TRAVAIL, capital et société 42:1&2 (2009)
Réduction de la pauvreté et compétitivité universelle
Paul Cammack
Résumé
Les documents de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté
(DSRP) de la Banque mondiale ont représenté, au début du siècle
actuel, une transition entre l’étroit projet politique néolibéral et
une approche plus large axée sur la création d’un climat favorable à l’investissement et caractérisée par des actions étatiques
positives favorisant la compétitivité des produits, du capital et
des marchés de la main d’œuvre. Si les « saines politiques
macroéconomiques » constituaient toujours la base de la réduction de la pauvreté, les DSRP allaient beaucoup plus loin, afin de
réformer les relations sociales et la relation entre les citoyens, les
marchés et l’État. Cet article soutient que par l’orientation générale de ses politiques, la Banque mondiale favorise maintenant
des objectifs qu’elle partage avec d’autres agences internationales et multilatérales, particulièrement l’OCDE. C’est-à-dire
bâtir le capital humain des travailleurs, accroître les possibilités
d'emploi, et rendre encore plus compétitifs les marchés de la
main d’œuvre. L'article examine donc la relation entre la réduction de la pauvreté et la politique de compétitivité. Il explore (i) le
terrain commun entre le « consensus de Washington », le
« consensus post-Washington » et la stratégie de prolétarianisation mondiale énoncée par la Banque mondiale depuis 1990; (ii)
le programme parallèle de l’OCDE et de l’UE visant à rétablir
l’hégémonie du capital sur la main-d’œuvre dans les pays
développés; et (iii) la logique actuelle des institutions internationales et régionales concernées par la gouvernance économique mondiale. La conclusion évalue la complémentarité et les
contradictions entre les stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté et
la compétitivité universelle.
LABOUR, Capital and Society 42:1&2 (2009)
Poverty Reduction and Universal
Competitiveness
Paul Cammack1
Abstract
World Bank poverty reduction strategies papers (PRSP)
in the first years of the present century represented a shift from a
narrowly conceived neoliberal agenda to a broader one focused
on creating a climate for investment and characterized by
positive state action to promote competitiveness in product,
capital and labour markets. While 'sound macroeconomic policy'
remained a bedrock of poverty reduction, PRSPs went far beyond
this in order to reshape social relations and the relationship
between citizens, markets and the state. This paper argues that in
its general policy orientation the World Bank now promotes an
agenda shared with other international and multilateral agencies,
especially the OECD, focused on building the human capital of
workers, expanding employment, and making labour markets ever
more competitive. The focus of the paper, therefore, is on the
relationship between poverty reduction and the politics of
competitiveness. The paper discusses (i) the common ground
between the ‘Washington Consensus’, the ‘Post-Washington
Consensus’ and the strategy of global proletarianisation spelled
out by the World Bank from 1990 onwards; (ii) the parallel
OECD/EU programme for restoring the hegemony of capital over
labour in the developed world; and (iii) the current conventional
wisdom of the international and regional institutions concerned
with global economic governance. The conclusion assesses the
complementarity and contradictions between poverty reduction
strategies and universal competitiveness.
Introduction
There has been considerable debate in recent years over
the extent and significance of a presumed shift at the World Bank
and the IMF from structural adjustment, with externally imposed
conditionality, towards a greater emphasis on country ownership,
inclusion and local participation and a primary focus on poverty
reduction (Pender, 2001; Gilbert and Vines, 2002; Pincus and
Winters, 2002; Craig and Porter, 2003, 2005; Cammack, 2004;
Ruckert, 2006; Best, 2006; Lazarus, 2008). This essay argues that
there has been no significant change over the last twenty years in
either the salience of poverty reduction, or the broad strategy
through which it is to be achieved. In particular, it is mistaken
either to ascribe a new ethical or moral dimension to the practice
of the international financial institutions (Best, 2005, 2006), or to
see in it any retreat from an original orthodoxy (Ruckert, 2006).
The IFIs may have refined their understanding of the
complexities of poverty reduction (with regard, for example, to
institution-building, sequencing, regulation and strategies of
legitimization). But despite successive and increasingly severe
global and regional crises, neither their moral nor their politicoeconomic vision has changed. In fact, a consistent focus has
underpinned not only the Bretton Woods institutions’ approach to
poverty reduction throughout the period, but also the policies
promoted by the OECD and the European Commission in relation
to the most developed countries over the same period. Its logic is
best described as one of ‘universal convergence on
competitiveness’.
The focus of this paper, therefore, is on the relationship
between poverty reduction and the politics of competitiveness. It
proceeds as follows: I first highlight specific arguments made by
Best and Ruckert which represent two interpretations of the
recent transformations of World Bank policy I wish to challenge.
