W
O R K
G L O B E L I C S
I N G
P A P E R S
E R I E S
THE GLOBAL NETWORK FOR ECONOMICS OF LEARNING,
I N N O V AT I O N , A N D C O M P E T E N C E B U I L D I N G S Y S T E M
A policy model to foster
coevolutionary processes of science,
technology and innovation: the
Mexican case
Gabriela Dutrénit,
Martín Puchet Anyul,
Luis Sanz-Menendez, Morris Teubal
and Alexandre O. Vera-Cruz
Working Paper
No. 2008-03
ISBN: 978-87-92923-05-9
www.globelics.org
GLOBELICS
A policy model to foster coevolutionary processes of
science, technology and innovation: the Mexican case
Gabriela Dutrénit
UAM-X, Mexico
gdutrenit@laneta.apc.org
Martín Puchet Anyul
UNAM, Mexico
anyul@servidor.unam.mx
Luis Sanz-Menendez
CSIC, Spain
lsanz@iesam.csic.es
Morris Teubal
Hebrew University, Israel
msmorris@mscc.huji.ac.il
Alexandre O. Vera-Cruz
UAM-X, Mexico
veracruz@correo.xoc.uam.mx
Abstract
This paper argues that in the context of the knowledge economy the coevolution of S&T and
Innovation is crucial for developing countries. Two features limit such coevolution in this type of
countries: (i) the conditions for generating variation, selection and retention (VSR) processes in
both arenas are still incipient, there is neither the required size nor the diversity of agents and
organizations, and (ii) even though there are links between the agents and functioning structures,
they hardly generate bidirectional causal mechanisms. A set of policies are required to stimulate a
coevolutionary process of S&T and Innovation; they should focus on the capabilities and
institutions that are required for the emergence of the initial conditions and the promotion of new
processes.
Drawing on the Systems-Evolutionary Perspective, and based on a comprehensive assessment of
the Mexican STI policy 2000-2006, this paper discusses the failures to build virtuous
coevolutionary processes of S&T and Innovation and suggests a three stage STI policy design to
strengthen the VSR processes and the bidirectional causal mechanisms that contribute to such
coevolutive processes.
Key Words:
coevolution, innovation, science and technology, development, structural change, policies, Mexico, Israel
JEL classification: 011, 012, 014, 025, 031, 038, 053, 054, 057, L21, C20
3
1 Introduction1
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the coevolution between the science and
Technology (S&T) 2 and Innovation (Innov) arenas from a developing country’s
perspective. It argues that in the context of the knowledge economy the coevolution of
these arenas is crucial for this type of countries to transit to a development process.
The discovery that some Japanese firms as well as firms from Korea and other newly
industrializing countries could compete successfully with their United States
counterparts contributed to focus the attention of scholars and policy makers on the
conditions of a successful catching up process. From the 1980s there has been a sudden
increase of books and papers focusing on the function of S&T and Innov, and on their
interrelations, for the development processes. In spite of the number of works tackling
this issue, there is no work in the literature addressing specifically the problems of the
coevolution between S&T and Innov, and also there is no conclusive historical evidence
of the existence of a process of coevolution between these arenas in the postwar
catching up processes. Drawing on Hobday (1995) and Kim (1997), it seems that most
of these processes were driven by an extremely acute accumulation of innovation
capabilities, which were fundamentally driven by learning from experience instead of
by science or R&D activities.
However, the conditions for catching up and development seem to have changed since
those days. There is little dispute about the argument that scientific and technological
knowledge is essential for the development process. Thulstrump (1994), for instance,
asserts that “highly efficient technologies, even low cost technologies and those adapted
for local use tend to contain a large amount of research based knowledge”. Lundvall
(1992 and 1996), in turn, clams that the fundamental resource of the modern economy is
knowledge, and suggests that knowledge and learning are more important in the current
phase of economic development than in previous historical periods. The author asserts
that “there is no alternative way to become permanently better off-besides the one of
putting learning and knowledge creation at the centre of the strategy”. (Lundvall, 1996)
Drawing on these arguments, it can be claimed that in previous periods coevolution
between S&T and Innov was not crucial for development, but at the moment is
A previous version of this document was presented in the IV Globelics Annual Conference “Innovation,
Systems for Competitiveness and Shared Prosperity in Developing Countries”, India, 2006; later it was
presented in the Atlanta Conference on Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy, Atlanta, USA, 2007,
and a shorter version will appear as Dutrénit, G. et al, “Coevolution of science and technology and
innovation: a three stage model of policies based on the Mexican case”, in Susan E. Cozzens and Elena
Berger Harari (Eds), 2007 Atlanta Conference on Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy,
Piscataway, NJ: IEEE, (forthcoming).
2
This paper integrates science and technology in a single population, which is called S&T and
differentiates it from the other population that is innov. The authors are aware that there are important
differences between science and technology; in fact an advance in science is not automatically translated
in to an advance in technology and vice-versa. In addition, the business sector, which is the actor of the
Innov activities, also generates technological knowledge, so technology could be treated also jointly with
Innov. However, in terms of policies, it was considered important to distinguish the arena of Innov,
associated exclusively with the business sector, from the arenas of science.
1
4
dramatically needed to sustain knowledge based 3 innovations and train the human
resources, both of which are required for the transit of many countries into the
development process.
There is a body of work that discusses the problems of coevolution between different
populations. In this direction, Nelson (1994) discusses coevolution between technology,
industry and institutions; Murray (2002) between Industries and National Institutions;
Murmam (2003) analyses Industries and Academic Disciplines; Metcalfe, James and
Mina (2005) discuss coevolution between clinical knowledge and technological
capabilities of the medical innovation system; and Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006) relate
Public Policy with technological Innovation as well as Public Policy with Economic
Development in technologically innovative regions.
In the same line and based on the evidence that emerge from the Israeli case,
Avnimelech and Teubal (2005 and 2008) analyse the coevolution of STI and Policies in
high tech industries, and propose a type of life cycle model to foster innovation and the
domestic venture capital industry. This model consists of three phases, from promoting
business sector R&D, to the creation of a critical mass of start-up companies, and to the
targeting of venture capital industry. Over time, direct and indirect support to the
business sector R&D is required, but the combination of both and the appropriate
measures evolve to satisfy new demands.
The Avnimelech and Teubal’s (2005 and 2008) model is more directly applicable to
countries, which have a quite strong S&T infrastructure. However, looking at most of
the developing countries, with narrow S&T infrastructure, weak institutional building,
biases in the incentive structures that affect the agents conduct, and dramatic social
needs, such models should include the coevolution of: (i) S&T, and (ii) Innovation.
They should consider more explicitly the strengthening of the S&T bases, changes in
the regulatory framework and in the existent incentive structure, a broader focus on
horizontal support and targeted industries, combining high tech with other technologies
associated with revealed advantages and social needs.
Moreover, in developing countries there are two features that shape a coevolutionary
model of S&T and Innov: (i) the conditions for generating variation, selection and
retention (VSR) processes in both arenas are still incipient, there is neither the required
size nor the diversity of agents and organizations, and (ii) the initial conditions show
that even though there are links between the agents and functioning structures in both
group of activities, they do not generate coevolutionary processes. Thus a
coevolutionary process of S&T and Innov should focus on: (i) the capabilities, which
are required for the emergence of the initial conditions for coevolutionary processes of
S&T and Innov, and (ii) the institutions, which should change to move from the current
linear model of STI to a coevolutionary one. This change from a linear to a non-linear
structure requires a set of policies for both groups of activities.
3
Freeman and Louçã (2001) analyses the interdependence and coevolution of science, technology,
economy, policy and culture in England to explain the upsurge of the industrial revolution. However, not
being the objective of his work to analyze the co evolution between science, technology and innovation, it
offers several insights suggesting that such coevolution was crucial for the development of England and
will keep being crucial for further development processes.
5
Drawing on the Systems-Evolutionary Perspective, and based on a comprehensive
assessment of the Mexican Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policy 20002006, this paper discusses the failures to build virtuous coevolutionary processes of
S&T and Innov and suggests a three phases STI policy design to strengthen the VSR
processes and the bidirectional causal mechanisms that contribute to such coevolutive
processes.
After this introduction, Section 2 describes the conceptual bases of a coevolutionary
model of S&T and Innov. Section 3 discusses key aspects of a dynamic coevolutionary
model of S&T and Innov. Section 4 summarizes an assessment of the Mexican
Innovation System and of the STI policy implemented in the last 6 years and discusses
the difficulties to build virtuous coevolutionary processes. Based on this assessment,
section 5 proposes a STI policy to generate and foster a coevolutionary model. Section 6
presents some final reflections.
2 A coevolutionary approach to S&T and Innov
There is a growing literature that applies coevolutionary concepts to the study of socioeconomic systems, although challenging issues for transferring evolutionary concepts
and insights from the biological to the social arenas have been recognized (Nelson,
1995, van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). Evolutionary models became popular in the
organization and management theory, the innovation theory and the science policy
theory since the late 1970s (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 and 1984; Aldrich, 1979; Nelson
& Winter, 1982; McKelvey, 1982; Langton, 1984; Metcalfe, 1995). 4 Initially the
authors began to focus on selection processes rather than agent’s intentions in
explaining organizational outcomes. Later on, coevolutionary arguments began to
receive more attention (Norgaard, 1984 and 1994; Eisenhardt and Galunic, 2000;
McKelvey, 1999; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Baum and McKelvey, 1999; Levinthal
and Myatt, 1995; March, 1994). This section describes the conceptual bases of the
coevolutionary models, and analyzes the key features of the Science and Technology
(S&T) and Innovation (Innov) populations and a set of institutional aspects of Science,
Technology and Innovation (STI).
