Environmental Ethics

Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Environmental Ethics Jozef Keulartz* and Michiel Korthals Applied Philosophy, Social Sciences Group, Wageningen University, Wageningen, Netherlands Introduction The development of environmental ethics was inspired by the widespread perception of an “environmental crisis” in the 1960s. Rachel Carson’s landmark book Silent Spring (1962), which documented the accumulation of dangerous pesticides and chemical toxins throughout planetary food webs, played a vitally important role in raising awareness of this crisis. Never before and since has a book been so successful in providing impetus for action against a common threat to so diverse a body of people. Silent Spring was published 1 month before the Cuba missile crisis and owed its worldwide success at least in part to Carson’s comparison between the effects of atomic radiation and those of synthetic chemical pesticides. By framing pesticides as another form of fallout, Carson’s book made a powerful impression on a generation that grew up under the shadow of nuclear destruction. It brought about the transformation of the earlier conservation movement into a worldwide environmental movement. An important milestone in the emergence of environmental ethics was the first Earth Day on April 22, 1970, when environmentalists started urging philosophers who were involved with environmental groups to think through the norms and values that lead to environmental problems, as well as the norms and values that are necessary for resolving them. Anthropocentrism and Non-anthropocentrism In its early stages, the debate among academic philosophers on environmental issues was strongly stimulated by Lynn White’s seminal article “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis.” In this article from 1967, White claims that Christianity, as “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen” (p. 1205), is to be blamed for the ongoing exploitation and degradation of nature in the occidental world. Richard Routley (1973), in another highly influential article, also identifies anthropocentrism, or basic human chauvinism, as the core principle of Western ethical systems and argued that it is inconsistent with a true environmental ethic. A thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject the anthropocentric principle of total use, “implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for human ends, ‘humanized’” (p. 206). In the footsteps of authors such as White and Routley, environmental ethics developed primarily as a radical critique and correction of anthropocentric ethics. There are at least three main approaches to radical non-anthropocentric environmental ethics: Arne Næss’ deep ecology (1989), in which the current environmental crisis is attributed to modern humanity’s anthropocentrism; Murray Bookchin’s social ecology (1995), which explains hostile behavior toward nature in *Email: jozef.keulartz@wur.nl Page 1 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 terms of the existence of hierarchical relationships among human beings; and ecofeminism (see Merchant 1983), which points to androcentrism rather than anthropocentrism as the main culprit and assumes a strong relationship between suppression of nature and of women. It is interesting to notice that this discussion has made it very difficult to reconcile environmental ethics with an agricultural perspective, because the latter, necessary for survival and quality of human life, has a clear anthropocentric focus (see also “▶ Agriculture and Environmentalism”). An important goal within this field has long been to find a convincing theory of the intrinsic value of natural entities. The debate focuses on whether this noninstrumental value of nature has a subjective or an objective character. Subjectivists claim that the only sources of value are the evaluative attitudes of humans, whereas objectivists (such as Routley) deny that value depends on the attitude of valuers (O’Neill 1992). The Expanding Circle Another important debate within the new field of environmental ethics concerned the question of which entities possess intrinsic value. Here the idea of the so-called expanded circle proved to be important, i.e., the idea that humans’ moral development is characterized by a constant extension of the moral community (Nash 1989). In the beginning, the circle of beings considered morally relevant was confined to fellow tribesmen, but in the course of history, this circle gradually expanded until all of humanity was encompassed, a milestone reached during the Enlightenment in the declaration of human rights. At first these rights only applied to male proprietors, but this gradually changed during the nineteenth century, with the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of the laborer, the introduction of female suffrage, and the ban on child labor. As discussed below, the moral community once again experienced a powerful expansion during the twentieth century and now extends to future generations. However, the expansion of the moral community did not come to a halt at the human species boundary, but also continued, step by step, outside the domain of humankind, first to animals (zoocentrism), next to plants and microorganisms (biocentrism), and finally to collectives such as endangered species and complete ecosystems (ecocentrism). Transgenerational Ethics: Past and Future Generations In reaction to the emergence of environmental problems on a global scale, the moral community recently underwent a powerful extension to future generations. This expansion of the moral community is evident in the 1989 Brundtland report Our Common Future, in which sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Present