GrowingintheGreenhouse
ProtectingtheClimate
byPuttingDevelopmentFirst
EDITEDBY:
INCOLLABORATIONWITH:
ROB BRADLEY
NAVROZ K .DUBASH
KEVIN A . BAUMERT
JOSÉ ROBERTO MOREIRA
STANFORD MWAKASONDA
WEI - SHIUEN NG
LUIZ AUGUSTO HORTA NOGUEIRA
VIRGINIA PARENTE
JONATHAN PERSHING
LEE SCHIPPER
HARALD WINKLER
HyacinthBillings
PublicationsDirector
Editedby:RobBradley,KevinA.Baumert
Incollaborationwith:NavrozK.Dubash,JoséRobertoMoreira,StanfordMwakasonda,
Wei-ShiuenNg,LuizAugustoHortaNogueira,VirginiaParente,JonathanPershing,
LeeSchipper,HaraldWinkler
Authors
DeverDesigns
CoverDesignandLayout
EachWorldResourcesInstitutereportrepresentsatimely,scholarlytreatmentofasubjectofpublicconcern.
WRItakesresponsibilityforchoosingthestudytopicsandguaranteeingitsauthorsandresearchersfreedomof
inquiry.Italsosolicitsandrespondstotheguidanceofadvisorypanelsandexpertreviewers.Unlessotherwisestated,
however,alltheinterpretationandfindingssetforthinWRIpublicationsarethoseoftheauthors.
Copyright©2005WorldResourcesInstitute.Allrightsreserved.
ISBN1-56973-601-4
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2005937342
PrintedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaonchlorine-freepaperwithrecycledcontentof50%,
15%ofwhichispost-consumer.
ThecoverimagesarephotographsbyBarbaraPfeffer,MarkEdwards,RonGiling,andCorneliusPaas,
courtesyofPeterArnold,Inc.
II
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
TableofContents
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
V
FOREWORD
VI
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
VII
Chapter1INTRODUCTIONTOSD-PAMs
Chapter1
1.ClimateMeetsDevelopment
2.DevelopmentMeetsClimate
3.SD-PAMS:BreakingtheLogjam
4.FundingSD-PAMS
5.TheLimitationsofSD-PAMS
6.ThisReport
Chapter2SD-PAMsANDINTERNATIONALCLIMATEAGREEMENTS
Chapter2
1.DefiningandFormalizingSD-PAMs
2.PledgingSD-PAMs
3.KeepingTrack:InternationalRegistry
4.AssessingProgress:ReportingandReview
5.QuantitativeApproaches:AccountingforEmissionReductions
6.Conclusion
Chapter3
Chapter3BIOFUELSFORTRANSPORT,DEVELOPMENTANDCLIMATECHANGE:
LESSONSFROMBRAZIL
1.Introduction
2.BiofuelsinBrazil
3.ReasonsfortheSuccessofBiofuelsinBrazil
4.TheSustainableDevelopmentBenefitsofBiofuels
5.ThePotentialforExpansionofBiofuelsUseinBrazil
6.BiofuelsandClimate
7.BiofuelsintheInternationalContext
8.Conclusion
Chapter4
Chapter4CHINAMOTORIZATIONTRENDS:POLICYOPTIONSINAWORLD
OFTRANSPORTCHALLENGES
1.Introduction
2.TransportTendsandChallengesinChina
3.China'sTransportRelatedPrioritiesandPolicies
4.FutureMotorizationandMotorVehicleUseinChina:TheScenarios
5.ScenarioResults
6.PolicyOptions
7.Conclusion
1
2
4
6
10
11
12
15
16
16
18
18
20
22
24
25
26
30
32
38
40
41
44
48
49
50
52
55
57
58
62
C ON TEN TS
III
Chapter5PATHWAYSTORURALELECTRIFICATIONININDIA:ARENATIONAL
Chapter5
GOALSALSOANINTERNATIONALOPPORTUNITY?
1.Introduction
2.EstimatingRuralDemand:HowMuchPowertothePeople?
3.MeetingthisDemand
4.Conclusion
IV
68
69
73
76
88
Chapter6CARBONCAPTUREANDSTORAGEINSOUTHAFRICA
Chapter6
94
1.Introduction
2.WhatisCarbonCaptureandStorage
3.ThePotentialforCCSinSouthAfrica
4.CCSandSustainableDevelopment
5.Conclusion
95
97
99
100
107
Chapter7CONCLUSIONS
Chapter7
111
GLOSSARYANDABBREVIATIONS
115
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Acknowledgements
GrowingintheGreenhousehasbeenmadepossiblefirstandforemostbythetalentedauthorsthathavecontributed
theirworkandexpertise.Theeditorswouldliketoconveytheirdeepappreciation.Butasalwaysinthepreparationof
suchavolume,manyothershavecontributed.
Thisreportbenefitedenormouslyfrompeerreview.Wearethankfulfortheinputreceivedfromthefollowing
reviewers:JasonAnderson,IsaiasMacedo,S.Padmanaban,M.V.Ramana,DanielSperling,FrankRosilloCalle,Hari
Sharan,SuaniTeixeiraCoelho,DavidVictorandZhiLiu.Themanyhelpfulcommentsandsuggestionswereceived
substantiallyimprovedthemanuscript.Anyremainingerrorsandomissionsare,ofcourse,theresponsibilityoftheeditors.
Notleast,wewouldliketothankthoseatWRIwhoweregenerouswiththeirtimeandinputasthisreportprogressed.
DerikBroekhoff,FlorenceDaviet,DavidJhirad,LizMarshall,SmitaNakhooda,JohnSohnandAnnieWoollam
providedreviewcommentsandotherassistance.BrittChildsworkedtirelesslyonbothresearchandproductionassistance.
Forproductionandorganizationalsupport,wethankHyacinthBillings,EvanBranosky,andJennieHommel.Wewould
liketothankEmilyWeningerforlendingusahandinChapter2.TheskillfuleditingofBobLivernashfurtherimproved
thefinalproduct.TheexquisitedesignofKimPollockandhercolleaguesatDeverDesignsturneditintothejewelyou
nowholdinyourhands.
Finally,withoutfinancialsupport,thisreportwouldnothavebeenpossible.Wearegratefulforthesupportofthe
CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency,thegovernmentoftheNetherlands,andthegovernmentofNorway.
Supportfromtheseinstitutionswasintegraltothedevelopmentofthisreport.
TheEditors
A C KN OWLED GEMEN TS
V
Foreword
“Thetroublewithbeingpoor”saidtheartistWillemdeKooning,“isthatittakesupallyourtime.”Countriesfaced
withtheproblemsofpoverty—peoplewithoutelectricity,withouttransportation,withoutlivelihoods—havelittlescope
toraisetheireyesfromtheseimmediateconcerns.Butthewaysinwhichtheydealwiththesechallengescanmakeabig
differencetofutureclimatechange.
InBrazilinthe1970s,wewerefacedwithdauntingproblems.Ourdependenceonimportedoilatatimeofescalating
priceswassuckingresourcesoutofthecountry,andourruralcommunitieswerebatteredbytheirdependenceonvolatile
commoditymarkets,especiallysugar.Inresponsetotheseseeminglyseparateproblemswebeganaconsistentpushto
encourageandsupporttheuseofethanolasatransportfuel.Overtimethenatureofthissupportbothchangedand
shrank,asthetechnologyandsystemsimproved.Butthecleargovernmentpolicyremainedtokeepethanolasamajor
partofourenergymix.Asthestudyinthisbookshows,Brazilisfarbetterofftodaybecauseofit;ournationalexternal
debtstandsat$100billionlowerthanitwouldhavedoneifwehadreliedexclusivelyonoil.Theadditionalrevenuein
ourruralareashashelpedsupportagriculturalcommunitiesandhundredsofthousandsofjobs.Andtheworldisalso
betteroff:Brazil’sethanolprogramoffsetssome26milliontonsofCO2everyyear.Wasthisprimarilyaclimatemeasure?
No.ButtheclimatehasbenefitedfromBrazil’schoices.
Developingcountriesareacutelyawareoftherisksofclimatechange.Afterall,ourpeoplearetheonesmostlikelyto
bearthebruntofitsimpacts.Thepoordependcriticallyonagriculture,forests,freshwaterresourcesandcoastalecosystems—theverysystemsmostatriskfromclimatechange.Whendisasterstrikes,developingcountrygovernmentsdonot
haveattheircommandthebillionsofdollarsthattheirrichercounterpartscanbringtobearonfixingthemess.
Soclimatechangematterstous.Itisaproblemnotofourmaking:thegreenhousegasesthathaveaccumulated
intheatmospheretodateareoverwhelminglyfromindustrializedcountries,andtheaveragecitizenofanOECD
countrystillemitssixtimesmoreCO2thanhisdevelopingcountrycounterpart.Weexpectthesecountriestomake
meaningfuleffortstoreducetheiremissionsfirst.Still,thereisnoescapingthefactthatclimatechangebringsanew
reality.Ifwewanttoavoidaglobalcatastrophe,developingcountrieswillhavetofinddevelopmentpathsthatavoid
hugegreenhousegasemissions.
Thequestionexploredinthisbookis:wherearethenewopportunitiesforthiskindofsuccess?Thestudiespresented
here,inBrazil,China,IndiaandSouthAfricaarenotjustinterestinginthemselves,butbecausetheyrepresentanewway
ofengagingdevelopingcountries–byspeakingdirectlytothepressingconcernsofenergypoverty,lackofmobilityand
energysecuritythataretheirimmediateconcerns.
NelsonMandelaoncesaid:“Ifyoutalktoamaninalanguageheunderstands,thatgoestohishead.Ifyoutalkto
himinhislanguage,thatgoestohisheart.”Thisbookpresentsawayoftalkingtodevelopingcountriesaboutclimate
changeinourlanguage:thelanguageofthosethatseehumanneedandpovertyasvastandvitalchallengesthatwemust
overcome.Alanguagethatdoesnotmerelytalkofsustainabledevelopmentasanadjuncttofightingclimatechange,but
ofclimatechangeasonechallengeinourfightagainstpoverty.
Thisbookthenisastart.Theworldhasfartogoinfindingtheapproachthatwilldealwiththeworstofclimate
change.Buttheideasexploredhereareperhapsabasisforamoreconstructiveengagementbetweendevelopedand
developingcountries.
FernandoHenriqueCardoso
PresidentoftheFederativeRepublicofBrazil,1995–2002
DirectoroftheWorldResourcesInstitute
VI
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
ExecutiveSummary
Thisreportexploresanapproachtoclimatechange
policycalledSustainableDevelopmentPoliciesandMeasures,orSD-PAMs.SD-PAMsarepoliciesandmeasures
thatareaimedatmeetingthedomesticobjectivesofthe
hostcountry,butthatalsobringsignificantbenefitstothe
climatethroughreducedGHGemissions.Thisconcept
offersapotentiallylessdivisiveapproachtoengagement
betweendevelopedanddevelopingcountriesintackling
dangerousclimatechange.
Internationalclimatechangepolicyisbasedonthe
UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimate
Change(UNFCCC),whichemphasizesboththeneedto
avoiddangerousclimatechangeandthespecialchallenges
facedbydevelopingcountries.Thisraisesapotentialconflict:ononehand,meetingtheobjectiveoftheUNFCCC
ofpreventingdangerousclimatechangeisimpossible
withoutlimitingemissionsinatleastsomemajordevelopingcountries.Ontheother,thesecountriesfacevitaland
urgentprioritiesthatinevitablytrumpconsiderationsrelatedtogreenhousegasemissions:theneedtoreducepoverty,extendtheprovisionofmodernenergyservices,meet
citizens’growingdemandformobility,andmanyothers.
Howcanthesetwovitalsetsofprioritiesbereconciled?
Whiletheconceptofcombiningdomesticandclimate
prioritiesisfirmlyembeddedintheUNFCCCitself,existingclimateagreementshavenotattemptedtosystematicallyfostertheintegrationofclimatechangeanddevelopment
atthepolicylevel.Thisreportisanattempttoexplore
somewaysinwhichthismightbedone,aswellasprovide
someillustrativeexamplesofthetypesofpoliciesand
measuresthatmightfallundertheSD-PAMsrubricand
someoftheadvantagesandlimitationsofthisapproach.
WhatareSD-PAMs?
SD-PAMsaredefinedbroadlyinthisreportaspolicies
andmeasurestakenbyacountryinpursuitofitsdomestic
policyobjectives—energysecurity,provisionofelectricity,
improvedurbantransportation,forexample—butwhich
areshapedsoastotakealower-emissionpathtothose
objectives.Thesemaybewhollydomesticinnature,orinvolvesupportorotherinteractionfromothercountriesor
internationalinstitutions.BydescribingtheseSD-PAMs,
thisreportseekstoopenthepossibilityofincludingthem
inaninternationalagreement,thusengagingdeveloping
countriesmoredirectlyinclimatechangepolicywhile
promotingtheirdevelopment.
WhyincludeSD-PAMswithinaninternational
climateagreement?
Fromthepointofviewofclimateprotection,the
potentialbenefitofincludingSD-PAMsisobvious:
importantdevelopingcountriesthatarenotyetreadyto
takespecificmeasuresaimedatreducingemissionscan
behelpedtoplacetheirdevelopmentonasignificantly
lower-carbonpathway.
Fromthepointofviewofdevelopingcountriestheuse
ofSD-PAMsbringsseveralpotentialadvantages:
1.Recognition.Manydevelopingcountrieshave
implementedpoliciesandmeasuresthatbringsignificant
emissionreductions,whichifimplementedinindustrializedcountrieswouldbelabeledasclimatepolicy.Yetitis
oftenclaimedbysomeindustrializedcountriesthatdevelopingcountriesarenotcontributinganythingtowardsthe
fightagainstclimatechange.SD-PAMsoffertheopportunitytodispelthatimpression,andcodifycontributionsof
differentcountries.
2.Learning.Byformallysharingandexaminingeach
others’policiesandmeasuresthereisconsiderablescope
forexchangingbestpracticeandotherinformation.
3.Engagement.Ratherthanadvocatinganewsetof
prioritiesfordevelopingcountries,SD-PAMsengagepreciselyontheissuesthatthesecountriesconsidermostpressing.Thisallowstheleveragingofinvestmentandpolicy
effortsmadeinthesecoredevelopmentareas,ratherthan
tryingtocarveoutaseparateeffortforclimateprotection.
4.Promotion.Thepotentialtopromotebothdevelopmentandclimategoalsinawaythatreducestheir
totalcostisapowerfulincentivetobothhostanddonor
countriestosupportappropriateSD-PAMs.Thefactthat
theseSD-PAMsarenotexclusively“additional”emission
reductionmeasuresalsoopensupawiderrangeofsources
forsupport.
Howmighttheybepaidfor?
