HOW TERRORISM MODIFIED THE HORROR MOVIES

INTRODUCTION

Of course horror movies depict the social fears of particular times and cultures. Their emotional effects use the devices of the macabre or supernatural to connect with culture-bound primal fears. They have an ordinary social setting which gets disrupted by the invasion of a fearsome agent such as monsters or savage beasts. To some extent, horror movies represented a violation of the sacred law of hospitality. Hospitality is a norm that functions to create and maintain a benign social environment. After 9/11 the nature of the threats in horror movies changed from either non-human nature or the supernatural to the social. After 9/11, villains were no longer animals or monsters, but humans. In this process of transformation humans, ordinary everyday people who look and act like us, became the objects of horror (Korstanje & Olsen 2011;Korstanje & Tarlow 2012;Korstanje, Korstanje 2015). As Luke Howie observed, not only was generalized fear one of the main effects of terrorism in modern society, but it also represents radical changes in the way we perceive otherness. In recent years, terrorism has shifted the way we construct monsters, leading cinema to frame sources of fear as ordinary citizens who are capable of the worst anytime (Howie 2011;. Here we explore the hypothesis that horror movies, and closely related popular culture artefacts, have decentralised their objects of fear from the non-human to the human. Today, after 9/11, aliens as non-compatriots have become the model Other and the real enemy to defeat. In movies such as Jaws (Spielberg 1975), The Birds (Hitchcock 1963) or The Naked Jungle (Haskin1954), humans are put in jeopardy by savage animals which can be defeated by the embodiment of human ingenuity--technology. In post 9/11 cinema, not only there are no happy ends, but the main threats are fellow humans who are hard to detect. The enemy is not just there, on the other side of the river or wall, they are among us, live as us, and could be one of our neighbours. This cinematic shift reprises that during the post Second World War Red Scare (Skoll and Korstanje 2013) when Hollywood movies identified the threat as Communists who blended in with the population of the United States and its allies. This same theme is replicated by current horror movie remakes like The Hills Have Eyes (Aja 2006), Hostel (2005, Texas Chainsaw Massacre (Hooper 2003) or The Others (Amenábar 2001). These movies are all remakes of originals from earlier decades, which add torture-terror inspired the war on terror after the World Trade Centre attacks of 9/11.

9/11: the Archetype of Terrorism

Western and non-Western nations had long been the terrain of terrorist attacks, but it was only after 9/11 that the cultural, economic, and strategic hegemony of the United States created the global archetype of terrorism-the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. So-called Ground-Zero, the site of the former World Trade Centre in lower Manhattan became both symbol and icon for terrorism, as the work of radical Muslims. In contrast, the Madrid train bombing of 11 March 2004 was originally blamed on the Basque separatist group the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) to gain political advantaged in the upcoming national elections scheduled three days hence (Sabada 2008). Spanish authorities eventually fell in line under the US terror mythology, and identified Al Qaeda inspired Muslim fanatics. A few sceptics questioned the official story about 9/11 (Keohane & Zackhauser, 2003;Griffin, 2004;Friedman 2011), and some commenters saw 9/11 and the war on terror as a pretext for governments to restrict individual rights (Vargas Llosa 2002;Ignatieff, 2013). Nevertheless, the post 9/11 culture of fear was conducive to neo-liberal policies that enhanced the profits of elite and expansion of the US led global empire rationalized by neo-conservatives (Skoll, 2007;Skoll & Korstanje 2013;Altheide 2002;. The climate of polarization, far from being diluted after US-led invasion to Middle East, multiplied in various spheres of society. Mahmoud Eid pointed to the mass media, arguing that the question whether 9/11 ignited the custom of consuming terror as a rentable commodity, cannot be answered without addressing the responsibility of journalism and mass media in covering attacks 24 hours day. This event opened the doors for a new epoch where terror and profits in television converged (Eid 2014).

The United States used its position as global hegemon to engender a culture of fear. In the counties at the centre of the world capitalist system fear served to protect the status quo social order. After 9/11 this culture of fear became globalized in conjunction with the US-led empire. The US dominated culture industries, in cinema especially, shaped public consciousness in support of the empire. Culture construction aided and abetted securitization, which promised a safer world, and governments relied on both to protect against domestic terrorism internally. In fact, the securitization of global imperialism has really been pacification of segments of populations who posed a threat to the interests of capital owners (Skoll 2016).

