Ubi Lex, Ibi Poena:
Designing Norm Enforcement in e-Institutions
D. Grossi, H. Aldewereld, and F. Dignum
Institute of Information and Computing Sciences
Utrecht University
The Netherlands
{davide,huib,dignum}@cs.uu.nl
Abstract. The viability of the application of the e-Institution paradigm
for obtaining overall desired behavior in open multiagent systems (MAS)
lies in the possibility of bringing the norms of the institution to have an
actual impact on the MAS. Institutional norms have to be implemented
in the society. The paper addresses two possible views on implementing
norms, the so-called regimentation of norms, and the enforcement of
norms, with particular attention to this last one. Aim of the paper is to
provide a theory for the understanding of the notion of enforcement and
for the design of enforcement mechanisms in e-Institutions.
1
Introduction
The purpose of electronic institutions (e-Institutions) is to guarantee
the overall behavior of an open multi-agent system (MAS) to exhibit
desired properties without compromising the agents’ autonomy. Aiming
in particular at easing interactions and enhancing trust between agents
[11]. This is accomplished through norms directed to the agents taking
part in the society which specify the behavior that the institution expects
from the agents. As such, institutions can be seen as normative systems
[1], i.e., as sets of norms.
Institutions do not have access to the internal states of the agents and
hence, they cannot modify them in order to avoid any incongruence between the goals of the agents and the norms of the institutions. Therefore,
the problem arises of how to let those norms have an effective influence on
the activities of the agents. This is the problem of norm implementation.
This issue consists of two main aspects.
First, there is an interpretation issue concerning the concepts used in
the formulation of the norms in terms of the ontology used at the society
level. It is well-known feature of normative codifications (especially in
legal systems) to be “open-textured” [6] or abstract, that is, to be in
need of interpretation in order for them to be translated into norms
which are meaningful for the regulated society. This is what we have
called the “ontological” aspect of norm implementation [4] or, to use
terminology common in legal and social theory, the “constitutive” aspect
[9]. For instance, an institution might require personal data to be treated
according to specific procedures. The notion of “personal data” is of an
abstract nature and, in order for the norms concerning the treatment
of personal data to be implemented, a clear specification of what counts
as personal data in the given institution should be made precise. Much
attention to this issue has been dedicated by the authors in previous
work (see for instance [5,4]). The present paper will leave the problem of
the interpretation of norm codifications aside.
Second, there is the issue concerning the design of appropriate “enforcement mechanisms” required to push the society toward the compliance to
the norms of the institution. For instance, if personal data is not treated
in accordance to the institutional regulation, the institution should trigger some kind of reaction. This broad notion of “institutional reaction”
corresponds to what we call here enforcement.
The present paper focuses on this last point, aiming at discussing a theory
for understanding the implementation of norms in institutions and the
design of enforcement mechanisms.
The core of the enforcement implementation strategy presented in this
paper is summarized in the saying “Ubi lex ibi poena” (“where there is
law, there is sanction”). In other words, if norms are to be enforced, then
the institution should specify and handle sanctions for every possible
violation of the norms. The paper is trying to give some answers around
two concrete questions surrounding the enforcement: How do institutions
handle violations and specify enforcement mechanisms? And how should
sanctions be designed in order to be effective for the enforcement of
norms in eInstitutions?
In Section 2 we discuss different enforcement strategies (regimentation
vs. reaction). The effect of these different enforcement strategies on the
society are discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss what are the
possible sanctions that an institution can take in a society consisting
of software agents. In Section 5 we give some conclusions and areas for
future work.
2
Dealing with Violations
There exists an obvious way in which the compliance to the norms of
an institution can be implemented, namely by making the violation of
the norms impossible. When this is the case we talk about regimentation
([7]): norm compliance is unavoidable, and hence, with respect to what is
stated by the norms of the institution, the space of the agents’ autonomy
is strongly limited. This typically happens in e-commerce: when shopping
on the web, you cannot get your goods delivered before giving consent
for using your credit card number for paying those goods.
Regimentation guarantees the compliance of the society to the norms
of the institution. However, it has been argued, for instance in [2], that
violations can be functional for the society as a whole. Even stronger, if
no violation can occur, if nothing can go wrong, it does not make sense
any more to talk about norms at all. From the agent point of view, a
regimented norm, is just a fact.