2.1 The bases of coevolutionary models
The standard evolutionary approach draws on a concatenation of three general causal
processes (variation, selection and retention) introduced by Campbell (1969)’s model of
change. The struggle over scarce resources is seen as a fourth process in the case of the
social and economic evolution (Sotarauta and Srinivas, 2006: Aldrich, 2001).5
Variation, as the introduction of new entities, may be intentional, and so an actively
generated alternative and solution to a problem, or blind and driven by environmental
4
Winder, McIntosh and Jeffrey (2005) discuss the differences between a mechanistic versus an
evolutionary dynamics focus.
5
Struggle occurs within organizations as their members pursue individual goals, and within economies as
various organizations pursue their own goals, and between economies each pursuing their own goals.
Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006) argue that the struggle over scarce resources may lead to new varieties.
6
selection pressures. The selection process happens in a specific environment, which
includes market and a set of non-market factors (especially institutions); it can be
originated in two ways, first, there are forces that lead to differential selection, and,
second, it can be a selective elimination of certain types of variations.6 The evolutionary
approach stresses adaptation to the selection environment, and as most ecological
studies, it tends to ignore strategies and intentions of individual actors or collectives.
The retention process involves the mechanisms for preserving, duplicating, or otherwise
reproducing selected variations, so that the selected activities are repeated on future
occasions or the selected activities appear again in future. Following Zollo and Winter
(2002), replication is also an important concept in the evolutionary models; it refers to
the process in which new selected variations are replicated elsewhere, in another
organization or in another location, i.e. in those populations that may utilize them.
Variation, selection and retention are causal processes that explain how outcomes are
produced from a given set of conditions including resources, incentives and other
framework conditions. Very specific features of the environment frequently influence
the trajectory of a population. Because environments differ, the same causal process can
produce very different outcomes. Thus, in this approach the environment drives the
evolution of the populations.
Since Campbell (1969)’s contribution, it has been recognized that evolutionary
explanations apply to all phenomena that can be conceptualized as a variation and
selective retention system, such as science and technology policies, public science
system, university system, and science and technology system.
Coevolution refers to the evolution of different populations that are causally linked.
Originally coevolution was confined to two populations; according to that a
coevolutionary explanation requires two conditions: first, two analytically separable
populations, each of which experiences variation, selection and retention processes, and,
second, the evolution of one population influences the evolutionary path of the other.
Later on, authors had also analyzed the coevolution between several populations,
various levels within population, and in terms of populations and/or their environments.
In this coevolutionary approach, and by introducing a complex systems’ view, the
actions of human agents in the coevolving populations to some extent shape their own
selection environment.
A coevolutionary process could be either beneficial or risky for the populations
involved; this depends on the particular causal relationship that links the parties.
Biological ecologists have thought extensively about the relationship between different
populations and they have identified six possible kinds of pair-wise interactions or
processes: competition, predation, neutralism, mutualism, commensalisms and
amensalism. (Murmman, 2002)
Even though it is already recognized that coevolution involves reciprocal causation
between the evolving partners, there is limited knowledge about the precise causal
6
As argued by Nelson and Winter (1982), the concept of the selection environment directs attention to
the fact that the intentional adaptation or a decision not to adopt often involves firm and inhabitant
preferences, government policies and/or a wide set of market factors that range from macroeconomic
conditions to the leadership of individual companies.
7
mechanisms that bring about coevolution. The conditions for the coevolution of the
S&T and Innov populations have not been analyzed in the literature.
2.2 The coevolutionary features of the S&T and Innov populations
According to Volberda and Lewin (2003), coevolutionary studies should specify actors
in terms of replicators (e.g., routines, capabilities) and interactors (e.g., individuals,
units, organizations); processes in terms of variation, selection, and retention; and
outcomes that result in a change of the emergent composition of a population over time.
Following Murmman’s (2003) recommendations, to know whether the variation,
selection and retention model possesses explanatory power in the selected populations the S&T and Innov, this section focuses on the S&T and Innov arenas and discusses:
how new variants are introduced into these arenas, how consistent selection pressures
are generated that eliminate some variants, and how the selected variants are retained
over time to serve as the raw material for a new set of variants.
S&T and Innov are two activities that transform capabilities into outputs, thus the
populations can be defined in both terms –capabilities and outputs. Two levels of
analysis of the populations can be identified: individual and organizational.7 This paper
focuses on the populations of capabilities of S&T and Innov at individual level (Table
1).
Table 1 The S&T and Innov populations at individual level
8
Activities
Capabilities
Outputs
S&T
Researchers
Innov
Engineers & technicians (including doctors
in science and engineering) involved in
innovation activities.
Ideas that are expressed in papers, patents,
reports etc.
Product, process, services and
organizational innovations, Trademarks,
Patents, etc.
The processes that introduce new variations into the population of researchers are
constituted by the increase in the number of S&T human resources, the creation of
positions for new researchers in existent and emergent fields, particularly those focused
on social needs,9 and the present incentives to stimulate the existent researchers to enter
in emergent fields and the creation of research group in existent and emergent fields,
and by social and cultural environment. The selection process comes about because a set
7
At organizational level, the population of S&T is integrated by research centers and universities, and the
population of Innov by innovative firms. As the systems mature, monitoring at organizational level is
more important than at individual level. But, when the institutional structures are still immature, as in the
developing countries case, it is more relevant to map the individuals.
8
Some indicators to measure the S&T population could be: Size, Type of capacities (curiosity-driven
research vs. problem-oriented research, categories of the researchers, disciplines), and Patterns of
behaviors (production of papers instead of books, interaction academy-industry, etc.). Indicators for Innov
population could be: Size, Type of capabilities, BERD, and Patterns of behaviors (innovativeness,
interaction academy-industry, access to public grants for innovation, hiring of PhD).
9
As asserted by Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006) for the Indian case, “While external mechanisms like the
new multilateral trading rules, including changes in intellectual property regimes, had a selecting
influence on specific technologies and S&T institutions, a more important potential selector is basic social
needs. In India, the dialogues about innovation have been more reactive to the West, and there has been
less of an exploration of local markets and local needs—for example, basic infrastructure, vaccines or
disaster warning and relief systems (for pharmaceutical and biotech).”
8
of researchers submits and grants projects in competitive research funds, applies to be
members of the National System of Researchers and is recognized by this organization
as researchers,10 and submits and publishes papers in peer review journals. Framework
conditions and the existent social norms in relation to STI determine what is socially
accepted and affect the relationships between the STI Council and the academic
research, shaping the selection process. The existence of permanent post with
competitive income, the availability of resources for research, the prestige of the
universities or research centers where they work, and also framework conditions and the
particular social norms affect the retention process. What evolves when a researchers
population changes is the frequency with which more researchers adopt internationally
recognized behavioral practices.
The processes that introduce new variations into the population of engineers &
technicians involved in innovation activities are constituted by the increase in the
number of trained engineers & technicians that are able to work in the productive sector
in existent and emergent fields, the creation of positions for innovation activities, and
the existent incentives to carry out R&D activities and hiring engineers & technicians
by the productive sector. The selection process comes about through submitting and
granting projects in competitive research funds oriented to the productive sector, and
submitting and granting R&D tax return. Framework conditions and the existent social
norms in relation to STI determine what is socially accepted and affect the relationships
between the STI Council and the business sector, shaping the selection process. Salaries
and stability, stimulus for developing innovation activities (e.g. administrative and
researchers carriers, innovation culture of the firms), and the prestige of the organization
constitute the retention mechanisms in the population of engineers & technicians change,
which is also affected by framework conditions and the particular social norms. What
evolves when an engineers & technicians population changes is the frequency with
which more engineers & technicians adopt internationally recognized behavioral
practices.
The environment for the variation processes in both populations is conformed by: the
educational system, the domestic and international labor market, the scientific and
technological paths, the competitive position of the national industry, and the national
postgraduate scholarship policy. The environment for the selection and retention
processes is associated with: the organization of the research, the budget for S&T, the
policy mix, the financial sector, the market structure of the hiring firms, the labor
market, the regulatory framework, the existence of innovative firms and the innovation
culture. The processes of variation, selection and retention are also influenced by
economies of scale and externalities, learning processes and the culture.
The coevolution of the S&T and Innov populations depends on the existence of bidirectional causal mechanisms that link the evolutionary trajectory of S&T and of Innov.
These mechanisms causally affect some of the variation, selection and retention
processes in each population. If the evolution of S&T and Innov is causally linked, thus
we can argue that there should be coevolution of both populations.
Following Murmman (2002), four types of relationships qualify as an example of
coevolution of S&T and Innov, and can be seen as bidirectional causal mechanisms,
10
The SNI (for its Spanish name) constitutes an important economic incentive as there is a montly
payment to its members that represents a high share of the researchers’ total income.
