Interdisciplinarity as a way of life

Interdiscipinarity as a way of life

There is no man who has not been a follower of Plato, at least for a moment of his life ... Who has not experienced how the insuperable wall between subject and object crumbles and breaks, how the Ego leaves the confines of its egotistical isolation, breathes the sublime air of knowledge as deeply as it can, and becomes a single thing with the entire world?1

Part 1. Pierre Hadot on philosophy as a way of life

We owe to the late Pierre Hadot the idea of "philosophy as a way of life". What he meant by this was that philosophy, in Greco-Roman Antiquity, was not mere discourse, an intellectual pastime akin to solving a crossword puzzle; nor was it the construction of elaborate metaphysical systems and the writing of treatises in which such systems were set forth.

Instead, it had to do with the way people live their lives. It consisted above all in a set of techniques for carrying out a transformation of the human personality, by means of what Hadot named "spiritual exercises".

These exercises or transformative practices were "spiritual" in that they engaged not only the human intellectual faculty, but the entire person, including desire and the imagination. By means of this transformation, the philosopher could hope to leave behind the isolation of her individuality, rising to the level of the Logos, or universal Reason2, and 1 Pavel Florensky, Obščečelovečeskie korni idealizma ("The universal human roots of Idealism"), in Sočineniya v četyrekh tomakh, vol. 3.2, Moskva 1999, p. 146. 2 It is true that Hadot sometimes (once, to my knowledge, cf. 1995, p. 82) speaks of the individual "raising himself up to the objective Spirit". But this does not suffice to make him a Hegelian, as P. Vesperini believes ("Pour une archéologie comparatiste de la notion de « spirituel ». Michel Foucault et la « philosophie antique » comme « spiritualité »", Colloque "Michel Foucault et les religions", organisé par Jean-François Bert, Université de Lausanne, 22-24 octobre 2014). achieving a state of peace of mind, freedom, and intensification of her being.

Pierre Hadot has shown that this conception of philosophy as a way of life was closely linked to the historical, political and socio-economic circumstances of Antiquity, in which philosophical training was handed down from master to disciple by means of dialogue. Ancient philosophical writings are therefore "echoes, direct or indirect, of oral instruction" 3 ; and if they sometimes seem to us to be confusing or badly written, this is because "they are series of exercises, intended to make

[students] practice a method, rather than doctrinal expositions". Once the headquarters of the four main Greek philosophical schools were more or less destroyed in the first century B.C, however, philosophical teaching, now dispersed throughout the Empire, could no longer be carried out by oral transmission from master to disciple, and philosophy gradually assumed the form of commentary on texts by the founding figures of each school 4 .

From the Middle Ages until today, the academic study of philosophy gradually became discourse on or about philosophy, rather than the practice thereof. It is, of course, neither possible nor desirable to recreate ancient teaching conditions today. However, I suggest that the practice of interdisciplinarity, properly understood, can play a role similar to that of the spiritual exercises of antiquity in the revitalization of philosophy today.

3 Pierre Hadot, "La philosophie: une éthique ou une pratique?", in P. Demont, ed., Problèmes de la Morale Antique, sept études, Amiens, Faculté des Lettres, 1993, p. 11. Cf. 1995 4 Cf. Arnold Davidson, "Introduction" to Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of Life, translated by Michael Chase, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 5, with references to works by Hadot.

Happiness and self-involvement

A recurrent theme in Pierre Hadot's works is the insight that the reason many of us are unhappy much of the time is that we are too wrapped up in ourselves. Each of us thinks he or she is the center of the universe, and that his or her problems, whether minor or major -and even our minor problems have a way of becoming major very quickly, What all the ancient philosophical schools had in common, Hadot claims, was their goal: achieving happiness or peace of mind. And this goal was to be achieved, not so much by analysing arguments or writing philosophical treatises -although these activities could also have a spiritual or formative aspect 6 -as by practicing a series of exercises designed to change our way of perceiving reality, and hence our mode of being.

Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans, Cynics and Sceptics defined happiness differently, although most would agree, Hadot claims, that it is closely related to, if not identical with, self-realization, autonomy, and freedom. Achieving this freedom entails controlling our passions, which tend to enslave us to external things that are beyond our control, and contribute to engendering the isolated perspective that is the source of much of our unhappiness7. Above all, it entails controlling our inner discourse. We are constantly carrying out a dialogue with ourselves, by means of that inner speech (endiathetos logos) that differs from intersubjective speech, the prophorikos logos, only in that the latter is pronounced while the former remains silent. For a Stoic like Marcus Aurelius, the goal of philosophy was to discipline one's inner discourse, just as rhetoric was the art of disciplining or setting in order one's external discourse. Instead of allowing oneself to be buffetted by chaotic waves of incoming thoughts over which one had no control, one was to train and discipline them, following the Stoic dictum that it is not things that cause us pain, but our reactions to those things, reactions that are, to 6 Commentaries on philosophical texts, for instance, could be practiced as spiritual exercises, as could the practice of writing down the philosophical doctrines of one's chosen school ; cf. Hadot 1993, 17. 7 Cf. Matthew Sharpe, "Philosophy and the View from Above in Alejandro's Amenabar's Agora", Crossroads 6.1 (2012), 31-45. a large extent, under our control. For Marcus, there were in fact three disciplines we have to exercise: the discipline of thought, the discipline of desire, and the discipline of action.

Marcus Aurelius and the Stoic triple discipline 8

Traditionally, Stoic philosophy was divided into three parts: logic, physics, and ethics. The study of these fields as theoretical disciplines was essential, and the Stoics devoted many technical treatises to them.

Yet this was not all there was to philosophy: the three theoretical disciplines of logic, physics and ethics also had a practical side, which represented the application, concretization, or actualization of the theoretical aspects. Whereas the theoretical aspect of these three disciplines corresponds to discourse about philosophy, their practical aspect corresponds to actually doing or living philosophy: thus, Hadot can speak of a lived logic, a lived physics and a lived ethics 9 , and it is within these lived aspects of philosophy that spiritual exercises have their place.

As an example of the way Hadot conceived of the function of discourse in ancient philosophy, let's look briefly at the practical, lived side of the Stoic triple discipline.

In the discipline of thought, associated with logic, we make sure, insofar as is possible, that we see things objectively, withholding our consent from what is false or dubious. For instance, if we see something that initially seems to us to be frightening, disgusting or even excessively attractive, we are to try to separate out what our passions contribute to these impressions. We can thus hope to achieve a view of things that is more objective: at the ideal limit, the Stoic sage could look at the tusks of a charging boar and feel the same aesthetic pleasure as if he were seeing them in a painting, because he has freed his perception from the distorting effects of fear or desire.

The discipline of action corresponds to the practical aspect or actualization of the theory of ethics. Instead of theorizing about virtue and vice, we now accomplish our duties and act for the good of the human community.

Finally, the discipline of desire corresponds to the lived practice of physics. We are to remind ourselves that we are part of the universe, which is ruled by a rational law that is consubstantial with our own reason, and that we must discipline our will so that we not only accept but lovingly desire what happens as a consequence of that rational law.

As Hadot's widow Ilsetraut Hadot has recently written10, Living according to reason means renouncing one's personal viewpoint and egoistic interests, so as to submit them to the common rules of logic in order to think correctly, to the common rules of social life in order to act correctly, to the common laws of nature to consent to the will of universal reason. There is no trace of egoism in these maneuvers, but, on the contrary, a transcendence of the ego.

What is crucial here, I think, is the change in our perspective: from the limited, particular, individual viewpoint we usually have on the world, which makes us feel that it revolves around us, we are to shift to a perspective in which we feel that we are a part of a larger whole, or rather several larger wholes: reason (corresponding to logic), the human race (corresponding to ethics), and the universe as a whole. This last element, 10 I. Hadot, Sénèque. Direction spirituelle et pratique de la philosophie, Paris Vrin, 2014 (Philosophie du présent), p. 189. achieved by the spiritual exercise of lived physics, was what Hadot referred to as cosmic consciousness. He defined it as follows: "the consciousness that we are a part of the cosmos, and the consequent dilation of our self throughout the infinity of universal nature"11.

