14 Israeli attitudes to the Obama administration Yaeli Bloch-Elkon and Jonathan Rynhold Introduction Israel is a rumbustious democracy in which the public takes a keen interest in foreign and security policy. Foreign and security policy is usually the number-one issue on the political agenda, and it often plays a critical role in determining the results of elections (Rynhold and Steinberg 2004; Rynhold 2007, 2010a, 2010b). Consequently, Israeli public opinion is regularly and systematically surveyed on issues related to the peace process and security threats emanating from the Middle East (Arian 1995; Shamir and Shikaki 2010; Israel Democracy Institute 2015; Institute for National Security Studies 2015). Surprisingly, however, given the centrality of the United States to Israeli foreign and security policy, there has been little systematic polling of Israeli attitudes toward the United States. This chapter aims to fill that gap by presenting and analyzing several ongoing comprehensive surveys of Israeli opinion toward the United States during the Obama era, conducted by the BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies, including a recent wide-ranging survey taken in November 2014. Overall, the polls show that Israelis strongly support the United States, while also being very critical of the Obama administration’s Middle East policies. More specifically, the findings are that Israelis overwhelmingly view the relationship with the United States as vital to Israeli security. Indeed, they rank it as more important than any factor other than Israel’s own military capabilities. They also clearly view the United States in general as a reliable ally of Israel. However, Israelis are evenly divided as to whether Obama’s approach to Israel is a positive one and, even more significantly, a clear majority of Israelis view Obama’s policies in the Middle East in a negative light. This is true for the administration’s policies toward the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), the Iranian nuclear issue, and the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. The chapter begins by exploring the role of the United States in Israeli strategy and Israeli politics. It then discusses the standing of the United States in general, and more specifically as regards Middle East policy 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 248 27/10/15 15:04:44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 249 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 issues, in the eyes of the Israeli public, as reflected in various polls conducted from 2009 through 2014. The United States in Israeli strategy and politics Prior to discussing the standing of the United States in Israeli public opinion, it is necessary to understand the context in which opinions have been formed by briefly reviewing the strategic and diplomatic relationship between the United States and Israel. Traditionally, Israeli strategy has placed a major emphasis on selfreliance, deterrence, and military power. Yet Israeli strategy has always recognized that Israel is a small country that requires the assistance of a great power patron; the importance of such a patron in Israeli strategy increased during the period following the Yom Kippur war in 1973 (Inbar 1983). While the United States was always the preferred patron, France played that role from the mid-1950s until 1967. Subsequently, in the 1970s, the strategic relationship with the United States grew, and the United States emerged as Israel’s most important strategic partner. The most dramatic display of US support came when the United States resupplied Israel with military equipment during the Yom Kippur war, in the largest airlift of military supplies between allies during a conflict since World War II (Levey 2008; Boyne 2002). The fact that many Western countries refused to assist the US in this effort, and that many other countries broke off diplomatic relations with Israel or shifted their policy in a proArab direction in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, brought home to the Israeli public the importance of relations with the United States. Whether or not the airlift made a substantial difference on the battlefield is debatable, but as far as the public was concerned the United States had been alone in its willingness to stand by Israel at a time when it faced severe danger. In any case, by the 1970s the United States was Israel’s principle arms supplier, and was committed to preserving Israel’s “qualitative edge” over Arab states’ armies. It defended Israel diplomatically at the UN, where Arab states sought to isolate and delegitimize the Jewish state, and it helped broker peace agreements and peace negotiations, notably between Israel and Egypt. It has also provided Israel with billions of dollars’ worth of military aid since the 1970s. However, this is much less significant than it used to be. In 1988, US aid to Israel constituted 6.5 percent of Israel’s GNP; by 2009 that had shrunk to 1.1 percent – about 20 percent of the defense budget (Nathanson and Mandelbaum 2012). In any case, since the 