University of Ss. Cyril and Methodius - Skopje
Faculty of Philosophy
Macedonian
Historical
Review
vol. 3
2012
Diego PEIRANO
D. Peirano)
3
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Dimitar
LJOROVSKI
VAMVAKOVSKI
Greek-Macedonian Struggle:
The Reasons for its Occurrence
Dimitar LJOROVSKI VAMVAKOVSKI
Assistant Researcher, Institute of National History
Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
The idea for an organised armed action - coordinated and supported by
the Greek Kingdom and aimed against the Macedonian revolutionary organisation emerged few years before the Ilinden Uprising.1 During this period the
Greek nationalistic circles in Greece and Ottoman Macedonia, primarily the official representatives of the Greek state and the Patriarchate of Constantinople,
becoming aware about the threat against Hellenism repeatedly demanded changes
in the policy concerning the Macedonian question, including for the Kingdom
to send some armed groups.2 On the other hand, after the defeat by the Ottoman
Empire in 1897 and until the Ilinden Uprising, the officials in Athens led utterly
cautious policy with a constant tendency of building good-neighbourly relations
with the Ottoman Porte. The Greek governments during this period acted with
no clear national policy and without defined foreign and domestic programme,
while the whole activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was primarily oriented towards the problem of Crete.3 The Greek official policy strived for and
hoped that the Ottoman civil and military authorities were going to protect their
interests in Macedonia, a practice which was giving results to a certain extent.
ХЄϼЅІЂ ϥϼϿјϴЁЂ϶, ϢЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼІϹ ϵЂЄϵϼ Ёϴ ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼјϴ II, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2004, ЅІЄέ
151.
2
In his first report to the Greek government at the beginning of 1901, the Metropolitan from Kastoria Karavengelis, after looking into the situation in his Eparchy
he paid special attention to the need of sending Greek chetas to Macedonia.
ϗϹЄЀϴЁЂЅ ϞϴЄϴ϶ϴЁϷϹϿϼЅ, ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϴІϴ ϵЂЄϵϴ, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2000, ЅІЄέ 15.
3
Ο Μαε κθδεκμΝ αΰπθ εαδ α δμ Θλαεβθ ΰ ΰκθκ α, Γ θδεκθ πδ ζ δκθ λα κυν
∆δ υγυθ δμ δ κλδαμ λα κυ, γβθαδ, 1979, έ 123.
1
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In any case, regardless of the negative attitude of the official Greek policy towards the idea of organising “Кrmed defence of Hellenism” in Macedonia,
certain nationalistic circles started the process on their own initiative.4 The Metropolitan from Kastoria, Germanos Karavangelis, was resolute to realise the
plan for initiating organised armed struggle against MRO (later known as
IMRO). According to his concept, the armed forces coming from Greece would
have not been intended for the liberation of “tСe Greeks” from the Ottoman
rule, and even less would have acted on the territory populated with Greeks. On
the other hand MRO’s goal was not to induce terror and killing against the Greek
population, but later on they did apply certain reciprocity. In spite of yet officially not approved plan by the Greek government or still not thinking in that
direction the resoluteness of Karavangelis was due to the gained rights of the
Greek propaganda in the Ottoman Empire, and above all due to the cooperation and assistance rendered by the local Ottoman authorities. In addition to recruiting of the local population - former bandits and renegades from MRO by
means of financial compensation, just before the Ilinden Uprising an armed
group of about 10 Cretans had arrived to south-western Macedonia.5 The prime
objective of these groups was to oppose the chetas of the Macedonian Revolu4
The rapid development of the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation at the beginning of 20th century caused fear among the Greek national factors about the
future of their plans in Macedonia. The joining of a great number of Macedonians – patriarchists, to the Organisation and the fact that they started to lose
control over that portion of the Macedonian population caused uneasiness and
panic among the Greek academic-propaganda circles. The process of unification of the Macedonian population in the Kastoria district and the disappearance of the “МlКsh between the Exarchists and Patriarchists“ due to the MRO’s
programme for fighting the Ottoman regime caused feelings of concern. The
violation of the projected borders of “СТstorТМКl ύrООМО” for the Greek propaganda factors meant a reason for initiating merciless war against the Macedonian revolutionary movement, with the metropolitan Germanos Karavengelis as one of the leading protagonists.
5
More on the activity of the ten Cretans see in: ϘϼЀϼІϴЄ ώЂЄЂ϶ЅϾϼ ϖϴЀ϶ϴϾЂ϶ЅϾϼ,Ν
“ϘϹјЁЂЅІϴ Ёϴ ϸϹЅϹІЀϼЁϴІϴ ϾЄϼІјϴЁϼ ϶Ђ јЇϷЂϻϴЃϴϸЁϴ ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼјϴ“, ϜЅІЂЄϼјϴ,Ν
ϵЄ. 1-2, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2007, ЅІЄ. 17 - 32; ϖϹЅϹϿϴ ϦЄϴϽϾЂ϶ϴ, “ϡϴЋϹЁϾϼ Ёϴ ϴЁϸϴЄЅϾЂІЂ ϸϹϿЂ ϶ ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼГ – ϞϴЄϴ϶ϴЁϷϹϿϼЅ, ύЂЁ ϘЄϴϷЇЀϼЅ ϼ ϸϹЅϹІϼЁϴІϴ ϞЄϼІГЁϼ“, ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϼ ЁϴЇЋϹЁ ϼЁЅІϼІЇІν ϣЄϹϷϿϹϸ, ϥЂЈϼГ, Ϸέ XXIV, 2001, ϵЄέ 1,
ЅІЄέ
45-60.