generations are obligated by considerations of (distributive) justice not to pursue policies that create benefits for themselves but impose costs on those who will live in the future. The Brundtland report mentions not only justice between generations (intergenerational justice) but also justice within generations (intragenerational justice) as preconditions for sustainable development (see also “▶ Sustainability of Food Production and Consumption”). For example, there is a huge difference between the rich North and the poor South with respect to the consumption of natural resources. This difference can be visualized with the help of the socalled ecological footprint (“EF” for short) (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). The EF is a measure Page 2 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 of human demand on the Earth’s ecosystems that indicates how many hectares of productive land and sea area an average person needs for his or her consumptive activities on an annual basis. The present footprint of inhabitants of poor countries is far below the global average of 2.2 ha, whereas the footprint of those of rich countries is far above this average. A bone of contention with respect to sustainability lies in how far nature’s services can be viewed as resources that are substitutable (in the sense that it is acceptable that when one destroys one and leaves another intact) or not: the first view is called weak sustainability and the second view strong sustainability (Norton 2005). Weak sustainability allows for virtually unlimited substitution between man-made, manufactured capital, which incorporates resources such as infrastructure, labor, and knowledge, and natural capital, which covers the stock of environmental services. The decline of natural capital can be compensated by an increase of manufactured capital. Intergenerational equity is guaranteed as long as the total capital is left constant over time. Strong sustainability on the other hand denies that man-made and natural capitals are interchangeable, implying that natural resources should be passed to future generations still intact in their original form. People have duties not only to future and current generations but also to past generations. One should pay honor and respect to the dead. That means remembering their achievements, continuing their work, or paying compensation to their children for a wrongdoing they may have suffered. Transgenerational ethics can underpin the notion of “cultural heritage.” Of course, these retrospective, present, and prospective duties can conflict with each other. Zoocentric Ethics: Utilitarian and Deontological Perspectives In his 1840 Preisschrift u€ber die Grundlage der Moral [On the Basis of Morality], Arthur Schopenhauer remarked, much to his regret, that above the entrance of occidental ethics hangs a prohibition sign with the inscription: “Tiere m€ ussen draußen bleiben” [Animals have to stay outside]. One of the first modern philosophers who successfully denounced this situation was Peter Singer. Singer (1975) blames traditional ethics for the fact that animals are wrongly excluded from the moral community. Traditional ethics attributes a superior moral status to humans on the basis of their exclusively possessing specific capacities like the ability to think or to speak. If this criterion were applied rigorously, however, then newborn children and demented people would not deserve any moral consideration. If one wants to avoid this consequence, then one has to choose a less demanding criterion for right of entry to the moral community. Singer borrows this criterion from Jeremy Bentham, the famous founder of utilitarianism. “The question is not,” Bentham stated in 1789, “Can they reason? Nor Can they Talk? But Can they suffer?” If one accepts the ability to suffer as the main criterion for right of entry, then there is no reason to exclude animals from the moral community. Singer argues that one should engage in actions that result in the greatest good for all sentient organisms. Thus, in the utilitarian calculus, the damage to animal welfare has to be weighed against the human benefits of food, shelter, medicine, and so on. Animal experiments can, for instance, be justified on utilitarian grounds if substantial human health interests are at stake which outweigh the harms to the animals and when there are no alternatives that produce a greater net balance of benefit over harm. Tom Regan has strongly rejected utilitarianism as foundation of animal ethics. In his influential 1983 book, The Case for Animal Rights, Regan develops a theory of animal ethics along Page 3 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 deontological lines. According to Kant’s categorical imperative, one should treat fellow humans never merely as a means, but always at the same time as ends-in-themselves. Tom Regan has applied Kant’s categorical imperative to animals. Animals should not simply be appreciated for their instrumental value but they should be respected for their inherent value. To achieve this, one should grant animals certain rights, according to Regan. These rights prevent trade-offs between animal welfare considerations and human welfare considerations. For Regan, virtually any type of captivity or manipulation of a sentient animal is morally unacceptable, irrespective of the possibly beneficial consequences for the protection of rare or endangered species. Although most animal ethicists only attribute moral standing to individual animals, and not to plants or collective entities such as species or ecosystems, they are nevertheless convinced that animal ethics is an environmental ethics, because individual animals can survive and flourish only if they have a