With enforcement we mean the reaction that the institution specifies to
respond to a violation of its norms. Enforcement presupposes, therefore,
the possibility of violation. Institutions aim at regulating the behavior of
agents through norms, but it is commonplace that norms are useless if
the violation of those norms is ignored (to quote the Romans again: “ubi
culpa est, ibi poena subesse debet”, that is, “where there is a violation,
there must be a sanction”). In other words, the enforcement of a norm
by an institution requires the institution to be in the condition of recognizing the occurrence of violations of that norm in the society and to
react upon them. Not surprisingly, this check-react enforcement mechanism is specified by means of more norms. Enforcement is sought through
further regulating the domain, i.e., adding norms imposing checks and
norms specifying reactions to the occurrences of a given violation. Regulations on tax evasion are a typical example in this sense: tax payment
is impossible to be regimented but checks, which could detect possible
violations, are made obligatory. Once the detection takes place, precise
reactions are also specified and made obligatory.
On the basis of these considerations, we can isolate three types of norms
involved in the specification of institutions. In fact, the whole statute of
an institution could be analyzed in terms of sets of norms of these types.
There is a set of substantive norms which consists of those norms which
describe the society’s behavior desired by the institution, and there is
a set of enforcement norms consisting of norms regulating checks and
reactions on violations of other norms.
The following is an example inspired by the domain concerning the policies for data protection followed by the Spanish National Transplant
Organization in the organ allocation process [10].
Example 1. (Types of norms for the specification of institutions)
Substantive norm “The National Transplant Organization is not allowed to use racial data for allocating organs to patients”.
Check norm “The inspecting authority should perform random checks
of the compliance to the previous norm every two months ...”.
Reaction norm “If racial data are used in the allocation process, then
the hospital has to be fined accordingly.”
The enforcement activity can thus be split in two sub-activities: check
and reaction. Check norms deserve some further comments. They specify
the way the institution is supposed to perceive the occurrence of violations. Needless to say, this can happen in many different ways. Either
directly, via random checks, like in the above example; or via constant
monitoring activity, like a referee in a sport match. Or indirectly, allowing agents to denounce the occurrence of a violation and then verifying
their claim. This last checking activity is of an intrinsically more complex nature, calling for the establishment of tribunal-like sub-institutions
within the main institution. It would be appropriate, in this case, to talk
about check sub-institutions rather than check norms. For the present
paper, we leave these complexities aside focusing rather on direct forms
of checks.
Via such a normatively specified enforcement of the substantive norms,
the enforcement issue is just lifted up to the set of enforcement norms
because, if not regimented, those norms could be violated and be thus
in need of enforcement. In principle, this pattern could be endlessly iterated unless there exists a final enforcement level, whose norms are all
regimented, or whose violations are not punished (see Figure 1).
Substantive regulation
SET OF NORMS
1st enforcement level
regimentation
SET OF NORMS
2nd enforcement level
regimentation
SET OF NORMS
Fig. 1. Norms implementation between regimentation and enforcement.
As a matter of fact, such a cascade is precisely how real human institutions seem to be organized, where several levels of enforcement regulations may be recognized. Violations on the last level are not considered.
I.e. rulings of a supreme court are supposed to be final (even though they
might be violating a norm). In this sense it seems very interesting that
instead of a full regimentation, the devising of a deep (i.e. structured on
more enforcement levels) normative guided reaction appears to offer an
efficient implementation strategy, granting at the same time a certain
institutional flexibility and the room for institutional change and development. It is finally important to notice that, although we have somehow
drawn a neat line between the regimentation approach and the approach
leaving the possibility of violations open, an institution will most likely
choose for a mixed approach deciding to regiment a (small) number of
norms, and to enforce the others. We will expand on this crucial issue in
the next section.
3
Different Enforcements, Different Societies
The way in which we have framed institutional implementations of norm
enforcement offers a straightforward ground for showing in what precisely
enforcement strategies can differ, and what kind of impact they have on
societies. Consider the following (most appearing) cases:
1. A set of norms is implemented via direct regimentation;
2. A set of norms is implemented via regimentation of the set of first
level enforcement norms, i.e. all occurrences of violations of the substantive regulation are sanctioned;
3. A set of norms is implemented via regimentation of the set of reaction
norms of the second enforcement level, while the violation of check
norms of this level is left ignored.