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tionary Organisation and to show that in the “МontОstОН” parts of Macedonia,
Hellenism “НТН suЛsТst”, but also to incite reaction in the Greek capital in order
to motivate the government to become actively involved in the struggle that they
had already started.
A radical turn in the policy of the Greek state regarding the Macedonian question happened after the Ilinden Uprising was crushed. The Greek government6 was no longer able to act indifferently towards the demands of the
Greek propaganda representatives in Macedonia, since the Uprising clearly confirmed their constant warnings and urges that urgent action against MRO structures were necessary. Essentially, during the Ilinden Uprising Greece came to a
conclusion that Hellenism’s foundations in Macedonia were no longer sound and
that the Greek state with the propaganda activities, at that time based primarily
on peaceful actions, was not able to realise the programme of the Megali idea.7
What the Ottoman authorities and even less the Balkans authorities were unable
to accept, was the fact that the Internal Organisation basically presented itself
as a legitimate representative of the majority of the Macedonian Orthodox
Christian population. In parallel to this tendency the leading national ideologists
in the Greek kingdom, along with the propaganda of the other pretenders for
Macedonia, rightfully started identifying MRO as one of the main obstacles in
achieving their national programmes. The slogan “Autonomy for εКМОНonТК”,Ν
which was confirmed also in the most important Organisation program document - the Constitution8 from 1897, clearly defined the political form of the future state. Furthermore, especially important was the organisation of most of
the territory of Macedonia in revolutionary districts which “rОsultОН from the
specific needs that imposed themselves in the course of the practical function6
At that time there were frequent changes at the prime minister’s position in the Greek
government. Thus, between December 1902 and June 1903 Prime Minister was
Teodoros Delianis; he was followed by Georgios Theotokis (June - July 1903);
then came Dimitrios Ralis (July - December 1903); and then again the Greek
government was headed by Theotokis (December 1903 - December 1904).
7
ϞЄЅІϹ ϕϼІЂ϶ЅϾϼ, ϗЄЋϾϴІϴ “ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϴ ϵЂЄϵϴ“, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2001, ЅІЄέ 90.
8
Article 1 of the 1897 Constitution, which defined the goal of Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation read: “to unify as a whole all dissatisfied elements from
Macedonia and Edirne, regardless of their nationality, in order to achieve full
political autonomy for these two regions by means of revolutТon”έ ϜЅІЂЄϼјϴΝ
Ёϴ ЀϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϼЂІ ЁϴЄЂϸ, ІЂЀ 3, ϜЁЅІϼІЇІ ϻϴ ЁϴЊϼЂЁϴϿЁϴ ϼЅІЂЄϼјϴ, ϥϾЂЃјϹ,
2003, ЅІЄέ 187.
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ing of TMORO on the grounН”έ9 In such a way the presented territorial sovereignty of the Macedonian revolutionary movement overlapped with some of
the territorial plans of the Megali idea. The direct confrontation happened in the
so called middle or “МontОstОd area” of Macedonia, according to the Greek
views, where the intensity of the Ilinden Uprising was most strongly felt and
where later on most of the Andart chetas would operate.
The massive participation of the Macedonian Orthodox Christian population from western Macedonia, being exarchical and patriarchate, in the Ilinden Uprising caused a surprise and anxiety in Greece and among the Greek representatives in the Ottoman Empire. The Secretary of the Greek Consulate in
Bitola at the time, Ion Dragumis in a letter addressed to his father Stephanos
dated 25 July 190310 concluded: “we have a Slavic uprising in Macedonia... All
the Slavophones listen to the Committee (MRO, author’s note) both Orthodox
Christians and Schismatics (Exarchists, author’s note) and most of them voluntКrТlв”έ11 What concerned them was the fact that the majority of that population “tСКt did not have the necessary national consciousness and pКtrТotТsm” to
follow the policy of Greek propaganda, had shown surprising consciousness
and patriotism in accepting and following the policy and the programme propagandised by a secret organisation which offered liberty and constitution of its
own Macedonian state.12 Another alarming moment, as one could notice, was
the participation of a great percent of the Macedonian patriarchate population
in the Uprising, which by the Greek policy was declared to be of Greek ethnic
origin in the Ottoman Empire. In such a way the Greek state (with the exception of the small enclaves of Vlach and Albanian Orthodox Christian population that were also considered to be “ύrООk”), which before the Uprising based
on the church affiliation of the population, presented and recognised domination of the Greek ethnic population in parts of the Macedonian territory, de
facto during the Uprising was left without most its self-proclaimed ethnic element in Macedonia. This situation soon afterwards forced the Greek political
ϠϴЄϼјϴ ϣϴЁϸϹ϶ЅϾϴ, ϥІЄЇЀϼЋϾϼ ЄϹ϶ЂϿЇЊϼЂЁϹЄϹЁΝ ЂϾЄЇϷ (1893-1903), ϾЁϼϷϴ I,
ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2002, ЅІЄέ 25.