1970s the countries have signed a string of memoranda that have upgraded their strategic relationship, for example in 1983 and 1987, and since the 1980s the IDF has been involved in regular exercises with the US armed forces. Until the 1990s Israeli–US cooperation was mainly directed against the Soviet Union’s allies in the Middle East. Since the end of the 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 249 27/10/15 15:04:44 250 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold Cold War, cooperation has focused on opposing radical actors and terrorism in the Middle East, especially so since 9/11, including intelligence cooperation directed against the Iranian nuclear program. None of this means that there have not been numerous crises in the relations between US administrations and Israeli governments; in fact there have been many, from the very foundation of the State of Israel down to the Obama administration. But the existence of a “special relationship” means that following any specific crisis the relationship recovers (Feldman 1984). It also means that, even when there are strained relations between the president and the prime minister at the political level, it is quite possible that cooperation across the broader administrations remains robust. Indeed, this has been the case during the Obama era, when despite the poor relationship between Netanyahu and Obama, professionals on both sides have hailed the unprecedented depth of strategic cooperation.1 Nonetheless, it is during political crises that the Israeli public plays an especially important role in the relationship. As Robert Putnam recognized (1988), international politics is a “two level game,” in which each side negotiates not only with the other side, but also internally within its own polity. Naturally, each side tries to influence the other government’s position by appealing to their public as a means of pressuring their interlocutor. In the context of US–Israeli relations, Ben-Zvi refers to this as the “balance of legitimacy,” that is, “the domestic social and political context which constrains actors” (Ben-Zvi 1993, 10). This is usually taken as referring to the way in which the pro-Israel lobby and the pro-Israel orientation of US public opinion constrain the US administration from pressuring Israel.2 Less talked about is the way the United States seeks to influence Israeli policy by appealing to the Israeli electorate. On several occasions the United States has deliberately sought to affect Israeli public opinion as a means of promoting its policies regarding the peace process, especially in terms of pressuring or seeking to remove Israeli right-wing governments; examples include the 1992 and 1996 election campaigns (Weinberg 2011, 2012). In a similar vein, President Obama’s visit to Israel in 2013 was designed to push forward the US-sponsored peace process in the face of a skeptical Israeli prime minister. In an attempt to get Israel to be more amenable to US policy, Obama decided to engage directly with the Israeli public. He recognized that majority of Israelis were skeptical of the peace process, but he calculated that he could take advantage of the fact that Israelis are very pro-United States. By making a good impression and showcasing his pro-Israel credentials, the president hoped to make it more difficult for Netanyahu to be uncooperative. It was one thing to say no to the Palestinians; it would be quite another to say no to Israel’s best friend and ally in the middle of a charm offensive.3 As it turns out, the trip failed to achieve its political objective, as will be discussed below. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 250 27/10/15 15:04:44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 251 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 The United States in Israeli public opinion Public opinion is a significant political force. Polls and surveys have become the preferred tools for measuring public opinion. Although polls are open to manipulation, they still constitute the most common and accurate measure of public attitudes, and have thus become considered an important tool for decision makers, especially in democracies. Poll results play a significant role in the political calculations of elites concerning both domestic and foreign policy (Nacos et al. 2011). Indeed, they help to set the boundaries of the policy debate. Specifically, broad and constant public support has been a key factor in the founding and continuation of the special relationship between Israel and the United States. Yet despite that fact, there has been no research project – other than the Begin-Sadat Center project discussed here4 – that has focused exclusively on Israeli attitudes toward the United States. Other research projects, such as the Israel Democracy Institute’s monthly Peace Index, occasionally ask questions related to US–Israeli relations if the issue has been in the news during the particular month in question.5 However, they do not ask a set of consistent questions concerning relations with the United States, as this is not their central focus. In