In Case 1 violation is impossible.In Case 2 violation is possible but the
reaction is absolutely certain. This would result in creating perfect deterrents. Agents would violate the norms only if they consider the benefits
obtained via violating the norm higher than the disadvantages originating by the institutional reaction.
It is clear that only in Case 3 it is possible to violate a substantive norm
without any reaction on that precise violation to occur. This can happen
because of a failure in complying with the corresponding check norm or
with the reaction norm at the first enforcement level. If the violation
of the substantive norms does not happen to be detected at the first
enforcement level, then no reaction at all would follow, because at the
second enforcement level only the reaction norms of the first level are
regimented. This happens, for instance, when one does not get caught
by the police while exceeding speed limits (they were not checking): a
violation occurs which is not detected and, as a consequence, no reaction
is taken. If, on the other hand, the violation of the substantive norms
is detected, but still no reaction is undertaken, then the second enforcement level would automatically detect this violation occurred at the first
enforcement level and react to it. This would correspond to the (unrealistic) case in which a police agent who, though detecting a violation of
speed limits, does not proceed to issue a fine, is automatically sanctioned.
3.1
An example
In the previous section we sketched how institutions can implement norm
enforcement over different levels of regimentation. When designing an
institution this would lead of course to the question how many levels the
institution should use. What are the consequences for the society when
one, two, three, or more levels are used? In this section this question is
elaborated by means of a simple example. We take into consideration
two possible implementation strategies of an institution that two agents
can use in order to play a chess match.
Example 2. (Electronic chess)
Let us first consider what happens in an electronic chess match. Players
cannot move pieces other than in the way prescribed by the rules of
the game, that means that they cannot violate them: the set of actions
they can perform within the game is limited, and each of these actions is
norm compliant. There is no possibility for them to move the rook as if it
were a bishop. For these reasons electronic versions of the game of chess
constitute a clear example of regimentation of a substantive regulation.
Agents cannot do anything else than playing chess according to the rules.
It is instructive to notice that the AMELI framework [3] falls under this
category. In fact, in AMELI every agent is coupled with an institutional
agent, the “governor”, which acts as a filter on the agent’s activities
letting only allowed actions to actually take place. Governors are, as
such, an excellent example of norm implementation based on the full
regimentation of the set of substantive norms. It provides for a clear and
protected environment. However, it is not very flexible to change (all possible moves of the game in every situation must be known beforehand).
Example 3. (Chess with flawless referee agent)
A variation on the previous example would be the use of an automatic
agent referee regimenting the first enforcement level norms. Such a referee
would always recognize violations and react to them. What would be the
difference of this implementation of the chess institution with respect to
the one described before? In that implementation, the agents could not
do anything but play chess, while here they would have a wider range of
actions at their disposal such as, for instance, making illegal moves on
purpose in order to distract (or signal) the opponent.
The resulting games, would therefore be quite different from the one
implemented in the previous example, even though the set of substantial
rules (the rules of chess) is the same.
Example 4. (Chess with referee agent)
Consider now how a chess match in a standard live contest is devised. The
two players are not subjected to any regimentation: there is no limitation
of the set of actions available. They have the possibility to move rooks
as bishops, they can thus violate the rules of chess. However, there is a
further set of norms stating precisely how to react to a violation. There
might for example be a third party involved, namely a referee agent,
whose task is to detect violations and react to them in specific ways (or
to whom suspected violations can be reported by the players). We can
then think of a norm, addressed to the referee, stating that the referee
ought to check what happens on the chessboard (check norm), to signal
an occurring violation and to intervene in the game suspending it and
ordering the faulting player to retract its move (reaction norms).