sustainable and sound environment. Biocentric Ethics: Egalitarian and Hierarchical Approaches The next step, the transfer of ethical fundamentals from human beings to plants and microorganisms, was taken by Paul Taylor, who was influenced by Albert Schweitzer (1923) and his “reverence for life” ethic. Taylor (1986) defends a biocentric position, implying that not only humans and animals should count as members of the moral community but all living beings, including plants and microorganisms. Without exception, all organisms deserve moral consideration because as “teleological centers of life,” they have a good of their own. This good consists in the realization of capacities and the fulfillment of needs in a regular, well-balanced way that goes with the species-specific nature of organisms. According to Taylor, human beings can claim no primacy over other living beings. On the basis of his “principle of species impartiality,” all organisms should be treated with equal care and respect, regardless of the species they belong to. However, not all biocentric approaches are egalitarian and consider all organisms to be equal. Hierarchical approaches make an organism’s value dependent on their organizational level; they will generally attribute higher value to animals than to plants. Endangered Species and Biodiversity Protection While some people would dispute whether ethical obligations exist to protect or prevent harm to individual organisms, many more are willing to acknowledge that it is morally wrong to jeopardize the continued existence of an entire species. This has become a particularly central issue in public land-use policy as urban development and habitat loss have increasingly become major causes of species extinction. Much of the reasoning used to justify concern about loss of endangered species in recent years has clearly been anthropocentric in nature. There are many important pragmatic reasons for protecting endangered plant and animal species (see also “▶ Biodiversity and Global Development”). They represent a tremendous biological storehouse, the loss of which may deprive us of substantial medical, scientific, and commercial benefits. But non-anthropocentric arguments have also been offered. Similar to the positions embraced by animal rights supporters, the protection of species diversity is sometimes defended on the grounds that species have an inherent right to exist regardless of the utility or value such species might hold for humans (Rolston 1986). Page 4 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Ecocentric Ethics: Land Ethic Versus Animal Ethics Both Singer’s utilitarian (animal welfare) approach and Regan’s deontological (animal rights) approach center on individual organisms, the difference being that Singer allows for utilitarian trade-offs between the various interests of individuals. The same holds for biocentric approaches. For both zoocentrists and biocentrists, collectives (e.g., endangered species) do not possess any intrinsic value or direct moral standing at all. This individualistic approach was opposed by philosophers who felt that the narrow focus on individual welfare failed to address the concerns of environmentalists about pollution, biodiversity loss, habitat fragmentation, and so on. They advocated a holistic approach in which organisms are perceived as parts of a greater whole such as biotopes or ecosystems. The locus classicus of this holistic approach is A Sand County Almanac (1949) by Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), a famous nature conservationist who was strongly influenced by the science of ecology. The basic moral rule of his so-called land ethic goes as follows: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold 1949, p. 262). Around 1980, a fierce conflict erupted between individualistic animal ethicists and holistic environmental ethicists. Tom Regan maintained that as long as proper respect was shown for the rights of individuals, the biotic community would also be preserved, simply because this community is ultimately made up by individuals. Environmental ethicist Baird Callicott (1980) depicted this conviction as a certificate of “ecological illiteracy.” Animal ethicists make no distinction whatsoever between wild and domesticated species, between rare and common species, and between native and exotic species. According to Callicott, the moral worth of individuals is relative to be assessed in accordance with their particular relation to the collective entity which Leopold called “the land.” Tom Regan responded to this attack with the accusation that environmental ethicists were committing the crime of “environmental fascism” by subordinating the rights of individuals to the interests of the greater whole. “Environmental fascism and the rights view are like oil and water, they don’t mix” (1983, p. 362). Eight years after his frontal attack, Callicott (1989) offered individualistic animal ethicists an olive branch. As a compromise, he proposed to order one’s moral relations according to concentric circles. He now made a distinction between three different communities: the human community, the mixed community of humans and domesticated animals, and, finally, the wider biotic community that also includes wild animals. This attempt to reconcile individualistic animal ethics and holistic ecoethics through a theory of concentric circles comes down to a division of labor between three moral regimes: traditional, anthropocentric ethics is about humans and their relations to each other, zoocentric and biocentric ethics are about the well-being and the integrity of domesticated and cultivated species, and ecocentric ethics deals with wild species as members of the biotic community and as parts of the ecosystem. Climate