Forms of life and forms of discourse

In ancient philosophy, there is a seemingly paradoxical relation between the philosophical life and philosophical discourse: indeed, according to Hadot these two aspects are "simultaneously incommensurable and inseparable" 12 . They are incommensurable, in that it is the apprentice philosopher's choice of a way of life that initially determines his discourse, not vice versa, and there are many aspects of philosophy that exceed the expressive capacities of language: Hadot mentions the Platonic theory of love and the Plotinian experience of mystical union, among other examples. At the same time, however, discourse remains inseparable from the philosophical life, in that is justifies the choice of life, allows the philosopher to carry out actions on himself and others, and, as dialogue with oneself or with others, constitutes one of the main forms of philosophy as a way of life 13 . 11 Hadot 1995, 266. It was, in part, because he failed to see that spiritual exericizes are practiced in all three areas of lived philosophy -not only ethics, but also logic and especially physics -that Pierre Hadot criticized the interpretation of ancient philosophy given by Michael Foucault. Foucault's concentration on the ethical exercises, those relating to what he called the care of the self, caused him to neglect the exercises of lived physics by which one could achieve what Hadot called cosmic consciousness: the lived awareness of one's place and role as part of the universal Whole. Cf. Davidson 1995, 24. 12 There was thus a relation of reciprocal causality between the basic choice of life or existential option that led one to join a particular philosophical school, and the theoretical discourse one employed 14 .

Theoretical discourse emanates from and expresses the philosopher's initial choice of a way of life -the Stoic or Epicurean way of life, for instance -, and it also allows one to justify that way of life and communicate it to others. Through meditation, memorization, and writing out the school's discourse, formulated in a particularly striking and memorable way, the disciple then uses this discourse to set his own inner discourse in order 15 .

The philosopher cannot do without external discourse, which is an essential part of philosophy as a way of life. Yet there is an important difference between discourse as addressed to a disciple or to oneself, which is "actually a spiritual exercise", and discourse considered abstractly in its formal structure. It is the latter, Hadot argues, that is the object of most studies of the history of philosophy. Yet "in the eyes of the ancient philosophers, if one contents oneself with this discourse, one is not doing philosophy" 16 . Part of Hadot's radical critique of contemporary philosophy, as taught in the Universities today, is that it has completely neglected the lived, practical side of philosophy, as though philosophy could be reduced to mere discourse about philosophy. In so doing, it has succumbed to what Hadot has called the perpetual temptation to be satisfied with philosophical discourse 18 .

The role of spiritual exercizes

Ancient philosophers, at least from the Hellenisic period on, did not think one could simply resolve to practice these three disciplines and then change one's life. Just as an athlete must spend many hours in the gym practicing exercises to strengthen her body, so would-be philosophers must have recourse to spiritual exercises to enable them to practice this triple discipline, not just once or twice, but constantly, and throughout their lifetime. The ancients were well aware -perhaps more so than we are -that it is not enough merely to have read or heard about a philosophical doctrine --for instance, the Stoic doctrine that the only evil is moral evil -and accepted it as true. If one wants to be able to have such a doctrine immediately available, so that one can quickly and 17 Cf. Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?, p. 3: "Philosophical discourse ... originates in a a choice of life and an existential option,-not vice versa". It has been argued (Flynn, Thomas, "Philosophy as a way of life: Foucault and Hadot", Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 31, 2005) that this ephiphenomenal nature of philosophical systems -the fact that philosophical choice is primary -reduces the role of reflective critical and self-critical inquiry in Hadot's thought. But this is to ignore the role of reciprocal causality between philosophical discourse and philosophical choice.