Nevertheless, this might not be enough. Violations can indeed occur also
at this level and the same implementation problem is then shifted to the
first enforcement level. What should happen if the referee does not detect
a move that is not allowed, or does not sanction a player? A further set of
norms siding, this time, the first enforcement regulation provides answers
to these questions. A new enforcement level, namely a second enforcement
level, is therefore added. This can be a contest committee which is obliged
to annul a game vitiated by referee’s faults and so on. As already noticed,
reactive levels can in principle be added ad infinitum, but they are, of
course, de facto limited. For a chess contest, two reactive levels could be
reasonably enough to grant a regular chess match. However, they are not
enough in an absolute sense. It is possible that the last reactive level does
not behave in the expected way (reconsidering the example, suppose the
committee not to annul an irregular match), at least as far as it itself is
not fully regimented.
What are the new opportunities in this situation? Notice that in this
situation players might violate the norms without being noticed (and
sanctioned). Therefore the simple fact that a player does not violate the
rules might already give him extra credit with his opponent. A notion
like ”trust” suddenly might become important in this game. In general,
the possible reasons for making a (illegal) move have again multiplied as
well as the interpretation of them. Therefore, again, the game is enriched
even though the basic rules stayed the same.
By means of this example we illustrated how different implementation
strategies of the same substantive set of norms can actually give rise
to radically different institutions and therefore to considerably different
systems. The natural question arising is then: what would be, given a
society and a set of substantive norms, the most sensible implementation strategy? And more crucially, why to allow for violations instead of
choosing for a full regimentation?
3.2
eInstitutions: to Regiment or to Enforce?
The implementation of a set of (substantive) norms can be obtained either via regimentation or via the specification of an enforcement activity
to be carried out by the institution. Enforcement specification takes place
normatively, i.e., via adding more norms to the prior set which, thus, also
require implementation. Schematically, suppose S to be the set of to-beimplemented norms, Regiment (X) to denote the set of norms from X
which are regimented, and Enforce(X) to denote the set of norms containing X together with all the norms specifying the enforcement of X
(X ⊆ Enforce(X)). The implementation of S can be formally defined as
follows:
Implement(S) = Enforce(S \ Regiment (S)).
In other words, to implement a set of norms amounts to implement the set
of unregimented norms together with their enforcement. This definition
clearly states that the implementation of a set of norms yields a set of
norms, and this is, in a nutshell, one of the main theses we are upholding
here. In some sense, it is very difficult to get rid of the normative reality.
The only possibility is via regimentation. In fact:
If Regiment (S) ≡ S then Implement(S) ≡ ∅.
Instead:
If Regiment (S) ⊂ S then ∅ ⊂ Implement(S)
which means that the implementation operation should be applied again
on Implement(S).
This analysis has been led by the consideration of human institutions,
but when it comes to electronic ones, some more assumptions can be
made.
First of all, for human institutions it can be accepted that the violation
of some norms can remain in principle ignored (see Example 4), this is
not the case for e-Institutions. No designer would accept the possibility
of norms the violation of which would not trigger any reaction.
Secondly, for e-Institutions, one enforcement level (level one of Figure 1)
is enough. The reason is that when implementing unregimented norms,
we would expect enforcement agents explicitly programmed by the designer of the institution, and therefore we would assume them to act in
perfect accordance with the principles of the institution itself1 .
Based on these considerations we can consider Example 4 as too rich
(and unrealistic) in the perspective of e-Institutions. If an institution
has to be designed for agents to play chess, than the possibility of an
unreliable referee can be reasonably ruled out assuming that the designer
of the institution would program appropriate referee agents2 . Only two
implementation choices are therefore to be considered realistic:
1. Either all substantive norms are regimented: Regiment (S) ≡ S. In
this case no checking and reacting activities are necessary like in
Example 2.
2. Or some (possibly all) norms are left unregimented (Regiment (S) ⊂
S), while what is regimented is just their enforcement like in Example
3, that is: Regiment (Enforce(S \ Regiment (S)).
The question amounts then to: “when is it better to choose 1 over 2 or
vice versa?” In general, the preference for 2 over 1 can be dictated by
two factors.
Complexity of the regimented activities Regimentation can considerably raise the complexity of the activities that agents carry out
within the institution, so that for an agent to pursue its goals it would
be compelled to go through unnecessarily complex procedures. This is
illustrated by a simple example: consider a postal service in which the
deliverer should wait for the addressee to open his/her parcels and confirm the content has been delivered in the desired state. This would rule
out the possibility of deliveries of damaged parcels, but it would also
make the delivery process considerably slower and inconvenient for the
agents which should always be present at the delivery. In other words,
regimentation can thus give rise to computationally demanding activities
(see [12]) both for the institution itself, and for the agents acting within
it. Formally analogous scenarios can be devised especially in the eCommerce domain, where the possibility of simple and quick transactions can
be a highly desired feature.