Among its other effects 9/11 caused a trauma in the means of transport that largely served the West and centre of capital. Never in history had civilian airplanes been used as weapons against the centre of world capitalism, the World Trade Center, and simultaneously against the centre of world militarism, the Pentagon. The attacks of 9/11 could have undermined the credibility of the George Bush administration in Washington DC by showing how vulnerable the United States was. To counter this threat t its legitimacy, US President George W Bush declared a global war on terror, prosecuted mainly by US military and intelligence apparatuses like the CIA, NSA, and NRO. What Bush failed to declare was the war on terror carried out by the culture industries. Those few, mainly marginal, figures who claimed that 9/11 served as a sort of Reichstag Fire to extend US world control were dismissed as conspiracy theorists.

Throwing around accusations of conspiracy theory buttresses the power of the ruling class by affirming the managed messages from the media they own. Establishment social theorists and scholars have deemed conspiracy theory a pathology (Lipset & Raab 1978;Groh 1987;Hofman 1993;Catron & Harmon 1981), because according to them, it leads to what Hannah Arendt (2013) called a totalitarian mind. More recently, some scholars present conspiracy as a key factor of politics. David Kelman (2012) argues that conspiracy beliefs are part of populism. Especially in Latin America and the United States the efficacy of the ruling class depends on consolidating their hegemony by cutting reality in two. Secrecy in government rests on the legitimacy of silence which creates two alternative circuits, official and unofficial. The credibility of one story is linked to the secret that allows the discovering of the other. Conspiracy theories reveal plots for elites to keep the control of society. Any attempt to decipher the plot, validates the secrecy of politics.

"Politics is not based on an ideology decided in advance, but it is rather constituted through a specific type of narrative that is often called conspiracy theory. This type of theory is always a machination, that is, a narrative mechanism that secretes, as it were, ideological labels such as the right or the left." (Kelman 2012, 8) According to Kelman, opposing the secret with the public and the official with the unofficial creates a dialectic in which every conspiracy narrative connotes a double structure: the visible story is continuously eroded by a secret one, like an infinite palimpsest. Kelman, a literary theorist who theorizes politics not through social and political analysis but through works of fiction, explains the political struggle as an unlimited game, rather than battle lines of power. Kelman says that conspiracy is a necessary condition for one discourse to dominate all others. Politics, in his terms, can be defined as an illusory state of emergency where the sense of community (we) is opposed to others who are the enemies (they). Conspiracy narratives are always rooted in a near future, which never materializes in reality. In this type of simulacra conspiracy produces a paradoxical situation.

Of course, Kelman's approach to politics through fiction just adds another layer of obfuscation. For example, the US government blamed Osama bin Laden for 9/11. They never offered any proof for the assertion, but did launch an attack on Afghanistan, presumably to capture him. Although he either died of pneumonia in December 2001 as reported by Pakistani news media (CLG 2011), or maybe kidney failure in 2003, US forces ravaged the country, and in fact continue to do so, before they claimed to have killed him 2 May 2011, close to 10 years after 9/11. By the way, his ill health virtually precludes him as the so-called mastermind behind 9/11. The bin Laden saga should raise several questions. Why did the US government refuse to provide proof to the Taliban, which the United States recognized as the legitimate government of Afghanistan? Why did the United States attack and invade Afghanistan instead of using policing to apprehend him? Why did it take almost ten years to find bin Laden in an area (Afghanistan-Pakistan border region) where US forces and intelligence apparatuses along with those of its ally Pakistan control information? Why was the actual killing of bin Laden not recorded, although events immediately leading up to it were recorded? Why did US forces not return his body for forensic examination? Why did they secretly dump the body at sea? There are other questions, but the foregoing provide a good start. The fact that they remain unanswered, at least to any satisfactory degree, strongly suggests a US conspiracy and cover-up. The alleged excuse for invading Afghanistan, to get bin Laden, pales in comparison with another: the US government as the main executive branch of the global ruling class wanted to secure transport lines to the Caspian Sea area oil and gas deposits, and to occupy a geostrategic location with respect to China and Russia (Brisard and Daquié 2002).