The following sections then discuss (i) the common ground
between the ‘Washington Consensus’, the ‘Post-Washington
Consensus’ and the strategy of global proletarianisation spelled
out by the World Bank from 1990; (ii) the parallel OECD/EU
programme for restoring the hegemony of capital over labour in
the developed world; and (iii) the current conventional wisdom of
the international and regional institutions concerned with global
economic governance. The conclusion assesses the
complementarity and contradictions between poverty reduction
strategies and universal competitiveness.
Country Ownership and Inclusion
In her analysis of recent policy reform at the IMF,
Jacqueline Best identifies an ‘ethical turn’ on the part of the IMF
from a stance of neutrality and objectivity to an explicitly moral
one that amounts to a new global or universal ethics, albeit with a
34
communitarian twist. Country ownership is central to this
approach, as it “plays a crucial role in legitimizing the Fund’s
reforms, embedding a universal vision of the global economy
through a particularist ethics that places the responsibility for
change on developing states” (Best, 2005: 359; see also Best,
2003a and 2003b). She faults the new global ethics for imposing
Western norms and practices on the developing world, and for
promoting its moral vision without any “real awareness of the
political implications of financial reform” (ibid: 373). So “the
financial reforms that the Fund is proposing as a part of this new
ethical framework appear to reinforce rather than to reduce their
efforts to universalise their much-criticised neo-liberal
policies” (Best, 2006: 308). Indeed these have become even more
intrusive, moving from an emphasis on policy reform to requiring
changes in the “economic and political institutions” of developing
and emerging states (ibid: 311, emphasis in the original). In sum,
Best argues that the IMF’s “new policies on conditionality and
ownership can best be understood as efforts to shore up the
legitimacy of the institution by supplementing its traditional
emphasis on expert-based legitimacy with a more explicitly
political concern with ensuring participation, transparency and
genuine consent to Fund programmes (Best, 2007: 471).
I share Best’s conclusion that the new turn to global
ethics does not “significantly challenge the current neo-liberal
logic of contemporary global economic governance, but rather
attempts to provide a moral justification for its
continuance” (2006: 315). However, her analysis does not seem
to grasp the full implications of its universal prescriptions or of
the role that country ownership plays in them. This is an issue of
considerable significance, as many left critics of the IFIs similarly
characterise the policies they promote as imposed on the
developing world at the behest of the US, or the developed states
as a group, or global capital – as with Peter Gowan’s ‘DollarWall Street Regime’ (Gowan, 1999: Ch. 3), or David Harvey’s
bald assertion that “the IMF is the United States” (Harvey, 2005:
72). As a point of entry, I identify the contradiction, on which
Best does not comment, between her assertion that the neo-liberal
logic of reform is imposed upon developing and emerging states,
and the insistence of Camdessus, which she cites, that “a duty of
universal responsibility is incumbent upon all”, that more rigour
is needed in the industrial countries along with more discipline in
35
the structural adjustment of the developing countries, and that
there is a need for “a renewed sense of urgency in the structural
adaptation of all economies, be they industrial, in transition, or
developing” (cited in Best, 2006: 312, 313). I suggest that this
points to a crucial misinterpretation of the project to which the
IFIs and other institutions of global governance are committed.
Arne Ruckert similarly sees the Post-Washington
Consensus (PWC) as “the first step towards the tendential
emergence of an inclusive-neoliberal regime of development in
the global economy”, and argues that “its introduction represents
an attempt by the IFIs to resolve some of the legitimacy problems
and contradictions that neoliberal policies faced in the
periphery” (Ruckert, 2006: 35). While allowing that there are
some progressive aspects to this approach, he recognises that “the
neoliberal logic of commodification and market colonization of
all aspects of social life are not fundamentally challenged in the
inclusive-neoliberal development model that is promoted under
the tutelage of the PWC” (ibid: 59). I agree. But like Best, he
finds the current paradigm unstable and therefore vulnerable to
destabilising critique, in this case because of the following
contradiction at its heart: “developing country governments are
asked under the inclusive-neoliberal regime to increase their
poverty-related spending and to subsidize the consumption of the
disempowered and impoverished through the erection of social
safety nets – clearly a first step in undermining the logic of
neoliberal rule” (ibid: 62 – emphasis mine). Here my point of
entry is to suggest that if one looks at workers as producers as
well as consumers, and sees proposals for subsidisation and
compensation as a strategy of increasing the supply of efficient
and productive labour power over the medium/longer term,
within a continuing social logic of commodification, there is not
necessarily any contradiction here. Everything depends upon
whether the logic of inclusion exceeds or diverges from that of
labour market efficiency over time. If it does not, it remains
consistent with a politics of universal competitiveness.