SD-PAMsofthescaleneededtochangeemissions
anddevelopmenttrajectorieswillrequirehigherlevels
offundingthanhavehithertobeenavailableformitigationindevelopingcountries.Existingmechanismsbased
onexplicit“climate”fundingareassessedandfound
inadequate(Chapter1).Accordingly,therealchallenge
EXEC U TIVE SU MMA RY
VII
istoinstillclimatebenefitsandrisksintothebroader
setofinternationalcapitalflows,onlysomeofwhichare
climate-specific.
Alongtheselines,itissuggestedthatSD-PAMfunding
shouldbeabletocomefromanysource:bilateralaid
agencies,theGlobalEnvironmentFacility,multilateral
developmentbanks,exportcreditagencies,theprivate
sector,thehostgovernment(federalandperhapsstate/
local),stateandlocalcommunities,orothers.The
aspirationoftheSD-PAMsapproachisthatbytargetingactionsofclearmutualbenefit,largerfinancialflows
willbefreedupthanwouldotherwisehavebeenthe
case.Thisremainsacomplexissuehowever,andonethat
requiresfurtherexploration.
HowmightSD-PAMsbeincorporatedinanagreement?
Thereportpresentsapledge-basedapproachtoimplementingSD-PAMs.Thesepledgesarevoluntary,andmay
takeseveralforms,asoutlinedinChapter2:
1.First,asinglecountrymightpledgeoneormoreSDPAMthatisuniquetoitsnationalcircumstancesandnot
directlyrelatedtothepledgesofothercountries.
2.Twoormorecountriesmaymakemutualpledges,
perhapsconsistingofsimultaneouspledgesbybotha
developinganddevelopedcountry.Thismightinvolve
adevelopedcountrypledgingsupportforadeveloping
country’sactivities.Thishastheadditionalattractionof
engagingdonorcountriesonSD-PAMsinwhichthey
haveamutualinterest,suchasforthedevelopmentofa
particulartechnologyorsector.
3.Agroupofcountriescouldmakeharmonizedpledges
inanSD-PAMsnegotiationprocess.Thisapproachacknowledgestheglobalnatureofmanyindustrialactivities,
andopensthedoortomultiplecountriesagreeingtothe
samekindofmeasurestopromoteormaintainan“even
playingfield”forcompetitiveindustries.
AccountingforSD-PAMs
MethodsfordefiningSD-PAMs,establishingaregistry,
reportingandreviewingareexaminedinChapter2.
ConsiderationisalsogiventowhetherandhowemissionreductionsfromSD-PAMsmightbe“credited.”The
premiseofSD-PAMs,however,isdistinctfromproject
mechanismssuchastheCleanDevelopmentMechanism
(CDM)inthatanSD-PAMwillnotneedtodemonstrate
thatitwasundertakenforclimateprotectionreasons.This
isamajoradvantageoftheapproach,butalsomeansthat
itisunlikelytopracticabletoallocatecreditsforemission
reductionsachievedinthemannerofaCDMapproach.
VIII
Beingabletoreasonablyassess,inquantitativeterms,
thecontributionsdifferentcountriesmaketothecollective
globalefforttoprotecttheclimatewouldprovideusefulinputandinformationtonegotiationsthatwilllikely
stretchovermultipledecades.However,itisimportantto
notethatanSD-PAMisacommitmenttoimplementa
policyormeasure,notonaspecificoutcomeexpressedin
termsofemissions.Additionalworkisneededatthesector
andpolicylevelstodevelopreasonablysimpleandtransparentmethodologiestoquantitativelycapturetheGHG
benefitsofSD-PAMs.
Countrystudies
Thisreportpresentsfourcountrystudiesthatexamine
thetypesofpoliciesandmeasuresthatmightbeframedas
SD-PAMs(Chapters3-6).Theauthorsofthesestudiesare
in-countryexperts,buttheaimofpresentingthemhereis
bothtoinvestigatethepotentialSD-PAMsthemselvesand
todrawsomemoregeneralconclusionsabouttheSDPAMsmodel.Theorderinwhichtheyarepresentedisin
somesenseadescendingscaleofhowcompellingthecases
areforanSD-PAMsapproach.Seenanotherway,theyare
anindicationofhowmuchoutsideassistancewouldlikely
beneededtomakethemwork.Byahappycoincidence,
theorderisalsoalphabetical.
BiofuelsfortransportinBrazil
Brazil’sbiofuelsprogram,discussedinChapter3,isthe
onlypolicysetdescribedherewhichisalreadyimplemented
onalargescaleandoveralongtimeperiod.Brazilhasused
arangeofmeasurestosupporttheuseofethanolfromsugarcaneasatransportfuelsincethe1970s,whenthismodel
emergedasameansofrespondingtotheoilcrisis.Although
thesystemwasinitiallybasedonlargesubsidies,thesehave
declinedtowardszero,andethanolisnowcompetitivewith
gasoline.Theauthorsfindthattheeffectshavebeenhuge:
althoughtheextentofethanolusehasvariedovertime,
itnowaccountsforapproximatelyonethirdofBrazil’s
transportfuel.Thesavingsinoilimportsandassociated
debtservicinghavesavedthecountryaround$100billion
inhardcurrency.Brazil’sexternaldebtwouldbe50percent
highertodaywereitnotforethanol.Overamillionjobsin
ruralBrazildependonethanolandsugarproduction,and
theindustryhasbeenprotectedfromexclusivedependence
onthevolatileworldpriceforsugar.Airqualityhasgenerallyimproved,andbiofuelmanufactureproducesaround
1,350gigawatthoursperyearofelectricityforexportto
thegrid,afigurethatisrisingfastastechnologyimproves.
ThesebenefitsarereasonenoughforBraziltocontinueand
expandethanoluse,buttheincidentalimpactonGHG
emissionshasbeensignificant:anestimatedsavingof574
milliontonsofCO2since1975,orroughlytenpercentof
Brazil’sCO2emissionsoverthatperiod.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
ThenatureofBrazil’ssupportforbiofuelshaschanged
overtime,andisthusperhapsbestviewedasaseriesof
SD-PAMs,withcostsdecliningovertimetoasituation
requiringsmallornosubsidiestoday.Theneteffecthas
beenconsiderablebenefitstothecountry,andtheauthors
considerthatsome20othercountriesmightalsofind
theBrazilianmodelattractive.Themodeldependson
sugarcane,whichatpresentoffersmuchbetterenergy
yieldsthanothercrops,andatropicalclimatetogrowit
effectively.Butimprovedproductiontechnology,together
withnewflexfuelcarsthatcanrunoneithergasolineor
ethanol,willmakeimplementationeasier.Incountries
withmoretemperateclimates,atechnologybreakthrough
isstillneededtomakecellulosicethanolmoreviable.
Asonemightsurmisefromthefactthatithassurvived
formorethanthreedecades,Brazil’sbiofuelsprogramhas
flourishedindependentofexplicitclimatechangeconcerns.ItrepresentsoneendofaspectrumofSD-PAMs.A
numberofcountriesmightbehelpedtoimplementsucha
programwithlittlemoreincentivethanexchangeofinformationandeasieraccesstorelevanttechnologies,although
dependingonnationalcircumstancesmoredirectfinancial
supportmightbewarranted.ThereductioninGHGemissionsfromthisdevelopmentwouldbeverysignificant,but
wouldnotneedtobetreatedasamitigationcost.
TransportefficiencyinChina
China’sgrowingtransportsector,whichisthesubjectof
Chapter4,presentsamorecomplexcase.Inurbanareasin
particular,thegrowthincarownershipanduseisspectacular,andthegapbetweenChinaanddevelopedeconomies
suggeststhatthisgrowthwillcontinueforsometime.The
welfarebenefitsoftheincreasedmobilitythatthisimplies
areverylarge,buttheyalsogiverisetorapidlyincreasing
GHGemissions.
Theauthorsseepotentialconstraintsonthesemobility
gainsemergingfromtwofactors:
■ China’srapidly-growingoildemand,whichismakingthepriceandprovenanceofitsimportedoilan
increasingconcern,and
■ Therapidgrowthincaruse,whichisleadingto
gridlockincitiesthatwerenotdesigned,andcannot
beeasilyadapted,forsuchtraffic.
TheypresentthreescenariosforChina’surbantransportthrough2020.“TheRoadAhead”describesabusiness-as-usualscenario;“OilSaved”appliesmeasurestaken
expresslytocurtailoildemandgrowth;and“Integrated
Transport”includesmeasurestoreducetheburdenon
China’surbaninfrastructure.
Thesescenariosgiveanindicationofthescopeforpolicytowork.OilSavedresultsina55percentreductionin
transportenergyuseby2020relativetoTheRoadAhead,
whileIntegratedTransportleadstoa78percentreduction.
Thesereductionscomethroughthreeimprovements:more
efficientenginetypes(hybrids,compressednaturalgas);
smallervehiclestoadapttoconstrainedroadandparking
space;andlowervehicle-miles-traveledaspeopleusepublictransportationalternatives.Theauthorsareatpainsto
pointoutthatthesemeasuresarelikelytoimprove,rather
thanconstrain,mobilityforurbanChinese.
ThechallengesdescribedinthischapterlendthemselvestoanSD-PAMsapproachinseveralways:
■ Chinahasalreadyrecognizedtheseproblemsandis
startingtoimplementpoliciestoaddressthem,such
asimprovedvehicleefficiencystandards.
■ Thescopeforextendingandacceleratingsuchpolicies
andmeasuresappearstobesignificant,andthebenefitsaremajorbothforChinesepolicyinterestsand
forreducedCO2emissions.
■ Thesectorsinvolved,especiallytheautomobilesector,
areglobalinscopeandworkinglobalmarkets.Concertedinternationalactionmayprovemoreeffective
thancountriesactingindividually.
RuralelectrificationinIndia
Ruralelectrificationisapivotaldevelopmentissuein
manypartsoftheworld.Electricityprovidesawiderange
ofdevelopmentadvantages,promotingbettereducation,
betterhealth,andmoreeconomicactivity.TheIndiangovernmenthassetambitioustargetsforprovidingfullelectrification,butitisfarfromclearthatthesegoalscanbemet.
ExperienceinIndiatodatesuggeststhatelectrification
goalswillproveextremelychallenging.Despiterepeated
efforts,56percentofIndianhouseholdshavenoelectricity
supply,andtheproblemisgrowingworseasnewconnectionsfailtokeeppacewithpopulationgrowth.
Forthepurposesofthisstudy,theauthorsstartfrom
thepremisethatthesegoalswillneedtobemetsomehow,
andconsiderthreescenariosunderwhichthisisdone:an
extensionofthegridusingIndia’sexistinggenerationmix;
ascenariodominatedbyoff-griddieselgenerators;and
onedominatedbyoff-gridrenewableenergygeneration.
Theyalsoconsiderthreelevelsofdemandinruralcommunities,includinghouseholds,communalservices,and
(forthehighlevelscenario)productiveusesofpower.
Theyevaluatetheseapproachesaccordingtoasetofnonclimatecriteria:
■ speedinmeetingtheelectrificationtargets
■ qualityandreliabilityofthepower
■ cost
■ securityoffuelsupply
EXEC U TIVE SU MMA RY
IX
Theyfindreasontodoubtwhethergrid-basedelectrificationcanmeettheambitioustimetableofthegovernment’stargets,givenfundamentalstructuralproblems
withIndia’selectricitymarket.Dieselgenerationisperhaps
morepromising,withperhapsthebestpotentialforquicklydeliveringelectrificationoff-grid,andinmanywaysit
canbeexpectedtoplayanimportantrole.However,the
authorspointoutthathighlevelsofdieselusedopresent
asignificantimportdependenceandfuelsecurityproblem
forIndia.Dependingonthedemandscenarioused,the
increaseinoilimportsisbetween6percentand41percent
oftoday’slevels.Theauthorsarguethatthiseconomic
impact,togetherwiththestrategicissuesassociatedwith
growingoilimports,raisedoubtsastothedesirabilityof
seeingalargeuseofdieselinelectrification.
Favoringrenewableenergysourcesbringssignificant
CO2emissionsavings:14to102milliontonsofCO2per
yearcomparedtousingthegrid.Theauthorsarguethat
thisinitselfshouldnotdecisivelyinfluenceIndia’schoice
oftechnology;theyconcludehoweverthatbasedonthe
concernsraisedaboutthegridanddieseltechnologies,
therearesignificantreasonsforIndiatopreferrenewable
energyondomesticpolicygrounds,providedthatthe
institutionaldeliverymechanismscanbeputinplace.
TheyacknowledgethatthecostofrenewableenergytechnologiestendstobehighinIndiaduetothehighcostof
capital,butsuggestthatmakingIndia’selectrificationgoals
partofaninternationalclimateeffortmightofferscopefor
addressingthisobstacle.
India’sruralelectrificationthereforeseemstoofferan
opportunityforanSD-PAMsapproachthatischallenging
initsscopebutequallylargeinitspotentialdevelopment
andclimatebenefits.
CarboncaptureandstorageinSouthAfrica
SouthAfricatypifiesanimportantchallengeforseveral
majordevelopingcountries.Asignificantpartofitspopulationlacksaccesstoelectricity,andprovidingthataccess
isanurgentpoliticalpriority.However,thecountry’s
fuelmixisdominatedbycoal,andthelargedomestic
coalresourcesuggeststhatexpandinggenerationmeans
amajorincreaseinCO2emissions.Carboncaptureand
storage(CCS)technology,whichinvolvesthecaptureof
CO2emissionsfrompowerplantsorindustrialprocesses
anditspermanentdisposalingeologicalformations,offers
X
thetechnicalpotentialtoaddressthisproblem.Canthe
implementationofthistechnologyworkasanSD-PAM?
TheauthorsexaminethetechnicalpotentialinSouthAfricaforboththecapturefromparticularfacilitiesandthe
availabilityofdisposalsites.Theyalsoaddressissuessuch
asthetechnicalandinstitutionalcapacityinSouthAfrica
tomakesCCSwork.
TheyconcludethatCCShassignificantpotentialfor
cuttingemissionsinSouthAfrica.Someofthisisatrelativelylowcost—some30milliontonsCO2peryearmay
beavailableforcaptureandstorageatanestimated$20
perton—butmostwillbemuchmoreexpensivethanthis.
Moreimportantly,theyfindfewsustainabledevelopment
benefitsforSouthAfricabeyondthemitigationofGHGs.
Onepossibleexceptionisinthepotentialfortransfer
oftechnologiesthataremoregenerallyusefulinSouth
Africa,suchasCO2gastransmissionwhichmayalsobe
usefulforpipingnaturalgas.Butthisaloneisfarfrom
makingthecaseforSouthAfricatoimplementCCSinthe
absenceofaformalemissionconstraint,whichisunlikely
intheforeseeablefuture.