Kelman´s explanation of conspiracy theory is typical of the more academic, and especially post-modernist, part of ideological justifications for the status quo. A sign of ideological manipulation is the immensely popular support for the US government after the attacks of 9/11. One can only be reminded of the fervor shown by Germans for the Nazis after the Reichstag Fire. Pace Kelman, conspiracy is not politics but anti-politics. Conspiracy is the state at its ideological most effective. A clue to Kelman's political cluelessness is his dismissal of ideology. He simplifies it to a left-right divide without mentioning the ruling class hegemony over political discourse which allows only a very limited range of approved politics, like the Democrats versus Republicans in the United States.

Maintaining the status quo depends on constructing discourses that treat present social relations as if they were unchanged from time immemorial. Unchanging social relations naturalizes them. In effect, status quo discourses present the present in such a way that change is unimaginable. Theories attributing conspiracy imply that the social structure is not natural; they imply that things are the way they are because somebody has contrived them. A conspiracy points to the possibility that events do not occur because of nature or chance, but that there is a designed purpose. Once bringing forth the possibility of purpose, the next implication is that some particular persons designed them and did so because they benefit from those social arrangements. In effect, conspiracy theories say that there might be a wizard behind the curtain, and maybe that wizard is not so all powerful as surface appearances might suggest. For example, a conspiracy theory suggests that 9/11 was not the result of many bad decisions, or acts of negligence, but decisions of some secret actors. Conspiracy theories raise questions of causality, and causality implies questions of who caused things. Similarly the emotional effect of horror stories relies on implying evils and threats that are at first only suggested, but as the horror story unfolds, are gradually revealed.

The construction of Monstrosity: Philosophy of Horror Movies

Corey Robin (2004) said that fear in politics produces a paralysis in society which inevitably endorses the legitimacy of the existing order. The invention of external enemies enhances the declining social cohesion, while at the same time it quells internal dissident voices. Threat ideology frames events so that they fall within an ethos that endorses the current social structure by setting truth conditions. The ideology ensures changelessness, not by overt propaganda or censorship, but by setting how statements can be judged as either true or false (Burnett, 1995;Buchmann, 2010). That is why pejorative accusations against dissidents as conspiracy theorists rules out whatever they might say; it is illegitimate, and false by definition.

Movies and similar cultural artefacts create momentary mini-worlds that invite audiences to participate in their stories. They invite a willing suspension of disbelief, and thereby create a strong pull of audience complicity in the imaginings they present. This is where their effectiveness lies. They round out the worlds that hegemonic discourses describe and explain. In that vein, the construction of horror plays a crucial role in ideological constructs that endorse authority. In his book, The Philosophy of Horror, Richard Fahy argues that one of the fascinations for horror movies rests on the fact danger is controlled by the audience. As a cultural entertainment it offers "The anticipation of terror, the mixture of fear and exhilaration as events unfold, the opportunity to confront the unpredictable and dangerous, the promise of relative safety… and the feeling of relief and regained control when it is over. As Stephen King (1983), we realize that the worst has been faced and it was not so bad after all. King calls this moment reintegration which he compares to the end of a roller coaster ride when one gets off unhurt" (Fahy, 2010: 1-2). Fahy adds, horror not only calls to our attention suffering and death, but does it in a safe context. If the versatility of horror is given by the possibilities to repeat each story in different environment, this constant reproduction alludes to an allegory which merits being deciphered. Eli Roth, a director strongly influenced by 9/11 seems to be replicate the problem of torture and biological terrorism in works as Cabin Fever, 2002 (Fahy 2010) or Hostel, 2005 (Korstanje and Tarlow 2012; Korstanje and Olsen 2011). From its inception, human beings have questioned not only their nature, where or to where they go, but their adaptative skills respecting to other species. Horror movies depict the conjuncture of nature violence (Fahy 2010). Despite the human creation of culture serves as a protective cocoon, human evil cannot be abolished, and good people can fall victim to it (Korstanje 2015).