10
The dates in the text from here onwards will be written in an old style (Julian calendar).
11
Ιπθκμ ∆λαΰκυµβμ, Σα Σ λα δα κυ Ιζδθ θ, Γδπλΰκμ Π δίαμ, γβθα, 2000, έ 195.
12
ϞЄЅІϹ ϕϼІЂЅϾϼ, “ϡϹϾЂϼ ϴЅЃϹϾІϼ Ёϴ ϼϿϼЁϸϹЁЅϾϼІϹ ЁϴЊϼЂЁϴϿЁЂЂЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼ
ϵЂЄϵϼ“, ϜЅІЂЄϼјϴ, ϷЂϸ. XXXIX, ϵЄЂј 1-2, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2003, ЅІЄέ 17.
9
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leadership to adopt strategic and political solutions regarding the Macedonian
question, which, with small exceptions, had ignored the Macedonian reality on
the ground.13 Such a move was the equalisation of the Macedonian revolutionary movement with the Bulgarian propaganda institutions, which in essence
made it easier for the Greek state in confronting the structures of MRO. This
tendency was supported by the policy and propaganda of the Bulgarian government, which was trying to present the Macedonian revolutionary movement
as a work of the “εКМОНonТКn BulgКrТКns”έ The identification was aimed at justifying the Greek armed intervention, which allegedly was provoked by the “Bulgarian movement, which was against the Greek nation and the Ecumenical PatriarcСКtО”.14 On the other hand the Greek propaganda by presenting the Organisation as an armed phase of Bulgarian propaganda demanded an appropriate reaction by the Greek side. In that sense the Greek Consul in Thessaloniki,
N. Evgeniadis, at the beginning of 1904 advised the General Administrator
Hilmi Pasha that “Bulgarian chetas could be destroyed by creating Greek ones,
which would also establish orНОr”. The Consul also requested from Hilmi Pasha
a guarantee that their chetas “would not be persecuted by the Ottoman authorТtТОs”έ15 This proposal was decisively refused by the General Administrator. Still,
the ideologists of that policy, despite the official position of the Greek propaganda, were familiar with the goals and the programme of MRO and its autochthonous Macedonian character, which on the other hand cannot be claimed
for the majority of the Greek public and political elite. In February 1903, the
abovementioned Ion Dragmus concluded: “So the majority of the Macedonian
people will foment an uprising... What do they care about Hellenism? We shall
remain a minority in being stripped ... I pity them, they want neither Bulgaria nor
Greece, but they want their own freedom, the freedom that attracted them and
made them ПКnКtТМs”έ16 Furthermore, in a letter to Pavlos Mellas dated 27 February 1903 Dragumis wrote: “tСe chetas and the committees are infiltrated
ϘϼЀϼІЄϼЅ ϟϼІЂϾЅЂЇ, ϗЄЋϾϴІϴ ϴЁІϼЀϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϴ ϵЂЄϵϴ I; Ϣϸ ϜϿϼЁϸϹЁ ϸЂ ϛϴϷЂЄϼЋϴЁϼ (1903-1905), ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2004, ЅІЄέ 39.
14
Ε αδλδα Μαε κθδεκθ πκυ πθ, Ι λυµα µ ζ πθ χ λ κθβ κυ κυ αδµκυ, Π λδεζ κυμ
ζ ιέ λΰυλκπκυζκυ, Ο µαε κθδεκμ αΰπθ (απκµθβµκθ υµα α), Θ
αζκθδεβ,
1957, έ 4.
15
Report by the Royal Greek Consulate in Thessaloniki, No. 3, 4 January 1904. The author has a copy of the original.
16
Ιέ ∆λαΰκυµβμ, Σα Σ λα δαέέέ, έ 21.
13
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everywhere and have no intention to give in to the demands of the Russians and
the Great Powers, who had been advising for peace. On the contrary, they had
worked even more aggressively than before... they claim... that they are not fighting to make Macedonia Bulgarian, but to create an autonomous state (Macedonia to the εКМОНonТКns)”έ17 The contemporary of the Ilinden Uprising period
and a later on Greek historian, Gregorios Modis (born in Bitola with Vlach origin), with a kind of respect and admiration wrote about MRO, which “КssumОНΝ
the liberation monopolв” and “аТtС great supra-Christian soul gave an opportunity to all Christians, righteous and unrighteous to partТМТpКtО”.18 Elaborating
on the objectives of the “IntОrnal OrgКnТsКtТon”, Modis noted: “Тt declared itself and fought for the entire Macedonian population, regardless of the national
and religious feelings of the different elements. The Organisation was counting
on every individual who did not give in to the Ottoman tyranny and wanted to
dedicate all its energy to general liberation deeds... Their slogan was ‘εКМОНonia to the εКМОНonТКns’ and they tirelessly waved the flКР”.19
The role of the Great Powers and their interests during the Ottoman
domination always had crucial significance for the situation in the Balkan Peninsula. In the last quarter of the 19th century the relations between the Ottoman
Empire and the European powers were under the influence of the new protagonists, the newly-formed Balkan states and their efforts to realise their national
programmes that were primarily oriented towards the Ottoman territories, but
also in mutual competition for attracting the Christian population and conquering the territory of Ottoman Macedonia. The Great Powers tried to take
advantage of the newly created Balkan nationalism imposing themselves on
Turkey and one of the Balkan states in order to protect their own interest in the
region. The Great Powers in their attempt to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire frequently intervened with the excuse of reforms in favour of
the Christian population in Macedonia, but with prime objective was to maintain the situation status-quo.20 In this direction were the Mürzsteg reforms21 of
Να αζδα Μ ζα, Παυζκμ Μ ζαμ, γβθα, 1926, έ 172.