ThiscaseillustratesoneofthelimitationsoftheSDPAMsapproach.CCSbringsfewsustainabledevelopment
benefits,andnonethatcomeclosetomakingitviablein
theabsenceofexplicitmitigationcommitments.These
mitigationcommitmentswouldnotneedtobeonthepart
ofSouthAfrica:itwouldbepossiblefordonorcountries
tofinancethefuturecaptureandstorageofSouthAfrican
emissions.Buttheamountsofmoneyinvolvedwould
beastep-changeinthewillingnessoftheinternational
communitytopayforGHGmitigation,whichthusfar
hasbeenlow.Theauthorsmakeavaluablecontribution
tothestudyofCCSinSouthAfrica,butitdoesnotseem
thattheSD-PAMsmodelwillservewell,absentsignificant
internationalsupport.
Conclusions
TheuseofSD-PAMsopensupawayofputtinginto
moreformaleffecttheprovisionsoftheUNFCCCandoffershopeofamoreconstructivedialoguearounddevelopingcountryemissionsandtheimportanceofdevelopment.
Whiletheconceptisnotnew,thisreportaimstolaythe
ideaoutsystematicallyandtoexploresomeofitsimplicationsandpotentialapplications.
Thecountrystudiespresentedinthisreportshowa
rangeofopportunitiesforSD-PAMs.InthecaseofBrazil’s
biofuelsprogram,thepotentialisnotsomuchtoexpand
ethanoluseinBrazilitselfastofindwaystoexpandthe
approachtoothercountries.InChina,moreefficient
vehiclesandintegratedtransportsolutionsarealreadya
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
targetofgovernmentpolicy,butanSD-PAMsapproach
haspotentialtohelptheuptakeofthesebefasterand
deeper.Indiahasalreadymaderuralelectrificationapolicy
priority,buthasseenrenewableenergyasarelativelyminorcomponentwithinthatpolicy;SD-PAMscanbeused
tosettheconditionsforashifttowardsmakingrenewables
thecoreofaruralelectrificationstrategy.
ThechiefadvantageofSD-PAMsisthattheyalignthe
interestsofclimateprotectionwiththoseofpolicygoals
thathaveahigherpriorityfordevelopingcountrypolicy
makers.Theemphasismustbeonhowtoimprovethe
deliveryofdevelopmentgoalsatthesametimeasreducingemissions.Thisleveragingofexistingpolicyprioritiesmeansboththattheappropriatelevelofdomestic
incentivewillexisttoimplementthenecessarylawsand
policies,andthatlargerfinancialflowscanbeinfluenced,
ratherthandependingonmorelimitedfundsdedicatedto
climatepolicy.Theoverwhelmingimportanceofdomestic
andprivatecapitalinenergyinvestmentinmajordevelopingcountriesmeansthatleveragingexistingfinancialflows
isfarmoresignificantthancreatingnewfundsspecifically
aimedatclimateprotection.
TheprocessofestablishingSD-PAMspromisesto
bemorevariedthanmanyexistingproposalsforfuture
climatepolicy.Insomecasestheapproachmaybeasimple
pledgeandreview;inothersanagreementofcomparable
commitmentsinspecificsectors;inyetothersnegotiation
ofmutualcommitmentsbetweencountries.Thismay
seemmessy,butinfactmostinternationalagreements
withaimsofasimilarlevelofambitiontothoseofclimate
policyhaveproceededasimilarfashion.
Moreworkneedstobedone.Analysisisneededofsectorssuchaswater,agriculture,forestryandnon-electricity
energyefficiency.TheinteractionbetweenSD-PAMsand
marketmechanismssuchastheCDM,howSD-PAMs
mightbefinanced,andhowmutualcommitmentscould
work,areallimportantareasoffurtherenquiry,
Theworldneedsaclimateagreementbeyond2012
thatwillmeettheneedsofalltheworld’scountries,rich
andpoor;italsoneedstoacceleratetheriseofitspoorest
inhabitantsoutofpoverty.SD-PAMsofferssomehope
thatthesetwocrucialaimscanbemet.
EXEC U TIVE SU MMA RY
XI
XII
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
chapteri
Introductionto
Introductionto
SustainableDevelopment
SustainableDevelopment
PoliciesandMeasures
RobBradley ■ JonathanPershing
IfyoufillyourcarwithpetrolinBrazil,you’renotgetting
quitewhatyoumaythink.Evenbasicpetrolisaquarter
ethanol,whichisproducedfromfermentationofsugarfrom
Brazil’svastsugarcanecrop.Indeed,ifyouhavea“flexfuel”
car,asdoasignificantproportionofBrazilians,youneed
notusepetrolatall.Suchcarscanrunonpureethanol.
EthanolwasusedasasupplementtopetrolinBrazilfor
muchofthe20thcentury,butstartinginthe1970sitwas
activelypromotedbythegovernment.Then,Brazil—like
mostcountries—facedafast-risingoilpriceandinsecurity
overthefuturestabilityofthecountriesthatsitatopthe
world’smajorreserves.Italsohadalargeandeconomically
importantsugarsector,whichwasstrugglingintheface
oflowworldsugarpricesandeagerforanothersource
ofincome.Promotingethanolasatransportfuelhelped
addressbothoftheseseeminglyunrelatedproblems.
ClimatechangeplayednopartinBrazil’sdecisionto
embracebiofuels.Atthetime,climatechangewasnot
evenrecognizedasaproblem.Buttheclimatehascertainly
benefited.TheBraziliangovernmentcalculatesthat
between1975and2000thisprogramavoidedemissions
of403milliontons(Mt)ofcarbondioxide(CO2)equivalent.1Today,itstilloffsetssome26MtCO2equivalent
eachyear—morethanwouldbesavedeachyearbytaking
allofSweden’scarspermanentlyofftheroad.Wideruse
ofthisstrategy,inbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries,wouldbeamajorcontributiontofightingdangerousclimatechange.Ifitwereimplementedinadeveloped
countrytoday,itwouldalmostcertainlybedescribedas
aclimateprotectionmeasure.Yetatpresentinternational
climatepolicyoffersnowayofrecognizingandsupportingsuchmeasures.
Thisreportexploresanapproachtoreconciling
developmentandclimatepriorities,termedsustainable
developmentpoliciesandmeasures(SD-PAMs).This
approachwasfirstputforwardinthisformbyWinkler
etal.(2002)anddescribespoliciesandmeasuresthat
arefirmlywithinthenationalsustainabledevelopment
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
1
prioritiesofthehostcountry,butthroughinclusionin
aninternationalclimateframeworkseekstorecognize,
promoteandsupportmeansofmeetingthesepolicy
prioritiesonalower-carbontrajectory.TheSD-PAMs
approachhasbeenthesubjectofsomediscussionwithin
theclimatechangeliterature2andhasbeenpresentedas
acomponentofaclimateregimebytheClimateAction
Network(2003),amongothers.Ithasthusenteredthe
climatepolicyvocabulary.However,agreatdealofwork
remainstobedonetoexploretheoperationalimplications
ofSD-PAMsaspartofaninternationalpolicyframework.
Thisreportisacontributiontothateffort.Wefirstdiscuss
themeritsandlimitationsofSD-PAMs(Chapter1)and
howanSD-PAMspledgingprocessmightfitwithinthe
internationalpolicycontext(Chapter2).Wethenexamine
indetailfourcasestudiesofpolicyoptionsindeveloping
countries:Brazil’suseofbiofuelsfortransport(Chapter
3),efficienturbantransportinChina(Chapter4),options
forruralelectrificationinIndia(Chapter5)andcarbon
captureandstorageinSouthAfrica(Chapter6).
SD-PAMsarenotapanacea.Inparticular,theydonot
changetheneedforindustrializedcountriestoleadwith
explicitactiontomitigatetheirowngreenhousegas(GHG)
emissions.However,theydoofferthepotentialforaless
confrontationalapproachbetweenindustrializedand
developingcountries,andameanstoaddressdeveloping
countryemissionsbypromotingratherthanthreatening
theirdevelopment.Thisapproachhasgreatpotentialfor
trust-building,asSD-PAMsaremadecomplementaryto,
andnotexclusiveof,otherformsofdevelopingcountry
policy.TheycancoexistwithKyoto-styletargets,project
mechanisms,andotherformsofengagement.
ThischapterpresentstheSD-PAMsapproachinthe
followingsections:
1)Climatemeetsdevelopment:whyaninnovative
solutiontothecurrentimpasseinclimatepolicyis
needed,andwhatSD-PAMsaimtoachieve.
2)Developmentmeetsclimate:thechallengesfacedby
developingcountries,andhowthesecanandshould
beovercomeinmoreclimate-friendlyways.
3)FittingSD-PAMsintofutureclimateagreements:
howSD-PAMsmightwork,theiradvantages,and
howtheyrelatetootherclimateinstruments.
4)FinancingSD-PAMs:howSD-PAMsmightbe
paidfor.
5)LimitationsofSD-PAMs:theimportanceofunderstandingwhatSD-PAMscanandcan’tdo.
6)Thisreport:mappingouttheremainderofthisreport.
2
1.CLIMATEMEETSDEVELOPMENT
Thestorysofar
Eversinceinternationaleffortstocombatclimate
changebegan,atensionhasexistedbetweendevelopingandindustrializedcountries.Richercountrieshave
pointedtotheneedforglobalclimatepolicyandtherising
absoluteemissionsoflargedevelopingcountriessuchas
ChinaandIndia.Developingcountriesretortthattheir
per-capitaemissionsremainmuchbelowthoseofindustrializedcountries,andthattheirhistoricalcontribution
totoday’sgreenhousegasconcentrationsisstillsmaller.
Thisimpliesthatindustrializedcountriesshouldtherefore
taketheleadinreducingemissions,notleasttoallowfor
developingcountrygrowth.Furthermore,the“capacity”ofdevelopingcountries—thatistheresourcesand
institutionalcapabilities—toinvestincleanertechnology
andtakeothermitigationmeasuresislower.Mostofall,
developingcountriesfaceurgentsustainabledevelopment
needs—reducingpoverty,increasingaccesstomodern
energyservices,increasingmobility,andattainingthe
otherbenefitsenjoyedbyrichercountries.
Thesetensionsareapparentinthe1992UNFramework
ConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC,or“Convention”).TheConventionestablishesthebasicprinciples
andpreliminarystepsforaddressingclimatechangeata
globallevel,aswellasanultimateobjectiveofstabilizing
atmosphericconcentrationsofGHGsatalevelthatavoids
dangeroushumaninterferencewiththeclimatesystem.
WhiletheConventionhasnearlyuniversalmembership,it
alsodividestheworldintotwogroups—AnnexI(developed)andnon-AnnexI(developing).Itplacestheprimary
responsibilityonthedevelopedcountriestoreducetheir
emissionsandassistdevelopingcountriesindoingthe
same.Thisisexpressedasthe“commonbutdifferentiated
responsibilities”oftheParties:allhaveresponsibilities,but
thesevarytoreflecttheirdifferingnationalcircumstances.
Underthe1997KyotoProtocol,theAnnexIcountries
assumedlegallybindingemissioncapstobeachievedduringthefive-yearperiodfrom2008to2012.Targetsrange
fromadecreaseof8percentrelativeto1990(European
Unionandothers)toanincreaseof10percent(Iceland).
However,twoindustrializedcountries—theUnitedStates
andAustralia—havenotaccededtotheKyotoProtocol,
whichenteredintoforceinFebruary2005,andarethereforenotboundbyitsemissioncontrols.Fortheirpart,the
developingcountrieshavenoemissionlimitsunderKyoto,
althoughtheymayhostemission-reductionprojectsunder
theKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanism
(CDM).Suchprojects,itishoped,willgeneratesomedevelopmentbenefits,whilealsoearningemissionreduction
creditsthatmaybeusedbyAnnexIcountriestohelpmeet
theirKyototargets.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
TheunwillingnessofcountriessuchastheUnited
StatesandAustraliatoengagemeaningfullyininternationalclimatepolicyremainsthesinglebiggestobstacle
toconfrontingtheproblemofclimatechange.Looking
ahead,however,someformofmoreactivedeveloping
countryparticipationisgenerallyregardedasaprerequisite
foraclimateagreementtofollowthefirst“commitment
period”oftheKyotoProtocol,whichendsin2012.And
thesetwochallengesaretosomeextentlinked—criticsof
theKyotoProtocolpointtotheapparentlackofparticipationbydevelopingcountries,whiledevelopingcountries
areunlikelytotakemoreactiveclimatemeasureswhilethe
world’slargestemitterremainsunwillingtodoso.Inasmuchasdevelopingcountrieshavemadeclearthattheyare
notpreparedtotakeonthesamekindsoftargetsasAnnex
Icountries(inlargepartbecauseofthedisparitiesindevelopmentdiscussedinsection2below),movingaheadwill
requirecreativethinkingonhowtofindmoreappropriate
waysfordevelopingcountriestopromoteandaccelerate
theirgrowthwhilelimitingtheirGHGemissions.
Thenextphase
Examiningthebasisforfutureagreements,policyanalystshavesuggestedasetofoptionsfornextsteps.These
include(1)theexpansionandamplificationoftheKyoto
structureofemissionstargetsandmarketmechanisms;(2)
afocusontechnology,includingresearch,development,
transfer,anddiffusion;(3)anemphasisondevelopment
policiesandmeasures(thefocusofthisreport),and(4)
agreementsthatmayencompassanyoralloftheabove
measuresandoptions,butthatmayberegionallyor
sectorallydefinedratherthanglobalinscope.
KyotoPlus.Withmorethan150countriesandregions
PartytotheKyotoProtocol,thisoptionhasenormous
support.Targetsarebeingimplemented,andthemarkets
establishedundertheProtocolareoperative.TheEuropeanUnionhasallocatedemissionsallowancesformorethan
2billionmetrictonsofCO2—andpricesin2005were
approximately�30/ton.Whilestillarelativelynewmarket,
theCDM,withsupportfromsimilareffortsbytheWorld
Bankandothers,hasattractedapproximately$1billion
ofpledgedinvestmentindevelopingcountries.However,
notwithstandingthebroadlevelofagreementonthestructure,keycountries—inparticulartheUnitedStates—have
rejectedtheProtocol.Asidefromthisproblem,themost
importantgapinthisapproachisthatitlacksanappropriatemeansofdealingwithdevelopingcountryemissions.
Technology.Aratherdifferentapproach,oneemphasizingtheneedtodevelopalternateandlong-termtechnologies,particularlyfortheenergysector,hasbeenpostulated
ascomplementaryto—orpossiblyasareplacement
for—theKyotostructure.Proponentshavearguedthat
theindirectandnear-terminfluenceofpricingmechanismsestablishedthroughemissionscapsareinadequate
tocreateincentivesthatwilldrivethemajortechnology
changesrequiredtoredirecttheglobaleconomytozero
netemissions.Aggressiveeffortsatresearch,development,
anddeployment(RD&D)—inspecifictechnologiessuch
asrenewableenergy,energyefficiency,newfuelssuchas
hydrogenandbiofuels,andcarboncaptureandstorage
toallowsafeuseoffossilfuels—areafocusofthisvision.