Phillip Nickel (2010) offers a different aspect of horror. He examines the origin of horror as a particular condition of human experience. According to Nickel, all horror stories are based on two significant tenets: the presence of a super natural evil, and the intention to create fear in their audience. Nickel also addresses the attraction of horror: "I will try to put the philosophical discussion of horror back on track. I will argue that there is something good about horror-I mean, aesthetically interesting and epistemologically good. I shall argue that by the threats it presents to the everyday life of the viewer, horror gives us a perspective on so-called common sense. It helps us to see that the notion of everyday life completely secure against threats cannot be possible, and that security of common-sense is a persistent illusion" (Nikel 2010: 17). Terrorism operates in a like manner to horror stories in that terrorism threatens a population by victimizing a few. States claim to offer security from terror; just as the fictional quality of horror stories reassure audiences. States, therefore, point to "the unknown Other" as that which disrupts security and they demonize the threatening Other as the reason of all our evils (Korstanje 2015b).

Lorena Russell (2010) interprets The Hills Have Eyes as a critique of conservatism in American families, where the dangerous others are hippies, vagabonds, and the homeless. Russell discusses the power of films as imbricated materials that represent specific behaviours and practices using an ideologically tinted lens. Films not only reflect the relations of power, but the "anxieties of the times" (p. 104). From her viewpoint, the manipulation of horror by cinema works as ideological apparatus that controls the working class.

Jeremy Morris (2010) contends that current horror movies express a higher degree of sadism as never before. In works as Hostel, Saw and The Devil´s Reject, there is a reverse role between torturer and the victim where converges sadism, punishment and retributivism. Torture-related in horror films rests on the obsession for modern citizens to feel happiness by acts which escapes from morality, even torture. His main thesis is that the "distant other" who scares us is reduced to a controlled-prey which upends the roots of fear. The sentiment of vulnerability sets the pace to the desire for torture. Enrooted in the heart of civil life, torture has impacted in American Social imaginary. To what extent torture can be morally permitted, is one of the questions Morris attempts to respond. Is the enjoyment of torture ever morally justifiable? (Morris, 2010: 43). The issue seems not to be new. Originally the act of torture is associated to instrumentality, which oscillates from gleaning information to "disciplinary acts of punishments," but enjoyment entails some underlying elements of sadism. Given this argument, Morris notes, sadist torture is oriented to the transformation of victims in torturers and torturers in victims. Those who have experienced the trauma of being tortured, become in a potential torturer while the original monster who inflicted a greater pain in their preys (as in Hostel) become victims. Additionally, there is a supernatural element in these types of movies (as in House of 1000 Corpses) which excites audience to the extent to construct a collective imaginary narrative that exerts influence in daily life. This is exactly, Morris adheres, and the doctrine of redistribution as it was formulated by liberals. The lesson is what you are doing to others you are doing to yourself. In disciplining this remote unknown others we accept torture as a form of entertainment (Morris 2010). "Here is the genius of sadist torture-terror: it transforms the source of fear from a distant other to something familiar in ourselves. The terror of the victim is supplanted by the delight of the torturer, which is being consciously shared by audience: that is the source of terror" (Morris 2010: 51). What have in common all demons and monster in the whole portion of horror movies?

There are two elements not addressed by the foregoing critiques. The first is the fact that almost all villains and monsters kill and torture strangers who have been made vulnerable by seduction. The negative hospitality is inextricably intertwined with a kind of irreconcilable evil. Secondly, terrorism and 9/11 changed the ways these monsters have been constructed. These two aspects form the point of departure for the following discussion.

Evil as the Lack of Hospitality

Horror movies draw on folk tales. Sometimes they do it directly, but more often it is indirect. Monsters of various sorts populate folktales-trolls, goblins, werewolves, witches, vampires and other kinds of undead the latter of which would include the modern Frankenstein monster. Folktales in the present usage refers to stories that have no particular authors but have circulated in various forms among populations define by semi-permeable cultural boundaries. This is most noticeable in geographically bounded areas like the Middle East, Scandinavia, sub-Saharan Africa, and North America where various mythical figures appear in slightly different versions among culture-defining narratives. Occasionally a set of folk tales takes on foundational significance for a much broader cultural tradition. Such is the case for Greek myths that serve as a foundation stone for Western culture.