Γέ Χέ Μκ β, Μαε κθδεκμ αΰπθ εαδ µαε κθδε μ αλχβΰκδ, Θ αζκθδεβ, 1950, έ 32,
33.
19
Γέ Χέ Μκ β, Μαε κθδεκμ αΰπθ εαδέέέ, έ 32.
20
Μδλαθ α Παιδµα κπκυζκυ - αυλδθκυ, Η δπζπµα δα πθ ∆υθαµ πθ εαδ κδ µ αλλυγµδ δμ β Μαε κθδα (1903-1908), γβθα, 2009, έ 405.
21
The Mürzsteg reforms were named according to the place Mürzsteg, where the Russ17
18
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2 October 1903, directly caused by the Ilinden Uprising and the violent intervention by the Ottoman armed forces in putting it down. One should also mention one of the factors that incited the armed intervention of the Greek state in
Macedonia, and that is Article 3 of the reform programme from Mürzsteg. It
prescribed “After the pacification of the country, the imperial government
should be requested to make certain changes in the territorial division of the administrative units in order to properly group the different nКtТonКlТtТОs”.22 This
formulation of the article by the Balkan pretenders was interpreted as a possibility to present and win over the majority of the Christian population, in order
to group them artificially and more compactly i.e. to divide the “nКtТonКlТtТОs”Ν
based on the new territorial division. The first one who realised the “tСrОКt for
the Hellenism” was Ion Dragumis, at the time an official at the Greek consulate
in Serres, who in his report to the Greek Foreign Ministry dated 4 December
1903 warned that “tСosО threats refer to the spheres of influence on the Macedonian territory by the Balkan nationalists for characterising the population in
Macedonia as Greeks, Vlachs, Serbs, Albanians, Turks or Bulgarians, depending on the НТstrТМts”έ23 Dragumis also noted that for the Greek interests “Тn the
Greek territories with purely Greek populКtТon”, referring to the southern Hellenophone area of Macedonia, “tСОre were no threat, but such a danger did exist
on the territories with mixed population, especially those with Bulgarophones,
Schismatics or Orthodox ωСrТstТКns”έ24 The battle continued with even greater
intensity, primarily between the Greek and Bulgarian propagandas, but the Serbian and the Romanian ones did not fall behind when it came to attracting individuals or entire settlements to their own church organisations, thus presenting
their church affiliation as a part of their ethnic group in Ottoman Macedonia.
The attracting of believers soon turned into a violent i.e. armed and fierce conflict, to which MRO was drawn into. On the other hand, the requirement that
was incorporated in the above mentioned article of the reforms, “КПtОr the pacification of the countrв”, was totally in favour of the Ottoman authorities, which
ian Tsar Nikolai II and the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Joseph I met. The programme was later approved by other powers that participated in the Berlin Congress. The reforms had 9 articles that envisaged reforms in the administration,
the economy, the police and justice.
22
Хέ ϥϼϿјϴЁЂ϶, ϢЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼІϹ ϵЂЄϵϼέέέ, ЅІЄέ 54.
23
Ιέ ∆λαΰκυµβμ, Σα Σ λα δαέέέ, έ 622 - 634.
24
Ibid., p. 622 - 634.
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not only had not undertaken proper measures for preventing the armed conflict, but on the contrary, in many cases they incited it or acted indifferently towards certain developments.
Transfers of individuals or entire villages from one to another church
organisation (Patriarchate or Exarchate) started much before the Ilinden Uprising. The beginnings of that process dated from the time when the Exarchate
was founded in 1870, especially with Article 10 of the Ottoman firman, which
prescribed two thirds plebiscitary support by the Christian population in order
to join a certain church organisation.25 MRO’s policy on this issue during this period was clear. Its agitation was oriented towards the entire Macedonian population. In the course of it they explained the objectives of the Organisation regardless whether the Macedonian population was under the jurisdiction of the
Patriarchate or the Exarchate and no pressure was exerted on the population to
transfer from one church to another. However, at the end of 1902 one could notice enhanced agitation by MRO in the region of Kastoria aimed at convincing
the Macedonian population to leave the Patriarchate and to go over to the Exarchate. The frequent practicing of this was characteristic for the entire following
year. The decision of the Kastoria committee was reached as a result of the negative influence that the Kastoria Metropolitan Germanos Karavangelis spread
among the Macedonian patriarchate population, his enhanced agitation and activity against the Macedonian revolutionary movement.26 Such moves by the
Macedonian Revolutionary Movement leaders in Kastoria, according to the
Greek publicist Georgios Pecivas was due to the 1902 decision according to
which, “tСe Patriarchate ordered for the patriarchists to stop cooperating on the
preparation of the UprТsТnР”έ 27 In any case, the situation started to change in
final phase of the Ilinden Uprising when the Greek Patriarchate metropolitans
as allies to the Ottoman authorities, profiting on the utterly difficult and hopeϜЅІЂЄϼјϴ Ёϴ ЀϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾϼЂІέέέ, ЅІЄέ 40.