A New Materialist Perspective
Each of these approaches begs a fundamental question: in
Best’s terms, what is the strategy that flows from the perception
of the IMF and others that “economic interdependence has
created a world in which no country’s economy is an
36
island” (Best, 2006: 312); in Ruckert’s terms, what is the social
logic of inclusion? I approach these questions from a new
materialist (or up-dated classical Marxist) perspective which
starts with the idea of capitalism as a global system, rather than
with a world of states (Burnham, 1994, Holloway, 1994), and
gives priority to the analysis of capitalist accumulation and class
struggle – contemporarily, in circumstances of the ‘completion of
the world market’, or the emergence of a genuinely global
capitalist economy (Cammack, 2003). In its light, I argue that the
answer to each is the same – universal convergence on
competitiveness. In other words, both point to a universal strategy
to intensify the commodification of labour, reflective and
constitutive of class struggle on a global scale.
Simply put, the World Bank and the IMF, along with
other institutions such as the EU, the OECD and the UNDP, are
in the business of spreading capitalism on a global scale. The
Bretton Woods institutions have promoted this under the slogan
of ‘poverty reduction’, most notably in the World Bank’s strapline ‘Working for a World Free of Poverty” (a recent twist on the
earlier “Our Dream is a World Free of Poverty”). From this
perspective, the promotion of poverty reduction in the context of
country ownership should not be seen as a contested issue
between the IFIs and developing country governments, but as a
joint strategy on their part to secure the hegemony of capital over
labour, in such a way to ensure that the strategies adopted in
individual countries collectively contribute to securing the
hegemony of capital at a global level.
Importantly, the focus of that strategy goes beyond the
IFIs and the low income countries, as it is pursued just as
vigorously in the advanced capitalist countries as in the
developing world or the emerging economies. In crude terms, in
the former case the emphasis is on restoring and extending the
sway of capital over labour, while in the latter it is on
proletarianisation – making new workers available to, and
exploitable by, capital. The discipline upon which both depend
stems from the intensification of competitiveness on a global
scale. The commitment of the international organisations to
developing and disseminating programmes of domestic reform
which aim to intensify the competitiveness not only in domestic
markets, but also across the global capitalist system as a whole is
to be understood, therefore, as an intervention in the global class
37
struggle.
In this perspective, country ownership, whether promoted
by the IMF and the World Bank in the developing world, or (as it
also is) by the EU’s European Commission and the OECD in
advanced and emerging economies, is about consolidating states
as effective agents of bourgeois hegemony. And to the extent that
this incorporates a focus on inclusion, it is primarily about
incorporating the poor as workers, or in other words as producers
rather than consumers. If so, the strategy is not undermined but
reinforced by measures intended to propel new or displaced
workers back into the labour force with enhanced skills and
‘flexibility’, while the ‘new global ethics’ of the IMF (and others)
represent not an attempt to impose existing Western norms and
practices on a potentially different developing world, but an effort
to provide ideological cover for a programme of universal
capitalist competitiveness that imposes transformative social
change in the developed and developing worlds alike. All in all,
this suggests that the IMF and the World Bank have an all too
acute grasp of the politics of reform – but one that in different
ways Best and Ruckert have missed (Best, 2006)(Ruckert, 2006).
Proletarianisation and Poverty Reduction: from the 1990
World Development Report to the ‘Post-Washington
Consensus’
As suggested above, the defining feature of ‘universal
convergence on competitiveness’ is that it articulates and seeks to
implement a strategy that will both hasten the process of
primitive accumulation – or global proletarianisation – and
enforce the laws of capitalist accumulation throughout the
enlarged space of the capitalist world economy (Cammack, 2002:
126). What does this tell us about the prospects for poverty
reduction? A first step in addressing this question (to which I
shall return in the conclusion), is to locate it in the overall
strategy.
Williamson was clear on the point that prevailing
suggestions for reform were market-oriented and largely excluded
considerations of equity and redistribution. His much discussed
summary of what he saw as the ‘Washington Consensus’ or the
“conventional wisdom of the day [on Latin America] among the
economically influential bits of Washington” in the late 1980s
(Williamson, 1993: 1329) identified ten policy instruments (fiscal
38
discipline; the orientation of public expenditure to primary health,
education and infrastructure; tax reform; financial liberalisation;
unified and competitive exchange rates; trade liberalisation;
openness to and equal treatment of foreign direct investment;
privatisation; deregulation; and secure property rights).
Commenting on this ‘consensus’ in 1993 in the light of the
debates it engendered, Williamson identified the underlying issue
as the trade-off between equity and efficiency, and stated that he
had “deliberately excluded from the list anything which was
primarily distributive, as opposed to having equitable
consequences as a by-product of seeking efficiency objectives,
because I felt the Washington of the 1980s to be a city that was
essentially contemptuous of equity concerns” (Williamson, 1993:
1329). Its premise was that the pursuit of efficiency would reduce
poverty, but that any effort to address it by methods that reduced
efficiency was misguided. Williamson argued that this view was
compatible with a range of possible social welfare functions,
which were proper matters for debate and political choice, but he
ruled out “policies that are populist, socialist, or protectionist” on
the grounds that they produced ‘inefficient outcomes’ (ibid: 1331,
1336). At the same time he explicitly rejected the suggestion that
the policy package identified was ‘neoliberal’, for good reason,
and would argue later that it was pro-poor in orientation
(Williamson, 2000: 251-2, 257-9; see also Williamson, 1993:
1334).