This aspect has directly to do with the delicate balance between the two
fundamental goals of e-Institutions, i.e, increase trust in agents’ transactions and facilitate those transactions [11]. The point is that, although
via regimentation the highest level of trust can be achieved, agents’ interaction can end up being not facilitated at all.
Usefulness of the violations As we have seen in Example 3 the possibility for agents to violate the substantive regulation would allow for
1
2
It is instructive to notice that this is not the case in human institutions, where the
enforcement is always outsourced, in the sense that no agent can be assumed to be
“programmed” by the institution: for instance, enforcement agents such as policemen
do maintain private goals and believes completely inaccessible from an institutional
perspective. This is why, in human institutions, the nesting of many more that just
one enforcement levels is the rule.
These are of course contingent assumptions on the actual state of the art in MAS and
e-Institutions. Future developments in these fields would make them become possibly obsolete. It can be indeed thought of e-Institutions delegating the enforcement
activity to agents of different e-Institutions.
activities which would otherwise be impossible. The agent can choose to
violate the regulation and possibly incur in a sanction in order to pursue
some specific goals. In Example 3 agents playing chess in an institution
with a flawless referee would actually have the possibility to use a wider
variety of strategies for winning the game by trying to distract the opponent via performing invalid moves. Alternatively, suppose a reputation
value to be attached to each chess-playing agent so that the less often
they violate the norms the higher reputation they get. In this case, the
possibility to violate the norms enables also the possibility to introduce
a reputation value system which might be useful for further purposes:
for instance, a high reputation value might be required to access chess
tournaments.
At the end, allowing for violations results in a higher flexibility of the
e-Institutions which might happen to serve more purposes than the one
for which it was designed. This can be a desirable feature especially in
domains where more e-Institutions operate on the same society.
4
Sanctions in e-Institutions
When using an enforcement mechanism to implement norms in an eInstitution, as argued in the previous section, sanctions need to be specified to define the institution’s reaction to the violations of the norms.
Violations that do not trigger any reaction have no sensible meaning in
an e-Institution that uses the norms and sanctions, the reaction to the
violation of the norms, to direct and control the behavior of the agents
participating in the institution.
In previous literature (cf. [11,8]) several kinds of sanctions have been
proposed, mostly influenced by sanctions used in human institutions.
Some of the sanctions involve, e.g. bans, dismissal, reputation or trust
influences, fines to the agent or its owner, etc. However, when designing
an e-Institution not all human sanctions make sense, like, for instance,
incarceration, which is a common sanction for humans, but no direct
electronic equivalent of this sanction appears useful. In general there are
two ways of sanctioning agents which make sense: 1) limiting the future
actions of the agents, or 2) executing an action on behalf of the agents.
The first option includes, but is not limited to, sanctions such as bans and
fines that are meant to restrict the agent in doing actions that are needed
for it to achieve its goals (the money spent on the fine was actually meant
to buy goods in an auction; the ban prevented the agent from making
a bid before the auction closed). The second kind of sanctions are those
where the institution changes some information (resource) pertaining to
the agent which usually can only be changed by the agent itself. This
might consist in changing the reputation of the agent or in paying bills on
behalf of the agent, because either the agent has granted the institution
this power upon entering (by signing a contract that states that the
institution has the authority to issue payments on behalf of the agent in
case of violations), or because the agent had to pay a deposit when it
entered the institution (the deposit is then used to pay the bills and any
fines that might arise).
Whatever type of sanction is chosen they are there to serve a purpose.
In the following we examine the purpose of sanctions. We look at what
sanctions are supposed to do and how the complexity of the agents in
the institution can influence the choice of sanctions.
