Austria
Kerem Öktem
Introduction
2014 was an eventful year for Austria’s Muslims marked by contradictory shortand medium term trends. Employing a short-term focus of analysis, it would be
fair to say that the long-standing phenomena of xenophobia, Islamophobia,1
and structural racism both by state agencies and citizens have become more
deeply pronounced in public debates and everyday encounters between
Muslims and non-Muslim Austrians.2 This may not be surprising, as the public
debate on Islam and Muslims is structured by the prevalence of two right-wing
populist institutions, which follow a decidedly anti-Muslim and anti-immigration discourse: a tabloid newspaper (Neue Kronenzeitung) with a circulation of
over 800,000 daily copies and hence a penetration rate of 40% of Austrian society, and the extreme right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs, FPÖ) with electoral support rates of up to 30%.3
The deepening of Islamophobia has been aggravated by the mounting violence of global jihadi groups and the growing public attention given
to that violence in European societies. This attention is visible in the widely
reported dehumanising methods of warfare of the so-called Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) but also takes on specific local relevance with reports of
the involvement of Austrian citizens therein. Islamophobic reactions made
* Kerem Öktem is Professor for the Study of Southeast Europe and Modern Turkey at the
Centre of Southeast European Studies, University of Graz (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz)
and Associate of the Centre of International Studies, University of Oxford. I would like to
thank Mag. Güler Alkan (University of Graz) for her meticulous research for this entry.
1 See Hafez, Farid (ed.), Jahrbuch für Islamophobieforschung 2014 (Vienna: New Academic Press,
2014); Müller-Uri, Fanny, Antimuslimischer Rassismus (Wien: Mandelbaum, 2014); Bunzl,
John, and Farid Hafez (eds.), Islamophobie in Österreich (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009);
Bunzl, Matti, Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe (Chicago:
Prickly Paradigm Press, 2007).
2 The racism monitoring agency ZARA testifies to a significant rise in racist and Islamophobic
attacks. See, Scḧfer, Claudia (ed.), Rassismus Report 2014: Einzelfall-Bericht über rassistische
Ü bergriffe und Strukturen in Ö sterreich (Vienna: ZARA—Zivilcourage und Anti-RassismusArbeit, 2015).
3 Kremling, Lisa, “Feindbild MuslimInnen: Zur Konstruktion anti-muslimischer Fremdbilder”,
in Scḧfer, Rassismus Report 2014, pp. 64–65.
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004308909_005
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inroads into public debates on the Islamgesetz (Islam Law), shaping the final
text that became law in February 2015, and into controversies over the alleged
absence of “willingness” among Muslims to integrate. The idea that Muslims
not only do not belong to Austrian society but also that they fail to make an
effort to belong, is captured in a neologism imported from the German antiimmigration debate: Integrationsunwilligkeit or “lacking the willingness to
integrate.” In public debates, such euphemisms have largely supplanted more
meaningful and policy-relevant discussions on discrimination, racism, classbiased access to education, and constraints on social capital to the domain
of less audible experts. These developments have consolidated the idea that
Islam does not really belong to Austria, with more than 50% of Austrians in
December 2014 supporting the statement that “Islam is a danger for Austria’s
culture.”4
A medium-term analysis would probably tell a different story: despite the
prevalence of kneejerk reactions to the challenges of jihadi violence, two
important processes appear to have consolidated the conditions for the acceptance of Muslims and their permanence in Austria. A growing trend towards
naturalisation meant that the citizenship ratio of Muslims in Austria increased
from below 30% in 2001 to over 50% in 2014.5 It is highly probable that this
will lead to a growing number of Austrian citizens with a Muslim heritage
in political office and positions of power, following the patterns of Muslims in
Germany and other European countries in the last decade. The debate on
the Islam Law (Islamgesetz) and its current promulgated version leave much
space for improvement. The Islam Law nevertheless reaffirms the recognition
of Muslims by the Austrian state, which has its roots in the initial law dating
back to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It has the potential to create a framework whereby Muslims are eventually placed on an equal footing with other
religious communities.6
4 See Seidl, Conrad, “Jeder Zweite sieht Islam als Gefahr für Österreichs Kultur”, DerStandard.
at, 9 January 2015, http://derstandard.at/2000010210943/Jeder-Zweite-sieht-Islam-als-Gefahrfuer-Oesterreichs-Kultur, accessed 10 January 2015.
5 According to Aslan and Yıldız, the ratio of naturalised Muslims reached 49% in 2012.
As circumstantial evidence strongly suggests, this trend has continued since, resulting in a
citizenship ratio above 50% in 2014. See Aslan, Ednan, and Erol Yıldız (eds.), Muslimische
Alltagspraxis in Österreich: Ein Kompass zur religiösen Diversität. Zwischenbericht für das
Projektjahr 2013 (Vienna: Universiẗt Wien, Institut für Islamische Studien, 2014), pp. 19–22.
6 Kifayat, Adnan, A New Model for Integration: Austria’s New Law on Islam (Washington: The
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2015), www.gmfus.org/blog/2015/04/09/newmodel-integration-austria’s-new-law-islam, accessed 10 April 2015.
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43
Public Debates
Throughout 2014, the Austrian public has been incensed by stories pertaining to Islam in one way or another. These were all linked to global events of
jihadi violence and transnational Islamist mobilisation. Most share a negative
subtext. The debate on the Islam Law has been a constant in this landscape of
debates and responses to jihadi mobilisation. In chronological sequence, the
following stories shaped the debate on Muslims in Austria most forcefully:
The “Jihadi Poster Girls” story began in April 2014 and lasted through much
of the year; Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s election visit to Vienna led to
an outcry against the involvement of foreign actors in Austrian Muslim communities in June 2014; a simmering conflict over the Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz
International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID)
escalated in September 2014.
