Aalbers, M.B. (forthcoming) The pre-histories of neoliberal urbanism in the United States. In: C.Morel Journel and G. Pinson (eds), Debating the Neoliberal City. Aldershot: Ashgate. Manuel B. Aalbers KU Leuven / University of Leuven, Department of Geography Celestijnenlaan 200e – bus 2409, 3001 Leuven, Belgium manuel.aalbers@ees.kuleuven.be Abstract In the last two decades, critical urban studies has paid a great deal of attention to contemporary “neoliberal urbanism”, but very little to its historical and urban roots. This chapter discusses the use of neighbourhood typologies and mapping in the United States by looking at government redlining maps from the 1930s until the 1970s, and “planned shrinkage”, “urban triage” and “benign neglect” in late 1960s and 1970s New York City as well as in early 2000s New Orleans and Cleveland. A map or ranking indicating declining or shrinking neighbourhoods may lead to the withholding of not only city services, but also mortgage loans. The ranking and mapping of neighbourhoods excludes and impoverishes those places deemed racially infiltrated, declining, and dying. It could be argued that this is a form of “neoliberal urbanism”, but these policies had a pre-cursor in the ideas of the Chicago School of Sociology, Babcock, Hoyt, the HOLC and the FHA in the 1920s and 1930s, and Hoover and Vernon, Downs sr. and jr., Starr and Moynihan in the post-war years. The “old urban right” had already won several significant victories in the war of ideologies, hinting at a neoliberalism avant la lettre. Introduction In the last two decades critical urban studies has paid a great deal of attention to “neoliberal urbanism” or “urban neoliberalism” (e.g. Brenner and Theodore 2002, Hackworth 2007, Peck 2006, Smith 1998, Wilson 2004), the beginnings of which in the United States are often marked by the post-1975 restructuring of bankrupt New York City and the 1980s presidency of Ronald Reagan. Now that we are a few decades into neoliberal urbanism, it is time to take a step back and re-think the roots of this ideology and practice of the so-called “new urban right”, and focus on the moyenne durée instead. In this chapter I only begin opening Pandora’s Box by questioning the novelty of neoliberal urbanism and by suggesting that the roots of the neoliberal urban thinking go much deeper and can be found in the theories of the Chicago School of Sociology, in particular Burgess’s concentric zone model and the concepts of succession and infiltration; Babcock’s and Hoyt’s work for the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Association (FHA); Hoover and Vernon’s, and Downs’ work on neighbourhood typologies for the Regional Plan Association of New York (RPA), the Chicago Real Estate Board, the Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC) and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Starr’s ideas of “planned shrinkage”, the RAND Institute’s prescription of both military and business logics to urban policies, and Moynihan’s “benign neglect” which turned into a strategy to abandon federal programs in urban neighbourhoods. All of this suggests that we need to rethink what it means to say that an idea or policy is “neoliberal”, what the roots of such ideas and policies are, and what is really different in 2 urban policies post-1975. If neoliberal urbanism can be characterized by a) the dominance of market-like logics in urban policies, b) the introduction of hierarchies of places through so-called “efficient solutions”, and c) processes of “othering” and “civilizing” through discourses of the undeserving poor resulting in a subjectification to neoliberal ideals; then, neoliberal urbanism was not born in the 1970s and 1980s, but rather in the early twentieth century, putting both the descriptive and analytical dimensions of the concept of the neoliberal city into question. The history of neoliberalism is a complex and non-linear one (Audier 2008, 2012). At the Colloque Walter Lippmann in Paris in 1938, neoliberalism was defined in terms of the priority of the price mechanism, free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and impartial state (Plehwe 2009, 14), but not yet associated with deregulation, privatisation, inequality and the withdrawal of the state (Audier 2008). The neoliberalisms of the Colloque Lippmann (1938 – Audier 2008), the Mont Pèlerin Society (founded in 1947 – Mirowski and Plehwe 2009), Pinochet’s Chicago Boys (1970s – Valdés 1995) and other early forms are fundamentally different from one another as well as from how contemporary neoliberalism is understood (Audier 2012, Brennetot 2013). The latter, commencing in the 1970s and 1980s, seems to selectively pick and place elements from classical liberalism as well as from the pre-histories of contemporary neoliberalism, resulting in what Chabal (2012) calls a “curious assemblage”. Contemporary neoliberalism (hereafter: neoliberalism) is more than traditional liberalism and it is not capitalism by another name. It is a specific movement within capitalism that relies on some but not all of the old principles of economic liberalism (Aalbers 2013). Neoliberalism shares with classical liberalism a “belief” in the superiority and efficiency of markets, but whereas classical liberals think that the free market comes about naturally, neoliberals think that it can only come about through a concerted political effort and organization. Neoliberals do not seek to completely eliminate the state, but rather to redefine the nature and functions of the state (Mirowski 2009). As such, neoliberalism ‘is a prescriptive concept that articulates a normative vision of the proper relationship between the state, capital, property, and individuals’ (Ganti 2014, 93) as well as ‘a class project, masked by a lot of neo-liberal rhetoric about individual freedom, liberty, responsibility, privatisation and the free market’ (Harvey 2009, 1). In this process, the state is not a silent actor but a rather active one. Despite all talk of markets, state intervention under ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore 2002) is very different from the discourse (or ideology) of neoliberalism, and state intervention under neoliberalism has actually been severe (Panitch and Konings 2009). Neoliberalism is about market discipline, but never laissez-faire market discipline: neoliberalism is ‘a self-contradictory form of regulation-in-denial’ (Peck 2010, xiii). The field of urban studies is very much concerned with and against neoliberalism, but we still lack a history of neoliberal urbanism. Audier (2008, 2012), Mirowski and Plehwe (2009), Birch and Mykhnenko (2010), Peck (2010) and Jones (2012), among others, have written on the roots of neoliberalism, but the roots of neoliberal urbanism are either ignored or simply seen as the adaptation of neoliberal reasoning in the urban context (but see Jones 2012 chapter 7, Wilson 2004). In that sense, the history of neoliberalism may no longer be placeless but it is still “scaleless”, i.e. historians of neoliberalism have described different national roots and meanings of neoliberalism, but have not focused on the urban roots of neoliberalism. I do not mention this to critique the historians of neoliberalism, but rather to argue that the idea of neoliberalism is simply applied to cities and then called urban neoliberalism as if neoliberal policies and practices landed in a vacuum on the urban scale and were not implemented through existing institutions at the urban scale. The city is not an empty container in which neoliberalism could simply be poured; i.e. neoliberalism is not simply an external, higher order process that landed in cities. Without explicitly engaging with the urban history of neoliberal urbanism, the concept is fundamentally limited and limiting. Neoliberalism had to be actively constructed in the urban context and it did so, at least in part, through existing and older institutions, practices and ideas. Not all of these ideas come from 3 “elsewhere” (Ong 2007); some of them were locally produced and are reproduced – and thereby possibly altered – under neoliberalism. If we accept the argument that neoliberalization is a project of sociospatial transformation (Peck et al. 2010), it follows that neoliberal governmentalities can travel through different contexts and scales (Ong 2007) as well as that they need to be embedded in existing contextualized institutions, whether those are found at the urban scale or elsewhere (cf. Wilson 2004). In other words, a relational understanding takes serious the claim that neoliberalism does not come out of a single control centre and is constituted across scales (England and Ward 2007, Peck et al. 2010). Such claims have been taken up in geography and anthropology but often still prioritize the national scale over other scales and in such accounts neoliberal technologies tend to travel between countries rather than being formed and reshaped at different scales. Similar to “national neoliberalisms”, neoliberal