Significantly, Stiglitz took exactly the same substantive
position, thereby providing justification for Williamson’s acerbic
suggestion that the only reason to adopt the notion of a ‘postWashington consensus’ is that it accurately captures the content
of the original consensus in a way that the caricature offered by
Stiglitz and others did not (Williamson, 2000: 259). Stiglitz is
equally committed to “enhancing the efficiency of the
economy” (Stiglitz, 1998: 7, 25-6); he identifies competition and
increases in productivity at central objectives (ibid: 18, 29); and
he draws on his Nobel Prize-winning analysis of incomplete
information and market failure to make the case for public
investment to promote human capital development and to
encourage technology transfer (ibid: 31-4; see also Stiglitz,
2001). His conclusion is that “[t]he government should serve as a
complement to markets, undertaking actions that make markets
work better and correcting market failures”; and he adds for good
39
measure that “some of the most promising and least explored
ways to improve the function of government is (sic) to use
markets and market-like mechanisms” (ibid: 26, 29).
Stiglitz reflected here, just as much as Williamson had
before, the strategy spelled out by the World Bank at the
beginning of the decade. As stated in the 1990 World
Development Report, entitled Poverty:
The evidence in this Reports suggests that rapid and
politically sustainable progress on poverty has been
achieved by pursuing a strategy that has two equally
important elements. The first element is to promote the
productive use of the poor’s most abundant asset – labor.
It calls for policies that harness market incentives, social
and political institutions, infrastructure and technology to
that end. The second is to provide basic social services to
the poor. Primary health care, family planning, nutrition
and primary education are especially important (World
Bank, 1990: 3).
As summarised at the end of that Report, the strategy for reducing
poverty involved three related components: “efficient laborintensive growth based on appropriate market incentives, physical
infrastructure, institutions, and technological innovation”;
“adequate provision of social services, including primary
education, basic health care, and family planning services”; and
“transfers ... to help those who would not otherwise benefit ... and
safety nets ... to protect those most vulnerable to income-reducing
shocks” (ibid: 138).
From the outset, then, the provision of basic services for
the poor went along with policies to “harness market incentives,
social and political institutions, infrastructure and
technology” (ibid: 3) to the end of promoting the productive use
of their labour. And poverty reduction was presented from the
start in terms of promoting economic opportunities for the poor
(ibid: Ch. 4), ensuring that they can participate in, and contribute
to, growth by “helping” them to grasp new income-earning
opportunities (ibid: 56). But behind the language of participation
and opportunity was an explicit programme to make healthy
workers with good basic education available to capital all around
the world. In relation to education, for example, the report
40
reiterated the point that “the principal asset of the poor is labor
time. Education increases the productivity of this asset. … Since
labor is the one scarce resource on which all able-bodied poor can
rely, increasing the productivity of this labor is clearly the most
effective way to combat poverty” (ibid: 80, 81). The education of
girls was identified as particularly important, because it would
have the dual effect of reducing fertility and hence population
growth, while also making them available as workers. It followed
that “longer-term policies to increase women’s participation in
the labor market will be needed if the bias against girls’ education
in some parts of the world is to be eliminated” (ibid: 88).
Finally, this Report devoted an entire chapter to reflecting
on the experience of the 1980s in order to explore the relationship
between structural adjustment and long-term growth, and
especially the impact of structural adjustment on the poor (ibid:
Ch. 7). Invoking UNICEF, the World Bank addressed the slow
pace of macroeconomic recovery and structural change over the
previous decade, and concluded that while it was right to pursue
the long-run goal of the more efficient use of labour, care had to
be taken to avoid perverse short-term effects due to the slow
adjustment of firms and labour markets and possible sharp cuts in
the consumption levels of the poor. And since “the only way to
help the poor is to bring about sustainable recovery based on a
growth path that involves efficient use of labor and widespread
investment in human capital” (ibid: 112), a way had to be found
to manage the transition while keeping the process of reform on
track.
The way the World Bank found goes under the name of
the ‘political economy of adjustment’ and its key elements are (i)
building on discontent with previous forms of economic
management to defend market-oriented policies as progressive;
(ii) moving more decisively on reform fundamentals as crises can
‘strengthen support for policy change, weaken anti-reform
interest groups, and increase politicians’ willingness to rely on
technocrats; (iii) seeking external aid and investment to increase
the sustainability of reform; (iv) building coalitions of those who
benefit; (v) sequencing reforms carefully with respect to political
and economic objectives; and (vi) compensating losers, both
among the poor and the politically powerful, such as formal
sector workers, in the short term (ibid: Box 7.6, p. 115).
