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Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation
Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation

Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation

Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation

Clarification on Feelings in Buddhist Dhyāna/Jhāna Meditation
Profile image of Tse-fu Kuan 關則富Tse-fu Kuan 關則富

2005, Journal of Indian Philosophy

In conclusion, we can accept the Aviparītaka Sūtra account that domanassa, dukkha, somanassa, sukha and upekkhā cease successively as one proceeds from lower to higher meditative attainments, and these five terms in this account are not different from those in the usual jhāna formula. It is not necessary to equate sukha of the first three jhānas to somanassa as the Theravādins do, or to identify sukha of the first two jhānas with prasrabdhi (a volitional formation, not a feeling) as the Sarvāstivādins do. Neither is it necessary to interpret upekkhā in the jhānas as a volitional formation as the two traditions do. The process of reducing feelings as prescribed in the scheme of jhāna conforms with what is stated in the Saḷāyatanavibhaṅga Sutta: first developing pleasant feeling and eliminating unpleasant feeling; then abandoning pleasant feeling and achieving upekkhā.

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Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33: 285–319 DOI 10.1007/s10781-004-7378-6  Springer 2005 TSE-FU KUAN CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST   DHYANA/JH ANA MEDITATION There are various schemes of the path to liberation found in the Buddhist canon. The most prominent scheme is probably the one centred on dhy ana (Pali jh ana) meditation, which consists of four levels of meditative attainment. Rahula (1980: 270) describes the four dhy anas/jh anas as ‘high mystic or spiritual states of concentration’. These states involve transformation of hedonic and affective experiences. Heiler (1922: 26) says that the jh anas are concerned with the reduction of feelings. Other scholars have also discussed feelings in the dhy anas/jh anas.1 They rely mostly or exclusively on the Pali sources of the Therav ada tradition, but there are different interpretations by other traditions, and even some accounts in the canons of different schools disagree with each other. There still remain problems regarding the order in which specific feelings fade away in different levels of jh ana meditation and problems about the nature of these feelings and the mental factors of jh ana that may be feelings. After discussing the main passages on feelings of jh ana in the earliest Buddhist texts, this essay will investigate the interpretations by three Buddhist schools and put forth my personal opinions. Confronted by the divergence among different traditions in their interpretations, this essay will attempt to find out the possibly earliest or authentic teachings on this subject and to elucidate their implications. My research will take account of the plausibility and coherence of doctrinal issues in the earliest texts on the presupposition that these texts are basically, although not totally, the record of the Buddha’s teachings. ACCOUNTS IN THE EARLIEST TEXTS The four main Nik ayas and some texts in the Khuddaka Nik aya of the Therav ada Canon in Pali are mostly attributed by the tradition to the 1 For example Cousins (1973: 125), Griffiths (1983: 59–61); Gunaratana (1985: 59ff.), Bucknell (1993: 380ff ). 286 TSE-FU KUAN Buddha himself or his immediate disciples with some degree of  certainty. The four Agamas preserved in Chinese translations, which correspond to the four main Nik ayas, also represent the earliest stratum of the Canon. These texts are what I mean by ‘the earliest  texts’. With the exception of a few sutras, their authority is recognised by all Buddhist schools.2 The scheme of dhy ana/jh ana is often described in the Nik ayas/  Agamas by the following formula (hereafter ‘the usual jh ana formula’), with some variations in wording in different contexts (Tr. an.amoli and Bodhi, 2001: 275f. Pali words in parentheses are Ñ mine.): Quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, he enters upon and abides in the first jh ana, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought (savitakkam aram . savic . ), with rapture (piti) and pleasure (sukha) born of seclusion. … Again, with the stilling of applied and sustained thought, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the second jhana, which has self-confidence and singleness of mind without applied and sustained thought, with rapture (piti) and pleasure (sukha) born of concentration. … Again, with the fading away as well of rapture (piti), a bhikkhu abides in equanimity (upekkhaka), and mindful and fully aware, still feeling pleasure with the body, he enters upon and abides in the third jh ana, on account of which noble ones announce: ‘He has a pleasant abiding who has equanimity (upekkhaka) and is mindful.’ … Again, with the abandoning of pleasure (sukha) and pain (dukkha), and with the previous disappearance of joy (somanassa) and grief (domanassa), a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the fourth jh ana, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and purity of mindfulness due to equanimity (upekkh a).3 According to the usual jh ana formula, piti (rapture) and sukha (pleasure) are both present in the first and second jh anas; piti fades away in the third jh ana; the fourth jh ana is free from sukha, dukkha (pain), somanassa (joy) and domanassa (dejection); upekkh a (equanimity) is present in the third and fourth jh anas. It is not clear when somanassa and domanassa disappear. The Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta in the Indriya Sam aya provides a different for. yutta of the Sam . yutta Nik mulation of this issue.4 This text says that the arisen dukkha faculty (dukkhindriya) ceases without remainder in the first jh ana; the arisen 2 Lamotte (1988: 152). e.g. M I 181–182; S V 307; A I 163–164; D I 73–75: vivicc’ eva k amehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi … catuttham anam upasampajja viharati. The full formula is . jh included in note 5. 4 I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for drawing my attention to this text. 3 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 287 domanassa faculty (domanassindriya) ceases without remainder in the second jh ana; the arisen sukha faculty (sukhindriya) ceases without remainder in the third jh ana; the arisen somanassa faculty (somanassindriya) ceases without remainder in the fourth jh ana; the arisen upekkh a faculty (upekkhindriya) ceases without remainder in the avedayitanirodha, a stage that goes beyond the jh anas and the saññ yutta Nik aya all four formless meditative attainments.5 In the Sam . 6 the above faculties are referred to as feelings (vedan a). In sutta 36 of the Indriya Sam . yutta (S V 209), the sukha faculty is defined as comfortable (s ata) bodily (k ayika) feeling; the dukkha faculty is defined as uncomfortable (as ata) bodily feeling; the somanassa faculty is defined as comfortable mental (cetasika) feeling; the domanassa faculty is defined as uncomfortable mental feeling. The upekkh a faculty is defined thus: ‘‘Whatever feeling there is, whether bodily (k ayika) or mental (cetasika), that is neither comfortable (s ata) nor a refers to uncomfortable (as ata).’’7 Accordingly, bodily upekkh bodily feeling free from sukha and dukkha, while mental upekkh a refers to mental feeling free from somanassa and domanassa. In the context of jh ana, dukkha probably means any unpleasant physical feelings such as those given by Spiro’s (1982: 55) Burmese informants, including pain and itching. Likewise, sukha probably means any pleasant physical feelings such as a feeling of lightness and a pervading warmth mentioned by Bucknell (1993: 391). Likewise, somanassa and domanassa may refer to any pleasant and unpleasant mental feelings respectively. 5  S V 213–215: idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicc’ eva kamehi vivicca akusalehi dha . vivekajam  . upasampajja mmehi savitakkam . savicaram . pitisukham . pat.hamam . jhanam viharati, ettha c’ uppannam . dukkhindriyam . aparisesam . nirujjhati. . . idha, bhikkhave,  anam  . vupasam   .  bhikkhu vitakkavicar a ajjhattam . sampasadanam . cetaso ekodibhavam  . samadhijam   . upasampajja viharati, avitakkam . avicaram . pitisukham . dutiyam . jhanam ettha c’ uppannam . domanassindriyam . aparisesam . nirujjhati . . . idha, bhikkhave, bhik a upekkhako ca viharati sato ca sampajano  sukhañ ca kayena  khu pitiya ca virag     pat.isam vedeti yam tam ariy a acikkhanti ‘upekkhako satim a sukhavih ar i ’ ti tatiyam . . . .  . upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannam jhanam . sukhindriyam . aparisesam . nirujjhati. . .  a dukkhassa ca pahan  a pubb’ eva somaidha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sukhassa ca pahan  . atthagama adukkhamasukham   nassadomanassanam arisuddhim . upekkhasatip . catut tham jh anam upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannam somanassindriyam aparisesam . . . . .  asaññ   nirujjhati. . . idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sabbaso nevasaññan ayatanam . sam atikkamma saññavedayitanirodham . upasampajja viharati, ettha c’ uppannam . upekkhindriyam . aparisesam . nirujjhati. 6  sukhindriyam S IV 232: katama ca, bhikkhave, pañca vedana? . , dukkhindriyam ., somanassindriyam . , domanassindriyam . , upekkhindriyam . . See also S V 209. 7 Tr. Bodhi (2000: 1681). S V 209: yam ayikam a cetasikam a n’ . kho bhikkhave k . v . v eva s atam as atam . n . vedayitam .. 288 TSE-FU KUAN There are some difficulties with what is said in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta: (1) Commenting on the statement that the domanassa faculty ceases in the second jh ana, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1935) says, ‘‘This seems difficult to square with the usual jhana formula, which indicates that the first jhana is already free from all unwholesome states, including domanassa.’’ This remark is in accordance with the facts that the usual jh ana formula says that one enters the first jh ana having been secluded from unwholesome states (vivicca akusalehi dhammehi … pat.hamam anam ana for. jh . upasampajja viharati), and that the jh mula is often preceded by a formula on sense restraint as a preliminary to the jh anas, which includes domanassa in evil 8 unwholesome states. (2) One feels sukha with the body in the third jh ana according to a.tika Sutta says that the usual jh ana formula,9 but the Uppat.ip the sukha faculty ceases in the third jh ana. Trying to make sense of this ‘paradox’, Ven. Bodhi (2000: 1935) says, ‘‘The pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) here is bodily pleasant feeling, not the happiness (also called sukha) the meditator is said to ‘experience with the body’ in the third jh ana.’’ In the . Vibhan ga, a Theravada Abhidhamma text, sukha in the expression ‘he feels sukha with the body’ is defined as mental pleasure, which is identical with the definition of somanassa in this text (will be discussed later); ‘the body’ is defined as the three incorporeal aggregates: the aggregate of apperception akkhandha), the aggregate of volitional formations (saññ (sam arakkhandha) and the aggregate of consciousness . kh ana is interan.akkhandha).10 Thus sukha in the third jh (viññ preted as mental feeling and ‘the body’ is interpreted as the ‘mental body’. In his Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa explains ‘he feels sukha with the body’ in the jh ana formula thus: Because he would feel sukha associated with his mental body (n amak aya), or because he would feel sukha while emerging from the jh ana as his 8 e.g. M I 180, 269; D I 70: abhijjh adomanass a p apak a akusal a dhamm a. sukhañ ca k ayena pat.isam vedeti. . 10 Vibh 259: sukhañ ca k ayena pat.isam . vedeti ti tattha katamam . sukham . ? yam . cet . . . . idam   asikam saññakkhandho, . satam . vuccati sukham . . tattha katamo kayo?  . akkhandho. sam viññan . kharakkhandho, 9 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 289 physical body would have been pervaded by the exceedingly excellent material arising from the sukha associated with his mental body.’11 Here Buddhaghosa was apparently hesitant about categorically explaining ‘the body’ as a mental body, and allowed it to be understood as a physical body. This reflects the difficulty in interpreting sukha of the third jh ana in the usual formula while accepting the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta account that the sukha faculty ceases in this jh ana. To take sukha in the third jh ana as a mental feeling seems to be the only way to explain why one can feel sukha in the third jh ana while there is no sukha (a bodily feeling) in the third jh ana according to the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta. Therefore, there have to be two kinds of sukha in the jh anas – a bodily one and a mental one. The problems with the Therav ada interpretation of sukha in the jh anas will be discussed in detail later. (3) The Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta says that the somanassa faculty ceases in the fourth jh ana, which implies that somanassa still exists before the moment of attaining the fourth jh ana. The usual jh ana formula, however, says that one enters upon the fourth jh ana ‘with the disappearance of somanassa and domanassa’ (pubbe va somanassadomanass anam a), which ap. atthagam parently means that one’s somanassa and domanassa already cease at some stage/stages before the fourth jh ana, which could be the third jh ana, second jh ana or even earlier.  Unfortunately, many sutras of the Indriya Sam . yukta, including the counterpart of the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, are missing in the Chinese  translation of the Sam but the foregoing account in this . yukta Agama, sutta is quoted in several later texts of various traditions in Chinese astra translation. For example, the *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ A pi tan gan lu wei lun), which is attributed to the ( Sarv astiv adins by Takakusu (1905: 139), states: ‘‘The dejection (*daurmansya, Pali domanassa) faculty ceases without remainder in the first dhy ana. The pain (*duh. kha, Pali dukkha) faculty ceases without remainder in the second dhy ana. The joy (*saumanasya, Pali somanassa) faculty ceases without remainder in the third dhy ana. The 11   Vism 163: yasma tassa namak ayena sampayuttam . sukham . , yam . va tam .     namak ayasampayuttam assa yasma atipan . sukham . , tam . samut..thanen’ . itena rupena  phut.o, yassa phut.atta jhan  a vut..thito pi sukham    ayo rupak aya . pat.isam . vedeyya. Namak  See Vism 598–  aya. refers to the mental aspect of an individual, as opposed to rupak 599. 290 TSE-FU KUAN pleasure (*sukha) faculty ceases without remainder in the fourth dhy ana.’’12 The same account13 is found in the *Tattvasiddhi (or Cheng shi lun) of the Dars.t.antikas or the *Satyasiddhi-s´ astra, 14  ( ac arabhumi Yu qie shi B ahuśrutyas, and also in the Yog di lun) of the Yog ac ara school.15 The *Tattvasiddhi indicates that it is   quotes it from the Avisaid in the ‘Sutra’ and the Yog ac arabhumi  ( paritaka Sutra Wu dao jing,).16 Part of the passage in question  is also cited in the Abhidharmakos´abh in the Aviparitaka Sutra a.sya:  ‘‘uktam a Aviparitakasutre tr.tiyam anam uktv a . hi bhagavat . dhy ‘atr asyotpannam saumanasyendriyam aparis´es am nirudhyata iti; . . . 17 caturthe ca dhy ane sukhendriyam . nirudhyata’ ity uktam.’’ (Ak-P 440) The order in which various feelings cease according to these texts does not agree with the order found in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta. Although these texts are later than the Pali Nik ayas,18 the account of the relationship between the faculties and the jh anas preserved in  these texts could date back to the time when the Agamas and the  Nik ayas were compiled in that it is cited from a ‘sutra’. This account (hereafter ‘Aviparitaka version’) appears to be more plausible than the account in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta (hereafter ‘Pali version’), for the foregoing three difficulties with the Pali version are not found in  account: the Aviparitaka Sutra (1) The Aviparitaka version says that domanassa ceases in the first jh ana. This conforms with the usual jh ana formula, according to which one is free from unwholesome states, including domanassa, when entering the first jh ana. (2) According to the Aviparitaka version, the bodily feeling sukha is expected to be still present in the third jh ana. This tallies with the usual jh ana formula, and so there is no need to 12 T 28, 979b: T 32, 285b: Here the duh . kha faculty and the second dhy ana are not mentioned. 14 antikas according It was composed by Harivarman, who belonged to the D ars.t. to Lü (1982: 172) or to the Sautr antikas according to Ven. Yinshun antika-D ars.t. (1968: 574), but to the Bahuśrutiyas according to Buswell and Jaini (1996: 94). 15 T 30, 331a: . I am grateful to Mr Yuwen Yang and Mr Kin-tung Yit for the above references to the relationship between the faculties and the jh anas. 16 T 30, 331a: (‘‘As Bhagavat says thus in the Avi paritaka Sutra.’’). 17 I am grateful to Mr L.S. Cousins for this reference. 18 astra, which is dated to The earliest among them is the *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ the first half of the second century A.D. by Kritzer (1996: 489). 13 291 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST postulate a mental sukha apart from the sukha faculty, a bodily sukha. (3) According to the Aviparitaka version, somanassa and domanassa disappear at the stages before the fourth jh ana. This conforms with the description of the fourth jh ana in the usual jh ana formula. (For a comparison of the usual jh ana formula with the passage in  question in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta and Aviparitaka Sutra see Table 1.) However, there is an apparent contradiction between the Aviparitaka version and the usual jh ana formula. In the usual jh ana formula, the expression ‘with the abandoning of sukha and dukkha … a bhikkhu enters the fourth jh ana’ seems to suggest that one abandons both sukha and dukkha at the moment of entering the fourth jh ana, whereas according to the Aviparitaka version dukkha already ceases in the second jh ana. A similar paradox was discussed by the later Buddhist literature. I shall investigate how various Buddhist schools interpret the above mental factors of jh ana as found in the later literature, and will return to this paradox. TABLE 1 Comparison of the usual jh ana formula with the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta and Aviparitaka  Sutra usual jh ana formula 1st jhana Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta Avipar ataka  Sutra Present Abandoned Abandoned Abandoned piti sukha akusala-dhammas (including domanassa) dukkha domanassa 2nd jhana piti sukha domanassa dukkha 3rd jhana sukha upekkh a piti sukha somanassa 4th jhana upekkh a sukha, dukkha (somanassa domanassa abandoned previously) somanassa sukha 292 TSE-FU KUAN EXEGESES BY LATER BUDDHIST LITERATURE The literature that will be discussed here concerns the opinions of the Therav adins, Sarv astiv adins and Sautrantikas.19 The Theravada literature referred to here includes the canonical Abhidhamma works and the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa, which is closely connected to the Nik aya-commentaries, and seems to quote from the old commentaries more extensively than the extant commentaries do.20 The Sarv astiv ada works that I will use fall into the following three categories: (1) The [Abhidharma]Dharmaskandha[p ada-s´ astra] ( A pi da mo fa yun zu lun), one of the canonical Abhidharma works. ana(2) The Vibh a.sa literature as the commentary on the Jñ prasth ana, the last canonical work of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma. According to the tradition, the Vibh a.sa along anaprasth ana was compiled 500 years after the with the Jñ Buddha’s death or during the reign of King Kanis.ka.21 As followers of the Vibh a.sa, the orthodox Sarvastivadins in Kashmir are called the Vaibhas.ikas. There are three versions of the Vibh a.sa extant in Chinese translations: (i) the *Vibh a.saPi po sha lun) translated by Sam ghabhadra s´ astra ( . et al. in 383 A.D.; (ii) the *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra A pi tan pi po sha lun) translated by Bud( dhavarman in 437–439 A.D.; (iii) the *AbhidharmaA pi da mo da pi po sha mah avibh a.sa-s´ astra (  lun, or the *Mah avibh a.sa) translated by Xuanzang in 656–659 A.D.22 The first translation is only a partial translation,23 and its discussion of our topic seems incomplete. The third translation appears to be based on a rather late version since 19 While Sautrantika is generally considered to be a school that developed within the Sarvastivada sect, Kritzer (2003: 201–202) emphasises that it is not a sect. He indicates: ‘‘Cox suggests that the term may be better understood as referring to a variety of ideas that deviate from mainstream Sarv astiv ada, not to a consistent and formal school.’’ 20 Von Hinüber (1997: 125). 21 Willemen et al (1998: 116–117), Kragh (2002: 149). Kanis.ka is dated approximately 128–151 A.D. by Lamotte (1988: 585). 22 Willemen et al. (1998: 118). 