urbanism embodies a re-engineering of the state, which is mobilized to extend market – or often “market-like”– instruments based on the idea that such instruments are the best means to allocate resources efficiently (Hilgers 2012, Wacquant 2012). In doing so, risk is shifted ‘downward to those who have the least power’ (Mathew 2005, 81), i.e. taken away from both the state and powerful firms and intensified at the local and household levels. In that sense, neoliberalism is both ‘a structural force that affects people’s life chances’ and ‘an ideology of governance that shapes subjectivities’ (Ganti 2014, 89). The process of othering is a central component to neoliberal reasoning as such processes legitimize further neoliberal reforms in the name of “civilizing” (Springer 2009). To sum things up: neoliberal urbanism is the dominance of market and market-like logics in urban re/development, pushing socalled efficient solutions to problems of allocation, thereby mobilizing discourses of the un/deserving poor, relying on processes of othering and hierarchies of places and the people who inhabit those places, and resulting in a decline of public and private services, the management of the poor, and the subjectification of those groups to neoliberal ideals. Commentators of neoliberal urbanism typically see its urban origins in crisis-ridden 1970s New York City where federal intervention bailed out the city at the expense of its low-income residents (e.g. Gotham and Greenberg 2014, Hackworth 2007, Harvey 2005, Peck 2010), but in what follows I argue that the urban roots of neoliberal urbanism run deeper and can be located in the Chicago and Washington DC of the crisis-ridden 1930s. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Take 1 discusses the state production of redlining maps from the 1930s until the 1970s and connects these to the history of ideas regarding neighbourhood classifications. Take 2 focuses on ideas of “planned shrinkage”, “urban triage” and “benign neglect” in late 1960s and 1970s New York City and beyond. Take 3 is a discussion of the post-Katrina planning and rebuilding of New Orleans. Take 4 focuses on urban decline and mortgage foreclosures in the City of Cleveland, and in particular on the mapping of “distressed” places. There is not only a connection between urban neoliberalism avant la lettre and the contemporary neoliberal city, but also a distinct continuity in the application of so-called efficient policy solutions through hierarchies of people and places, resulting in the subjectification of the undeserving poor to neoliberal logics. Contemporary and often-cited examples of neoliberal urbanism in New Orleans and Cleveland are not only foreshadowed by 1970s New York City, but also by developments in the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, the concluding section argues that the federal government and cities around the U.S. use maps and neighbourhood typologies to get rid of what they see as declining neighbourhoods, but what they really get rid of is affordable housing. It could be argued that this is a form of “neoliberal urbanism” but if we go back to the 1930s and late 1960s and 1970s, it appears that the “old urban right” already won several significant victories in the war of ideologies. Urban neoliberalism does not originate in the 1970s application of neoliberal ideology and policies to cities, but can be dated at least four decades earlier. 4 First Take: Redlining Maps and the Chicago School Connection We start our discussion of the pre-histories of urban neoliberalism with the construction of governmental redlining maps in the 1930s. The Wall Street crash of 1929 and the subsequent economic crisis had severe consequences for the American housing market. Widespread unemployment made it impossible for many homeowners to pay off their mortgage loans, resulting in foreclosures. In the early 1930s the average number of foreclosed mortgage loans was 250,000 per year and at some point exceeding more than 1,000 per day. Half of all residential mortgages in the U.S. were in default. One response to the crisis was the creation of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) under the Roosevelt Administration. The HOLC was designed ‘to provide emergency relief to homeowners by refinancing or purchasing defaulted mortgages’ (Dennis and Pinkowish 2004, 7), i.e. to prevent foreclosures. Thanks to the HOLC tens of thousands of borrowers were kept from losing their homes in the mid and late 1930s and, in addition, it refinanced more than one million mortgages, all on relatively low-interest rates (Gotham 2002, 53). But by developing a neighbourhood rating system, the HOLC was also instrumental in implementing and institutionalizing redlining practices. Mortgage redlining is the identification in abstract space of a neighbourhood where no mortgage loans are granted (Aalbers 2011). Figure 1. Redlining map of Baltimore, 1930s. (Source: National Archives, Washington, DC)1 1 All maps are in the public domain and developed by public organizations. 5 The HOLC developed a neighbourhood rating and mapping system comprising four colours corresponding to four different numbers and four different letter codes (Jackson 1985, 197-200): • Green, First-grade or A referring to homogeneous neighborhoods, hot spots in demand as residential locations in good times and bad; American business and professional men. • Blue, Second-grade or B referring to stable, still good, still desirable areas that had reached their peak. • Yellow, Third-grade or C referring to definitely declining, heterogeneous neighborhoods that attract undesirable elements and are infiltrated by a lower grade population. • Red, Fourth-grade or D referring to neighborhoods in which the things taking place in C areas have already happened as a result of detrimental influences in a pronounced degree and where houses have little or no value today, having suffered a tremendous decline in values due to the colored element now controlling the district. According to Jackson (1985), Jewish neighbourhoods, even the stable and affluent ones, would never be considered First-grade, while Black neighbourhoods were by nature considered unstable and declining or depressed, and habitually coloured red. Although the HOLC is often blamed for introducing redlining policies and practices, it is important to note that the HOLC was following dominant ideas in real estate and mortgage markets, already practiced at the local level. Indeed, the HOLC may not have introduced redlining, but it did implement and institutionalize redlining policies (Aalbers 2011): it gave lenders an excuse not to grant mortgage in certain areas. As a government institution it did institutionalize already existing policies of redlining into government policies by designing redlining maps for more than 200 American cities. Figure 1, the map for the City of Baltimore, shows a classic pattern: inner-city neighbourhoods surrounding the central business district are coloured red, the next ring of neighbourhoods and the older suburbs are largely coloured yellow, while newer suburbs – albeit with a few exceptions – are coloured blue or, less common, green. Not only the HOLC and private mortgage lenders but also by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) implemented redlining practices. The FHA, established in 1934 under the Roosevelt administration, was created to insure private mortgage loans. The FHA helped to encourage suburbanization, but also ‘hastened the decay of inner-city neighbourhoods by stripping them of their middle-class constituency’, because ‘in practice, FHA insurance went to new residential developments on the edges of metropolitan areas, to the neglect of core cities’ (Jackson 1985, 206). In the mid and late 1960s the FHA was forced to change its policies and make mortgage insurance available in formerly redlined and yellowlined areas. Metzger (2000) draws parallels between the neighbourhood classification of the HOLC and FHA from the 1930s, Hoover and Vernon’s neighbourhood decline stage model for the Regional Plan Association of New York (1959), and the Downs-inspired stage model of neighbourhood decline written by the Real Estate Research Corporation but published by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (RERC 1975). Metzger demonstrates how the origin of these neighbourhood typologies is in Frederick Babcock’s textbook The Valuation of Real Estate, in which Babcock (1932, 75) wrote: A residential district seems to go through a very definite and inevitable course of development when not affected by forces which can entirely change its use. This cycle is characterized by the gradual decline in quality of people through the years accompanied by population increases and the more intensive residential use of ground. Babcock continued his career in 1936 as the chief underwriter of the FHA where he wrote his Underwriting Manual (1938) that warned against “inharmonious racial or nationality