As early as 1990, then, three elements appear together: a
41
transformation strategy to address poverty by increasing the
availability and productivity of workers, a marketing strategy to
present that transformation as progressive, and a short-term
compensation strategy (safety nets) to sustain the political
ascendancy of the reform coalition. It is hence mistaken to
suggest that the concerns for country ownership or inclusion postdate the period of the ‘Washington Consensus’.
Proletarianisation and the PRSP Approach
There is no doubting that the view that capitalist
development can reduce poverty is and has been sincerely held at
the IMF and the World Bank. The point made here is that the
logic of efforts to promote poverty reduction from within those
institutions has never diverged from or gone beyond a
commitment to the development of the social forces of production
to their maximum extent. The IFIs, in other words, are committed
to poverty reduction only in so far as it is compatible with the
overriding need to promote and solidify capitalist accumulation
on a global scale. The bottom line is not that poverty must be
reduced, by whatever means, but that the hegemony of capital
over labour must be enforced. Hence the enormous efforts taken
to shape states as effective agents of bourgeois hegemony, and to
manage potential resistance; hence, also, the paradox that the
deeper the crisis provoked, the greater the rush to insist that while
corrections may be required, the fundamental policy framework
must remain in place, and even be reinforced (see Cammack,
2009; World Bank, 2009). If we identify ‘poverty reduction’
throughout the period considered as part of a wider offensive to
embed the disciplines of capitalist competitiveness on a global
scale, obliging capitalists to compete, securing the hegemony of
capital over labour, and pressing governments to lay down the
infrastructural and institutional framework that these objectives
require, the changes in IFI development policy and the
transformations of the international aid architecture following the
introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)
approach represent neither straightforward continuity, nor
rupture, but a deepening or intensification of the strategy
reflected in the original ‘Washington Consensus’. The emphasis
on ‘ownership’, ‘participation’ and ‘inclusion’, as slippery and
deceptive as the emphasis on ‘poverty reduction’, reflects the
recognition that greater efforts needed to be devoted to
42
developing the capacity of states to make markets competitive
and capitalism hegemonic, and to instructing them on
complementary strategies that would induce citizens to change
their behaviour in appropriate ways. A fundamental part of this
strategy - of which Stiglitz and then Stern were leading exponents
within the World Bank - was to present the narrowing down of
choices to those consistent with the disciplines of global capital
competitiveness, as opening up a realm of freedom, choice and
empowerment for the individual and a ‘better climate for
investment’ for the national state – an argument I have made at
length elsewhere (Cammack, 2006c). In this context, Stiglitz took
the view that state action was essential and irreplaceable, whether
to regulate markets and ensure competition, or to build a local
sense of ownership through devolution. In sum, he was for
national ownership of the reform process, and for competition,
rather than against the market, arguing that “if policies are to be
sustainable, developing countries must take ownership of
them” (Stiglitz, 1998: 34). Stiglitz was not for national
modification of the process, any more than the IMF was, despite
Best’s invocation of a ‘particularist’ ethic. Rather, he took the
view, as Collier and Dollar did in a paper that contributed
substantially to the evolution of the PRSP approach (Collier and
Dollar, 2001), that only the state could introduce and maintain the
disciplines, on capital and labour alike, that would be conducive
to bourgeois hegemony and capitalist accumulation on both
national and global scales. From this followed the redefinition of
the World Bank as a ‘knowledge Bank’.
Parallel Developments across the Developed and Developing
Worlds
While successive World Bank Development Reports were
building up the detail of the poverty reduction agenda through the
1990s (Cammack, 2002), a similar emphasis was emerging in the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
the European Commission, and the Paris-based Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which all
produced parallel agendas for reform. The impetus behind these
was the same as that which impelled Stiglitz and others to turn
the spotlight onto micro-level policies and the management of
behaviour. The neoliberal revolution launched in the UK and the
US in the 1970s was seen to be faltering in the early 1990s,
43
particularly in the major economies of continental Europe. The
response, in the European Commission’s White Paper on
Competitiveness in 1993 (the ‘Delors Report’) and the OECD
Jobs Strategy of 1994, was precisely the same as that outlined
above for the World Bank.
The OECD Jobs Strategy promoted a set of proposals
aimed at addressing the need for reform in the advanced
economies of the world. It reflected the same principles in place
at the World Bank and the IMF in the period, and provides
evidence that prior to the World Bank’s adoption of similar
micro-political strategies under Stiglitz, reforms to promote
incentives to modify behaviour in such a way as to create more
competitive labour and capital markets and to eliminate
alternatives to work, such as early retirement or reliance on state
benefits, were also being pressed upon advanced states. The
OECD proposals, set in the context of the need for noninflationary macroeconomic policy and technological innovation,
revolved around creating flexible labour markets (through
deregulation, tax and social security reform, and ‘active labour
market policies’), extending education and training, and
promoting competition and an ‘entrepreneurial climate’ by
eliminating impediments to the creation and expansion of
enterprises (Cammack, 2006a: 7). They went hand in hand with
national legislation, pioneered in the UK, to limit the power of
trade unions to resist the changes pursued.