Change and Global Justice A new impulse for environmental ethics is the all-pervasive problem of climate change. It permeates everyday actions in the West, such as eating meat and driving a car. It challenges environmental approaches to find the causes of climate change and, as a consequence, the proper allocation of responsibility for human actions that increase climate change. Responding to climate change requires huge investments in new technologies both to moderate and to accommodate climate change, and the main issue here is who is to bear the burden? (see also “▶ Climate Change, Page 5 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Ethics and Food Production”). Consider an issue that was already implicitly mentioned in the discussion about sustainability: is it ethically acceptable to put price tags on natural services to make clear what damage is being done and what repairs should be done? On various levels, the issue of “monetarization” or commodification plays a role: rich countries, for example, can satisfy their duty to compensate for increasing climate change by investing in climate neutral technologies in poorer countries, or individual countries can charge climate changers to pay for their role in climate change. Many will argue that this type of commodification is inappropriate, given the intrinsic value of nature, and that paying a price means degrading the climate as a common good; finally it motivates the rich to continue with their conduct and not to look after more sustainable patterns of behavior. There are also other arguments against pricing, including the fact that pricing requires a strict analytical approach to exactly delineate which elements and particular services of the environment are harmed and which are not. The itemization or disaggregating this requires is argued by many to require a slicing up of nature which is impossible; you cannot piece by piece unravel the threads of which nature’s network is composed (O’Neill, Holland and Light 2008). Methodological Approaches: Principalist, Virtue/Care, and Pluralist Value Approaches Next to this substantive grouping of approaches, a more methodological division is possible between fundamental or principalist positions, value- and experience-oriented positions, and pragmatist positions. In the first approach, the idea is that ethics should begin with identifying and justifying fundamental principles and obligations that can rightly claim universal respect and agreement. On the basis of these principles, people can then try to tackle more practical problems by applying them to local circumstances. The ideal principles function more or less as foundations but also as searchlights that assist in identifying the main bones of contentions. Utilitarians like Peter Singer (1975) and deontologists like Regan (1983) argue in this way. Regan, for example, argues for not interfering with animals on the basis of the principle of animal integrity. The principalist approach is helpful in delineating lots of possibilities but does not assist in procedural questions of discussing them, such as the selection of urgent topics, the procedure, and the type of information needed; moreover, it leaves out virtue ethics and long-term processes. The value-oriented approach, like the first two, is a top-down approach, starting with the right values and then delineating what a valuable agriculture could be (Sandler 2007). A kind of ideal picture is sketched, and concrete reality is measured according to that. However, there are other approaches that start with human experiences. Eco-phenomenology, based on phenomenology, studies the nature of humans’ and animals’ first-person experiences, which include moral feelings of the environment and behaviors with respect to it. Abrams (2010) delineates a primordial space of relationality in which beings become experiencing humans and animals. Environmental hermeneutics emphasizes the importance of narratives and stories that people tell (O’Neill, Holland and Light 2008). In the case of Hulme (2009), this line of thought is unpacked considering mass and social media myths. Another approach is the pluralist and democratic approach. This one starts with the practices in which people are involved and tries to find their standards of excellence and their aims, and on the basis of these values and norms, it searches for problems, inconsistencies, and failures and then develops improvements (O’Neill 2008; Keulartz et al. 2004; see also “▶ Environmental and Animal Pragmatism”). Although the other approaches can be used as searchlights in these processes, they are not used as principles. In the case of animals, it means that the a priori Page 6 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 abolitionist position of, for instance, Regan is rejected and one looks instead to practices in which human-animal relationships can flourish and that one tries to expand these: not leaving animals alone but living with them (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Harroway 2008). This approach has also a clear connection with the capabilities approach of Sen (2010), who stresses that the concept of justice can be given shape step by step in comparing different practices that promote the flourishing of the capabilities of people and nature. The Task of Environmental Ethics Environmental ethics has a difficult task: it not only requires the application of ethical principles, but it also requires extensive analysis in which technical details are to be taken seriously. During this process, cherished notions of fundamental, non-applied branches of philosophy, such as the radical distinction between humans and animals or between culture and nature, can turn out to be insufficient. The main tasks