9
because the causation runs both ways between the two populations: (i) Competition:
each population inhibits the other (e.g. competition between private and public
laboratories based on prices), (ii) Predator/host: one of the populations exploits the other
population (e.g. engineers & technicians of the private sector get benefit from
knowledge of researchers through research contract or informal contacts, or researchers
get benefit from the knowledge acquired through interaction with engineers &
technicians to write papers or develop new patents), (iii) Neutralism: neither population
affects the other, thus it can be evolution of each population but not coevolution of both,
and (iv) Cooperation: interaction is favorable to both (named mutualism in the
literature). For instance, in the case of the cooperation, four significant causal
mechanisms link the evolutionary trajectory of S&T and Innov: the mobility of human
resources (PhD students, technicians and researchers), training of human resources, the
exchange of knowledge by formal means (contracts, seminars, stays) and informal
networks, and lobbying by each on behalf of the other. These causal mechanisms bring
about coevolution as they affect the variation, selection and retention processes that
transform S&T as well as those that transform Innov.11
2.3 Institutional aspects of the coevolution of S&T and Innov
An institutional approach would contribute to understand how conditions for the
operation of coevolutionary processes are generated. We need to understand: (i) What
institutions favor VSR processes?, (ii) What institutions favor positive bi-directional
mechanisms and which hamper the negative ones?, and (iii) How to move from one
structure to another that allows coevolution?
The behavior of the co-evolving populations is governed by a set of norms that they
have internalized over time, and is also influenced by restrictions associated to these
norms. It is worth to differentiate between those norms that shape informal institutions
by routines, habits, codes and agents’ modes of behavior, and the formal institutions
that emanate from constitutions, laws or regulations and set up the game rules. Both
norms and game rules condition the VSR processes.
What institutions favor the VSR processes? The variation process, in terms of the
diversity of behaviors and rationalities, is institutionally conditioned. For instance, if the
norm of ‘publish or perish’ has been introduced in the population of researchers, and at
the same time it was strengthened by incentives derived from specific rules, thus the
emergence of other behaviors associated with taking risks to explore new ways of
knowledge production is difficult. Along the same line, if the idea that only low cost
minor innovations are required to reach high benefits was introduced in the engineers &
technicians population, it is difficult to generate behaviors associated with evaluating
the risks of the emergence of competitors with higher innovation capacities.
The selection and retention processes of certain type of agents within the populations
are also highly determined for the institutions. They act as filters for the expansion of
certain agents in relation to others. For instance, the scholarships in the case of the
researchers’ population and the R&D fiscal benefits in the engineers & technicians’
population are some of the bases for the selection process, which usually are more
11
See Murmman (2002) for the case of Industries and National Institutions, and Murmam (2003) for the
case of Industries and Academic Disciplines.
10
demanding and have more capacity to distinguish between different competitors than
the natural selection.
What institutions favor positives bi-directional mechanisms and which hamper the
negatives ones? Those institutions located in the interface between universities and
firms are the main generators of rules to favor bidirectional mechanisms between both
populations. Some of the main characteristics of these intermediary institutions that
explain this role are: (i) they are created through agreements between producers and
users, for instance between academic research groups and engineers & technicians
groups; (ii) they clearly define the role played by the different agents –producers and
users- in their creation; these agents also fix the operation rules; and (iii) they establish
specific rules in relation to the participation that the personnel from the producers and
users can play.
How to move from one structure to another that allows coevolution? The transit from a
situation without coevolutive processes towards another where those coevolutive
processes are generalized requires an institutional change. In particular, it is called for
the emergence and consolidation of those institutions that favor the VSR processes and
the bidirectional mechanisms.
3 Coevolution of S&T and Innov: towards a dynamic model
This section discusses key aspects of a dynamic coevolutionary model of S&T and
Innov. Two equilibrium points based on coevolutionary processes are discussed, first, a
low level equilibrium trap (LLET), and second, a high level equilibrium point that can
only be reached by a strong Government Investment in STI and institutional changes.
Graph 1 illustrates these two equilibrium points.
3.1 A basic coevolutionary process of S&T and Innov
If S&T and Innov are two populations that evolve, and there are links between the
evolution of both populations, a basic model of coevolution of S&T and Innov can be
based on the following functions: (i) S&T= f(Innov), and (ii) Innov=g(S&T). In these
functions, S&T depend on Innov, and Innov depends on the levels of S&T.12 The link
between the two variables in the two functions is a complex matter since it involves
both a push [Innov=g(S&T)] and a pull [S&T= f(Innov)] component. This means that
there are both elements of efficiency -e.g. in the production of S&T and possibly in
generating those types of S&T, which favor Innov (S&T includes training of skilled
manpower for innovation), and elements of reactivity or interactivity between the two
realms that is to what extent Innov will respond to the new opportunities opened up by
S&T. Both elements would comprise the push effect underlying the equation
Innov=g(S&T).13
12
It is important to distinguish between the activities of S&T and of Innov, on the one hand, and the
levels, on the other, of a specific variable S&T that measures some scientific and technological activity or
Innov that measures an innovation activity.
13
Further research is needed to sort the ‘primitive’ relationships associated with both efficiency and
reactivity in both push and pull.
11
An even more realistic model would make that Innov depend not only on the levels of
S&T but also on the change or rate of change (d(S&T)/dt) to consider the possibility
that the addition, or ‘delta’ of S&T, has a greater affinity to Innov than in the first
model. This could result from more established areas (thus enhancing greater Innov
reactivity); or when the most recent changes in S&T were accompanied by changes in
governance of S&T in such a way that it may be easier than before for researchers
involved in S&T to be more directly involved in Innov activities. This change also
means that, for any level of S&T, Innov reactivity would be increased this time in what
seems to be a more direct way (i.e. if those directly involved in S&T will do Innov).
The SW quadrant of Graph 1 illustrates this basic model; its equilibrium point is
reached in LLET. The S&T and Innov curves, below the LLET equilibrium point,
incorporates what would be “decreasing returns” (e.g to induce a certain ‘delta’ of
Innov you need increasing ‘deltas’ of S&T, or the higher the level of S&T the more
‘delta’ of S&T is needed to induce a unit increase in Innov). Also to induce a unit
increase in S&T you need increasing amounts of Innov (i.e. the higher the level of
Innov, the higher the increase in Innov you need to induce a unitary increase in S&T).
System failures are observed when the amount of S&T is below S&T* and/or Innov is
below Innov*.
In terms of the coevolutive approach, the existence of decreasing returns is associated
with both populations’ characteristics. Particularly, the relative reduced size of the
populations, as illustrated by the position of the LLET point and even M* point in
Graph 1, make it difficult to have a high degree of variation between the individuals. At
the same time, the small scale makes the emergence of links between the populations
less likely, which could conduct to increasing returns. In other terms, when there are
high variation and virtuous bidirectional mechanisms between the populations, it is
possible that more increasing return links come out. But when a reduced variation does
not allow a high expansion of the researchers working in academic institutions, this
originates an increase of the engineers & technicians working in firms less than
proportional. At the same time, the limited size of the engineers & technicians
population and the lack of links also determine that their expansion would also induce a
less than proportional increase of the researchers. The scattered curves show scarce
variation processes and limited bidirectional links, which are interpreted by functions of
interaction between S&T and Innov capabilities with decreasing returns.
Graph 1 Phase diagram of a coevolutionary process
ST
ST´
I
M*
I´
ST*
LLET
ST
ST
I
I*
I
12
The slope of the g(S&T) curve is greater than the slope of the f(Innov) curve at the
point of intersection. The equilibrium point is named low level equilibrium trap (LLET).
In this point, to increase Innov by a unit you need a greater amount of S&T than that
amount of S&T that will be induced by such a unit increase in Innov. This condition
explains why the system is stable, in fact LLET is a stable equilibrium; there would be
a coevolutionary process that conducts to this point, but the system will not move
further from this point. That is why this is a low-level equilibrium trap. No
coevolutionary process can move the system further from LLET, this is an attraction
point. This shows the existence of some S&T capabilities and some Innov, but they
cannot move significantly forward.
The positive difference between the marginal returns of Innov as a function of S&T, in
relation to that observed by the S&T as a function of Innov, is explained by the
immaturity of the NIS. This feature of the system could be determined by a higher
capacity of the Innov population to transform the input of the S&T population than vice
versa.
This disparity of the marginal returns is based on the differences observed in the
selection and retention processes of both populations. The survival of a researcher is
tightly related to the production of papers, which do not usually require many links with
firms. These selection conditions suppose that the effect of S&T on Innov is less than
proportional both in average and between marginal increases. Along the same line, the
survival of an engineer or technician depends on his skills to generate product or
process improvements that increase the benefit in the short-time. This usually does not
require links with academic institutions. In the same way, this selection explains why
the effect of Innov over S&T is less than proportional both in average and between
marginal increases.
The marginal returns associated with Innov over S&T are lower than those generated
by S&T over Innov. In coevolutive terms, this means that the selection and retention
processes of the researchers’ population tend to generate more links towards the
engineers & technicians’ population than vice versa. These features of the selection and
retention processes are usually associated with the conditions of developing countries,
and contribute to explain why in this type of economies the magnitudes of S&T and
Innov are located in the scattered boxing ring. The coevolutive pattern described above
would explain those NIS that can be represented by the scattered curves in Graph 1.