groups” and where he was instrumental in developing FHA’s redlining policies. Since Babcock’s underwriting manual incorporated HOLC’s classification, which in turn was inspired by Babcock’s earlier work, 6 there is reason to believe that it was Babcock who came up with HOLC’s neighbourhood typology in the first place. Alternatively, there may have been a close cooperation between Babcock and the HOLC, resulting in a mutual flow of ideas. The underwriting manual was updated several times, but it continued to use Babcock’s typology in rating neighbourhoods long into the 1960s. Babcock’s work formed the basis for FHA’s redlining policies, but also for subsequent studies of neighbourhood typologies. Many of Babcock’s ideas were also found in Homer Hoyt’s 1939 study for the FHA. Greer (2012, 282) has argued that the HOLC and FHA maps ‘were in concert with the prevailing wisdom of prominent real estate analysts, notably Frederick Babcock and Homer Hoyt, the expressed positions of real estate interest groups (especially the important National Association of Real Estate Boards), and individuals throughout the real estate industry, many of whom held positions in the HOLC, the FHLB, and the FHA’. After finishing the FHA study, Hoyt moved on to direct the Chicago Plan Commission. In that position he coordinated the Chicago Land Use Survey (1942). James Downs of the Chicago Real Estate Board advised Hoyt. In 1931 Downs sr. had formed the Real Estate Research Corporation (RERC). His son, Anthony Downs, one of the proponents of the idea that neighbourhood decline is natural, went to Stanford University to get a PhD in economics (1956). The younger Downs combined his theoretical lenses of public choice theory and neoclassical economics with a racialized outlook on housing markets to advise his father’s organization on issues of neighbourhood decline (Metzger 2000) before chairing the RERC himself in most of the 1960s and 1970s. In two papers from the early 1960s he already lamented the growth of non-white neighbourhoods that depressed property values (Downs 1960, 1961). He was also part of the National Commission on Urban Problems (1967, known as the Douglas Commission) and leading consultant to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968, known as the Kerner Commission). His ideas not only set the stage for policies of “planned shrinkage”, “benign neglect”, and “urban triage” (see Take 2), but he also actively advocated such policies in his various positions (Shiffman 2005). The RERC life-cycle model basically repeated all of Down’s lessons as it talked about “racial infiltration” and African-Americans downgrading neighbourhoods. Metzger (2000, 20) concludes that As a product of the Chicago real estate industry, Downs brought industry theories of race and neighborhood change into the mainstream of national urban policy. … In particular, his fourpronged strategy of increasing federally assisted housing production, using the life-cycle theory to warn of investment risk in central-city neighborhoods, targeting most new construction to the suburbs, and then achieving racial and economic integration on a small scale to ensure the cultural domination of middle-class whites, might appeal to real estate trade groups that had opposed fair housing. Downs (2000) himself argues that his life-cycle theory may seem to have affected government institutions and the real estate industry, but that they were simply acting on signs of decline in actual neighbourhoods based on what was considered common knowledge. Downs, however, seems to downplay the fact that he was heavily connected to the real estate industry. He not only worked for the real estate industry, he also wrote reports for both real estate and government institutions, and RERC and HUD reports credit his work. The point is, of course, not that Downs developed these ideas out of thin air and was followed blindly by the real estate industry, but that his theory builds on decades of thinking about neighbourhood classifications: his model was as much a result of reflecting on practice in the real estate industry as it was influencing neighbourhood classifications by both the real estate industry and the government institutions. Although Metzger pays a lot of attention to the connections of Babcock, Hoyt, Hoover and Vernon, and Downs to both public policy making and the real estate sector, he pays no attention to the influence of the Chicago School of Sociology to the neighbourhood typologies advanced by Babcock, Hoyt, Hoover and Vernon, and Downs. Chicago was not only the centre of thinking about 7 neighbourhood typologies and mapping in the 1930s to 1960s, but already in the 1920s. The concepts “invasion”, “succession” and “natural areas”, that found their way into the work of Babcock, Downs and others, are based on the pioneering work of Chicago School sociologists (Park et al. 1925). Although I have not systematically looked into the question if these authors said they applied or adapted the Chicago School model (but see Temkin and Rohe 1996, Harris and Lewis 1998), it is clear that they had internalized key concepts of the Chicago School. These concepts and Burgess’ “concentric zone model”, which includes words like “vice” and “slum” on the one hand, and “bright light area” on the other, were powerful models for simplifying neighbourhood change. It is not only the powerful connection of Chicago’s real estate sector to DC’s public policy sector, but also the deep influence of the Chicago School of Sociology, that made neighbourhood typologies and mapping such seemingly normal and neutral, yet possibly exclusionary and racist activities. Throughout the years, the Burgess model was simplified and used to make economic generalizations (Harris and Lewis 1998), but its influence, albeit perverted, remained strong. In that sense, Park and Burgess laid the foundations on which first Babcock, Hoyt, HOLC and FHA, and later Hoover and Vernon, Downs, RPA and RERC could build. In the 1960s and 1970s, the centre of thinking about neighbourhood typologies and mapping would shift from the Chicago-DC axis to the New York-DC axis. Second Take: Planned Shrinkage and Benign Neglect The second take on the pre-histories of urban neoliberalism are New York City’s policies of planned shrinkage, urban triage and benign neglect. In the late 1960s and 1970s, NYC was rapidly losing population and many neighbourhoods were declining. The City’s chief housing administrator in the early 1970s, Roger Starr, advocated “planned shrinkage”: ‘the orderly withdrawal’ of city services from low-income and ethnic minority neighbourhoods that were dying and could not be saved in his eyes (Starr 1967). A few years later, in a speech to the real estate industry, Starr not only suggested closing firehouses, schools and subway stations, but also argued that the city should ‘accelerate the drainage’ of ‘terminal places’ by encouraging ‘the natural flow out of areas that have lost general attraction’ (Starr 1976) by thinning out services and reconcentrating them in a limited number of areas. The first goal of planned shrinkage was to drain these areas from their remaining population, in order to create a situation in which these areas would then become not only dying but also obsolete. This objective was not only to be accomplished through geographically selective service cuts but also by not repairing or rebuilding damaged housing. The second goal was to preserve the tax base of the city by concentrating the efforts on what were considered more viable neighbourhoods. While New York City had a population of 7.5 million in the mid 1970s, it was in Starr’s outlook destined to become one of no more than 5 million people – ‘Better a thriving city of five million than a Calcutta of seven’ (Starr, cited in Beauregard 2003, 191). If Starr is the critical person pushing the city’s planned shrinkage policies, the NYC RAND Institute is its intellectual home. In the late 1960s the Administration of NYC Mayor John Lindsay (1966-1973) started working with the “Research and Development” (RAND) Corporation and by 1969 they had created a quasi-governmental agency called the “New York City-RAND Institute”, a New York non-profit corporation, staffed by the RAND Corporation, subject to oversight by a Board of Trustees chosen jointly by RAND and the City, and funded largely by the City but also by foundations and federal agencies (Szanton 1972). In the post-war years the RAND Corporation was the powerful think tank of the military-industrial complex. A leading defence contractor formed RAND shortly after the World War II and this private research group became an important consultant to the Pentagon, gaining increasing influence over domestic policies in the 1950s, 1960s 8 and 1970s (Metzger 2000). The RAND Corporation also published Anthony Downs’ paper Inside bureaucracy (1964) and the RAND Institute corresponded with Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to who we will turn soon, and it is clear