What are the commonalities of Greek ancient tragedy and horror movies? For example, what has Helen of Troy's abduction by Paris in common with the movie Hostel?

In the Homeric version of the story, Helen is kidnapped by Paris while he and his brother, Hector, enjoyed the hospitality of Menelaus, Helen's husband and brother of Agamemnon, who then led the invasion of Troy to re-capture Helen. In the Illiad's account, the question of hospitality arises at least twice: with Paris' violation of stealing his host's wife and the introduction of the Trojan horse into the walled city. A perverse side of hospitality, as noted by Julia Kristeva (1991), occurs when guests are welcomed only to be enslaved or killed, which illustrates the mechanism of reversal prevalent in folktales, and it is an example of negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1972). Hospitality is a norm that emerges coincident with the establishment of settled communities, as it sets and reinforces borders. Hospitality maintains peace, facilitates trade, and is crucial for exogamy and enforcement of incest rules. Hospitality ensures that an encounter between hosts and guests is a pretext for celebrating with a banquet gift-exchange hat can include marriage.

An example of reverse or negative hospitality is Bram Stoker's Dracula (1897) which draws on the mythological figure of vampires as monsters who suck the blood of their victims. In Stoker's novel the vampire is an aristocrat who has been preying on surrounding peasants; a fairly obvious bit of political symbolism. In the novel Dracula, a young lawyer, Jonathan Harker, leaves his English home Transylvania where Count Dracula has his castle. Although Dracula at first appears to be a generous host, eventually Dracula imprisons Harker and sucks his blood. As in the Iliad, initial hospitality eventually leads to torture and death.

The movie Hostel has a similar theme. Young backpackers are enticed to a youth hostel in Slovakia where they are imprisoned, and the hostel owners are paid handsomely by sadistic millionaires to torture and kill the hostel's guests. The fees charged for torturing and kiing vary with the nationalities of the guests with Americans at the top. An embedded message of the movie is that being American in Slovakia represents a great risk for travellers risk exposure to an orgy of sadism and cruelty. Hostel is a low-budget popular culture allegory of classical folktale themes and cultural functions. Still, Hostel and contemporary horror movies are meant as entertainment-just fiction which requires a willing suspension of disbelief. This is not the case with contemporary stories of terrorism. They are definitively not presented as fiction, but as fact. Terror fairy tales in the post-9/11 era claim to present the truth, albeit one that should strain the mind of a seven-year-old.

Terrorism Mythology and Contemporary Horror

Terrorism as a hypostasized phenomenon was invented by Ronald Reagan's presidential campaign functionaries in 1980. They accused the sitting US president, Jimmy Carter, of giving in or being weak against terrorism. The accusation arguably won the presidency for Ronald Reagan in November. The terrorism industry came into its own during the US presidential election of 1980. It was then that it assisted Ronald Reagan to gain the presidency over the incumbent Jimmy Carter (Wills 2003). The terrorism industry manufactures, refines, and packages for distribution information, analysis, and opinion on a topic called 'terrorism.' The industry-created terrorism qualifies as a commodity. The industry continually manufactures it with adjustments and occasional model changes as dictated by the exigencies of the state and the ruling class. Terrorism in the twenty-first century is an ideological vehicle for the production of fear as a commodity. The ideological apparatuses of the empire manufacture the terrorism mythology by creating terror events. The terrorism industry uses reversal and decontextualization to make its product. It employs techniques of repetition, imagery, and condensation. (Skoll 2016, 135).

Just as the terrorism industry has created the mythology of terrorism so the film industry creates movies. Of course the film industry's goal is profit whereas that of the terrorism industry is to further the interests of the state. Nonetheless, there is more overlap than it might first appear. The terrorism industry is part of the overarching ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971). Movies are products of the culture industry (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). The overlap is greater and more obvious in the propaganda movies like Zero Dark Thirty (Bigelow 2012), American Sniper (Eastwood 2015), and Eye in the Sky (Hood 2016). Increasingly since the Second World War, movies as commodities have sold state ideology with entertainment along a continuum of subtlety-some movies are more ideologically obvious than others. Horror movies seem remote, but partly because ours is an age of fear promoted by the mythology of terrorism, horror and terror mythology begin to converge.