This coevolutive pattern explains the dynamic around LLET that characterizes the
developing countries, in other words, it explains a trap of low growth.
Despite a measure of S&T and Innov coevolution below the LLET, the overall NIS
exhibits a sort of Dynamic Decreasing Returns. In other words, in the area within the
two curves below the LLET equilibrium point, an increase in S&T will bring about an
increase in Innov and this will increase S&T. But this process will lose vigor (smaller
increases over time) and eventually come to a standstill. With a higher Innov curve,
which means that the cost of Innov is higher in terms of S&T, or a lower S&T curve, as
13
a result of the increase of the costs of S&T in terms of Innov, the LLET will be reached
at lower levels of S&T and Innov.
In the basic model of coevolution of S&T and Innov described above, the only way to
increase S&T and Innov would be with permanent government support, which would
shift the curves upwards (curves depend on how much of the permanent support goes to
S&T and how much to Innov). In other words, the system by itself will not grow, and
any one-shot support will only lead to temporary increases in activity, which will end
once such a support is withheld, the system thereafter returning to the LLET.
The only way to spark a new and more dynamic (or even permanent) coevolutionary
process is by transforming the process into one characterized by Dynamic Increasing
Returns. This could be visualized in terms of generating a new set of curves from the
LLET point with the slope of the Innov curve being lower than the slope of the S&T
curve. This means that the S&T curve would look like sloping upwards at an increasing
rate while the Innov curve would look sloping upwards at a decreasing rate.
The new set of curves starts at the LLET point and would intersect at a new point,
which can be named the critical mass point (M*). The system will not automatically
shift from LLET to M*, since any deviation from LLET will make the system return to
this point. What is needed is a discrete increase both in S&T and in Innov to shift the
system to M*. Once this takes place, a new process of virtuous coevolution will start.
3.2 The required changes to transform the model
The above is a very simple model but it is highly suggestive. The shift from the LLET
to M* requires three types of events: (i) a shift in both the S&T and Innov curves in the
direction mentioned above, (ii) a big push in Government investment in both S&T and
Innov in order to arrive at a point where a new virtuous coevolutionary process will start,
and (iii) a set of policies to sustain the coevolutionary process. The former requires an
increase in the efficiency and Governance of STI (policy may have a strong effect on
it); the later an explicit Government attempt at triggering or sparking the new
coevolutionary process. Thus, in order to reach the M* point, a set of policies are
required to spark or trigger the process. But, after reaching the M* point, it is necessary
to sustain the coevolutive process.
i) Increases in efficiency of S&T and Innov and in its Governance (maybe also
broader institutional changes)
S&T and Innov should become more efficient and more reactive; this means a new S&T
function which lies above the old S&T function (e.g. starting from the LLET) and a new
Innov function which lies below the old Innov function. But this is not enough; it is also
necessary that at M*, the slope of the S&T curve is higher than that of the Innov curve,
which means that a unit increase in Innov requires less ‘delta’ S&T than the ‘delta’ S&T
induced by this increase in Innov. This is the condition for virtuous coevolution to take
off starting from M* in the NE direction (i.e. in the space between the two curves
starting at M*).
14
How to achieve this? The selection and variation processes of both populations and the
capacity to generate bidirectional mechanisms between them should change to generate
the conditions in order for the Dynamic Decreasing Returns move towards the Dynamic
Increasing Returns. This change will also depend on other norms that not only induce
the ‘publish or perish’ behavior by researchers or the introduction of minor innovations
to reach short-term benefits by engineers & technicians. Changes in governance of
Universities seem to be crucial, such as greater power of young professors in ICT areas
in setting priorities for allocation of funds to teaching and research; changes in the
status of University professors from Government employees to employees of
semipublic organizations; changes in the distribution of receipts from the patents and
the licensing of technology between the University, the Department and the researcher;
legal reforms to facilitate professors setting up start up companies and having these
companies use indivisible equipment and services at universities, etc. A big challenge
would be to identify a small number of profiles of University systems and University
Governance in order to ascertain possible implications for shifting beyond the LLET
point.
ii) A discrete increase in resources by the Government to shift the state from
LLET to M*.
The jump from LLET to M* depends on the increase of the variation in both
populations. The number of researchers and engineers & technicians should increase
notably. A simultaneous effort and a strong one might be necessary, which should be
distinguished from a routine, day by day effort of maintaining the system operation.
What is required is a strong government investment in STI, over and beyond the current
budget, which should be maintained at least for a short while. This may require a
change in the governance of STI policy, with a more balanced division of powers
between Ministries of treasury on the one hand and on inter-Ministerial committees
dealing globally with STI on the other.
iii) Policies to sustain the coevolutionary process
To reach the M* point policies 'to spark or trigger the process' are required. Once the
M* point is reached, a set of policies 'to sustain the coevolutive process’ are also
required. Moreover, it is necessary to design policies to overcome the M* point.
According to the initial conditions of S&T and Innov, it is essential to identify the
adequate policy mix to generate a new set of curves that should intercept in the M*
point. This issue requires further analysis.
The above arguments suggest that non-virtuous S&T and Innov coevolutionary process
will happen if the Government puts more money without institutional/governance
changes; or it introduces purely institutional changes without a significant investment in
resources. Piecemeal policies will bring only temporary relief without setting the STI
system into a new, largely endogenous, coevolutionary trajectory. Only both conditions
make sure that a new S&T and Innov coevolutionary process is triggered and that the
system failures that block the growth and endogeneization of STI is overcome.
15
4 The difficulties to build virtuous
processes in the Mexican case
coevolutionary
The analysis of the difficulties to build virtuous coevolutionary processes of S&T and
Innov in the Mexican case is drawn on a comprehensive assessment of the Mexican key
economic and social problems, the main characteristics of the NIS and the STI policy in
this decade.
Mexico has five key economic and social problems: (i) low rates of growth in the last
decades; (ii) an export specialization in medium and high tech industries linked to
global chains, but with low R&D activities in Mexico; (iii) a trend towards
competitiveness reduction; (iv) some international niches in industries based on natural
resources, but which still do not compete on the bases of technology; and (v) high
inequality and poverty. Overall, these key economic and social problems contribute to
shape the NIS. Its performance is largely influenced by the evolution of the S&T and
Innov populations. They have evolved slowly, as comparing to international trends, and
at different pace and direction. Moreover, these populations confront serious difficulties
to build bidirectional mechanisms.
This section sketches the key features that shape the evolutionary path of S&T and
Innov populations and the evidence related to the difficulties to build coevolutionary
processes, the initial conditions of an extremely low level equilibrium trap and the
context and the institutional setting for the selection process.
4.1 Weaknesses of the VSR processes and the bidirectional causal
mechanisms
The VSR processes of both populations are influenced by very specific features of the
environment, so they have to adapt themselves to it. Thus in some way the environment
drives the evolution of the populations. A main factor of the selection environment that
influences those processes is the limited political and social priority that government
and society have traditionally assigned to STI. This is reflected in the low levels of
investment –relative to international standards- in such activities by the different agents
of the NSI. According to the goals set at the Special Programme for S&T 2001-2006
(PECYT for its name in Spanish), national expenditure in STI had to reach levels
equivalent to 1.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2006 14 ; Gross Domestic
Expenditure on R&D (GERD), in turn, had to reach 1.0% of GDP. Figures show that
from the 1980s, Federal Expenditure in S&T (FES&T) and GERD have levelled below
0.5% of the GD –see Graph 2, thus considerable gaps remain in meeting such goals. In
addition, the Mexican effort is far below the international level. The stagnating trend in
the public investment in STI has been accompanied by an unbalanced distribution of
resources among STI activities in detriment of innovation, particularly in the case of the
budget managed by the National Council of Science and Technology (CONACYT for
its name in Spanish), as analysed below.
14
National expenditure in STI includes the investments by the private, public and social sectors in R&D,
postgraduate education and S&T services in a given year.
16
Graph 2 Evolution of GERD/GDP and Federal Expenditure in S&
&T/GDP, 1980-2005 (%)
3.00
USA
2.50
% GDP
2.00
China
1.50
Spain
1.00
0.50
0.00
1980
Mexico
FES&T
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
YEAR
Note: FES&T/GDP: Federal Expenditure in S&T as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product;
GERD/GDP: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as percentage of the Gross Domestic Product.
Source: CONACYT
The variation process
1. S&T population
The processes that introduce new variations into the S&T population can be illustrated
by the evolution of the number of academic researchers, the trend of the supply of S&T
postgraduates, the geographical and institutional distribution, and a set of incentives to
stimulate the existent researchers to enter emergent fields and the creation of research
group based on new forms of knowledge production
Slow increase in the number of academic researchers. The academic community has
grown over time at the pace of the population and employment. But as the initial
conditions in the beginning of the 1990s were of a small community according to the
size of the economy, the population and their needs, still it is. Being 23,000 individuals,
they represent only 0.5% of thousand employments (see Graph 3). This amount and
percentage is low as comparing to Korea, Spain and other well behaved economies. The
academic researchers represent 83.8% of the total of researchers, which denotes an
academics focus of the R&D activities in Mexico.
