuclear fam ily, with two children, is the tenant of a 2BHK lat in the Rajouri Garden area of West Delhi. They had changed four hom es in the last nine years. Mr. Rajender Kathuria, the head of the family, told us: “We can’t aford to buy a house in Delhi, and neither can we m ove to the outskirts due to the location of m y business, m y wife’s job and m y children’s schooling. Renting a house is the last resort we have. But the landlords in Delhi are highly sceptical while renting out their properties. None in last 10 years have agreed upon a tenancy period of m ore than 2 years. This throws enough light on the m indset of landlords in Delhi. Due to tenant-friendly laws, they fear encroachm ent of their properties. And this fear has further troubled genuine tenants.” He explained various costs involved in shifting the residence every two years. Various other formalities such as change of address in Aadhaar card, Voter ID card, electricity and water connections, phone bills, couriers etc. becomes a tedious process, and demands signiicant investment in terms of time, energy and money. It is interesting to note that the same family has lived in two diferent houses for a period of more than ten years in each house, in the same locality before 1999. The scepticism in landlords emerged only in late 90 s when the cases regarding encroachment of properties by the tenants under DRCA took a sharp upward trend, demonstrating that “tenant-friendly rental laws” are not the solution but the cause of the current unavailability of rental housing. Direct im plications of the DRC Act Freezing Housing Stock With thousands of houses in the city coming under the purview of this Act, tenancy to landlords has become largely a philanthropic activity. About 50% of properties under rent control fetch a monthly rent less than even the daily minimum wage of an unskilled worker pegged at ₹353 per day (Garg 2016). This inhibits the housing stock to be utilized to its potential. Even though properties whose rent is greater than ₹3,500 fall outside the domain of this Act, the law of conformity in prices, and experience of landlords in the past are disincentives for investments in rental housing. Also, the fear of losing perpetual control of their houses leads homeowners to withdraw their vacant premises from the rental market leading to reduced supply. Growth of low-cost housing has been hit due to freezing of rents under the Act, while contributing to the growth of slums in the capital. Deterioration of Quality of Properties The low rate of return from ten an cy which com es un der the law also leads to rapid deterioration of existin g housin g stock, as lan dlords have n o in cen tive to in vest an y fun ds in the upkeep of their apartm en ts. This is detrim en tal to the lon g-term in terests of the lan dlord, ten an t an d the housin g m arket. The situation is m ore severe in case of old DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 93 ECON OMICS OF REN T CON TROL Shortage of housin g due to ren t con trol: In the short run , the n um ber of apartments in a city is ixed and cannot be adjusted to changes in market con dition s. The dem an d rem ain s un respon sive to prices in the short run , as it requires tim e to adjust housin g arran gem en ts. As a result, ren t con trol creates shortages in the m arket. In the lon g run , both the n um ber of apartm en ts an d the dem an d for housin g can be adjusted to m arket con dition s which results in respon sive dem an d an d supply. Ren t con trol, in such a scenario, creates signiicantly higher shortage of housing available for ren t. D e te rio ratio n o f H o u s in g Qu ality: Now, in presence of shortage of housing available for rent (or excess dem and) and low rents, the landlords lose all the incentives to m aintain their properties. Therefore, the overall quality of housing in a city deteriorates sharply. This is in contrast to free m arkets where landlords try to keep their apartm ents clean and safe, as desirable apartm ents com m and higher prices. Som e econom ists, therefore, call rent control the best way to destroy a city, after bom bing. 94 URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ten an cies where the ren ts have been frozen at low levels. It is in case of these old properties that the n eed for m ain ten an ce is higher. The older housin g stock in our urban areas thus faces prem ature decay an d degradation . Reduced Liquidity of Housing Supply Properties com in g un der this Act are usually on es which were let out a lon g tim e ago. Sin ce the ten an ts are payin g m uch below the m arket value of their properties as ren t, they have n o in cen tive to vacate the prem ises. Prospective buyers are un likely to purchase a property which is occupied in this m an n er. This reduces the n um ber of houses available for sale in the m arket, thus decreasin g its liquidity. As a result, the property prices rise, an d the risk that property bubbles m ight em erge in creases. This is detrim en tal to the local econ om y of NCR itself. Decline in Municipal Revenues Local revenues such as property and house taxes take a hit due to DRCA, which are calculated on the basic rent of a premise. Apart from that, income tax collection is also afected, since if landowners were receiving higher rents, the taxes accrued will also rise. Distortion of the Market As with an y other price con trol, ren t con trols also distort in cen tives an d price signals, leading to ineicient allocation of resources (lan d an d buildin g). This is because in presen ce of ren t con trols, houses do n ot always get allocated to those who are willin g to pay the highest ren t. In light of spatial growth of illegal housin g in suburban Delhi, this is on e of the m ajor im plication s of the Act on urban isation . Low Selling Price of Properties Mostly, the properties that fall under dispute between the landlord and the tenant fetch low prices for its land and building. Sale of such properties becomes a tedious process and often involves arbitrage and involvement of criminal activity. Indirect Im plications of the DRC Act Artiicial Shortage of Housing There is a huge m ism atch between dem and and supply in the urban housing sector. Around 1.2 crore com pleted houses are lying vacant across urban India. At present, urban housing shortage is 1.88 crore units (Kaul 20 15). However, 95.6 percent of housing shortage is for the economically weaker sections (EWS) and low income group (LIG) segments (Kaul 2015). Houses presently being built mostly cater to Middle Income Group (MIG) or High Income Group (HIG). Currently, an average price of a house in Delhi is ₹7.4 million (Kaul 2015). A person who belongs to a low-income group or DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 95 OVERCOMIN G REN T CON TROLS IN TH E PH ILIPPIN ES Rent-setting in Philippines has been prim arily dictated by m arket forces. There are no existing controls placed. Landlords consider the existing rental rates in the area for a sim ilar structure and adjust rates based on facilities and afordability of lease. The law initially im posed a freeze on rents for low-cost rental housing. In the 1980 s, the law allowed increases in rent but placed a cap on the m axim um increase. The m axim um increase has been variable over the last two decades from 20 % annual increase to 15% and currently to 10 %. There was, however, a growing sentiment in government that the rent control law may not be relevant in the present day and age. Rent control was envisaged as an efective means to control the rise in rent and protect lower income groups from exploitation by “rich” landlords. This rationale, however, is now one of the myths in the rental housing market. To start with, rent level is set by the market and as such this can only be efectively lowered through the supply-side. This meant encouraging more and better supply of low-cost rental dwellings. When applied to the form al m arket, rent control m ay only be relevant in cases when quality of rental dwellings becom es a threat to people’s lives. In this case, the law has to be applied selectively (for exam ple to rental dwellings 20 years old or higher) and based on building structure rather than rent levels (Ballesteros 20 0 4). 96 economically weaker section cannot aford to “buy” a house in Delhi. As a result, the mismatch between supply of housing units and its demand comes into the picture. Now, th is m ism atch can be elim in ated by ren tin g activities. If a low-in com e or econ om ically weaker person can n ot “buy” a h ouse, s/ h e can always ch oose to en joy proper an d efficien t h ousin g by payin g “m on th ly ren ts”. H owever, in vestors are m ore com fortable keepin g th e h om es em pty, an d th us, th e h ouses are n ever placed in th e ren tal m arket. Th is was th e com m on respon se given by 10 out of 12 in vestors approach ed, wh o stated th at th e risk in volved in ren tin g out a property is too h igh due to ten an t-frien dly ren tal laws an d restriction s on ren t in crease an d eviction . The rental yield (i.e. annual rent divided by the m arket price of the hom e) stands very low at 2-4% (Kaul 20 15). As a result, rental incom es don’t seem attractive to landlords even when their properties com e out of the am bit of DRC Act 1958. Artiicial shortage of housing poses a further concern. Due to locking up of vacant houses, the supply of the sam e in the m arket declines sharply. This leads to ballooning of rents of the rem aining available houses in the rental m arket. URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 Overburdened J udiciary The Act has not only afected the landlords who are stuck under it by historical accident, but has also overburdened the judiciary. Every year 10 ,0 0 0 fresh cases are registered under this Act, and 10 .5% of all cases pending before districts courts are a result of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Garg 20 16). These cases usually take longer than other cases because the m oral judgm ent that the judiciary wishes to deliver is at odds with the legislation. Draft Model Ten an cy Act, 20 15 The Draft Model Tenancy Act is intended to be a consideration for States/ UTs in order to m ake laws that would be locally suitable. It has been initiated to establish a fram ework for regulation of rent and to balance the rights and responsibilities of landlords and tenants in order to provide faster adjudication for resolving disputes. Through an analysis of the Draft Model Tenancy Act, 20 15, a recom m endation and a solution is put forth to counter the current shortcom ings of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Tenancy Agreem ent a) The Act m akes the process of tenancy transparent by docum enting each step of the procedure and validating it with a legal provision. For an individual to reside in a rental accom m odation, an agreem ent needs to be established between the two parties and the tenancy is to be registered with local Rent Authority. The authority thus, would provide them with a registration num ber that would be uploaded to their local website within 15 days. This agreem ent and its provisions act as valid evidence during legal proceedings as they specify the tenure of tenancy, rent and other relevant details. b) The tenant m ay approach the landlord for renewal or extension of the tenancy, within the period agreed to in the agreem ent or prior to the end of tenancy period and if agreeable to the landlord, m ay enter into a new tenancy agreem ent with the landlord. c) If a tenancy for a ixed term ends and has not been renewed or the prem ises have not been vacated by the tenant, it shall be deem ed, to be renewed on a m onth-to-m onth basis on the sam e term s and conditions as were in the expired tenancy agreem ent, for a m axim um period of six m onths. This provides the landlord with the autonom y of renewing and thus deciding the tenure of residency post term ination of the agreem ent (Model Tenancy Act, 20 15). Increase in Rent a) In order to increase the rent, the landlord is necessitated by the law to provide a notice of increase in rent (under Subsection 2 of Section 9) 3 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 97 m onths prior to the due date of the rent. In response, if the tenant fails to provide a notice for the term ination of his tenancy he is deem ed to have accepted the increm ent. b) In case of alteration of property or addition al con struction by th e lan dlord for im provin g th e h abitable area (oth er th an th ose m en tion ed in Section 15), th e in creased cost n eeds to be agreed upon between th e lan dlords an d ten an t before th e con struction an d it sh all be effectively added to th e ren t from th e m on th after th e com pletion of work. c) Com m on respon sibilities to be sh ared or areas to be utilised by both th e parties sh all be pen n ed down in th e agreem en t an d th e degree of m ain ten an ce by each , specified. If th e ten an t refuses to con duct n ecessary repairs, th e lan dlord can do th e sam e an d m ake addition s to th e ren t. If after con struction th e place is un in h abitable an d n ot in proper con dition , th e ten an t h as th e auth ority to give a 15 day n otice an d vacate th e property (i.e. if th e ten an t h as requested via a written n otice to get repairs don e). d) The Lan dlord is en titled to double the ren t if the ten ure of residen cy has been term in ated by order or agreem en t. This m ain tain s the regulatory an d bin din g n ature of the con tract between the two parties, en surin g tim ely paym en t of ren t an d evacuation (Model Ten an cy Act, 20 15). 98 Grounds for Eviction due to Failure of Paying Rent a) Evacuation or repossession of the property by the landlord can only occur if the landlord and the tenant have breached the term s and conditions of the tenancy agreem ent. b) In case the ten an t fails to pay ren t for two m on ths, the lan dlord is en titled to issue a n otice for evacuation of property. If the ten an t pays the ren t for two m on ths plus the arrears an d other penalties as speciied under the ren t agreem en t within on e m on th of the n otice, n o such eviction shall happen . This relief shall n ot be gran ted again , if the ten an t fails to pay ren t con secutively for two m on ths in an y on e year subsequen t to bein g provided with such relief on ce. H e shall be subjected to evacuation within a m on th’s n otice. Other Grounds for Eviction In case the lan dlord wan ts the property evacuated for a bona ide purpose, such as a family member not being able to ind residen ce in an y other urban area, a due n otice has to be issued referrin g Section 21 Subsection (g), on e m on th prior to the expected date of eviction . Though, if this section is in voked, the lan dlord is n ot allowed to re-let the property for a period of 3 years an d if he does so, the ren t authority/ tribun al shall levy a high pen alty. This is to circum ven t un scrupulous lan dlords from ran dom ly URBANISATION Housing for low-income migrants and the impact of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 evictin g ten an ts, but sim ultan eously provides leverage to the lan dlord to use her property as she wishes. In case of the category of special landlords, the property can be vacated im m ediately after the passing of the eviction order. (As speciied in Schedule 3 of the MTA’15 which provides relief to persons with disabilities, widows, single wom en, senior citizen, retired arm ed force, air force and navy personnel). Establishm ent of Rent Tribunals and Their Authority The Ren t Tribun al shall be a m ultim em ber Tribun al headed by a Prin cipal Appellate Mem ber an d the sen iorm ost judges shall fun ction as Prin cipal Appellate Mem ber. H e shall have the power to tran sfer appeal cases from on e m em ber of the Appellate Tribun al to an other m em ber when ever deem ed n ecessary. Sim ilarly, the Prin cipal Appellate Tribun al m ay on an application or suo m otu tran sfer a suit from on e Ren t Court to an other Ren t Court, an d all the m em bers of Ren t Tribun al shall be appoin ted by the Cen tral/ State/ UT Govern m en t in con sultation with the H igh Court. Establishm en t of such Tribun als would reduce the burden that lies upon the judiciary to look in to issues arisin g out of ren t laws an d would lead to the creation of an arbitrary body focused on this agen da. The localised Ren tal Authorities would play a role in m akin g the process of ren tal activity tran sparen t, by registerin g an d providin g the in form ation on their respective websites (Model Ten an cy Act, 20 15). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 99 Bibliography Alliance Association Ltd. vs M/ S. Sagw am al Kishan Lal. 257/ 20 12 (Delhi High Court, J uly 4, 20 12). Basu, Indrani. “For 1,0 0 0 people, just half a bus in Delhi.” The Tim es of India. J uly 26, 20 12. http:/ / tim esoindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/For-1000-people-just-half-a-bus-in-Delhi/articleshow/15154517.cms (accessed J uly 12, 20 16). Kaul, Vivek. “Why are m ore than 10 m illion hom es vacant in India?” BBC New s. 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J uly 2, 20 16. http:/ / www.econom ist.com / news/ leaders/ 2170 1491-growing-cities-africa-and-asia-are-bound-spread-out-they-do-not-have-do-it-so (accessed J uly 12, 20 16). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 101 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop System s for Delhi Households Archit Jain, Soum y a Joshi, Pragy a Jat EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At the Conference of Parties (COP) 21 sum m it, India com m itted to producing 10 0 Giga Watts (GW) of solar energy by 20 22 (Ananthakrishnan 20 16), out of which 40 GW are to be generated through grid connected solar rooftop system s (Meza 20 16). The Delhi governm ent has pledged to generate 1 GW of solar power and recently passed the Delhi Solar Policy 20 16. This paper exam ines the econom ic viability of residential solar rooftop system s in Delhi for consum ers from varying power consum ption levels. The study inds that adoption of rooftop solar systems will prove cost beneicial for households, while addressing structural problem s such as ballooning peak dem and and pollution. KEY FINDINGS 1. A 1 Kilo Watt (kW) solar system generates 4 units of power in a day; therefore, households that consum e 40 0 , 60 0 and 1,20 0 units a m onth require solar system s of capacities 3 kW, 5 kW and 10 kW respectively. The total cost of purchasing and installing solar system s, inclusive of net m etering charges, is ₹257,740 for a 3 kW system , ₹40 1,380 for a 5 kW system and ₹791,980 for a 10 kW system . 2. The per unit cost of solar power will am ount to ₹2.98, ₹2.79 and ₹2.75 respectively for households consum ing 40 0 , 60 0 and 1,20 0 units of power per m onth. These households currently pay an average of ₹4.98, ₹5.75 and ₹6.79 respectively. Households that consum e 40 0 , 60 0 and 1,20 0 units a m onth will start generating positive returns on their solar investm ent after 12, 11 and 9 years respectively. 3. The largest con sum ers of power (havin g a m on thly con sum ption of 1,20 0 un its in the study) experience economies of scale and hence derive the maximum beneit from the in vestm en t: they break even the earliest an d also gen erate the highest Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return. The beneits decrease with the con sum ption level, though the adoption of solar en ergy is econ om ically viable for all household categories con sidered. 4. The inancing method adopted by a household to purchase the solar equipment (whether it chooses to on ly use up its own savin gs or take a loan for 60 % of the expen diture) has n o im pact on the payback period or the levelled cost of electricity an d has a m in im al im pact on the n et presen t value an d in tern al rate of return . This is en couragin g n ews for m iddle-in com e households, who can expect to gen erate suicient reward even in the absence of adequate personal savings to inance the in itial expen diture. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 103 Introduction The power sector in Delhi comprises of organisations performing 3 distinct functions: POWER SECTOR IN DELHI Delhi Power Company (DPC) REGULATION FACILITATION PROVISION Generation of Electricity Transmission of Electricity Pragati PCL Indraprastha Power Generation Company Limited (IPGCL) Delhi Transco Limited (DTL) Distribution of Electricity Central Electricity Authority Power Department, Government of Delhi Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB) New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) Tata Power Delhi Distribution Limited (TPDDL)* BSES Yamuna Power Limited (BYPL)* BSES Rajdhani Power Limited (BRPL)* * 49% equity held by Delhi Government 104 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) Investm ent in the energy sector by the Govternm ent of Delhi is only for augm entation of transm ission, transform ation capacity, and power generation. When the Aam Aadm i Party (AAP) assumed oice in 2015, it laid out a ive-point action plan for reviving the power sector in Delhi. The Delhi Governm ent allotted ₹1,60 0 crore as electricity subsidy in 20 15 to com pensate 50 % of the electricity bill of consum ers using up to 400 units of power, fulilling its prom ise of reducing electricity bills by half. It has taken, at best, sm all steps in the other four areas as appraised below: • In 20 14, the Delhi Govern m en t ordered an audit of the three DISCOMs by CAG amidst allegations that they had inlated expen ses in their books to force the DERC to raise tarifs. The DISCOMs objected to this m ove, claim in g that bein g private com pan ies an d n ot PSUs, they were beyon d the jurisdiction of the CAG. The Suprem e Court called the DISCOMs’ argum en t in to question durin g a J an uary 20 16 hearin g an d adjourn ed the m atter un til March 20 16. • Curren tly, Delh i produces less th an 2,0 0 0 MW of power wh ile peak dem an d in th e city reach es 6,50 0 MW durin g th e sum m er. To m ake th e city self-sufficien t in power gen eration , th e AAP-led govern m en t plan s to establish a coal-based power plan t in an oth er state. For th is, th e govern m en t h opes to partn er with a private firm th rough a biddin g process, but it will m aterialise on ly in four to five years. • As th e power sector of Delh i stan ds today, th ere is zero com petition am on gst th e th ree distribution utilities. In stead of allowin g th em to com pete for custom ers, distin ct zon es of operation h ave been earm arked for th em —BSES Rajdh an i Power Lim ited (BRPL) supplies power to Cen tral, South an d West Delh i, BSES Yam un a Power Lim ited (BYPL) to East Delh i an d Tata Power Delh i Distribution Lim ited (TPDDL) to North an d North west Delh i. Th is is in sh arp con trast with th e power distribution m odel in oth er m etropolitan cities of th e coun try, such as Mum bai, wh ere custom ers can ch oose th eir distribution com pan y—Tata Power or Relian ce In fra. Th is fosters com petition between th ese two firm s an d drives th em to provide value-added services to th eir custom ers, such as an on lin e ch at service an d acquisition cam ps. • In J un e 20 16, the AAP cam e out with an am bitious policy an n oun cin g in cen tives an d tax breaks to prom ote solar power an d m akin g it m an datory for govern m en t in stitution s to in stall rooftop solar pan els (Govern m en t of Delhi NCT, Delhi Solar Policy 20 16). The m otive is to gen erate 1,0 0 0 MW power within the city by 20 20 . Am on gst other action s, the govern m en t is: (a) takin g up with Mun icipal Corporation s of Delhi (MCDs) an d New Delhi Mun icipal Coun cil (NDMC) to exem pt the curren t 5% electricity tax on solar power; (b) willing to exempt oicial certiication of solar systems up to 20 0 KW; (c) discardin g wheelin g, ban kin g an d tran sm ission charges for solar en ergy. Moreover, to en courage solar plan ts on rooftops of buildin gs that can n ot con sum e all of the en ergy DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 105 gen erated locally, the DISCOMs will facilitate group n et m eterin g whereby surplus en ergy exported to the grid can be adjusted in an y other electricity service con n ection of the con sum er. A crucial determ in an t of the success of this policy is the willin gn ess of households to in stall solar pan els on their rooftops. In addition to th ese four issues iden tified by th e AAP in its m an ifesto, an oth er question regardin g Delh i’s power sector is wh eth er th e city sh ould join th e UDAY (Ujjwal DISCOM Assuran ce Yojan a) sch em e en acted by th e Cen tral Govern m en t in Novem ber 20 15, a fin an cial restructurin g package for loss-m akin g distribution utilities Key Statistics pertaining to the Power Sector in Delhi Categories State government expenditure on electricity Figures (2014-15) ₹581.26 crores Consumers of electricity in Delhi 5,405,000 Total electricity supplied 25,111 units Peak demand level 5925 MW GENERATION Installed power generation capacity 2118.2 MW Power purchase sourced internally (within Delhi) 13% Power purchase sourced externally (Central Government) 87% TRANSMISSION Total transmission and distribution losses 13% No. of 400 kV Substations/ Transformation Capacity (in Mega Volt Amp) 4/5040 No. of 200 kV Substations/ Transformation Capacity (in Mega Volt Amp) 33/10530 DISTRIBUTION Energy used for domestic purposes 12,649 Mega Units (MU) Energy used for commercial purposes 6370 MU Energy used for industrial purpose 3062 MU Energy used for PWW and Street Lights 1219 MU Others 1810 MU SOLAR ENERGY No. of sunny days in a year (approx.) 300 Solar Energy Potential 2.5 GW Potential Realisation Goal by 2020 1 GW (4.2% of energy consumed) Sources: Econom ic Survey of Delhi 20 14-15; Delhi Solar Policy 20 16 106 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households across th e coun try. Un der UDAY, state govern m en ts wh ich own th e DISCOMs are required to take over 75% of th e DISCOMs’ debt (as on 30 Septem ber 20 15) an d pay th e len ders by issuin g bon ds. DISCOMs are expected to issue bon ds for th e rem ain in g 25% of th eir debt (ET Bureau 20 16). At the tim e of writing this paper 15 states have voluntarily joined UDAY, but Delhi is not one of them despite its DISCOMs’ stated desire to beneit from the scheme. The payof from UDAY can be huge— experts claim that Delhi’s DISCOMs can save as m uch as ₹1,0 0 0 crores in interest costs, which is a substantial 5% of the com bined debt they owe. Moreover, it is estimated that improving the inancial health of DISCOMs in this m anner will translate to a relief of approxim ately 75 paisa per unit of power. Delhi Solar Policy targets for 10 iscal years *Based on 6 GW peak load in 20 15 and a grow th assum ption of 5% per annum **Based on actual energy units consum ed in Delhi (27,266 MU) in 20 14-15 and a grow th assum ption of 5% per annum DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 107 Review of Delhi Solar Policy 20 16 The policy estimates that Delhi receives 300 sunny days a year and has available rooftop space of 31 sq. km. This gives the city a solar energy potential of 2.5 GW, which corresponds to an annual power generation of 3,500 million Kilo Watt Hours (kWh). Of this potential, 26% is in the government sector, 25% in the commercial sector and the largest—49%—in the domestic sector. The Government of Delhi has consequently established a goal of producing 1 GW of energy by 2020, which is 4.2% of the energy consumed by the city. Net Meter charges Meter Type Charges (₹) 1-PH 1500 3-PH 7800 LT CT 9200 HT CT 10400 Source: Delhi Solar Policy 20 16 Registration charges Capacity (KWp) Charges (₹) 1 - 10 1000 10 - 50 3000 50 - 100 6000 100 - 300 9000 300 - 500 12000 500 + 15000 The State Nodal Agency entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring efective im plem entation of the policy is Energy Eiciency and Renewable Energy Managem ent Centre (EE & REM), a subdivision of the state Departm ent of Power. 108 The policy m andates solar installations on all governm ent-owned buildings that have shadow free rooftops of at least 50 sq. m . This will be carried out in a phased manner over the next ive years. At the sam e tim e, it encourages households to install rooftop solar system s, via lim ited tim e Generation-Based Incentives (GBIs). Beneits of Generation-Based Incentives • Delhi’s peak dem and curve broadly m atches the generation curve of solar system s—the dem and for electricity is highest in the afternoon hours (for air conditioning) and so is the generation potential of solar panels. Thus, adoption of solar panels can help reduce peak dem ands—which reached 6 GW in 20 15. This will in turn lower electricity tarifs because DISCOMs pay m ost to m eet short term surges in dem and, thereby increasing their average cost of power. • Energy produced at rooftop solar systems is mostly consumed at, or near, the point of generation. This reduces distribution and transmission losses. Self-consumption of rooftop solar energy also reduces the challenge of provisioning new distribution infrastructure such as transformers in congested localities. • Market con dition s for rooftop solar en ergy gen eration are extrem ely favourable—wh ile solar en ergy tariffs h ave fallen 6-8 % every year sin ce 1998 (PTI 20 16), solar pan el prices h ave dropped by 75% in th e last 6 years (Econ om ic Survey of Delh i, Govern m en t of Delh i NCT), POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households N ET METERIN G Net Metering and billing system between the consumers and their respective distribution utilities which facilitates self-consumption from a rooftop solar project and allows for the surplus to be fed into the grid network of the distribution utility. Surplus power is passed on to the grid and consumers’ electricity bills reduce. Two distinct ownership arrangements arise in the context of rooftop solar projects: • Self-owned arrangement: Here, the rooftop owner also owns the PV system and is also the consum er. The electricity generated is irst used to fulill the consumer’s captive load and then the excess electricity is fed into— a net m eter, a bi-directional energy m eter capable of registering both im port and export of electricity. The net generation is then credited to the owner’s account and adjusted subsequently in the bill. • Third Party Ownership: A developer owns the PV system and enters into a lease/ commercial arrangement with the rooftop owner. The owner provides the rooftop and commissions an installer to design and install the system. The installer can even ofer services of leasing, commissioning and maintaining the system. The DERC Net Metering policy professes con ven tion al en ergy tariffs h ave risen 6.9% per year sin ce 20 0 7. To encourage solar plants on rooftops of buildings that cannot consume all of the energy generated locally, DISCOMs shall facilitate net metering. DISCOMs in other states have shown little interest in the following beneits for the owners and developers respectively: ▪ A large upfront investment is avoided by the household and net-m etering allows the rooftop owner to save on power consum ed from the grid. ▪ The leasing company/ installer gains revenue from the lease rental paid by the rooftop owner under a contract. Process of Obtaining a Net-Meter A distribution license is required to issue net m eters in a non-discrim inatory fashion on a irst-come irst-serve basis for both self-owned and third-party owned rooftop PV system s, as long as the capacity of the system does not exceed the sanctioned load of the household. The consum er subm its an application to the DISCOM along with a fee of ₹1,0 0 0 , which is approved in 15 working days. In order to ensure that the reverse low electricity does not lead to safety and grid security issues, the DISCOM can provide net m etering arrangem ents to all eligible consum ers as long as the cum ulative capacity does not exceed 15% of the capacity of a particular distribution transform er. facilitating net metering till now, because it means lower revenues for them. The Delhi Solar Policy mandates DISCOMs to meet 75% of their Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO) from within Delhi. Moreover, it provides a framework for DISCOMs to meet their solar RPOs through the power generated under net metering. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 109 A variety of incentives and exem ptions are ofered to encourage the installation of solar panels. Forem ost am ongst these are the Generation Based Incentives. ₹2 per kWh of gross solar energy generated will be paid out to the households, for the next three years. The paym ent will be m ade on a irst-come irst-serve basis until the funds earm arked for the GBI run out. The m inim um eligibility criterion for availing the GBI is 1,0 0 0 kWh per year, and the annual solar energy generation eligible for GBI will be capped at 1,50 0 kWh per kWp. Moreover, adoption of solar panels would exem pt the households from : • The 5% electricity tax on solar units generated, whether self-consum ed or supplied to the grid. This will be applicable only on the net consum ption charges billed by the DISCOM. • Open access charges and conversion charges. • VAT and entry tax on all solar panels, inverters, energy m eters and other devices purchased for the installation of solar plants. • Wh eelin g an d Ban kin g Ch arges on Solar Plan ts. • Cross Subsidy Ch arges an d Tran sm ission Ch arges. • In addition to these, various subsidies are available at the central level for ongrid residential solar rooftop projects. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy ofers a subsidy of up to 30% of capital expenditure for such projects. 110 Methodology, Assumptions & Limitations For the purpose of the study, three categories of households were identiied, based on their average m onthly consum ption of power. These were households consum ing 40 0 , 60 0 and 1,20 0 units of power a m onth. The following steps were taken for data collection and analysis: • Data on the various costs of purchasing and installing rooftop solar equipm ent was obtained including the prices of solar panels, m ounting structures, cables, inverters, com biner boxes, m ain junction boxes, fuses and disconnects, protection switches, energy m onitoring m eters, and rem ote control and m onitoring system s. The costs also include charges for transport, installation, project m anagem ent, design and engineering. The total cost of installing solar panels of varying capacities was obtained from Tata Solar Com pany (Appendix 2). • Inform ation on net m etering charges was obtained from BSES. Total costs of establishing a Net Metering connection Category Charge (₹) Application charge 500 Stamp paper cost 100 Registration charge 1,000 Cost of 3-PH meter 7,800 TOTAL 9400 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households • Capacities of solar panel system s were determ ined with respect to the three household categories. The conversion unit of a 1 kWp system generating four units of power in a day was used, with a Plant Load Factor of 18% (data obtained from BSES oicials). The 30% capital subsidy provided by the MNRE on the purchase and installation of solar equipm ent was accounted for. This led to the derivation of the total initial cost for each household category. Net cost of installing solar system s of diferent capacities System Capacity Household monthly consumption 3 kWp 5 kWp 10 kWp 400 units 600 units 1,200 units Costs for purchase and installation 358,800 Net metering charges 9,400 Total Cost Net Cost to the household after 30% capital subsidy 368,200 257,740 564,000 9,400 573,400 401,380 1,122,000 • The electricity tarif that households would avoid in future years by adopting solar energy per unit tarifs for diferent consum ption slabs (DERC). Monthly Electricity Consumption (Units) Per Unit Tarif (₹) 0-200 4 201-400 5.95 401-800 7.3 801-1,200 8.1 Above 1,200 8.75 Average per unit price of power for diferent household categories Household Monthly Consumption Average Per Unit Price of Power (2016) 400 units 4.98 600 units 5.75 1200 units 6.79 9,400 1,131,400 791,980 • Per unit tarifs for the three household categories over the next 20 years (which is the lifespan of an average solar panel). The average annual tarif hike was assum ed to be 6% per annum based on the average annual tarif hike in Delhi in the period 20 0 3-20 15. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 111 • Tarif bills saved by diferent households by adopting solar energy (rate multiplied with m onthly consum ption level x 12) 112 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households • Th e gen er ation based in cen tives offer ed by th e Gover n m en t of Delh i u n d er th e Delh i Solar Policy wer e taken in to accou n t. Accor d in gly, each h ou seh old gen er atin g m or e th an 1,0 0 0 kWh p ower p er year was p r ovid ed with a r ebate of ₹2 p er u n it with a cap of 1,50 0 u n its gen er ated p er kWp . Th is im p lies a gen er ation based in cen tive of ₹3,0 0 0 p er year for each h ou seh old categor y. • All these cash lows were juxtaposed to derive the households’ total an n ual cash lows. The cash lows were discoun ted at 6% to facilitate in ter tem poral com parison s. 6% was deem ed the appropriate discoun t rate as it is the approxim ate after-tax in terest rate on 20 year Fixed Deposits in In dia, which capture the opportun ity cost of in vestin g these am oun ts in solar pan els. The cum ulative NPV (Net Presen t Value) series was also calculated for each household category (Appendix 2). This an alysis assum es that the household provides 10 0 % of the fun ds n eeded for the in vestm en t in solar equipm en t out of its own savin gs. • A second case where the debt to equity ratio was 60 :40 was considered, the ratio for the nascent rooftop industry. Data obtained from various banks, such as the State Bank of India, Vijaya Bank and the State Bank of Patiala indicated that hom e loans for purchasing solar equipm ent carry an interest rate of about 9.5% and are repayable in 60 Equated Monthly Installments over ive years. Using these igures, the loan amounts and the EMIs were calculated for each household category (Appendix 2). Wh ile th e fin din gs of th e study can n ot be gen eralised to all h ouseh olds, th e fram ework with in wh ich th e study operates can be used elsewh ere. Differen t n um erical values specific to differen t h ouseh olds can always be in serted in th is fram ework to derive correspon din g con clusion s. Th e fin din gs of th e study are subject to th e followin g assum ption s an d lim itation s: • The life of the solar plant is 20 years, as provided by the solar com pany. • The residential rooftops being considered have adequate shadow free roof top area required to install solar panels to fulill the household’s consum ption needs. • The dem and for power rem ains constant over the course of the study. • The houses being considered are connected to the power grid, that is, have net m eters installed. They do not have any battery to go with the solar panels. This is because the electricity generated in the presence of sunlight is consum ed sim ultaneously through the day. Any excess electricity produced is fed back into the grid and energy credit is received by the producer. It is assum ed that the energy needs to be m et at night are roughly equivalent to the excess energy fed back into the system , cancelling out any electricity costs. • The average annual tarif hike for Delhi’s power sector is 6%. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 113 • The after tax in terest rate on 20 years’ worth of ixed deposits (discount rate) is 6%. • Th e len din g rate for five year h om e loan s is 9.5% • The Operation s an d Main ten an ce (O&M) Costs for the solar pan els are n egligible. This assum ption was deem ed reason able because even though about 1.5% of the in itial capital expen diture on large scale plan ts is assum ed to be for O&M, on ly regular clean in g is required for household plan ts, which can be taken care of by the households them selves. • The installation costs have been sourced from a leading solar equipm ent m anufacturer. Other com panies m ay charge diferent prices. • A lim itation is that the power dem and for the next 20 years cannot be estim ated due to unavailability of data; and unprecedented changes in dem and in the past few years, which would be diicult to generalise. • Availability of sunlight and other weather conditions are subject to change. An alysis & Recom m en dation s The data compiled allows several meaningful conclusions to be drawn. The payback period of the investment in solar systems (the number of years it takes for a household to break even), the net present value of the investment, and the internal 114 rate of return (Appendix 1) vary with the consumption level of the household and the inancing method considered (100% own savings or taking a loan). The payback period of investment in solar systems for both equity models is 12 years for 40 0 unit systems, 11 years for 60 0 unit systems, and 9 years for 1,20 0 unit systems. Net Present Value of investm ent in solar systems under diferent scenarios Net Present Value (in ₹) 600 units 1,200 units 100% equity 200,753 387,797 1,060,824 40% equity 372,960 1,031,537 400 units 191,224 Internal Rate of Return of investm ent in solar systems under diferent scenarios Internal Rate 400 units of Return 600 units 1,200 units 100% equity 12.72% 14.08% 16.60% 40% equity 15.64% 19.04% 13.92% These results indicate that the installation of solar system s brings the highest returns for the largest consum ers. They break even the earliest, generate the highest Net Present Value and also have the highest Internal Rate of Return. This is because they enjoy econom ies of scale on account of the larger num ber of units of power they produce and consum e. These costs should be interpreted as the average per unit cost of solar power and are very low com pared to the current per POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households unit tarif that households pay. Further, while the Levelised Cost of Electricity (LCOE) is com puted keeping the entire 20 year period in mind, the tarifs set by the DERC will likely increase over tim e (at around 6% p.a.). Over these 20 years, the median tarif for the households consum ing 40 0 , 60 0 and 1,20 0 units per m onth is approxim ately 2.9, 3.6 and 4.3 tim es higher than the LCOE. Levelised Cost of Electricity un der diferent scenarios Levelised Cost of Electricity (in ₹) 400 units 600 units 1,200 units 100% equity 2.98 2.79 2.75 40% equity 2.98 2.79 2.75 Current Rate 4.98 5.75 6.79 The observations from the study corroborate the hypothesis that adoption of rooftop solar systems will prove cost beneicial for households. While the exact results of the cost-beneit analysis difer according to the household’s circumstance, solar energy from rooftop systems appear to provide an economically viable option when compared with conventional energy. While addressing structural problems such as ballooning peak demand and pollution, it would also improve the standard of living of the households that choose to adopt it. It would be beneicial to have a coherent roadmap of all the solar policies and incentives being adopted by the Government of Delhi, as well as those from the Central Government. This would lead to greater clarity and the policy certainty could result in increased adoption of solar rooftops. RECOMMENDATION 1: Create Awareness Both high an d m iddle con sum ption households would gain con siderably from solar plan ts, but in order for adoption to gain traction , in form ation asym m etry n eeds to be addressed. Awaren ess program m es, advertisin g, in fographics would go a lon g way in addressin g this issue. An on lin e portal should be created with a step-by-step guide for in stallation of solar pan els by households along with a helpline for clariication of queries. Lists of recogn ised sellers, costs of obtain in g n et m eters, required solar capacity calculators, inancing options, available subsidies an d in cen tives, an d the process of obtain in g the sam e should be clearly stated an d explain ed. RECOMMENDATION 2: Access to Finance Ease of access to capital and credit rem ains key to whether a m iddle incom e household would transition to solar rooftops. For those households which do not have required capital and/ or access to credit, lease agreem ents/ thirdparty ownership of solar panels could be a viable business m odel and should be encouraged. Alternatively, Resident Welfare Associations could assist in pooling resources to obtain solar panels for a colony. This m arginally reduces the per unit cost incurred by a household and the large am ount of initial investm ent required opens up m any avenues of generating inance such as bank loans, bond m arkets etc. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 115 SMART GRID S IN PU D U CH ERRY In 20 12, the Min istry of Power decided to run 14 pilot projects testin g various features of a ‘Sm art grid’ throughout In dia. Puducherry is a union territory located in South India. In 20 12, The Electricity Departm ent of Puducherry and the Power Grid Corporation of India Lim ited (PGCIL) signed a Mem orandum of Understanding by way of which the latter was allowed to set up sm art grid facilities—m ainly Advanced Metering Infrastructure with Central Data Control Centres—to m onitor power consum ption patterns, trace power theft and allow easier billing procedures (especially online paym ent processes). The governm ent visualised a reduction in Transm ission & Distribution losses from 23% to 9%, and an increased tax collection eiciency from 90% to 98% through the duration of the project (Uria 20 11). In Phase I of the pilot project, 1,40 0 sm art m eters were in stalled in the project area. These m eters in form ed con sum ers about their hourly con sum ption of electricity, while clearin g the way for feedin g excess en ergy produced usin g ren ewable resources (solar/ win d) back in to grid, peak load m an agem en t (time of use tarif), power quality management and outage management system s. These system s were put in place because of the overarchin g Meter Data Man agem en t System , which sen ds data recorded by sm art m eters to Data Collection Un its which forward that to cen tral database server system s. The an alysis of con sum ption data overtim e yields certain electricity threshold levels for each household—maximum consumption igures—which, if exceeded, in dicate power theft. This system also delivers billin g details to con sum ers as per billing cycles for diferent sections. Another salient feature is that of energy audits con ducted on a m on thly basis which calculate the am oun t of un accoun ted en ergy within the system —which can be reduced through preven tive m easures (Ram esh 20 16). Due to a fun d crun ch, the PGCIL backed out of an y further com m itm en ts. The Govern m en t of Puducherry, which wished to con tin ue with the project, adopted the In vestor Model an d tied up with a Chin ese m ajor, Don g Fon g, which will in stall sm art m eters in 8 7,0 0 0 houses begin n in g in 20 16. The Cen tral Govern m en t will fun d half the cost of the operation (Prasad 20 15). The im plem en tation an d success of such projects serve to provide viable altern atives to the prevailin g power system s in In dian cities an d town s. 116 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households RECOMMENDATION 3: Fiscal Incentives targeted to Low Consum ption Levels Generation-Based Incentives or GBIs seem to have a m inim al im pact given the larger total costs of procuring solar panels, and require review, as they presently create a bureaucratic hassle and m islead any potential generating households. Given that households will take around 9-12 years to recover the costs incurred by them for installing solar panels, an initial m onetary push through a bigger incentive is desirable, and should be structured as targeted incentives across diferent consum ption levels. Since the highest consum ption households have the best econom ic case for adopting solar energy, the added incentive of a GBI should be reconsidered for this category, and instead targeted toward the lowest consum ption households for m axim um im pact. Generation-Based Incentives as a proportion of total cost Capacity Cost of Procuring Panels Cumulative Earnings from GBIs GBIs as a Percentage of Initial Cost 10 kW 791,980 9,000 1.136 5 kW 401,380 9,000 2.242 3 kW 257,740 9,000 3.419 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 117 Bibliography Ananthakrishnan, G. “After Paris, prom ises to keep.” The Hindu. Decem ber 25, 20 15. http:/ / www.thehindu.com / opinion/ lead/ cop-21-clim ate-change-sum m it-g-ananthakrishnan-writes-on-theclim ate-change-m eeting-after-paris-prom ises-to-keep/ article80 26162.ece (accessed J uly 6, 20 16). Berlin, and Neibull. “Germ any’s Energy Transform ation: Energiewende.” The Econom ist. 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DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 119 APPENDIX 1: Key Calculations a) Ave rage p e r u n it Price o f Po w e r Given the tarif rates ixed by the DERC, the average per unit price (in rupees) of power for a household consum ing 40 0 units per m onth is: The corresponding igures for households consuming 600 and 1,200 units per month respectively are: and b) Equ ate d Mo n th ly In s talm e n ts ( EMI) The EMI for a principal am ount P invested at a m onthly interest rate R% to be repaid in N instalm ents is given by the form ula: Hence, the EMI for a 5-year (60 m onth) 9.5% loan of ₹4,75,188 taken by a household consum ing 1,20 0 units per m onth would be: Multiplying by 12 months a year, we derived an annual cash outlow of ₹119,760 . EMIs for the other household categories were calculated in a similar fashion. c) Le ve lize d Co s t o f Ele ctricity ( LCOE) The LCOE is the ratio of the initial system cost and the total num ber of units of power generated in the system ’s lifetim e. For the 10 kW system , the initial cost is ₹791,980 and the total generation is: 1,200 units x 12 months a year x 20 years in the panel’s lifespan = 2,88,000 units The LCOE is, therefore: 120 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households The LCOE for other household categories was calculated in a sim ilar fashion. d ) N e t Pre s e n t Valu e ( N PV) The NPV of a series of Free Cash Flows (FCF) over t years, where the discount rate is (10 0 r)% per annum , is given by: This formula was used to compute the net beneit resulting from the investment in solar system s for each household category. e ) In te rn al Rate o f Re tu rn ( IRR) The IRR is the unique rate of interest r that satisies the equation: In other words, it is the rate, which if used to discount free cash lows, results in a net present value of zero. The Internal Rate of Return m entioned in this study were calculated using the online software on www.inancialprojections.com DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 121 APPENDIX 2: Annual Cash Flows with both equity types In these tables, cum ulative Net Present Values are written in red for the years they were negative. That is, the year in which the font in the last colum n changes from red to black is the year in which the household starts earning positive returns on its investm ent. This is called the year in which the household ‘breaks even’. Moreover, the last cell of the last colum n gives the Net Present Value of the investm ent when the entire 20 -year shelf life of the solar panel is considered. Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 1,20 0 units/ m onth 122 Year System Cost 2016 -791,980 Generation -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost Annual Cash Flow NPV of Annual Cash Flow Cumulative NPV -791,980 -791,980 -791,980 2017 3,000 97,776 100,776 95,072 -696,908 2018 3,000 103,680 106,680 94,944 -601,964 2019 3,000 109,872 112,872 94,770 -507,194 2020 116,496 116,496 92,276 -414,918 2021 123,408 123,408 92,218 -322,700 2022 130,896 130,896 92,277 -230,423 2023 138,672 138,672 92,225 -138,198 2024 147,024 147,024 92,245 -45,953 2025 155,808 155,808 92,223 46,270 2026 165,168 165,168 92,229 138,499 2027 175,104 175,104 92,243 230,742 2028 185,616 185,616 92,245 322,987 2029 196,704 196,704 92,223 415,210 2030 208,512 208,512 92,225 507,435 2031 221,040 221,040 92,232 599,667 2032 234,288 234,288 92,227 691,894 2033 248,400 248,400 92,247 784,141 2034 263,232 263,232 92,222 876,363 2035 279,072 279,072 92,237 968,600 2036 295,776 295,776 92,224 1,060,824 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 40 0 units/ m onth Year System Cost 2016 -257,740 Generation -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost Annual Cash Flow NPV of Annual Cash Flow Cumulative NPV -257,740 -257,740 -257,740 2017 3,000 23,904 26,904 25,381 -232,359 2018 3,000 25,344 28,344 25,226 -207,133 2019 3,000 26,880 29,880 25,088 -182,045 2020 28,464 28,464 22,546 -159,499 2021 30,192 30,192 22,561 -136,938 2022 31,968 31,968 22,536 -114,402 2023 33,888 33,888 22,537 -91,865 2024 35,904 35,904 22,527 -69,338 2025 38,064 35,904 22,530 -46,808 2026 40,368 40,368 22,541 -24,267 2027 42,768 42,768 22,530 -1,737 2028 45,360 45,360 22,543 20,806 2029 48,048 48,048 22,527 43,333 2030 50,298 50,298 22,247 65,580 2031 54,000 54,000 22,532 88,112 2032 57,216 57,216 22,523 110,635 2033 60,672 60,672 22,531 133,166 2034 64,320 64,320 22,534 155,700 2035 68,160 68,160 22,528 178,228 2036 72,240 72,240 22,525 200,753 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 123 Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 60 0 units/ m onth 124 Year System Cost 2016 -401,380 Generation -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost Annual Cash Flow NPV of Annual Cash Flow Cumulative NPV -401,380 -401,380 -401,380 2017 3,000 41,400 44,400 41,887 -359,493 2018 3,000 43,920 46,920 41,759 -317,734 2019 3,000 46,512 49,512 41,571 -276,163 2020 49,320 49,320 39,066 -237,097 2021 52,272 52,272 39,061 -198,036 2022 5,5368 55,368 39,032 -159,004 2023 58,752 58,752 39,073 -119,931 2024 62,280 62,280 39,075 -80,856 2025 65,952 65952 39,037 -41,819 2026 69,912 69,912 39,038 -2,781 2027 74,160 74,160 39,067 36,286 2028 78,624 78,624 39,074 75,360 2029 83,304 83,304 39,056 114,416 2030 88,272 88,272 39,043 153,459 2031 93,600 93,600 39,056 192,515 2032 99,216 99,216 39,056 231,571 2033 105,192 105,192 39,065 270,636 2034 111,456 111,456 39,048 309,684 2035 118,152 118,152 39,051 348,735 2036 125,280 125,280 39,062 387,797 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 1,20 0 units/ m onth (with loan) Year System Cost 2016 -791,980 Loan Repayment Generation Received -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost 475,188 Annual Cash NPV of Cumulative Flow Annual Cash NPV Flow -316,792 -316,792 -316,792 2017 -119,760 3,000 97,776 -18,984 -17,909 -334,701 2018 -119,760 3,000 103,680 -13,080 -11,641 -346,342 2019 -119,760 3,000 109,872 -6,888 -5,783 -352,125 2020 -119,760 116,496 -3,264 -2,585 -354,710 2021 -119,760 123,408 3,648 2,725 -351,985 2022 130,896 130,896 92,277 -259,708 2023 138,672 138,672 92,225 -167,483 2024 147,024 147,024 92,245 -75,238 2025 155,808 155,808 92,223 16,985 2026 165,168 165,168 92,229 109,214 2027 175,104 175,104 92,243 201,457 2028 185,616 185,616 92,245 293,702 2029 196,704 196,704 92,223 385,925 2030 208,512 208,512 92,225 478,150 2031 221,040 221,040 92,232 570,382 2032 234,288 234,288 92,227 662,609 2033 248,400 248,400 92,247 754,856 2034 263,232 263,232 92,222 847,078 2035 279,072 279,072 92,237 939,315 2036 295,776 295,776 92,224 1,031,539 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 125 Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 40 0 units/ m onth (with loan) 126 Year System Cost Loan received 2016 -257,740 154,644 Repayment Generation -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost Annual Cash NPV of Cumulative Flow Annual Cash NPV Flow -103,096 -103,096 -103,096 2017 -38,974 3,000 23,904 -12,070 -11,387 -114,483 2018 -38,974 3,000 25,344 -10,630 -9,461 -123,944 2019 -38,974 3,000 26,880 -9,094 -7,635 -131,579 2020 -38,974 28,464 -10,510 -8,325 -139,904 2021 -38,974 30,192 -8,782 -6,562 -146,466 2022 31,968 31,968 22,536 -123,930 2023 33,888 33,888 22,537 -101,393 2024 35,904 35,904 22,527 -78,866 2025 38,064 38,064 22,530 -56,336 2026 40,368 40,368 22,541 -33,795 2027 42,768 42,768 22,529 -11,266 2028 45,360 45,360 22,543 11,277 2029 48,048 48,048 22,527 33,804 2030 50,298 50,298 22,247 56,051 2031 54,000 54,000 22,532 78,583 2032 57,216 57,216 22,523 101,106 2033 60,672 60,672 22,531 123,637 2034 64,320 64,320 22,534 146,171 2035 68,160 68,160 22,528 168,699 2036 72,240 72,240 22,525 191,224 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households Annual Cash Flows for household consum ing 60 0 units/ m onth (with loan) Year System Cost Loan received 2016 -401,380 240,828 Repayment Generation -Based Incentive Avoided Electricity Cost Annual Cash NPV of Cumulative Flow Annual Cash NPV Flow -160,552 -160,552 -160,552 2017 -60,694 3,000 41,400 -16,294 -15,372 -175,924 2018 -60,694 3,000 43,920 -13,774 -12,259 -188,183 2019 -60,694 3,000 46,512 -11,182 -9,389 -197,572 2020 -60,694 49,320 -11,374 -9,009 -206,581 2021 -60,694 52,272 -8,422 -6,293 -212,874 2022 55,368 55,368 39,032 -173,842 2023 58,752 58,752 39,073 -134,769 2024 62,280 62,280 39,075 -95,694 2025 65,952 65,952 39,037 -56,657 2026 69,912 69,912 39,038 -17,619 2027 74,160 74,160 39,067 21,448 2028 78,624 78,624 39,074 60,522 2029 83,304 83,304 39,056 99,578 2030 88,272 88,272 39,043 138,621 2031 93,600 93,600 39,056 177,677 2032 99,216 99,216 39,056 216,733 2033 105,192 105,192 39,065 255,798 2034 111,456 111,456 39,048 294,846 2035 118,152 118,152 39,051 333,897 2036 125,280 125,280 39,063 372,960 DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 127 APPENDIX 3: Interview questions for solar developers 1. What are the capacities of diferent solar systems available? What is their price? 2. What are the n um erical m agn itudes for the various costs in volved in purchase and installation of solar equipment in 3 diferent cases: capacities of 3, 5 an d 10 kWp? 3. Do the costs above include the 30% subsidy ofered by the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy? 4. Given a ixed household electricity consumption level per month (say 400 units/ 60 0 units/ 120 0 units), what should be the capacity of the solar panel bought in all three cases? 5. Since the distance between point of consum ption and point of use of the solar energy is negligible in this case, do we assum e there is no wastage? i. e. Do we assum e that 6 kW energy generated is wholly available for the household? In other words, in case of wastage due to transm ission losses, what is the percentage of total power produced that is assum ed to be available for use? 128 POWER Cost-Beneit Analysis of Solar Rooftop Systems for Delhi Households HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: Will they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? Naom i Hazarika, N ithy a Srinivasan, Tany a Sharm a EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Delhi Government has come up with the concept of ‘Mohalla Clinics’, with the aim of bringing primary healthcare delivery systems right to the doorsteps of its citizens. The paper reviews the Mohalla Clinics system and seeks to identify the health needs of Delhi citizens with regard to the two branches of healthcare, i.e. public health and healthcare delivery systems. The study inds that Delhi needs a robust and decentralised primary healthcare subcentres such as Mohalla Clinics and that these are cost-efective. The paper recommends modiications to the Mohalla Clinics scheme in order to incorporate the parallel aspect of preventive public health and em erge as ‘Wellness Clinics’. KEY FINDINGS 1. India has historically under-spent on healthcare, while public health has over-emphasised vertical programmes that focus on a single condition or small group of health conditions. 2. The two most important issues related to healthcare in Delhi were the lack of access to primary healthcare and the lack of suicient preventive health measures under public health. 3. The newly launched Mohalla Clinic Schem e of the Delhi Governm ent seeks to provide decentralised access to prim ary healthcare in the city, easing the burden of bigger hospitals like AIIMS and Safdarjung hospital. 4. Overall, 80-100 percent of citizens were satisied with the services, location, infrastructure, and doctors of the Mohalla Clinics, where they existed. 5. Those seeking healthcare facilities from public system s varied with locations. Alm ost all the citizens in Peeragarhi used public healthcare facilities as opposed to Hauz Khas or Safdarjung Enclave where only a third availed public health facilities. More than half of Munirka’s citizens availed public healthcare facilities. 6. Public Health needs also varied with geography. Som e areas needed better sanitation to im prove public health in their neighbourhood, while others needed greater awareness about nutrition, and yet others needed inform ation about substance abuse. Health needs difer based on income levels, education and awareness levels, dem ographic com position and availability of healthcare facilities. 7. Mohalla Clinics have the potential to m ove beyond being sub-centres with prim arily curative functions and become Mohalla-speciic wellness centres targeting the speciic health needs of diferent neighbourhoods and taking into account preventive public health m easures at a local level. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 131 Backgroun d H ealth h as two facets: public h ealth , an d th e h ealth care delivery system . Th e form er refers to th e h ealth of th e com m un ity, an d th e latter to th e im provem en t of on e’s well-bein g th rough diagn osis an d treatm en t. Th e differen ce between public h ealth an d th e h ealth care delivery system is th at public h ealth works prior to th e occurren ce of diseases, as opposed to th e h ealth care delivery system of train ed doctors an d n urses wh o focus on treatin g patien ts on ce th ey h ave acquired an illn ess, or h ave been in jured. Government of the National Capital Territory Department of Health and Family Welfare MCD, NDMC, Delhi Cantonment Board Director General of Health Services DHS, DFW, Hospitals, Medical Colleges, Drug Control Department, Other Autonomous Bodies For public health, Delhi prim arily has vertical health program s (health programs that speciically target 132 a particular disease) in place. For exam ple, to tackle tuberculosis, there is a Revised Nation al Tuberculosis Con trol Program (RNTCP) laun ched in 1997 an d im plem en ted in Delhi by the Delhi Tapedic Un m ulan Sam iti (DTUS). H owever, Delhi’s poor air quality an d poor san itation con tin ue to threaten the health of Delhi’s citizen s. Th e In dian h ealth care delivery system in volves th e public an d private sector. Th e govern m en t spen ds 1.16% of GDP (Gross Dom estic Product) on h ealth (Min istry of H ealth an d Fam ily Welfare 20 15), of wh ich 8 0 % (Mukh erjee 20 14) is sub-n ation al—raised an d spen t by th e states th em selves. Of th e ₹5,259 crores allotted to h ealth in Delh i’s 20 1620 17 budget, plan n ed public h ealth expen diture is ₹3,20 0 crores, wh ich is 16% of th e total plan outlay (Delh i Budget 20 16-20 17). Th e public providers at th e State level in clude Govern m en t of NCT of Delh i, MCD, an d th e NDMC. H ealth care is also provided by subcen tres, m obile van s an d so on . Delh i, in particular, h as also seen a trem en dous growth in private h ealth care providers over th e past decade. The Delhi Govern m en t has proposed the Delhi H ealth Bill, 20 15 to regulate services provided by hospitals an d clin ics in the n ation al capital, seekin g to brin g all Clin ical Establishm en ts, in cludin g big private hospitals, un der a state-level fram ework of regulation (Deshm an e 20 15). This bill is the Delhi adaptation of The Clin ical Establishm en t Act, 20 10 . HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? Key Problems Identiied in the Health Sector Lesser Focus on Prim ary Healthcare Th e th ree aspects of h ealth care— prim ary, secon dary, an d tertiary h ealth care—can be arran ged in a pyram id. In th e ideal scen ario, th e pyram id sh ould h ave a developed prim ary h ealth care section wh ich “stream lin es upward” to m ore specialised care (In stitute for Work & H ealth 20 16). H owever, in Delh i’s presen t scen ario, th e pyram id is in verted. Delh i h as m ature tertiary h ealth care with h igh tech n ical ability attractin g m edical tourism from aroun d th e world, in stark con trast with its coverage-lackin g prim ary h ealth care (Roych owdh ury 20 14). So far, the government has looked at public health problems with a missionled lens, but largely missed the preventive aspect. For example, in Delhi, various public health related schemes have been instituted to tackle issues like tuberculosis, HIV/ AIDS and provide maternal and child healthcare. But these schemes only target a speciic section of the population and miss the preventive component (they deal directly with diseases). Current public health schemes do not cover preventive public health issues such as sanitation, drinking water, the importance of hygiene, awareness about nutrition, and environmental concerns such as poor air quality—reported to reduce lifespan in Delhi by six years (Rohatgil 2016). While vertical health programs may be helpful in reducing a speciic disease burden in the short term, they often cause disruption in routine primary healthcare provision (Devadasan, Boelaert, et al. 2007). Table 1: Area-wise prevalence (per 1,0 0 0 ) of chronic diseases DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 133 Variation in Heathcare Requirem ents There is a rem arkable heterogeneity in health needs across vertices of location, incom e, etc. Prim ary and secondary data indicate these diferential health needs. A few case studies further illustrate this heterogeneity in health needs across Delhi. CASE STUDY 1: Occurrence Of Lifestyle Diseases Across Neighbourhoods Chronic diseases such as diabetes, arthritis and hypertension were found to be more prevalent in the higher economic strata and chronic bronchitis was more prevalent among people from a comparatively lower economic strata (Gupta and Pandey 20 0 6). It is evident from the irst table, that the prevalence of arthritis, diabetes, and hypertension was the highest among people of New Urban Colonies. The economic status of the people of these colonies was higher as compared to those of other colonies. Chronic bronchitis was more prevalent among people of Jhuggi Jhopri and resettlement colonies, where the people were of lower economic status. The occurrences of all the four diseases among people seemed to increase with age. The signiicant prevalence has been observed among people of age 15 years and above (Table 2). CASE STUDY 2: Concentration of Malaria across Delhi’s Neighbourhoods A study by the National Malaria Research Institute supplem ents the idea of diferential disease prevalence in diferent localities. Delhi has reported the highest num ber of deaths due to m alaria as com pared to the other states in India. Out of the total cases, 31% were reported from Delhi and adjoining areas. A Geographical Inform ation System (GIS) based Dengue Surveillance System was developed for m onitoring and control of dengue in Delhi by the National Malaria Research Institute. It recorded 139 m illion populations over three Table 2: Age-wise prevalence (per 1,0 0 0 ) of chronic diseases 134 HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? localities: Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), New Delhi Municipal Com m ittee (NDMC) and Cantonm ent area. Digital m aps of streets were used to create the GIS database. Streetwise dengue cases were m apped to identify clusters that required intense attention for control of the disease. The data was used to identify breeding sources contributing to the proliferation of the disease and undertake situation-speciic control measures. Based on this GIS m apping, a focused control strategy has been put into place (m ap). m edical councils at the national level (Medical Council of India) and state level (Delhi Medical Council) have a conlict of interest in appropriately addressing grievances against doctors, as these boards are com posed of doctors them selves (Phadke 20 16). Further, Kum ar (20 0 6) points to the quackery issue, estim ating around 30 ,0 0 0 nonqualiied practitioners in Delhi. Regulation of private clinics and hospitals also im pacts the quality of doctors. This point is pertinent now m ore than ever as big private hospitals have burgeoned and are im portant players in healthcare (Sengupta 20 0 5). Their regulation fram ework is not adequate. Frequent Change in Healthcare Policy A m ajor problem of th e h ealth care system is th e con stan t ch an ge th at it is subjected to with th e on set of a n ew political party’s ten ure. Susten an ce of an y particular idea or sch em e is essen tial for its lon g-term success an d m ust be in depen den t of an y political will. For th e system to run efficien tly, a certain degree of auton om y m ust exist. Quality of Doctors Inform ation asym m etries in the quality assessm ent of doctors is a universal problem in the healthcare sector. Firstly, the skewed distribution of m edical colleges as well as the existence of m akeshift m edical colleges lacking basic infrastructure result in inadequately trained m edical professionals. Secondly, Transparency in Healthcare A transparent m echanism is required to allow healthcare to efectively reach out to the econom ically weaker groups. An exam ple of an area where transparency is m issing is the procurem ent and delivery DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 135 of m edical equipm ent. The Audit Report of 20 15 tabled in the Delhi Assem bly on 13 J une 20 16 concluded that a com prehensive plan for the procurem ent of m edical equipm ent has not been prepared at the Departm ent or at the hospital level, as shown by the quote from a CAG report (20 16). Due to lack of coh eren t plan n in g an d im plem en tation , th e result h as been a delay in th e delivery of m edical equipm en t to th e exten t th at as m uch as an alleged ₹3.16 crores excess in th e budgetary plan n in g of procurin g m edical con sum ables. Th is delay in procurem en t could h ave been avoided with tran sparen t policies. Th ere was delay ran gin g up to two years in procurem en t an d delivery of m edical equipm en t, even th ough th ough th is activity was outsourced to an agen cy with th e specific objective of elim in atin g such delays. An am oun t of ₹60 .65 lakh was paid to th e agen cy as con sultan cy fee. H ospitals failed to im pose pen alty of ₹95.8 4 lakh on defaultin g suppliers for delayed supply of essen tial m edical equipm en t. Advan ces of ₹73.62 crore given to suppliers rem ain ed un adjusted from th e year 20 0 5 till date in h ospitals test-ch ecked. 136 High Out-of-Pocket Expenditure In dia ran ks am on g the top 20 of the world's coun tries in its private spen din g on healthcare, at 4.2% of GDP (World Ban k 20 0 1), an d ran ks am on g the lowest in public spen din g on healthcare at 1.16% (Min istry of H ealth & Fam ily Welfare 20 16). Out-of-pocket expen diture refers to private expen diture in curred by patien ts to pay for healthcare. In dia’s out-of-pocket expen diture ratio is a staggerin g 61%, m uch higher than m ost other low an d m iddle-in com e coun tries (McKin sey 20 12). This m ean s that m ost In dian patien ts pay for their hospital visits an d doctors’ appoin tm en ts with straight-up cash after care with n o altern ate paym en t arran gem en ts. The Mohalla Clinics Schem e, 20 15 It has been recognised since the late 1970 s that a functioning prim ary healthcare system , which is accessible within a reasonable geographical distance, is likely to take care of the m ajority of the health needs of the people. This was acknowledged at the global level by the Alm a Ata declaration in 1978 and accepted in India’s National Health Policy, 1983 and 20 0 2 (Lahariya 20 16). The recent Mohalla Clinics Scheme 2015 is a step towards universal access to primary healthcare services in Delhi. Mohalla Clinics are community clinics (also called Aam Aadm i Clinics or “Clinics at your doorstep”), that aim at expanding peripheral health facilities or the primary healthcare system. HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? These clinics are proposed to be set up in the innerm ost circles of “Mohallas” especially in poor and m arginalised neighbourhoods. The schem e is an attem pt to further decentralise healthcare in Delhi and strengthen the irst tier of prim ary healthcare in the three-tier healthcare system . These clinics are designed to address com m on healthcare needs of citizens, undertake a large com plem ent of diagnostic tests and provide all essential m edicines. These single doctor OPDs seek to address m ost of the com m on healthcare scenarios where specialists are not needed (Delhi Budget 20 16-20 17). Apart from rapid diagnostic tests such as digital blood pressure m onitors and glucom eters (for random blood sugar tests), lab technicians in these clinics collect sam ples for m ore than 212 tests that are conducted free of cost (Scroll.in 20 16). Patients are exam ined using an internet connected electronic tablet based protocol and m edicines are prescribed and dispensed by the doctor. The biom etric listing of patients will be m aintained along with a list of m edicines dispensed (Departm ent of Health and Fam ily Welfare 20 15). All this data is then stored in a digital cloud and m ade available to the governm ent. Use of this technology prom otes both perm anence of records and provides data for further analysis at a higher level. According to the schem e, the clinics shall have two or three room s with electricity, water, and sewer connection, which shall be rented by the governm ent. The cost of setting up a clinic is ₹20 lakh. The basic pharm acy shall be stocked by Chief District Medical Oicer (CDMO) of the district. The fully ready cham ber will be m ade available to doctors who are em panelled to m anage them in four hour shifts as an OPD clinic. Private, qualiied doctors are being requested to apply to the governm ent to be em panelled as the AAMC Cham ber doctor. IEC (Inform ation Education Com m unication) m aterial will be displayed and m aintained by the CDMO (Departm ent of Health and Fam ily Welfare 20 15). Each clinic will be stafed by a doctor, a nurse, a pharm acist and a laboratory technician. These units will provide a package of services which include outpatient consultations, free m edicines and diagnostics, im m unisation, fam ily planning, referral and counselling services. At a later stage, there are plans to have specialists such as gynaecologists and ophthalm ologists on a weekly basis (Lakhariya 20 16). Th e doctors are proposed to be paid at th e rate of ₹30 per patien t as con sultation ch arges. If a h elper is position ed, an addition al ₹10 per patien t is paid to th e doctor. It is expected th at on an average each doctor is able to exam in e aroun d 50 patien ts in a four h our sh ift (Departm en t of H ealth an d Fam ily Welfare 20 15). The governm ent has prom ised to set up 50 0 to 1,0 0 0 clinics, or 14 clinics per assem bly constituency (Lahariya 20 16). A pilot project for running 10 0 Mohalla Clinics through em panelled doctors positioned in rented locations is underway (Delhi Budget 20 16-20 17). DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 137 Th ree of th em —in Peeragarh i, Nath upura, an d Man davalli—are perm an en t clin ics th at run between 7 am an d 7 pm an d are m an n ed by doctors from th e State H ealth Departm en t. Th e rest are set up in Porta Cabin s by th e Publics Works Departm en t out of ren ted prem ises, wh ere th e Delh i govern m en t h as h ired private doctors, wh o see patien ts between 8 am an d 1 pm (Scroll. in 20 16). About the Study In order to gain an un derstan din g of the health n eeds of Delhi’s citizen s an d assess the im plem en tation of Mohalla Clin ics, a survey was con ducted in four localities: Peeragarhi, Mun irka, H auz Khas an d Safdarjun g En clave. The Peeragarhi Mohalla Clin ic is on e of the oldest, operatin g sin ce J uly 20 15 while the Mun irka Mohalla Clin ic is fairly recen t. We studied two clin ics to get a better un derstan din g of the schem e as it operates on the groun d. Survey results from residen ts of H auz Khas an d Safdarjun g En clave were lim ited to qualitative data in order to un derstan d n eeds an d behaviours toward health am on g Delhi’s citizen s. The data gathered has been substan tiated with secon dary research in cludin g an exten sive literature review an d m edia scan . The lim itation s of the study stem from the sam ple size as we in terviewed 15-17 people from each locality. The survey was con ducted durin g the aftern oon , which may also impact the indings, as people engaged in work or at oices escaped the purview of our study. 