23 Yinshun (1968: 208), Kragh (2002: 149). CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 293 the influence of the Mahayana may be noticed there.24 Therefore, I will mainly use the second translation. (3) The Hr.daya treatises as summary digests of non-Vaibhas.ika Sarv astiv ada doctrine: (i) the *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ astra A pi tan xin lun) by Dharmaśres.t.hin (Dharmaśr) ( around the beginning of the third century A.D.; (ii) the Za a pi tan xin lun) *Sam abhidharmahr.daya ( . yukt by Dharmatr ata in the beginning of the fourth century A.D.;25 astra ( (iii) the *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ A pi tan gan lu wei lun) by Ghos.aka in the second century A.D.26 Ven. Yinshun (1968: 493ff.) demonstrates that the *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ astra is based on this text, which will also be referred to in my discussion below. As to the Sautr antika views, I shall refer to the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya by Vasubandhu in the fourth or fifth century A.D. Although this treatise describes itself as ‘‘a presentation of the Abhidharma as taught by the Vaibhas.ikas’’, its author has evident sympathies for the Sautratikas.27 Sukha The Therav adins differentiate between the sukha faculty (sukhindriya) . and sukha as a jh ana factor (an ga), which refers to the sukha mentioned in the usual jh ana formula. As a jh ana factor, sukha is defined . thus in the Vibhan ga, a Theravada Abhidhamma text: ‘‘That which is mental ease, mental pleasure, easeful pleasant experience born of mental contact, easeful pleasant feeling born of mental contact. This is called pleasure.’’28 This definition is exactly the same as the definition of the somanassa faculty (Vibh 123), while the sukha faculty is defined thus: ‘‘That which is bodily ease; bodily pleasure; easeful pleasant experience born of bodily contact; easeful pleasant feeling 24 Willemen et al. (1998: 119). Dessein (2003: 291–292), Kragh (2002: 149–150). 26 Kritzer (1996: 489), Kragh (2002: 150). 27 de La Vallée Poussin (1988: 3). 28 Tr. Thit.t.ila (2002: 335). Vibh 257–259 (para. 567, 578 and 587 for the first,  . cetasikam second and third jh anas respectively): yam . cetasikam . satam . sukham .  . sukham  a sukha vedana,  idam cetosamphassajam . satam . vedayitam . cetosamphassaja sat . vuccati sukham .. 25 294 TSE-FU KUAN born of bodily contact.’’29 In other words, sukha in the first three jh anas as stated in the usual jh ana formula is in fact somanassa, mental pleasant feeling, not the sukha faculty. The sukha faculty which is said to cease in the third jh ana in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta is a bodily pleasant feeling. By inference, the sukha faculty is present before one enters the third jh ana, that is to say in the second jh ana and even the first jh ana. If this is the case, in the first two jh anas there is the sukha faculty as bodily feeling and the sukha as a jh ana factor, which is a mental one. Making such a distinction between mental sukha and bodily sukha can avoid the following contradiction: Sukha exists in the third jh ana according to the usual jh ana formula, whereas the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta says that the sukha faculty ceases in the third jh ana. Here arises a question: Which jh ana or jh anas have the sukha faculty? The Visuddhimagga says that the sukha faculty can arise in ana proper because in the third jh ana access,30 but not in the third jh the third jh ana the condition for the sukha faculty, piti, has ceased entirely.31 We can infer from this that the sukha faculty is present in the first two jh anas because piti is there. If so, the first two jh anas have two kinds of sukha: a mental one and a bodily one! However, the . Dhammasan gan.i, the first book of the Theravada Abhidhamma, dose not include the sukha faculty in the list of the mental factors of the first two jh anas.32 After all, it does not seem very clear how the Therav adins associate the sukha faculty with jh ana meditation. The usual jh ana formula speaks of the abandoning of sukha and the previous disappearance of somonassa in its description of the . fourth jh ana. The Vibhan ga explains sukha here as the sukha faculty and somonassa as the somanassa faculty. We can find a confusion in . the Vibhan ga interpretation of the four jh anas: Sukha in the first three jh anas refers to the somanassa faculty, while sukha mentioned in the 29   . kayikam   Tr. Thit.t.ila (2002: 161). Vibh 123: yam . kayikam . satam . sukham . kayas . sukham   a sukha vedana,  idam amphassajam a sat . satam . vedayitam . kayasamphassaj . vuccati sukhindriyam .. 30 The later Pali literature makes a distinction between full jh ana or complete concentration (appan a) and access concentration (upac ara-sam adhi), the preliminary stage of concentration preceding appan a. See DOP s.v. appan a and upac ara; Gethin (1998: 177). 31 Vism 166. 32 Dhs §§160, 161. CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 295 fourth jh ana refers to the sukha faculty,33 and somanassa mentioned in the fourth jh ana is identical with sukha in the first three jh anas. Therefore, in the fairly short usual jh ana formula the very same term changes its meaning, and can even mean the same as another term in the formula! The Sarv astiv adins also distinguish the sukha faculty from sukha as a jh ana factor, but in a different manner from the Theravadins. According to the *Vibh a.sa-s´ astra, sukha of the first two dhy anas as described in the usual dhy ana formula refers to pleasure as tranquillity (*prasrabdhi-sukha), and belongs to the aggregate of volitional formations (*sam ara-skandha).34 Another Sarvastivada . sk work, the *Sam abhidharmahr.daya, also says that sukha in the . yukt first dhy ana is pleasure as *prasrabdhi rather than pleasure as feeling (*vedan a).35 The Dharmaskandha, a canonical Sarvastivadin Abhidharma text, explains ‘he feels sukha with the body’ in the third dhy ana thus: ‘‘The body refers to the ‘body of the mind’ (*manask aya). Because the sukha feeling is present in the body of the mind, the body made of the four great elements also becomes comfortable.’’36 The text indicates that this sukha is sukha as feeling (vedan a), not sukha as astivada distinction of sukha in the three prasrabdhi.37 The Sarv dhy anas is made clear in the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya: ‘‘Why is sukha in the third dhy ana said to be a different thing? Because it is sukha as feeling (vedan asukha), whereas [sukha] in the first two dhy anas is sukha as tranquillity (prasrabdhisukha).’’38 Accordingly, the Sarvastivadins also deny that sukha as a dhy ana factor of the first three dhy anas is the same as the sukha faculty, the bodily feeling. Moreover, they even deny that sukha in the first two 33 This shift is recognised by Gunaratana (1985: 95): ‘‘Now the sukha spoken of as a factor of the first three jh anas is mental pleasant feeling, that is, somanassa or joy. … But in the fourth jh ana description the sukha which is said to be abandoned as a pre-requisite for the jh ana has undergone a shift in meaning: it now signifies bodily pleasure or physical happiness.’’ 34 T 28, 484b: ... 35 T 28, 924b: 36 T 26, 484b: See also *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra (T 28, 312c: ). 37 T 26, 484b: Both and are standard translations of prasrabdhi. 38 Ak-P 438: kasm at tr.tiye dhy ane sukham antaram ucyate? yasm at tad . dravy vedan asukham anayos tu prasrabdhisukham adyayoh.. . . dhy 296 TSE-FU KUAN dhy anas is feeling (vedan a). The reason is given in the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya: Because the sukha faculty does not apply to the [first] two dhy ana attainments. For the bodily [sukha] does not apply to the two [dhy anas]. Because the [five]39 classes of consciousness is absent in one who has attained absorption. Neither is [sukha of the first two dhy anas] a mental one because priti (rapture) is mentioned [there]. For priti is saumanasya (joy), and there is no coexistence of sukha and saumanasya. Neither can they arise alternately in those two dhy anas because the five factors40 are mentioned [with reference to the dhy anas].41 It is necessary to elucidate what bodily feeling and mental feeling refer to here. The translation of a later version of the *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra, the *Mah avibh a.sa,42 explains bodily feeling as feeling based on the five classes of consciousness, and mental feeling as feeling based on the ground of mind (*mano43  The five classes of consciousness refer to the five kinds bhumikatva). of consciousness conditioned by the first five sense organs in Buddhist classification of psychology, with the sixth consciousness, the mindconsciousness, being excluded. Since the first five sense organs (the eye, ear, nose, tongue and the tactile organ) are related to the physical body, feeling based on the five classes of consciousness is regarded as bodily. On the other hand, feeling based on the ‘sixth sense’, the mind (manas), is mental. 39 The word ‘five’ (pañca) is not found in the two editions of the text available to me (Ak-P 438; Ak-S 1142), but it occurs in both Chinese translations of the text (T 29, 147a: T 29, 298b: ). Without the word ‘five’, the sentence would mean that one who has attained absorption has no consciousness, which definitely does not apply to the dhy anas. Moreover, pañca is found in a passage in the  in a similar context: m Arthavinis´caya-sutra anasam ayikam, . sukham abhipretam . na k sam apannasya pañcavijñ anak ay abh av at. (Avs 184–185) This text is attributed by Santati to the Sarvastivada ‘‘in a broader sense comprising the doctrines, categories and controversies of both the Vaibh a.sika and the Sautr antika schools’’ (Avs: Introduction 137–140). He says that the compilation of this text might have commenced before the first century B.C. (Avs: Introduction 65). 40 The five factors refer to vitarka, vic ara, priti, sukha and cittaik agrat a (Ak-P 437). This passage implies that all the five factors arise simultaneously, and never alternately. 41 Ak-P 438: dvayor dhy anasam apattyoh. sukhendriy ayog at. na hi tat tayoh. k ayikam . yujyate. sam apannasya [pañca]vijñ anak ay abh av at. n api caitasikam at. pritir . pritivacan hi saumanasyam. na ca sukhasaumanasyayor yaugapadyam asti. na c api tayoh. par_ y ayen.a dhy ane vr.ttir yukt a pañc angavacan ad iti. 42 The fourth to eighth chapters, or skandhas, are missing in the translation of the *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra, but are preserved in the translation of the later version. The passage referred to here is cited from the fourth chapter. 