addition, the INSS (Institute for National Security Studies, formerly the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) has been surveying Israeli public opinion toward peace and security since the 1980s. As such, it has produced the most comprehensive studies on this subject, usually on an annual basis.6 While Israel’s relations with the United States have not been the central concern of these studies, they have asked several questions over the years that are relevant to this topic. Some of these questions, as well as some of the questions asked by the Peace Index, have been incorporated into this study. The bulk of the data, however, comes from the BESA surveys. The most prominent issue touched upon by previous INSS studies concerns the relative importance of relations with the United States to Israeli security. While this issue was addressed over a long period, the question was not asked directly or in a consistent manner. For example, between 1990 and 1994 about 80 percent of Israelis thought that Israel could contend successfully with a war against the Arab countries of the “Eastern Front” (Syria, Jordan, Iraq), while between 55 percent and 60 percent thought that Israel could contend successfully with UN sanctions. However, only a minority, approximately 40 percent, thought that Israel could contend with the ending of US aid (Arian 1995, 46–47). Again, between 2004 and 2009 the public was asked to assess the ability of Israel to cope with a variety of threats. Of the ten threats listed, the possibility that the US might reduce support for Israel ranked as one of the three most severe, along with all-out war with Arab countries and the threat of nuclear attack. The exact order varied from year to year (Ben Meir and 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 251 27/10/15 15:04:44 252 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold Bagno-Moldavsky 2010, 58). Clearly, these results indicate the great valued placed by Israelis on US support for Israeli security. We now turn to the surveys of Israeli public opinion on US–Israeli relations conducted by the Maagar Mochot polling agency for the BESA Center at three points during the Obama presidency: 2009, 2012, and 2014.7 The 2009 poll coincided with Obama’s election entry into office; the 2012 poll was at the end of his first term; and the 2014 poll was conducted immediately following the mid-term elections during President Obama’s second term in the White House. This wide time frame allows for the polls to reveal a full and accurate picture of trends in Israeli opinion throughout the Obama presidency. As we can see, Figure 14.1 clearly shows an overwhelming appreciation of the United States. In 2014, good relations between Israel and the United States were perceived by almost all Israelis (96 percent) as highly important, while a huge majority of 90 percent or more consistently believed that close relations with the United States are vital to Israeli security. In the same vein, as is apparent in Figure 14.2, in 2014 approximately three-quarters of the public (73 percent) considered the United States a 100% 91% 93% 96% 90% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2009 2012 2014 Vital to Israel security Important to Israel Figure 14.1 The importance of close relations with the United States to Israeli security. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 252 27/10/15 15:04:44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 253 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 100% 80% 68% 70% 73% 60% 40% 20% 0% 2009 2012 2014 Loyal ally Figure 14.2 The United States: a loyal ally of Israel. loyal ally of Israel. This percentage has increased steadily from just over two-thirds in 2009. As such, it is higher than in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when roughly between a half and two-thirds thought that the United States’ commitment to ensuring Israel’s security was reliable (Arian 1995, 169–170). In addition, in 2014, about three-quarters of the public continued to believe that in an existential crisis, with Israel facing a socalled “moment of truth,” the United States would come to its defense (Figure 14.3).8 Thus, the standing of the United States in a general sense could not be much higher. Indeed, by any comparative measure, Israelis are extremely pro-United States. Back in the late 1980s and early 1990s, more than 80 percent of Israelis had a good opinion of the United States, a far higher percentage than that found among the United States’ European allies (Arian 1995, 169–170). According to a survey of 39 countries conducted by the Pew Research Center (2013), 90 percent of Israelis viewed the United States as a partner, while only 1 percent viewed it as an enemy. Indeed, the percentage of the Israeli population viewing the United States as a partner was higher than for any other country in the world. Moreover, in the Middle East, Israel stood out as only the country where a majority viewed the United States as a partner. In the other Middle Eastern countries surveyed – Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt Jordan, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority – more people viewed the United States an as enemy than as 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 253 27/10/15 15:04:44 254 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold 100% 91% 80% 80% 76% 74% 60% 40% 16% 20% 14% 10% 3% 0% 2007 2009 2012* 2014 US will come to Israel's aid US will not come to Israel's aid Figure 14.3 US willingness to aid Israel in the event it is faced with an existential crisis. a partner. In the same survey, 83 percent of Israelis held favorable attitudes toward the United States. Once again, this was the highest percentage of favorability of all the countries surveyed, and Israel was the only country in the Middle East where a majority held favorable attitudes toward the United States. The high standing of the United States is also demonstrated by the fact that the Israeli public ranks relations with the US as more important to Israeli security than any factor other than the military power of Israel itself. This includes those factors valued more by the right, such as settlements, and those valued more by the left, such as peace with the Palestinians, as well as other more consensual factors, such as the peace agreements with Jordan and Egypt and an Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley. In turn, this demonstrates the potential importance of the United States as an influential factor in Israeli politics. Because the relationship with the United States ranks above all these factors, it means that the standing of an Israeli government which is perceived by the public to be damaging the relationship with the United States could face wide-ranging disapproval across the political spectrum. Indeed, in October 2014 a clear majority of the public defined the relationship between the Netanyahu government and the Obama administration as poor (Israel Democracy 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 254 27/10/15 15:04:44 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 255 100% 95% Important 90% 82% 80% 78% 61% 60% 47% 40% 20% Settlements in Judea and Samaria Peace with the Palestinians Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley Peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan Close relations with the US 0% Israel’s military power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Figure 14.4 The importance of various factors to Israeli security. Institute 2014). One might deduce from this that the Netanyahu government would be blamed by the public for damaging the relationship. In fact, a plurality blamed the Obama administration (47 percent) rather than Netanyahu (30 percent) (Israel Democracy Institute 2014). Israeli public opinion toward the Obama administration and its policies As is apparent from Figure 14.5, in 2014 Israelis were evenly divided in their assessment of President Obama’s approach toward Israel, with 37 percent holding the opinion that he had a positive approach, and 37 percent that he had a negative approach. About a quarter of the public attributed to President Obama a neutral attitude toward Israel. In other words, the majority of the Israeli public did not believe that Obama had a positive approach toward Israel. On this question, Obama’s personal standing with Israelis has clearly declined. In 2012, a majority (51 percent) believed he had a positive approach, while only 15 percent believed he 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 255 27/10/15 15:04:44 256 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold 80% 60% 51% 40% 38% 37% 37% 24% 21% 20% 15% 8% 0% 2009 2012 Positive Neutral Negative DK/not sure 2014 Linear (negative) Figure 14.5 President Obama’s approach toward Israel. had a negative approach. Back in 2009, only 8 percent thought he had a negative approach. Thus, as Figure 14.5 indicates, a shift appears to have taken place between 2009 and 2014, with a decline in the number of respondents who were unsure of Obama’s approach to Israel and a rise in the number of respondents who felt that Obama had a negative approach to Israel. Although there is no consensus regarding the question, it is clear that Obama’s personal standing on this issue is in decline – in stark contrast to the consistently high standing of the United States in general in the eyes of Israelis. The reason for this decline in Obama’s personal standing is related to the fact that the Israeli public took a negative view of the Obama administration’s policies toward the Middle East. Around three-quarters of Israelis (Figure 14.6) perceive radical Islamism, Iran’s development of nuclear weapons, and the Israeli–Palestinian conflict as constituting threats to Israel’s existential interests. In parallel, as we can see in Figure 14.7, in 2014 about half the Israeli public viewed the Obama administration’s policies toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, Iran, and the confrontation with 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 256 27/10/15 15:04:45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 100% Significant Very significant 80% 27% 60% 27% 30% 51% 48% 30% 40% 60% 20% 44% Iran’s development of nuclear weaponry Radical Islam ISR–PAL conflict 0% Terror 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Figure 14.6 Threats to Israel’s existential interests. 