Onthenegativeside,criticsworrythatsuchaprogram
runstheriskofchoosingpoorly;governmentshavebeen
notoriousfortechnologypushpoliciesthathavefailedto
generatebenefitsclaimed—andthathavecostsubstantially
morethanprojected.Somealsoworrythattoostrongan
emphasisonlong-termtechnologiescanactasacoverfor
deferringactiononclimatechangealtogether,whilefailingtocreateacarbonmarket,whichprovidesoneofthe
majorincentivestodeveloptechnologies.
Development.Thisapproachassumesthat,particularly
indevelopingcountries,theprioritiesfortheforeseeable
futurewillbetotacklebasicnecessities,suchaspoverty
alleviation,foodsupply,health,andaccesstomodernenergyservicesandtransportation.However,asdiscussedin
detailinthisreport,manyofthesedevelopmentpriorities
canbemetinamannerconsistentwithclimatemitigation.Thekeyistoidentifysuchpracticesandpromote
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
3
them.Thisemphasisalsohascritics.Notleast,proponents
mustaddresstheratherwoefulglobalhistory:therichestcountriesintheworldhaveseenemissionsofGHGs
increaseproportionaltotheireconomicgrowth.Even
effortstoprovideinternationaldevelopmentassistance
havenotapparentlyhelped:bothWorldBankandbilateral
loansintheenergysector(tochoosebutoneexample)
havepredominantlyfundedmassivefossilfuelelectricity
generatingfacilitiesratherthanclean,renewableenergy
alternatives(Sohnetal.,2005).
RegionalStructure.Underthistheory,progressisbest
madewhenlike-mindedgroupsofcountries—orcompanies—bandtogethertoaddresscommonproblems.For
example,TheAfricanUnionhassoughttojointogether
toaddressAfricandevelopmentissues.Itbringstothetask
anintimateunderstandingoftheregion’sneedsandopportunitiesunmatchedbyrepresentativesofotherregions.
Inclimatemitigation,suchgroupingsmayemergearound
oilexportingorimportingcountries,whichinthe1970s
gaverisebothtotheOrganizationofPetroleumExporting
CountriesandtotheInternationalEnergyAgency.Groupingsmightalsobelinkedtosectors,suchasautomobiles;
witnesstheeffortbytheEuropeanUniontosetstandards
forvehicleemissions,whichbroughttothetableEuropean,Japanese,andKoreancarmanufacturers.Heretoo,
criticshavelegitimateconcerns:howtoaddressissuesof
monopolycontrolsandtradedistortions?Howtopromote
morethanthe“lowestcommondenominator”solution—
wheretheeffectislikelytobeminimal?Howtointegrate
aseriesofsuchagreementstoensurethataggregateglobal
emissionsarereallybeingcurtailed?
Inreality,theinternationalclimateeffortislikelytobe
formedfromanamalgamofthesechoices,withelements
fromeachadoptedbydifferentcountriesdependingon
theircircumstancesandpriorities.Indeed,asystembased
ononlyoneseemslikelytobeinsufficient.Eachalternativebringscomplementarychoicestothediscussion,
whichifsuccessfullyimplementedcouldhelpconstruct
aneffectiveglobalregimetoaddresstheclimateproblem.
TheSD-PAMsapproachexploredinthisreporthasatits
centerofgravitythedevelopmentcomponent,butitis
importanttorecognizethatitiscompatiblewithallthe
componentsdiscussedabove.
4
2.DEVELOPMENTMEETSCLIMATE
Meanwhile,developingcountriesfacethechallengeof
developinginwhatisincreasinglylikelytobeacarbon-
constrainedworld.Althoughdevelopingcountryemissions
arenotconstrainedtoday,thethreatofclimatechange
meansthatanuncheckedriseinemissionswillinevitablyact
asaconstrainttotheirlong-termeconomicdevelopment.
Headingdownalower-carbonpathnowmayprovefar
cheaperinthelongtermthaninvestinginenergysystems
todaythatbecomealiabilitythroughhighGHGemissions.
Whileeconomicgrowthandprosperitymatterto
peopleallovertheworld,indevelopingcountriestheneeds
areparticularlyacute.Quiteapartfromtheeconomic
growthneededtoliftbillionsofpeopleoutofpoverty,
thereareanumberofkeyservicesandopportunitiesthat
arevitalfromthepointofviewofdevelopmentbutoffer
additionalchallengestoclimatepolicy.Theseinclude
accesstomodernenergyservices(withconcomitant
provisionoflighting,refrigeration,andotherservices),
transportation,andimprovedagriculturalpracticesthat
arelinkedtoadequatefoodsupplies.Presently,these
services,whereavailable,areprovidedinthemainwith
theuseoffossilfuels—withassociatedGHGemissions.
IncreasedAccesstoModernEnergyServices
Estimatesofthenumberofpeopleworldwidethat
lackaccesstomodernenergyservicesvary,butasmany
as2billionhavenoreliableaccesstoelectricityorclean
cookingorheatingfuels(ESMAP,2000),withsignificant
variationbycountry(Figure1).Thelackofsuchservices
isacontributingfactorinpoverty.Womeninparticular
spendmuchoftheirtimegatheringwoodforfuel,and
theninhalingthefumesthatcomefromthecookingfires.
Forestcoverisalsoreduced;modernappliancessuchas
refrigerationarenotavailable,andsmallbusinesseslack
themotivepowerformanyapplications.Therelationship
betweenpovertyandenergyservicesisacomplexone,but
foranygovernmentdeterminedtoreducepoverty,rolling
outaccesstoelectricityandothermodernenergycarriersis
ahighpriority.
BuildingaModernEconomy
Mostdevelopingcountrieswanttocultivateindustries
thatwillcreateemployment,economicgrowth,andtechnologicalprogressintheircountries.Thismeansbuilding
industriesandjobsinsectorsthatpromisegrowth,higher
wages,improveddomesticlivingstandards,technologicalmodernization,andexportpotential.Manyofthese
sectorscanleadtorisingemissions.Conversely,therearea
growingnumberofopportunitiesforthedevelopmentof
industriesthatproducethecleanertechnologiesthatallow
economicdevelopmentwithloweremissions.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
589m
60%
150
% Population Without Access
57%
Millions
50%
47%
125
47%
100
34%
30%
75
20%
50
5%
1%
China
5%
Mexico
Argentina
S. Africa
Indonesia
0%
Pakistan
5%
Brazil
10%
Millions of People
40%
India
EnergySecurityandAccesstoOilSupplies
Therolethatoilhasplayedinthedevelopmentof
today’sworldeconomyisseminal.Worldtrademaysometimesseembasedonflashesofinternet-basedinformation,
butitislikewisedrivenbyoiltankerschuggingacrossthe
oceansandkerosene-firedjetswingingthroughthesky.
Oilisanessentialingredientinabewilderingarrayof
products,fromplasticstomedicines,transportedinoil-fueledtruckstostoresthatareinturnvisitedbyoil-fueled
customers.Butincreasingly,gettingholdofitanddealing
withtheconsequencesofitsuseareamajorburdenon
mostmoderneconomies,andtheburdenisgreaterstillin
thecaseofdevelopingcountries,whichusemoreoilper
unitofGDP.Theeconomiccostofthisoiluseishuge,
andaffectsindebtednessinmanydevelopingcountries(see
Figure3).Theenergysecurityconcernssuchimportsraise
aresimilarlydaunting,inviewofthesometimesunstable
countriesthatproducethem.Some72percentofknown
reservesarefoundinjustsevencountries(SaudiArabia,
Iran,Iraq,UnitedArabEmirates,Kuwait,Venezuela,and
Russia)(BP,2005).Nearlyalloftheworld’slargesteconomies,includingtheUnitedStates,Japan,China,India,
Brazil,andSouthAfrica,areoilimporters.
Figure1.AccesstoElectricityinSelectedCountries
Percent of Population Without Access
IncreasedMobilityandCarOwnership
Improvedmobilityisbothacauseandconsequence
ofeconomicdevelopment.Accesstocheapandefficient
moderntransportationincreasesthescopeforeconomic
activity,allowingworkerstofindworkmoreeasilyand
reducingthetimewastedintransit,whichisneitheruseful
norenjoyable.Inaddition,greateruseoftransportisa
favoritepurchaseforpeopleleavingpovertybehind,and
doesmuchtoimprovetheirqualityoflife.Atthesame
time,giventhatalmostallmechanizedtransportisfueled
byoil,improvedmobilityplacesstrongupwardpressure
onGHGemissions.Thiswillbeespeciallythecasein
developingcountries,wheremotorvehicleuseislow,but
poisedtoriseconsiderablyrelativetotheindustrialized
countries(Figure2).
25
0
Source:IEA(2002)
Figure2.MotorVehiclesper1,000People
0
200
400
600
800
779
U.S.
572
Japan
159
Mexico
China
12
India
10
Source:WorldBank(2005).Datarangesfrom1997-2000.
LocalHealthandEnvironmentalQuality
Often,reducedGHGemissionsandimprovedlocal
environmentgohandinhand,butthereareimportant
exceptions.Forexample,theuseof(carbonneutral)biomassindoors,particularlyforcookingandspaceheating,
isamajorsourceofillnessandprematuredeathinmany
developingcountries.Aswitchtomoremodernfuels
suchaselectricityorLPGisoftendesirable.Findinglow-
emissionwaystomeetthesamegoalisamajorchallenge.
Similarly,aswitchtobiofuelcropstoreplaceoilmaylead
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
5
Figure3.DevelopingCountryExternalDebtTendstoIncreaseasOilPricesRise
40
External Debt
35
Crude Oil Price
65
55
45
25
35
20
15
25
10
15
5
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
-5
5
1972
0
Oil Price per barrel (US$ 2000)
Growth of External Debt (%)
30
-5
Source:IEA(2003)
toincreasedrequirementsforfertilizersaswellasadditionalsoilerosion;bothcanleadtoincreasednetGHG
emissionsaswellastolocalpollution.
Whiledevelopingcountriesfaceurgentdevelopmentneeds,itshouldalsoberememberedthatthepoor
aregenerallymostdependentonnaturalresourcesand
ecosystems,whichcanformthebasisfortheirsurvivaland
evenprosperity(WRI,2005).Climatechange,whilenot
animmediatelypressingissuefordevelopingcountries,is
infactaseriousthreattopreciselythosesystemsonwhich
theirpoorgenerallydepend.
Climatechangeconstraintsandtheimperativesof
developmentarethereforeoftenintension.Developing
countriesneedameansofdealingwiththeseformidable
challenges,whileavoidingcreatingaseriousfutureliability
forthemselvesbymakingGHGemissionsintegraltotheir
economies.This,asmuchasthepresentimpasseininternationalclimatepolicy,suggeststhatafutureregimemust
improvetheprospectsofintegratingGHGconsiderations
intodevelopmentconsiderations,andviceversa.
6
3.SD-PAMS:BREAKINGTHELOGJAM
TheSD-PAMsapproachproposestomakethedevelopmentpoliciesofeachcountrythebasis,orevensubstitute,
forclimatepolicyinthatcountry.Inmanycases,the
prioritiesfacingdevelopingcountriescanbemetinavarietyofways,withprofoundlydifferentoutcomesfroma
climateperspective.Forinstance,aplanforelectrification
ofaregionthatlackselectricitycanbebasedonfossilfuel
technologiesorrenewableenergy.Insomecases,thedifferencebetweenthetwoissmallfromalocalornational
perspective,eventhoughthedifferenceinimpactonthe
climatecanbesignificant.
3.1SD-PAMswithinaclimateagreement
ThebasicfoundationsoftheSD-PAMsconceptare
containedinthe1992ClimateConvention,discussed
above.Specifically,theConventionrequiresallcountries
todevelopnationalGHGmitigationprograms.3Atthe
sametime,theConventionaffirms“Partieshavearight
to,andshould,promotesustainabledevelopment.”Accordingly,“policiesandmeasurestoprotecttheclimate
system...shouldbeintegratedwithnationaldevelopment
programmes.”4TheKyotoProtocolreinforcesthisnotion
byobservingthatmitigationcommitmentsbeadvanced
“inordertoachievesustainabledevelopment.”5Thus,
undertheclimateagreements,sustainabledevelopment
andclimateprotectionobjectivesaretobepursuedinan
integratedandcomplementaryfashion.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Asmanyobservershavenoted,however,theConventionobligationsarevagueandindefinite.Thereisno
officialrecognitionofpoliciesandmeasuresactually
undertaken,orreviewoftheirimplementation.6Norare
theremechanismswithintheConventionorProtocolthat
provideincentivesorfinancing,orotherwisepromoteSDPAMsindevelopingcountries.Mechanismssuchasthe
GlobalEnvironmentFacilityandtheCleanDevelopment
Mechanism,whileimportant,areorientedtowardprojects
thatreduceemissions.
Theseshortcomingsarenotsurprising.TheConventionisonlyaframeworkagreementcontainingmostly
generalizedprovisions.Theexpectationisthatthebasic
Conventionobligationswillhelpbuildcapacityand
experience,whichcansubsequentlyformthebasisof
adoptingmoredefinedandrigorousapproaches.ThechallengeisforPartiestooperationalizethevisionsetforthin
theClimateConvention.SD-PAMsrepresentonesuch
operationalvision.
ThepossibleoperationalmechanicsofanSD-PAMs
approacharediscussedindetailinChapter2.Inbrief,an
SD-PAMsystemcouldinvolvethepledging,bygovernments,ofspecificactionstobeundertaken,oralready
beingimplemented.Additionalprovisionsformonitoring,
reporting,andreviewwouldalsobeessential,aswellas
funding.ApledgedSD-PAMmightbeexpectedtohave
thefollowingcharacteristics:
■ Alegislative,regulatory,orothergovernmentaction.
Thusitisdistinctfrompurelyprivateinitiativesor
projects.
■ Aimedatthecountry’sownsustainabledevelopment
objectives,asdefinedbythedevelopingcountry
(Box1).Thereisnoneedtoproveorevenclaimthat
climatechangeisamotivationforimplementingan
SD-PAM—thusitdoesnotneedtodemonstrate
“additionality”inthesamesensethataCDMproject
wouldneedto.
■ HavingabeneficialeffectonGHGemissions.This
factorneedstobeevaluatedagainstsomealternative
(forexample,abiofuelsprogramwouldbereplacing
petroluse),butitwouldnotnecessarilyhavetobe
calculatedagainstaspecificbaseline.
