In this article, I try to flesh out the shadowy figure of Mithradates, son of a sister of the Seleukid king Antiochos III, supposing that he is the ancestor of the line of the Kommagenian sovereigns which had its most illustrious member in Antiochos I and which lasted until the Imperial Age. The name of Mithradates's possible son, Ptolemaios of Kommagene, led me to think that the father of this first Kommagenian sovereign married a princess of the dynasty of Telmessos. It is possible that Mithradates reigned for some time in Sophene, succeeding Zariadres or Zariadris in the period 188-179. The historical sources on this subject are few and fragmentary: two passages by Polybios, one by Diodoros of Sicily and some epigraphical and numismatic documents. A chart at the end of this article illustrates some relationships proposed in the paper and categorizes them by degree of certainty. The article intends to show how Antiochos III and his immediate successors sought to control the most peripheral areas of their huge kingdom through vassal rulers rather than direct rule, according the hypothesis proposed few years ago by D. Engels 1 (and discussed more recently by him 2 and by R. Strootman 3), even though this hypothesis seems to be contradicted by the annexation of Kommagene by Antiochos III. Actually we have no idea about Kommagene's first Seleukid governors, who might well be indigenous nobles (like Zariadres and Artaxias in Armenia). On the other hand, just when we can shed some light on the political situation of Kommagene, we find an Orontid, Ptolemaios (who belonged to the dynasty that had ruled for centuries in Armenia and Kommagene and who probably was a relative of the Seleukid king), as its governor. Note This Iranian name invariably appears in literary sources as Mithridates, in epigraphical and numismatic ones as Mithradates. I prefer to use the latter form, because it is closer to the original Iranian name (Mithradata), unless I am quoting a literary or modern historical source which prefers the Mithridates version.

We are hard pressed to understand the events of Caracalla’s Parthian war, including the role Armenia played in the conflict, because of gross inadequacies in our sources. A careful analysis suggests that Caracalla intended to annex Armenia but never saw the project through. His intentions can be gauged by his treatment of Edessa, for whose annexation the evidence is more solid. Caracalla was trying to secure his rear, from Osrhoene to Armenia, in preparation for a full-scale Parthian war. Because the goal of stabilizing Armenia proved elusive, given local hostilities, Caracalla had to scale back his plans.

This thesis demonstrates that the emperor Augustus (31 BC to AD 14) did encourage and instigate marriage-alliances between Roman client kings, as suggested by the sources. Analysis of the marriage-alliances formed before Augustus’ reign reveals a number of characteristics that did not apply to many of the marriage-alliances formed during Augustus’ reign and beyond. New or modified characteristics have assisted in the determination of which marriage-alliances were arranged by the emperor. Furthermore, this thesis also assesses the possible aims that compelled Augustus to arrange or encourage these marriages, how this policy complied with the emperor’s other beliefs and policies regarding marriage in general, and whether his policy was continued by his successors. Finally the repercussions and problems that arose from binding the client kings together through intermarriage are examined and the policy assessed in terms of success or failure. The study of Augustus’ policy of intermarriage between client kings also illuminates the nature and role of client kings within the framework of the principate and shed further light on their relationship with the emperor.

Note that this is an early Master's thesis and therefore somewhat outdated.

The aim of this study is to analyse the Roman-Parthian relations under Artabanos II and Tiberius, and the political role played by Armenia, focusing on the agreement between the Roman prince Germanicus and Artabanos II. A scrutiny of military and diplomatic measures taken by Rome, Parthia, and minor kings of Kappadokia, Pontos and Armenia suggests a new perspective of the Roman and Parthian policies towards Armenia under Tiberius and Artabanos II. Artabanos IIʼs triumph over Vonones compelled Rome to revise her policy toward Parthia. Arta-banos agreed on a compromise with the ruler of Kappadokia Archelaos, a Roman client king, that involved installing Archelaosʼ stepson, Zeno, on the throne of Armenia. Germanicusʼ intervention in Armenia in A.D. 18 led to the conclusion of a compromise settlement between Rome and the Parthians, securing over a decade of peace between the two powers. Zeno Artaxiasʼ coronation at the hands of Ger-manicus was commemorated by the issue of a set of meaningful silver coins.

With an overall length of about 550km, the Pontic-Cappadocian frontier was among the longest in the Roman Empire. It is also the least known, as there is a minimal amount of literary, epigraphic and archaeological evidence available for the location and identity of the province’s garrison. In addition, many of the military stations known or believed to have existed on the frontier are now lost beneath the waters of the Keban dam. However, a re-examination of the available evidence, along with recent limited and spontaneous fieldwork in the region, allows for some tentative remarks to be made on the origins and early history of this frontier. These form the main subject of this article, and include the suggestion that Nero should be credited with the genesis of this frontier, not Vespasian, as usually indicated in the modern literature.