THE CONCEPT OF SIGN IN THE WORK OF VYGOTSKY, WINNICOTT, AND BAKHTIN: Further integration of object relations theory and activity theory Postprint version Published in: The British Journal of Medical Psychology, 1992, 65, 209-221. (Original footnotes bracketed in italics) Mikael Leiman University of Joensuu Finland Abstract In a recent paper Ryle introduced the idea of integrating object relations theory and Activity Theory, a conceptual tradition originated by Vygotsky and developed by a number of Soviet psychologists during the previous decades. A specific aspect of this integrative perspective will be examined, implied in Ryle's paper but not elaborated by him. It is the issue of sign mediation which was Vygotsky's primary contribution to the methodological problems of modern psychology. The aim is to show that object relations theory, especially the work of Winnicott, may bring fresh understanding into Vygotsky's early notions. It is further claimed that, by introducing the contribution of Mikhail Bakhtin and his circle to the notion of sign mediation, the profundity in Winnicott's understanding of the transitional object and of the potential space may be more fully appreciated. At the same time Winnicott's and Bakhtin's ideas will jointly clarify the limitations in Vygotsky's sign conception. The concept of sign in the work of Vygotsky, Winnicott, and Bakhtin In a recent paper Ryle addressed the possibility of integrating object relations theory with activity theory (Ryle, 1991) by using the Procedural Sequence Object Relations Model, developed by him in the context of an integrated approach to brief dynamic psychotherapy, the Cognitive-Analytic Therapy (Ryle, 1982; Ryle, 1990a). Ryle's attempt to transcend, by introducing activity theory, some of the limitations in a cognitivist understanding of mental functioning, seems to open promising perspectives for examining the classical issue of the relations between psychoanalysis, psychology, and linguistics, addressed by the Soviet psychologists in the 20's (Voloshinov, 1976; Vygotsky, 1979). This early integration failed due to a number of limitations both within classical psychoanalysis and linguistics. A new, and perhaps a fruitful, conception may be built by bringing object relations theory into a dialogue with a modified understanding of signs, freed from their traditional linguistic understanding. In what follows, the concept of sign will be examined by bringing together the work of three creative scholars - Vygotsky, Winnicott, and Bakhtin. The contribution of these three authors will be presented in order to elucidate the concept of sign and to examine its relations with the concepts of intersubjective space, joint activity, and dialogue. This integrative effort will, hopefully, serve as the next step in the effort to relate object relations theory with activity theory. 1. Vygotsky's views of sign mediation It seems that Vygotsky did not work with a unitary and completed definition of the sign concept. As with all creative scientists he allowed it to develop and obtain somewhat different shades of meaning depending on the context where he used it. Thus the whole issue of sign-mediated activity in Vygotsky's work covers a broad spectrum from tool-mediated activity to the process of acquiring scientific concepts. A separate task of critical analysis, not attempted here, would be to trace Vygotsky's different views of the sign, a task laudably approached by Lee (1985) and Wertsch (1985). I shall exploit some of their insights, combining them with my selective reading of Vygotsky's own writing. a) The sign and the tool The first thing to note about Vygotsky's understanding of the sign is his manner of approaching it from a developmental perspective. For him this perspective did not, however, mean a task of writing a history of the concept itself. He enriched his definitions of the sign by studying the genesis and developmental paths of various sign-mediated activities in children. Such a contextual definition of the sign in the process of empirical research of children's sign use permitted a truly flexible way of examining the concrete transformations of sign-mediated activity and its relations with practical activities. Unfortunately, it also led Vygotsky to adopt, without a critical reflection, an understanding of the sign as it was presented in the prevailing linguistic research, with all its ambiguities and limitations. While Vygotsky managed to transcend the unmediated stimulus response models of behaviourism as well as the subjective idealism embedded in introspectionist psychology he seems to have accepted, without critical appraisal, the linguistic notions of Sapir (Lee, 1985) and Yakubinskii (Wertsch, 1985). Vygotsky correctly postulated that the sign adopts a mediating position in human activity changing its structure and developmental course. At the same time he adopted (unconsciously) the prevailing epistemological distinction, long nurtured in Western philosophy and psychology, between the object and its representation. This caused a conceptual impoverishment in his conception of the sign and also created and maintained a gap between the two primary mediators of human activity, the tool and the sign. (It might be argued that the later accusations, made by