Suchanapproachwoulddiffersubstantiallyfrommost
existingandpreviousproposalsforadvancingandassisting
developingcountryparticipation,inthatitfocuseson
effortsandpolicycommitmentsratherthancommitments
toaspecificoutcome.Inthisrespect,however,itdoesresembleinternationalprocessesinotherdomains.Thetrade
Box1.DefiningSustainableDevelopment
Thegeneralenthusiasmfortheconceptofsustainabledevelopmentismatched
bytheconfusionoverwhatitmeans.Thebest-knowndefinitioncomesfromthe
BrundtlandReport(WCED,1987):“[Developmentthat]meetstheneedsofthe
presentwithoutcompromisingtheabilityoffuturegenerationstomeettheir
ownneeds.”Ingeneral,itistakentomeandevelopmentthatgoesbeyondpure
economicgrowthtoincludeaspectsofenvironmentalandsocialprotection.
WithintheUNFCCChowever,therehasbeenstrongresistancetoanydefinition
ofsustainabledevelopmentthatappearstoconstraindevelopingcountrychoices.
TheCDM,forexample,ismandatedtopromotesustainabledevelopment—but
thisisdefinedaswhateverthehostcountrydeclarestobeinlinewithitsinterests.
Inthisreport,wedonotattempttodefinerigorouslywhatsustainabledevelopmentmeans.Astheauthorsofthecountrystudies(Chapters3-6)show,national
prioritiesaremanyandvaried.Inpractice,itislikelythathost-countrydefinitions
ofsustainabledevelopmentwillremaintheorderoftheday.
liberalizationprocessundertheWorldTradeOrganization
(anditspredecessor,theGeneralAgreementonTariffsand
Trade)hasproceededunderroundsofinteractiveandflexiblenegotiations,whichresultedinmutualcommitments
fromtheParties.Ithasbeensuggestedthatasimilarprocesscouldbefollowedinformingclimatecommitments
(Victor,2001).InternationalMonetaryFundcountry
reviewshavealsobeensuggestedasamodel(Chayesand
Chayes,1991).TheMarshallFundprocessafterWorld
WarIIinvolvedadetailedsharingofeachcountry’splans
for(re)development,althoughtheexistenceoftheUnited
Statesasaneffectiveoverseerisclearlydifferentfromthe
climatepolicysituation(Schelling,1998).
AnimportantdifferencebetweentheMarshallPlan
processandthatoftheUNFCCCwasthenumberof
countriesinvolved.Thefactthatthelargest20orsoemitters(countingtheEuropeanUnionasasingleemitter)
accountforover75percentofglobalGHGemissionshas
ledanumberofcommentatorstoproposenegotiations
amongagroupofmajoremitters.7Inthecaseofclimate
change,itisunlikelythattheUnitedNationswillloseits
roleastheprinciplevenuefornegotiations,butanSDPAMsstructureallowsthepossibilityofsmallergroups
deepeningtheircooperationwithinalargeragreement.
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
7
3.2SD-PAMsandexisting
proposalsfordevelopingcountry
engagement
Todate,mostproposalsforlimitingemissionsin
developingcountriesareorientedtowardvariousformulasforquantitativeGHGtargets,includingmanywith
“top-down”determinationsofnationalobligations.8Such
proposalstendtolackanexplicitdevelopmentdimension,
andaretypicallyviewedbydevelopingcountryParties
aspotentiallyconstrainingtheireconomicdevelopment.
Overall,theadoptionofemissiontargetsindeveloping
countriesfacessubstantialpolitical,capacitybuilding,and
technicalhurdles.9
Asecondapproachistorelyincreasinglyonprojectbasedmechanisms,suchastheCDM,asthemainform
ofdevelopingcountryengagement.WhiletheCDM
remainspromisingandcouldcomplementSD-PAMs,it
differsfromSD-PAMsinkeyrespects.First,theCDM
isrestrictedtoprojects,whichlimitsitspotential.Policy
change,morethanindividualprojects,isneededtoachieve
theClimateConventionanddevelopmentobjectives.Itis
widelyunderstoodthatmeetingsustainabledevelopment
challengeswillrequire“profoundstructuralchangesin
socio-economicandinstitutionalarrangements,”(WCED,
1987)whichwillbedifficultorimpossibletobringabout
onaproject-by-projectbasis.Second,becauseCDMcreditsareusedbyAnnexIPartiestooffsettheirownemissions,itisessentialthatCDMprojectsare“additional”—
thatis,projectsneedtoprovethattheyreduceemissions
relativetothosethatwouldhaveoccurredintheabsence
oftheCDM.This“additionality”requirementdoesnot
existforSD-PAMs,whichisnotacreditingmechanism
(althoughtheremaybescopeforcrediting,ifcertain
safeguardswereinplace,asdiscussedinChapter2).Under
anSD-PAMssystem,itismorelikelythatpledgedactions
aremotivatedbynon-climateconsiderations,suchas
energysecurityorlocalpollutionreduction.Severalcase
studiesinthisreportareillustrativeofsuchoutcomes.
AlthoughSD-PAMswouldcomplementandnotreplace
theCDM,baselinesforCDMprojectscanbeaffected
bywhetherpoliciesandmeasuresarealreadyinplacein
therelevantsectorandcountry.Atpresent,thisleadstoa
cleardisincentiveforpoliciesandmeasuresindeveloping
countries—CDMprojectsarevalued,whilepoliciesand
8
measuresarenot.AnSD-PAMsapproachmaynotremove
thisperverseincentiveentirely,butbygrantingsomevalue
topoliciesandmeasuresitmayreduceit.
Afinalapproach,focusingonharmonizedpolicies
andmeasures,hasbeenunderdiscussionformanyyears
withintheUNFCCCandKyotoProtocol.Thisapproach
involvescountriesadoptingidenticalorsimilarpolicies
inparticularsectors.Anagreementonacommonsetof
PAMshasbeenresistedbymanyPartiesonthegrounds
thatitintrudestoostronglyintodomesticpolicymakingprerogatives.Indeed,theprevailingprincipleofthe
ClimateConventionthathasfacilitatedcooperationis
differentiation,notharmonization.UnderKyoto,forinstance,governmentsarefreetoachievetheirtargetsinany
waytheydeemappropriate,includingbyusingtrading
andotherregulatoryapproaches.Similarly,underanSDPAMsapproach,therewouldbenospecificpoliciesand
measuresimposedoncountries.Rather,acountrywould
pledgeonlyitsownpoliciesandmeasures,consistentwith
itsuniquenationalcircumstances.AsdiscussedinChapter
2,itispossiblethatgroupsofcountrieswithsimilarconcernsmightchoosetocoordinatetheirSD-PAMs,butthis
wouldbeabottom-upprocess.
3.3 WhytakeonanSD-PAM?
AlthoughSD-PAMs,asnotedabove,arealreadyapart
oftheClimateConvention,onemayaskwhyanycountry
shouldpresent(orsubject)itscurrentorproposedsustainabledevelopmentpoliciestoaninternationalclimate
regime.Thereareseveraladvantagesdiscussedinthis
section:recognition,learning,betteralignmentbetween
climateprotectionandotherinterests,andpromotion.
First,officialrecognitionofSD-PAMswouldenableall
Partiestoparticipateformallyinmitigationeffortsunder
theclimateregime.Thiswouldhavepositivepoliticalas
wellassubstantiveimplications.Theformalpledgingof
SD-PAMscouldreducetheperceptioninindustrialized
countries—especiallytheUnitedStates,butalsoelsewhere—thatdevelopingcountriesarenotcontributingto
globalclimateprotectionefforts.Indeed,asthisreportand
othershaveillustrated,10developingcountriesareinsome
casesalreadytakingmeasurestobendthetrajectoryof
theiremissionsdownward.However,developingcountries
arenotgettingsufficientrecognitionforclimate-friendly
actions.Thisleadstomisperceptionsonthepartof
politiciansinsomewealthiercountries,whopointtoward
apparentinactioninthedevelopingworldaspartofa
justificationfortheirownlackofeffort.Indeed,identical
measures,especiallyonenergyefficiency,maybepresented
as“climatepolicies”inindustrializedcountriesandsimply
as“energypolicies”indevelopingcountries.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
betweenthesescenarios.Thiswillnotinitselfbeenough
todealwiththeclimateproblem—explicitmitigation
measureswillbecalledfor—butitwouldmakethetask
lessdaunting.Moretothepoint,itisataskwecan
embarkuponnowindevelopingcountries,whilericher
countriesleadthewayonmitigation.
Box2.TheIPCCScenarios
TheIPCChasmodeledthepossibletrendinfutureglobalemissionsthrough
thelensofanumberofscenarios.Noneofthesescenariosincludesanyspecific
actiontomitigateclimatechange.However,theyvarysignificantlyintermsof
trade,technologydevelopment,energyprices,andotherfactors.Forinstance,
theAITscenarioassumestechnologicaldevelopmentofnon-fossilenergy
sources,whiletheB1scenarioemphasizes“globalsolutionstoeconomic,social
andenvironmentalsustainability,includingimprovedequity,butwithoutadditionalclimateinitiatives”(IPCC,2001).TheresultingGHGemissionsvarybya
factorofsix.
Figure4.IPCCSRESScenarios
40
35
30
Total emissioins (Gt/yr)
Second,asystemofSD-PAMsimplementationwould
helpacceleratelearninginclimateprotectioneffortsand
helpbuildcapacitytotakefurtheractions.Theinformationgatheredinareviewofimplementationshould
enhancetheabilityofregulatorsandstakeholderstodistinguishbetweenpoliciesthatareeffectivefromthosethat
failtoproducedesiredresults,eitherintermsofemission
reductionsorsustainabledevelopmentbenefits(Chapter
2).Manyindustrializedanddevelopingcountriesshare
similarsetsofconcernsand/ornaturalresources,anda
betterunderstandingofeachothers’prioritiesmayreveal
newareasofcollaboration.Inthisreport,thevalueof
learningisrelatedtoclimatebenefits.However,SD-PAMs
maylikewiseacceleratelearningondevelopmentmatters.
Policiestakenbycountriestoincreaseenergysecurity,to
improveaccesstomodernenergyservices,andtoextend
thereachoftransportsystemsareofinestimablevalueon
theirownandprovideanadditionalincentivetoshare
informationandlearning.
Third,SD-PAMsofferachancetomakeclimate
changepolicymattertodevelopingcountriesbyaligningitmoredirectlywiththeirinterests.Developmentisa
keypriorityfordecisionmakersindevelopingcountries,
sothatbuildingclimatechangepolicyondevelopment
prioritieswouldmakeitattractivetothesestakeholders.
Startingfromdevelopmentobjectivesandthendescribing
pathsthatalsoaddressclimatechangemaybetheeasiest
wayformanydevelopingcountriestotakethefirststepsin
longer-termactiononclimatechange.
Finally,byarticulatingthekindsofmeasuresthat
contributetoboththeConventionobjectiveandnational
sustainabledevelopmentobjectives,thosemeasurescan
bemorevigorouslypromotedbyPartiesandinternational
organizations.Thiscanbedoneinanumberofways,includingnewfinancingarrangements,discussedinsection
4,andcredittrading(Chapter2).FormalizingSD-PAMs
wouldlikewisegivestakeholders,includingnationalcivil
societygroupsandthemedia,concretepolicyoptionsto
promote,track,andevaluateatthedomesticlevel.
Ifsuchanapproachweresuccessfulinalteringdevelopmentpaths,theclimatebenefitswouldlikelybesubstantial.Infact,thescenariosoftheIntergovernmental
PanelonClimateChange(IPCC)suggestthatthetypeof
developmentpathtakenbyacountryismoresignificant
intermsoflong-termemissionsthanexplicitmitigationmeasures(seeBox2).Becauseofthisdynamic,the
objectiveoftheClimateConventioncanbefurtheredby
addressingdevelopmentconsiderationsmoredirectlyin
itsarchitecture.SD-PAMscanbethoughtofasameans
ofidentifyingandmakingoperationalthedifferences
25
20
15
10
5
0
1980
2000
2020
2040
2060
2080
2100
2120
AIT Scenatio (SRES)
B1 Scenario (SRES)
A1F1 (A1G) Scenario (SRES)
A2 Scenario (SRES)
B2 Scenario (SRES)
A1 (A1B) Scenario (SRES)
Source:IPCC(2001)
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
9
4.FUNDINGSD-PAMS
SD-PAMsofthescaleneededtochangeemissions
anddevelopmenttrajectorieswillrequirehigherlevelsof
fundingthanhavehithertobeenavailableformitigation
indevelopingcountries.Thepresentmodelforfunding
mitigationindevelopingcountrieshashadonlylimited
success.Developingcountries,asdiscussed,arerequired
undertheUNFCCCtoformulateandimplementGHG
mitigationmeasures.Fortheirpart,industrializedcountries
areobligatedtoprovidethefinanceandtechnologyto
meetthe“agreedfullincrementalcosts”ofimplementingthesemeasures.11Financialresourcescanbeprovided
throughtheGlobalEnvironmentFacility(GEF)or
throughbilateral,regional,ormultilateralchannels.12
Thissystem,however,hasnodefinitions,guidelines,or
requirementsastowhatmeasuresdevelopingcountries
mighttake,nordoesitestablishasystematicaccounting
offundingprovided(asidefromtheGEF),orofthe
resultingemissionreductions.13(SeeBox3forrelevant
existingfinancialmechanisms.)
Forthesereasons,bothmitigationprograms(with
respecttoPAMsindevelopingcountries)andtheassociatedfinancingandtechnologytransfer(fromdeveloped
countries)areviewedasmorehortatorythanrequired.
Notsurprisingly,fundingisatopicofconsiderable
10
disagreementandacrimonyintheinternationalclimate
negotiations.Developingcountriestendtocontinually
insistonmorefundingthroughtheUNFCCC,whereas
industrializedcountriestendtoresistopen-endedpromises
offinancing.
ToachievetheConventionobjective,thepresentsystemwillneedtoimprove.WhetherSD-PAMswilldeliver
suchanimprovementcannotbeknowninadvance.The
approachdoes,however,offermorerigorandflexibility
thanthepresentsystem.Itismorerigorous,asdiscussed
below,inthatitestablishestangiblecommitmentstoward
whichfinancialresourcescanmeaningfullybedirected.It
ismoreflexibleinthatclimatechangefundingneednotbe
soseparatedfromnon-climatefunding.Theproblemwith
continuallycreatingdiscrete“pots”ofmoneyearmarked
forGHGmitigationisthattheywillneverbelarge
enoughtoachievetheConventionobjective.Accordingly,
therealchallengeistoinstillcarbonconsiderationsinto
thebroadersetofinternationalcapitalflows,onlysomeof
whichareclimate-specific.