4.1
A Taxonomy of Sanctions
Sanctions serve different purposes in different institutions. However, there
is a general purpose to sanctions that holds for all institutional environments: sanctions are there to discourage agents from taking actions that
are considered unwanted or illegal by the institution. Sanctions can be
seen as a deterrence, making agents less keen about performing these
unwanted and illegal actions. To achieve this discouraging effect on the
agents in the institution, sanctions are designed to limit the future actions of agents. For instance, fines influence the possibilities of the agent,
since they make it harder for the agent to get the items it requires as the
agent has less money to spend (which, of course, only really restricts the
agent if it had a limited budget and the agent’s owner ordered the agent
to obtain lots of items). Similarly, reputation changes might limit the actions of an agent as it might influence the outcome of future negotiations
and interactions of the agent.
Next to their discouraging effect, sanctions might also be used as a compensation to those most effected by the violation of the norm. In order
to provide some satisfaction or compensation to those harmed by the
violation, the violating agent is sanctioned. For instance, an agent might
become obliged, after violating a norm, to pay an amount of money
to the affected agent(s) as compensation. This difference between using
sanctions as a deterrence and as a compensation signifies a difference in
the role of the institution when applying the sanction. Sanctions that
are solely used as a discouragement are sanctions that are applied by the
institution itself, and therefore benefit the institution itself (the fines are
payed to the institution, bans are applied solely to maintain order in the
system). When sanctions are applied to provide a compensation to those
harmed (note that the sanction will also retain its deterring nature), the
institution becomes a mediator instead, interacting between the agent
who committed the violation and the rest of the society.
Another difference in sanctions, as mentioned in [12], is whether the
sanction is of direct or indirect nature. Direct sanctions are those that
influence the agent immediately and are noticeable directly. These include fines, bans and other “corporeal” sanctions. Indirect sanctions, on
the other hand, influence the agent on a kind of meta-level, such as reputation changes or trust related sanctions. Those sanctions might not be
noticeable immediately but can influence the agent for a longer period
of time. Combinations of both types of sanctions can be used as well.
The choice between using a sanction merely as deterrence or adding a
compensational value to it depends on the norm and domain in question. If the violation of the norm harms other agents, and these ‘victims’
require support to overcome this harm, a compensation might seem appropriate. However, if the norm only affects the institution, no compensation is needed. Similarly, the choice between the usage of direct and
indirect sanctions is entirely up to the domain and norm in question.
If indirect sanctions have an equal deterring value as direct sanctions,
indirect sanctions can be used just as well. In a domain, however, where
reputation plays no role, an indirect sanction (in this case, lowering the
agents reputation value) has no value and a direct sanction should be
used instead.
4.2
Sanctions and Types of Agents
Whatever purpose the sanctions might serve in a certain institution, the
complexity of the agents in the system must be understood to determine
the effectiveness of the sanction. A system that is trying to discourage
agents from violating the norms by applying bans might be quite successful when the agents in the system feel bad about being banned, or
are unable to complete their goals because of the ban. However, if the
agents do not mind the ban the sanction fails its purpose.
The hierarchy of types of agents’ autonomy developed in [13] can be used
to distinguish, for each level of autonomy, what the impact of sanctions
can be and which sanctions are suitable for the cognitive structure of the
agent. The hierarchy of [13] distinguishes the following types of autonomy
in agents (also see figure 2):
Type I Reactive Agents: Agents whose autonomy completely resides
in the combination of environmental cues and system properties.
Type II Plan Autonomous Agents: Agents that are autonomous in
their choosing the sequences of actions (plans) to obtain goals. The
goals itself are either inherent to the agent or triggered by requests
from other agents.
Type III Goal Autonomous Agents: Agents that are autonomous
in making decisions about goals (which have become their interests),
enabling them to choose their “prevailing interest”, considering its
goals. It determines which states of the world are desired, given the
goal satisfaction and its goal priority.