Soviet psychologists, of Vygotsky's intellectualism reflect his dualism concerning the tool as a material object and the sign as an ideal phenomenon. However, the efforts to resolve this dualism by adopting the conception of object-oriented activity led into another dead end, described by Zinchenko (1990). It caused an impoverishment in the psychological understanding of symbolic processes and blocked empirical research on the manifold patterns and transformations of tool and sign mediation. ) This problem becomes evident in Vygotsky's definition of the sign in which he first postulates an analogy between it and the tool, but then goes on emphasizing their fundamental difference. The sign acts as an instrument of psychological activity in a manner analogous to the role of a tool in labour. 'The invention and use of signs as auxiliary means of solving a given psychological problem (to remember, compare something, report, choose, and so on) is analogous to the invention and use of tools.' (Vygotsky, 1978) There is, however, an important feature that separates the sign from the tool. Tools mediate object oriented activity whereas signs, in the form of language, mediate social intercourse. Tools are externally oriented and are used in the modification of objects whereas signs 'change nothing in the psychological operation'. Signs are multifunctional tools of communication and representation. b) Vygotsky's linguistic understanding of the sign For Vygotsky, signs in general and language in particular, as the prime system of signs, are reversible (Lee, 1985). By this he understands that (verbal) signs fall back on their users, that they can serve both as a stimulus and as a response. This property allows their users to employ signs in controlling their own behaviour. Such a view of the sign seems to have been developed by qualifying the tool analogy. What is brought forward from the analogy is the mediating role of signs in psychological processes, but the sign itself remains a rather undeveloped concept. Yet the sign becomes, somewhat indirectly, characterized in Vygotsky's research on internal speech, on the development of word meaning and scientific concepts. Reviewing this work Lee (1985) has described two characteristics of the sign that reflect the influence of contemporary linguistics and logic on Vygotsky's thought. Firstly, in his genetic analysis of speech, Vygotsky distinguished between communicative and representative functions of language. Secondly, when examining the development of word meaning, he singled out meaning and reference as the two structural aspects of linguistic signs. Vygotsky illustrated this with two phrases which refer to Napoleon. Whether we say 'the victor at Jena' or 'the loser at Waterloo', we refer to the same person, yet the meaning of the two phrases differs. Vygotsky made use of this distinction when he began to examine the development of word meanings in ontogenesis. It also played a part in his understanding of everyday vs. scientific concepts. In this analysis his dependence on linguistics became even more pronounced. He asserted that syntactic relations, codified in grammar, played an important part in relating a concept with another. Interconceptual relations were the defining feature of scientific concepts. Vygotsky's understanding of syntax, and grammatical relations in general, is fully in line with a Saussurean conception that approaches grammar as a generalized and normative structure of language. As Lee has emphasized, grammar acts for Vygotsky as the mediating device between the 'upward growth of spontaneous concepts and the downward growth of scientific concepts'. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that Vygotsky adopted the prevailing linguistic views of words and grammar. His truly creative and fruitful insight, based on the tool analogy, was to understand the mediating role of signs in the construction of mental activity, but he failed to develop the sign concept further on the basis of a genetic analysis of the sign itself. Such an analysis would have shown its material nature, as well as its various developmental changes in the object oriented and communicative activities. (The materiality of signs is much better understood by Winnicott, and especially well by Bakhtin. Such a conception of signs as something equally material as everything else in the world may be incomprehensible for us, having been brought up in the Western tradition of thinking which distinguishes sharply between object and representation, between 'the world out there' and our knowledge of it. The materiality of signs include their physical characteristics, i.e., the specific sign-material, of their external forms. In addition, the materiality of a sign is defined by the intercommunicational activity into which it enters as a mediator. This form of materiality is retained by the sign even in its internalized forms - as a mediator of mental activity. This aspect of the sign will be clarified below, when I will introduce Bakhtin's conceptions.) c) A glimpse at the genesis of meaning Vygotsky's unduly linguistic conception of the sign can probably explain some of the difficulties in his analyses of speech development and word meaning. It certainly exposes the contradiction we encounter within the