The case of two teenagers, Samra Kesinovic and Sabina Selimovic, who travelled to Syria in April 2014 to join the so-called Islamic State captured Austrian,
and increasingly international, media interest.7 The two girls, aged 15 and 16,
were not from religiously conservative families, and the transformation of
their appearance from flirtatious Viennese schoolgirls of Bosnian origin to
fully covered women in ISIS-controlled Syria was intriguing for the Austrian
public. Tabloid as well as quality papers were fascinated by this conversion
into “Jihad brides” and “Playmates for Jihadists.”8 Despite the veritable media
frenzy around the two girls, however, a public debate on the responsibility of
head teachers and public agencies failed to materialise, even after it became
evident that neither chose not to act, despite clear signs of radicalisation.9
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s election trip to Vienna and his forceful rejection
of “assimilation” in June 2014 sent shockwaves through the Austrian political establishment. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Integration, Sebastian
Kurz, described Erdoğan’s visit as “detrimental” and suggested that “we had
made progress on the identity issue. Due to his gig, things have become more
7 Sherwood, Harriet, Sandra Laville, Kim Willsher, Ben Knight, Maddy French and Lauren
Gambino, “Schoolgirl jihadis: the female Islamists leaving home to join Isis fighters”, The
Guardian.com, 29 September 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/29/schoolgirljihadis-female-islamists-leaving-home-join-isis-iraq-syria, accessed 11 April 2015.
8 Kraitt, Tyma, “Dschihad in Wien”, falter.at, 12 August 2014, www.falter.at/falter/2014/08/12/
der-dschihad-in-wien/, accessed 11 April 2015.
9 The head teacher of the school attended by Samra Kesinovic, simply expelled her without
calling on community representatives, social workers or the police. See Steinberger, Karin,
“I love al-Qaida”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 October 2014.
44
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complicated.”10 The Turkish Prime Minister’s visit and his allusions to Ottoman
grandeur were seen as interference in Austrian domestic affairs and as an
attempt to roll back efforts for integration, or what Kurz described as “progress
on the identity issue.” This overall sentiment was further aggravated by reports
that ATIB, the Austrian Association of the Turkish Presidency of Religious
Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) was involved in mobilisation efforts prior to
the Erdoğan visit, leading in turn to a reappraisal by the Austrian government
of foreign country funding of religious communities.11
The Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and
Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID,12 henceforth Centre) was established in 2012
as a Saudi-funded international institution for interreligious and intercultural
dialogue in Vienna. While the Centre sparked criticism by left-wing and some
Muslim groups even before its establishment,13 an episode in 2014 led to particular public concern. It was an interview with the Centre’s vice-secretary,
former Austrian Minster of Justice Claudia Bandion-Ortner, who played down
criticism of capital punishment in Saudi Arabia with the rather compromising
statement: “decapitations do not take place every Friday.”14
Transnational Links
Transnational links pertaining to Muslim networks are varied, multifaceted
and complex. Almost all of Austria’s Muslims are embedded in transnational,
or at least bi-national, spaces of cultural, economic, and political interaction.
10
11
12
13
14
Ultsch, Christian, “Erdoğans Einmischung war scḧdlich”, DiePresse.com, 20 June 2014,
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/3824747/Erdogans-Einmischungwar-schaedlich?_vl_backlink=/home/politik/aussenpolitik/3820502/index.do&
direct=3820502, accessed 1 April 2015. The author goes further in proposing that it was this
incident which ultimately led the Government and Foreign Minister Kurz to ban foreign
country funding in the revised Islam Law.
Neuhold, Clemens, “Der Halbmond ḧngt schief”, WienerZeitung.at, 27 February 2015,
www.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/oesterreich/politik/737835_Der-Halbmond-haengtschief.html, accessed 1 April 2015.
www.kaiciid.org, accessed 1 April 2015.
Ultsch, Christian, and Erich Kocina, “Dialogzentrum der Saudis in Wien löst hitzige
Debatte aus”, DiePresse.com, 4 October 2011, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/
innenpolitik/698385/Dialogzentrum-der-Saudis-in-Wien-lost-hitzige-Debatte-aus,
accessed 11 April 2015.
“Interview mit Claudia Bandion-Ortner zum Alltag in Saudi-Arabien: ‘Nicht jeden Freitag
wird geköpft’ ”, profil.at, 21 October 2014, www.profil.at/oesterreich/interview-claudiabandion-ortner-alltag-saudi-arabien-nicht-freitag-378239, accessed 1 April 2015.
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45
The countries of origin of first generation immigrants, like Turkey, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, or Macedonia, play important roles for the identification of
young Muslims and their cultural and political socialisation. Yet, it was particularly the transnational nature of global jihadi mobilisation and the pull of
the Syrian war that attracted public interest. This interest was closely followed
by debates on institutions and activities associated with the Turkish state, particularly with the role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and its
Austria-based union called ATIB, but also the Gülen movement. Such interest
peaked especially during and after Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to
Vienna in June 2014.
Existing transnational jihadi networks in Austria have been reinvigorated
by the civil war in Syria and aggressive recruitment by the Al-Nusrah Front and
the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) affiliates. In August 2014,
several would-be fighters on their way to Turkey and Syria were intercepted
at the Austrian border.15 A comprehensive series of raids against jihadi networks took place in November 2014. It led to the arrest of 13 suspects thought
to be associated with the Al-Nusrah Front,16 and drew attention to a “Bosnian
connection” of jihadis who use Salafi prayer rooms in Vienna to radicalise
young Muslims and then send them to Syria after military training in Bosnia.17
While any numbers of Austrian residents joining jihadi networks can only be
perfunctory, experts estimate the number to be at least 270.18 This is a relatively
high number considering the size of the Austrian Muslim population.