43 T 27, 599a: CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 297 The Sarv astiv adins maintain that sukha in the first two dhy anas cannot be a feeling, whether bodily or mental. It cannot be a bodily feeling since the five classes of consciousness related to the body do not work in one who has attained absorption, including dhy anas. Neither can it be a mental feeling because the first two dhy anas have priti, which is identified with saumanasya by the Sarvastivadins, and they contend that sukha cannot coexist with saumanasya. The reason why they cannot coexist is not clear. Xuanzang’s new translation of the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya reads: ‘‘Because two feelings cannot function simultaneously in a single mind.’’44 This probably means that it is impossible for two mental feelings to coexist. There is no priti, i.e. saumanasya, in the third dhy ana, so sukha as a mental feeling can exist there. Here sukha is a mental feeling since the five classes of consciousness related to the body do not work in absorptions, and it is felt with the ‘body of the mind’ (*manask aya) as mentioned above. Here arises a question: In none of the first three dhy anas is sukha as a dhy ana factor a bodily pleasant feeling, or the sukha faculty. The  Aviparitaka Sutra account, which is acknowledged by the Sarvastiv adins, says that the sukha faculty ceases in the fourth dhy ana. This implies that the sukha faculty is present in the third dhy ana, or even lower levels of dhy ana. Which levels have the sukha faculty according adins? There is no simple answer. The *Mah avibh a.sa astiv to the Sarv says that the sukha faculty only exists in the realm of sense-desire, the astra also first and the third dhy anas.45 The *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ 46 mentions the sukha faculty in the first and third dhy anas. Here the sukha faculty in the first dhy ana is said to be a bodily feeling,47 but the sukha faculty in the third dhy ana is said to be based on the ground of mind-consciousness (*manovijñ ana).48 This implies that the sukha faculty in the third dhy ana refers to sukha as a factor of the third dhy ana for both are dependent on the sixth sense, the mind (manas). Therefore the sukha faculty in the third dhy ana is a mental feeling,  whereas the sukha faculty according to the Aviparitaka Sutra is a bodily feeling. Apart from this inconsistency, the *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ astra’s account that ‘‘the sukha faculty in the first dhy ana is a bodily feeling’’ 44 45 46 47 48 T T T T T 29, 27, 28, 28, 28, 147: 464a: 823c: 823c: 823c: ... 298 TSE-FU KUAN apparently contradicts the Sarvastivada view that the five classes of consciousness related to the body do not work in on who has attained absorption, including the first dhy ana, so there is no bodily feeling. The even earlier text, the *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ astra, also says that in the first dhy ana there is the sukha faculty associated with three classes of consciousness, namely the eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness and body(tactile organ)-consciousness.49 This implies that the sukha faculty in the first dhy ana is a bodily feeling. The reason is that although the Sarv astivadins hold that the five classes of consciousness do not work in one who has attained the dhy anas in meditation, they contend that one who has been reborn in the first dhy ana as heaven50 can have four kinds of consciousness. This is astra’s exposition of the first implied in the *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ ) before saying, dhy ana, which mentions the ‘Brahma world’ ( ‘‘The first dhy ana has fourfold mind: the eye-consciousness, earconsciousness, body(tactile organ)-consciousness, and mind-consciousness.’’51 The sukha faculty is associated with the first three kinds of consciousness related to the body as mentioned above. Similarly, the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya explicitly states: ‘‘There are three feelings with regard to rebirth in the first dhy ana: sukha is 52 associated with three classes of consciousness; …’’ In the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya, ‘others’ (apare) refute the foregoing views that sukha of the first two dhy anas is prasrabdhi and sukha of the third dhy ana is mental feeling. This refutation is attributed to the .54 As mentioned Sautr antikas by Yaśomitra53 and Puguang above, the author of the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya has evident sympathies for the Sautr atika opinions. This text reads: ‘‘Others said, ‘In the three dhy anas there is no mental sukha faculty at all, but only . bodily sukha is established as a factor (an ga)’.’’55 Thus the Sautrantikas identify the sukha faculty with sukha as a factor of the first three dhy anas, and regard it as only bodily, not mental. Then they rebut the 49 T 28, 975a: There is a correspondence between Buddhist cosmology and meditative states. See below. 51 T 28, 823c: 52 Ak-P 442: prathamadhy anotpattau tisro vedan a.h: sukham anak ayikam . trivijñ . … 53 Akvy 673. 54 T 41, 423a-b. 55 Ak-P 439: apare punar ahuh asty eva caitasikam . : n . sukhendriyam . tris.v api hi _ . vyavasth dhy anes.u, kayikam eva sukham angam apitam iti. 50 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 299  authenticity of a sutra (attributed to the Sarvastivadins by Puguang56) that defines the sukha faculty as pleasant bodily and mental feeling:57 This text is interpolated. Why? (1) Because in all other schools the text only reads ‘bodily’. (2) And because the [canonical] statement in its own words is ‘‘And he feels sukha with the body (k ayena)’’. If [one interprets ‘with the body’ as]: ‘‘with the body of the mind’’ (manask ayena), what merit [should be] by saying so?58 As Yoshifumi (2003: 322–324) points out, the name ‘Sautrantikas’ come from their position towards the scripture on which they depend  most, i.e. the sutras, and they recognise the authority of the Vinaya as  well as sutras, but do not recognise the authority of the Abhidharastra. The Sautr antikas, sticking to the earliest canonical texts, mas´ reject the Sarv astiv ada theory that sukha as a factor of the third dhy ana is a mental feeling which is to be experienced by the ‘body of the mind’. It is obvious that the Sautrantika opinion also disagree ada view that sukha in the third dhy ana is a mental with the Therav feeling which is to be experienced by the three incorporeal aggregates or is associated with the ‘mental body’ (n amak aya) as mentioned above. The Sautr antikas also criticise the Sarvastivadins for interpreting sukha in the first two dhy anas as prasrabdhi (tranquillity), saying, ‘‘Sukha is not stated in the fourth dhy ana, where prasrabdhi is anas even greater.’’59 This implies that if sukha in the first two dhy referred to prasrabdhi, the even higher degree of prasrabdhi in the fourth dhy ana would also be referred to as sukha, but sukha is not there  according to the usual dhy ana formula and the Aviparitaka Sutra. The Sautr antikas object that the five kinds of consciousness related to the body are absent in one who has entered dhy anas and consequently bodily feeling is also absent. They say, ‘‘If [the Sarvastivadins ask]: ‘How is there bodily consciousness in one who has attained absorption?’ [There is bodily consciousness] because the body is pervaded by the wind which is born of special concentration, which is named prasrabdhi and to be felt as sukha.’’60 For the Sautrantikas it is not a 56 T 41, 423b.  uktam Ak-P 439: sutra ayikam atam . ‘‘sukhendriyam . katamat? yat … k . caitasikam . s . veditam …’’ iti. . 58 Ak-P 439: adhy aropita es.a p at.hah.. ken api? sarvanik ay antares.u k ayikam ity eve p a.th at. ‘‘sukham ayena pratisam ac ca. mana. ca k . vedayata’’ iti svas´abdena vacan skayeneti cet, evam uktv a ko gun ah ? . . 59  Ak-P 439: caturthe dhy ane prasrabdhibhuyastve ’pi sukh avacan ac ca. 60 Ak-P 439: sam apannasya katham ayavijñ anam iti cet. sam adhivis´es.ajena pras. k rabdhisam ayun a k ayaspharan . jñakena sukhavedaniyena v . at. 57 300 TSE-FU KUAN problem to have bodily sukha in the dhy anas as they do not accept that the five classes of consciousness pertaining to the body are absent in one who enters the dhy anas. Like the Sarvastivadins, a Theravada Abhidhamma text, the Kath avatthu, holds that the five senses do not work in ayas suggest that the first three formless the jh anas.61 However, the Nik attainments, which are higher than the jh anas, are to be perceived by a mind free from the functioning of the five senses.62 There does not seem to be any passage in the earliest texts saying that the five senses or the five classes of consciousness stop working in the jh anas. Therefore, the Sautr antikas may be right in arguing that there is bodily consciousness and hence bodily sukha in the first three dhy anas. To sum up, the Sautr antikas only recognise sukha mentioned in the three dhy anas as bodily feeling, and identify it with the sukha faculty, and thus avoid those complexities and even contradictions found in the Sarvastivada ada exegeses. Their understanding of sukha of the dhy anas and Therav  accords with both the usual jh ana formula and the Aviparitaka Sutra account. The views of different schools compared with the usual jh ana  are summarised in Table 2. formula and the Aviparitaka Sutra Somanassa and piti The Sarv astiv adins hold that the saumanasya faculty is present in the first two dhy anas, but not in the others.63 This is in accordance with  the Aviparitaka Sutra account, which says that the saumanasya faculty ceases in the third dhy ana. The *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra64 and the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya even equate priti of the first two dhy anas to the saumanasya faculty.65 It is notable that priti also ceases in the third dhy ana according to the usual jh ana formula. The  *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra explicitly states that priti belongs to the aggregate of feeling (*vedan a-skandha).66 . In contrast, a Theravada Abhidhamma text, the Dhammasan gan.i (§§ 160, 161, 163), includes the somanassa faculty in the mental factors . of the first three jh anas. This conforms with the Vibhan ga, which 61 Kv XVIII 8, p. 572. M I 293; A IV 426-427. 63 e.g. *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ astra (T 28, 975a); *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ astra (T 28, 823c). 64 T 28, 312 a, b: Both priti and saumanasya are translated as but they can be distinguished from the contexts. 65 Ak-P 440: pritir eva saumanasyam .. 