In his diary, one of the heads of Kastoria committee, Vasil Cakalarov noted that at
the “ύОnОrКl AssОmЛlв” in the village of Bapcor, held on 29 August 1902, beside the other organisational issues they also discussed “tСО behaviour of the
bishop and the Greeks who did things out of malice and imprisoned our people” and the people “КНmТttОd that the Greeks were our devils and agreed to
renounce the ЛТsСop”. ϘЁϹ϶ЁϼϾЂІ Ёϴ ϶Ђј϶ЂϸϴІϴ ϖϴЅϼϿ ЧϴϾϴϿϴЄЂ϶, ϥϾЂЃјϹ,
2007, ЅІЄέ 153.
27
Ιπαθθκυ Καλαίδ β, Οµαε κθδεκμΝ ΰπθ, πκµθβµκθ υµα α, Σκµκμ ’, Εδ αΰπΰβ,Ν
Επδµ ζ δα, χκζδα Γδπλΰκμ Π δίαμ,
γβθα, 1994,
έ 17.
25
26
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less situation of the population, forced the Macedonian Exarchate population
to go over to the Patriarchate. On the other hand, the population the only way
out and the protection from the retribution of the Ottoman authorities could
see in their return under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
Such was the case in the Kastoria district where about 5,000 peasants were
forced by the Kastoria metropolitan to return to the patriarchate’s side i.e. according to the beliefs at the time to become “ύrООks”.28 But, very soon, immediately after the end of the Uprising, and especially in the first half of 1904 as a
reaction to the negative attitude of the Greek propaganda institutions towards
the Uprising, especially their cooperation with the local Ottoman authorities
against the population, one could notice massive transfers of many families, and
later on entire villages to the Exarchate church.29 On the other hand, undoubted
impact on this course of events also had the activity of the Bulgarian (Exarchate)
propaganda institutions and the initiative of the Bitola district committee “ПorΝ
the patriarchate villages to be turned over into exarchate onОs”.30 In his memoirs, Gjorce Petrov confirmed the district committee’s decision, which goal was
“to resist the manifested tendencies of the Greek bishops and consuls to benefit from the disaster in favour of the Greek propagКnНК”.31 However, the reaction by some in the Organisation to the spontaneous leaving of the Patriarchate
by the peasants in the entire area of the insurrection was not expected to be different i.e. to take an opposite stand, “sТnМe it suffered significantly from the conϘϼЀϼІϴЄ ώЂЄЂ϶ЅϾϼ ϖϴЀ϶ϴϾЂ϶ЅϾϼ, “ϗϹЄЀϴЁЂЅ ϞϴЄϴ϶ϴЁϷϹϿϼЅ ϼέέέ, ЅІЄέ 30.
There are many documents confirming the passing of the Macedonian population
from the Patriarchate over to the Exarchate. For instance, the Greek Consul in
Bitola D. Kalergis informed the Greek Minister of the Foreign Affairs, A. Romanos in his report dated 26 February 1904 that 65 villages passed over to the
Exarchate. Μκυ δκµαε κθδεκυαΰπθα, Οδαπαλχ μ κυΝ Μαε κθδεκυαΰπθαΝ
(1903-1904); 100 ΰΰλαφα απκ κ λχ δκ κυ Τπκυλΰ δκυ πθ Ειπ λδεπθ βμΝ
Εζζα κμ, Θ αζκθδεβ, 1996, έ 136 - 139; In a report under the ref. No. 333,
from the Bulgarian trade agency in Bitola addressed to the Prime Minister
Racho Petrov on 3 May 1904 it was reported that 15 villages from the Kastoria
district passed from the Patriarchate over to the Exarchate. ϖϹϿϼЋϾЂ ϗϹЂЄϷϼϹ϶,Ν
ϥІϴϽϾЂ ϦЄϼЈЂЁЂ϶, ϗЄьЊϾϴІϴ ϼ ЅЄьϵЅϾϴІϴ ЃЄЂЃϴϷϴЁϸϼ ϶ ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼГν ϾЄϴГІΝ
Ёϴ XIX - ЁϴЋϴϿЂІЂ Ёϴ ХХ ϶ϹϾ, ϥЂЈϼГ, 1995, ЅІЄέ 35 - 36.
30
ϖϴЁЋЂ ЃЂЄѓϼϹ϶, ϣЂϸϻϹЀЁϴІϴ ЄϹЃЇϵϿϼϾϴ; ϘϴЀјϴЁ ϗЄЇϹ϶ ϼΝΝЀϴϾϹϸЂЁЅϾЂІЂΝ
ЄϹ϶ЂϿЇЊϼЂЁϹЄЁЂ ϸ϶ϼϺϹњϹ, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2010, ЅІЄέ 353.