Strong stimulus to increase the supply of S&T postgraduates by means of
scholarships. From 1971 on CONACYT has sponsored 136,000 scholarships for
postgraduate studies in Mexico and abroad (Graph 3). There has been an increase in the
number of scholarships assigned in Mexico as new postgraduate programs were
established and increased their academic quality. Scholarships have been assigned in
different disciplines and approaches, without much priorization. In 2005 this program
represented a third of the CONACYT’s budget, which suggest the importance assigned
by the STI policy to the human resources formation. Unfortunately, this financial effort
has not been matched with the creation of job positions for the retention of the
postgraduates. Even though Mexico performs well in terms of the amount of supply of
science and technology graduates as comparing to other countries, due to the size of the
population, the results in terms of annually graduated PhD in Mexico and the coverage
is less successful (OCDE, 2006).
Graph 3 Weight of the academic researchers
Graph 4 Evolution of the postgraduate
17
in the total researchers and percentage
of thousand employees, 2004
scholarships
Abroad
20,000
4.0
M exico
18,000
Spain, 3.9, 70.2
16,000
3.5
Number
14,000
3.0
12,000
10,000
2.5
8,000
6,000
2.0
Korea, 1.8, 26.4
1.5
United States, 1.8,
19.5
4,000
2,000
Mexico, 0.5, 83.8
1.0
0
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
20 03
05
e/
Academic researchers per thousand employment
4.5
0.5
0.0
0
1
2
3
4
5
Y ear
Note: The size of the circle relates to the percentage of the academic researchers in the total of researchers.
Source: CONACYT
A high geographical and institutional concentration that affects the positive
variation effect associated with the increase in the number of researchers and the
supply of highly qualified human resources. There is a high institutional and regional
concentration of the S&T capabilities, which attempt against the diversity and variation
required for academic research. In addition, such regional concentration makes it
difficult to focus on relevant problems at a local level. UNAM (Universidad Nacional
Autónoma de México) concentrates 24.6% of the academic researchers. The main
campus of the four largest institutions (UNAM, UAM –Universidad Autónoma
Metropolitana, IPN –Instituto Politécnico Nacional - and CINVESTAV – Centro de
Investigación y de Estudios Avanzados del IPN) are located in Mexico City, thus this
state concentrates more than 40% of the Mexican academic researchers. In the last 10
years there has been an important concern with the regionalization of the S&T
capabilities, as is stated in the S&T programs, but the results are still limited.
Some incentives to stimulate the existent researchers to enter emergent fields but
limited resources. At the beginning of the 2000, CONACYT introduced, reformed or
continued implementing several policy instruments and programs in support of STI
activities. In 2001 17 Sectoral Funds were established, which are operated in
conjunction with some Secretaries of State or other government organizations. They
were designed as competitive funds and promote the development and consolidation of
STI capabilities according to the strategic needs of each participating sector (e.g. basic
research, economy/innovation, energy, agriculture, etc.). 30 Regional Funds were
created with partnership from State or municipal governments, they intend to tailor STI
capacities and development projects to the local demands. These are new instruments
that can contribute to the variation process across sectors and regions. Unfortunately,
only 16.4% of the budget of 2002-2005 was allocated to the sectoral and regional funds.
Of these resources, applied research absorbed 9% and basic research 7.4%.
Incentives for the creation of research groups in existent and emergent fields. In
the last administration some actions were undertaken to promote teamwork and
networking for academic research. The calls for projects of many Sectoral and Regional
Funds contain proposals for different forms of knowledge production, including
individual and research groups. The committees that led the peer review process have
some inclination for proposal submitted by research groups. As a result, in the case of
18
the Sectoral Fund of basic science, funding for research groups has grown for 16.7% of
the total budget in 2000 to 32.4% in 2005.
2. Innov population
The processes that introduce new variations into the Innov population can be illustrated
by the direct public support to R&D and other innovation activities, the trends of the
expenditures in R&D and other innovation activities by firms, and the evolution of the
number of trained engineers & technicians that are able to work in the productive sector
in existent and emergent fields.
Limited and non-articulated direct support for innovation. Overtime, CONACYT
has lacked the capacity to promote STI among the private sector, and recent changes in
STI policy have contributed little to modify this situation. In 2002-2005, in a context of
low investment in STI, the budget of CONACYT shows a relative balance in favor of
academic researcher’s compensation and human resources formation (57.3% of its
budget), in contrast the resources for promoting innovation by the business sector are
extremely low (3.8%), basically for the Sectoral fund of economy/innovation and
AVANCE. This is a new and interesting instrument, which is oriented to promote
innovation in private firms, preferably at advanced stages of development (the last
mile); but they have received scarce resources. The most successful new instrument is
the R&D fiscal benefits, as analyzed below, which is coordinated by the Finance
Secretary. Large firms are those which mostly take advantage of it. Overall there is a
bias in favor of large firms and limited resources are assigned to stimulate innovation by
the SMEs.
ow expenditures in R&D and other
Increase of the BERD over time but still lo
innovation activities by the business sector. There has been an increase of the
business sector contribution to the GERD. The Business Enterprise Expenditure on
R&D (BERD) has doubled from 1995 to 2005; but the actual 35.4% is still below the
national target of 40% and far from the Lisbon target of 70%. Additionally, this change
in the figures of the GERD sources of funding happens in a context of stagnation of the
FES&T (see Graph 2 above). Thus the impact on the GERD as percentage of the GDP
is limited; the BERD intensity as percentage of the GDP has grown from 0.06% in 1995
to 0.16% in 2004, which is extremely low as comparing to international standards (see
Graph 5). The increase of the BERD is largely associated with the R&D tax benefit,
which has grown from $36 million dollars in 2001 to $273 in 2005. The number of
firms that claim R&D tax benefits has increased from 193, when this program was
established, to 646 in 2005. Overall, during the whole period 2001-2005, 930 different
firms have applied for, and many firms have applied in different years. The group of
R&D performers is integrated by all size of firms; however 26 large firms explain 54%
of the total. Even though this instrument has stimulated th involment of many firms in
R&T activities, the extent to what the activities can be defined as R&D activities needs
to be deeply analyzed. Particularly because the number of PhD working in the industry
and in general R&D personnel (engineers & technicians) is still very low, and there are
few R&D groups working in the business sector.
Graph 5 BERD intensity (as % of GDP)
Graph 6 Business firm researchers per thousand
employments in industry
19
14
2.5
79.9
12
2.0
2.1
1.9
2.0
1995
2000
2004 (1)
74.2
31.7
40.4
11.5
Business researchers as a
% of total researchers
10.9
10
per thousand EAP
1.6
% GDP
1.5
1.0
1995
4.2
2.4
2
1.7
0.16
1.8
0.4
United States
Korea
Spain
2004 (1)
6
0.5
1.8
2000
6.5
4
0.6
0.5
8
0.11
0.06
0.0
9.3
3.9
1.0
United States
Korea
Spain
0
Mexico
0.4
0.1
0.1
Mexico
Note: (1) 2003 for Spain
Source: OECD: Main Science and Technology Indicators database, July 2006, and CONACYT.
Increase in the number of trained engineers & technicians that are able to work in
the productive sector in existent and emergent fields. In the OCDE countries
business firm researchers continue to account for the bulk of the researcher population.
The Mexican case shows an important increase of the number of engineers &
technicians working in research related activities in the business sector, both as
percentage of thousand employments in industry (from 0.1% in 1995 to 0.4% in 2004,
see Graph 5 above), and as a percentage of total national researchers (from 10.3% to
40.4% in the same years). In fact these figures reveal that the number of engineers &
technicians have grown quicker than the academic researchers.15 However, the figures
are still very low in comparison to international trends.
The selection process
1. S&T population
The selection process in the S&T population can be illustrated through the procedures
and number of researchers nominated by the National System of Researchers, the use of
competitive funds to allocate research resources, and the evolution of publications in ISI
journals.
Researchers at the National System of Researchers. The number of researchers
recognized by the National System of Researchers (SNI by its Spanish name) has grown
fast (see Graph 7),16 however there are only 12,096 of the 23,000 academic researchers
recognized by the SNI, mostly government researchers in universities and public
research centers. In addition, there is a trend to the ageing of the research community, as
the hiring of young researchers is much slower that than the retirement of mature
researchers’. The reduced size does not allow the required variety to sustain a robust
15
The oficial data provides this trend, which is far away of the S&T community imaginary. Perhaps
statistical problems are generating bias, such as a subvaluation of the business researchers in the part and
a better recopilatiojn of information at the present. In any case this paper is based on official data.
16
The SNI is one of the STI instruments with the longest tradition in the country, dating from 1984; its
main goals include the promotion of the formation, development and consolidation of a critical mass of
researchers at the highest level, mostly within the public system of higher education and research. The
SNI grants both pecuniary (a monthly compensation) and non-pecuniary stimulus (status and recognition)
to researchers based on the productivity and quality of their research.
20
selection process. In addition, the rejection rate at the present is only 25%; it has been
reduced, which suggests a less tie selection process at least for the nomination of the
lower levels.