18 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?, p. 279-280. Yet Hadot immediately adds that the worst danger is to believe one can do without philosophical reflection.

reliably apply it to the sudden demands of life situations, one needs to meditate on it, assimilate it, digest it, make it a part of oneself. This exercise of meditation on a kanon, or rule of life, was one of what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises".

Once again, the main goal of these spiritual exercizes was to change our perspective from an individual to a universal viewpoint, or in Hadot's words "to switch from a 'human' vision of reality, in which our values depend on our passions, to a 'natural' vision of things, which replaces each event within the perspective of universal nature"19.

Hadot has described in detail these spiritual exercizes, which could include research, listening, attention, self-mastery, indifference to indifferent things, reading, meditation, therapies of the passions, inner detachment from persons and things, remembrance of good things, accomplishing duties, and the examination of one's conscience20. A specifically Stoic technique was that of physical definition, in which one breaks down a thing or event into its component parts, circumscribing them and giving each a name21. Closely linked to this exercize was the technique of living in the present, concentrating intensely on each moment in the knowledge that unlike the past or the future, which are out of our control, the present is the only thing that really depends on us. An Epicurean would therefore concentrate on the infinite pleasure and happiness that can be derived from each instant, a pleasure that cannot be increased by duration, while a Stoic would scrutinize his moral intentions at each instant, making sure that he is giving his assent only to objective 19 Hadot 1995, 83. 20 For parallels to these exercises in Indian thought, see Jonardon Ganeri, "A Return to the Self: Indians and Greeks on Life as Art and Philosophical Therapy", in C. representations, that he is acting in the service of the human community, and that he is consenting to the will of the rational cosmos, situating himself within the perspective of the Whole 22 . By concentrating on the present, as Hadot wrote in his last published work, "consciousness, far from shrinking, raises itself to a higher viewpoint, from which one sees, in a way, the past and the future in the present, and it opens up to the infinity and eternity of being" 23 .

Another important spiritual exercise is the one Hadot calls the "Look from above". It consists in imagining oneself flying high above the ground and looking down at one's life, the people and things within it, and the circumstances surrounding it. The Ancients believed this would allow us to "put things back into perspective", as the phrase goes: when we look at our life from far above, the problems and obstacles that threaten it seem to lose the character of all-consuming importance they often seem to us to have. Compared to the vastness of the earth, and even more so, to the immensity of cosmic space and the time during which it has existed, our problems really don't seem to amount to much. When seen from far above, for instance, the tiny portions of land over which wars are fought seem ridiculous. This exercise of practical physics, in which one soars through space and time in one's imagination, to explore the vastness of the universe, could lead to what the ancients called "greatness of soul" (Greek megalopsukhia, Latin magnanimitas), a quality which consisted precisely in downplaying the importance of our individual self in the overall economy of the universe 24 .

Boethius and the Look from Above

The notion of the Look from above recurs down to the end of Greco-Roman Antiquity, when Boethius, in his Consolation of Philosophy, describes God as ensconced high above reality, looking down upon earthly things and events from a kind of watchtower or mountaintop (porro a rebus infimis constituta quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat). From his lofty vantage point, God sees all the temporal events in the world's history at once, stretched out like clothespins on a laundry line, or the slices of a sausage or a loaf of bread, or, as Thomas Aquinas explained, like an observer perched high above a road could see all the travellers upon it at the same time. Boethius leaves open the possibility that human beings can accede to a state very close to this God's eye view of reality. It may be possible for human beings to raise themselves, though the practice of philosophy, to a level where they see the world in a way similar to the way God sees reality 25 : a world foreign to the distinction between past, present and future. In turn, this God's-eye view from above26, which human beings may be able to imitate, is very much like the view espoused by many exponents of think that it can consider human life to be a matter of great importance? Hence such a man will not suppose death to be terrible". Similarly, the cosmology of Plato's Timaeus could produce greatness of soul and cosmic consciousness in its readers. For Marcus Aurelius, greatness of soul can be defined as looking at things in the same way Nature looks at them, viz. with a benevolence that makes no distinctions or value judgments between them. contemporary physics 27 . If the narrator of the Consolation, who is initially wallowing in self-pity and convinced the world is unjust because he has been treated unfairly, could raise himself up to this God's eye-view, he would see that the world is indeed ruled by Providence, and is ultimately just. As in Hadot's description of the spiritual exercise of the Look from Above, this shift in perspective away from his limited, isolated, individual viewpoint allows the Narrator to become aware of his place within the cosmos, and his role in the network of relations that constitute it.