31
ϥЃЂЀϹЁϼ Ёϴ ЃЂЄЋϹ ϣϹІЄЂ϶, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 1950, ЅІЄέ 154.
28
29
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duct by Greek clergy during the UprТsТnР”έ But, besides that, “tСО Greek bishops, open allies of the Ottoman authorities, with even greater eagerness than
before encouraged their priests and teachers... to betrayal and spвТnР”.32 On the
other hand, as to the regions in the south-western Macedonia, particularly the
region of Kastoria, from the memoirs of Georgi Pop Hristov who came to that
region in mid 1904, we learned about almost complete passiveness on the part
of the Organisation in this region as well as about complete disconnection from
the District Committee in Bitola.33 Hence, we can conclude that the possibility
for MRO’s structures in Kastoria to act in that direction was meagre, especially
since after the arrival of Pop Hristov there was full reorganisation of the district, and the leadership for the first time was introduced to the rule book and
the draft Constitution of the District Committee of the Bitola Revolutionary
District.
However, this situation was used and presented another strong argument among the representatives of the Greek propaganda institutions to influence the Greek government to change its position in order to start considering
military intervention in some parts of Macedonia. Firstly, those were the consular officers of the Greek state as well as the clergy of the Constantinople Patriarchate who were constantly reporting of the “МКtКstropСТc state of Hellenism”
and the need of armed intervention, but not against the Ottoman regime, but
against the forces of MRO. The Greek Consul in Bitola, D. Kalergis, in that
sense tendentiously in his report to the Greek Foreign Ministry presented the
“unЛОКrКЛlО” situation of the Macedonian peasants who “were coming to the
Consulate from everywhere to let us know that the committee (MRO, author’s
note) members at night surround their villages and threat the village elders to
sign statements saying that the entire village is willing to belong to the Bulgarian
ExarcСКtО”έ34 Kalgeris’ goal, regardless of the actual situation on the ground
was to blame MRO and for the Greek authorities to confront it with arms. In
the same report the Consul openly confirmed their cooperation with the local
Ottoman authorities, “аСТch after receiving the order from ωonstКntТnoplО”, as
Х ϥϼϿјϴЁЂ϶, ϢЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼІϹ ϵЂЄϵϼέέέ, ЅІЄέ 134.
ϗϹЂЄϷϼ ϣЂЃЉЄϼЅІЂ϶, ϤϹ϶ЂϿВЊϼЂЁϴІϴ ϵЂЄϵϴ ϶ъ ϵϼІЂϿЅϾϼГ ЂϾЄЇϷ, ϥЂЈϼГ, 1933,
ЅІЄέ 54.
34
Report by D. Kalergis to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Romanos, Bitola,
6 February 1904. Μκυ δκ µαε κθδεκυ αΰπθα, Οδαπαλχ μΝ κυ Μαε κθδεκυΝ
αΰπθα (1903-1904); 100 ΰΰλαφαέέέ, έ 134.
32
33
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well as after the advice by the Greek Metropolitan, “НОМТНОН to send an army to
protect villages that were threatened by the BulgКrТКns”.35 Such, in favour of the
Greek propaganda, was also the decision of the General Administrator of
Macedonia, Hilmi Pasha, who in January 1904, gave an order for status-quo, according to which, the villages should stayed under the same church rule as before the Uprising i.e. he deprived the people of the right to transfer from one
church organisation to another.36 This order, pursuant to the decision of the
Mürzsteg reforms was completely in favour of the Greek propaganda, which at
this time massively, something that was not typical for the period before the Ilinder Uprising, started to lose its self-proclaimed Greek ethnic population in
Macedonia.
In the abovementioned report of Ion Dragumis dated 4 December 1903
two measures were suggested to keep the Macedonian patriarchate population
within the Constantinople Patriarchate. First of all peaceful propaganda
“prОКching.... for the Bulgarophones to stick to tradition, but also... violence is
necessarв”, which essentially was the second measure proposed by him. According to Dragumis, the Macedonian patriarchists, “Тf it wasn’t for the committee, would have been for ever peaceful, subordinated and devoted to the faith
they inherited from their forefathers and most probably they wouldn’t have
needed the preacСТnР”, but because, according to him, the Organisation acted
violently in order “Пor our preaching and encouragement to bring rОsults”, it was
necessary “ОТtСОr to destroy the committee or to oppose the violence with violОnМО”. He actually imagined “a Greek state outside the borders of the Greek
state, organised inside the Turkish state by means of coordination of the Greek
munТМТpКlТtТОs”έ37 Dragumis as someone who was well familiar with the situation in Ottoman Macedonia, proposed establishing a Greek “IntОrnal Organisation” similar to the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, which unlike the
MRO that had autochthonous character, this one should have been a product
of the Greek propaganda institutions in Macedonia. The reaction of the Kastoria Metropolitan Karavangelis was similar. On 11 May 1904 he wrote: “The
situation is already disappointing, there is no protection of our interests and the
panic that has spread throughout villages with everyday killings and compulsion
have destroyed the eparchy, which suffers from these murderers, who had
Ibid., έ 135.
Хέ ϥϼϿјϴЁЂ϶, ϢЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼІϹ ϵЂЄϵϼέέέ, ЅІЄέ 135.