that there was a mutual flow of ideas. Downs himself, in a retrospective also writes that One other policy derived from the life-cycle theory seems to encourage abandonment. It states that when resources for revitalization are quite limited, those resources should be invested where they are likely to have the greatest positive impact. This means withholding some or all such resources from the areas where conditions are worst because the resources have a low probability of being effective there. … From the providers’ perspective, achieving long-term revitalization may be more important than aiding the worst-off people first, but not producing any permanent improvements. (Downs 2000, 49) Although Downs does not necessarily advocate such a policy (he sees an ‘inherent moral quandary’ here), he does see how his ideas influenced such “efficient” policies regarding the geographical distribution of city services. The RAND Institute developed these so-called “efficient” policies for municipal service withdrawal, including the closure of fire stations, from poor often heavily segregated neighbourhoods (Wallace and Wallace 1998). In the 1970s RAND had achieved close ties with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), facilitating the policy transfer from New York to other cities. HUD paid RAND to develop models such as the FirehouseSiting Model, which HUD subsequently pushed on other cities. An important link between New York and HUD was Donna Shalala: before becoming the Assistant Commissioner of HUD for Science and Public Policy in the Carter Administration (1977-1980), she had been the director and treasurer of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (1975-1977), the New York State entity that coordinated New York City during its fiscal crisis of 1975. Planned shrinkage hit large parts of the Bronx and Brooklyn, but also many neighbourhoods in the other boroughs, including the Lower East Side, Harlem (both Manhattan) and the Rockaways (Queens). Starr also used the term “triage”, a military term used to set ‘priorities for medical treatment of the wounded by writing off the most serious cases and concentrating on the cases on whom medical attention has the best chance of success’ (Brandes Gratz 1989, 180), while letting the healthier ones take care of themselves. In practice, it meant the withdrawal of essential services from “dying” non-white and low-income neighbourhoods so that “healthy” white and middle-class neighbourhoods could enjoy increased services without an increase in the municipal budget (Wallace and Wallace 1998). In the mid and late 1970s there were about 120,000 fires per year, or 330 a day, in the Bronx. These fires helped to destroy 40% of the borough’s housing, making it resemble a bombed out German city at the end of the World War II. Not surprisingly, the population of the Bronx and other areas declined rapidly, as projected. Yet, they never were completely abandoned by its population and new groups, often migrants with little money to spend, also moved in. The so-called “fire epidemic” has often been blamed on the citizens of the neighbourhoods most affected by it. Both Wallace and Wallace (1998) and Flood (2010), however, argue that the fires in the Bronx and elsewhere were first and foremost the result of RAND’s Firehouse-Siting Model. They convincingly demonstrate that the model was based on faulty assumptions and omissions. The model’s flaws made it appear that low-income, predominately non-white neighbourhoods with more under-maintained and therefore fire-prone buildings were actually overserved by the fire department. Wallace and Wallace (1998) go one step further by labelling RAND’s solutions not only discriminatory in consequence but also in intent. While Flood (2010) points at the flaws of the model and its consequences to low-income neighbourhoods, he does not go as far as to argue that the models were manipulated or distorted on purpose. Modelling and mapping are not simply technical exercises with technocratic solutions, but subjective exercises 9 with intended consequences, i.e. the scaling down of services to low-income, non-white areas of New York City that were deemed “dying”. Planned shrinkage is the local version of Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s “benign neglect” policy at the federal level. Moynihan, President Richard Nixon’s advisor on urban affairs, wrote the president a letter suggesting a period of rhetorical calm: ‘the issue of race could benefit from a period of benign neglect’, which became a strategy to abandon federal programs in urban, and in particular black, neighbourhoods. Although planned shrinkage and benign neglect are sometimes seen as examples of “laissez faire”, they should be interpreted as active state withdrawal, or “rollback”, from non-white neighbourhoods, thereby allowing, facilitating and pushing private companies to do the same because the state actively looks for neighbourhoods to be ignored. Actively ignoring certain neighbourhoods is not the same as being apathetic; it demonstrates the state’s manifest inadequacy of dealing with difference and of caring for its citizens. In the late 1960s HUD-funded community renewal plan for New York neighbourhoods were grouped into nine categories, including those declining and those ready for redevelopment, echoing earlier classifications by HOLC and Hoover and Vernon. The HUD plan was used as input for the 1969 Master Plan for New York City. In this Master Plan the South Bronx and parts of Brownsville-East New York (Brooklyn) and Harlem were designated for industrial renewal, just like Starr (1976) would suggest several years later: ‘The stretches of empty blocks may then be knocked down, services can be stopped, subway stations closed, and the land left fallow until a change in the economic and demographic assumptions makes the land useful once more.’ Indeed, one such useful land use was industry and ‘one motivation for destroying the housing of large poor communities was to get land for industry’ (Wallace and Wallace 1998, 27). Or, as Metzger (2000, 20) concludes: Local planners could use the neighborhood life-cycle theory with triage planning to assemble land for redevelopment, an increasingly difficult task because of high land costs (an ongoing problem), federal funding cuts and municipal fiscal crises, and organized opposition to slum clearance. Instead of defining areas as already blighted and then acquiring land through eminent domain, redevelopment planners could use the life-cycle theory with triage to depress land values and accelerate the abandonment of privately owned property in neighborhoods marked for decline. … Triage would reduce or eliminate financial compensation to neighborhood property owners and avoid the expense and controversy of relocating households and small businesses. Elected officials could then target resources to the moderate-income neighborhoods that delivered political support. The combined power of life-cycle theory and urban triage devalued neighbourhoods and made them ready for redevelopment. One ingredient in this process was rhetorical: the RAND Institute, Starr and Moynihan accused the residents of poor neighbourhoods of arson and were essentially blaming the victim (for a critique, see, e.g., Gans 1996). In the 1970s and early 1980s between 31,000 and 60,000 households in NYC were lost to abandonment each year (Marcuse 1985). Although the policy of planned shrinkage was never officially implemented, Wallace and Wallace (1998) argue that it was the de facto policy of New York City for at least 20 years. Both public and private actors abandoned the South Bronx, like other areas around the city. Yet, many residents stayed and new ones, often migrants, moved in. Community development corporations and small entrepreneurs also stayed active. Together they slowly rebuild the Bronx and at 1.4 million residents, the borough is now almost as populated as it was at its peak in the late 1960s before it was abandoned. Third Take: Urban Triage Revisited in Post-Katrina New Orleans Twenty-first century Cleveland and in particular New Orleans are oft-cited examples of urban neoliberalism. The policies of these cities – as well as the policies applied to these cities from 10 elsewhere – are seen as the ultimate application of neoliberalism to cities. It is pointed out how urban politics become neoliberalized in similar ways to national politics, i.e. how neoliberal urbanism is rooted in national neoliberalism. The urban roots of contemporary neoliberal urbanism are typically limited to a reference to 1970s New York City, but in presenting the cases of New Orleans and Cleveland, I’d like to point to the roots of their urban policies and urban ideologies not only in national neoliberalism and 1970s New York City, but also in the urban ideas and policies of early twentieth century American cities. The hierarchies of people and places that we see in contemporary neoliberal urbanism do not hint at a fundamental