Type IV Norm Autonomous Agents: Agents with the capabilities
to choose goals that are legitimate to pursue, based on the norms
of the system. Moreover, norm autonomous agents are equipped to
judge the legitimacy of its own and other agents’ goals.
norm
autonomy
goal autonomy
plan autonomy
reactivity
Fig. 2. A Taxonomy of Autonomy
The lower level agents, i.e. types I to III, have no idea of a sanction (they
have no conception of what a sanction is). To these agents, a sanction
applied by the system is nothing more than an environmental reaction to
the situation at hand (or to the action they have just performed). This
makes informing the agents about the norms a bit harder, as the norms
need to be translated to situational causal effects that are triggered by
actions in various situations. The sanctions become a necessary causal
effect of the actions prohibited by the norms. However, directing and
controlling the agents is a bit easier for the lower types of agents, as
punishing agents by making them unable to reach their goal is easy for
agents of types I and II. These agents can easily be prevented to achieve
their goals by making them unable to do an action (making the sanction
not as much a punishment for the agent, but more an incentive for the
developer to redesign the agent to become norm-compliant). This is a bit
harder for agents of type III , as these agents are more capable of coming
up with alternative ways to achieve their goal (or can pursue alternative
goals, making the punishment less effective).
Type IV agents are even a bigger problem, since they have a clear conception about what a sanction is and when a sanction will be applied.
These agents can reason about the results of their actions in a normative
manner, i.e. they take the norms into account to determine if an action
in a certain situation is acceptable or if it will trigger a violation. This
means that if a type IV agent violates a norm, the agent has probably
reasoned that violating the norm is the only or the most efficient way to
achieve it’s goal, and a punishment is therefore only an increase in cost
for the agent doing the action (while this increased cost has been fully
taken into account in the decision of the agent). Moreover, since agents
of type IV have the same capabilities as agents of type III, the sanctions
loose even more of their deterring effectiveness.
A big problem, however, is that no guarantees can be given whether the
sanction has the right effect on all the agents possibly joining the institution. To design sanctions to work for agents, assumptions about the
inner working of the agents have to be made; what effect will the sanction have on them? Will they replan and try again, or will the sanction
make them sorry about what they did?
In human institutions, such assumptions about the inner process of humans can be made, and such assumptions are correct most of the time
(we know how most of us think, react to certain stimuli etc.). Sanctions
applied in human institutions are based on these assumptions to work as
an effective deterrent, as humans tend to dislike spending time in prison
or paying fines applied after violating a norm. Even alternative punishments, such as being put under probation, which can be seen merely as a
warning, work for humans, as they apply to the moral sense of the perpetrator. For agents, however, this kind of reaction is not assured. Agents
are programmed by different developers, making them heterogeneous in
nature. This heterogeneity also means that the inner workings of agents
can be very different between agents. Since one cannot assume that all
agents work in a similar manner or have the same beliefs in certain situations, it makes designing sanctions that are really punishments for all
agents very hard. Using, for instance, probations in agent environments
makes no sense, since most agents will not consider this sanction to be
a warning.
If, however, one can assume that (the majority of) Type IV agents are
programmed in such a manner that they will try to be norm-compliant,
sanctioning these agents becomes a bit easier as the sanction is no longer
seen by these agents just as a necessary causal effect to a prohibited action but as something undesirable in itself. This would mean that a norm
breaking action is just less preferred by such agents than other normcompliant actions (even if the norm-compliant action is more costly) because of the agent’s desire to be norm-compliant. Sanctions can in this
case rely on an intrinsic deterrence effect allowing for the specification of
less drastic institutional reactions to violations (for instance fines instead
of bans). However, if the willingness of agents to be norm-compliant cannot be guaranteed, the normative awareness with which Type IV agents
are endowed cannot be exploited and they will have to be sanctioned in
the same way as Type III agents.
5
Conclusions
In this paper we have explored two related problems that have to be
solved when implementing norms in e-Institutions. First is the decision
between enforcement of norms through regimentation or through reaction. An interesting first observation is that implementing norms actually implies adding more norms (albeit of a slightly different nature). Of
course all conceivable levels of enforcement norms are possible. However,
we have seen that in most situations the best is to have one level of enforcement norms in e-Institutions due to the fact that enforcing agents
are centrally controlled (and programmed).
The second question addressed in this paper was which sanctions are
useful as reaction to violations. We have shown that, although many
mechanisms are based on human society, not all human-based sanctions
make sense in an e-Institution. A first classification of different types of
sanctions is given, but many issues still remain open. One of the first issues to be addressed is how to choose the most effective sanction from an
institutional point of view. This would both deter agents from violating
norms too easily, but also facilitate normal transactions between agents
as much as possible.
Acknowledgments
Authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of COIN’06 for
their useful comments.
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