three pages of Mind and Society where he discusses the tool/sign analogy. Having made the sharp division between material tools and immaterial signs, Vygotsky addresses the problem of internalization. And when describing it he delivers an example, a vignette, which I find to be most important in the attempt to understand the genesis of signifying acts and the material origin of signs: A good example of this process may be found in the development of pointing. Initially, this gesture is nothing more than an unsuccessful attempt to grasp something, a movement aimed at a certain object placed beyond his reach; his hands, stretched toward that object, remain poised in the air. His fingers make grasping movements. At this initial stage pointing is represented by the child's movement, which seems to be pointing to an object - that and nothing more. When the mother comes to the child's aid and realizes his movement indicates something, the situation changes fundamentally. Pointing becomes a gesture for others. The child's unsuccessful attempt engenders a reaction not from the object he seeks but from another person. Consequently, the primary meaning of that unsuccessful grasping movement is established by others. Only later, when the child can link his unsuccessful grasping movement to the objective situation as a whole, does he begin to understand this movement as pointing. At this juncture there occurs a change in that movement's function: from an object-oriented movement it becomes a movement aimed at another person, a means of establishing relations. The grasping movement changes to the act of pointing. As a result of this change, the movement itself is then physically simplified, and what results is the form of pointing that we may call a true gesture. It becomes a true gesture only after it objectively manifests all the functions of pointing for others and is understood by others as such a gesture. Its meaning and functions are created at first by an objective situation and then by people who surround the child. (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 56) This important account of the genesis of signifying acts is by no means limited to the sphere of gestures. Linguistic signs acquire their proper meaning as well as their individual colouring for the child by similar contextual dynamics. We might continue Vygotsky's description by extending the example. It does not take a long time for the infant to realize that the gesture of pointing may be expressed by another form of signification, by the request - first in the form of a cry and later by using an articulated word, still later a question. And look, the true magic of words is hidden in the fact that they seem to affect mother's reciprocating acts as effectively as did the previous, physical gesture. The child would never find a motive for speaking unless words would not carry this strange aspect of power in themselves. Vygotsky's case example of the development of mediated acts and their transformation represents the first step toward a truly genetic and unified notion of signs which he himself was unable to develop. 2. Winnicott's concepts of the transitional object and potential space We must now turn to Winnicott in order to elaborate Vygotsky's account of the path from action to gesture as the generative process of meaningful signs. (The quoted passage is so compact that much understanding brought from other sources must be used in order to comprehend its brilliance and depth. By relating Vygotsky's insight with Winnicott's views I hope to be able to show how much it contains.) What was expressed as a sweeping generalization by Vygotsky would become a persistent issue for Winnicott and his theory of transitional objects - the 'transforming tool' for the psychoanalytic tradition which, however, has been unable to incorporate its implications into the classical conceptual apparatus of Freudian metapsychology. a) The early setting for Winnicott's insights Being a pediatrician Winnicott had a unique opportunity to observe infants in their primary social settings and in the clinical laboratory of the consulting room. He was able to recognize how tool-mediated activity developed in the early interaction between the baby and the mother and, being a psychoanalyst, he was sensitized to the emotional aspects and implications of this interaction. One of the earliest writings of Winnicott that addresses the complex pattern of tool mediation and early emotional interaction is The observation of infants in a set situation published in 1941 (Winnicott, 1982). I will borrow a lengthy quotation from this article, because the behaviour of the infant, as described by Winnicott, is quite important for the understanding of very early forms of tool mediation. The quotation will also help to introduce Winnicott's views of transitional objects. ...I ask the mother to sit opposite me with the angle of the table coming between me and her. She sits down with the baby on her knee. As a routine, I place a right-angled shining tongue-depressor at the edge of the table and I invite the mother to place the child in such a way that, if the child should wish to handle the spatula, it is possible. Ordinarily, a mother will understand what I am about, and it is easy for me gradually to