14000
600
12000
500
Researchers
10000
400
8000
300
6000
4000
2000
100
0
19
8
19 4
8
19 6
8
19 8
9
19 0
9
19 2
9
19 4
9
19 6
9
20 8
0
20 0
0
20 2
04
0
200
Index 1984=100
Graph 7 Researchers at the SNI
Source: FCCT (2006)
Most of the research funds are allocated on the bases of competitive funds, which
have a low percentage of success. The sectoral and competitive funds were introduced
in 2001, as described above. They are the main mechanism to allocate research funds as
only the UNAM has institutional funding for research. In the case of the Sectoral fund
of basic research, the average percentage of rejection was 60% for the period of 20022005. In the case of the regional funds, it was 57%. These figures reveal a quite tie
selection process.
Increase in the number of papers in ISI journals. As a result of the own trajectory of
the academic researchers and the stimulus associated with the SNI, between 1990 and
2004 México has increased its scientific production at an annual rate of 11.24%; similar
rates are observed in Brazil. However, this trajectory has not changed significantly its
relative contribution to the world production, which is only 0.52%, below the 1.32%
reported by Brazil. Mexico observes a relative specialization in physics; vegetal and
animal biology; agriculture, stockbreeding and fishing; food science and technology;
electric, electronics and automatic engineering; and electronics and communication
technology. (Scimago Research Group, 2006) As analyzed above in the case of the
number of academic researchers, there is a high concentration of the scientific
production. 15 academic institutions, of 85, explain 70.4% of the Mexican ISI
publications. Only one institution, the UNAM, generates a third of the papers.
There are more incentives for the curiosity-driven than for the problem-oriented
research.. The incentives associated with the SNI and the concern for increasing the
number of publications in ISI journals influence the academic research towards
curiosity-driven themes that are relevant for the discipline frontiers. This makes an
attempt on research more oriented towards national problems, like health, environment
or food.
2. Innov population
21
The selection process in the Innov population can be underlined by the use of
competitive funds to allocate resources, and the importance assigned to the R&D fiscal
benefits.
High rate of rejection in the public instruments oriented to support innovation in
the business sector. The rejection rate of the Sectoral fund of economy for innovation
in the business sector was 72% during 2002-2005, showing a high competition. This
was the highest rejection rate of all the Sectoral and Regional Funds. AVANCE also
observed a high rate of rejection of 63%. These rates are more associated with the
limited amount of resources assigned to these instruments than to the quality of the
proposal.
Increased importance of the R&D fiscal benefits. As referred to above, in 2001 R&D
fiscal benefits were introduced in Mexico to help companies to invest more in R&D by
reducing the company's tax bill. In contrast to other countries, this instrument has
budgetary ceiling established annually by the Secretary of Finance, which has been
growing rapidly since the creation of the instrument until today. The amount has
increased from 4 millions dollars in 2001 to 30 in 2005. The rejection rate was very low,
only 11% during the period of 2002-2005. The selection process has been quite loose,
according to many specialists. In fact during this learning process, oportunistic
behaviors were observed, in firms as in consultants, and this instrument has supported
more development activities, and incremental design, than experimental research.
(Santos and Dutrénit, 2007)
The retention process
The retention process is particularly limited in both populations. In the case of the S&T
population, the effort to increase the number of postgraduate students has not been
accompanied by the creation of new positions to hire them. In addition, bad retirement
conditions and lack of retirement age show down the natural renovation process.
In the case of the Innov population, the lack of culture of innovation in the business
sector, the limited numbers of firms that carried out innovation activities of world
novelty and that differentiate administrative from technical careers do not favor the
retention processes.
The last CONACYT’s administration was particularly interested on matching the
knowledge supply and demand in strategic areas and promote lacking linkages between
different agents, particularly university and business sector. In this line some actions
were undertaken such as the creation of a jobs list, and a pilot program to support the
hiring of PhD in the business sector. However, these new mechanisms are still far from
being successful to changing the characteristics of the retention process
Bidirectional causal mechanisms
The Mexican case shows that there are limited links between the agents. There is a
limited scope of the links between agents that produce and use knowledge, which does
not allow the articulation to generate virtuous accumulative effects. Particularly, scarce
cooperation for innovation is observed. The National Innovation Survey of 2001 shows
that developments by innovative firms are largely based on internal sources and in-
22
house R&D (82%). They tend to cooperate more with other firms (14%) than with
universities and research centers (4%).
The main instruments used by CONACYT for resource allocation do not stimulate
linkages between agents. The main economic incentives to promote academia-business
sector linkages in R&D activities are associated with the Sectoral fund of
economy/innovation, AVANCE and a pilot experience of Public-Private Partnerships,
which have received very limited resources. (Dutrénit, Santiago and Vera-Cruz, 2007)
Additionally, the way selection is carried out, largely influenced by curiosity-driven
targets, negatively affects the bidirectional causal mechanisms.
Section 2.2 describes four types of relationships, which qualify as an example of
coevolutionary processes, and can be seen as bidirectional causal mechanisms, because
the causation runs in both ways (competition, predator/host, neutralism and
cooperation). In the S&T and Innov populations of the Mexican case they are observed
in different degrees.
Some few experiences of competition are observed, like between the private and public
laboratories based on prices. Limited experiences of predator/host are also observed,
like cases where engineers & technicians of the private sector receive benefits from
knowledge of researchers through research contracts or informal contacts, or researchers
get benefits from the knowledge acquired through interaction with engineers &
technicians to write papers or develop new patents,
Cooperation is more commonly observed, which means that interaction is favorable to
both populations. The most commonly observed causal mechanisms that link the
evolutionary trajectory of S&T and Innov are mobility of human resources and training.
In contrast the exchange of knowledge by formal means (contracts, seminars, stays) and
informal networks, and lobbying by each on the behalf of the other are less frequent.
Unfortunately, neutralism is largely diffused in the Mexican case, which means that
neither population affects the other, thus it can be evolution of each population but not
coevolution of both.
So far the evidence illustrates that the evolutionary path of each population has been
quite weak, due to the restrictions of each population’s VSR processes. In addition,
difficulties have been identified to build bidirectional mechanisms that support
coevolutionary processes. Thus it can be argue that there have not been sustainable
coevolutive processes between the populations of S&T and Innov. The selection
environment, and particularly the budget constraints and the narrow STI culture of the
society, has had a dramatic influence on its performance. Even though it is recognized
that the actions of agents in the coevolving populations, to some extent, shape their own
selection environment, the Mexican case shows weaknesses in the coevolutionary
processes and so on the agents’ capacity to radically transform their context.
It is worth to highlight that during the last administration a large number of instruments
and programmes operated by CONACYT were introduced, but changes in the balance
of incentives and actual impulse to the evolution of new social norms related to STI has
been limited. The agents, mostly those in the public education and research system, face
mixed stimulus for action in different directions. On one hand, some instruments have
motivated researchers to increasingly carry out applied research oriented to innovation –
23
e.g. AVANCE, the Sectoral fund of economy/innovation-, and R&D with an orientation
towards the solution of national problems –e.g. most of the Sectoral and all the Regional
funds, but they have received very limited resources. On the other hand, strong
incentives –both financial and in terms of recognition- have privileged curiosity-driven
scientific research. In the same line, there are few economic incentives to promote
academia-productive sector linkages in R&D activities. (Dutrénit, Santiago and VeraCruz, 2007) This has negatively influenced the evolutionary trajectory of both
populations.
According to the discussion of section 3.1, and Graph 1, the evidence suggests that
historically the initial conditions of the Mexican case are located in a extremely low
LLET, with a relatively high level of the vertical axis (S&T) as referred to the
horizontal axis (Innov). The different pace of the evolution of the populations, quicker
in the case of the Innov population, seems to be moving that equilibrium point along the
horizontal axis, but far away to the M*. But the weak financial effort of the last 25 years
can only ensure to be attracted by the same LLET.
4.2 The context for the selection processes and the institutional
setting
The Mexican context is characterized by a weeak institutional building and multi-actor
related governance, and by weaknesses of the STI policy design, which influences the
incentives structure.
Weak institutional building and multi-actor related governance. The STI policy for
the period 2001-2006 benefited from several changes in the regulatory framework and
the accumulated learning from past experiences in policy-making and design. Among
the legal reforms, those that stand up include the 1999 Law for the Promotion of
Scientific Research and Technological Development 17 , the Special Program on S&T
2001-2006 -the main document guiding STI policy in Mexico- (PECYT), and the Law
for S&T18 and the new CONACYT’s Law19 enacted as of 2002. The Law for S&T, in
particular, set the bases for a “State Policy” in the field;; STI policy gained greater
priority under assumptions of an increased commitment from government organizations
and adoption of an integrated Federal budget for STI.20
The Law for S&T placed CONACYT at the centre of the administrative coordination of
the STI system, and under the direct control of the President of the Republic. New
agents and structures emerged. However, the government’s actions did not contribute to
the recognition of this institutional capacity. As a result, CONACYT lacked the power
to call and negotiate with other agents. The public efforts to coordinate the STI
activities between the different ministries of the federal government and between the
three levels of the government were insufficient to foster a greater structuration of the
17
Ley para el Fomento de la Investigación Científica y el Desarrollo Tecnológico.
Ley de Ciencia y Tecnología.