Alongtheselines,SD-PAMfundingshouldbeableto
comefromanysource:bilateralaidagencies,theGEF,
multilateraldevelopmentbanks,exportcreditagencies,the
privatesector,thehostgovernment(federalandperhaps
state/local),stateandlocalcommunities,orothers.Some
funders—hostgovernments,developmentbanks,andaid
agencies—wouldbeprimarilyconcernedwithalleviating
povertyorotherwiseboostingeconomicdevelopment.14
Otherfunders,suchastheGEF,wouldinvestbecauseof
theexplicitclimatebenefit.Stillothers,suchasprivate
banksorcorporations,wouldhavecommercialpurposes,
orfinancetheGHGcomponentofapolicyorprojectin
ordertoacquireresultingemissionreductions.Theintent
istoalignandstrengthenthelinkagesbetweentherelevant
financialinstitutionsinamannerthatmaximizesresource
andtechnologyflowstodevelopmentinitiativesthat
deliverclimatebenefits.15
Whichfundingapproachismostappropriateisdependentonthecircumstances,asthecasestudiesinthis
reportillustrate.Insomecases—suchasbiofuelsorenergy
efficiency—measuresmayhavenoincrementalcosts,as
theyaresufficientlyattractiveonnon-climategroundsand
thusmaynotrequireinternationalassistance.Awhole
basketofSD-PAMsinthetransportsector,forinstance,
couldbenefitChina(intermsofreducedoildependency,
greatermobility,andimprovedpublichealth)aswellas
theglobalenvironment(Chapter4).Here,international
fundingmaynotbecritical,asdomesticbenefitsdrive
downtheincrementalcostsofclimatefriendlyaction.
Inotherinstances,suchascarboncaptureandstorage
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
(CCS)inSouthAfrica(Chapter6),sustainabledevelopmentbenefitsarelowwhileglobalbenefitsarehigh.Here,
internationalfinancingofCCStechnologyiscrucial.In
stillothercases,suchasrenewableenergyinIndia’spower
sector(Chapter5),therearelargenationalandglobalbenefits,yetcapitalandinstitutionalconstraintsnecessitate
internationalassistance.
AnSD-PAMsapproachtofundingalsooffersrigorin
thatitwoulddirectfinancialresourcestotangiblecommitments.Thefactthatacountryhascommittedto
undertakeaparticularactionmightmakeitmorelikely
toattractfunding.Bywayofcomparison,thesuccessfulfinancialmechanismoftheMontrealProtocolon
SubstancesthatDepletetheOzoneLayer(togetherwith
bilateralassistance)financesthephaseoutcommitments
agreedtobydevelopingcountries.IfGEFandother
assistanceweresimilarlygearedtowardimplementing
pledgedSD-PAMs,thendevelopingcountriesmaybeable
tonegotiateadditionalfunding,andallstakeholderscould
monitorprogress.
Theinternationalcarbonmarketmayalsobeableto
giveatangiblefinancialboosttosomeSD-PAMs.WhetherthisispossibledependsonthedegreetowhichemissionsreductionsfromcertainSD-PAMscanbequantified,
atopicreturnedtoinChapter2.
5.THELIMITATIONSOFSD-PAMS
Therearefewideassogoodthattheycannotbekilled
bybeingoversold.WhileanapproachbasedonSD-PAMs
seemstooffersomepromiseforengagingdeveloping
countriesinlower-emissiondevelopment,ithasitslimits.
Somechallengesinclude:
SD-PAMsdonotsubstituteformitigationbydevelopedcountries.Althoughthelevelofemissionsconsistent
withavoidingdangerousclimatechangeissubjectto
bothscientificandpoliticaluncertainties,eventhemost
“sustainable”oftheIPCCemissionscenariosdoesnot
seemlikelytoadequatelyreducegreenhousegases.Asan
exclusivepolicy,SD-PAMsareaimedatpoorerorless
developedcountriesthatarenotabletotakeonexplicit
climatemitigationprograms.Richercountriesdonotfall
intothisgroup.Forthisgroup,SD-PAMsmaypossibly
beadoptedascomplementsto,ratherthansubstitutesfor,
existingandnewmitigationpolicyoptions.
SD-PAMsdonotseemappropriateforeverytechnologyorpolicy.TheSouthAfricacasestudyinChapter
6suggeststhatforatechnologyoptionsuchascarbon
captureandstorage,thesustainabledevelopmentbenefits
aresimplynotasignificantfactor.Thus,measuressuchas
these,iftheyaretobeundertaken,willneedfullfinancial
supportonthebasisoftheclimatebenefitsalone.Furthermore,somepoliciesandmeasuresthatareappropriatefor
Box3.ExistingFundingMechanisms:theGEFandCDM
ThetwoconcretemechanismsforfinancingGHGmitigationthatdoexist—
theGlobalEnvironmentFacilityandtheCleanDevelopmentMechanism—are
primarilyfocusedonprojects,ratherthanpolicychangeorsectoralstrategies.
During2003–04,theGEF,asthefinancialmechanismoftheConvention,
contributedabout$217milliontoclimatechangeactivities,about$150million
ofwhichwastargetedatGHGmitigationeffortsrelatedtowindpower,energy
efficiency,andotherareas.Sinceitsinceptioninthemid-1990s,theGEFhas
committed$1.8billioningrantstoclimatechangeprojects,andleveragedabout
fivetimesthatamountincofinancing.TheGEFiscapitalizedbyPartiesfrom
industrializedcountriesinmultiyearreplenishments.
TheKyotoProtocol’sCleanDevelopmentMechanismisexpectedtogenerate
financialflowsonthesameorderofmagnitudeastheGEF.Areviewofestimates
oftheprojectedsizeofCDMactivityrevealsacentralestimateofabout250
milliontonsperyear(rangeof50to500).Atamarketpriceof$3pertonof
CO2equivalent,thiswouldamounttoabout$750millionperyear.TheCDMis
gearedprimarilytowardprivatefunding,andisexpresslysegregatedfromother
financialflowsundertheConvention.Specifically,CDMprojectparticipantsmust
providean“affirmation”that“fundingdoesnotresultinadiversionofofficial
developmentassistanceandisseparatefromandisnotcountedtowardthe
financialobligationsofthoseParties.”
TheSpecialClimateChangeFund(SCCF)alsoprovidesfundingforConvention
implementation,includingformitigationprojects.Atthe10thConferenceof
thePartiestotheUNFCCCin2004,industrializedcountryPartiespledged$34.7
milliontotheSCCF.
Sources:UNFCCC(2004a);Haites(2004);UNFCCC(2001):AppendixB;http://unfccc.int.
non-climategoalswillbeharmfulfromaclimateperspective—forinstancerespondingtooilsecurityconcernswith
technologiesthatproduceliquidfuelsfromhigh-carbon
sourcessuchascoal.Alongthesamelines,somepotentiallyfruitfulSD-PAMsmightbecounteractedbyother
PAMsthatpromoteincreasesinemissions.
SD-PAMsimplementation,onthescaleneeded,may
notattractsufficientfunding.Thescaleofthechallenges
beingaddressedbySD-PAMsislargeintermsofthe
potentialgains,bothtodevelopmentandtotheclimate.
Aswithdevelopmentitself,however,theassociatedcosts
arecorrespondinglyhigh.Itremainstobeseenwhetherthe
multiplebenefitsfromSD-PAMsmakethemmoresuccessfulthanotherapproachesinattractingthelevelsofsupport,
bothwithinthehostcountryandfromtheinternational
community,appropriatetothescaleofthechallenge.
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
11
6.THISREPORT
Atthecoreofthereportarefourcasestudiesofactual
orpotentialpoliciesandmeasuresthatmightfitwithinan
SD-PAMsframework.Theyshowthepotentiallinksbetweeninternationalpolicyanddomesticefforts,andhow
thisbalancemightdifferfordifferentSD-PAMtypes—in
whichsomemeasuresmaybecompellingintheirown
right,whileothersaredependentonfundingandsupport
fromdevelopedcountries.
ChapterTwodiscussessomeofthepossibleoperationalmechanicsofhowSD-PAMsmightbeincorporated
intoaninternationalclimateagreement.Itaddressesthe
keyissuesofdefinitionofeligibletypesofSD-PAMs
andtheproceduresforpledging,tracking,andreviewing
SD-PAMs.ResolvingGHGaccountingissuesmayalso
enablequantificationoftheGHGbenefitsflowingfrom
particularPAMs,orsectorswithinwhichmultiplePAMs
aretargeted.
ChapterThreepresentsthecaseoftheBrazilianbiofuels
program,whichhaspromotedtheuseofethanolasa
transportfueltosubstituteforpetrol.Thiswasestablished
inthe1970sinresponsetoboththeoilcrisis,which
presentedamajorbalanceofpaymentsproblemforoil
importers,andaweaksugarmarket,whichwasdamaging
Brazil’slargesugarcaneindustry.Todate,ithassaved
Brazilsome$100billioninexternaldebtandcreated
directlyandindirectlyanestimated1millionjobsinrural
12
areas.Theclimatehasalsobenefited,asethanolusein
placeofpetroloffsetssome26MtCO2emissionsperyear.
Whiletheauthorsconcludethattheethanolprogramdoes
notdependonrecognitionofitsclimatebenefitsforits
success,theysuggestthatvaluationofthesebenefitsmight
acceleratetheexpansionofbiofueluse.Suchbenefits
mayalsoservetopromotetheimplementationofsucha
programinothercountries.
ChapterFourexaminestwomajoremergingconstraints
ontransportinthefast-growing“megacities”ofChina:
oilsupplyandurbaninfrastructure.Thegovernmentin
Chinaisbeginningtotakemeasurestoencouragetheuse
ofhigher-efficiencyvehiclestoreduceoilimportgrowth,
andsmallvehicleplatformstolimittheimpactonroad
andparkingspace.Inadditionthereareanumberof
measuresproposedtoreducecarmilestraveledbyofferingpublictransportalternatives.Thestudyexaminesthe
consequencesofsignificantlyincreasingthepolicy“push”
inthesedirections,showinghowadoptionofthoughtfultransportpoliciesinChinacoulddecreasecarbon
emissionsanenormous79percentin2020relativetoa
continuationofpresenttrends.Suchpolicieswouldhave
themajoraddedbenefitofreducingdependenceonoiluse
andrelievingpressureonurbaninfrastructure.Itisthese
characteristicsthatmakethemeasuresattractivebothfor
Chinaandforothergrowingeconomiesfacedwithsimilar
energysupplyconstraints.
ChapterFivelooksattheoptionsfacingIndiaasitaims
toprovideelectricitytothemorethan100millionhouseholdsthatcurrentlylackit.Whilethetaskisdaunting,the
developmentstakesarehuge.Thestudyexaminesrural
electrificationapproachesbasedonextensionofthegrid,
asproposedbytheMinistryofPower,aswellastwoalternativescenariosbasedonoff-gridpower:onedominated
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
bydiesel,theotherbasedmainlyonrenewableenergy.The
authorssuggestthatarenewableenergyapproachbrings
somesignificantpotentialadvantages,notablyinreduced
importdependenceforbothoilandcoal,aswellassetting
ruralIndiaonalow-emissiontrajectorythatwillgrowin
importanceastheirpowerdemanddoes.However,itis
notclearthatthenon-climatebenefitsoutweightheadditionalcostofrenewabletechnologies.Thismaypresenta
potentialopportunityforIndiatoseeksupportfrominternationaldonorstoreflecttheglobalbenefitatissue;itmay
alsoprovidethepotentialforthedispersionofnewand
lower-costtechnologiesthatcouldfindalargecompetitive
marketifpricesdiddecline.Inasmuchasotherdeveloping
countriesfaceasimilarcosthurdle—withcomparablelimitsonfinancialwherewithal—thiscaseisofclearrelevance
toapotentiallylargeglobalrenewableenergymarket.
ChapterSixexaminestheuseofcarboncaptureand
storageinSouthAfrica.SouthAfricaisoneofseveral
developingcountrieshighlydependentoncoalforpower
generation(93percentofitspowercomesfromcoal),and
likelytoremainsofortheforeseeablefuture.SouthAfrica
alsoshareswithmanydevelopingcountriestheneedtoexpandaccesstoelectricpower,particularlyinitsruralareas.
Ifindeedthecountryislockedintogrowingcoaldemand,
thentheuseofcarboncaptureandstoragetomitigatethe
resultingemissionsisanoptionthathastobeexamined.
Theauthorssuggestthatsomeminornon-climate
sustainabledevelopmentbenefitsforSouthAfricamayaccrue,particularlyinthetransferofsometechnologieswith
broaderapplication.However,thesebenefitsaretinyin
comparisonwiththecostsinvolved.ThiscasestudysuggestsonelimittotheSD-PAMsapproach:carboncapture
andstorageremainsanexplicitmitigationmeasure,andas
suchadevelopingcountrysuchasSouthAfricaisunlikely
toshoulderitscost.Althoughcaptureandstorageisnot
goingtobeanSD-PAM,thecasedoesprovideausefulframeworkforevaluatingthemagnitudeofthecosts
thatmayneedtobeborneinanycountrythatchooses
toadoptsuchatechnology.Giventherelianceoncoalin
othermajoreconomies—suchasChina,India,andthe
UnitedStates—thisstudyprovidesinsightsthatmayhave
applicationbeyondtheSD-PAMsframework.
ChapterSevenofferssomeconclusionsandsuggests
areasthatneedfurtherinvestigationanddebatetodevelop
theSD-PAMsconceptfurther.ItarguesthattheSDPAMsapproachoffersgenuinescopeforlimitingemissionsgrowthindevelopingcountrieswhileaccelerating
theireconomicdevelopment.ThekeyaspectofSD-PAMs
isthatthesustainabledevelopmentgoalsofthehostcountryformthebasisofapolicycommitment,ratherthanan
emissions-basedtarget.Therearelimitationsinthetypes
ofclimatetechnologiesthatcanbesupportedinthisway,
butthisisinitselfanindicatorofwhattypesofabatement
strategiesaremostappropriate.TheissueofhowSDPAMswillbesupportedisonethatrequiresfurtherwork,
butthereisreasontohopethatamixtureoffinancialand
othertypesofsupportmaybeeasiertoleveragethrougha
policy-basednegotiationfocusedondevelopmentthanby
broaderemissions-basedcommitments.
ENDNOTES
SeeChapter3referenceMCT,2004.
SeeforinstanceBondanskyetal.,2004;Mquadietal.,2005;den
ElzenandBerk,2004.
3 UNFCCC,Art.4.1(b),statingthat“allPartiesshall“[f ]ormulate,
implement,publishandregularlyupdatenational...programmes
containingmeasurestomitigateclimatechange...”Thisrequirement,
however,pertainsmainlytodevelopingcountries,sinceindustrialized
countrieshaveadditionalspecificcommitments.