describe to her that there is to be a period of time in which she and I will contribute as little as possible to the situation, so that what happens can fairly be put down to the child's account. You can imagine that mothers show by their ability or relative inability to follow this suggestion something of what they are like at home; if they are anxious about infection, or have strong moral feelings against putting things to the mouth, if they are hasty or move impulsively, these characteristics will be shown up... The infant's behaviour The baby is inevitably attracted by the shining, perhaps rocking, metal object... and I will now describe what, in my opinion, is a normal sequence of events... Stage 1. The baby puts his hand to the spatula, but at this moment discovers unexpectedly that the situation must be given a thought. He is in a fix. Either with his hand resting on the spatula and his body quite still he looks at me and his mother with big eyes, and watches and waits, or in certain cases, he withdraws interest completely and buries his face in the front of his mother's blouse. It is usually possible to manage the situation so that active reassurance is not given, and it is very interesting to watch the gradual and spontaneous return of the child's interest in the spatula. Stage 2. All the time, in 'the period of hesitation' (as I call it), the baby holds his body still (but not rigid). Gradually he becomes brave enough to let his feelings develop, and then the picture changes quite quickly. The moment at which this first phase changes into the second is evident, for the child's acceptance of the reality of desire for the spatula is heralded by a change in the inside of the mouth, which becomes flabby, while the tongue looks thick and soft, and saliva flows copiously. Before long he puts the spatula into his mouth and is chewing it with his gums, or seems to be copying father smoking a pipe. The change in the baby's behaviour is a striking feature. Instead of expectancy and stillness there now develops self-confidence, and there is free bodily movement, the latter related to manipulation of the spatula... The baby now seems to feel that the spatula is in his possession, perhaps in his power, certainly available for the purposes of self-expression. He bangs with it on the table or on a metal bowl which is nearby on the table, making as much noise as he can; or else he holds it to my mouth and to his mother's mouth, very pleased if we pretend to be fed by it. He definitely wishes us to play at being fed, and is upset if we should be so stupid as to take the thing into our mouths and spoil the game as a game. (Winnicott, 1982, pp. 52-54) b) Joint activity in an intersubjective space In the passage all of the important constituents of intersubjective space, all the basic relations between the infant, the physical object, and the adults may be seen in their embryonic forms. Much of Winnicott's later work on transitional objects as well as his ideas of the potential space are elaborations of this description, itself backed up by twenty years of clinical experience with infants and their mothers. (The concept of intersubjective space, which I will be using, must be separated from Winnicott's concept of the potential space. The former is a general concept, intended to convey the idea that any kind of psychological phenomenon is necessarily embedded in the matrix of mediated intercommunication. Winnicott's potential space is one concrete instance of this, aimed specifically at setting the stage for transitional phenomena and the developmental path by which, in the end, we fully employ the distinctions between the subjective and the objective, between the object and its representation.) In this case example we may see how the baby, attracted by the object, immediately checks the attitude of the adults in order to determine the basic meaning of the situation. We may see how intimately emotional aspects are interwoven into the path from perceiving the spatula to the grasping of it. We recognize the appearance of an active relation to the object and its gradual transformation from a tool of manipulative acts into a device of playful unitedness. I shall now examine Winnicott's theory of the transitional object more closely. The following case vignette illustrates very well the dialogical origin of the infant's transitional objects as well as the path from mediated joint activity to mediated individual activity, proceeding first on an external and later on a internalized plane. The mother of a 22 week old baby noticed that he begun to caress the bib toward the end of feeding, when he became relaxed and slumbrous. The mother interpreted these elementary acts with the cloth as signs of falling into sleep. Because of frequent dribbling, she had him to wear the bib almost all the time he was awake. Thus it was indeed a 'frequent companion' for the baby. Having interpreted the baby's caressing of the bib as a sign of drowsiness, the mother then began to give him a similar sized, bright terry towel which soon became a 'mediating sign' of the joint preparation for a snooze. Being sensitized, by a book of baby care, to the importance of the distinct meaning that the towel should attain, she only handed it to the baby in these situations. She