37
Ιέ ∆λαΰκυµβμ, Σα Σ λα δαέέέ, έ 622 - 634.
35
36
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changed their ПКТtС”έ38 Karavangelis disappointed by the attitude of the official
Greek policy even submitted his resignation from the position as Kastoria Metropolitan, which of course was rejected.39
It can be clearly seen not only from Dragumis or KaravangОlТs’ contemplations, but also from the rest of the Greek propaganda representatives that
the greatest “ОnОmy of Hellenism” in Macedonia was MRO’s activity, which as an
entity completely disturbed the Greek positions they used to have and for which
it was necessary to undertake suitable measures. Furthermore, unfounded were
the attacks of the Greek propaganda representatives aimed at getting a reaction
from Athens, to the alleged violent behaviour and pressure against the Macedonian population to go over to the Exarchate. In the activity of MRO at the
time no such action was noticed i.e. compulsion by means of terror even though
we have come to a conclusion that there were some recommendations and decisions in that sense, but always as a result of the negative consequences from
the Greek actions. On the other hand, after the end of the Ilinden Uprising, the
Organisation became passive to a great extent, especially in the regions which
suffered the most from the Ottoman reaction. For instance in the Kastoria and
Florina regions the only remaining were Mitre Vlaseto and few other local
voivodes who were forced to think more about finding shelter for themselves
and “tСОв were not able, even if they wanted, to organise – especially by means
of terror – a massive counter patriarchate activity.”40
“The rТРСt” to proclaim the Orthodox Christian population as part of
its own ethnic group in the Ottoman Empire, the official Greek policy founded
on the millet system, which essentially meant a religious group. The equalisation of
the terms millet and nation happened under the west-European influence, where
the word millet was literary linked to the word nation i.e. equality in the concept
of the French model of nation. The consideration of these two terms as equal
θα α δκμ Ικλ αθκΰζκυ, “Η εα α α β β Μαε κθδα µ ία β α ε κµ θα παλδαλχδεα ΰΰλαφα, 1903 - 1λίκ“, Ο µαε κθδεκμ αΰπθαμ; υµπκ δκ, Θ
αζκθδεβΝ- Φζπλδθα - Κα κλδα - Ε
α, 28 κε πµίλδκυΝ- 2 θκ µίλδκυ 1984,
Θ αζκθδεβ, 1987, έ 131.
39
Mβ λκπκζέ βμ Aυ λέαμ ε. Mδχαάζ Ϊρεκμ, “H υµίκζά κυ µβ λκπκζέ β Kα κλδΪμΝ
Γ λµαθκτ KαλαίαΰΰΫζβ κθ Mαε κθδεσ Aΰυθα“, Ε αδλ δα µαε κθδεκπθΝ
πκυ πθ, Επδ βµκθδεκ υθ λδκ, Μαε κθδεκμ αΰπθ 100 χλκθδα απκ κθ γαθα κ κυ Παυζκυ Μ ζα, Θ αζκθδεβ, 12 - 13 θκ µίλδκυ 2004, έ 44.
40
Х.ϥϼϿјϴЁЂ϶, ϢЅϿЂϵЂϸϼІϹϿЁϼІϹ ϵЂЄϵϼ..., ЅІЄ. 133, 134.
38
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was in favour of the small Balkan states and it strongly encouraged nationalism
in recognising their own “Сolв” right to seek, to find, to count, to recount or to
convert their “nКtТonКl compatriots” in Ottoman Macedonia. In the late Ottoman pre-national millet system in which there were no conditions for a modern nation and national awareness to develop, the Balkan nations-states saw a
possibility to create their own “nКtТonКl tissue” using the church, the schools and
later on the armed violence. In that sense, the starting point of this policy was
tendentious identification of church affiliation with the recognition of “onО’s
own nКtТon” in the Ottoman Empire or, as the Greek historian Dimitris Livanios concludes the “ТНОntТtв” seems could not be a matter of choice; it “ОбТstОН”Ν
independently from what the individual had thought.41
In any case, this situation was rather opposite to the factual reality which
has been confirmed by numerous testimonies that were also known to the official representatives of the Greek state in the Empire. For instance, Ion Dragumis noted that “Пor most of the Slavophones the word Orthodoxy has no meanТnР”, referring to the non-identification of the church affiliation with the Greek
nation, “ЛОМКuse the schismatic priests (exarchists, author’s note) apart from the
use of the Slavic language, are no different in any other aspect from the Orthodox onОs”έ42 Furthermore, about the conversion from one church organisation
to another or according to the national understandings at the time – becoming
a “ύrООk” or a “BulgКrТКn” over night or even vice versa, Dragumis wrote: “ItΝ
seems that the peasants have never understood that they had become schismatics (Bulgarians, author’s note) nor that they continued to be schismatics, nor that
they returned to Orthodoxy (Hellenism, author’s note)... Let alone the [existence
of Greek] national МonsМТousnОss”έ43 Namely, according to the historian Andrew Rossos, their proto-national consciousness was in great extent a response
to factors such as: language, folklore, customs, traditions and local interests –
symbols that they identified with Macedonia and which made them different
from their neighbours.44 In 1908 the English politician and lawyer Alan Upward
described a Macedonian peasant as follows: “Antoni Stankoff (from the village)
Dimitris Livanios, “ωonquОrТnР the Souls: Nationalism and Greek Guerilla Warfare
in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1λίκ“, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies,
23, 1999, p. 199.