19
Ley Orgánica de CONACYT.
20
The consolidated budget includes not only the resources granted to CONACYT and its associated
public research system, but all those funds allocated to STI by the diverse federal government
organisations.
18
24
STI system. The governance of the system became quite complex. In addition, the types
of governance and evaluation of the universities or research centers’ activities lack of
bodies that could be able to promptly set rules for implementing the STI policy’s
measures.
Weaknesses of the STI policy design. In 2001 the new government introduced a fresh
STI policy based on a fresh policy mix. Principles shaping the new STI policy model
include: (i) adoption of more strict quality principles and the look for pertinence of
R&D carried out at the public research system, which was seen as a higher orientation
towards the solution of national economic and social problems, (ii) explicit intentions to
promote interactivity and coordination amongst agents in the NSI, (iii) commitment to
regionalization of STI capabilities across the country, (iv) promotion of innovation
activities, particularly in the private sector and, (v) opening up of spaces to the
participation of ample groups in the Mexican society (PECYT, 2001-2006). These
objectives translate into about 60 Funds and programs operated by CONACYT alone, or
jointly with other organizations –see Section 4. The new policy program seeks to
minimize “adverse selection” and “moral hazard” problems by means of a series of
incentives and coordination mechanisms amongst agents in the NSI.
However, in practice, the STI policy mix and the funds allocation has kept a traditional
shape. It is fragmented and based on an insufficient mass of resources to reach the
defined goals. Particularly, the implementation of the innovation related instruments has
been extremely slow.
.
The improved design of STI policy confronts different problems though: (i) an
institutional framework around the public research system whose changes have taken
place at a very slow pace, (ii) very limited public investment in STI, (iii) inertias
associated to policy tools coming from previous governments that kept their share in an
stagnated budget for STI, and (iv) a slow process of policy learning within CONACYT.
These issues result in a series of incentives that send inappropriate messages for the
renewal of the social norms and the change in the agents’ behavior needed to sustain a
renewed social contract for STI. As a result, there were no modifications in the
economic incentives related to the instruments; therefore the signals to induce changes
in the agents’ behavior according to the targets of the new STI policy design were not
strong enough. (Dutrénit, Santiago and Vera-Cruz, 2006)
5 A STI policy design
coevolutionary model21
to
generate
and
foster
a
Based on the generic coevolutionary model of S&T and Innov discussed in section 3
and on the assessment of the Mexican STI summarized in section 4, this section outlines
a three phase STI policy design. This STI policy takes into account the initial conditions
of weaknesses in the coevolutionary processes of the S&T and Innov populations that
21
This section is based on a proposal of a new STI policy design for the Mexican case carried out by the
authors and other researchers between November 2005 and July 2006. The team was integrated by Mario
Capdevielle, Rosalba Casas, Daniel Malkin, Martín Puchet, Luis Sanz, Morris Teubal, Kurt Unger,
Alexandre Vera-Cruz. FCCyT (2006) contains a more detailed analysis of the proposal.
25
have conducted to a low LLET. Thus it emphasises on the generation of coevolutionary
processes (i.e. variation, selection and retention processes), reciprocal causal
mechanisms and changes in the selection environment that allow to move the
equilibrium point towards M* as a step to overcome this point. Such trajectory would
make a great contribution to overcome the weaknesses and biases of the NIS,
particularly its system failures, to generate and foster the S&T bases and the Innov
activities, to satisfy social needs and to promote social and economic development.
We argue that in the Mexican case an STI policy design should consider the
strengthening of the S&T bases more explicitly, changes in the regulatory framework
and in the existent incentive structure, and a broader focus on horizontal support and
targeted industries, combining high tech with others associated with revealed
advantages and social needs. The main argument is that S&T and Innov co-evolve. The
NIS, understood as a complex system, is taken as the unit of analysis to trace
coevolutionary processes of S&T and Innov.
Five strategic goals are defined: (i) Strengthen the S&T human resources formation and
insertion in the labor market; (ii) Consolidate and increase the S&T capabilities, by
promoting quality and excellence of the research and increasing the international links;
(iii) Increase the scientific and technological research of universities and research
centers oriented to satisfy regional and national needs and promote knowledge transfer;
(iv) Foster the R&D activities, the innovation activities and the innovation capacity of
the business sector, and promote the technological diffusion within the business sector,
particularly within SME; and (v) Favor collaboration and cooperation between agents at
national and international levels.
5.1 Required conditions for the coevolution of S&T and Innov
As argued above, the VSR processes of both populations –researchers and engineers &
technicians- and the bidirectional mechanisms that link these processes come about in
formal and informal institutions, which emerge from the activities and the regulatory
framework. As these evolutive and coevolutive processes take place in institutional
frameworks, they transmit those conditionings to the performance of S&T and Innov, of
the underlying structures of these variables and the stage of development. As the
specific rules that were established for the agents and the social norms that they adopt in
their behavior condition the mentioned processes, they determine the observed
dynamics of variables, structures and stages. This institutional conditioning shows the
key role played by the institutional change and the types of governance observed in the
different institutions in the coevolution of S&T and Innov.
Some of the institutional changes observed in the Mexican case in the last 15 years have
favored the coevolutionary processes described in section 4.1. As described above, these
changes have emanated from both the legal reforms and important transformations of
the behavior and practices of the agents. The selection processes in both populations
have improved as a result of the introduction of competitive funds for research and
R&D fiscal benefits. At the same time, the growth of the research centers and the SNI
have contributed to the retention of researchers. The openness of new linkages channels
between universities and research centers and the business sector have contribute to link
evolutive processes of both populations.
26
The mentioned changes not only favor coevolutive processes, they also introduce new
managerial capacities of the populations. In this way, the greater governance conducts
to generate better mechanisms of adaptation of the organizations to the context and new
forms of coordination. This, in turn, has repercussions on more appropriated selection
and retention processes, deepening the coevolutive processes.
Following this trajectory, future changes should strengthen those aspects that favor
coevolutive processes and reject those institutions that strike up these processes.
Between the former changes, it is worth to mention the new incentives that foster
university-business sector linkages, the transformation of the public research centers
according to criteria of quality, excellence, pertinence and generational renovation, the
promotion of a new culture in universities and research centers that privilege the links
with the society, the fostering of a S&T culture in the society, and a new social contract
for S&T.
5.2 The dynamics of S&T and Innov
To be able to put STI at the centre for satisfying social needs and promoting social and
economic development is a gradual and cumulative process. The FES&T in 2005 only
represented 0.4% of the GDP. This government’s effort is far below the minimum
magnitudes and percentages considered at international level to spark or trigger an
autoreinforcing evolutive process of STI, the economy and the society, and thus be
capable of jumping from LLET to M* point. It is expected that the additional
magnitudes of public investment required in this process will generate an increase of the
GERD funded by the government and executed by the government, universities and
research centers and the business sector. After a gradual period of strategy maturation,
the new incentives for innovation would trigger a substantial increase of the GERD
funded by the business sector (BERD). The cases of Finland, Korea, Israel, Ireland and
Spain illustrate, at different levels, this dynamic. However, the success of this process
requires for the government to sustain this financial effort over a period of time,
avoiding the risk of opportunistic behaviors by the agents –particularly the business
sector- to take advantage of the additional public funds.
This is a three stage STI policy design; each stage involves different purposes of the
evolutive processes of S&T and Innov, mechanisms for promoting variation, selection
and retention, and changes in the environment. In each stage it is necessary to
punctually introduce the required adjustments to move forward to the final goal. T1 and
T2 stages correspond to the trajectory between LLET and M*, and the T3 stage would
allow to overcome M*.
T1
T2
Strengthen S&T and Innov, modify the institutional context and
consolidate a significant segment of innovative firms (20072012)
Consolidation of the S&T and Innov capabilities oriented towards
strategic sectors and acceleration of the innovation activities
(2012-2018)
27
T3
Virtuous dynamics: Excellence in S&T and generation of
endogenous innovation activities in the business sector (20182024)
To make a scene for the future and discuss the STI policy design, we start with real
data; the FES&T in 2006 was of $3,220 millions dollars. We suppose: (i) the FES&T
and the GERD funded by the government will have a real annual increase of 20%, (ii)
the growth rate of the GDP will be 5%, (iii) annual increase of the GERD funded by the
business sector of 20% in the first years (higher than the 15% observed in the last
period), but it tends to increase towards the end of T1. This trajectory would increase
the GERD/GDP from 0.5% to 1.1% in 2012. The share of the business sector in the
GERD would increase from 35.4% to 42.1% in 2012. This scene would position
Mexico in 2012 in a situation like Spain in 2004.
This STI policy design suggests that the increase of the GERD funded by the public
sector in the T1 phase will be oriented to strengthen the S&T capabilities, the R&D
activities of the business sector and other innovation activities. Concerning the
additional public resources to strengthen the S&T capabilities, direct and multiplied
effects are expected. On one side, the generation of knowledge to solve basic needs and
requirements of strategic sector will be made stronger; on the other, demands for new
research both curiosity-driven and problem-oriented will be created. This process would
nurture the variation and selection processes and create the conditions to look for new
funding sources for S&T. Along this line, the stimulus to increase the human resources
formation according to the specialized profiles required by the business sector to carry
out R&D and other innovation activities would generate variation, increase the supply
capacity of these human resources, and create conditions to involve the business sector
in their funding. In addition, as researchers increase their participation in international
networks, through selection processes, better access to international funding can be
available.