Law and Domestic Politics
The amendment of the Islam Law (Islamgesetz), scheduled for debate in the
Austrian Parliament in early 2015 constituted the most important, but also
the most contested, development in the legal sphere. In response to the
15
16
17
18
Ritterband, Charles, “Die Gefahr der ‘Austro-Jihadisten’—Von Österreich in den ‘heiligen
Krieg’”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 August 2014, www.nzz.ch/international/von-oesterreichin-den-heiligen-krieg-1.18369384, accessed 23 February 2015.
“13 Festnahmen bei Großrazzia gegen Islamisten”, DiePresse.com, 28 November 2014,
http://diepresse.com/home/panorama/oesterreich/4606718/13-Festnahmen-beiGrossrazzia-gegen-Islamisten, accessed 13 February 2015.
Wetz, Andreas, “Bosnien Connection: Al-Qaidas Netzwerk in Österreich”, DiePresse.
com, 29 November 2014, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/4607236/
BosnienConnection_AlQaidas-Netzwerk-in-Osterreich, accessed 23 February 2015.
Weissensteiner, Nina, “Terrormitgliedschaft: Verfahren im Vorjahr mehr als verdoppelt”,
DerStandard.at, 20 January 2015, http://derstandard.at/2000010603446/Oesterreich-269Verfahren-wegen-Terror-Mitgliedschaft, accessed 23 February 2015.
46
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growing activity of jihadi networks, the Government also tightened criminal
law and passed several measures against the radicalisation of young Muslims.
For a long time, Austria has been marked by an intriguing contradiction. Despite a generally unsympathetic sentiment towards immigrants and
Muslims in Austrian society, the country possessed quite a unique legal framework for the incorporation of Muslim communities into state structures.
This unique situation was owed to the country’s imperial past and the aim of
the Austro-Hungarian state to control and manage the Muslims of annexed
Bosnia and Herzegovina.19 First promulgated in 1912 and obsolete well into
the 1960s with the arrival of first Yugoslav and Turkish immigrants, the Islam
Law (henceforth also referred to as Law) did create a sense of legal certainty
and formal structures for Muslim communities. Since 1979, an officially recognised Muslim community exists, the Muslim Religious Community of Austria
(Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ), established according
to the provisions of the Islam Law.20 Unlike in annexed Bosnia, where the Law
was successful in establishing a single catch-all Muslim community representative of all Muslims, diversity in Austria’s post-World War II immigrant society
made such a goal unattainable. Debates for an amendment of the Law had
been going on since 2012 and included representatives of the existing Muslim
communities. Debates reached a peak towards the end of 2014 with most
Muslim communities rejecting the amended Law.
The Law in its version discussed in 2014 is characterised by two conflicting
logics: an integrative and a securitising one. Following the first logic, it includes
positive gestures, ranging from the recognition of the Muslim community to
the safeguarding of Islamic dietary requirements in public institutions and the
right to attend Friday prayers. The second logic is at least as consequential and
rooted in the general suspicion that Muslims constitute a substantial security
threat. In consequence, the Law obliges Muslim communities to declare the
primacy of the laws and values of the State and makes it impossible for Muslim
groups not associated with the official IGGiÖ to continue their religious
19
20
For a concise discussion of the Islam Law’s history, see Schmidinger, Thomas, “Austria”, in
Jørgen S. Nielsen, Samim Akgönül, Ahmet Alibašić and Egdunas Račius (eds.), Yearbook of
Muslims in Europe, vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 47–64 (49–51).
Heine, Susanne, Rüdiger Lohlker and Richard Potz (eds.), Muslime in Österreich:
Geschichte, Lebenswelt, Religion: Grundlagen für den Dialog (Innsbruck, Vienna: TyroliaVerlag, 2012), p. 56.
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47
services. Most controversially, it explicitly outlaws the funding of religious services by bodies outside Austria.21
Leading legal experts have pointed out that the clause prohibiting foreign
funding violates the principle of equal treatment, since such prohibition does
not apply to any other religious group in Austria.22 Yet, the ban also constitutes a blatant interference into the autonomy of a religious community,
and it is unlikely that the current amendment would hold up to scrutiny by
the Austrian Constitutional Court, or, that failing, by the European Court of
Human Rights. Despite the positive signals, which the Islam Law also sends
to Austria’s Muslims, it may create more problems than it promised to solve
if it becomes law in the current form. It snubs the country’s largest Muslim
association ATIB, whose very existence is based on Turkish funding and
being part of the larger structures of Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs.
For smaller associations, who are not yet affiliated with the IGGiÖ, the situation may dramatically worsen, as they will be explicitly banned from operating prayer rooms after 2015. And finally, for Shi’i and Alevi groups, the need
arises for a rapid re-orientation, either towards the IGGiÖ or towards applying for registration as a distinct community. Some Alevis have successfully
done this, establishing the Muslim Alevi Community in Austria (Islamische
Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft, IAGÖ), only to be challenged by a dissenting
Alevi organisation, which has contested IAGÖ’s claim to represent all Alevis.
Considering that Alevism as a distinct religious community that stands outside
Islam, the Federation of Alevi Communities in Austria (Föderation der Aleviten
Gemeinden in Österreich, AABF) also applied for registration.23 Another such
application is expected from the Islamic Shi’i Religious Community in Austria.
21
22
23
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Integration Sebastian Kurz justified this choice in
stark words: “With other religions, there is not the challenge that we have to fear influences from abroad and therefore have to be stricter with the funding. . . . We want an
Austrian form of Islam.” See Bell, Bethany, “Austria’s Muslims fear changes to historic
Islam law”, BBC News, 4 November 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29814688
accessed 5 December 2014.
Fritzl, Martin, “Experten gegen Islamgesetz”, DiePresse.at, 24 October 2014, http://
diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/4195325/Experten-gegen-Islamgesetz,
accessed 12 April 2015.
Karabulut, Deniz, “AABF Presseerkl̈rung”, aleviten.com, http://aleviten.com/index.php/
de/start/78-haberler/176-aabf-presseerklaerung, accessed 13 February 2015.