One concern that weighs down upon us -sometimes to the point that it overwhelms every other consideration, stripping everything else of its importance and making it seem derisive -is the prospect of our own death. If our ego, our individual self, seems to us to be all that matters, then its obliteration in death is an unthinkable, scandalous catastrophe.

But as Hadot has pointed out, Plato defined philosophy as an "exercise or training to die" (meletê thanatou). In Platonism, the death in question is a death to the body28, or the separation of the soul from the body: in other words, the goal of this training for death is to render our self-centered passions subordinate to the universal laws of reason. Hadot thus interprets the Platonic appeal to "train for death" (meletê thanatou) as a call to die "to one's individuality and passions, in order to look at things from the 27 Cf., among many possible examples, Bernard d' Espagnat, In Search of reality, New York: Springer Verlag, 1983, p. 161: "the fact of the passing of time, which to us is quite familiar and which we tend almost unavoidably to consider as a basic reality, becomes (...) a relative one that refers to the phenomena and not to reality itself".

28 Plato, Phaedo, 67c: "Shall we not say that purification occurs ... when man separates the soul as much as possible from the body, and accustoms it to gather itself together from every part of the body and concentrate itself until it is completely independent, and to have its dwelling, so far as it can, both now and in the future, alone and by itself, freed from the shackles of the body?" perspective of universality and objectivity" 29. Meditation on death is closely linked to the exercise of living in the present: thanks to it, we can try to live each moment as if it were both our first and our last 30 .

Finally, another way to formulate the goal of spiritual exercizes is to describe it as a return to the self. Yet the self in question is not only our egoistic, passionate, individualistic self: the return to this self is merely a preliminary stage, corresponding to the Platonic advice to "Know thyself". The ultimate goal is to identify with a transcendental self that, paradoxically, is both our self and something higher than our self : "it is our moral person, open to universality and objectivity, and participating in universal nature or thought"31.

It is thanks to such spiritual exercizes as the look from above, and more generally those that relate to the practice of lived physics -as opposed to mere discourse about physics -which help us to resituate ourselves as parts of the universe, acquiring or regaining what Hadot calls "cosmic consciousness", that we can relativize our own importance. The isolated self of our everyday consciousness, source of our despair, comes to be seen as an illusion that can be shaken off by means of a change in our way of looking at the world. That world does not, in fact, revolve around us; but we are an integral part of it -in its intellectual, social, and physical aspects -and it will keep on spinning long after we are gone. 29 1995, 95. Hadot also formulates this goal of philosophical separation as "shedding the pasions linked to the corporeal senses, so as to attain to the autonomy of thought" (ibid., p. 94), or to "the exercise of pure thought" (ibid., p. 97). On the importance of the pernicious effects of the passions, defined as "unregulated desires and exaggerated fears", cf. Hadot, ibid., p. 83. 30 1995Hadot, ibid., p. 83. 30 , 96. 31 1995. was thus a prime example of the practice of interdisciplinarity, and he also seems to have practiced such spiritual exercizes as the look from above and concentration on the present moment. As he wrote to his family from the Gulag, just months before his execution:

Life flies like a dream...therefore we must learn the art of living, the most difficult and the most important of arts: that of filling every hour with a substantive content, thinking that that hour will never again return32.

Yet Florensky's case is very complex, and would require a more detailed presentation than I'll have time to give here. So I will limit myself to mentioning him in passing, before going on to discuss the views of a figure whom Florensky admired and with whom he corresponded 33 : the Russian mineralogist and geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky (1863-1945).