80% Good Bad 60% 51% 49% 46% 40% 25% 20% 17% 16% 0% ISR–PAL conflict Iran ISIS Figure 14.7 President Obama’s policies toward the Middle East. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 257 27/10/15 15:04:45 258 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) to be “bad.” Barely 20 percent of the public believed Obama’s policies were “good,” meaning that only one in five Israelis thinks Obama is pursing the correct policy toward the major security and foreign policy challenges facing both Israel and the United States in the Middle East. On the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the gap between those who thought Obama’s policy was bad (51 percent) and those who thought it was good (17 percent) was at its widest. In addition, it should be noted that this gap has widened since 2012, when “only” 41 percent of the public was dissatisfied with Obama’s policies on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, meaning the dissatisfaction had increased by ten percentage points in only two years. Why should this be so? Two factors are worth examining: first, the Unied States’ failed attempt to broker a breakthrough in the peace process by mediating between the Netanyahu government and the Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas. Israelis were deeply skeptical regarding the possibility that negotiations would succeed, so they may well have viewed Secretary of State John Kerry’s efforts to reach an accord as naive. On the other hand, Israelis are generally supportive of negotiations in principle, even as they remain highly skeptical, so this factor is unlikely be the main explanation. The second, much more likely explanation for the particularly high level of negative attitudes found in November 2014 has to do with perceptions of US policy during the Gaza conflict in the summer of 2014. Specifically, there was widespread consternation in Israel when the United States was perceived as favoring the ceasefire proposal proffered by Turkey and Qatar, who were supportive of Hamas and other Islamists, as opposed to that put forward by Egypt, a staunch US ally. Even the left-wing liberal Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz was highly critical of this move (Ravid 2014). In the case of Iran, a survey from November 2013 – when the negotiations between Iran and the P5 + 1 led by the United States commenced – found that three-quarters of Israelis believed that the negotiations between the United States and Iran would not prevent Iran obtaining nuclear weapons capability (Israel Democracy Institute 2013). This probably explains the significant decline (of 17 percent) in the percentage of Israelis who believe that the United States would stand by Israel “if Israel is faced with a serious crisis involving a threat to its very existence, a so-called ‘moment of truth’ ” (Figure 14.3, above). Still, the fact remains that around three-quarters of Israelis continued to believe that the United States nonetheless remains a reliable ally. This may be related to the fact that 82 percent of Israelis believe that relations between the Israeli and US peoples are good (only 11 percent think they are bad). In turn, this could indicate that Israelis believe that widespread public support for Israel in the United States would have a major impact on administration policy in a crunch (Israel Democracy Institute 2014). Regarding US policy toward ISIS, the size of the plurality holding a negative view of US policy (46 percent bad : 25 percent good) was smaller 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 258 27/10/15 15:04:45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 259 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 than that for US policy toward Iran (49 percent bad : 16 percent good). This is probably because the administration had begun to take active military measures to counter ISIS in Iraq (though not in Syria) prior to the BESA survey. So that even while Israelis remained unimpressed overall, this limited display of active involvement in countering threats in the region appeared to positively affect Israeli public opinion. Taken together then, the Obama administration’s policies were perceived by almost two-thirds of the public as weakening the standing of the United States in the Middle East in 2014; only 11 percent thought that Obama’s overall approach strengthened the United States’ standing, as shown in Figure 14.8. This represents a major decline from 2012, when about one-third thought the Obama administration’s approach to the Middle East weakened the standing of the United States in the region, compared to about a fifth who thought the opposite. The growth of this negative trend in opinion is illustrated in Figure 14.8, with the difference between negative and positive attitudes growing from 17 percentage points in 2012 to a huge 53 percentage points in 2014. As a result, it is not surprising to see in Figure 14.9 that only about a third of the Israeli public rate the United States’ current position in the Middle East as “strong,” meaning that more than 60 percent think otherwise. 