Greek myths follow into the more general category of folktales. Folktales originate as part of oral tradition, and therefore are hard to date. It is only when they are transcribed that they enter a place in history. In the case of the Greek myths, tradition names Homer as the first to record them in writing. But homer's time, the eighth century BCE, was several hundred years removed from the Trojan wars which probably occurred in the eleventh century BCE. Homer's world saw the transition from tribal societies, the home of the heroes of the myths to the emergence of states controlling urban settlements-the city-states of classical Greece. His time also expressed the transition from a culture rooted in Mythos, performance-based transmission of myths, to Logos (Havelock 1983), written myths, which also corresponded to the emergence of the state as the main political mechanism (Gouldner 1965). Moreover, the versions of the Greek myths we moderns rely on are derived from an even later period, the classical Greek age in the fourth century BCE, with poets such as Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles. Modern versions of myths and folktales go through several transformations before they reach us. The original, oral versions function within pre-modern societies, sometimes tribal and sometimes feudal, but always pre-industrial. They reflect the functional requirements of their times. Once recorded, however, another dimension of meaning is added, as their transcribers record them according to the social needs of their times. For example, the Grimm bothers recorded northern European folktales in the first part of the nineteenth century at the time of the rise of the bourgeoisie and industrial capitalism. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein comes from the same era, but Bram Stoker's Dracula is from the age of monopoly capitalism and neo-colonialism. Although the movies considered here are from the twenty-first century, their roots go back to pre-modern times. The movies are an amalgam of cultures, and their most recent accretion comes from the ideological needs of the terror states, especially the United States and its closest Anglophone allies.

Myths, fairy tales, and horror stories call for a willing suspension of disbelief in order to work their cultural magic, which relies on entertainment in the furtherance of enculturation and norm enforcement. Their didacticism is sugar coated. Imbricated social commentary is woven into the story and images, but in ways that are decontextualized as if to avoid censorship. The earlier commentary about blood sucking aristocrats illustrates the point, and so do some distinctions between vampires and werewolves. Vampires can only be killed by a wooden stake, a peasant's tool, but silver bullets kill werewolves. Werewolves are at the opposite end of the social scale; they are homeless rabble. Such criticisms of the social order are probably part of the original oral tradition, but the most recent elements appear in the recorded versions. Frankenstein's monster alludes to the dramatic and potentially uncontrollable forces unleashed by the early industrial revolution in the 1810s, and the aristocrat Dracula must contend with the triumphant bourgeoisie of the 1890s.

When folktales become recorded stories, they are commodified in novels and movies among other forms. Like any commodity, social labor produces them, and a vehicle for the market is the terrorism mythology. Terrorism is the marketing of the fear commodity. Just like steel, cotton cloth, or electronically produced images are created by certain mechanisms of human work so is terrorism. The first, fundamental mechanism is reversal. At this crucial stage of the production process victims are converted to villains. Those who resist the coercive violence of the empire meted out through state apparatuses are recreated as terrorists. Any organized resistance is made into terrorism. Moreover, this production process is progressive. The more certain people are victimized, the more they are depicted as terror threats. Possibly the model in this regard was the Nazi production of communists and Jews as terrorist threats to Germans. The more the communists and Jews were victimizedkilled, torture, detained, and so on-the more they were advertised as dangerous. For an earlier example, the more the United States carried out its genocide of American Indians, the more fearsome became representations of them. The more the US military, CIA, and other purveyors of violence and terror bomb, assassinate, and isolate Muslims and others in the Middle East and Central Asia, the more they become terrorist threats.

An important part of the production of the terrorism mythology and each tale of terror is decontextualization. Representations serve to disconnect events from history and contemporary social phenomena. Repetition is one of the techniques employed in this mechanism as illustrated by the aforementioned repetition of a plane striking the World Trade Center on 9/11. The image becomes the event and explains it. Imagery is of course another technique in the repetition mechanism. Focusing attention on the World Trade Center towers helped sever the event from the hidden connection to the Saudis and that the CIA had created al Qaeda, including its name. Not everyone was mesmerized by the magic. Some saw through the misdirection, but it is not necessary to fool all the people all the time. The minority can always be dismissed as cranks and so-called conspiracy theorists. A third technique in the process of decontextualization is condensation. Condensation narrows consciousness to the event or episode. Only the violent incident, the search for perpetrators, the identification of terrorist organization are depicted and repeated. The war on terror, that global extension of imperial control, is condensed to incidents which are strung together only to present a myth of designated terrorists, which since 9/11 are mainly jihadists.