Vladimir Vernadsky, Edward Said and Silvano

Tagliagambe on intermediary zones

Perhaps the most important property of a cell, the most basic subsystem of life, is that it features a membrane that is both a barrier against the outside world and a means of communciation with it. This limit or border enables the cell to maintain its integrity and identity, while keeping potential enemies at bay; yet it also enables it to receive nourishment from outside and expel waste from its vicinity. Vernadsky extended this notion of the importance of borders not only to all living beings as such, but also to systems of knowledge such as science. In this respect, cells, living beings, the biosphere, and science are all analogous, in some of their defining features, to self-organizing systems34.

As the epistemologist Silvano Tagliagambe has written, discussing the interaction between objects as they are in reality and objects as we know and perceive them, it is through the border and thanks to the activity of translation explained by it that what is external to the system can become internal, and the domains placed in . 33 With astonishing foresight, Florensky wrote to Vernadsky on November 21, 1929 that chemistry and physics "will necessarily have to be restructured, transfoming themselves into biochemistry and biophysics" (химия и физика будут перестроены, как биохимия и биофизика). The letter is available online at http://www.nffedorov.ru/wiki. 34 In this section I am indebted to Silvano Tagliagambe, Il cielo incarnato. Epistemologia del simbolo di Pavel Florenskij, Roma: Aracne, 2013 (Filosofia della scienza, 6), cf. p. 58. On the cell as an autopoietic system with a permeable but selective boundary, cf. Evan Thompson, Waking dreaming being. Self and consciousness in neuroscience, meditation, and philosophy, New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, 326f. communication cease to appear separate and heterogeneous, achieving a level of homogeneity that makes one forget their differences. The border, understood as a mechanism of translation (...) activates the identity between real object and object of knowledge (...) on the other hand, this same border, now understood as a line of demarcation, safeguards the difference and the alterity with respect to the system of what comes from outside.

What becomes crucial in this context is the notion of the intermediary space -in Russian, skachok -between two different and even opposing domains. This intermediary space is a zone of communciation, in which processes of hybridization between two initially opposed domains may take place. Such hybridization is the condition for the appearance of new "intermediary spaces" between these domains, initially considered as too different to have anything in common.

This notion of the importance of intermediary spaces reminds one, in a completely different context, of the last work of Edward Said, Humanism and democratic criticism (2004). Here, Said insists on the need for the humanist scholar to create a critical distance, both from his own cultural horizon and from the works he studies. Already in his major work Orientalism (1978), Said had written that "the more one is able to leave one's cultural home, the more easily is one able to judge it, and the whole world as well, with the spiritual detachment and generosity necessary for true vision. The more easily, too, does one assess oneself and alien cultures with the same combination of intimacy and distance" 35 .

Here again, what is crucial is the change in viewpoint or perspective that is necessary for a more detached, objective view on things. As Orazio Irrera has pointed out, the achievement of such detachment was, in the view of the later Said, a kind of spiritual exercize, 35 Edward Said, Orientalism, 260, cited by Irrera 2009. consisting in "an effort to separate and detach oneself from one's own set of values in order to open up new paths" 36 . Irrera goes on to speak of "the asceticism the philologist must apply in order to distance himself from his own affiliations and be able to reach a deeper understanding of the texts he is working on, but above all to entirely transform his way of seeing the world and himself".

As a result of this spiritual exercise of detachment, then, the Saidian humanist can create a kind of intermediary zone in which new juxtapositions between cultures can take place.

In the context of discussing cases of multistable perception, that is, ambiguous images of which the mind can give different successive interpretations, Silvano Tagliagambe writes as follows:

This process of "hybidization" makes such "images" ... something unstable by virtue of the tension that emanates between the aspects placed together (componere) without, however, ending up fused into a "synthesis" capable of overcoming them and transcending both. And it is precisely this instability that "sets in motion" the psychic structure that perceives the images in question, triggering in it an evolutive development that critically revisits and places in discussion at least a part of the contents housed within them, anticipating possible alternatives with regard to them, that is, other viewpoints, other ways of seeing, and hence activating and implementing a creative capacity 37 .