4 UNFCCC,Art.3.4.Emphasisadded.
5 KyotoProtocol,1997:Art.10.
6 Intermsofreportingobligations,somedevelopingcountriesinclude
PAMsintheirnationalcommunicationsundertheConvention,
buttherearenoguidelinesorrequirementsorfordoingso.Kyoto
Protocol,Art.10(b)(ii)(“Partiesshallseektoincludeintheirnational
communications,asappropriate,informationon[GHG]programmes
....”Emphasisadded.).PartiesincludedinAnnexIarerequiredto
reportonprogressmadeinimplementingpoliciesandmeasures
(MarrakechAccordsDecision22/CP.7),butthisobligationdoesnot
extendtodevelopingcountryParties.
7 SeeforinstanceVictoretal,2004,partofabroaderprocesson
creatingan“L20”oftheleadersoflargecountriestofocusonmajor
internationalproblems.Availableat:http://www.L20.org.
8 Seee.g.,LaRovereetal.,2002(exploringtheBrazilianproposalbased
onhistoricalresponsibility),Aslam,2002(analyzingequalpercapita
entitlements),andBlanchard,2002(comparingthreeproposals).
9 Baumertetal.,2005(notingthetechnicalandpoliticalproblems,in
particularassociatedwithuncertaintiesinfutureemissionprojections
indevelopingcountries).
10 GoldembergandReid,1999;Chandleretal.,2002.
11 UNFCCC,1992:Art.4.1(b);Art.4.3.
12 UNFCCC,1992:Art.11.
13 SeeUNFCCC2004b.Themostrecentestimatesofbilateralassistance
arefrom1998-2000,whentheOECDestimated“climate-changerelatedaid”(broadlydefined)atabout$2.7billionperyear(OECD,
2002).MultilateralfundingthroughtheWorldBank,UNDP,and
othersforsupportofConventionimplementationissignificant,but
notpresentlyknown.
14 CarewouldhavetobetakenthatSD-PAMsnotdivertdevelopment
assistanceflowsawayfromotherpriorities(healthcare,education,
etc.)thatdonotoffersimilarpotentialforcuttingGHGemissions.
15 Foranexcellentdiscussionofthisconcept,seeHellerandShukla,
2003:132(referringto“programmaticclimatecooperation”).
1
2
IN TR OD U C TION TO SU STA IN A B LE D EVELOPMEN T POLIC IES A ND MEA SU R ES
13
REFERENCES
BP.2005.
BP.2005.StatisticalReviewofWorldEnergy.Availableat:http://
www.bp.com/downloads.do?categoryId=9003093&contentId=
7005944.
IPCC(IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange).2001.
ClimateChange2001:Mitigation.ContributionofWorking
GroupIIItotheThirdAssessmentreportoftheIPCC.Available
at:http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/.
Baumert,K.,T.Herzog,andJ.Pershing,2005.
Baumert,K.,T.Herzog,andJ.Pershing,2005.Navigatingthe
Numbers:GreenhouseGasDataandInternationalClimatePolicy.
Washington,DC:WorldResourcesInstitute.
Mquadi,Lwandle,HaraldWinkler,andAngelaChurieKallhaug.
Mquadi,Lwandle,HaraldWinkler,andAngelaChurieKallhaug.
2005.SouthAfricabeyondKyoto.Stockholm:SwedishEnviron2005.
mentalProtectionAgency.Availableat:www.naturvardsverket.
se/dokument/press/2004/juni/postkyoto/southafrica.pdf.
Bodansky,D.,S.Chou,andChristieJorge-Tresolini.2004.
InternationalClimateEffortsbeyond2012:aSurveyofApproaches.
Washington,DC:PewCenteronGlobalClimateChange.
OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand
OECD(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationand
Development).2002.AidTargetingtheObjectivesoftheRio
Development).2002.
Conventions1998-2000.Paris:OECD.
Chandler,W.etal.2002.
Chandler,W.etal.2002.ClimateChangeMitigationinDevelopingCountries:Brazil,China,India,Mexico,S.Africa,andTurkey.
Washington,DC:PewCenteronGlobalClimateChange.
Schelling,ThomasC.1998.
Schelling,ThomasC.1998.CostsandBenefitsofGreenhouse
GasReduction.Washington,DC:AEIPress.
Chayes,AbramandAntoniaHandlerChayes.1991.
Chayes,AbramandAntoniaHandlerChayes.1991.“AdjustmentandComplianceProcessesinInternationalRegulatory
Regimes.”InJessicaTuchmanMathews,ed.PreservingtheGlobal
Environment:TheChallengeofSharedLeadership.NewYork:
W.W.Norton&Co.
ClimateActionNetwork.2003.
ClimateActionNetwork.2003.AViableGlobalFrameworkfor
PreventingDangerousClimateChange—CANDiscussionPaper.
Availableat:http://www.climatenetwork.org.
denElzen,M.G.J.andM.M.Berk.2004.
denElzen,M.G.J.andM.M.Berk.2004.BottomUpApproaches
forDefiningFutureClimateMitigationCommitments.Bilthoven:
RIVM.
Goldemberg,J.andW.Reid,eds.1999.PromotingDevelopment
Goldemberg,J.andW.Reid,eds.1999.
whileLimitingGreenhouseGasEmissions:TrendsandBaselines.
NewYork:UNDPandWorldResourcesInstitute.
Haites,E.2004.
Haites,E.2004.EstimatingtheMarketPotentialfortheClean
DevelopmentMechanism:ReviewofModelsandLessonsLearned.
Availableat:http://carbonfinance.org/docs/EstimatingMarket
Potential.pdf.
Hare,B.andM.Meinshausen,2004,
Hare,B.andM.Meinshausen,2004,“HowMuchWarming
AreWeCommittedtoandHowMuchCanBeAvoided?”PIK
Report49(93).Potsdam:PotsdamInstituteforClimateImpact
Research.Onlineat:http://www.pik-potsdam.de/publications/
pik_reports.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2002.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2002.WorldEnergy
Outlook2002:Energy&Poverty.Paris.Availableat:http://www.
worldenergyoutlook.org/weo/pubs/weo2002/EnergyPoverty.pdf.
IEA.2003.
IEA.2003.“TheImpactofHigherOilPricesontheWorld
Economy.”Availableat:http://library.iea.org/dbtw-wpd/textbase/
weo/papers/SLTZO.pdf.
Sohn,J.,S.Nakhooda,andK.Baumert.2005.Mainstreaming
Sohn,J.,S.Nakhooda,andK.Baumert.2005.
ClimateChangeattheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks.
Washington,DC:WorldResourcesInstitute.
Victor,DavidG.2001.
Victor,DavidG.
2001.TheCollapseoftheKyotoProtocoland
theStruggletoSlowGlobalWarming.Princeton,NewJersey:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
Victor,DavidG.etal.2004.
Victor,DavidG.etal.2004.“ClimateChangeattheL20?
OverviewoftheIssues.”Commissionedbriefingnotesforthe
CIGI/CFGSL20Project.NewYork,September20-21,2004.
Availableat:http://www.L20.org.
WCED(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopWCED(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentandDevelopment)(TheBrundtlandReport).1987.“OurCommonFuture.”
ment)(TheBrundtlandReport).1987.
OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Winkler,H.,R.Spalding-Fecher,S.Mwakasonda,and
Winkler,H.,R.Spalding-Fecher,S.Mwakasonda,and
O.Davidson.2002.“PoliciesandMeasuresforSustainable
O.Davidson.2002.
Development.”InBaumertetal.(eds.).BuildingontheKyoto
Protocol:OptionsforProtectingtheClimate.Washington,DC:
WorldResourcesInstitute.
UNFCCC.2001.
UNFCCC.2001.ReportoftheConferenceofthePartiesonits
SeventhSession,HeldatMarrakeshfrom29Oct.to10Nov.2001,
decision17/CP.7,UNFCCCDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2.
UNFCCC.2004a.
UNFCCC.2004a.ReportoftheGlobalEnvironmentFacilityto
theConferenceoftheParties.NotebytheSecretariat.Document
FCCC/CP/2004/6.Availableat:http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop10/06.pdf.
UNFCCC.2004b.
UNFCCC.2004b.Implementationofdecisions12/CP.2and12/
CP.3:determinationoffundingfortheimplementationoftheConvention.NotebytheSecretariat.DocumentFCCC/SBI/2004/6.
WorldBank.2005.
WorldBank.2005.WorldDevelopmentIndicatorsOnline
Database(somedataisalsodrawnfrompreviouseditions).
WRI(WorldResourcesInstitute).2005.WorldResources2005:
WRI(WorldResourcesInstitute).2005.
TheWealthofthePoor—ManagingEcosystemstoFightPoverty.
Washington,DC:UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme,
UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme,WorldBank,andWRI.
14
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
chapterii
SustainableDevelopment
SustainableDevelopment
PoliciesandMeasuresand
PoliciesandMeasuresand
InternationalClimate
InternationalClimate
Agreements
Agreements
KevinA.Baumert ■ HaraldWinkler
Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesfacingnations
attemptingtoimplementtheClimateConventionisthe
integrationofGHGconsiderationsintonationaldevelopmentprograms.BuildingonWinkleretal.(2002),this
chapterexploresthischallengeattheinternationallevel.
Namely,howmightanapproachbasedonpoliciesand
measuresbeformalizedanddefinedwithinafutureinternationalclimateagreement?Inotherwords,howmight
Partiesdevelopamechanismforformallyrecognizingand
advancingthekindsofsustainabledevelopmentpolicies
andmeasures(SD-PAMs)discussedinthisvolume?
Theapproachoutlinedhereproceedsalongseveral
steps.First,theinternationalcommunitywouldlikely
needtoagreeongeneralguidelinesforwhatconstitutes
an“SD-PAM”thatiseligibletobepledgedunderthe
UNFCCC.Thesebasicdefinitionalconsiderationsare
outlinedinsection1.Second,aprocesswouldbeneeded
wherebyPartieswouldactuallypledgeeligibleSD-PAMs.
Suchaprocess,discussedinsection2,couldworkina
varietyofdifferentways,eitherasunilateral,mutual,or
harmonizedpledges.Third,oncepledged,SD-PAMs
couldberecordedandtrackedbytheConventionSecretariatorotherbody(section3).Fourth,abroaderprogram
ofassessingprogresswouldlikelybeneeded,including
reportingandreviewprocedures(section4).Finally,while
thisisessentiallyaqualitativeapproach,itisconceivable
thatitcouldincorporateaquantitativedimension,and
perhapsalsobeintegratedintothenascentinternational
carbonmarket.Section5discussesissuesandoptions
regardingquantifyingSD-PAMs.
S U S TA IN A B LE D E VE LOPM EN T POLIC IES A N D M EA SU R ES A N D IN TER N ATION A L C LIMATE A GR EEMEN TS
15
1.DEFININGAND
1.DEFININGAND
FORMALIZINGSD-PAMS
Generally,SD-PAMsdeliverbothtangiblenationaland
globalbenefits.Thiscouldincludemanyoftheactions
describedinthecasestudiespresentedhere,aswellas
others,suchasrenewableenergyinitiatives,energy
efficiencystandards,andforestconservationprograms.
Beyondthisfoundationaldescriptionandindicative
examples,however,threeofthesalientcharacteristicsof
SD-PAMswarrantelaboration.
First,asdiscussedinChapter1,“sustainabledevelopment”isnotarigidlydefinedconcept.Sustainable
development,asarticulatedintheRioDeclarationonEnvironmentandDevelopment,isaboutthepromotionof
healthyandproductivelifestylesthroughimprovedsocial
andeconomicconditions(UNGA,1992).Thisincludes
environmentalprotectionandconservation.Because
prioritiesandcircumstancesdifferwidelybycountry,the
sustainabledevelopmentaspectofSD-PAMswouldbe
definedbyindividualdevelopingcountries(Winkleretal.,
2002).ThisissimilartotheapproachtakenintheClean
DevelopmentMechanism(CDM),whereitisthehost
country’sprerogativetodeterminewhetheraprojectassists
initssustainabledevelopmentobjectives(UNFCCC,2001).
Accordingly,nationalsustainabledevelopmentbenefits
maypertaintoawidevarietyofareas,includingeconomic,
social,andenvironmental.InastudyofSD-PAMsin
SouthAfrica,forexample,Winkleretal.(2002)identified
energydevelopmentandhousingasimportantpriorities
withinanationalsustainabilitycontext.Chapters3-6of
thisreportidentifysomeotherprioritieswithinvarying
nationalcontexts.
Second,“policiesandmeasures”couldincludelegislativeorexecutiveacts,regulations,andpublic-private
partnershipssuchasnegotiatedagreements.PAMscould
befiscal(taxes,charges,subsidies),regulatory(mandates,
standards,sectorreforms),orotherinitiativesthathave
someofficialstatus(Table2,p.19).Althoughthereisno
needtoformarestrictivedefinitionofwhatformofaction
mightconstitutea“policy”or“measure,”theyaregenerally
distinguishablefromsolelyprivateinitiativesorprojects.1
Inthisway,SD-PAMsaredistinctfromtheproject-based
CDM,discussedinChapter1.
Ofcourse,notallpoliciesandmeasureshaveabeneficialeffectonGHGemissions;infact,development
wouldgenerallybeexpectedtoincreaseemissions.Thus,
athirdbasiccharacteristicofSD-PAMsisthattheymust
havesomebeneficialeffectonGHGemissionsorabsorptions.Asthisreportandotherstudiesdemonstrate,there
16
areawiderangeofpoliciesintransport,energyefficiency
(industrialandbuildings),powergeneration,forestry,and
elsewherethatcontributetotheConventionobjective
whilehavingtheprimarypurposeofsupportinglocaland
nationalpriorities(GoldembergandReid,1999;Chandler
etal.,2002).Table1listsnational(sustainabledevelopment)benefitsandindicativeglobal(emissions)benefits
thatmightbederivedfromSD-PAMs.
AnSD-PAMmayhaveabeneficialGHGeffect
withoutreducingemissionsinabsoluteterms.Asthe
ClimateConventionsuggests,energyuseandemissions
indevelopingcountrieswillneedtogrowtomeetthe
requirementsofsustainableeconomicdevelopment.This
isillustratedclearlyinChina’stransportsector(Chapter
4)andIndia’spowersector(Chapter5),whereeventhe
cleanestscenariosshowemissionsincreasing.Ratherthan
absoluteemissionreductions,thetestshouldbewhether
developmentisproceedingusingclean,efficient,and
energy-savingtechnologiesandprocesses.
Thus,pledgedSD-PAMsmustbe(1)government
actionsthathave(2)developmentbenefitsand(3)GHG
benefits.InconsideringwhichSD-PAMsareeligiblefor
internationalrecognitionandassistance,themotivating
rationaleamongthesefactorsshouldnotberelevant.In
mostcases,developingcountriesarelikelytoactonthe
basisofdevelopmentratherthanglobalpriorities,giventhat
poverty,publichealth,employment,andotherfactorscontinuallykeepclimatechangelowonthepoliticalagenda.
