A Philosophical History of the Concept (Cambridge University Press), 2025
Several prominent Anglo-American philosophers—the concept theorists, as I shall call them—argue that to engage rationally in inquiry, one must grasp and apply non-linguistic entities called concepts which, when properly combined, yield non-linguistic entities called propositions or thoughts that are true or false. Arguments of this sort have a long history that extends at least as far back as Plato. What is distinctive of theorizing about concepts since the late 1930s, however, is its reliance on methods of metalinguistic semantic analysis first devised by Alfred Tarski. My goals in this paper are to explain this reliance and reconstruct and evaluate a small but representative selection of the most influential philosophical views on concepts since 1945. In the first two sections I describe how our use of metalinguistic semantic analysis to clarify and facilitate our inquiries presupposes our practical ability to use our words. In the third section I reconstruct the concept theorists’ argument that our practical ability to use our words requires an explanation and that only a theory of concepts can explain it. In the fourth through the seventh sections I examine, respectively, Rudolf Carnap’s, W.V. Quine’s, Hilary Putnam’s, and Tyler Burge’s influential views on whether, and if so, how, a theory of concepts can explain our practical ability to use our words. My examination of these views leads me to conclude that our practical ability to use our words in inquiry is more fundamental than any explanation of it that the concept theorists hope to provide. I therefore propose that we take this practical ability as fundamental and focus not on explaining it, but on clarifying it, refining it, and investigating its consequences.