Happiness and the External Goods

For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities-which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theo

2009

The functionalist account of Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia by

Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, 64, 1, pp. 117–124, 2020

I shall show in this paper that happiness in Aristotle should not be understood one-sidedly and restrictively as actualization of a single virtue, even though the latter might be deemed the most important among virtues. Happiness cannot be exclusively reduced to contemplative activity. I intend to approach the happiness problem in the larger context of seeking the human good, which is, after all, the same as happiness. In the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that there are three ways of life to be taken into account and further analysed with regard to human happiness: life of enjoyment, political and contemplative life (1095b, 18–19)1. Delving analytically into these ways of life, Aristotle concludes, according to some commentators, in book X of Nicomachean Ethics that the happiest life is the one dedicated to contemplative activity. What is the significance of this conclusion seeing that it seems to not tally with the ideas developed in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics? I shall try to show that there is no contradiction between the two stances of Aristotle if happiness is understood in an inclusive and hierarchical manner – as actualization of all virtues (ethical and dianoetic alike), with an emphasis on the virtue, which leads man towards the highest possible accomplishment: resemblance with the divine through contemplation.

2019

This project explores the topic of dependency of happiness on external goods in Nicomachean Ethics. In this project I defend the following thesis: the dependency of happiness on external goods, in EN, is interpreted in the light of its political self-sufficiency, and in the light of our political humanity; this dependency is of three kinds: 1) enhancing-instrumental, 2) constitutive, and 3) subsistent. The political self-sufficiency of happiness means that, the ultimate good of man, the good of the ruling science of Politics, is self-sufficient based on the self-sufficiency of the city. According to Aristotle, every human being, by nature, is political. The nature of every human being is fundamentally relational. We are what we are, among and with others in the city. This constitutive political human nature functions best only in the city. Based on this political anthropology I interpret the dependency of the human political good on external goods in EN.

Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life , 2017

In Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, three types of lives that are generally observed to be conventional permutations of ways of living are presented as candidates for the good life. They are the life of pleasure, the political life, and the life of philosophical contemplation. The life of pleasure is immediately dismissed as a viable candidate because those that equate the good with pleasure lack the essential qualities that are required for the cultivation of a good and meaningful life. The political life, i.e. a life that is centered on action and doing good deeds for the benefit of other citizens is not so easily dismissed as a candidate for the good life due to the moral virtues that are practiced in such a life. In Book X Aristotle declares that it is indeed the life of philosophical contemplation that is the best candidate for achieving the good life. The greatest good and the goal of all action is to attain eudaimonia, i.e. happiness, or well-being, which is, according to Aristotle, not a state but an activity. Choosing a life dedicated to philosophical contemplation, however, in itself, does not necessarily assure the attainment of eudaimonia, which is a permanent possession of the soul. In addition to choosing the right kind of life to live, Aristotle argues, one's life must also be comprised of partaking in good, correct actions, which, throughout time, lead to the development of virtues. Aristotle states that there are two different kinds of virtues, moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which are, respectively, developed through practice and instruction, and are, in almost all circumstances, achieved by striving for what is moderate in things and situations. Additionally, the external goods, as in sufficient material possessions, and having a few good friends are also essential constituents of the good life. This paper will examine the components required for attaining the good life according to Aristotle's arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, and will propose that an awareness of the teleological aspect of human nature is indeed necessary for the acquisition of eudaimonia.

Excellent rational activity is central to happiness as outlined in the Nicomachean Ethics. This chapter argues that this activity is contemplation, but not practical activity in accordance with the virtues, because only the former satisfies the criteria for happiness presented in EN I.12: being honourable, complete, and divine. This intellectualist account of happiness is then defended against the charge that Aristotle distinguishes between human and divine happiness, where only the latter, but not the former requires contemplation: Aristotle’s distinction is rather between qualified and unqualified happiness, and the latter requires contemplation. Finally, the happy life according to this interpretation is sketched: while contemplation makes a life happy, it is not the only thing that counts, as human beings also need to act well in social settings.

Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 2021