138 Health Needs are Diverse In Peeragarhi, sanitation and sewage were open and identiied as a serious health hazard, indicating a need to em ploy preventive public health m easures. In Munirka, pollution and congestion were identiied as a health hazard and residents com plained about the lack of open spaces to play and exercise. Residents of Haus Khas and Safdarjung Enclave com plained about the incom petence of public doctors. Most citizens availed private healthcare services and relied on fam ily doctors and references. Their concerns were associated with the needs of senior citizens. Quality of Access to Health Services also Difer Citizens in Hauz Khas and Safdarjung were m ost likely to wait for less than an hour when they went to a healthcare facility, whereas citizens in Munirka and Peeragarhi were m ost likely to wait between four and eight hours. Residents from Peeragarhi used public healthcare facilities as opposed to Hauz Khas or Safdarjung Enclave where only a third of the respondents availed public healthcare facilities. Munirka was in the m iddle with 59% of respondents availing public healthcare facilities. Less than half (47%) of the respondents from Safdarjung Enclave and Hauz Khas availed some sort of health insurance. The igure in Munirka was less than a quarter (24%). However, the igure was signiicantly HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? lower in Peeragarhi, where less than 6% of the respondents availed health insurance. Mohalla Clinics: The Insiders’ View Am ong the few Mohalla Clinics in operation, a study was conducted am ong those in Peeragarhi and Munirka. These are diferent in terms of duration of establishm ent, infrastructure and nature of engagem ent of doctors, and represent the two dom inant m odels of the Schem e. Peeragarhi Munirka Inaugurated July 2015 March 2016 Construction Porta Cabin Rented space Doctor Public Private Patients’ Responses Pat ien t s wer e lar gely sa t isfied wit h t h e over a ll ser vices, loca t ion , in fr ast r u ct u r e, an d d oct or . H owever , t h e r esp on d en t s also m ad e r ecom m en d at ion s for im p r ovin g t h e Moh alla Clin ics, wh ich in clu d ed : • Increased transparency, such as explaining the health conditions of the patients and inform ing them of treatm ent options. • Im proving infrastructure, i.e. developing bigger clinics and building fences for safety of wom en and children. • Im proved availability of m edicines. Doctors’ Responses Doctors were in terviewed to un derstan d th eir con cern s an d recom m en dation s regardin g th e clin ic, an d wh at in cen tivised th em to take up th e job. Th e overall fin din gs in dicated th at th e doctors were satisfied with th eir m edicin e stocks an d felt th at patien ts were satisfied. Th e doctor in Peeragarh i did n ot use electron ic tablets to en ter h er patien ts’ data on th e cloud system . Th e doctor in th e Mun irka clin ic, h owever, did use th e tablet. Their m ain concerns and recom m endations were as follows: • Sustainability of the project, given its dependence on political agendas. • Location of the Clinics, which should ideally be in the innerm ost circles of the J J Colonies. • La ck of awa r en ess p r ogr am m es, r ega r d in g p u b lic h ea lt h an d p r even t ive h ea lt h car e. • Training of technology use, and backup system s for recording data and system atic checks. • Accountability of doctors, in term s of proper records and system s of checks and balances. • Im proved infrastructure, in term s of bigger prem ises, uninterrupted power and water supplies, and access to an am bulance for em ergency cases. • Faster generation of test reports, which currently takes about three to four days. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 139 Incentive Structure of Interviewed Doctors Doctor A (Public) Doctor B (Private) Where did you work before? Public Urban Health Center (Nihal Vihar), Employed under the NRHM (National Urban Health Mission) – RCH (Reproductive Child Health). NA P.G. Student currently pursuing his Diploma in medicine. Hours of Work Minimum Wages Act, 1948 What do you like about working here? Serving people who need primary healthcare the most. The timings are from 9 am -1 pm. The four-hour duration of the shift helps manage medical practice with studies. Why did you choose to work here? Service: Believes primary healthcare is more required in areas where people are most in need. Similar provisions in the Factories Act, 1948, but covers only workers in factories, not those in shops and establishments. Transfer: Transferred from Nihal Vihar dispensary. Experience: Get to see 100+ patients a day. Would not be possible in a private practice. None What incentives might other doctors’ have to work at a Mohalla Clinic? Unsure about the incentives of private doctors. Raised questions about their accountability. Retired doctors who are looking for short working hours and some pay. Mohalla Clinics: the Outsiders’ View Access to prim ary healthcare services has increased for the urban poor. Many of the Mohalla Clinics have been set up in the innerm ost circles of Jhuggi Jhopris increasing outreach in those areas. Waiting tim e, which is an opportunity cost (especially for daily wage earners), has com e down to a large extent. At Peeragarhi and Munirka, the waiting tim e has decreased from a few hours to around 15-20 m inutes on an average. Sim ilar results have been noted across alm ost all Mohalla Clinics in the city (Scroll.in 20 16). 140 The cost of healthcare services has reduced for the poor. Along with the signiicant reduction in travel and opportunity costs, Mohalla Clinics provide free medicines and diagnostic tests. Though public dispensaries also provide free services, patient overload and uncertain availability of medicines are major deterrents. In addition to costs, quality of private healthcare services is often suspect. Mohalla Clinics are succeeding in giving quacks a run for their m oney. For exam ple, Peeragarhi has plenty of quacks and practitioners of a controversial system of m edicine called 'Electropathy'. In Peeragarhi’s Punjabi Clinic, these so-called HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? doctors adm itted that the Mohalla Clinic was taking away their patients (Scroll.in 2016). Similar responses about unqualiied doctors were reported in Munirka. Mohalla Clinics have the potential to alter health-seeking behaviour (Lakhariya 20 16). A m ajority of m igrants, being new to the city, are hesitant about visiting bigger healthcare facilities until the illness turns serious. They typically end up going to unqualiied providers. Sustainability of Mohalla Clinics Moh alla Clin ics are h igh ly cost-effective. Th e on e-tim e cost of th ese 1,0 0 0 clin ics is approxim ately ₹20 0 crores, less th an wh at is n eeded for settin g up a secon dary h ospital (th e budget allocation for settin g up a n ew AIIMS is ₹8 20 crores, an d eigh t such in stitution s are san ction ed in two ph ases). Mohalla Clin ics have stron g political support. The State Govern m en t has already allocated n early ₹125 crore for Mohalla Clin ics while in creasin g the health budget by 50 %, in keepin g with electoral prom ises m ade by the rulin g party. This could also be a challen ge since the identiication is strong. For exam ple, there are several visual sym bols of the political party in addition to a photograph of the Chief Min ister, Mr. Arvin d Kejriwal, in the Peeragarhi Mohalla Clin ic. The Clin ic has earn ed the popular sobriquet of “AAP Clin ic”. As a Governm ent initiative, Mohalla Clinics also run the risk of bureaucratisation and centralisation. Som e of the early hiccups include: • Tim in g: m any citizens com plained that the m orning shifts were inconvenient as they would either be at school or work, and would prefer an evening shift. • D o cto rs : Delhi has the advantage of fresh graduates as well as retired senior physicians who would be ideal for the project. However, proper incentives m ust be developed for hiring and retaining private doctors for at least three years at any location. • Staf: Doctors should be em powered to hire their own staf using model contracts that provide for incentives and ixed tenures. • Acco u n tability: Outcom e-based budgets need to be provided to each Mohalla Clinic to optim ise operations. This could be based on basic inform ation such as a num ber of patients treated and patient feedback, m onitored electronically using sim ple m etrics. While the Peeragarhi Mohalla Clinic used paper-based m anual registers, the Munirka Mohalla Clinic used technology and stored the data of all the patients on the Cloud. Mohalla Clinics to Mohalla Health Centres Prim ary healthcare is in tricately lin ked with public health an d a holistic approach n eeds to be taken at the grassroots. It is proposed that Mohalla Clin ics, equipped with their in frastructure an d strategic location s, can aim higher an d tackle DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 141 n ot on ly the issue of lackin g prim ary healthcare but also the issue of lackin g preven tive public health. Mohalla Clin ics can m ove beyon d bein g sub-cen tres with prim arily curative fun ction s an d becom e neighbourhood-speciic (Mohallaspeciic) wellness centres targeting the varyin g health n eeds of respective n eighbourhoods. To incorporate the parallel aspect of preventive public health in Mohalla Clinics, we propose that a Coordinator (person or organisation) be em ployed. J ust as the core team of m edical professionals provides curative prim ary healthcare, the Coordinator will be in charge of providing preventive public healthcare to the neighbourhood. For a welln ess cen tre to address the health n eeds of the n eighbourhood it m ust have a m echan ism to m on itor the curren t status of health an d public health related problem s in the n eighbourhood an d respon d to these as they chan ge. Ideally, the Coordinator will be a public health professional who is hired on contractual basis (as the private doctors) to m onitor and analyse data (with the help of technology) and prepare periodic reports for each Mohalla. Incentive Structure of Interviewed Doctors Preventive Public Health (Proposed) Curative Primary Healthcare (Existing) Coordinator NGOs 142 Government Organisations, Departments Existing Govt. Schemes (e.g. ASHA Workers) HEALTH Mohalla Clinics: W ill they address the health needs of the Aam Aadm i in Delhi? Exam ples of preventive public healthcare activities to be led by the coordinator: • Im m unisations and Vaccinations • Sanitation and Hygienic Living Conditions • Nutritional Awareness • Safe Drinking Water • Pest control • Fum igation • Other en viron m en tal con cern s related to health The National Urban Health Mission (NUHM, 2013) speciies various eforts for NGO integration in preventive and prom otional capacities with existing polyclinics like Prim ary Health Centre (PHC). With the addition of Mohalla Clinics as a tier below even, it is proposed that this link between NGOs and PHCs also be further decentralised to m ake it easier to conduct educational activities and public health cam ps. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 143 Bibliography and Citations At Work. W hat researchers m ean by … prim ary , secondary and tertiary prevention. 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SMCs are aimed at increasing the accountability of government schools, where owing to a variety of factors including but not limited to teacher apathy, the quality of education imparted to the students has been poorer than their private counterparts. This paper assesses the functioning of School Management Committees (or SMCs) in Delhi’s Directorate of Education (DoE) Schools. Telephonic interviews were conducted with stakeholders including parents, social workers and teachers from 30 DoE schools representing 5 districts of Delhi. Secondary data was collected from NGOs working with SMCs in Delhi such as Saajha, J OSH, and Matri Sudha, among others. The study identiies four key issues with the functioning of Delhi SMCs and makes recommendations for addressing these: lack of clarity in the wording of the Delhi SMC rules; lack of awareness amongst parent members of SMCs; irregularity of meetings; and lack of recognition preventing parents from conducting random visits to schools. KEY FINDINGS 1. The quorum required for an SMC meeting is 5 out of 16 voting members. 4 of the 16 SMC members include the principal, teacher, elected representative and social worker. Thus, any resolution can be easily passed without majority of parents which goes against the spirit of a School Management Committee. 2. 46% of the parents interviewed were uninformed about their roles and responsibilities as SMC members. While 54% of the parents were informed, they did not conclude the question to be speciically about the roles and responsibilities as prescribed by the act, but understood broadly as they answered “We have to take care of the school”. 3. 68% of the social workers and the teachers interviewed reported that the government had provided them training to fulil their roles as members of the SMCs. 4. A major component of an SMC, as prescribed by the RTE, 20 0 9, is the creation of a School Development Plan (Preparation of School Development Plan 20 13). 77% of the parents surveyed were not aware of a document by that name. Nearly 30 % of the unaware parents asked the surveyors to explain the School Development Plan. The social workers and teachers reported that a lack of awareness amongst parents often hinder the efective functioning of the committee. 5. 9 out of 22 social workers an d teachers also reported a lack of m on etary tran sparen cy. In terviews in dicated that expen diture breakup was n ot in the han ds DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 149 of the SMCs. Som e social workers claim ed that even after becom in g SMC m em bers, they rem ain ed un in form ed about the plan . 6. An im portan t fun ction of SMCs is m on itorin g im plem en tation of the Mid-Day Meal, yet on ly 35% (41 out of 115) of paren ts m en tion ed in spection of the m eals as a part of their respon sibility. Introduction The m ajor Acts and Policies that govern the Structure of Education in Delhi are: • The Natio n al Po licy o n Educatio n : Formulated in 1986 and modiied in 1992, it aims at providing quality education to all students irrespective of their backgrounds. It lays stress on the need for radical transformation of the education system to improve quality at all stages. The NEP proposed the provision of free and compulsory education up to 14 years of age. • Th e Righ t o f Ch ild re n to Fre e & Co m p u ls o ry Ed u catio n ( RTE) Act: Cam e into force on 1 April 20 10 and seeks to provide and ensure adm ission, attendance, and com pletion of elem entary education, for all children in the 6-14 age group. With this, India has m oved forward to a rights-based fram ework that casts a legal obligation on the Central and state governm ents to im plem ent this fundam ental child right as enshrined in Article 21A of the Constitution (Departm ent of School Education and Literacy, Ministry of Hum an Resource Developm ent 20 16). • Th e D e lh i Sch o o l Ed u catio n Act, 19 73 an d th e D e lh i Sch o o l Ed u catio n Ru le s , 19 73 : Form ulates the guidelines for the functioning of the Directorate of Education such as the regulation of education, establishm ent, m anagem ent, recognition and upgradation of schools, term s and conditions of the service of the em ployees, adm ission to schools and fees, taking over the m anagem ent of the school, opening of new schools or classes and closure of existing ones, code of conduct for teachers and other em ployees, school fund, duties and responsibilities of Schools Managem ent Com m ittees, inspection of schools etc. (RTE Forum n.d.) 150 S. No Key Data (2014-2015) 1 2 3 4 5 Total Schools Delhi Government Schools MCD Schools NDMC Schools Other (Kendriya Vidyalaya +Delhi Cantonment Board) 6 7 8 9 10 Private Schools Total Enrolment Enrolment in Government Schools Enrolment in Private Schools Total Teachers Total Number 5739 1,145 1,794 82 50 2897 2,991,067 1,704,446 1,286,621 139, 480 Source: District Report Cards 20 14-15 Volum e 1, National University of Educational Planning and Adm inistration EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees Budget The Delhi Governm ent, under the Aam Aadm i Party, has prioritised the education sector. In 20 16, this sector received a m ajority of the funds, with a total expenditure of ₹10 ,690 crores. This is 23% of the total budget and an increase of 8.7% from last year. Of