break in urban policy, but rather at a distinct continuity. Although the immediate cause of the displacement of 100,000s of New Orleans residents might have been hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the disaster was in fact not so much “natural” as it was “man-made” and therefore socially constructed (Hartman and Squires 2006, Shiffman 2005). The evacuation was poorly organized and many residents, in particular those in low-income and black neighbourhoods received help very late. The government’s failure to respond adequately to the crisis effectively constituted a second disaster (Hartman and Squires 2006). Their neighbourhoods were also closed-off for much longer than other neighbourhoods, making it impossible for people to return to their homes, even if they had little or no water damage. The damage and risk in these low-income and minority areas was exaggerated while it was downplayed in some other areas, again making it more difficult for black people to return and rebuild their neighbourhoods (Hartman and Squires 2006, Logan 2006, Shiffman 2005, Arena 2012). Moreover, despite the severe lack of affordable housing, the New Orleans Housing Authority decided to demolish thousands of public housing units, many of them with little or no flood damage. Furthermore, affordable housing, whether multi-family rental or owner-occupied buildings, was excluded from funding. Public services were scaled down even further. Infrastructure in some parts of the city is not or insufficiently reconstructed, city workers were laid off, and public space in many parts of the city is maintained by residents and their organizations rather than by the city government (Klein 2007, Nelson et al. 2007). The remaking of New Orleans looks like a neoliberal dream scenario. While rescue operations were still in place, people were suggesting half of the city’s population might not return, making them wonder if “planned shrinkage” might be a good strategy for post-Katrina New Orleans (see Reardon 2006, Wolf-Powers 2007). Influential reports by the Urban Land Institute (ULI) and the Bring New Orleans Back Commission also included plans to limit rebuilding to high ground and to terminate the re-urbanization of heavily flooded parts of the city. ULI (2005) proposed a selective rebuilding plan that reads like urban triage all-over again: neighbourhoods that have been heavily damaged should be depopulated and will not be rebuilt (Category or Investment Zone A), neighbourhoods that have intermediate damage would have to demonstrate the viability of their neighbourhoods to be eligible for funding (Category or Investment Zone B), and neighbourhoods that have only limited damage are eligible for immediate funding (Category or Investment Zone C). Figure 2 shows the location of the different Investment Zones as well as the location of “Strategic Open Space”. Since the worst damage was concentrated in poor and minority communities, most low-income and ethnic groups would not be allowed to return in the ULI plan or only if they would be to demonstrate the viability of their neighbourhoods, thereby creating a catch-22 situation in which funds needed for rehabilitation are withheld until a critical mass moves back without receiving much needed aid quickly. Residents of more well-off areas in terms of both income and relatively limited damage, however, would not only be allowed to return but would also be able to get immediate funding. 11 Figure 2. Neighborhood Investment Zones and Strategic Open Space. (Source: ULI 2005) The Bring New Orleans Back (2006) report, commissioned by the City’s Mayor, is less explicit than the ULI plan, but also mentions that flood-prone areas and neighbourhoods that fail to attract a critical mass of returning residents may be given up. The remaining residents would be rehoused, city services terminated and housing demolished. The report fails to address how remaining and former residents of such areas would be able to afford housing in other, higher priced, neighbourhoods. Although the plan is not very clear about the neighbourhoods deemed to be depopulated, the plan does include maps of future “parkland and open space” as well of those of “immediate opportunity areas” that have little or no flood damage, “infill development areas” and “targeted development areas”. The green dots on the map, indicating parkland and open space, become the new redlining. Although it may seem reasonable or even rational to protect people by not allowing them to live in flood-prone areas, it is striking that damage is exaggerated in low-income and minority areas. Both plans essentially propose to abandon the poorest neighbourhoods of the city without offering its former and current residents a decent and affordable alternative. Many AfricanAmericans viewed the ULI and BNOB plans as strategies to keep them from returning: “shrinking the footprint”, a term from ULI’s report, has been criticized for being an attempt to prevent AfricanAmericans from returning and allowing developers access to well-situated sites (Nelson et al. 2007). The New Orleans City Council unanimously passed a resolution emphasizing that all neighbourhoods could be rebuild. Plans were nevertheless developed for a much smaller city and the City Council – which was significantly whiter after its re-election when many minorities had not yet returned to the city – opposed multi-family housing developments and voted unanimously to demolish public housing (Chen 2008, Ehrenfeucht and Nelson 2011). In the end, the urban triage plans of the ULI and those of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission were discarded and replaced by the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) and Office of 12 Recovery Management (ORM) plans. UNOP includes a strategy of targeting, which is ‘a compromise between forcibly shrinking the city’s footprint to restrict redevelopment in the most flood-prone areas and permitting redevelopment to continue throughout the city in a haphazard or unplanned manner’ (Nelson et al. 2007, 33). The targeting focuses on 17 so-called “rebuild zones”, include several in low-income and minority neighbourhoods, allowing more poor and minority residents to return to their neighbourhoods than had hitherto been the case. Yet, many private investors, including prime lenders, did not support the move back to the neighbourhoods and refused financial support, making it hard for residents to fix up and move into their houses. In ORM’s plan, UNOP’s target areas were designated as “rebuild”, “redevelop” and “renew” zones based on the amount of damage they had sustained. Although the clustering idea is less exclusive of low-income and minority neighbourhoods, opposition to these plans has not completely vanished and some residents argued that clustering is simply another attempt to deny them the right to return to their neighbourhoods (Nelson et al. 2007). Furthermore, residents in higher ground neighbourhoods opposed infill development and City and State agencies did not propose any land swap mechanism that would enable residents from non-targeted neighbourhoods to return to nearby areas, suggesting that in practice the plans had elements of both planned shrinkage/Starr-style (see Take 2) and right-sizing style (see Take 4). In short, the actions and strategies of federal, state and municipal institutions as well as think tanks, supported by numerous maps, to further the decline in low-income and minority neighbourhoods had parallels to public redlining maps as well as to planned shrinkage, urban triage and benign neglect. Fourth Take: Planned Shrinkage after the Perfect Storm (Cleveland) Cleveland, Ohio is one of the many U.S. Rustbelt cities that suffered from a loss of manufacturing jobs and a consequent population decline starting in the 1950s. In the beginning of that decade Cleveland had 914,000 residents; 60 years later it had only 397,000. In several predominately African-American neighbourhoods, population declined by 70-85% (Dillman 2010). In the first decade of the 21st century the city lost 17% of its population, second only to Katrina-hit New Orleans. In 2007, about 7,500 foreclosures took place in Cleveland. In Cuyahoga County – which includes Cleveland and surrounding suburbs and has an estimated population of 1.28 million – this number was around 15,000 in 2007 (Schiller and Hirsh 2008) and over 100,000 for the first nine years of this century, amounting to one in five properties. Subprime lending in Cleveland grew from 3% in 1995 to 19% in 1998, and 45% in 2004 (Dillman 2010). High-cost sub-prime, i.e. predatory, loans are responsible for 84% of all foreclosures in Cuyahoga County; African-American borrowers are disproportionally hit and so are minority and low-income neighbourhoods (Coulton et al. 2008). As is well-known from the literature, predatory loans, and in particular refinance loans, are targeted at low-income, minority homeowners and the neighbourhoods they inhabit (PenningtonCross 