80% 64% 60% 40% 38% 21% 20% 11% 0% 2012 Strengthening the standing of the US in the ME 2014 Weakening the standing of the US in the ME Figure 14.8 Obama’s policies and US standing in the Middle East. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 259 27/10/15 15:04:45 260 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold Medium 24% Strong 39% Weak 37% Figure 14.9 The United States’ standing in the Middle East. As far as the Israeli public is concerned, the decline in US standing has serious implications for Israel. This is because two-thirds of Israelis believe that Israel’s position in the Middle East is heavily influenced by the United States’ standing in the region (Figure 14.10). In addition, about threequarters of Israelis view US and Israeli interests in the Middle East as similar or complementary (Figure 14.11).9 Indeed, both Israelis and US citizens rank terrorism and the Iranian nuclear threat as major threats to their countries’ security (Chicago Council on Global Affairs 2010). In other words, most Israelis think that Obama’s approach to the Middle East damages the standing of both Israel and the United States. This is probably connected to the fact that a clear majority of Israelis believe that reduced US involvement in the region is bad for Israel (Figure 14.10). In this vein, the Obama administration’s strategy toward the Middle East has been a cautious one of retrenchment, aimed at reducing assertive, forceful US interventions abroad. Indeed, the administration has been very cautious about using military force abroad, as it fears getting bogged down. It perceives the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to have been costly failures, and in the wake of economic crises it sought to focus its efforts on a domestic agenda (Dueck 2015; Drezner 2011). 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 260 27/10/15 15:04:45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 80% 67% 59% 60% 40% 20% 0% Israel’s position in the ME is influenced by US position If US involvement in the ME were reduced it would negatively influence Israel's security Figure 14.10 Israeli security and the United States’ standing in the Middle East. 100% 7% 20% 23% 80% 60% 87% 40% 78% 71% 20% 0% 2009 2012 Different/contradictory interests 2014* Similar/complementary interests Figure 14.11 US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 261 27/10/15 15:04:45 262 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold An Israeli attack on Iran: the impact of US opposition Back in 2002 and 2003, the public was asked what should be done if Israel determined that a (hostile) country in the region had nuclear capacity. The most popular response by far was that Israel should seek to remove that capacity by any means available; around half of respondents favored this option. Only 16–20 percent favored asking for US protection (Arian 2002, 34, 2003, 15). However, the 2014 BESA survey indicates that Israeli public opinion has shifted on this issue since then. Indeed, perhaps the most significant and surprising results from the 2014 BESA survey concern attitudes toward an Israeli military strike on Iran in the event that diplomacy fails to prevent Iran obtaining nuclear weapons. Only a narrow plurality thought that Israel should attack in such circumstances, by a margin of 41 percent to 37 percent (Figure 14.12). This represents a dramatic change from previous BESA survey results. In 2009 and 2012 a large majority of around two-thirds thought that Israeli should attack in such circumstances. Even more significantly, for the first time, a narrow plurality (42 percent vs 35 percent) thought that Israel should not attack Iran in such circumstances if the United States opposed such an attack (Figure 14.13). In other words, even when the public is unhappy with US policy, relations with the United States remain a central component in determining the public’s approach to critical security issues. Furthermore, the case of Iran is particularly important because it is viewed as an existential security scenario which pits the number-one security value of Israelis, Israeli military power, against their number-two value, the relationship with the United 80% 66% 66% Support militray strike on Iran DK/not sure 60% 41% 40% 23% 20% 0% 2009 2012 2014 Figure 14.12 Support for Israeli military action if diplomacy fails to halt Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 262 27/10/15 15:04:45 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 263 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 60% 50% 47% 42% 40% 35% 27% 23% 20% 0% 2009 2012 2014 Would not support if the US opposed Would support even if the US opposed Figure 14.13 Support for Israeli military action in the event that diplomacy fails to halt Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons and the United States opposes an Israeli air strike. States. Despite this general ranking, in this specific