It is on the basis of this evidence that the same set of
proposals being promoted in the developing world by the IMF
and the World Bank was being urged upon the advanced
capitalist countries by such institutions as the European
Commission and the OECD (and incidentally, through its Article
IV engagements, by the IMF itself), that I argue that we are
dealing with a ‘universal convergence on competitiveness’. This
has become particularly apparent over the last decade, with the
EU’s adoption of the pro-competitiveness Lisbon Agenda in 2000
(Cammack, 2006a), and its enlargement strategy, and the
OECD’s engagement with the BRICs. It is also reflected in the
increasingly close co-operation between the IMF, the World Bank
and its regional offices, the regional banks, and UN agencies such
as UNCTAD, the UNDP and ECOSOC, as reflected in the
Monterrey Consensus and the UN World Summit of 2005, which
have all helped to broaden the scope of the new consensus and
44
the institutional basis on which it rests (Cammack, 2006b, 2007,
2008; Charnock, 2006, 2007). Along with the systematic
interaction between these various institutions and national and
third sector donor agencies, such as the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID) and Oxfam, this has produced
a host of mechanisms for the dissemination and implementation
of the reform agenda at the micro-level.
Universal Convergence on Competitiveness
What is the content, then, of the ‘universal convergence
on competitiveness’? My reading of the positions of the various
organisations mentioned above suggests that it can be
summarised in ten key precepts, which together constitute the
‘conventional wisdom of the day’:
All countries should pursue competitiveness in the global
economy: The immediate priorities depend on national
circumstances, but the objective is always more flexible and more
productive economies that are better able to compete. The need to
adapt to the inevitable changes brought by competition is an issue
for developed and developing country governments alike. As
regards timing, there is no bad time for reform: when times are
good, abundant resources are available to fund reforms and buy
off opponents; when times are bad, crisis weakens resistance and
justifies deeper reform.
Country ownership is essential: Governments must take
responsibility for reforms or they will not appear legitimate. They
must not follow public opinion, but rather educate the public on
the need for change and the cost of non-reform. Reform will not
be sustainable over the longer term without secure electoral
support. The ultimate objective is to persuade citizens to adopt
new patterns of behaviour, and this cannot be imposed, least of all
from outside.
International institutions must be ‘strategic partners in
the political economy of reform’ (Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary
General, in OECD, 2007: 5): The international institutions and
their allies provide development knowledge and sound policy
advice; identify and disseminate best practice; offer authoritative
support for reform; and where necessary exert pressure on states
through surveillance and peer review. They must work closely
together in order to achieve their strategic objectives. And in
order to be legitimate, they must extend representation, especially
45
to the emerging economies.
Their task is to promote national reforms that contribute
simultaneously to national and global competitiveness: The right
policies enhance both national competitiveness and the
competitiveness of the global economy as a whole – for example,
competitive product markets are good, but protectionism is not. It
is not advisable to do everything at once; intelligent sequencing
of reform will maximise support and weaken opposition.
Sound macro-economic policies are still the
indispensable starting point: Monetary and fiscal stability provide
the basic conditions for investment, employment creation and
growth (e.g. World Bank, 2009).
Beyond that, all governments must create and maintain a
good climate for investment (World Bank, 2004): The private
sector is the primary source of growth, so the state must provide
good governance and the rule of law: predictable legal and
regulatory frameworks and secure property rights.
It must then provide an abundant and productive labour
force: Flexible labour markets are the key, with benefits
calibrated to make work pay, low barriers to labour mobility
(hiring and firing), and minimal disincentives to employment
(excessive minimum wages, redundancy provisions and
centralised wage bargaining).
Public expenditure should be directed to growthsupporting infrastructure and accelerated human capital
formation: Public investment in health, education, and
infrastructural projects is essential. Privatisation of state
enterprises is appropriate, so long as competition is guaranteed.
Where the state funds provision, it should do so through publicprivate partnerships. In education, the emphasis should be on
providing the skills required among the workforce for success in
a knowledge-based economy.
Entrepreneurship and innovation should be promoted at
all levels: Domestic and foreign capital should be treated equally.
Fiscal, legal and regulatory frameworks should all favour
enterprise, and especially SMEs (small and medium enterprises)
which provide employment and nurture domestic
entrepreneurship. Sound and effective competition law must be in
place, to enforce both local and global competitiveness.
Innovation should be promoted through partnerships between
business, universities, and local, regional and national
46
government development agencies.