2002, Squires 2004, Aalbers 2012). In Cleveland, the denial rates for African-Americans were not only twice as high as those of whites, upper income African-Americans were denied prime loans more often than low-income whites (Dillman 2010). Many of those that were denied prime loans, resorted to subprime loans, often of the predatory kind. As a result of the foreclosure crisis, house prices in Cleveland have fallen dramatically. In 2005 the median sales price of a house was around $100,000; in early 2007 it was $62,000; a year later it was $15,500, a decrease of 75% in only one year (Mallach 2009). The City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County have to deal with an oversupply of housing and an undersupply of funds to demolish or renovate housing. Consequently, some have argued that it is impossible to save all neighbourhoods that have been hit by the predatory and foreclosure crisis: ‘Limited resources should be deployed strategically, paying close attention to which neighborhoods 13 have the existing housing stock and community amenities to compete for a pool of purchasers that had been shrinking even before credit standards tightened. Inevitably, this strategy will leave significant areas where parcels are abandoned or vacant’ (Weinstein 2008, 275). Ohio, together with other Rustbelt states, had successfully lobbied the federal government to make sure Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds could also be used for demolition. Subsequently, the city developed a neighbourhood typology (Figure 3) to help determine where to target new investment, distinguishing between neighborhoods that could support new market activity from those where the residential market was so weak that investment would merely be “thrown down the drain”. Using indicators of housing market strength, the typology classified the neighborhoods within Cuyahoga County along a continuum of neighborhood types, including “Regional Choice”, “Stable”, “Transitional”, “Fragile”, and “Distressed”. (Reid 2011, 26) This typology is based on Mallach’s report on housing policies in so-called “weak market cities” in which he suggests to map neighbourhoods ranging along a continuum from those that are regionally competitive and largely insulated from the cycle of decline affecting the rest of the city, to those at the opposite end of the spectrum that have been heavily disinvested, with widespread population loss and abandonment, and where the real estate market is functioning poorly, if at all. Each of these neighborhoods requires a different mix of strategies, financial incentives, and investment to rebuild its market and preserve or restore neighborhood vitality. (Mallach 2005, 23) Figure 3. Housing Market Typology of Cuyahoga County (Source: City of Cleveland Department of Community Development 2009) 14 Although Mallach (2005, 24) warns that ‘the development of neighbourhood typologies is not a basis for rationing attention and resources, but for focusing those resources most constructively’, he also asserts that governments have to choose between different declining neighbourhoods and that investment should be targeted based on a ‘careful assessment of the opportunities and benefits the project offers, as well as the opportunity costs of using scarce resources which could be used elsewhere’ (27). Mallach himself does nowhere speak of ending services and investment in declining neighbourhoods, but it is easy to see how the mapping of distressed neighbourhoods, in combination with the language of ‘targeting’, ‘scarce resources’, and ‘assessment of the opportunities’ could result in a new form of planned shrinkage. The question of how to deal with shrinking populations and declining neighbourhoods is of course an interesting one, but another important question is: when do strategies and policies that deal with shrinkage and decline become geographically exclusionary? Rybczynski (1995), for example, like Starr, calls for consolidating services in denser areas, and removing unused and underused buildings and infrastructure from less attractive areas. Like urban triage, Rybczynski‘s “right-sizing” is a military term that is applied to cities in a corporate or business-like fashion and that strives to make things more lucrative, efficient, and competitive. Neoliberal urbanism comes in its purest form when it borrows military terms and applies them to places and governments with a corporate twist: cities are seen as businesses that need to be made more competitive and military concepts are employed to do so. Cleveland’s marriage of in/convenience, not unlike New Orleans’ more recent plans, effectively comes down to a refashioned planned shrinkage strategy, i.e. urban triage + right-sizing + selective targeting + community involvement. In the end, significant parts of the city will be neglected. Conclusion: The Unwritten History of Neoliberal Urbanism Throughout the 20th century, many states, firms and academics in the U.S. have seen neighbourhood change as the result of a natural process (e.g. Downs 1973, Grigsby et al. 1987, Hoover and Vernon 1959). Concepts, partly inherited from the Chicago School of Sociology, like “neighbourhood succession”, “life-cycle” and “filtering” that are used to explain what is seen as the natural operation of the real estate market, distort the actual processes of neighbourhood decline by obscuring agency as well as the social construction of place (Gotham 2002). States, lenders, brokers, developers and landlords play a significant role in restructuring neighbourhoods and in re/creating housing submarkets (Harvey 1985, King 1987, Knox 1991). States as well as private actors such as lenders, brokers, developers and landlords should be seen as intentionally and unintentionally restructuring the local real estate market and thus possibly producing or contributing to process of neighbourhood change (Aalbers 2006, Gotham 2002). The decline of cities and neighbourhoods did not start with the construction of city maps and the implementation of redlining or planned shrinkage policies. It starts with an ideology of deserving and undeserving neighbourhoods. That ideology shapes the actions of public and private actors. There is a whole chain of connections between the state, academics, think tanks and private companies that has resulted in HOLC’s redlining maps, NYC’s planned shrinkage, DC’s benign neglect, and New Orleans’, Cleveland’s and other cities’ reinvention of such strategies. The maps used in these strategies have a performative function: they are either used to prescribe decline or they have the effect of furthering decline by marking neighbourhoods as places “where houses have little or no value” (HOLC), that are “dying” (New York), “to be depopulated” (New Orleans), or “distressed” (Cleveland). All these cities map deserving and undeserving neighbourhoods and thereby exclude and impoverish those places deemed racially infiltrated, declining, and dying, thereby contributing to “institutional desertification” (Gans 1996), “financial desertification” 15 (Leyshon and Thrift 1997), “spaces of social exclusion” (Gough and Eisenschitz 1996), “state retrenchment” (Wacquant 1996), or simply “places of decline”. As in New York in the 1970s, several state institutions, businesses and think thanks in New Orleans advocated a much smaller city. In both cases, poor residential areas have also been earmarked for commercial development rather than residential rehabilitation. In the years and decades before Katrina, poor black people were increasingly perceived as redundant within the labour market, further impoverished by a scaled down welfare system and the services it was supposed to offer, and controlled by a penal state (see Gotham 2007, Hartman and Squires 2006, Rhodes 2010 for New Orleans; and Peck 2003, Wacquant 2008 more generally speaking). The hurricanes and floods were abused to remove poor and black people. Subsequently plans, strategies and maps were used to remove them, first, from the imaginary of the city (Rhodes 2010), and second, from the physical city. Geography, both physical and socio-economic, was employed to displace people. As Peck (2006 682&704) has convincingly argued, the “new urban right” has won some significant victories in the war of ideas – along the way, reframing the debate around America’s cities, their alleged pathologies, and their putative salvation. … Fundamentally, the agenda of the new urban right is about setting the “ground rules” for appropriate behavior in cities, largely modeled on middle-class norms; establishing the preconditions for economic growth, largely through the kinds of minimalist supply-side interventions … and maintaining social order through ruthless application of the force of law, facilitated by zero-tolerance policing. This, clearly, is anything but a noninterventionist program, but its interventions are profoundly selective. Peck makes a connection between New York under Giuliani and post-Katrina New Orleans and goes on to