this, ₹4,645 crores are allocated under the plan fund (The Indian Express 20 16). Quality of learning is the m ain focus this year. In order to achieve this goal, the governm ent has given a boost to skill developm ent and teacher training. ₹10 2 crores has been earm arked for training of teachers in foreign universities and the budget for skill developm ent in schools has been raised to ₹152 crores. An additional sum of ₹8 crores has been allotted for “extracurricular activities such as theatre, m usic, creative writing and photography” (Sharm a 20 16). In order to ensure security, ₹10 0 crores has also been allocated to install CCTV cam eras in all governm ent schools. An additional budget of ₹50 crores is being set aside to train 50 ,0 0 0 students in vocational skills (The Financial Express 20 16). The Delhi Governm ent has also released ₹745.98 crores of the com bined budget estim ate of the three m unicipal corporations for the inancial year of 20 16-17: ₹40 4.0 2 crores to NDMC, ₹171.13 crores to SDMC and ₹170 .83 crore to EDMC (Business Standard 20 16). According to the stakeholders, the inancial crisis of the three civic bodies is rooted in the trifurcation of the erstwhile Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The trifurcation tripled the num ber of oicers within the corporation; one com m issioner was replaced by three, 11 additional com m issioners were put in place and 30 com m ittees tripled to 90 . In order to endure these inancial issues, the trifurcated MCD required resorting to loans to inance their operations. According to m edia reports, “These loans reached approxim ately ₹2,0 51 crore at the tim e of trifurcation. Therefore, South civic body was created with a deicit of ₹850 crore, North with ₹750 crore and East with a loan liability of ₹451 crore” (Iqbal 20 16). A sm all part of the city, com prising of Lutyens' Delhi and surrounding areas, falls under the jurisdiction of the New Delhi Municipal Council. The council is one of the richest civic agencies in the country. The NDMC Chairperson Naresh Kum ar said the council generates 95% of its revenue on its own through license fees, user charges, tax revenue and interest earned on its investm ents (The Indian Express 20 16). School Managem ent Com m ittees The RTE, 20 0 9 m andates the creation of School Managem ent Com m ittees (SMCs) in order to increase the role of parents in the m anagem ent of schools. The logic behind this decision is that carving a greater role for parents will ensure, speciically, greater learning outcom es; and generally, higher standard of education in schools. The SMCs are aim ed at increasing the accountability of DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 151 governm ent schools, where owing to a variety of factors, including but not lim ited to teacher apathy, the quality of education im parted to the students has been poorer than their private counterparts. Accor din g to th e Delh i Sch ool Education Act an d Rules 20 11, SMCs ar e to com pr ise of m ostly par en ts, with th r ee qu ar ter s of th e com m ittee r eser ved for th em , wh ile th e r est will com pr ise oth er stakeh older gr oups such as teach er s, m an agem en t, social wor ker s an d local r epr esen tatives. For the purpose of this paper, the focus is prim arily on assessin g SMCs as they curren tly exist in Delhi govern m en t schools, also kn own as Directorate of Education (DoE) schools. There are two reason s as to why this approach has been utilised: irst, the Directorate of Education has m ade available all of their SMC lists on lin e for public access. Secon d, The South Delhi Mun icipal Corporation’s oice corroborated the lack of cen tralised SMC lists for schools un der the Mun icipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), which im paired the possibility of exten din g this study. Methodology, Assum ptions and Lim itations In order to accomplish the stated objective, a holistic approach was needed. Five out of thirteen of the Directorate of Education districts were selected for the study. D is tricts Su rve ye d: Centre, South, East, North, West 152 N u m be r o f Sch o o ls Su rve ye d: 25-31 N u m be r o f Pare n ts Su rve ye d: 115 (From 31 schools) N u m be r o f Te ach e rs Su rve ye d: 26 (From 26 schools) N u m be r o f So cial W o rke rs Su rve ye d: 25 (From 25 schools) In order to attain that holistic approach, telephon ic in terviews were con ducted of the three m ain stakeholders—paren ts, teachers, an d social workers—to ascertain whether they were aware of the existen ce an d fun ction s of the SMC an d to gauge their un derstan din g of the sam e. In terviews an d m eetin gs were held with m em bers of various organ isation s working in the ield of education. Th ere exist som e caveats with th e m eth od of data collection used, n am ely teleph on ic in terviews: 1 There was a diiculty of accessibility as relying prim arily on telephonic contact inform ation, m any respondents failed to answer calls. 2 Even when people did answer, most were reluctant to engage over the phone. 3 Th e in terviewer could n ot see th e in terviewee, th ereby excludin g body lan guage an d in ter-person al con duct as in dication s. 4 Language and dialect diferences between the interviewer and the interviewee were an additional constraint. EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees 5 In m any instances the people being interviewed were not the owners of the phone num bers they had provided for the SMC lists. There were additional constraints as this paper was com pleted over a period of six weeks which coincided with sum m er holidays, resulting in schools being unavailable for inform ation. While the paper attem pts to be as representative as possible by including the relevant stakeholder groups; school principals were not contacted. Delhi School Man agem en t Com m ittee Functions of the School Managem ent Com m ittee, as outlined by the circular issued by the Delhi Governm ent in 20 13, are the following: 1 Monitor the working of the school. 2 Prepare and recom m end a School Developm ent Plan. 3 Monitor utilisation of grants received from the appropriate governm ent or local authority or any other source. 4 Com m unicate in sim ple and creative ways to the population and the neighborhood of the school, the right of the child as enunciated in the Act, as also the duties of the Governm ent, local authority, school, parents and guardians. 5 Ensure that teachers m aintain regularity and punctuality in attending school. 6 H old regular m eetin gs with paren ts an d guardian s an d apprise them about the regularity in atten dan ce, ability to learn progress m ade in learn in g an d an y other relevan t in form ation about the child. 7 Monitor that teachers are not burdened with non-academ ic duties other than those speciied in Section 27 of RTE Act. 8 Ensure the enrollm ent and continued attendance of all the children from the neighborhood in the school. 9 Monitor the m aintenance of the norm s and standards speciied in the Schedule. 10 Brin g to the n otice of the Govern m en t or local authority, as the case m ay be, an y deviation from the rights of the child, in particular m en tal an d physical harassm en t of children , den ial of adm ission an d tim ely provision of free en titlem en ts as per Section 3(2) of RTE Act, 20 0 9. 11 Identify the needs and m onitor the im plem entation of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act which states “where a child above six years of age has been adm itted in any school or though adm itted could not com plete his or her elem entary education, then, he or she shall be adm itted in a class appropriate of his or her age”. 12 Monitor the identiication and enrollm ent of and facilities for adm ission of children with disabilities and ensure their participation in, and com pletion of elem entary education. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 153 13 Monitor the im plem entation of the Mid-Day Meal in school. Som e of the additional functions of the SMC as proposed under the RTE Bill draft 20 0 5 (Right to Education Bill 20 0 5) were: 1 Ensuring the diligent perform ance of duties by school teachers. 2. Disbursing salary to teachers from the grants received for the purpose from the appropriate governm ent/ authority. 3 And, deducting paym ent of salary for the period of unauthorized absence, if any, in a m anner as decided by the SMC. These functions would have allowed the SMC to m onitor the functioning of the teachers far more efectively than the present Act. However, they were eventually om itted from the RTE Act, 20 0 9 and therefore from the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 20 11 as well. Com position of the School Managem ent Com m ittee: Note: 1 One Social Science Teacher, One Math Teacher and One Science Teacher shall be special invitees. According to Abhishek Chaudhaury, Chairm an of Saaja, the oicial NGO partner of the DoE for SMCs, these m em bers are not allowed to vote and are present solely for their perspective on issues. Break up of the School Management Committee 2 Fifty percent of the m em bers of this com m ittee shall be wom en. 16% 5% 5% 5% 5% 63% Parents Principal Teacher Social Worker Elected Representative Special Invitees (Teachers) 3 There shall be a proportionate representation of parents/ guardians of children belonging to disadvantaged groups and weaker sections. 4 Vice Chairperson shall be from am ongst the parent m em bers. 154 EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS The Delhi Governm ent took a bold initiative in 20 15 to revive the SMCs in DoE schools. A circular regarding the election of parent m em bers of the SMC was issued in Septem ber 20 15 to all Delhi Governm ent schools and aided schools, stating the guidelines for holding elections. At the sam e tim e, the governm ent also provided a structure with strict timelines for iling nominations, and criteria for the nom ination to be considered valid, as well as the date of election and declaration of results. Provision of Training by the Governm ent 32% Yes No 68% care of the school”. The rem aining 46% were uninform ed. Number of parents informed about their role Con cur r en tly, teach er s an d social wor ker s wer e asked wh eth er th ey wer e pr ovided an y tr ain in g by th e gover n m en t to fulfil th eir r oles as m em ber s of th e SMCs. 68 % of th e social wor ker s an d th e teach er s in ter viewed r epor ted th at th e gover n m en t h ad pr ovided th em tr ain in g. It was n oted th at two of th e social wor ker s wer e n ot awar e of an y tr ain in g. Parents were asked if they were inform ed about their roles and responsibilities as SMC Mem bers, to determ ine whether the parents were provided any sort of training after becom ing m em bers. 54% of the parents answered in the airmative. The parents who did answer “yes” did not conclude the question to be speciically about the roles and responsibilities as prescribed by the Act, but understood broadly as they answered “We have to take A m ajor com pon en t of an SMC, as pr escr ibed by th e RTE, 20 0 9, is th e cr eation of a Sch ool Developm en t Plan (Pr epar ation of Sch ool Developm en t Plan 20 13). 1 The School Managem ent Com m ittee shall prepare a School Developm ent Plan at least three m onths before the end of the inancial year in which it is irst constituted under the Act. 2 The School Developm ent Plan shall be a three-year plan com prising of three annual sub-plans. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 155 3 The School Developm ent Plan shall contain the following details, nam ely: a. Estim ates of class wise enrolm ent for each year. b. Requirem en t of the n um ber of addition al teachers, in cludin g subject teachers an d part-tim e teachers etc., separately for classes I to V an d classes VI to VIII, calculated with reference to the norms speciied in the Schedule. c. Ph ysical requirem en t of addition al in frastructure an d equipm en t, calculated with referen ce to th e n orm s an d stan dards specified in th e Sch edule. d. Financial requirement in respect of (b) and (c) above, including additional requirement for providing special training facility speciied in Section 4 of the Act, entitlements of children such as free text books and uniforms, and any other additional inancial requirement for fulilling the responsibilities of the school under the Act. 4 The School Development Plan shall be signed by the Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the School Management Committee and submitted to the Appropriate Authority before the end of the inancial year in which it is prepared. It m ust be noted that the question did not refer to whether the com m ittee has created a SDP but focussed on illustrating the cognizance of the stakeholder. 77% of the parents surveyed were not aware of a docum ent by that nam e. Nearly 30 % of 156 EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees the unaware parents asked the surveyors to explain the School Developm ent Plan. There was a diference between social workers and teachers in terms of their awareness about the School Development Plan. A higher number of social workers reported that their schools had made the SDP in comparison to the teachers. The social workers and teachers reported that a lack of awareness amongst parents often hinder the efective functioning of the committee. The m otivation of setting up and preparing a School Developm ent Plan is to ensure accountability and efective utilisation of the funds received by governm ent schools. Interviews with social workers and teachers indicate that expenditure breakup was not in the hands of the SMCs. Som e social workers claim ed that even after becom ing SMC m em bers, they rem ained uninform ed about the plan. signatures, and that they were not always allowed to inspect whether the funds received are being used for the exact purpose for which they have been sanctioned. 9 out of 22 social workers and teachers also reported a lack of monetary transparency. Areas of Focus of the SMCs “Student related problems” refer to student and teacher absenteeism. Student absenteeism is dealt with by speaking to the parents of other students to understand the reason behind the child’s inability to attend Area of focus of the SMC as per Parents (Total) 21% 39% Some parents mentioned that they are only told about the funds received and are used as “rubber stamps” by the school for their Infrastructure Cleanliness Student Related Problems 40% Num ber of Parents aware of the funds received by the school Area of focus of the SMC as per Teachers 28% 25% 28% 3% Infrastructure Student Absenteeism Quality of Education Teachers Absenteeism Cleanliness 16% DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 157 Area of focus of the SMC as per Social Workers 19% 32% 16% Infrastructure Student Absenteeism Quality of Education Teachers Absenteeism Cleanliness 11% 22% quorum of the SMC m ust be a third of the total stren gth an d every resolution m ust be passed by a proper quorum without an y proxy, that is 5 out of 16 votin g m em bers. 4 of the 16 SMC m em bers in clude the prin cipal, teacher, elected represen tative an d social worker. Thus, an y resolution can be easily passed without m ajority of paren ts, which goes again st the spirit of a School Man agem en t Com m ittee. Re co m m e n d atio n : school. Parents from East Delhi schools reported that they are allowed to take rounds of the school to ensure that teachers are present in the class. Parents from West Delhi and South Delhi schools reported a shortage of teachers. An important function of SMCs is monitoring implementation of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme, yet only 35% (41 out of 115) of parents mentioned inspection of the meals as a part of their responsibility. As per the Delhi SMC rules, the social worker must be from the ield of education. In the survey conducted, only four of the social workers interviewed were from the ield of education, while ive were social workers from other ields. One of the social workers interviewed was a college student with no prior experience as a social worker. 