Retaliation: Can we live with flaws?

Journal of Information Assurance and Security, 2008

Abstract: Security protocols intend to give their parties reasonable assurance that certain security properties will protect their communication session. However, the literature confirms that the protocols may suffer subtle and hidden attacks. Flawed protocols are customarily sent back to the design process, but the costs of reengineering a deployed protocol may be prohibitive. This paper outlines the concept of retaliation: who would steal a sum of money today, should this pose significant risks of having twice as much stolen back tomorrow? ...

2005

Citeseer

European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, 2007

Although there exist informal design guidelines and formal development support, security protocol development is time-consuming because design is error-prone. In this paper, we introduce Shrimp, a mechanism that aims to speed up the development cycle by adding automated aid for protocol diagnosis and repair. Shrimp relies on existing verification tools both to analyse an intermediate protocol and to compute attacks

2006

Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009

Rav Prof. David Halivni's life and work, including Talmud Criticism, Biblical Theory and Holocaust Theology, for the second edition of the Encyclopedia Hebraica.