66 T 28, 312 a, b: 62 301 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST TABLE 2 Three schools’ interpretations of sukha compared with canonical passages usual jh ana formula 1st jhana 2nd jh ana 3rd jh ana 4th jh ana sukha sukha sukha felt with the body sukha is abandoned sukha faculty ceases Aviparitaka Sutra  sukha as mental Theravada (where sukha feeling = faculty exists somanassa is not clear) sukha as mental feeling = somanassa sukha as mental feeling (= somanassa) felt with the 3 mental khandhas; sukha faculty ceases Sarvastivada 1) sukha = prasrabdhi „ feeling 2) sukha faculty = bodily feeling sukha = prasrabdhi „ feeling sukha faculty = mental feeling felt with manask aya or based on manovijñ ana Sautrantika sukha faculty as bodily feeling sukha faculty as bodily feeling sukha faculty as bodily feeling sukha as bodily feeling is abandoned defines sukha of the first three jh anas as somanassa (see above). On the other hand, this is also in accordance with the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, which says that the somanassa faculty ceases in the fourth jh ana. As discussed above, this account is difficult to square with the usual jh ana formula’s description of the fourth jh ana. The foregoing is summarised in Table 3. While the Sarv astiv adins contend that priti belongs to the aggregate of feeling, piti (= Skt priti) is classified under the aggregate of volitional formations (sam arakkhandha) in the Theravada . kh . Abhidhamma, e.g. the Dhammasan gan.i §§62, 148, etc. The Visuddhimagga explicitly states that piti of the first two jh anas is included in 67 the aggregate of volitional formations. In the earliest texts, how. 67 Vism 145: sam arakkhandhasan gahit a piti. Vism 158: pitisukhan ti idam . kh . vuttanayam eva. 302 TSE-FU KUAN TABLE 3 Two schools’ interpretations of somanassa and piti Usual jh ana formula 1st jhana 2nd jhana 3rd jhana priti & sukha exist priti & sukha exist priti fades away sukha exists Aviparitaka  Sutra saumanasya ceases Sarvastivada saumanasya = saumanasya = priti priti Theravada somanassa = sukha Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta somanassa = sukha 4th jhana sukha ceases somanassa = sukha sukha ceases somanassa ceases ever, piti is apparently regarded as a feeling. For example, when the 16 exercises of the an ap anasati are correlated to the four establishments of mindfulness (satipat.t.h ana), the exercise ‘‘He trains thus: ‘I will breathe in experiencing piti’; he trains thus: ‘I will breathe out experiencing piti’.’’ (pitipat.isam ami ti sikkhati, . vedi assasiss pitipat.isam ved i passasiss a m i ti sikkhati) is assigned to contemplation . a of feelings.68 Another example can be found in sutta 29 of the Vedan Sam yutta, a chapter of the Sam yutta Nik a ya devoted to the discus. . sion of feeling (vedan a). Here piti, sukha and upekkh a that arise in dependence on sensual pleasure are called worldly (s amisa) piti, worldly sukha, and worldly upekkh a; piti in the first and second jh anas is unworldly (nir amisa) piti; sukha in the first, second and third jh anas is unworldly sukha (S IV 235–236). It is evident that piti, along with sukha and upekkh a, is treated as a feeling since these three are discussed in the same manner in this text.69 The Sarvastivadins are right in classifying priti under the aggregate of feeling, but there does not seem to be any support from the earliest texts for their argument that priti refers to the saumanasya faculty. 68 e.g. M III 84, S V 323–324. Although worldly liberation (vimokkha) and unworldly liberation, etc. are also discussed in this text, they are treated in a different way and cannot be seen as feelings. 69 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 303 Upekkh a/upeks.a In the later Therav ada literature a distinction is made between upekkh a as feeling (vedanupekkh a) and upekkh a as specific neutrality a of the (tatramajjhattupekkh a);70 specific neutrality includes upekkh third and fourth jh anas71 and is placed under the aggregate of volitional formations (sam arakkhandha).72 It is necessary for the . kh adins to interpret upekkh a of the third jh ana as something Therav . distinct from feeling, since according to their Vibhan ga, sukha of the third jh ana is the same as somanassa (see above),73 which is ayas do speak of incompatible with upekkh a as feeling.74 The Nik 75 a as specific neuupekkh a as feeling, but do not mention upekkh trality or sam ara. The second book of the Pali Abhidhamma, the . kh . Vibhan ga, is perhaps the first text to define upekkh a of the third and fourth jh anas as something similar to specific neutrality stated in the later literature: ‘‘What is upekkh a? That which is upekkh a, upekkhan a (also meaning ‘equanimity’), supreme upekkhan a, neutrality of mind.’’76 Such a definition, however, is not found in the first book . of the Pali Abhidhamma, the Dhammasan gan.i, which makes mention of upekkh a only as feeling. In this text upekkh a and the upekkh a faculty are both defined as mental (cetasika) neutral feeling, neither pleasant nor unpleasant.77 In other words, they refer to the feeling . free from somanassa and domanassa. In the Dhammasan gan.i §165, upekkh a and the upekkh a faculty (upekkhindriya) are included in the mental factors of the fourth jh ana, but neither upekkh a nor the 70 Literally ‘neutral therein upekkh a’. Ven. Ñ an.amoli (1975: 167) translates it as ‘equanimity as specific neutrality’. C.A.F. Rhys Davids translates tatramajjhattat a as ‘balance of mind’, ‘mental equipoise’ (Aung, 1910: 230). I follow Ven. Ñ an.amoli’s translation. 71 e.g. Vism 161. Here jh anupekkh a refers to the upekkh a of the third jh ana, and p arisuddhupekkh a refers to the upekkh a of the fourth jh ana. Both are said to be the same as tatramajjhattupekkh a. 72 Aung (1910: 229 – 230) and Gethin (2001: 157). 73 According to the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, the somanassa faculty ceases in the fourth jh ana. This also implies that somanassa is present in the third jh ana. 74 This is suggested by Gunaratana (1985: 90 – 91): ‘‘The statement that both happiness and equanimity are present in the third jh ana might create the impression that two different feelings are present simultaneously. Such confusion is due to misinterpreting this equanimity as equanimous feeling (vedan’ upekkh a).’’ 75 e.g. S IV 232; S V 209. 76 Vibh 261: y a upekkh a upekkhan a ajjhupekkhan a majjhattat a cittassa. 77 Dhs §§ 153, 154: cetasikam atam as atam . neva s . n . cetosamphassajam . adukkhamasukham a adukkhamasukh a vedan a. . vedayitam . cetosamphassaj 304 TSE-FU KUAN upekkh a faculty is included in the mental factors of the first, second, or even third jh anas in §§160, 161 and 163, presumably because these sections include somanassindriya in these three jh anas.78 Since somanassa is incompatible with upekkh a, the Dhammasagan.i has to exclude upekkh a from the first three jh anas.79 Similar omission of upekkh a is found in Sutta 29 of the Vedan a Sam . yutta (S IV 237), which explains unworldly upekkh a as the upekkh a in the fourth jh ana without mention of the third jh ana. But according to the Sam . yukta  Agama preserved in Chinese translation, ‘unworldly80 *upeks.a’ refers to the upeks.a in the third dhy ana, while that in the fourth dhy ana is called ‘unworldly unworldly81 *upeks.a’.82 The omission of unworldly upekkh a in the third jh ana in the Pali version is perhaps also influenced by the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, according to which the third jh ana still has somanassa, which is incompatible with upekkh a. In summary, upekkh a of the third and fourth jh anas found in the usual jh ana formula is interpreted by the Theravadins as ‘upekkh a as specific neutrality’ (belonging to sam arakkhandha), whereas . kh upekkh a as feeling (or the upekkh a faculty) only exists in the fourth jh ana according to this school. Therefore, the fourth jh ana has two different types of upekkh a, as Gunaratana (1985: 99) has pointed out. Similarly, the Sarv astivadins also posit two kinds of upeks.a with regard to the dhy anas. In its interpretation of the fourth dhy ana, the astra says that upeks.a here refers to upeks.a as a *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ volitional formation (*sam aropeks.a).83 Even upeks.a of the third . sk dhy ana, along with the fourth dhy ana, is also said to be upeks.a as a volitional formation in the later version of this text, the *Mah avibh a.sa.84 As for the upeks.a faculty, it is present in all the four . Likewise, the Vibhan ga identifies sukha of the first three jh anas as somanassa. Moreover, the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta says that somanassa ceases in the fourth jh ana, and so implies that somanassa exists in the first three jh anas. 79 It can also be inferred from Dhs §§1, 146, 147, 150, 156 and 157 that somanassa and upekkh a do not coexist. 80 , literally ‘non-food’, *nir amis.a. 81 This probably means ‘even more unworldly’. 82 T 2, 123b: 78 83 T 28, 313a: Although the term ‘fourth dhy ana’ does not occur here, the lemmas are from the description of the fourth dhy ana in the usual dhy ana formula. 84 T 27, 416c: . . .. CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 305 TABLE 4 Two schools’ interpretations of upekkh a 1st jhana 2nd jhana Theravada Sarvastivada (Mah avibh a.sa) upeks.a faculty upeks.a faculty 3rd jhana 4th jhana upekkh a as sam ara . kh 1. upekkh a as sam ara . kh 2. upekkh a faculty 1. upeks.a as sam ara . sk 2. upeks.a faculty 1. upeks.a as sam ara . sk 2. upeks.a faculty dhy anas according to the *Mah avibh a.sa.85 The *Abhidharmahr.dayas´ astra (T 28, 823c) and *Sam abhidharmahr.daya (T 28, 924c), . yukt however, only mention the upeks.a faculty in the first three dhy anas. It seems surprising that the Sarv astiv adins believe that the upeks.a faculty is present in the first two dhy anas, considering that saumanasya (= priti according to them) exists there. This is explained in the astra in its exposition of the second dhy ana: *Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ ‘‘Secluded from vitarka-vic ara, one has manifold mind: sometimes one enters the saumanasya faculty, and sometimes enters the upeks.a faculty.’’86 In other words, the saumanasya faculty and the upeks.a faculty arise alternately, and therefore they can ‘both exist’ in the second dhy ana. The same theory is probably also intended to apply to the first dhy ana although the text does not specify. The opinions of the two schools can be summarised in Table 4. Just as in their interpretations of sukha, the Theravadins and Sarv astiv adins also distinguish between upekkh a as a jh ana factor and the upekkh a faculty, but still the two schools do not agree with each other. As demonstrated above, the Sautrantikas refute such a ‘differentiating’ approach and identify the sukha faculty with sukha as a jh ana factor in accordance with the earliest texts. Unfortunately, the Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya does not discuss the Sautrantika view on this topic. It does not interpret upeks.a as a dhy ana factor to mean upeks.a as a volitional formation, nor does it mention the upeks.a faculty in its discus85 T 27, 463a: 86 T 28, 823c: dharmahr.daya (T28, ). 