42
Ιέ ∆λαΰκυµβμ, Σα Σ λα δαέέέ, έ 622 - 634.
43
Ibid., p. 622 - 634.
44
ϙЁϸЄјЇ ϤЂЅЂЅ, ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼјϴ ϼ ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁЊϼІϹ; ϼЅІЂЄϼјϴ, ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2010, ЅІЄ. 109.
41
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Frangotchi (meaning the village of Ranci – the region of Kajlari district). Speaks
no Greek. Is a Patriarchist. Does not know the difference between the Patriarchists and Exarchists. Suffers from the Turkish terror. Does not want any band
in his village. Has no preference between Greek and Bulgarian, so long as the
Turk goes. Would prefer even Austrian rule to TurkТsС”.45 During his humanistic activities after the Ilinden Uprising in western Macedonia, the English journalist Henry Noel Brailsford in a discussion with several Macedonians in front
of the remains of the fortress of Tsar Samoil in Ohrid, came to some interesting conclusions: “’Who built this plКМОς’, I asked them. Their reply was significant: - ‘The free pОoplО’. ‘And who were tСОв’? ‘τur КnМОstors’. ‘τk, but were
they Serbs or Bulgarians or Greeks or even Turks’? ‘They were not Turks, but
Christians.’”46 Actually, those boys were asked to respond to questions that they
could not understand. Brailsford asked them questions that belonged to the
times of the nations, something they were not familiar with, and they simply still
lived in the multicultural and religious Ottoman society.
However, at beginning of 1904 the Greek government headed by the
Prime Minister Theotokis, pressured by the public opinion, started taking some
more radical steps in regard to the Macedonian question.47 This decision was
due to the common view of the Greek state that was created as a result of constant panicky urging of the official Greek propaganda representatives in the Ottoman Empire and the nationalistic circles in the Greek state concerning the
threats and the unbearable state of Hellenism in Macedonia.48 The indecisiveness
45
Allen Upward, The East End of Europe, London, 1908, p. 181 - 182.
ХϹЁЄϼ ϡЂϹϿ ϕЄϹјϿЅЈЂЄϸ, ϠϴϾϹϸЂЁϼјϴν ЁϹјϻϼЁϼІϹ ЁϴЄЂϸϼ ϼ ЁϹјϻϼЁϴІϴ ϼϸЁϼЁϴ,Ν
ϥϾЂЃјϹ, 2003, ЅІЄέ 160.
47
Ι κλδα κυ ζζβθδεκυ γθκυμ, θ π λκμ ζζβθδ µκμαπκ 1881 πμ 1913, ΣκµκμΙ∆, γβθα,
1977, έ 238.
48
The Macedonian problem became an every day topic in the life of the Greek population; nationalism was stirred up by the Athens newspapers and various syllogoses that were constantly talking or writing about the terror and killings of
their “МompКtrТots” in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the national feelings
and solidarity to what had been happening in the north of the Greek state were
stimulated with the alleged 700 killed “ύrООks” in the period from 1897 until
the beginning of 1904. πκ κζκυ Εέ αεαζκπκυζκυ, Ο µαε κθδεκμ αΰπθαμΝ
(1904-1908) πμ εκλυφαδα φα β πθ αΰπθπθ πθ Εζζβθπθ ΰδα β Μαε κθδα,Ν
Θ αζκθδεβ, 1985, έ 29. Professor Neoklis Kazazis, in the January issue of
the magazine “ElТnТsmos” described the indifference of the Greek authorities
46
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and hesitation of the Greek Prime Minister Theotokis to start an armed intervention against MRO structures was due to the fear of involving Greece in an
open conflict with the Ottoman Empire, similar to the one from 1897. At the
beginning, the Greek government decided to carry out a broad survey of the situation in Macedonia in order to see whether there were favourable conditions
for “Кn armed defence of Macedonian Hellenism”έ49
in the following way: “ύrООМe, the free homeland, is forgetting its duties, continuing with its policy of indifference. The bells are alarming the approaching
threat. Nobody is listening. The church bell will mark a disaster. Only then we
shall rise. But, at the same time, the cry of the historical revenge will also be
heard. It’s too late. I hope that this new year that has already started will waken
us all up from the winter slumber, the young, the old, the official, the unofficial, I wish for nothing moreέέέ“έ αγβμ Π ζαΰδ βμ, “Λδΰκ µ α κ Ιζδθ θ (20
δκυζδκυ 1903) δμ π λδκχ μ Κα κλδαμ εαδ Φζπλδθαμ“, Ο µαε κθδεκμ αΰπθαμνΝ
υµπκ δκ, Θ αζκθδεβ - Φζπλδθα - Κα κλδα - Ε
α, 28 κε πµίλδκυ - 2
θκ µίλδκυ 1984, Θ αζκθδεβ, 1987, έ 366, 367.
49
Ο Μαε κθδεκμ αΰπθ εαδ α δμ Θλαεβθέέέ, έ 13.