instance, the US relationship narrowly trumps an Israeli military strike. The question is: what explains this discrepancy and the shift in Israeli attitudes? For many years there was little public debate about the Iranian nuclear issue. There was a consensus that Iran needed to be stopped, and that Israel should be prepared to act militarily in the last resort if necessary. But as long as Iran was still considered to be some distance from the bomb, this debate remained largely theoretical and considered in tone. In any case, the public seemed willing to leave the issues for the elites to deal with (Rynhold 2010a). Around 2012, as the window for an effective Israeli strike was perceived by some to be shrinking, the debate among the elites became much more vociferous. The former head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, the president, Shimon Peres, and several members of the security cabinet, all preferred to focus on working closely with the United States, and they were critical of Prime Minister Netanyahu and then defense minister Ehud Barak, who were widely believed to favor a strike (see, e.g., Goldberg 2012). However, as of 2012 Israeli public opinion still favored a strike to stop Iran going nuclear. What changed between 2012 and 2014 was the advent of formal negotiations between Iran and the P5 + 1, led by the US. It would seem that, 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 263 27/10/15 15:04:46 264 Y. Bloch-Elkon and J. Rynhold while Israelis were overwhelmingly skeptical of these talks, an increasing number came to believe that an Israeli strike during these negotiations would harm Israel without providing a clear-cut solution to the Iranian nuclear program. In the best case, an Israeli military operation could only delay the Iranian nuclear program by somewhere between six months and two years. Moreover, even a successful Israeli strike during negotiations would lead to the collapse of the sanctions regime, which has been surprisingly successful, while embroiling Israel in a crisis with its number-one ally, which was sponsoring the negotiations. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that Israelis oppose a strike in the face of US opposition only by a narrow margin. If the negotiations drag on without success, and/or Iran is perceived to be cheating or the sanctions regime weakening, it is likely that the Israeli public would come to support an Israeli military strike as a last resort. Conclusion At the heart of Israeli attitudes toward the United States under Obama is a dichotomy. On the one hand, Israelis are consistently very positive about US leadership, they trust the United States as a loyal ally, and believe that US involvement in the Middle East is of vital importance to Israel’s security. Indeed, the Israeli public remains one of the most pro-US publics in the world. On the other hand, Israelis are very critical and apprehensive about President Obama’s Middle East policies, and their approach became increasingly negative during 2012–2014, including on the Iranian nuclear issue. Despite this, and the fact that Israelis rank Israeli military power as the most important determinant of Israeli security, a slim plurality of Israelis in 2014 believed that Israel should not attack Iran in the event that diplomacy fails and the United States opposes an Israeli military strike. Events may lead the public to change this assessment. Nonetheless, it is a testament to the fact that the Israeli public appreciates the strategic significance of close relations with the United States, even when it believes US policies in the region to be seriously mistaken. Notes 1 Author discussions with US and Israeli officials, 2012–2013. 2 For the case that the pro-Israel lobby plays a major role in determining US policy, see Mearsheimer and Walt (2007). For rebuttals of this thesis, see Rynhold (2010b) and Lieberman (2009). 3 Author discussions with members of the Obama administration in late 2012 and early 2013. 4 Analysis of the results from an earlier BESA survey, conducted in 2007, is presented in Gilboa (2009). 5 The Israel Democracy Institute “Peace Index” surveys have been overseen by Ephraim Ya’ar and Tamar Hermann. 612_14_US Foreign Policy.indd 264 27/10/15 15:04:46 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 Israeli attitudes: the Obama administration 265 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 6 The surveys of Israeli public opinion were originally overseen by Asher Arian, but in the mid-2000s Yehuda Ben-Meir took over the running of the project. 7 The 2014 poll covered the Israeli public at large, including the Arab sector (about 13 percent of respondents), while the previous polls surveyed only the Jewish sector. 8 In 2012 the answer “would help” was divided into two categories: “would help” (53 percent) and “would help conditionally” (38 percent). 9 In 2014 there was a slight change in the wording of the answer categories, so that the scale included five categories: very different; different; more or less similar; similar; very similar. 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