924c: See also *Sam abhi. yukt 306 TSE-FU KUAN sion of dhy ana. It only mentions upeks.a in the lists of factors of the third ana formula only mentions and fourth dhy anas,87 just as the usual jh upekkh a in the third and fourth jh anas. Therefore, it is possible that Vasubandhu does not accept the way in which the Sarvastivadins interpret upeks.a of the dhy anas. Here I would like to propose a possibly more plausible interpretation of upekkh a in the jh anas by elucidating the earliest texts through those texts themselves. This might be called  the ‘Sautr antika’ approach, i.e. taking sutras/suttas as criteria. Since there is no passage in the earliest texts that defines upekkh a of jh ana as sam kh a ra and distinguishes it from the upekkh a faculty . (belonging to vedan a), let us assume that upekkh a mentioned in the usual jh ana formula is identical with the upekkh a faculty, and try to find out if this hypothesis makes sense. As mentioned above, according to the earliest texts, upekkh a can be either bodily or mental: bodily upekkh a is free from sukha and dukkha, while mental upekkh a is free from somanassa and domanassa. The usual jh ana formula first mentions upekkh a in its adjective form upekkhako in the third jh ana. Since sukha, bodily feeling, is present in the third jh ana, the upekkh a  referred to here cannot be bodily. According to the Aviparitaka Sutra account, domanassa ceases in the first jh ana and somanassa ceases in the third jh ana. Therefore, when one enters the third jh ana, one has neither domanassa nor somanassa. In other words, one achieves mental upekkh a in the third jh ana. We can infer from the Aviparitaka  Sutra account that somanassa exists in the first two jh anas88 and prevents the arising of mental upekkh a. Since the first three jh anas have sukha, they must be devoid of bodily upekkh a. This can explain why the usual jh ana formula makes no mention of upekkh a in the first two jh anas as there is neither mental nor bodily upekkh a there, but it mentions upekkh a in the third jh ana as there is mental upekkh a. The uaual jh ana formula speaks of upekkh a again in the fourth jh ana. Since sukha as well as dukkha is abandoned in the fourth jh ana  according to the usual jh ana formula and the Aviparitaka Sutra account, the fourth jh ana is devoid of not only somanassa and domanassa, but also dukkha and sukha. Therefore, upekkh a here can 87 Xuanzang uses (*sam aropeks.a) to translate upeks.a in the lists of factors . sk of the third and fourth dhy anas (T 29, 146c: ... . . .), but the Sanskrit original only has upeks.a instead of artha (T 29, 298a) translates sam aropeks.a (Ak-P 438, Ak-S 1140-1141). Param . sk (*upeks.a) rather than (*sam aropeks.a). Xuanzang’s translation may have been . sk influenced by his understanding of the Sarv astiv ada interpretation. 88 As mentioned above, both the Therav adins and Sarv astiv adins accept that somanassa exists in the first two jh anas. CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 307 TABLE 5 Interpretation of upekkh a according to the earliest texts 1st jhana 2nd jhana 3rd jhana 4th jhana Abandoned Present domanassa dukkha somanassa sukha dukkha, sukha, somanassa sukha, somanassa sukha, mental upekkh a mental upekkh a, bodily upekkh a refer to both mental and bodily neutral feeling. In conclusion, the  Aviparitaka Sutra account on the feelings fits in very well with the usual jh ana formula, and so upekkh a in the usual jh ana formula may refer to the upekkh a faculty, and there seems to be no need to interpret upekkh a in the usual jh ana formula as something other than feeling (like sam kh a ra) and distinct from the upekkh a faculty. The . above points I made are summarised in Table 5. Domanassa and Dukkha  While recognising that ‘the sutra’ (Aviparitaka version) says that the daurmanasya faculty ceases in the first dhy ana and that the duh. kha faculty ceases in the second dhy ana, the *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra holds that both faculties cease when one is secluded from desire (*k ama),89 which is elsewhere referred to as desire in the realm of sense-desire (*k amadh atu).90 In other words, for the Sarvastivadins these two feelings disappear as soon as one has escaped from the realm of sense-desire and attained the dhy anas, equivalent to the  realm of form (rupadh atu), or has attained even higher meditative  states called ‘formless attainments’ ( arupyasam apatti), equivalent to  the formless realm (arupadh atu).91 According to this Sarvastivada opinion, duh. kha is already abandoned at the moment of entering the  first dhy ana, whereas the Aviparitaka Sutra says that the duh. kha faculty ceases in the second dhy ana, which implies that duh. kha still exists in the first dhy ana. The *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra proposes four interpretations to reconcile this apparent contradiction. In striking contrast with a Theravada explanation stated later, the last 89 90 T 28, 313b: T 28, 313b: T 28, 313a: In Buddhism, there is a correspondence between cosmology and states of mind, including those meditative states. See Gethin (1998: 119ff). 91 308 TSE-FU KUAN interpretation is noteworthy: ‘‘Here vitarka-vic ara is spoken of as duh. kha. The noble people form the conception of duh. kha in regard to vitarka-vic ara.’’92 Therefore, the duh. kha faculty exists in the first dhy ana since vitarka-vic ara is present there, and ceases in the second dhy ana as vitarka-vic ara is abandoned. As mentioned above, there is a paradox between the usual jh ana  formula and the Aviparitaka Sutra account: the former mentions ‘with the abandoning of sukha and dukkha’ in the fourth jh ana, whereas the latter says that dukkha ceases in the second jh ana. Facing a similar paradox, the *Abhidharmavibh a.sa-s´ astra raises this question: ‘‘When secluded from the desire of the realm of sense-desire, the practitioner has already abandoned the duh. kha faculty. Why does [the usual jh ana formula] mention the abandoning of duh. kha when one is secluded from the desire of the third dhy ana93?’’94 Five reasons are given here. The second one seems quite plausible: Because ‘the pair is abandoned absolutely’ is meant here. Duh . kha and sukha are a 95 pair. Although duh . kha and sukha are abandoned when one is secluded from the desire [of the realm of] sense-desire, sukha is not absolutely abandoned. When one is secluded from the desire of the third dhy ana, sukha is absolutely abandoned.96 The same reason can be used to explain why the duh. kha faculty ceases  in the second dhy ana according to the Aviparitaka Sutra, while the usual jh ana formula mentions the abandoning of dukkha in the attaining of the fourth jh ana. Likewise, in this formula somanassa and domanassa also form a pair, and their previous disappearance (pubbe va somanassadomanass anam a) is also mentioned in the . atthagam fourth jh ana. These expressions emphasise that the fourth jh ana represents a state free from any pleasant and unpleasant feelings, whether bodily (sukha, dukkha) or mental (somanassa, domanassa). As for the Therav ada school, the Visuddhimagga holds that the dukkha faculty ceases in the first jh ana, in accordance with the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta. It says that the dukkha faculty has absolutely 92 T 28, 313c: ‘Secluded from the desire of the third dhy ana’ means surmounting the third dhy ana and entering the fourth dhy ana. 94 T 28, 313a: . 95 This sukha is not found in the later translation, the *Mah avibh a.sa: ‘‘Although duh . kha ceases when one is secluded from [the realm of] sense-desire, sukha does not yet cease.’’ (T 27, 417a-b: ). Sukha in the earlier translation is probably redundent. 96 T 28, 313a: 93 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 309 TABLE 6 Two schools’ interpretations of dukkha and domanassa 1st jhana 2nd jhana Usual jh ana formula 3rd jhana 4th jhana dukkha ceases Aviparitaka  Sutra daurmanasya ceases duh . kha ceases Sarvastivada duh . kha exists = vitarkavic ara (or duh . kha ceases) duh . kha ceases as vitarkavic ara ceases Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta dukkha ceases domanassa ceases Theravada domanassa exists, conditioned by vitakka-vic ara domanassa ceases as vitakka-vic ara ceases ceased during the first jh ana as the practitioner’s body is showered with sukha due to pervasion by piti.97 This implies that piti and sukha of the first jh ana do not allow the presence of the dukkha faculty. Also following the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, the Visuddhimagga explains why the domanassa faculty ceases in the second jh ana by arguing that the domanassa faculty only arises when there are bodily fatigue and mental injury, which have vitakka-vic ara as their condition, and so the domanassa faculty may arise in the second jh ana access when its condition, vitakka-vic ara, is not abandoned, but it ceases in the second jh ana for vitakka-vic ara is absent there.98 Therefore, the domanassa faculty is causally associated with vitakka-vic ara, which is present in the first jh ana, and is abandoned in the second jh ana. This interpretation is in sharp contrast with the foregoing Sarvastivada interpretation which associates the duh. kha faculty, rather than the domanassa faculty, with vitarka-vic ara. The two schools’ interpretations of dukkha and domanassa can be summarised Table 6. 97  sukhokkanto hoti, sukhokkantakayassa  Vism 166: pitipharan ca . ena sabbo kayo sut..thu niruddham . hoti dukkhindriyam .. 98  upac  pahinassa pi domanassindriyassa yasma etam  are Vism 166: dutiyajjhan .    ca sati uppajjati. vitakkavitakkavicarapaccaye pi kayakilamathe cittupaghate  abh  ave  ca neva uppajjati. yattha pana uppajjati, tattha vitakkavicarabh   vicar ave,  upac  vitakkavicar  a ti tatth’ assa siya uppatti, na tv eva  are appahina eva ca dutiyajjhan  pahinapaccayatta.  dutiyajjhane, 310 TSE-FU KUAN EXAMINATION OF THE TWO SCHOOLS’ EXEGETIC APPROACHES It would be worthwhile to have a review of the above interpretations by the Therav adins and Sarvastivadins and examine their exegetic approaches. When some terms in the canon occur in contexts that contradict their particular tenets or even passages of their own canon, they often assign these terms new attributes that can, as it were, avoid contradiction. For example, since the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta says that the sukha faculty (bodily feeling) ceases in the third jh ana, the Therav adins are forced to identify sukha of the third jh ana with somanassa, metnal feeling, and to interpret the ‘body’ that feels this sukha as the three mental aggregates. In a similar way, the Sarvastivadins have to interpret sukha of the first two dhy anas as prasrabdhi rather than feeling because of their tenets that the five classes of consciousness do not work in the dhy anas and that sukha as feeling cannot coexist with priti, which they identify with saumanasya. Although such an approach can avoid certain contradictions, it creates more problems as have been demonstrated above. Another approach they use is to associate the faculties of feeling with the jh ana factors that cease simultaneously with them. Since the order in which the faculties cease differs in different traditions, the way in which they associate the faculties with the jh ana factors is also different. Therefore, the Therav adins say that domanassa is conditioned by viara. takka-vic ara, but the Sarvastivadins equate duh. kha to vitarka-vic adins identify saumanasya with priti, whereas astiv Similarly, the Sarv adins maintain that piti is the condition for the sukha faculty the Therav as bodily feeling, so the sukha faculty ceases in the third jh ana when piti ceases. Interestingly, they use the same approaches to interpret the earliest texts, but sometimes reach different conclusions. SOME PERSONAL VIEWS BASED ON THE EARLIEST TEXTS  From the above discussion it is clear that the Aviparitaka Sutra account, rather than the Pali version, fits in quite well with the usual jh ana formula, and there is no need to distinguish the sukha faculty and upekkh a faculty from sukha and upekkh a in the usual jh ana  formula. The Aviparitaka Sutra account provides us with a clear order in which feelings are reduced in jh ana meditation. This account is largely in accordance with the order implied in the usual jh ana formula, although they seem to disagree as to in which jh ana is CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 311 dukkha abandoned. As discussed above, there could be no contradiction at all in the light of a Sarvastivada interpretation.  