was however (fortunately) only partly aware of the fact that all the good, soothing and comforting qualities of the towel were created by the good, peaceful, and loving 'intercommunion' between herself and the baby. Only in the forgetful intimacy, unobscured by the mother's controlling and over-conscious aims, may the transitional object become saturated by its magic. This standard example of the birth of transitional objects illustrates the necessary components involved in the emergence of such objects. It also demonstrates how intimately their developing properties are connected with the complex joint activity, during which the adult provides the basic meaning of the object. (It is important to note that transitional objects are not only created for soothing purposes. As Eigen (1981) points out, the core of transitional experiencing has to do with an inherent fit between the infant's creativeness and the world, i.e. the mother's sensitivity to the embryonic actions of the baby and her ability to amplify these actions.) The infant's own activity is, however, very important in making the object subjectively meaningful and, in the long run, an object enriched by more and more complex experiences, following both from joint and individual activities. c) Transitional phenomena create a new reality The simple illustration, quoted above, of the mediated character of transitional objects only partly explicates the subtle interplay between the subjective and objective aspects of the intersubjective space. For Winnicott, the meeting point between the internal and the external, between what is subjectively created and objectively existing, is indeed a delicate issue. [A transitional phenomenon or object] is a symbol of the union of the baby and the mother (or part of the mother). This symbol can be located. It is at the place in space and time where and when the mother is in transition from being (in the baby's mind) merged in with the infant and alternatively being experienced as an object to be perceived rather than conceived of. The use of an object symbolizes the union of two now separate things, baby and mother, at the point in time and space of the initiation of their state of separateness. (Winnicott, 1974, p. 114) For me the most important aspect of Winnicott's understanding of the 'third area of living', which he approaches by the concepts of transitional phenomena and potential space, is the emergence of a symbol in the meeting point of union and separateness. (As will be shown below, the Bakhtinian concept of the sign, as a mediator between two interpenetrating realities, and Winnicott's understanding of the symbol come very close to each other.) Compared with Vygotsky's unproblematic view of objectivity, as something given and internalized by the child while interacting with the adult, Winnicott has a more interesting view of reality as an interplay between what is given (objectively) and what is created - jointly - in the intersubjective space. Human beings bring their subjectivity into the external world of which they are an inseparable part. In such a view of reality the ancient Cartesian dualism has radically been transcended. d) Mediation is a developmental phenomenon Winnicott's view of mediation, although he did not use this concept, emphasizes its developmental nature. Transitional objects obtain their specific meaning in the gradual process of experiential separation during which the infant becomes capable of distinguishing between 'the object objectively existing' and 'the object conceived of'. The end product of such development is the complete separation of the sign from its referent. Yet throughout our lives we retain the intermediate phases of experiencing, where the object and its perception merge. Playing, art, and religion are those areas of human experience which continue to make full use of the third area of experience. Trying to relate Vygotsky's views of internalization with Winnicott's understanding of transitional phenomena gives us a rich basis for conceiving the formation of meaning in joint activity. We have to combine both of the above-mentioned aspects, firstly, that the sign (or the tool) acquires meaning only as a sign of union, in the process of separation; secondly, that it has at the same time an objective existence in the shared reality. Whether as physical objects or symbolic artefacts, all that exists will become subjectively meaningful - and usable - only when mediating the eternal interplay of union and separateness. This is Winnicott's teaching for a Vygotskian scholar. The concept of mediation is enriched by emotional aspects and by the idea of the third area, where reality is found creatively. Perhaps the most important aspect in this understanding of mediation is its developmental nature. Being initially an unrecognized aspect of reality, combining creation and finding (Winnicott's paradox), mediational patterns change as the infant grows toward a conscious and creative use of objects. Mediation itself changes, as it mediates the developing distinction between the internal and external. e) Moving from Vygotsky to Winnicott - and beyond The theoretical formulation that may summarized from Winnicott's work on transitional objects reads as follows: Every act of signification will always