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In response to the growing number of “foreign fighters” in Syria hailing from
Austria, the Government passed a set of legal initiatives with the intent to
fight jihadi recruitment and incitement to terrorism.24 In a move exemplary
of Austrian ambiguities towards inclusive notions of citizenship, Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Integration Sebastian Kurz was considering a change in the
citizenship law to ensure that “Austro-Jihadists” found to be fighting abroad
can be stripped of their Austrian passports.25
Activities and Initiatives of Main Muslim Organisations
At first sight, Muslim organisations seem to act, above all, within the framework set by a “majority society” and a public sphere structured by populist
tabloids overwhelmingly unsympathetic to Muslims and immigrants. Muslim
organisations and their representatives hence are generally called upon to
apologise for, or at least to express their shock about, atrocities committed by
global jihadi groups. Every so often, they will respond to Islamophobic public
debates (i.e. Integrationsunwilligkeit) or comment on legal initiatives like the
Islam Law or the measures against jihadi radicalisation. In this sense, Muslim
organisations are held captive by the agenda, fears, and animosities of the
majority society.
It would, however, be misleading to think of Muslim organisations in
Austria as lacking agency. Despite a structure tilting towards Islamophobia
and xenophobia, Muslim organisations have been active in a wide range of
fields, from community and spiritual work and dialogue events with other religious communities in Austria to mobilisation for transnational “Muslim interest issues.” The most visible organisations were the official Islamic Religious
Community (IGGiÖ) and its two largest constituent members, the Austrian
Turkish Islamic Union (ATIB) and the Islamic Federation (IF), the Muslim
Youth of Austria (MJÖ) and the two organisations representing Turkish and
Kurdish Alevis, IAGÖ and AABF. Despite a significant presence of Muslims
24
25
“Verhetzungsparagraf wird verscḧrft”, news.orf.at, 14 October 2014, http://orf.at/
stories/2249580/2249578/, accessed 23 February 2014. “Anti-Terror-Paket im Nationalrat
beschlossen”, news.orf.at, 10 December 2014, http://orf.at/stories/2257176/, accessed
23 February 2015.
Aichinger, Philipp, “Minister Kurz will Jihadisten ausbürgern”, DiePresse.com, 19 January
2015, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/4642366/Minister-Kurz-willJihadisten-ausburgern, accessed 12 April 2015.
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49
from the ex-Yugoslav space, the IGGiÖ and its affiliated communities on state
level are dominated by Muslims from Turkey.26
The celebration of religious festivities and community work is the main area
of activity of all Muslim organisations in Austria and elsewhere. They include
the celebration of Muslim holidays, collective dinners during Ramadan, and
particularly in the Turkish-Hanafi tradition, the celebration of the Prophet’s
birthday and the “Holy Birth Week,” complemented by Qur’an reading events.
During the month of Ramadan, many Muslims dedicate their zakat to Muslims
in poorer countries, an activity that also serves to create a sense of commitment to the concerns of Muslims elsewhere.27 Crucial community services
extend from language and religious courses to the “burial funds” by ATIB or the
Islamic Federation.28
Particularly the Muslim Youth Austria, which is one of the few associations not shaped by strong links to the “country of origin”—at least among
Turkish and Balkan Muslim associations—is committed to a bottom-up logic
of dialogue and cooperation with other religious communities and initiatives
against racism and xenophobia. They are members of the National Youth
Representation (Bundesjugendvertretung) and hence share a platform with
young Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, and other religious groups. This
is particularly important from a medium-term perspective, as it is in such
forums that young people are socialised into modes of collective belonging
that are more inclusive than the tendentially exclusivist structure of Austrian
society.
It is in the domain of transnational Muslim interest issues that “Muslim
agency” creates the largest potential for friction with the Austrian majority
society. Particularly demonstrations against the Israeli occupation of Palestine
and the Al-Quds-Day in July 2014 are seen through the lens of Austria’s historical responsibility for the Holocaust, and are hence often classified as
anti-Semitic.29 The most contested transnational issue of Muslim concern in
26
27
28
29
Heine et al., Muslime in Österreich, p. 58.
I would like to thank Dudu Küçükgöl (Muslim Youth Austria) for her valuable contributions to this section.
Especially Turkish Muslims up to the grandchildren of immigrants tend to opt for a burial
in Turkey rather than in Europe. Burial funds hence play an important social, cultural and
religious function. In Vienna, approximately 70% of all Muslim funerals are transferred to
the country of origin. See Heine et al., Muslime in Österreich, p. 134.
See “Anti-israelische Kundgebung in Wien”, DerStandard.at, 26 July 2014, http://
derstandard.at/2000003576278/Anti-israelische-Kundgebung-in-Wien, accessed 12 April
2015. A coalition of Jewish, Zionist and Green Party groups formed an alliance against
the Al-Quds-Day: See “Bündnis gegen den Al Quds Tag in Wien gegen Antisemitismus
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Austria—if only within its Turkish constituencies—was the election visit
of then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 18 June 2014, his
speech to an audience of more than 7,000 sympathisers and the involvement
of Turkish associations in the preparation of the visit. This visit was especially
insightful, as it revealed the extent to which history shapes Austrian attitudes
and fears towards Islam and Muslims. Erdoğan’s appraisal of Turks in Vienna
as the “grandchildren of Suleiman the Magnificent . . . and Kara Mustafa”—the
commanders of the first and second Ottoman sieges on Vienna—exposed a
raw nerve in the complex landscape of Austrian identity politics.30
Demographics and Statistics
The last available census data using the explicit category of religious affiliation dates back to the micro-census of 15 January 2001.31 According to the 2001
census, 338,988 residents of Austria were identified as Muslims, which corresponds to 4.2% of the total population. A large majority of 71.7% held foreign
country citizenships. A 2009 study by Stephan Marik-Lebeck, a demographer
with the state demography agency Statistics Austria, estimated the country’s
Muslim population to be 515,914.32 The most recent projection from January
2012 was compiled by Ednan Aslan and Erol Yıldız.33 The following data is
based on the Aslan and Yıldız projection and on Marik-Lebeck’s study, which
they take as the point of departure.