158 • There is no clarity whether ‘total strength’ refers to the strength of the entire com m ittee or the strength of the m em bers present for a particular m eeting. Greater clarity m ust be provided in this regard. • At the sam e tim e, the quorum requirem ent can be increased from 1/ 3rd to any num ber that ensures a m ajority of parents, which would be in line with the spirit of the SMC. ISSUE: Lack of Awareness Recommendations The general lack of awareness am ongst parents is due to lack of form al training provided to SMC m em bers. They are unable to ask the right questions as they are not aware of their rights as a m em ber. ISSUE: Lack of Clarity Re co m m e n d atio n : The circular issued by the Delhi Govern m en t in March 20 13 regardin g the guidelin es for the com position an d fun ction s of the SMC states that the • Non-Governm ental Organizations such as J OSH and Saajha conduct training workshops for parents. These organisations have also created EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees handbooks, in both Hindi and English, designed speciically to train parents about their role and responsibilities as SMC m em bers as well as the overall functioning of the com m ittee. • Due to lack of m anpower, NGO’s m ay not be able to reach out to all Delhi Governm ent schools. However, collective training workshops can be conducted at the zonal level where parents can be educated and provided with the handbooks. to two m eetings consecutively a warning can be sent to the m em ber. Skipping three consecutive m eetings could lead to the term ination of the m em bership. This rule m ust be applied uniform ly to all SMC m em bers. ISSUE: Lack of Recognition Parents reported that they do not have any form of identiication stating that they were m em bers of the com m ittee, due to which they have not been allowed to conduct random visits to schools. ISSUE: Irregularity of Meetings Re co m m e n d atio n : According to the survey indings, working parents are not able to attend m eetings during the week. A large num ber of parents also reported that the day and timing of the meeting is not ixed and this uncertainty adds to their inability to take time of from work to attend. Re co m m e n d atio n : • Meetings must be held on ixed days to ensure sm oother functioning and greater clarity am ongst the Com m ittee m em bers. Certain schools have the SMC m eeting on the last weekend of the m onth. Alternatively, the day and time of the next meeting can be ixed at the beginning of each session. Such a m ethod can be followed across all schools to ensure the regularity of m em bers. • Certain schools have issued identity cards for SMC m em bers. This practice, if m ade m andatory for all schools which have constituted a School Managem ent Com m ittee, would resolve the above stated issue. Schools should also create a physical board with the nam es and photographs of their current SMC members to make it easier for the staf to identify the m em bers. • A three strike attendance m echanism can be followed to check the attendance of all SMC m em bers. If a m em ber skips DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 159 Bibliography Chandra, Shailaja. Report of Review Com m ittee on the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973. J anuary 2012. http://righttoeducation.in/sites/default/iles/Report-of-the-review-committee-on-dse-act-and-rules_ vol-1.pdf (accessed J une 23, 20 16). Chowdhury, Shreya Roy. “Delhi govt launches m entor teacher program m e.” The Tim es of India. 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J une 30 , 20 16. http:/ / indiatoday.intoday.in/ education/ story/ education-reform -plan-chunauti-20 18/ 1/ 70 4630 .htm l (accessed J une 30 , 20 16). —. “Delhi govt passes 3 education bills to do away with no-detention policy and screening at nursery.” India Today . Decem ber 2, 20 15. http:/ / indiatoday.intoday.in/ education/ story/ education-bills-delhi/ 1/ 536594.htm l (accessed J une 23, 20 16). —. “Over 16 lakh Delhi school students have no textbooks! High court dem ands explanation from governm ent.” India Today . April 19, 20 16. http:/ / indiatoday.intoday.in/ education/ story/ delhi-schools/ 1/ 645917. htm l (accessed J une 7, 20 16). 162 EDUCATION: An Assessm ent of School Managem ent Com m ittees About the Researching Reality 20 16 Interns DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 163 Akshay Thakre is a Business Graduate from Sym biosis International University with specialization in Marketing. He was a Gandhi Fellow with KEF at Surat. He has written for Youth Ki Awaaz, an awardwinning online m outhpiece for the youth. He’s currently pursuing his LL.B from Nagpur University and hopes to be a successful litigator in the future. Anshu Kum ari is pursuing Honours in Econom ics at Miranda House, University of Delhi. She is passionate about socio-econom ic issues, and regularly parses through academ ic literature on the sam e. Archit J ain is pursuing Honours in Econom ics at St. Stephen’s College, University of Delhi. His research interests include the m yriad of failed public health insurance program s in India, which he wishes to study to determ ine the optim al role of the governm ent in the country’s health sector. He plans to pursue a graduate degree in inancial economics. Devika Chopra is pursuing Honours in Political Science at J esus and Mary College, University of Delhi. She is a m em ber of Global Youth India as well as her college debating and MUN societies, all of which has allowed her a glim pse into the world of diplom acy and international relations. She wishes to pursue hum an rights advocacy. Devishi Dar is pursuing Honours in Econom ics at Indraprastha College for Women, University of Delhi. She is a proliic writer and is interested in the ield of social entrepreneurship, having served in the Enactus chapter in her college. Keval Patel is pursuing a bachelors degree in Liberal Studies at the School of Liberal Studies, Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University based in Gandhinagar. He strongly believes in ideas such as 'liberalism ', 'growing your own food' and 'conservation of diversity in the environment'. He aims at being an expert in the ield of International Relations in his future. 164 About the Researching Reality 20 16 Interns Naom i Hazarika is pursuing a post-graduate degree in Political Science at J awaharlal Nehru University, Delhi. She aspires to do research in the ield of political philosophy, aims to earn a doctorate. Her areas of interest include political philosophy, norm ative political theory, identity politics, public policy and governance, issues of social justice and tribal rights. Nithya Srinivasan is pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Economics at Miranda House, University of Delhi. She is interested in pursuing a career in Economics and aspires to work with an International Development Organisation. Her interests range from social entrepreneurship to women empowerment and vocational skill training. Parnika Barara is pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Political Science at Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi. She is also trained as an Indian Classical Odissi dancer and likes to debate. Pragya J at is pursuin g a bach elor’s degree in Econ om ics at St. Steph en ’s College, Un iversity of Delh i. Sh e feels attracted to Econ om ics as a disciplin e as it com bin es th e ration ality an d practical approach of th e scien ces as well as th e h um an ism of th e liberal arts. Sh e in ten ds on pursuin g a career in public policy an d/ or econ om ic research . Prarth n a Tan don is currently pursuing an undergraduate degree in Econom ics at J esus and Mary College, University of Delhi. She has debated on national and international economic afairs, attem pting to form ulate econom ic policies in Model United Nations and researching and analysing the econom ic im plications of policy options with PRS Legislative Research. Prateek Pillai currently an under-graduate student at Ashoka University where he is pursuing a m ajor in econom ics with a m inor in m athem atics. He aim s to go into research and is working towards a future in public policy. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 165 Priyash a Ch awla is graduate in Com m erce from Sh ri Ram College of Com m erce, Un iversity of Delh i.H er Sh e h as atten ded th e Space Sch ool Program by NASA wh ere sh e was a part of th e win n in g team . Sh e h as served on th e Editorial team of h er college m agazin e for two years. Ragini Khurana is pursuing undergraduate studies at Sciences Po Paris, Cam pus du Havre, which focuses on European Asian studies. Her academ ic interests include legal pluralism , self governance mechanisms and conlict resolution. She aspires to work in the Middle East and Africa on regim e dem ocratisation and stabilisation. Rahul Singh Chauhan is pursuing undergraduate studies in Econom ics at Presidency University, Kolkata. He is deeply interested in Econom ics and has represented India at the South Asian Econom ics Students Meet, Colom bo. He serves as the convenor of his college’s Econom ics festival and is the founder of the Entrepreneurship Society. Razi Iqbal is a graduate in Econom ics from Shri Ram College of Com m erce, University of Delhi. His interests lie in Econom ic policy and research, and his work has been published by Elsevier. He has received a full scholarship grant from the Swiss Centre of Excellence and will head to the Graduate Institute, Geneva for his Masters in International Econom ics in Septem ber. Rishabh Rekhade is a graduate in Political Science from the University of British Colum bia, Vancouver. He has represented his high school in the Chennai Model UN, the Harvard Model Congress Asia Singapore and in the International Student Forum , held in Kyoto, J apan. He has participated in the Global Youth Leadership Institute’s cultural exchange in New York. Sanchi Gupta is pursuing an undergraduate degree in Political Science at Miranda House, University of Delhi. She has worked with New Delhi Television (NDTV) and the Centre for Legislative Research and Advocacy (CLRA). She is involved in two research studies—an attempt to decipher India’s foreign policy and the other aims to analyze the causes and consequences of sexual harassment on a college campus. 166 About the Researching Reality 20 16 Interns Saum ya J oshi is pursuing undergraduate studies in Econom ics at Sri Ram College of Com m erce. A m em ber of her college’s Debating, Com m erce, and Finance and Investm ent Societies, she enjoys reading witty political com m entaries, writing for college m agazines, debating at com petitive tournam ents and solving case studies. Shaurya Arora is pursuing econom ics as his m ajor at University of Delhi and aspires to study the subject further. He is strongly concerned about clim ate change. Shreshta Sharm a, is pursuing Honours in English Literature at Lady Shri Ram College for Wom en, University of Delhi. She has been actively involved in National Service Schem e of her college as the core team m em ber. She has also volunteered for teaching and organizing events at slum s. Tanay Raj Bhatt is pursuing Honours in Econom ics at Dyal Singh College, University of Delhi. He has qualiied as a state level volleyball player is a regular debater. He wishes to pursue m asters in Econom ics after graduation and thereafter engage in an academ ic career. Tanya Sharm a is currently enrolled in a specialised cohort program , International Econom ics, at the University of British Colum bia on a prestigious scholarship, the International Leader of Tom orrow. She has previously published a report on what m akes a sustainable social initiative for aspiring social entrepreneurs, titled My NGO Handbook, and later published with HufPost India on public-health issues. Tanya Sethi is pursuing Honours in Econom ics at Shri Ram College of Com m erce, Delhi. Tanya is interested in policy oriented interdisciplinary research—especially on developm ent related issues. Her college adventures have included stints in ields as diverse as social entrepreneurship, m anagem ent consultancy, start up incubation, and leading research projects. DELHI CITIZENS' HANDBOOK 2016 167 About Researching Reality Internship An efort to identify and address lacunas in everyday governance, Researching Reality is an annual six-week internship program which ofers intensive training in research and public policy to undergraduate and graduate students across various disciplines. Over the course of the internship, interns are expected to draft research papers that rely on prim ary and secondary data. Interns conduct an analysis of the feasibility, im pact and outcom es of various policies. This is achieved through engagem ent with m odular legislations and relevant literature, interaction with key stakeholders, and extensive ield surveys. This includes the study of various agencies, boards, corporations, departm ents, schem es and program s of the state governm ents and Municipal Corporations; evaluating existing system s to recom m end sustainable and longterm policy im provem ents in the functioning of governm ent structures. Each year, interns identify core areas of governance and assess the eicacy of prevailing institutions and propose policy recom m endations. One of the country's prem ier research internship program s, 20 16 m arks the sixteenth edition of Researching Reality. Am ir U llah Kh an , Developm ent and Trade Econom ist Based on careful ieldwork, interviews and analysis this handbook ofers penetrating insights into problems plaguing the governance of the nation’s capital and practical steps to address them. It is essential reading for anyone interested in a better Delhi be it politicians, policymakers, planners or the aam aadmi. Sh re e kan t Gu p ta, Professor, Delhi School of Econom ics The Delhi Citizens’ handbook 2016 marks the 16th year of Researching Reality, one of the premier research-intensive internship programs of CCS. The Handbook illustrates how to make policies that afect countless citizens, successful and efective. A must-read for anyone who aspires to hold informed views on where policies on urban public utilities stand, and how they can be improved. Sh an tan u Gu p ta, Founder, YUVA Foundation My experience with the Researching Reality Internship Programme has been hugely rewarding. It is very encouraging to see and help bright young minds engage in rigorous research and have CCS nurture and give direction to their spirit of academic inquiry. Centre for Civil Society A-69, Hauz Khas, New Delhi – 110016 Phone: +91 11 26537456 Email: ccs@ccs.in Website: www.ccs.in Perspectives On Local Governance In Delhi Kan ika Ch aw la, Sen ior Program m e Lead at Coun cil on En ergy , Env ironm ent & W ater Delhi Citizens’ hanDbook 2016 The handbook is a simple and eicient Democratic tool that advocates minimum government, optimal regulation and maximum eiciency in a market economy. The internship ofers students a irst hand experience with how real transactions happen and what enables the economy to function smoothly. I am sure this edition too will go a long way I strengthening democracy in Delhi state.