involve a three-term relation between (at least) two persons and the 'object' - inverted commas are used, because the object may be anything from parts of the body, from gestures and other actions, to physical things, whether man-made or not, and to signs. The person-object interchanges constitute indeed an indivisible totality, made up of its indissoluble constituents, becoming consumed by each other, yet becoming enriched by this ever evolving mutual consummation. It is this mediated co-activity that makes up the intersubjective space within which life only is possible. All meaning is generated within this developing, intercommunicational space, which unites that which is seen with what is not yet seen, which transforms practical, material transactions into signs and which materializes symbolic and invisible forms of activity into practical acts and tangible objects. Everything that exists in the human mind - indeed in the world, 'humanized' by man's practical object oriented activities - is created within this living, concrete and material space. It is this radical materialism that places Winnicott's work so close to Vygotsky and especially Bakhtin, as will be shown below. Vygotsky's important discoveries of tool-mediated activity were hampered by his linguistic conception of signs that prevented him from seeing clearly the early development of signs and their true materiality as mediators. Winnicott was, in his turn, restrained by psychoanalytic views that did not contain any understanding of mediation. Brought into the methodological context of mediated activity, Winnicott's views of the creative nature of subjectivity, of the origins of object use in the intersubjective space, and of the quality of transitional objects and their gradual transformation, may be regarded as very important contributions to the theory of tool-mediated activity and the origin of signs. Indeed, in this new context Winnicott's writings gain simplicity and clarity that do not at all justify claims of the inaccessibility of his thought. It is through Winnicott's work that object relations theory may be integrated with Vygotskian conceptions of sign mediation while, at the same time, freeing the latter from its linguistic constraints. 3. The Bakhtinian understanding of signs To continue my conceptual journey I shall explore the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and his collaborators, because in the Bakhtinian conception of signs we are going to encounter a synthetic view, not fully covered by either Vygotsky or Winnicott. Yet it has to be added that without the profound insights of these two creative theorists it would not be possible to disclose the rich implications of Bakhtin's ideas. (Bakhtin (1895-1975) was an original scholar whose work, together with his close associates, embraces a broad field of interests. He is probably best known from his theory of novel based on the studies of Rabelais and Dostoevsky, but his work on signs, discourse and language has begun to attract increasing interest within Western semiotics, linguistics and psychology (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Recently his relevance to the Vygotskian tradition has been noticed both in the Soviet Union (Zinchenko, 1985) and in the West (Emerson, 1986; Wertsch, 1985f).) a) The sign as a mediator of two realities The basic Bakhtinian definition of the sign is presented by Voloshinov (1973) in his philosophical study of language. (Within the recent tradition of Bakhtin exegesis a controversy of authorship has attracted a lot of scholarly interest (Morson & Emerson, 1989; 1990) Although the authorship is an important aspect of Bakhtin's own theory of utterance, he himself had quite liberal views about it and regarded creative work as collective productivity. It has been commonly assumed that two books (Voloshinov, 1973; 1976), published in V.N. Voloshinov's name, are in fact written by Bakhtin. Voloshinov's authorship of Marxism and the philosophy of language may be questioned and some writers try to account for this problem by referring to 'Bakhtin/Voloshinov'. As this would result in a clumsy presentation I shall refer to Voloshinov as the author. No substantial damage will ensue as the concept of sign discussed here will be found throughout the writing of Bakhtin himself.) Any ideological product is not only itself a part of a reality (natural or social), just as is any physical body, any instrument of production, or any product for consumption, it also, in contradistinction to these other phenomena, reflects and refracts another reality outside itself. Everything ideological possesses meaning: it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside itself. In other words, it is a sign. (Voloshinov, 1973, p.9) The basic thing to note in this quotation is Voloshinov's use of the term ideological. Accustomed to its close connection with political jargon we often invest it with negative connotations. For Voloshinov ideological does not have these implications it embraces a far wider domain, in fact everything in human life that may assume the function of a sign. There are two important aspects in Voloshinov's opening remarks of the sign. Firstly, the sign is a part of reality and in this sense it is as material as any other natural or