30
31
32
33
und Islamismus”, https://gegendenalqudstagwien.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/aufruf-zurkundgebung-gegen-den-al-quds-tag-in-wien-2014/, accessed 12 April 2015.
Özkan, Duygu, “Erdoğan in Wien. Die Enkel der Belagerer”, Zeit Online, 20 June 2014, www
.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2014-06/recep-tayyip-erdogan-wien, accessed 1 March 2015.
Statistik Austria, Bevölkerung 2001 nach Religionsbekenntnis und Staatsangehörigkeit
(Wien: Statistik Austria, 2007), www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/bevoelkerung/
volkszaehlungen_registerzaehlungen_abgestimmte_erwerbsstatistik/bevoelkerung_
nach_demographischen_merkmalen/022894.html, accessed 10 March 2015.
Marik-Lebeck, Stephan, “Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs: Bestand und
Ver̈nderung 2001–2009”, in Alexander Janda and Mathias Vogl (eds.), Islam in Österreich
(Vienna: Österreichischer Integrationsfonds, 2010), pp. 5–9 (7).
Aslan and Yıldız, Muslimische Alltagspraxis in Österreich, pp. 19–22.
51
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Muslim Population
573,876 (6.8% of population in 2012).34
Ethnic/National
Backgrounds
49% of Muslims in Austria hold the Austrian
citizenship (in 2009).35
Largest ethnic/national groups:36
Turkish: 21.2%
Bosnian: 10.1%
Montenegrin, Serbian, Kosovar: 6.7%
Russian: 3.6%
Macedonian: 2.7%
Afghani: 0.8%
Egyptian: 0.8%
Iranian: 0.8%
Pakistani: 0.5%
Tunisian: 0.3%
Iraqi: 0.3%
Bangladeshi: 0.3%
Other: 3.2%
Inner-Islamic Groups
34
35
36
37
Most Muslims in Austria belong to the Sunni-Hanafi
School prevalent in Turkey and most Balkan countries. There is a sizeable Alevi community with
origins in Turkey, which is estimated at 10–20% of
the total Muslim population.37 Roughly 1% of all
Aslan and Yıldız, Muslimische Alltagspraxis in Österreich, p. 20.
Marik-Lebeck, “Die muslimische Bevölkerung Österreichs”, p. 7. Please note that the percentage points add up to slightly more than 100% due to the separate rounding off of each
country figure.
These figures are based on citizenship and not on ethnic or linguistic roots. Turkish passport holders, for instance, can be Turks or Kurds. Based on the available data, a further
distinction into ethnic and linguistic groups is therefore not possible.
Medien-Servicestelle Neue ÖsterreicherInnen, Türkische Community—Zahlen und
Daten (Vienna: MSNÖ 2011), http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2011/08/17/
turkische-community-zahlen-und-daten/, accessed 12 March 2015. Thomas Schmidinger
suggested in 2008 that the share of Alevis may be as high as 25–30%, even though this
is probably an overestimation. Schmidinger, Thomas, “Islam in Ö sterreich—zwischen
Repr̈sentation und Integration“, in Andreas Khol, Günther Ofner, Stefan Karner und
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Muslims in Austria emigrated from countries with a
Shi’i majority population.38
Geographical Spread
Most Muslims in Austria live in the Northern states
on the German border, with 38% or 216,345 in the
capital Vienna alone. 30% live in the states of Upperand Lower Austria.39
Number of Mosques
There are 205 mosques registered with the official
Islamic Religious Community in Austria (Islamische
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IGGiÖ),40 and
several hundred non-registered prayer rooms. Four
mosques in Vienna, Telfs, Bad Vöslau, and Saalfelden
are purpose-built structures with minarets, with a
fifth such structure awaiting completion in Graz.
Muslim Burial Sites
– Muslim Cemetery Vienna (Islamischer Friedhof Wien, Großmarktstraße 2a, 1230 Wien,
cemetery administration: Ali Ibrahim, tel.: ++43
6764706920, islamischer.friedhof@gmx.at). Operated by the Islamic Religious Community in
Austria (IGGiÖ), 4000 burial plots.
– Muslim Cemetery Altach (Islamischer Friedhof
Altach, Schotterried 1, 6844 Altach, http://altach.
at/buergerservice/bestattungen/islamischerfriedhof-altach, Cemetery administration: Ali
Can, tel.: ++43 6644355927). Public cemetery, 700
burial plots.
– Interconfessional Cemetery Graz (Interkonfessioneller Friedhof Graz, Alte Poststrasse 343,
8020 Graz, bestattung@holding-graz.at). Public
38
39
40
Dietmar Halper (eds.), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna, Cologne,
Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2008), pp. 235–256 (242).
Aslan and Yıldız, Muslimische Alltagspraxis in Österreich, p. 21.
Aslan and Yıldız, Muslimische Alltagspraxis in Österreich, p. 21.
Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, Registrierte Moscheen (Wien: IGGiÖ,
2015), www.derislam.at/?c=content&p=suchen_moschee&v=vereine&cssid=Moscheen&
navid=410&par=40&cssid=Moscheen&navid=410&par=40, accessed 8 March 2015.
Schmidinger estimates the number of prayer rooms at 260–280. Schmidinger, “Austria”,
p. 56.
Austria
53
cemetery, contains a Muslim section with
200 burial plots.
– Central Cemetery Vienna (Zentralfriedhof
Wien, Simmeringer Hauptstraße 234, 1100 Wien,
tel.: ++43 153469–28405). Public cemetery
which contains several sections for Muslims, also one dedicated to Egyptian Muslims.