There should be a particular focus on the empowerment
of women: This is ‘smart economics’. Girls are under-educated in
comparison to boys in most of the world, and their rates of
participation in the workforce fall well short of those of men.
Women should be supported in staying on to secondary and
higher education, in rural and urban entrepreneurship, and in
entering and remaining in work.
The Logic of Global Competitiveness at the World Bank
What this is all about, then, is delivering educated,
appropriately skilled, healthy and productive workers into the
hands of capital on a global scale – and all the detail has to be
seen in the context of this broader project. This could be amply
evidenced from the PRSP Sourcebook on which Ruckert’s
analysis builds, but I will illustrate it instead by drawing on the
CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment)
Questionnaire currently in force at the World Bank, which
provides the template against which countries are assessed and
marked, both to guide the allocation of lending, and to offer a
public appraisal of the extent to which the country’s policy and
institutional framework is conducive to “fostering poverty
reduction, sustainable growth, and the effective use of
development assistance” (World Bank, 2005: 1). It consists of
sixteen criteria set out in four equally weighted groups, the first
concerned with economic management (macroeconomic, fiscal,
and debt policy), the second focused on structural policies (trade,
the financial sector, and the regulatory environment for business),
the third addressing policies for social inclusion or equity (gender
equality, equity of public resource use, building human resources,
social protection and labour, and environmental sustainability),
and the fourth concerned with public sector management and
institutions (property rights and rule-based governance, budgetary
and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilization,
quality of public administration, and transparency, accountability
and (presumably, absence of) corruption in the public sector)
(ibid: 3). In each section, a sequence of descriptors running from
bad (1) to good (6) is provided to assist in country scoring, the
whole document running to 42 pages.
As the outline above suggests, policies relating to social
inclusion and equity are set in a broader framework relating to
47
economic management, structural policies and public sector
management. Along with the expected emphasis on sound
macroeconomic and fiscal policy and lean and efficient
government, the logic of competitiveness outlined above is
reflected throughout these sections. In the ideal business
environment, for example, foreign investment is freely permitted,
regulations are streamlined to facilitate entry, business activity,
and exit; employment law “provides a high degree of flexibility
to hire and fire at low cost”, other labour market institutions
“facilitate doing business”, state intervention in labour and land
markets is “limited to regulation and/or legislation to smooth out
market imperfections”, and procedures to register property are
simple, low cost and fast (ibid: 18).
As regards the criteria for social inclusion and equity,
gender equality is given pride of place. Ideally, “There are no
gender differences in human capital development, access to
productive and economic resources, and status and protection
under the law. Policies and laws that specifically address gender
equality in all these areas are consistently and effectively
enforced, and there are active programs or institutions to promote
greater gender equality or prevent an increase in gender
inequalities” (ibid: 20). On public resource use, public
expenditures “are fully aligned with poverty reduction priorities”,
with poor, vulnerable groups, and those lacking services clearly
identified and effective and well-monitored strategies in place
(ibid: 22). Human resources are built through (a) health and social
insurance policies with wide coverage, and universal access to
appropriate client-focused preventive and curative health
services, including the prevention and treatment of all forms of
malnutrition, and (b) a good quality, universal basic education
system, good quality, equitable ECD (early childhood
development) services, and diversified, good quality post-basic
education and training systems adequate to support economic
development and life-long learning, featuring the effective use of
public and private resources; and (c) strong commitment to
prevention, treatment, care and support of HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, and malaria (ibid: 26). On the all-important topic of
social protection and labour, (a) social protection programmes
provide cost-effective and well-targeted and monitored results as
part of a “balanced strategy with measures to increase poor and
vulnerable groups’ own incomes and their access to services and
48
to social insurance”, (b) the government implements core labour
standards, and “encourages civil society and local government
actions to reduce child labor, including appropriate incentives for
children to remain in school”, (c) “Labor market regulations and
active labor market policies promote broad access to employment
in the formal sector and reflects a balance between social
protection and job creation objectives in accordance with the
economic circumstances and values of the country”; (d)
“Government policies and programs encourage and support
communities’ own development initiatives with systematic
community involvement in planning, significant allocation of
resources to the community level, and capacity building and other
institutional strengthening efforts to ensure integration of
communities into local government processes”; and (e) “A
diversified, well-supervised, and appropriate combination of
pension and savings programs (including mandatory, voluntary,
public, private, funded, pay-as-you go, contributory and noncontributory programs) provide affordable, adequate, sustainable
and robust income security to most of the potentially vulnerable
groups with minimal distortions in the operation of labor
markets” (ibid: 30).
This summary shows three things. First, the framework
against which the World Bank evaluates country performance is
comprehensive, and represents a level of detailed intervention
that confirms that ‘country ownership’ means that the
government takes responsibility, not that it has a free hand to
devise or modify the programme. Second, the logic of the whole
corresponds precisely to the formulation offered by Williamson,
and developed above – the interpretation and extent of equity and
inclusion are governed by the logic of efficiency, with everything
oriented towards the efficient functioning of markets at all levels.