The mythology of terrorism creates social divisiveness. People learn to fear neither nature nor the supernatural, but each other. Typical of the movies mentioned above, the same theme permeates two of the most popular cable television series: the Walking Dead and Game of Thrones. The first comes from a series of comic books. Robert Kirkman is the principal writer for the novels and comics. The second, The Game of Thrones, based on a novel of the same title and a series of novels, titled A Song of Ice and Fire by George R. R. Martin, Both fall into the general category of science fiction fantasy. In The Walking Dead zombies are the central setting and plot device. It is set in the near future after a virus has turned much of humanity into zombies. The leading characters are those not afflicted, and who try to survive. The setting for The Game of Thrones is another world, but one that resembles earth in general outline with continents, separated by oceans, and differing climates ranging from sub-arctic to sub-tropical. The distinctive feature of Thrones is that it resembles a medieval society-a swords and sorcery fantasy fictional genre. Both are immensely popular television series. Thrones connects with a well-established consuming public going back at least to the nineteenth century's fascination with fictional medievalism, probably set in motion by Sir Walter Scott's (1771-1832) novels. The Walking Dead connects more with monster fiction, but also going back to the nineteenth century and another predilection is that for the undead, such as Bram Stoker's (1847Stoker's ( -1912 Dracula. Other famous fiction in a similar vein is Frankenstein by Mary Shelley, published 1818. One story, The Walking Dead, projects forward in time, and the other, Thrones, backward, but they have a similar political unconscious. Another obvious similarity is that neither has heroes or heroines. Unlike fiction rooted in the nineteenth century and largely through the twentieth, the characters fail to demonstrate anything like heroic personas, or even those that are especially likeable. They have a definite anti-empathic quality, as if both fictional worlds contained mainly psychopaths. This common characteristic is part of their political unconscious (Skoll 2010, 174-5).

Other undead populate the web and popular culture. The undead in various forms may not inhabit the earth, but they proliferate and reproduce in electronic form along with print media. This phenomenon, the popularity of undead motifs, does not arise from especially clever marketing strategies, although they play a role, but they would find less success if it did not resonate with a form of public consciousness, or more accurately, unconsciousness Skoll 2010, 175).

The undead represent a postmodern sensibility. This sensibility reeks of decay. "[It is a] 'degraded' landscape of schlock and kitsch, of TV series and Readers' Digest culture, of advertising and motels, of the late show and the grade-B Hollywood film, of so-called paraliterature with its airport paperback categories of the gothic and the romance, the popular biography, the murder mystery and science fiction or fantasy novel: materials they no longer simply 'quote', as a Joyce or a Mahler might have done, but incorporate into their very substance" (Jameson 1991:55).

CONCLUSION

The postmodern sensibility arises from material conditions in world capitalism. The creation of terrorism mythology was a piece of political propaganda that has risen to dominate international and domestic public policy throughout the world. The state ideological efforts suffuse popular culture, and the two elements-state ideological propaganda and popular culture-lean on each other for their narratives, images, and meanings. Social divisiveness and chaos suffuse movies, television, and popular literature. In the process, fiction and fact have become merged. The creation of the terrorism mythology arose because of the US support for Israel's invasion of Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s, where Lebanese forces resisting US forces were deemed terrorists (Fisk 1990).

International terrorism perpetrated by the United States, and other Western powers, is reversed so that its victims and those who resist it are constructed in propaganda and popular culture as the terrorists. One result has been to curb hospitality among First World nations as their civil populations try to cope with refugees their own governments have created by their military aggressions in the Middle East. Horror movies mirror the radical shifts international geopolitics, because such popular culture artefacts partake in the hegemonic ideology. The attacks of 9/11 have been used to justify US imperial aggression and act as the foundation for the fear-filled social imaginary.