Concerning the additional public resources to strengthen the business sector R&D and
other innovation activities, leverage and catalytic effects are expected. As capabilities
are developed in the business sector, new demands for subsidies and other government
support will be generated, thus it will be necessary to keep increasing the GED funded
by the government. However, as firms and other productive agents become involved in
R&D and other innovation activities, a leverage effect of the public expenditures is
expected and innovation began to be endogenized (T2 phase). In fact, because of the
catalytic attribute of the innovation policy, 22 as new dynamics are generated in the
business sector, and this sector increases the R&D and other innovation expenditure, the
need of public intervention is reduced (particularly in T3 phase). Dynamic learning
economies are also generated and contribute to this catalytic effect.
The additional mass of public resources should be both horizontal and oriented.
Horizontal support will produce variation, the objective is to: (i) promote
indiscriminately the identification and development of many projects and new
knowledge areas, (ii) increase the S&T capabilities and generate a critical mass of
innovative firms, and (iii) generate a variety of firms, sectors, technologies, areas of
knowledge specialization and researchers. Oriented support will generate selection
22
See Teubal, M. (1997 and 2002) and Avnimelech and Teubal (2005b).
28
processes, the objective is to: (i) promote the solution of problems oriented to satisfying
the basic needs of the society and support the strengthening of economically strategic
sectors, (ii) stimulate individual and collective learning trough STI activities, (iii)
consolidate firms, sectors, technologies, areas of knowledge specialization and
researchers, and (iv) consolidate emergent clusters.
The argument is that the STI policy should contribute to trigger an accelerated
coevolutive process of S&T and Innov. This STI policy design put a great emphasis on
fostering innovation to speed up the evolving trajectory of this population, but at the
same time it ensures that the S&T population evolves harmonically, and bidirectional
causal mechanisms between both populations are developed to ensure their coevolution.
Even though different types of dynamic processes can be promoted, the dynamic
process proposed here is one of those denominated “S&T and Innov push”, which is
based on the five strategic goals described above and is initially funded by an increase
of the public resources mass.
The policy mix should change over the three phases according to the specific emphasis
that each one stresses, to ensure the movement from LLET to M* and finally to
overcome the M* point. Consistency between the allocation of resources between the
different instruments should be kept. Table 2 illustrates the evolution proposed for the
Mexican case. Column one contains the policy mix in 2006; next column contain the
proposed policy mix in each phase (including new instruments) oriented to generate
variation, selection and retention processes in both arenas and promote bidirectional
causal mechanisms. To start with this process, the government should invest important
magnitudes to foster R&D and other innovation activities of the business sector. As it is
expected, to trigger an endogeneization process of the innovation funded by the
business sector, in the T3 phase it is predictable that the financial public effort oriented
to this target will be reduced.
Table 2 Evolution of the policy mix, 2006-2024
STI Instruments
Capabilities Innov
Capabilities S&T
National system of researchers
Scholarships
Posdoc positions
Competitive fund for curiosity driven research
Centers of excellence
Support for scientific infrastructure
Strategic sectoral funds
Competitive regional funds
Competitive fund for innovation
Subsidy for R&D and innovation
Support for technological infrastructure and technology
transfer
Funds for technology based firms
Support for incubators
Innovation program oriented to basic needs
R&D fiscal benefits
Support for fostering STI culture
Other S&T expenditures (by Conacyt and different
ministries)
Federal Expenditure in S&T
%FES&T
2006
4.5
6.5
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.3
0.2
Expected composition FES&T *
2012
2018
2024
2.9
2.7
2.5
6.3
5.9
5.5
1.6
1.3
0.2
1.6
3.0
3.7
2.1
4.0
6.2
1.6
2.0
2.0
1.6
3.9
3.7
1.6
3.0
3.7
0.9
0.8
0.3
3.9
3.7
0.2
0.0
1.6
2.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.8
0.0
0.8
0.3
0.3
9.5
0.3
1.9
0.9
1.1
8.9
0.5
0.6
0.6
1.3
5.6
0.3
76.2
63.2
54.5
63.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Note: *This expected evolution does not consider potential changes associated with the regionalization of
S&T, and thus a distribution of expenditures between federal and regional governments.
29
Source: Own elaboration based on SHCP, Presupuesto de Ciencia y Tecnología, 2006; CONACYT,
Situación Financiera de los Fondos, 2006.
Over time it will be also necessary to keep a sustainable financial effort to consolidate
and increase the S&T capabilities located in universities and research centers. Social
needs will probably change and new strategic sectors will emerge as the economy
moves gradually towards economic and social development. As science is a public good,
it will be necessary to sustain the financial public effort over time. Thus, as the country
moves along the described trajectory, the policy mix will change, particularly the
proportional allocation of resources between the different instruments, as illustrated in
Table 2.
This type of trajectory, based on coevolutive processes, requires a gradual change of the
agents’ behavior, and the incorporation of new groups of the society in the STI activities.
This also requires a change in the selection environment, particularly the institutional
culture about the role of S&T in the academic sector, the innovation culture in the
business sector, and the social perception of S&T and innovation.
6 Final reflections
This paper argues that in the knowledge economy context the coevolution of S&T and
Innovation is crucial for developing countries. The evidence of the Mexican case shows
that two features limit the coevolution of both arenas: (i) the conditions for generating
VSR processes in both groups of activities are still incipient, there is neither the
required size nor the diversity of agents and organizations, and (ii) even though there
are links between agents and functioning structures, they hardly generate bidirectional
causal mechanisms. Thus, failures were observed to build virtuous coevolutionary
processes of S&T and Innov. Drawing on the Systems-Evolutionary Perspective this
paper suggests a three phase STI policy design to strengthen the VSR processes and the
bidirectional causal mechanisms that contribute to such coevolutive processes.
The proposed STI policy design has as a starting point the existence of initial conditions
based on the endowment of capabilities, and the institutional framework. As many other
developing countries, the Mexican case is one of weak initial conditions, thus the policy
mix includes measures to overcome them. Such a policy would, through a chain of
dynamic processes and events, lead first to favorable pre-emergence conditions and then
to the successful targeting of new sectors. Throughout the three phases S&T, Innov and
STI policy interact and co-evolve with the firms, organizations, institutions and sectors
which they influence. This paper argues that one specific goal of the STI policy design
is to achieve a ‘critical mass’ of resources, capabilities and activities that triggers a
largely endogenous cumulative process within a reasonably short period of time. Such
policy design looks at stimulating a dynamic non linear coevolutive model that avoids
LLET traps and cycles, and moves both populations from the original LLET to another
equilibrium point over M*. Success depends on: a) generating a critical mass of
financial resources, capabilities (human resources, infrastructure, etc.) and activities;
and b) change the policy mix.
However, the evidence suggests that in order to be able to design and implement such
an STI policy it is necessary to acknowledge that a new policy mix is only a part of the
story, it is also required to introduce institutional changes to induce new social norms
30
that contribute to modify agents` behaviors towards generating coevolutive dynamics
(changes of S&T that affect VSR and vice versa), and to reach agreements between
different agents and to have a clear and consistent decisions taken by the federal
administration. The Mexican case suggests that harmonization between agents and the
buildings of a shared vision are key factors for the success of such an STI policy. As
suggested by Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006) and others, there is a large difference in the
images of future between scientific community, firms, families and individuals and
those circulating in the policy field. The latter are pulled by innovation and technology
lead visions, while the former have different visions, largely pushed from the past. The
generation of a shared vision is required.
However, it is difficult to establish how the links between policies and coevolutive
processes are generated. Further research is required to identify how the evolutive
processes change the dynamics of the capabilities, the underlying structures and the
evolutive stages, and how traps and cycles are avoided. Evidence suggests that
investment efforts on capabilities without putting institutional reforms into practice and
changes of the policy mix, and institutional reforms without a financial effort and
changes of the policy mix are insufficient for generating the required dynamic and avoid
traps of low growth and cycles that alternate phases of increase of S&T capabilities and
decrease of Innov capabilities with others of declining of S&T capabilities with
enlargement of Innov capabilities.
Some preliminary analyses, not reported here, suggest that other arenas also coevolved
with S&T and Innov, such the policy-making learning and skills23, and the institutionsorganizations.24 The evidence also suggests that there are several coevolutive processes
on going. As asserted by Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006), “Technology or innovation
policies or frameworks cannot be automatically equated with those for economic
development. Innovative economies require mechanisms for reshaping science and
engineering and reclaiming their outputs. Economic development policy processes can
and should be differentiated more carefully by impact on economic development and
impact on technological innovations…. A divergence is observed between the
coevolution of policy with innovation/technology, the coevolution of policy with
economic development, and the coevolution of technology with economic development
needs.”
A set of issues that require further research derivates from the analysis of the
coevolutionary model of S&T and Innov and the STI policy design for the Mexican
case: (i) theoretical issues related to the transit from a linear model to a coevolutive non
linear model; (ii) type of institutional changes required for this transit; and (iii) type of
harmonization between the agents to ensure the governance of the NIS.
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