argue that such policies are both neoliberal; Gotham and Greenberg (2014) make a similar connection, but I would like to question the neoliberal element in this debate. The hierarchies of people and places that we see in contemporary neoliberal urbanism do not hint at a fundamental break in urban policy, but rather at a distinct continuity. If we go back to the 1930s and late 1960s and 1970s, it appears that the “old urban right” already won several significant victories in the war of ideologies, whether they were advanced by Babcock, Hoyt, HOLC and FHA; by Hoover and Vernon, Downs sr. and jr., RPA and RERC; or by Starr, democrats like Moynihan and Shalala, the RAND Institute, and HUD. The dominance of market-like logics in urban policies, processes of “othering” through discourses of the undeserving poor, and the introduction of hierarchies of places through so-called “efficient solutions” are all considered hallmarks of neoliberal urbanism – this neoliberal urbanism is rooted in the urban thinking and policies of the early twentieth century. The so-called “new urban right” in the U.S. has a long history of right-wing urban thinking to rely and build upon, and it could be questioned what is so “new” or “neo” about their thinking and policies. In a sense, these policies are traditional right-wing urban thinking that seeks to claim cities as sites for capital accumulation and define low-income and poor communities as undeserving. We need to be more specific about what is new about these ideas. If the exclusion of minorities and low-income citizens is not, perhaps the use of public funding for better off citizens and big firms is? Or is it something in the way that low-income and minority neighbourhoods get targeted for depopulation that is different from earlier policies? Again, I am not arguing against the concept of neoliberalism per se, and have employed it elsewhere myself (e.g. Aalbers 2013), but I would like to see more precision in the debate and clearer explanations of perceived historical disjunctures and discontinuities. In short, when and how did right-wing urban thinking become new? If we do not answer these questions, we severely limit both the descriptive and analytical dimensions of the concept of the neoliberal city as it would be one disembedded from it urban roots. We need to focus on the pre-histories of neoliberalism: not only its roots in liberalism, the Colloque Lippmann, the Mont Pèlerin Societ, Pinochet’s Chicago Boys, or in the work of Friedrich 16 Hayek and Milton Friedman, but also the role of urban thinking and practice in government institutions, real estate organizations and think tanks. Neoliberal urbanism does not only have its roots in liberal and neoliberal thinking but also in urban thinking. Neoliberal urbanism is not simply the urban translation of general neoliberal thinking but also has urban pre-histories and those need to be told. If neoliberalism is intrinsically spatialized as geographers and urban scholars have argued, we should take the urban roots of neoliberalism seriously. We should start thinking more about the moyenne durée of neoliberal urbanism and uncover its roots in the ideologies and practices of the “old urban right”. Neoliberalism à la Hayek and Friedman as well as Reaganomics are important ingredients in the roll-out of neoliberalism, but since urban neoliberalism is more than neoliberalism applied to cities, we need to dig into its urban pre-histories. The 1970s restructuring of bankrupt New York City is an important starting point in going back in history, but we need to study other places and other decades, to be able to understand both the longevity and the temporality of neoliberal urbanism. The analysis presented here, in the partial history and geography of neighbourhood typologies, is no more than a small step in beginning to write the history of neoliberal urbanism and it is limited to only one country. Beauregard (2003, 242) has argued that U.S.-style capitalism requires decline and that ‘urban decline will endure as long as society’s tensions and conflicts are unresolved’ and the state continues to ‘geographically concentrate the sources of alienation and the consequences of exploitation.’ The recent and ongoing foreclosure and financial “twin crises” (Aalbers 2012) suggest that society’s tensions and conflicts are far from resolved, and the consequences of exploitation continue to be located geographically in certain parts of cities, but also in certain parts of countries – and that all of this is reproduced by neighbourhood typologies and maps of declining places. The state does not know how to deal with decline and shrinkage, as not only historical but also more recent examples illustrate. At times, the federal government and cities around the U.S. want to get rid of what they see as declining neighbourhoods, but what they really get rid of is affordable housing. The only way to address decline and shrinkage adequately is to address the underlying socio-economic structures and institutions, and the resulting patterns of uneven development. Acknowledgements This work was supported by the European Research Council under grant number 313376. A longer version of this chapter and with a differently framed argument is published as Aalbers 2014a, 2014b. 17 References Aalbers, M.B. 2006. ‘When the banks withdraw, slum landlords take over’: The structuration of neighbourhood decline through redlining, drug dealing, speculation and immigrant exploitation. Urban Studies, 43(7), 1061-1086. Aalbers, M.B. 2011. Place, Exclusion, and Mortgage Markets. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. Aalbers, M.B. eds. 2012. Subprime Cities: The Political Economy of Mortgage Markets. London: WileyBlackwell. Aalbers, M.B. 2013. Debate on Neoliberalism in and after the Neoliberal Crisis. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(3), 1053-1057. Aalbers, M.B. 2014a. Do Maps Make Geography? Part 1: Redlining, Planned Shrinkage, and the Places of Decline. ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 13(4), 525-556. Aalbers, M.B. 2014. Do Maps Make Geography? Part 2: Post-Katrina New Orleans, Post-Foreclosure Cleveland and Neoliberal Urbanism. ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 13(4), 557-582. Arena, J. 2012. Driven from New Orleans. How nonprofits betray public housing and promote privatization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Audier, S. 2008. Le colloque Lippmann, aux origines du néo-libéralisme. Lormont: Le Bord de l'Eau. Audier, S. 2012. Néo-libéralisme(s): une archéologie intellectuelle. Paris: Grasset. Babcock, F.M. 1932. The valuation of real estate. New York: McGraw-Hill. Beauregard, R.A. 2003. Voices of decline. The postwar fate of U.S. cities. Second edition. New York: Routledge. Birch, K. and Mykhnenko, V. eds. 2010. The rise and fall of neoliberalism. The collapse of an economic order? London: Zed Books. Brandes Gratz, R. 1989. The Living City. New York: Simon and Schuster. Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. eds. 2002. Spaces of Neoliberalism. Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe. Oxford: Blackwell. Brennetot, A. 2013. Géohistoire du « néolibéralisme ». Cybergeo : European Journal of Geography, document 655. URL: http://cybergeo.revues.org/26071. Bring New Orleans Back Commission. 2006. Action plan for New Orleans: The new American city. New Orleans, LA: City of New Orleans. Chabal, E. 2012. Le néo-libéralisme introuvable ? La Vie des idées, 4 juillet. URL: http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Le-neo-liberalisme-introuvable.html. Chen, M. 2008. Vanishing city: Post-Katrina redevelopment excludes “poor and working-class”. The WIP, February 8. URL: http://www.thewip.net/contributors/2008/02/vanishing_city_postkatrina_red.html. Coulton, C., Chan, T., Schramm, M. and Mikelbank, K. 2008. Pathways to foreclosure: A longitudinal study of mortgage loans, Cleveland and Cuyahoga County, 2005-2008. Cleveland: Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development. Dennis, M.W. and Pinkowish, T.J. 2004. Residential Mortgage Lending: Principles and Practices. 5th edn. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. Dillman, J.D. 2010. Subprime lending in the City of Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. Columbus, OH: Kirwan Institute. Downs, A. 1960. An economic analysis of property values and race. Land Economics, 36(2), 181-188. Downs, A. 1961. Metropolitan growth and future political problems. Land Economics, 37(4), 311-320. Downs, A. 1964. Inside bureaucracy. Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation. Downs, A. 1973. Opening up the suburbs: An urban strategy for America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 18 Downs, A. 2000. Comment on John T. Metzger’s “Planned abandonment: The neighborhood life-cycle theory and national urban policy”. Housing Policy Debate, 11(1), 41-54 Ehrenfeucht, R. and Nelson, M. 2011. Planning, population loss and equity in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina. Planning Practice & Research, 26(2), 129-146. England, K. and Ward, K. eds. 2007. Neoliberalization: states, networks, peoples. Malden: Blackwell. FHA. 1938. Underwriting manual. Washington, DC: Federal Housing Administration. Flood, J. 2010. The fires: How a computer formula, big ideas, and the best of intentions burned down New York City – and determined the future of cities. New York: Riverhead Books. Gans, H.J. 1996. From ‘underclass’ to ‘undercaste’: Some observations about the future of the post-industrial economy and its major victims, in Urban poverty and the underclass: A reader, edited by E. Mingione. Oxford: Blackwell, 141-152. Ganti, T. 2014 Neoliberalism. Annual Review of Anthropology, 43, 89-104. Gotham, K.F. 2002. Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900–2000. Albany: State University of New York Press. Gotham, K.F. 2007. Authentic New Orleans: Tourism, culture, and race in the Big Easy. New York: New York University Press. Gotham, K.F. and Greenberg, M. 2014. Crisis Cities: Disaster and Redevelopment in New York and New Orleans. Oxford: Oxford University Press Gough, J., A. Eisenschitz, with McCulloch, A. 2006. Spaces of social exclusion. Abingdon: Routledge. Greer, J. 2012. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation and the development of Residential Security Maps. Journal of Urban History, 39(2), 275-296. Grigsby, W., Baratz, M., Galster, G. and Maclennan, D. 1987. The Dynamics of Neighborhood Change and Decline. Progress in Planning, 28, 1-76. Hackworth, J. 2007. The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Harris, R. and Lewis, R. 1998. Constructing a fault(y) zone: Misrepresentations of American cities and suburbs, 1900-1950. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 88(4), 622-639. Hartman, C. and Squires, G.D. eds. 2006. There is no such thing as a natural disaster: Race, class, and hurricane Katrina. New York: Routledge. Harvey, D. 1985. The urbanization of capital. Studies in the history and theory of capitalist urbanization. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. 2009. Is this really the end of neoliberalism? The crisis and the consolidation of class power. Counterpunch, March 13-15. URL: http://www.counterpunch.org/harvey03132009.html. Hilgers, M. 2012. The historicity of the neoliberal state. Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale, 20, 8094. Hoover, E.M. and Vernon, R. 1959. Anatomy of a metropolis: The changing distribution of people and jobs within the New York metropolitan region. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hoyt, H. 1939. The structure and growth of residential neighborhoods in American cities. Washington, DC: Federal Housing Administration. Jackson, K.T. 1985. Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States. New York: Oxford University Press. Jones, D.S. 2012. Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal Policies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. King, R. 1987. Monopoly rent, residential differentiation and the second global crisis of capitalism: The case of Melbourne. Progress in Planning, 28, 196-298. Klein, N. 2007. The shock doctrine. The rise of disaster capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books. 19 Knox, P. 1991. The restless urban landscape: Economic and sociocultural change and the transformation of metropolitan Washington, DC. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81(2), 181-209. Leyshon, A. and N. Thrift 1997. Financial desertification, in Financial exclusion: Can mutuality fill the gap?, edited by J. Rossiter. London: New Policy Institute/UK Social Investment Forum, 7-11. Logan, J.R. 2006. The impact of Katrina: Race and class in storm-damaged neighborhoods. URL: http://www.s4.brown.edu/katrina/report.pdf. Mallach, A. 2005. Building a better urban future: New directions for housing policies in weak market cities. Denver: CO: Community Development Partnerships’ Network. Mallach, A. 2009. Addressing Ohio’s foreclosure crisis: Taking the next steps. Washington, DC: Brookings. Marcuse, P. 1985. Gentrification, abandonment, and displacement: Connections, causes and responses in New York City. Journal of Urban Contemporary Law, 28, 195-240. Mathew, B. 2005. Taxi! Cabs and Capitalism in New York City. New York: New Press Metzger, J.T. 2000. Planned abandonment: The neighborhood life-cycle theory and national urban policy. Housing Policy Debate, 11(1), 7-40. Mirowski, P. 2009. Defining neoliberalism, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, edited by P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 417455. Mirowski, P. and Plehwe, D. eds. 2009 The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nelson, M., Ehrenfeucht, R. and Laska, S. 2007. Planning, Plans, and People: Professional Expertise, Local Knowledge, and Governmental Action in Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans. Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research, 9(3), 23-52. Ong, A. 2007. Neoliberalism as a mobile technology. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 32, 3-8. Panitch, L. and Konings, M. 2009. Myths of neoliberal deregulation. New Left Review, 57(May-June), 67-83. Park. R.E., Burgess, E.W. and McKenzie, R.D. 1925. The city. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Peck, J. 2003. Geography and public policy. Mapping the penal state. Progress in Human Geography, 27(2), 222-232. Peck, J. 2006. Liberating the city: Between New York and New Orleans. Urban Geography, 27(8), 681-713. Peck, J. 2010. Constructions of neoliberal reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peck, J., Theodore, N. and Brenner, N. 2010. Postneoliberalism and its malcontents. Antipode, 41(1), 94-116. Pennington-Cross, A. 2002. Subprime lending in the primary and secondary markets. Journal of Housing Research, 13(1), 31–50. Plehwe, D. 2009. Introduction, in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective, edited by P. Mirowski and D. Plehwe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-42. Reardon, K.M. 2006. The shifting landscape of New Orleans. Progressive Planning Magazine, 146(Spring), 15-20. Reid, C. 2011. The Neighborhood Stabilization Program: Strategically targeting public investments. Community Investments, 23(1), 23-33. RERC 1975. The dynamics of neighborhood change. Chicago, IL/Washington DC: Real Estate Research Corporation/Department of Housing and Urban Development. Rhodes, J. 2010. Managing the parameters of visibility: The revelations of Katrina. Urban Studies, 47(10), 2051-2068. Rybczynski, W. 1995. Downsizing cities: to make cities work better, make them smaller. The Atlantic Monthly, 276(4), 36-47. Shiffman, R. 2005. New Orleans & New York: Planned shrinkage vs the self-regeneration of neighborhoods. Social Policy, 36(2), 14-16. 20 Smith, N. 1996. The New Urban Frontier. Gentrification and the Revanchist City. London: Routledge Smith, N. 1998. Giuliani time: The revanchist 1990s. Social Text, 57(4), 1–20. Springer, S. 2009. Culture of violence or violent Orientalism? Neoliberalisation and imagining the ‘savage other’ in posttransitional Cambodia. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 34, 305-319. Squires, G.D. ed. 2004. Why the Poor Pay More: How to Stop Predatory Lending. Westport, CT: Praeger. Starr, R. 1967. Urban Choices: The City and its Critics. Baltimore: Penguin Books. Starr, R. 1976. Making New York smaller. The New York Times, November 14: 32-33 & 99-106. Szanton, P.L. 1972. Analysis and urban government: Experience of the New York City-Rand Institute. Policy Sciences, 3, 153-161. Temkin, K. and Rohe, W. 1996. Neighborhood change and urban policy. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 15(3), 159–170. ULI. 2005. Executive summary of key recommendations. A strategy for rebuilding New Orleans, Louisiana. Washington, DC: The Urban Land Institute. Valdés, J.G. 1995. Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School of Economics in Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wacquant, L. 1996. Red Belt, Black Belt: Racial division, class inequality and the state in the French urban periphery and the American ghetto, in Urban poverty and the underclass: A reader, edited by E. Mingione. Oxford: Blackwell, 234-274. Wacquant, L. 2008. Urban outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge: Polity. Wacquant, L. 2012. Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliberalism. Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale, 20, 66-79. Wallace, D. and Wallace, R. 1998. A plague on your houses: How New York City was burned down and national public health crumbled. New York: Verso. Weinstein, A.C. 2008. The subprime mortgage crisis and local government: Immediate and future challenges. Municipal Lawyer, 49(3), 259-275. Wilson, D. 2004. Toward a contingent urban neoliberalism. Urban Geography, 25(8), 771-783. Wolf-Powers, L. 2007. Is New Orleans a shrinking city? Places, 19(1), 87-90.