Could Turkey dam the Tigris and Euphrates and deprive its downstream neighbors of vital water resources? Could Brazil over-pump the Guarani Aquifer System to the detriment of the other aquifer states? Could Egypt put pressure on upstream Nile states and prevent them from developing river related infrastructure that might limit downstream flow? International law in the field of transboundary water cooperation has evolved and would appear to condemn unilateral practices such as the ones suggested above. However, hydro politics and the lack of reception of international water law instruments by many countries sometimes make it difficult to see international law properly reflected in the management of major rivers, lakes and aquifers around the world. In this essay, I first highlight what international law dictates when it comes to the tension between national sovereignty and transboundary water cooperation. I then explore how this tension plays out in the three examples noted above. Du...

This paper addresses hydro-hegemony from the perspective of International Water Law, by examining the role of law in upstream/downstream negotiations. It is built on the understanding that International Water Law constitutes an element of power relations, asserting that it is a source of structural and bargaining power. The first section of the paper discusses main principles that have emerged, and their establishment as terms of reference for water cooperation. In the second part, competing claims are analyzed to see how co-riparians in the Euphrates and Tigris basins have provided deliberately conflicting interpretations over “International rivers”, “equitable and reasonable utilization”, “no harm”, “prior notification” and “consultation” to derive negotiating positions and influence from International Water Law. Conclusions point to the understanding of water law as a structural variable, impacting on the actors’ constraints and options and enhancing the structural power of the non hegemonic riparians. International Water Law appears to operate as well as process-related variable which influences the process and outcome of water negotiations. As a source of bargaining power, legal principles increase the legitimacy of downstream riparians and enhances their bargaining position in the negotiation process.

Transboundary water politics in the Euphrates-Tigris river system have evolved with competitive power dynamics and cooperative institutional development. We analyze the evolution of transboundary water relations over four consecutive periods. The first period coincided with nation build- ing in the region, when the riparian states focused on their domestic need for socioeconomic development rather than the formulation of external water policies. The second period saw the advent of competitive trans- boundary water politics shaped by the initiation of uncoordinated, large- scale water development projects. The third period was the most complex, given the link between transboundary water issues and nonriparian secu- rity issues. In the fourth period, the role of water bureaucracies in the re- orientation of water policies from hostile to cooperative became significant. Even in the midst of the very recent political crisis between Turkey and Syria, partial institutionalization of water cooperation and growing networks of water dialogue at both the governmental and non- governmental levels should continue to serve as open channels for easing the tensions. KEYWORDS: transboundary water politics, Euphrates-Tigris rivers, Iraq, Syria, Turkey, conflict, cooperation, water bureaucracies.