In the case of ambiguous images that can be interpreted in ways that are mutually exclusive, it is the very difference between viewpoints being compared and contrasted that triggers critical reassessment, Each of the two domains must constitute systems that are at the same time "open", in that they are connected to others, and yet "closed", insofar as they are autonomous and able to maintain their characteristic internal organization40.

Tagliagambe goes on to speak of "the cases, ever more frequent in current scientific practice, in which we find ourselves faced by an interaction that places in relation concepts and methods belonging to different fields of knowledge and research. This correlation, essential to the description of many problems, does not leave the two domains involved unchanged. By virtue of this, these fields come to partially overlap, giving rise to the constitution of a new object of knowledge, which are often at the origin of completely unexpected developments and results".

Tagliagambe concludes, following Vernadsky, that as a result of this viewpoint the rigid hierarchies between disciplines disappear, and "a new form of egalitarian collaboration and cooperation is established, in the context of which the humanistic disciplines and philosophy interact closely with the traditional sciences and acquire an increasingly important role"41.

Conclusion: Philosophy and science

Early in the twentieth century, Vernadsky, the eminent scientist, warned that any philosophy that ignores science runs the risk of becoming irrelevant and outmoded. This must not mean, however, that philosophy should blindly follow science.

"Indeed, he wrote, if philosophy limits itself to proceeding blindly in the footsteps of scientific tendencies, it will obviously be guided by them and will soon lose all autonomous and effective significance and value, and hence all interest for human knowledge: its work, and its participation in the process of the creative elaboration of human thought will soon be reduced to zero" 42 .

If humanistic thought chooses to slavishly follow a specific scientific tendency, it risks becoming as irrelevant as if it had ignored science altogether.

"For this purpose it is enough to recall the very recent history of the so-called scientific philosophy and the various orientations of positivism. The positions it adopted today appear in the eyes of a contemporary scientist as nothing more than old fables, good for old wives' tales"43.

The way that philosophy can complement science, then, is by its intrinsic multifariousness. Rather than possessing the truth as its exclusive property, philosophy, as Vernadsky writes44, is "something complex, polyhedric, and polyvalent". This variety of approaches makes philosophy apt to create a number of intermediary zones, in which, through the process of hybridization described by Tagliagambe, phenomena initially considered to be completely heterogenous may, when brought into proximity, shed light upon one another in unexpected ways.

What we might call "interdisciplinarity as a way of life" can thus fulfill a function analogous to that of the spiritual exercises in which, according to Pierre Hadot, ancient philosophy consisted: it can, perhaps, help to bring about a shift in perspective, a detachment from our usual self-centered, isolated, individualistic way of viewing things, according to which the world revolves around us. According to Pierre Hadot, ancient spiritual exercizes in general, and the View from Above in particular, can help detach our view from our own particular circumstances and accede to a more universal viewpoint, in which we realize that we are a part of several concentric larger wholes, culminating in the whole consitituted by the entire cosmos. An analogous shift in perspective can be achieved by the kind of comparative interdisciplinarity advocated by Tagliagambe, following Vernadksy and Florensky, according to which a fruitful 43 Vernadksy,ibid. 44 Vernadsky,op. cit.,p. 313. hybdrization can take place in the intermediary zone betwen two initially different domains of reality. Finally, yet another form of the shift of perspective can be brought about by the kind of humanism advocated in the late work of Edward Said, for whom the detachment from one's own cultural context, like the relativization of one's own problems brought about by the View from Above, can be considered a spiritual exercise necessary for achieving a more universal and objective perspective. Such a new perspective, in turn, can render us more open to encounters with the Other, which in turn can foster further creative innovation.

Each in its own way, these methods, and many others like them, can, I suggest, contribute to realizing the goal Pierre Hadot attributed to what he called the spiritual exercizes of ancient philosophy: they can help us change the way we view the world, reducing our self-centeredness and therefore enabling us to perceive and exist in a more intense and better way.