of environmental ethics are, first, to give a coherent overview of all the ethical problems people are confronted when dealing with environmental problems, such as pollution, habitat destruction, biodiversity loss, and climate change, and the preservation and conservation or construction of ecosystems. Therefore, environmental ethics is very much a collaborative endeavor with the environmental sciences, but it tries to do more than these particular disciplines in that it tries to unify all of different aspects of the problems and different levels of analysis. Second, environmental ethics explicates, analyzes, and evaluates the most relevant and important ethical issues. Again, it does this together with other disciplines, but it also maintains close contact with stakeholders, and so it can contribute to acceptable solutions. Third, environmental ethics can delve deeper by proposing and explicating ethical principles, norms, values, and meanings that are important in dealing with environment; analyzing cases is very helpful here. Finally, environmental ethics can contribute to the question of how to study the environment and so can help to improve the environmental sciences. Finally, “environment” is an essentially contested item, thoroughly impregnated with values and ethical questions. It cannot be studied in a neutral way, and ethics can help in analyzing its meaning. Just like in any other philosophical discipline, nothing is outside debate and unquestionable: controversies abound. However, within the arena of environmental ethics, there is one value that seems to be a fundamental assumption: the environment is an essential context for and element of human life. Many environmental ethicists want to argue for more than this and believe that the environment has an independent meaning which cannot be neglected. The environment covers relationships that one cannot annihilate; they require maintenance, exercise, and cultivation. When humans distance themselves too much from environmental relations, for example, when important elements of the environment are made of plastic or are only available through two-dimensional electronic screens, they are degrading these relations and themselves. Because humans always have multiple bodily and material meaning experiences of their environment, humans have to exercise the capacities that allow them to have these as much as possible in balance with other important capacities. As a matter of fact, these meanings are always culturally and socially differently shaped, but humans have to continuously learn to deal with those differences and to be sensitive to the relevant environmental problems and overlapping concerns. The bodily aspect of our relation to environment also implies that a sense of place, even in a mobile society, is important in connecting with landscapes and with the people one trusts. This anthropological insight could contribute to a better relationship with the environment: less spoilage, less waste, and less neglect. Page 7 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Environmental Ethics and Politics The rise of environmental ethics was accompanied by activism, by writing, by organization of sit-ins and boycotts, by initiating local conservation areas, by participating in social media, and by political action. The relation between environmental ethics and politics can be diverse and can be directed toward governments, farmers, corporations, and supermarkets. Moreover, these kinds of activism manifest themselves in the supermarket by urging for more and relevant information on the ecological footprint of products, where they come from, how they are made, and which ethical decisions are made in their production process. Political action can be so strong that governments are compelled to issue strict regulations or better oversight of existing regulations; some companies are playing a key role and business can in some cases be seen as a “green avant-garde.” Many citizens find it frustrating that environmental problems and solutions are not always a priority for political parties and so exercise their agency via traditional media, new social media, or directly via the civil society groups. Therefore, many ethical consumers become members of NGOs and other organizations when they want to contribute to “other regarding” political and ethical action. They contribute to these joint actions, although it is often not in their direct own interest, but in the interest of others, often people abroad. Environmental ethical activism is therefore more than citizen action, because it often transcends the borders of the nation-states to many areas in the world, like rainforests, tiger parks, and river deltas. Many activists act out a new kind of obligation, and in particular in acting together, they develop a first-person plural perspective of a group that act “vicariously” as advocates of silenced groups like next generations or nearly extinct animals. For ethicists engaged in controversial issues such as animal welfare or environmental degradation, it is not always easy to meet norms of scholarly integrity and to take the relevant aspects fairly into account. Pure neutrality in this field is impossible; however, the rules and values of good scholarship are clear for many, and upholding them can have a purifying and ideas generating effect. One of these values is the concrete engagement with practitioners and nature managers; here one learns what concrete problems arise in dealing with a certain ecosystem in which people have lived for a very long time. One learns to understand that these people often care very much about their surroundings and that environmental fundamentalism, which under all circumstances puts the environment first and gives