Everything is geared to enforce the disciplines of
competitiveness. Third, while some specifics are relevant only to
poor countries, the overall policy framework is identical to that
currently urged upon developed countries by the IMF, the OECD,
and the European Commission. The programme is universal. It is
not that there is nothing here that could be construed in isolation
as either progressive, or ethical. The point is rather that the ‘ideal’
policies for social inclusion and equity have the characteristics,
alongside the other elements of the full analytical framework,
identified in the summary above of ‘universal convergence on
49
competitiveness’. They envisage a world in which governments
deliver on the commitment to the development of private
enterprise, and competition in labour and product markets, with
policies towards gender, public expenditure, education and
welfare all shaped by that logic. Human capital is to be developed
to the maximum extent (a goal to which gender inequality is an
impediment); public expenditure is targeted, and monitored with
the intention of denying it to those capable of surviving in the
market, and equipping those who are not with the capacity to
enter or re-enter it; health and education expenditure and labour
market regulation aim to provide for (through a basic universal
minimum) and to set limits to (through the abolition of child
labour) the delivery of a global labour force, subject to common
welfare and regulatory standards. And finally, social protection
programmes are aimed to underpin the labour market and ensure
its sustainability over the longer term, communities are integrated
as significant sites of delivery and legitimation, and pensions- and
savings-based income security operates “with minimal distortions
in the operation of labor markets”.
Conclusion
For a number of reasons, the logic of poverty reduction has
not been well understood in much of the literature on PRSPs. In
some quarters, the ‘dream of a world free of poverty’ has been
taken in isolation and at face value, without a necessary
understanding of the extent to which capitalism depends upon the
existence of a multitudinous poor; there has been a tendency to
place a one-sided emphasis upon ideas and discourse, neglecting
the social relations of production, when the former are hard to
fathom without reference to the latter; the debate has focused too
often around sovereignty and the counter-posing of states and
international organisations, making it difficult to see the way in
which international organisations work through states and seek to
strengthen them as agents of accumulation and legitimisation;
crucially, there has been a tendency to address poverty reduction
in the developing world in isolation from the broader process of
class struggle on a global scale, and specifically in the advanced
capitalist countries themselves, so that the logic which shapes it is
rendered invisible; and fifth, too much emphasis has been placed
on the ‘Washington consensus’ and the ‘Post-Washington
Consensus’, and the supposed contrasts between them.
50
Taking cues from the work of Best and Ruckert, I have
argued that the commitment of the IMF and the World Bank to
‘poverty reduction’ is to be understood in terms of a universal
project whose logic is that of ‘universal convergence on
competitiveness’. And I believe that the evidence is strong that
the organizations concerned do indeed energetically promote the
full development of capitalism on a genuinely global scale, and
concentrate their attention on a comprehensive set of policies
aimed at transforming social relations around the world to
maximise competition within and between states, and the
maximum development of a appropriately skilled and disciplined
proletariat. In these circumstances, two questions in particular
suggest themselves. First, why are they doing it? And second,
what are the implications for poverty reduction?
The best answer I can give to the first of these questions,
unlikely as it will seem to some, is that the international
organisations concerned with global governance are increasingly
attuned to the efficient management of capitalism as a global
system. Their efforts are exerted not with a view to the interests
of particular states or particular capitals, but with a view to
maximizing the level of competitiveness across the global
economy as a whole. This cannot be construed in any sense as
resolving the fundamental contradictions of capital, but it can be
seen as a rational programme for enforcing the global hegemony
of capital over labour. In this logic, one of the significant effects
of the promotion of capitalist development in the regions
formerly known as the periphery is to facilitate the hegemony of
capital over labour in what was once the centre. The international
organisations are directing the class struggle on a global scale, by
engaging all states as agents of bourgeois hegemony, and
encouraging them to build regimes of domestic competitiveness
that contribute collectively to competitiveness across the global
economy as a whole. As to whether it will work, it depends on
what one means. It will contribute, as it is intended to do, to the
epochal transformation of the global economy which precedes,
motivates and accompanies their efforts. In the short and medium
term, this is compatible with rising living standards (or the
reduction of poverty) across much of the developing world. But
there are two inescapable corollaries. The first is that it equally
and unavoidably involves reduced living standards (or an increase
in poverty) in many parts of the developed world not previously
51
subject to intense competition on a global scale. Second, ‘poverty
reduction’ is quintessentially a transitional phenomenon, fated in
the (not necessarily so) long run, if the project outlined succeeds,
to demonstrate that universal convergence on competitiveness is
nothing other than universal convergence on subsistence wages.
Endnotes
1. Professor, Manchester
p.cammack@mmu.ac.uk.
Metropolitan
University,
Email:
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