also provides a more reasonFurthermore, the Aviparitaka Sutra able order with regard to the relationship between different feelings. In his discussion of vedan a, Johansson (1979: 88) notes that a distinction between the mere reception of sensation and the subjective reaction to it was made in Buddhism. This point is illustrated very well in sutta 6 of the Vedan a Sam . yutta, in which the Buddha says, ‘‘Monks, when an uninstructed ordinary person comes into contact with a painful feeling, he sorrows, distresses himself, laments, weeps beating his chest, and becomes bewildered. He feels two feelings: a bodily one and a mental one.’’99 The bodily feeling is compared to a stab by a dart, while the mental feeling is compared to a further stab by a second dart.100 In this statement the bodily feeling refers to the original painful feeling (dukkha) he experiences, which is the mere reception of sensory data, while the mental feeling refers to the subsequent subjective reaction to the original feeling, and is probably expressed in this sutta by the words ‘he sorrows, distresses himself’. This sutta says that the instructed noble disciple only feels the bodily feeling, not the mental one.101 The original feeling may be intrinsic, as it were, in the sensory data, just like the pain felt when a man is struck by a dart. While the original feeling is inevitable, the secondary mental feeling can be avoided. According to sutta 36 of the Indriya Sam . yutta (S V 209), the sukha faculty and dukkha faculty are bodily feelings; the somanassa faculty and domanassa faculty are mental feelings; the upekkh a faculty can be either bodily or mental feeling. Therefore sukha and dukkha in the jh anas may correspond to the original bodily feelings in the Vedan a Sam . yutta, while somanassa and domanassa may correspond to the secondary mental feelings. It is plausible that the secondary mental feelings can be surmounted before their corresponding original bodily feelings are surmounted, for the latter are more intrinsic. Therefore domanassa (mental displeasure) ceases before dukkha (bodily dis99  bhikkhave, puthujjano dukkhaya  vedanaya  phut..tho samano  S IV 208: assutava. . ikandati sammoham apajjati.  socati kilamati paridevati urattal so dve vedana vedayati  kayikañ ca cetasikañ ca. 100 S IV 208: seyyath a pi bhikkhave purisam . sallena vijjheyyum . , tam enam . dutiyena sallena anuvedham . vijjheyyum .. 101   vedanaya  phut..tho S IV 209: sutava ca kho bhikkhave ariyasavako dukkhaya  na socati na kilamati na paridevati na urattal . ikandati na sammoham apajjati.  samano  so ekam . vedanam . vedayati kayikam . , na cetasikam .. 312 TSE-FU KUAN pleasure), and somanassa (mental pleasure) before sukha (bodily pleasure). This does not mean that all somanassa and domanassa are related to sukha and dukkha, but only indicates that bodily feelings (sukha and dukkha) may exist without being accompanied by secondary mental feelings (somanassa and domanassa) as stated in sutta 6 of the Vedan a Sam . yutta. This can be illustrated by the following examples. In the first jh ana, a practitioner may feel dukkha (unpleasant physical feeling) in his legs due to sitting for a long time, but he will not feel domanassa (unpleasant mental feeling) in reaction to such dukkha as he would if he were in a normal state of mind. In passing to the second jh ana even dukkha is no longer felt. Throughout the first three jh anas he can feel sukha (physical pleasure). In the first two jh anas he can feel somanassa as a secondary feeling in reaction to such physical pleasure, but on entering the third jh ana, he overcomes somanassa while still experiencing that physical pleasure. Even the physical pleasure is abandoned when he attains the fourth jh ana. The process of jh ana meditation involves reducing feelings, and therefore achieving upekkh a, a state free from pleasant and un. pleasant feelings. The Sal.ayatanavibhan ga Sutta of the Majjhima Nik aya (M III 217–219) expounds somanassa, domanassa and upekkh a based on the household life as opposed to those based on a based on absence of desire.102 Somanassa, domanassa and upekkh the household life must only exist in an ordinary state of mind, while somanassa and upekkh a in the jh anas must belong to somanassa and upekkh a based on absence of desire. As mentioned above, in the Vedan a Sam a that arise in dependence . yutta, piti, sukha and upekkh on sensual pleasure are called worldly piti, worldly sukha, and worldly upekkh a; piti in the first two jh anas is unworldly piti; sukha in the first three jh anas is unworldly sukha; upekkh a in the third and fourth jh anas is also unworldly. Here worldly upekkh a corresponds to upekkh a based on the household life, while upekkh a in the third and fourth jh anas corresponds to upekkh a based on absence of desire. By 102 Ñan.amoli and Bodhi (2001: 1067ff.) translate nekkhamma as ‘renunciation’. PED (s.v. nekkhamma) takes this word as a derivation from nikkhamma (gerund of nikkhamati), equivalent to Sanskrit *nais.kramya, and gives a meaning ‘renunciation’. On the other hand, PED suggests that nekkhamma may be a bastard derivation from nikk ama (= Sanskrit *nais.k amya), which means ‘desireless’, but the form should be nekkamma. In his discussion of this term, Gethin (2001: 192) argues: ‘‘[T]here appears to be no clear reason for thinking nekkhamma – as well as *nekkamma – cannot stand for *nais.k amya.’’ The Chinese translation is ‘absence of desire’ ( T 1, 692c–693b), which supports the latter etymological explanation. I am grateful to Dr Gethin for indicating to me the problems with this term. CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 313 analogy, somanassa in the jh anas must be unworldly and refer to somanassa based on absence of desire rather than that based on the household life, and may correspond to unworldly piti according to the Sarv astiv adins as discussed above. These points together with the  Aviparitaka Sutra account can be shown in the following chart (factors in bold type are to be surmounted in the next jh ana): ordinary state: domanassa (worldly and unworldly), worldly somanassa, worldly piti, worldly sukha, worldly upekkh a, dukkha first jh ana: dukkha, unworldly somanassa, unworldly piti, unworldly sukha second jh ana unworldly somanassa, unworldly piti, unworldly sukha third jh ana: unworldly sukha, unworldly upekkh a (mental) fourth jh ana unworldly unworldly upekkh a (both mental and bodily) . In the Sal.ayatanavibhan ga Sutta the Buddha exhorts the monks 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. to abandon somanassa based on the household life depending on somanassa based on absence of desire, to abandon domanassa based on the household life depending on domanassa based on absence of desire, to abandon upekkh a based on the household life depending on upekkh a based on absence of desire, to abandon domanassa based on absence of desire depending on somanassa based on absence of desire, to abandon somanassa based on absence of desire depending on upekkh a based on absence of desire.103 by by by by by This passage can provide an explanation for the purpose of jh ana meditation with regard to feelings. When one attains the first jh ana, one has developed unworldly somanassa based on absence of desire, 103 M III 220: 1. y ani cha nekkhammasit ani somanass ani t ani niss aya t ani agamma y ani cha gehasit ani somanass ani t ani pajahatha, t ani samatikkamatha ... 2. y ani cha nekkhammasit ani domanass ani t ani niss aya t ani agamma y ani cha gehasit ani domanass ani t ani pajahatha, t ani samatikkamatha ... 3. y a cha nekkhammasit a upekkh a t a niss aya t a agamma y a cha gehasit a upekkh a t a pajahatha, t a samatikkamatha ... 4. y ani cha nekkhammasit ani somanass ani t ani niss aya t ani agamma y ani cha nekkhammasit ani domanass ani t ani pajahatha, t ani samatikkamatha ... 5. y a cha nekkhammasit a upekkh a t a niss aya t a agamma y ani cha nekkhammasit ani somanass ani t ani pajahatha, t ani samatikkamatha.... 314 TSE-FU KUAN which counteracts worldly somanassa based on the household life in an ordinary state of mind (point 1). This unworldly somanassa of the first jh ana also counteracts unworldly domanassa (point 4), which has counteracted worldly domanassa (point 2). In the third jh ana, unworldly somanassa is abandoned due to unworldly upekkh a (point 5). All these feelings can be considered to be emotions, and upekkh a is the supreme state of emotion that should be developed. Griffiths (1983: 61) describes upekkh a as ‘a psychological condition opposed to any kind of extreme emotional reaction, either pleasant or unpleasant’. Likewise, C.A.F. Rhys Davids indicates that upekkh a dividing somanassa and domanassa is emotional (Aung, 1910: 230). She translates upekkh a as ‘emotional indifference’ (1931: 166) or ‘emotional neutrality’ (1931: 35) in the context of the jh anas. As Spiro (1982: 48) notes, upekkh a is ‘the only emotional state ultimately valued by nibbanic Buddhism’.104 Piti can also be regarded as an emotion. This is how Rhys Davids (1974: 9) comments on piti: ‘‘It connotes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling.’’ Similarly, Guenther (1974: 124) translates priti as ‘ecstatic emotivity’. In the course of jh ana meditation, one first develops unworldly pleasant feelings and abandons worldly pleasant feelings as well as unpleasant feelings. As one proceeds to higher levels of jh ana, even unworldly pleasant feelings, from emotions to bodily feelings, are gradually abandoned. When the emotional elements, unwordly piti and somanassa, are abandoned in the third jh ana, the practitioner achieves the supreme affective state, upekkh a. In the fourth jh ana, even unworldly sukha is eliminated, and therefore upekkh a is even ‘purer’,105 as it is free not 104 Aronson (1979: 6) interprets Spiro’s remark as ‘the destruction of emotion’. In the usual jh ana formula, the fourth jh ana is described as upekkh asatip arisuddhi. The commentary on the Majjhima Nik aya takes p arisuddhi (purity) to apply to both upekkh a and sati: ‘‘Purity of mindfulness means pure mindfulness. Equanimity is also pure equanimity.’’ (Ps IV 90: satip arisuddhi ti parisuddh a sati yeva. upekh a pi parisuddh a upekh a). The Sarv astiv adins also say that the fourth dhy ana consists of four factors, including purity of equanimity (upeks.aparis´uddhi) and purity of mindfulness (smr.tiparis´uddhi). See the *Mah avibh a.sa (T 27, 412a) and Ak-P 438. Accordingly, upekh asatip arisuddhi should be translated as ‘purity of equanimity and of mindfulness’. This seems plausible since both sati and upekkh a are mentioned in the third jh ana, and thus the term upekh asatip arisuddhi might be intended to indicate that these two factors are both further elevated, or . ‘purer’, in the fourth jh ana. However, the Vibhan ga regards upekh a as the cause of satip arisuddhi: ‘‘By this equanimity, this mindfulness is uncovered as pure and clean. Therefore this is called upekh asatip arisuddhi’’ (Vibh 261: ayam aya upekh aya . sati im vivat.a hoti parisuddh a pariyod at a. tena vuccati upekh asatip arisuddhin ti). 105 CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 315 only from emotional disturbance, but also from the disturbance of bodily feelings. Thus proceeding through the four jh anas involves a reduction in affective and hedonic experiences to a state of equanimity, upekkh a. CONCLUSION  The foregoing passage of the Aviparitaka Sutra preserved in the Sanskrit and Chinese literature provides a plausible account of the order in which specific feelings cease in different jh anas, which fits in quite well with the usual jh ana formula. Its Pali counterpart in the Uppat.ip a.tika Sutta, however, contradicts the usual jh ana formula in three respects and has caused difficulties to Theravada exegesis. Similarly, some doctrines of the Sarvastivada Abhidharma also contradict the usual jh ana formula. The two schools use the same approaches to iron out their respective contradictions, but by so doing they get into other inconsistencies and complexities, and unsurprisingly the two schools sometimes arrive at different conclusions although using the same approaches. In contrast, the Sautr antika interpretation of sukha appears to be consistent with the  earliest texts. Such a ‘Sautrantika’ approach, i.e. taking sutras as criteria, adopted by this essay shows that the earliest accounts suffice to elucidate each other regarding the issue of feelings in jh ana, and that a plausible and consistent interpretation can be drawn from the earliest texts rather than from some later literature. In conclusion, we  can accept the Aviparitaka Sutra account that domanassa, dukkha, somanassa, sukha and upekkh a cease successively as one proceeds from lower to higher meditative attainments, and these five terms in this account are not different from those in the usual jh ana formula. It is not necessary to equate sukha of the first three jh anas to somanassa as the Therav adins do, or to identify sukha of the first two jh anas with prasrabdhi (a volitional formation, not a feeling) as the Sarvastivadins do. Neither is it necessary to interpret upekkh a in the jh anas as a volitional formation as the two traditions do. The process of reducing feelings as prescribed in the scheme of jh ana conforms with what is . stated in the Sal.ayatanavibhan ga Sutta: first developing pleasant feeling and eliminating unpleasant feeling; then abandoning pleasant feeling and achieving upekkh a. 316 TSE-FU KUAN ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my gratitude to Mr L.S. Cousins for directing me to many useful sources and giving me his invaluable advice. I would also like to thank Dr William Pruitt and the reviewer of this journal for their suggestions, which enabled me to improve this essay. REFERENCES Primary Sources References to Pali texts are to the Pali Text Society editions. Abhidharmakos´abh a.sya (see Ak-P, Ak-S). ). T 28, 809a*Abhidharmahr.daya-s´ astra (A pi tan xin lun 833b. *[Abhidharma]mah avibh as.a[s´ astra] (A pi da mo da pi po sha lun ). T 27, 1a-1004a. ). *Abhidharm amr.ta(rasa)-s´ astra (A pi tan gan lu wei lun T 28, 966a-980b. ). T 28, *Abhidharmavibh as.a-s´ astra (A pi tan pi po sha lun 1b-414c. . An guttara Nik aya  (see Avs). Arthavinis´caya-sutra . Dhammasan gan.i. ). T 26, 453bDharmaskandha (A pi da mo fa yun zu lun [ 513c. Digha Nik aya. (a Chinese commentary on the AbhidharmakoJu she lun ji ). T 41, 1a-452b. s´abh a.sya by Puguang Kath avatthu. Majjhima Nik aya.  ). T 2, 1a-373b. Sam (Za a han jing . yukta Agama ). T 28, *Sam yukt a bhidharmahr daya (Za a pi tan xin lun . . 869c-965c. Sam aya. . yutta Nik ). T 32, *Tattvasiddhi (or *Satyasiddhi-s´ astra, Cheng shi lun 239a-373b. . Vibhan ga. ). T 28, 416a-523b. astra (Pi po sha lun *Vibh a.sa-s´ Visuddhimagga.  (Yu qie shi di lun Yog ac arabhumi ). T 30, 279-881c. CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 317 Secondary Sources and Translations Aronson, Harvey B. (1979). ‘Equanimity (Upekkh a) in Therav ada Buddhism’, Studies in Pali and Buddhism (pp. 1–18). Delhi: B.R. Publishing Corporation. Aung, Shwe Zan (tr.) (1910). Compendium of Philosophy. London: Pali Text Society. Bodhi, Bhikkhu (tr.). (2000). The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. Oxford: Pali Text Society. Bucknell, Roderick S. (1993). ‘Reinterpreting the Jh anas’. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 16(2), 375–409. Buswell, Robert E. Jr. & Jaini, Padmanabh S. (1996). ‘The development of Abhidharma philosophy’. In Karl H. Potter, (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies Vol. VII: Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (pp. 73–119). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Cousins, L.S. (1973). ‘Buddhist Jh ana: Its nature and attainment according to the Pali sources’. Religion 3, 115–131. Dessein, Bart (2003). ‘Sautrantika and the Hr.daya treatises’. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26(2), 287–319. Gethin, R.M.L. (1998). The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gethin, R.M.L. (2001). The Buddhist Path to Awakening, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. (First published by E.J. Brill 1992) Griffiths, Paul (1983). ‘Buddhist Jh ana: A form critical study’. Religion 13, 55–68. Guenther, Herbert V. (1974). Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma. Berkeley: Shambhala publications. Gunaratana, Henepola (1985). The Path of Serenity and Insight. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Heiler, Friedrich (1922). Die Buddhistische Versenkung. München: Verlag von Ernst Reinhardt. von Hinüber, Oskar (1997). A Handbook of P ali Literature. 1st Indian ed. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd. (First published 1996, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co). Johansson, Rune E.A. (1979). The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism. Oxford: Curzon Press. Kritzer, Robert (1996). ‘Ghos.aka, Abhidharm amr.ta’. In Karl H. Potter (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. VII: Abhidharma Buddhism to 150 A.D. (pp. 489–509). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Kritzer, Robert (2003). ‘General introduction’. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26(2), 201–224. Kragh, Ulrich (2002). ‘The extant Abhidharma-literature’. The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 3, 123–167. Lamotte, Étienne (1988). History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origin to the S´aka Era, translated from the French by Sara Webb-Boin. Louvain: Peeters Press. de La Vallée Poussin, Louis (tr.) (1988). Abhidharmakos´abh a.syam, Volume I, English translation by Leo M. Pruden. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press. Lü, Cheng (1982). Yin du fo xue si xiang gai lun (An In. troduction to Indian Buddhist Thought). Taipei: Ñan . amoli, Bhikkhu (tr.) (1975). The Path of Purification, 3rd ed. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Ñan . amoli, Bhikkhu & Bodhi, Bhikkhu (tr.) (2001). The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, revised edition. Oxford: Pali Text Society. (First published 1995, Somerville: Wisdom Publications). Rahula, Walpola (1980). ‘Psychology of Buddhist Meditation’, Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Me´langes offerts à Mgr Étienne Lamotte. (pp. 267–279). Louvain-laNeuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste. 318 TSE-FU KUAN Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (1931). Sakya or Buddhist Origins. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. Rhys Davids, C.A.F. (1974). A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, 3rd ed. London: Pali Text Society. (First published 1900). Spiro, Melford E. (1982). Buddhism and Society, 2nd, expanded edition. Berkeley: University of California Press. (1st edition 1970). Takakusu, J. (1905). ‘The Abhidharma literature of the Sarv astiv adins’. Journal of the Pali Text Society 1904–1905, 67–146. . Thit. t.ila, Pat.hamakyaw Ashin (tr.) (2002). The Book of Analysis (Vibhan ga). Oxford: Pali Text Society. (First published 1969). Willemen, Charles, Dessein, Bart & Cox, Collett (1998). Sarv astiv ada Buddhist Scholasticism. Leiden: Brill. Yinshun (1968). Shuo yi qie you bu wei zhu de lun shu yu lun shi zhi yan jiu astrak aras astras and the Ś (A Study on the Ś principally of the Sarvastivada School). Taipei: . Yoshifumi, Honj o (2003). ‘The word Sautr antika’. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26(2), 321–330. ABBREVIATIONS . A An guttara Nik aya Ak-P Abhidharma-kos´abh a.sya, ed. P. Pradhan, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.  arya Vasubandhu with Ak-S Abhidharmakos´a & Bh a.sya of Ac  Sphut.arth a Commentary of Ac arya Yas´omitra, ed. Swam Dw arik ad as Ś astr, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1987. Akvy Sphut.arth a Abhidharmakos´avy akhy a by Yaśomitra, ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo: The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyakhya, 1932–1936.  and Its Commentary (Nibandhana), ed. Avs The Arthavinis´caya-sutra N.H. Santati, Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971. D Digha Nik aya. . Dhs Dhammasan gan.i. DOP A Dictionary of P ali, ed. Margaret Cone, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001. Kv Kath avatthu. M Majjhima Nik aya. PED The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, London: Pali Text Society, reprinted 1986. (First published 1921–1925).  i (Commentary on the Majjhima Nik Ps Papañcasudan aya). Skt Sanskrit. S Sam aya. . yutta Nik CLARIFICATION ON FEELINGS IN BUDDHIST 319 T Taish o Shinshu Daiz oky o Tokyo, reprinted: 1978. (referred to by volume number and page number). . Vibh Vibhan ga. Vism Visuddhimagga.

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