the people living in it only an insignificant role, is a serious mistake. Ethics and Environmental Sciences The relationship between ethics and the environmental sciences is often described as a kind of normfact relation: the sciences deliver the facts and ethics develops principles and norms to act upon. Often, the deliverers of the facts, the scientists, are attributed also normative tasks in dealing with humans’ distorted relations with the earth (see “▶ Ecotopia”). Lewis Mumford writes “One of the major tasks of the twentieth century is the resettlement of the planet. The past three centuries have been centuries of random exploration . . . spontaneous and guided by insufficient knowledge; and much of the work of settlements to be done over again . . .. Population that spread with no more social direction than the surface tension which gives definition to an ink blot, must be re-grouped and nucleated in a fashion that will make possible a co-operative, civilized life. Industries . . . must now flow out into new centres . . . conscious scientific intelligence must determine the new loci of industrial advantage” (Mumford 1940, p. 388; Keulartz 1998). However, these scientistic proposals run several severe risks. First, the environmental sciences (like any science) suffer from controversies, and it requires normative assumptions to choose one party; second, societal processes have a logic of Page 8 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 their own and cannot change just because scientists say that they should. Moreover, environmental sciences incorporate values and normative assumptions that steer their research. So, there are perspectives that try to have a more critical and distanced relationship with the sciences and to look for a broad spectrum of inspiration, like social movements and various neglected social practices. Outlook: Future of Environmental Ethics One assumption of the environmental ethics of the eighties and nineties of the last century (in particular deep ecology, Naess 1989) was that the environmentalists of the West should have very strong opinions about the “wild” ecosystems in the South: they have to be preserved, and poor people that live in these areas are harming nature and should give way to, for example, nearly extinct species like tigers. It turns out that the opposite is true: poor people are much more dependent on regular ecosystem services, and as the Indian social ecologist Ramachandra Guha (1994) argues, environmental and human justice need to be brought in balance (see also “▶ Environmental Justice and Food”). The future of environmental ethics lies in a careful integration of global and local orientations, of natural and human values, and requires respecting the diversity of nature and humans and a sustainable form of agriculture. In particular, in Asia the challenges, especially those posed by climate change, are enormous and will require integrating population growth, increasing welfare, and growing demand for animal proteins on the one hand and nature conservation of huge areas with incredible ecosystems on the other. The Asian religious traditions, just like other movements, can be an inspiration. Finally, the stalemate between an environmentalism – which focuses on wild nature – and agriculture, which focuses on the expression of a so-called anthropocentric, dominating attitude, needs to be expanded to include more sophisticated approaches that consider the need of all humans to live well with food and nature. Summary Non-anthropocentrism is one of the main starting points in environmental ethics, and it implies that the moral domain covers not only humans but also animals and, depending on one’s outlook, species, ecosystems, and the land. According to transgenerational ethics, even future generations are considered to be moral objects, which raises the issue of balancing current generational interests with those of the future. Utilitarian and deontological perspectives will give different answers to these questions, as will egalitarian and hierarchical approaches. An important issue is what to do with endangered species and biodiversity protection. According to ecocentric ethics, the land requires priority vis-à-vis animal ethics. A recent and growing challenge is the relationship between climate change and global justice. From a methodological perspective, one can distinguish between principalist, virtue/care, and pluralist value approaches. The tasks of environmental ethics were discussed as well as the relationships between environmental ethics, politics, and the environmental sciences. References Abrams, D. (2010). Becoming Animal: An Earthly Cosmology. New York: Vintage. Bookchin, M. (1995). The philosophy of social ecology: Essays on dialectical naturalism. Montreal: Black Rose Books. Callicott, J. B. (1980). Animal liberation: A triangular affair. Environmental Ethics, 2, 311–388. Page 9 of 10 Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_260-3 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 Callicott, J. B. (1989). In defence of the land ethic. Albany: SUNY Press. Donaldson, S., & Kymlicka, W. (2011). Zoopolis, a political theory of animal rights. City: Oxford University Press. Guha, R. (Ed.). (1994). Social ecology. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Harroway, D. (2008). When species meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Hulme, M. (2009). Why we disagree about climate change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keulartz, J. (1998). The struggle for nature. A critique of radical ecology. London/New York: Routledge. Keulartz, J., Schermer, M., Korthals, M., & Swierstra, T. (2004). Ethics in a technological culture. 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