Since 2011 the Islamic Alevi Religious Community in Austria has its own section at the
central cemetery Vienna too.41
– Muslim Cemetery at Linz/St. Martin (Islamischer Friedhof im Linz/St. Martin, Wiener
Bundesstraße 101, 4050 Traun). Public cemetery with a Muslim section.42
Places of Islamic Learning
and Education
41
42
– Academy for Muslim Religious Education
(Islamische Religionspädagogische Akademie,
IRPA, Eitnergasse 6, 1230 Wien, tel.: ++43
18674400, www.irpa.ac.at/). Private Degree
Course for Islamic Education (Privater
Studiengang für das Lehramt Islamische
Religion). The Academy is run by the Islamic
Religious Community in Austria (IGGiÖ) and
offers a three-year Bachelor of Education
in Islamic Religion for teaching Islamic
Religious Education at elementary and compulsory school level.
– Private Degree Programme in continuing
religious education for Muslims (Privater
Hochschullehrgang für Islamische Religionspädagogische Weiterbildung, IHL, Neustiftgasse 17, 1070 Wien, tel.: ++43 178632244,
www.ihl.ac.at/). Like the Academy, the programme is administered by the IGGiÖ and
offers further education and seminars for
Islamic religious teachers.
www.aleviten.at/de/?p=90, accessed 24 July 2015.
https://portal.linz.gv.at/Serviceguide/viewChapter.html?chapterid=121612, accessed 24
July 2015.
54
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– University of Vienna, Centre for Teacher Education
(Universität Wien, Zentrum für LehrerInnenbildung,
Porzellangasse 4, 1090 Wien, tel.: ++43 1427760060,
www.islamische-religionspaedagogik.at/home.
html). Two-year Master’s Degree in Islamic
Religious Education (Masterstudium Islamische
Religionspädagogik). Graduates are qualified to
teach Islamic Religious Education at secondary
schools.
– University of Vienna, Institute for Islamic Studies
(Universität Wien, Institut für Islamische Studien,
IIS, Thurngasse 8, 1090 Wien, tel.: ++ 43 1427725202,
https://iis.univie.ac.at/home/). The IIS was established as an interdisciplinary and cross-faculty
research platform in 2012 with the aim to further
research on Islamic religious pedagogy and Islamic
theology. It does not offer degree programmes,
but its faculty is involved in academic teaching at
the University of Vienna.
– University of Innsbruck, Institute of Education
(Universität Innsbruck, Institut für Fachdidaktik,
Bereich Islamische Religionspädagogik, Karl-RahnerPlatz 1, 6020 Innsbruck, www.uibk.ac.at/irp/studium.
html). Three-year Bachelor in Islamic Religious
Pedagogy (Bachelor Islamische Religionspädagogik).
– University of Innsbruck, Institute of Education
(Universität Innsbruck, Institut für Fachdidaktik,
Bereich Islamische Religionspädagogik, Karl-RahnerPlatz 1, 6020 Innsbruck, www.uibk.ac.at/studium/
angebot/uf-islamische-religion/). Four-year Bachelor of Education Secondary Level, Teaching
Subject Islamic Religion (Bachelorstudium Lehramt
Sekundarstufe, Lehramtsstudium Unterrichtsfach
Islamische Religion). Both degree programmes were
inaugurated in fall 2014, when Islamic religious pedagogy was introduced as a special area at the Institute
of Education, including a new professorial chair.
The BA track is the only Islamic religious pedagogy
undergraduate degree at an Austrian public university and, like the private IRPA, qualifies graduates for
Austria
55
teaching at elementary schools. The second bachelor
degree in Islamic Education, in combination with a
second teaching subject, qualifies graduates for
teaching Islamic Religious Education at all types
of secondary schools in Austria, including grammar and vocational schools. The introduction of a
Master’s Degree in Islamic Religious Pedagogy at the
University of Innsbruck is being planned for 2016.43
Alevi Religious Education
The Federation of Alevi Communities in Austria (AABF)
established an intra-organisational Alevi Academy
(Alevi Akademisi) in 2008 which prepares for teaching
in AABF-affiliated Alevi Cultural Centres only, as the
AABF is not entitled to teach Religious Education at
public schools. Due to its status as officially recognised
religious community, the IAGÖ is tasked to oversee
Alevi Religious Education at public schools. The Islamic
Theology Department will offer a new Master’s Degree44
in Islamic Religious Pedagogy with two tracks—one
for Sunni and one for Alevi Islam—from January
2016.45 For now, teachers of Alevi Religious Education
can obtain their qualifications in two ways. The IAGÖ
offers a four-month certificate programme which
has been completed by more than 60 participants in
Vienna, Innsbruck and Vorarlberg.46
Furthermore, the IAGÖ cooperates with the Interreligious College for Teacher Education (Kirchliche
Pädagogische Hochschule Wien/ Krems, KPH), where
prospective Alevi religion teachers can obtain a fouryear Bachelor Degree in Religious Pedagogy (combined
43
44
45
46
Author’s interview with Martina Kraml, Assistant Professor at the Institute of Education,
University of Innsbruck, 28 July 2015.
Until 2014, there was the possibility to enrol for a Master’s of Religious Pedagogy at
Innsbruck University with two tracks, one for Sunni and one for Alevi Islam. The Master’s
degree was identical to the IRP and jointly operated by both Vienna and Innsbruck universities, but is not offered anymore.
Author’s interview with Rıza Sarı, press spokesperson of the IAGÖ, 28 July 2015.
Interview with Rıza Sarı.
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with a second teaching subject) qualifying for teaching at elementary school and secondary school level.