man-made object. Secondly, its distinctive and basic property is the ability to mediate between two realities: the sign brings the reality which it stands for into the situation where it is used. To emphasize the materiality of signs, Voloshinov declares later in the text that 'Every ideological sign is not only a reflection, a shadow, of reality, but is also itself a material segment of that very reality.' In Voloshinov's definition there is no place for a dualism of the (material) thing and its (ideal) representation that has characterized the epistemological distinctions made in the Western traditions of philosophy and psychology. This is, of course, an extremely bold statement. The sign is not merely a mirror, it is the true carrier of the reality it signifies. This peculiarity is pointed out by Holquist (1990), but he does not examine its possible origin. In a recent paper Lock (1991) has put forward a thesis that this conception of a sign is a direct expression of Bakhtin's religious interests. As a Russian Orthodox he was well aware of the philosophical writings of the 4th century Greek Fathers whose work played an important part in the spiritual revival of the pre-revolutionary Russia. In the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, Athanasius the Great, Maximus the Confessor, and others, Neo-Platonist dualism was transcended by the Biblical understanding of the Incarnation as 'the Word that became flesh'. The early Fathers developed such a radically materialistic conception of the sign to account for the spiritual experience, shared by the Christians, of the presence of Christ in the sacramental life of the early church. ( When discussing the concept of symbol and its development in the Orthodox tradition, Schmeman (1990) refers to Maximus the Confessor, a sixth-century Father, who claimed that 'The symbol - and this is very important - is thus the very reality of that which it symbolizes. By representing, or signifying, that reality it makes it present, truly represents it.' (p. 123). Schmemann gives an example, encountered in the Orthodox liturgy, of such a materialistic view of symbols: 'Nowhere is this symbolic realism more evident than in the application by Maximus of the term "symbol" to the Body and Blood of Christ offered in the Eucharist, an application which, in the context of today's opposition between the symbolic and the real, would be plain heresy.' In his last work Bakhtin (1986), echoing this sacramental understanding of the symbol, writes, 'The symbol has a "warmth of fused mystery" '.It may be of interest to note that Winnicott (1974) also points out this peculiarity of Christian sacramentalism in his article of transitional objects.) In the political climate of the Soviet Union in the early 1920s such views could, of course, not be espoused openly. It seems, however, that Voloshinov's special emphasis of the sign as a mediator, not as a representation, can best be understood in the light of Patristic writings. We may now move on to Voloshinov's next thesis of the genesis of signs. He writes: Signs can arise only on interindividual territory. It is the territory that cannot be called 'natural' in the direct sense of the word: signs do not arise between any two members of the species Homo sapiens. It is essential that the two individuals be organized socially, that they compose a group (a social unit) only then can the medium of signs take shape between them. (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 12) Signs as 'psychological tools' incorporate the material properties of their origin, their 'action energy' so to say, and the relations into which they originally entered, or by which they were created, as mediators. This is the dynamic aspect of signs. In this passage Voloshinov also introduces the idea of the societal factors that affect the persons and their dialogic relationship, mediated by signs. In a truly dialectical fashion signs and socially organized persons define each other. Neither may be understood properly without the other. b) Words as signs Having provided the basic constitutive properties of the sign, Voloshinov addresses the problem of language. He delineates four aspects that characterize the word as 'the sign par excellence' of all human communication. Firstly, 'the entire reality of the word is wholly absorbed in its function of being a sign.' In this sense a word is the purest mediator of social interchange. It is created in communication, its meaning develops within communication, and the meaning - the word's ability to present another reality in the context of its use - is its constitutive property, its reason for coming into being. Secondly, the word is 'not only the purest, most indicatory sign but it is, in addition, a neutral sign.' Voloshinov clarifies this aspect of the word by contrasting it with other kinds of 'semiotic material' which are created and used within a particular field of socially significant activity. Whereas these signs, or symbols, remain inseparable from the domain of their usage, words can 'carry out ideological functions of any kind - scientific, aesthetic, ethical, religious.' Thirdly, because of its universality and its intrinsic capacity to mediate, the word is the prime tool of human interchange; it is 'preeminently