In 2014, there were 32 teachers of Alevi Religious
Education at public schools.47
Confessional Schools
There are four Muslim elementary schools, and six high
schools in Vienna. The majority of these educational
institutions are private schools with public status in
compliance with public education curricula. Teaching
staff is usually mixed; non-Muslim students are also
admitted. Confessional schools offer a combination of
science curricula with a setting that respects Muslim
religious values and enables children to live according to religious requirements through access to prayer
rooms and the availability of halal food.
– Al-Andalus Elementary and Middle School (Altmannsdorferstraße 154–156, 1230 Wien, tel.: ++43
12312035, http://alandalus.at/). Run by the Al-Andalus
Association, which seeks to promote intercultural
understanding and also operates two Muslim nursery schools.
– Austrian International Schools Vienna, AISV (previously Al-Azhar International Schools). The AISV operates an elementary and middle school (Weisselgasse
28, 1210 Wien, tel.: ++43 16077059) and an uppersecondary grammar school Nordbahnanlage 4, 1210
Wien, tel.: ++43 16077059, www.aisv.at/en/). It has
close ties to Egyptian Al-Azhar University and offers
teaching in Arabic as elective study. AISV has a stronger focus on the principles of Islam and until 2010 its
curriculum included courses on Islamic law and the
interpretation of the Qur’an.48 In 2014, the AISV was
47
48
Interview with Rıza Sarı.
Vasari, Bernd, “Islamschule im Kreuzfeuer”, Wiener Zeitung.at, 12 November 2014, www
.wienerzeitung.at/nachrichten/wien/stadtpolitik/704035_Islamschule-im-Kreuzfeuer
.html, accessed 28 July 2015.
57
Austria
–
–
–
–
–
49
50
accused of promoting radical Islam and some of its
students and staff showing support for ISIS.49
Avicenna Elementary School (Pragerstraße 124, 1210
Wien, tel.: ++43 12700044, vs.avicenna@a1.net). This
private school is for Muslim students only and was
founded in 2014 by a group of parents and other
individuals.50
Islamisches Realgymnasium Wien (Rauchfangkehrergasse 34, 1150 Wien, tel.: ++43 18972715, office
@irgw.at, www.irgw.at/). Established and run by
SOLMIT-Solidarisch miteinander, an association that
promotes the integration of Muslims into Austrian
society and intercultural understanding. The school
operates according to the public school curriculum.
Isma Muhamed Asad Comprehensive School (Reschgasse 20, 1120 Wien, tel.: ++43 1235080808, schule@
is-ma.at). This private confessional school was established in 2012 by the International Organisation for
Science and Education (IOSE, www.iose.at/). Since
2012 the school is run by a self-governing body
(Isma—Verein zur Erhaltung Privater Schulen) with a
waqf foundation as financial basis. Like the AISV the
Isma School has a stronger orientation on Muslim
values and principles than the other schools run by
Muslim associations in Vienna. Isma has its own curriculum and offers comprehensive education for 6 to
14-year olds.
Phönix Elementary School (Phönix Volksschule,
Gudrunstraße 11, 1100 Wien, office@phoenixvs.at,
tel.: ++43 1607950010, http://phoenixvs.at/).
Phönix Grammar School (Phönix Realgymnasium,
Knöllgasse 20–24, 1100 Wien, office@phoenixrealgymnasium.at, tel.: ++43 12084657, http://phoenixrealgymnasium.at/). Both schools are run by the
Phönix Association and are affiliated with the movement of the charismatic Turkish preacher Fethullah
Vasari, “Islamschule im Kreuzfeuer”.
www.eslam.de/begriffe/p/private_volksschule_avicenna_wien.htm, accessed 28 July 2015.
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Gülen. The Phönix schools offer teaching according
to public curricula.
Muslim Media and
Publications
– Der Islam—Quarterly e-magazine published by the
IGGiÖ since 2012; no issues published in 2014.51
– Qalam—Children’s magazine with a subscription
fee. Published by Islamic Centre Vienna (IZW Wien),
small selection of free issues available online: www
.qalam.at/.
– Eimaan—Children’s magazine (in German, first editions were Bosnian), published by the Bosniak Islamic
Cultural Centre Graz (Islamisches Kulturzentrum
Graz), available both in print and online: http://
issuu.com/eimaangraz, www.islamgraz.org/eimaan/.
– Dewa—Online news portal (in Turkish) with a general focus not limited to religious issues; published
by Islamic Federation Vienna (IF Wien): www.dewa
.at/.
– Der.Wisch—special interest web magazine with
a focus on Islam, politics, and culture; not affiliated to religious organizations, run by a student
association (Wiener Studentenverein, WSV): http://
der-wisch.net/.
Main Muslim Organisations
– Islamic Religious Community in Austria (Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft
in Österreich, IGGiÖ, Bernardgasse 5, 1070 Wien, tel.: ++43 15263122, www
.derislam.at/). The IGGiÖ exists since 1979 and was the only Muslim public
institution until the official recognition of the IAGÖ as a religious society in
2010. It is an officially recognised religious community endowed with special privileges and specified as one of two main public Muslim bodies in the
draft Islam Law (Islamgesetz).
– Austrian Turkish Islamic Union (Österreich Türkisch-Islamische Union, ATIB,
Sonnleithnergasse 20, 1100 Wien, tel.: ++43 13346280, www.atib.at/). ATIB is
the umbrella association of mosque societies supported financially and
clerically by Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri
51
www.derislam.at/index.php?c=emagazine&o=emagazin&cssid=eMagazin&navid=1154&
par=80, accessed 24 July 2015.
Austria
–
–
–
–
–
52
53
54
59
Başkanlığı). It is Austria’s largest Muslim organisation with currently 65
mosque associations.
Islamic Federation Vienna (Islamische Föderation Wien, IF, Rauchfangkehrergasse 36, 1150 Wien, info@ifwien.at, www.ifwien.at/). The Islamic Federation
is the Austrian branch of the Turkey-based but transnationally operating
Islamic Community Milli Görüş (IGMG) with around 60 mosque
associations.52
Union of Muslim Cultural Centres (Union Islamischer Kulturzentren in
Wien, UIKZ, Pelzgasse 9, 1150 Wien, tel.: ++43 19831295, www.uikz.org/jm/).
The Union is affiliated with the Turkey-based Sufi tariqa of the followers of
Süleyman Tunahan, often called Süleymancılar or Süleymanlılar, and runs
44 prayer rooms.53
Initiative of Liberal Muslims in Austria (Initiative Liberaler Muslime in Österreich, ILMÖ, Hackingerstraße 42–44/2/10, 1140 Wien, tel.: ++43 69910333243,
www.initiativeliberalermuslime.org/home/). ILMÖ is a rather insignificant
association with no claim to represent the interests of a particular faith
group. Due to its criticism of IGGiÖ and ATIB for their ties to external countries like Saudi-Arabia and Turkey, however, its members are given visibility
in Austrian media outlets.
Muslim Youth Austria (Muslimische Jugend Österreich, MJÖ, Eitnergasse 6/5,
1230 Wien, office@mjoe.at, www.mjoe.at/) The MJÖ was the official youth
organisation of the IGGiÖ until 2012, when under the then newly elected
president Fuat Sanaç a new youth organisation of the IGGiÖ (Jugendrat der
Islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft, JIGGiÖ) was established. The estrangement between the MJÖ intensified in 2014 during the debates on the new
Islam Law with Sanaç accusing the MJÖ of having ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, provoking a prompt denial by the MJÖ.54 The multi-ethnic and
multi-national MJÖ has been, together with the recently established grassroots Network of Muslim Civil Society (Netzwerk Muslimische Zivilgesellschaft, NMZ; http://dieanderen.net/ ), one of the fiercest critics of the new
Islam Law and the IGGiÖ. It is also one of the few organisations which are
not shaped by bounds to a particular country of origin.
Islamic Alevi Religious Community in Austria (Islamisch Alevitische
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, IAGÖ, Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, tel.:
++43 6764418468, www.aleviten.at/de/). The IAGÖ is the second officially
recognised Muslim religious community (Religionsgemeinschaft) in Austria
See Schmidinger, “Austria”, pp. 47–64.
www.uikz.org/jm/index.php/uikz/uikz-einrichtungen, accessed 11 April 2015.
“Muslimische Jugend wehrt sich gegen Vorwürfe”, religion.orf.at, http://religion.orf.at/tv/
stories/2692196/, accessed 25 February 2015.
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–
–
–
55
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and has been promised equal status to that of the IGGiÖ in the draft Islam
Law. The organisation itself now uses the acronym ALEVI and identifies
with the principles of the Turkey-based CEM Vakfı (Cem Foundation). Both
consider Alevism as a tradition that stands within Islam.
Federation of Alevi Communities in Austria (Föderation der Aleviten
Gemeinden in Österreich, AABF, Schererstraße 4, 1210 Wien, http://aleviten.
com/index.php/de/). AABF is member of the European Alevi Confederation
(Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyonu), which considers the Alevi faith as a
distinct religious community outside Islam that does, however, share a Muslim heritage. AABF challenges IAGÖ’s official status as sole representative
community of Alevis in Austria and has applied for recognition as an official
faith community (religiöse Bekennntnisgemeinschaft). A small Kurdish-Alevi
organisation (Alt-Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, AAGÖ),
which stresses the pre-Islamic origins of Alevism and is based in Vienna,
gained that status in 2013.
Islamic Centre Imam Ali (Islamisches Zentrum Imam Ali, IZIA, Mollardgasse
50, 1060 Wien, tel.: ++43 15977065, info@izia.at). IZIA was established in
2000 and maintains close ties to Iran. It represents Twelver Shi’is in Austria.
The IZIA operates a mosque and a cultural centre. The Ahl-ul-Bayt Federation of Shi’i Associations in Austria (Islamische Vereinigung Ahl-ul-Bayt,
IVAÖ), an umbrella organisation comprising six associations with 5000
members55, mostly from Iran and Afghanistan, has its seat at the IZIA.
Islamic-Shi’i Religious Community in Austria (Islamische-Schiitische
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, Schia, Pezzlgasse 58, 1170 Wien, tel.:
++43 699111979350, office@schia.at). The Islamic-Shi’i Religious Community
was granted the status of an official faith community in 2013 and represents
the Iraqi Shi’i hawza ilmiya tradition. It has its seat at the Ahl-ul-Bait Cultural Centre Vienna which was established in 1992. The centre’s Ahl-ul-Bait
Mosque is also used as the main prayer room of the Al Mufid Centre (Islamisch Kulturelles Zentrum Al Mufid, IKZ).
Federation of Bosniak-Islamic Associations (Verband der BosniakischIslamischen Vereine, IZBA, Arndtstrasse 28/2, 1120 Wien, tel.: ++43 476236664,
http://izba.at/). The federation serves as umbrella organisation for
www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Islamische%20Vereinigung%20Ahl-ulBayt_0.pdf, accessed 24 July 2015.
Austria
61
40 Bosnian religious associations and was established in 2012. It is the largest Muslim umbrella organisation in Austria after ATIB, IF, and UKIZ.56
– FRIEDE—Institute for Dialogue (Rotenturmstrasse 1–3/3, 1010 Wien, tel.:
++43 19580021, http://derfriede.at/). FRIEDE does not present itself as an
explicitly religious association but it is committed to the “furthering of
intercultural and interreligious dialogue.” It is affiliated with the Hizmet
movement of the charismatic preacher Fethullah Gülen.
56
www.islam-landkarte.at/sites/default/files/Verband%20der%20bosniakischen%20
islamischen%20Vereine%20in%20%C3%96sterreich_0.pdf, accessed 24 July 2015.