the material of behavioural communication'. For Voloshinov the birth place of language is the dialogue, the concrete, living speech activity between socially organized persons. During our cultural development we have learnt to reproduce verbal signs through extracorporeal material, in writing. This has greatly enhanced the possibilities of indirect communication. It has also seduced philologists throughout centuries, as well as linguists and psychologists of our time, to approach the word from a lexical-semantic point of view, mercilessly criticized by Voloshinov later in his book. The semiotic 'materialization' of the word may indeed adopt many forms. It should, however, not make us lose sight of its supreme position in the living communication. These implications are also reinforced by the fourth aspect of the word, its specifically human mode of existence: Although the reality of the word, as is true of any sign, resides between individuals, a word, at the same time, is produced by the individual organism's own means without recourse to any equipment or any other kind of extracorporeal material. This has determined the role of word as the semiotic material of inner life - of consciousness. (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 14) This aspect of the word comes very close to Winnicott's views. Voloshinov's thesis of the reality of the word, as residing between the individuals, may be understood fully in line with Winnicott's understanding of how transitional objects assume their qualities in the potential space. Keeping in mind that signs are true mediators of two interpenetrating realities, the notion of words as transitional objects becomes quite conspicuous. c) The inter-individuality of consciousness There is yet one aspect in Voloshinov's writings that has important methodological implications for psychology. It is the radical redefinition of consciousness, based on his notion of the sign. Consciousness cannot be derived directly from nature... [It] takes shape and being in the material of signs created by an organized group in the process of its social intercourse. The individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from then; it reflects their logic and laws. (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 13) Voloshinov elaborates this thesis when criticizing the traditions of contemporary psychology. In one passage he comes astonishingly close to Winnicott's definition of the third area of experience, the intersubjective space where human mental life takes shape: By its very existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localized somewhere between the organism and the outside world, on the borderline separating these two spheres of reality. It is here that an encounter between the organism and the outside world takes place, but the encounter is not a physical one: the organism and the outside world meet here in the sign. (Voloshinov, 1973, p. 26) These words speak for themselves, and by relating transitional phenomena with Voloshinov's views we may see the extremely important and radical implications of Winnicott's thinking. Moreover, his work provides concrete and developmentally relevant substance for Voloshinov's abstract views. d) Bakhtin's later views of the word Much of Bakhtin's later work on words and language was done in the context of his unique theory of utterance. This theory, which he kept on revising and extending throughout his life, is far too complex to be presented here. It permitted Bakhtin to explore the word as a living sign that traverses through time and absorbs into itself a treasure of voices, or previous dialogues. In the context of an utterance the word always 'wants to be heard, always seeks responsive understanding. For the word (and, consequently, for the human being) there is nothing more terrible than a lack of response.' (Bakhtin, 1984). Words do have strange powers in them, provided that we can free ourselves from our extremely reduced view of them - generated both by our epistemology and by our lexical-semantic approach. By speaking of the word's wish to be heard Bakhtin reiterates his early understanding of signs as mediators, as 'messengers' from the context where they were created in the new context of their use. 4. Conclusion Having in mind the concept of sign elaborated above, it would be tempting to make a critical examination of current, and still popular, cognitive theories about mental representation and concept formation. Another area of investigation would be the increasingly popular constructivist views espoused, for instance, by some social psychologists and within family therapy. Such tasks have to be left to the future. The question posed at the beginning of this paper concerned the possible relating of activity theory to psychoanalytic object relations theory. In his paper at the Second International Congress of Activity Theory in 1990, Ryle expressed his hope of marrying Melanie Klein and Vygotsky (Ryle, 1990b). In the light of this theoretical investigation such a marriage does indeed seem possible. However it will require Winnicott to act as a mediator and it seems that, in order to bear fruit, such a marriage will require an additional boost provided by Bakhtin. 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