Finally,accompanyingthepledgeofaparticularpolicy
ormeasuremightalsobeadescriptionofwhattheintendedresultsorimpactsareintermsofbothdevelopment
objectivesandemissionscobenefits.Suchadescription
mightbeasetofkeyperformanceindicatorsreflectedin
particularpolicygoals(forexample,thenumberofhomes
electrified,jobscreated,andsoon)orframedinmore
generalterms(forexample,themeansbywhichGHG
emissionsarekeptincheck).Suchanapproachwouldassist
inascertainingwhetherthepledgedactionisinkeeping
withthebasiccharacteristicsofanSD-PAM.
2.PLEDGINGSD-PAMS
TheincorporationofSD-PAMsintotheinternational
climateregimecouldinvolveadditionaldiscretestages,
including(1)apledgingprocessfornationalgovernments,(2)thetrackingofpledgesthroughaninternational
registry,and(3)reviewofimplementation.Thissection
considersthefirstoperationalstage—pledging—whilethe
followingsectionsconsiderthetwosubsequentstages.
Emissiontargetsforindustrializedcountriesunderthe
KyotoProtocolwereestablishedthroughtheusualgiveand-takeofanintergovernmentalnegotiationprocess.
ThegeneralapproachwasthataPartywouldproposea
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
targetforitself(pledge),andsubsequentlytrytoconvince
otherPartiesthatthiswasareasonableandfairlevel
ofeffortconsideringtheprinciplesoftheConvention,
theuniquecircumstancesoftheParty,andtherelative
stringencyofothercountries’targets.Negotiationsover
SD-PAMscouldproceedinaprocedurallysimilarmanner,butwithnotabledifferences.
Insteadofsettingatargetemissionlevel(asinKyoto),
developingcountryPartieswouldpledgeeithertoimplementexistingpoliciesoradoptnewonesthatmeetthe
broadcriteriaagreedtobytheParties.Wheregoodpolicies
areonthebooks,butnotbeingimplemented,theycould
beworthyofrecognitionandsupportbytheinternational
community.Inthecourseofnegotiations,severaldifferentapproachestopledgingSD-PAMsmightbeadopted,
includingsingle-countrypledges,mutualpledges,and
harmonizedpledges.
First,asinglecountrymightpledgeoneormoreSDPAMsthatareuniquetoitsnationalcircumstancesandnot
directlyrelatedtothepledgesofothercountries.Inthis
way,thesystemfunctionsinabottom-upfashion,starting
fromthepremisethatdifferentcountriesarelikelytoprefer
differentapproachestosocialandeconomicdevelopment.
Asecondapproachwouldbemutualpledges,which
wouldinvolvesimultaneouspledgesbybothadeveloping
anddevelopedcountry.Here,theapproachenvisioned
inArticle4oftheUNFCCC2wouldbeimplemented.A
developingcountryPartywouldpledgetoundertakea
particularPAM,andoneormoreindustrializedcountries
wouldagreetoassistintechnologytransferorfunding
support.Thisapproachmightbuildonexistingbilateral
relationshipsbetweencountries,includingthroughprovisionofofficialdevelopmentassistance.Particularindustrializedcountriesmightpledgetotakeleadrolesinassisting
withparticularSD-PAMs,withfurtherimplementation
andfinancingdetailstobeworkedoutlateramonga
broaderrangeofparticipantsandstakeholders.Thishas
theadditionalattractionofengagingdonorcountrieson
SD-PAMsinwhichtheyhaveamutualinterest,suchas
forthedevelopmentofaparticulartechnology.Ofcourse,
asdiscussedinChapter1,entitiessuchastheGlobal
EnvironmentFacility(GEF),multilateraldevelopment
banks,privatecompanies,orotherorganizationscould
alsoplayimportantrolesinfinancingorimplementing
mutual(orsingle-country)pledges.
Harmonizedpledgesamongmultiplecountriescould
constituteathirdelementofanSD-PAMsnegotiation
process.Thisapproachacknowledgestheglobalnatureof
manyindustrialactivities,andopensthedoortomultiplecountriesagreeingtothesamekindofmeasuresto
promoteormaintainan“evenplayingfield”forcompetitiveindustries(Baumertetal.,2005).Ironandsteel,
Table1.IndicativePolicyOutcomes:EmissionsandDevelopment
SustainableDevelopment
GHGEmissions
Greateraccesstoelectricity
Improvedenergyefficiency*
Reducedcoststoconsumers
Improvedenergyconservation*
Reducedcoststocompanies
Switchingtolowercarbonfuels
Improvednationalsecurity
Increasedmarketshareofcleanproducts
Improvedbalanceofpayments
Reduceddeforestationrates
Higheremploymentlevels
Changedagriculturalpractices
Increasedhousing
Reducedairpollution
Improvedpublicheath
Exportpromotion
*TheamountofGHGbenefitintheseinstanceswoulddependontheunderlyingfuelmix.
chemicals,aluminum,andmotorvehicles,forinstance,
aresectorscharacterizedbysignificantcross-bordertrade
andinvestment.Inthesekindsofareas,itislesslikelythat
individualcountrieswouldunilaterallypledgesignificant
actions,giventheperceivedoractualimpactoninternationalcompetitiveness.
Harmonizedpledgesmighthaveparticularpotential
amongmajortradingpartners,whererelationshipstendto
alreadybeestablishedthroughregionalorganizations,such
asMERCOSUR(inLatinAmerica)andASEAN(SoutheastAsia).AlthoughSD-PAMsareadvancedhereprimarilyasanapproachfordevelopingcountriestoengagein
globalmitigationefforts,itmaybeequallyimportantto
engageindustrializedcountriesinharmonizedpledgesystems.TheNorthAmericaFreeTradesystem(NAFTA),for
instance,mightbeonegroupingthatwouldbringtogether
importantAnnexIandnon-AnnexIParties.Othergroupings,eitherformalorinformal,alsohavepotential.
Asystemwithinwhichgovernmentspledgeactions—
eitherunilaterally,throughmutualcooperation,orina
harmonizedfashion—wouldrequiresignificantpreparatoryworkatthenationalandinternationallevels.Atthe
nationallevel,individualcountrieswouldofcourseneed
todetermineaheadoftime,throughtheirowndomestic
processes,whichactionstheyarepreparedtopledge(Box
1).Attheinternationallevel,governmentsmightneedto
engageinbilateral,multilateral,andregionalconsultations
priortoaformalnegotiationsession.Aseriesofsub-
negotiationsonspecifictopicswouldlikelyemerge.3This
couldresembleotherinternationalnegotiationsoncomplexissues,suchastrade,whichsomehavesuggestedisa
S U S TA IN A B LE D E VE LOPM EN T POLIC IES A N D M EA SU R ES A N D IN TER N ATION A L C LIMATE A GR EEMEN TS
17
modelforclimatenegotiations(Reinstein,2004).Ona
smallerscale,ananalogousprocesstookplaceatthe2004
BonnRenewableEnergiesConference(Box2),where
developedanddevelopingcountriesmadespecificpledges.
Overall,theexpectationisthatapledge-basedsystem
forengagingdevelopingcountriesopensupnewspace
andopportunityforinternationalcooperationonwhat
mightbethemostcomplexglobalissue.Atthesametime,
itisequallyimportantthattheUNFCCC,byembracing
SD-PAMs,coordinateitseffortswiththoseunderway
elsewhere,includingtheU.N.CommissionforSustainable
Box1.StepsinApplyingtheSD-PAMsApproach
Winkleretal.(2002)outlinefivestepsthatadevelopingcountrymightundertakeinconsideringitscommitmenttoSD-PAMs:
1.Outlinefuturedevelopmentobjectives,wherepossiblequantifyingthe
expectedbenefitsandpossiblerisks.Manydevelopingcountriesalreadyidentify
developmentobjectivesthroughNationalStrategiesforSustainableDevelopmentorAgenda21plans.
2.IdentifyPAMsthatwouldmakethedevelopmentpathmoresustainable,
primarilyforreasonsotherthanclimatechange(e.g.,greatersocialequity
andlocalenvironmentalprotectionwhilemaintainingorenhancingeconomic
growth).Thismightincludeexistingornewpolicies.
3.QuantifythechangesinGHGemissionsofparticularSD-PAMs,whichshould
bereportedinaccordancewiththeConventionorotherreportingprovisions.
4.Comparetheresultsfromsteps2and3toshowwhichactionscreatesynergiesbetweensustainabledevelopmentobjectivesandclimatechangepolicy,
andwhichconflict.
5.SummarizethenetimpactofabasketofSD-PAMsondevelopmentbenefits
andGHGemissions.
Source:AdaptedfromWinkleretal.(2002)
Box2.TheInternationalActionProgrammeforRenewableEnergies
TheInternationalActionProgramme(IAP)forrenewableenergiesisoneofthe
mainoutcomesofthe2004BonnRenewableEnergiesConference.TheIAP
containsconcreteactionsandcommitmentstowarddevelopingrenewable
energyputforwardbygovernments,internationalorganizations,stakeholders
fromcivilsociety,theprivatesector,andothers.Allconferenceparticipantswere
invited—througha“CallforActionsandCommitments”—tocontributetothe
IAPbypledgingvoluntarycommitmentstogoals,targets,andactionswithin
theirownspheresofresponsibility.
Source:AdaptedfromInternationalConferenceonRenewableEnergies,Bonn,at:
http://www.renewables2004.de/en/2004/outcome_actionprogramme.asp.TheIAPand
otherdocumentscanbefoundonthiswebsite.
18
Development,theInternationalCivilAviationOrganization(ICAO),theInternationalMaritimeOrganization
(IMO),andotherspecializedandregionalorganizations.
3.KEEPINGTRACK:
3.KEEPINGTRACK:
INTERNATIONALREGISTRY
AnimportantelementofformalizinganSD-PAMs
systemcouldbetomaintainaninternationalregistryof
pledgedactions(Winkleretal.,2002).Theregistrycould
beadatabasecontaininginformationonallSD-PAMs
pledgedbygovernments.Suchasystemwouldserve
severalpurposes.
Theregistrywouldserveasatooltoexchangeinformationamonggovernmentsandamonggovernmentsand
civilsociety,includingindustry.Makinginformationon
pledgedSD-PAMspublicwouldhelpinformtheinternationalcommunityandnationalstakeholdersofhowvarious
governmentsarecontributingtotheUNFCCCobjective
withinthecontextoftheirownnationalpriorities.A
registrywouldbeconsistentwithexistingpractice(suchas
theregistryofCDMprojects)andArticle6oftheClimate
Convention,whichcallsonPartiestopromoteandfacilitate
publicaccesstoclimatechange-relatedinformation.
TheSD-PAMsregistrycouldbemaintainedbyan
internationalorganizationorbody,suchastheUNFCCC
Secretariat.Partieswouldneedtoagreeonthebasicelementsoftheregistry.Table2presentsaseriesofindicative
categoriesthatmightbeusedtostructuresucharegistry.
4.ASSESSINGPROGRESS:
4.ASSESSINGPROGRESS:
REPORTINGANDREVIEW
AfinalelementofasuccessfulSD-PAMssystemwould
betoassessimplementation.Thisisnecessarytoensure
thatpledgedpoliciesandmeasuresaremorethanmere
wordscontainedinaregistry.Thereareperhapstwo
centralelementsofasuccessfulassessmentsystem:reportingandreview.
First,Partiesshouldreportontheimplementationof
theirpledgedSD-PAMs.Thiscouldcomeintheformof
anannualorotherregularprogressreport.Reportingcould
coverbothaspectsofPAMimplementation—development
andemissions—perhapsusingkeyperformanceindicators
pertainingtoeach.Someinformationfromthereports
couldbeenteredintotheregistryaswell.
Procedurally,oneoptionwouldbetointegratereportingintotheexistingreportingstructureoftheClimate
Convention,underwhichPartiesmustsubmitnational
communicationsthat,amongotherthings,describethe
stepstakenorenvisagedtoimplementtheConvention
(UNFCCC,1992:Art.12.1b).However,thissystemsufferslowlevelsofreporting,assomedevelopingcountries
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Table2.IndicativeClassificationParametersforSD-PAMs
PolicyTypes
Sector
Fuel/Technology
OtherClassificationDetails
Fiscal
■Taxes(exemptions,credits,etc.)
■Fees,charges,refunds
■Subsidies(transfers,grants,etc.)
Market/Regulatory
■Mandates(products,processes)
■Standards(products,processes)
■Sectorregulatoryreforms
■Productlabelling
■Disclosurerequirements
■Consumerpurchaseoptions
VoluntaryAgreements
■Corporatechallenges
■Public-privatepartnerships
Energyproduction
■Extraction
■Processing/refining
■Transport/transmission
■Electricitygeneration
Buildings
■Appliances
■Heating
■Cooking,lighting,etc.
Industry
■Steel,chemicals,cement
aluminum,others
Transportation
■Passenger,freight,air,etc.
WasteManagement
■Landfills,etc.
Forestry
Agriculture
FossilFuels
■Coal
■Oil
■NaturalGas
Renewables
■Geothermal
■Solar
■Wind
■Biomass
■Tidal/wave
■Hydroelectric,etc.
Others
■Hydrogen
■Carboncapture/storage
■Fuelcells
■Landfillgas
■Biofuels
■Industrialprocesschange
Country
Policyname&description
KeyPerformanceIndicators
■Sust.Development
■Emissions
Status
■Pledged
■Enacted/Implemented
■Completed
EffectiveDate(s)
References/Links
Source:WRI,basedonIEA/OECD(2001)
haveyettosubmitasinglecommunication.Othershave
onlyrecentlysubmittedtheirfirstreport,morethanadecadeaftertheConventionenteredintoforce.Onereason
whyisthatnationalcommunicationsarepresentlyaccompaniedbycompletenationalGHGinventories,which
aretechnicallychallengingandexpensivetoproduce.A
reportingsystemunderSD-PAMscouldfocuslesson
inventories,andmoreonpoliciesandmeasures,including
thestatusandresultsoftheirimplementation.
Asecondelementoftheassessmentprocesswouldbea
reviewofnationalreports.Thisprocesscouldbeanalogous
tothepresent“in-depth”reviewsystememployedfor
reviewingthenationalcommunicationsofindustrialized
countryParties.4AccordingtotheUNFCCCSecretariat,
thesereviewsaim“toprovideacomprehensive,technical
assessmentofaParty’simplementationofitscommitments.”5ForSD-PAMs,thesereviewswouldbefacilitative
innatureandwouldtrytoidentifybothsuccessesand
areaswhereimplementationcanbeimproved.Civilsociety
groupsandinternationalorganizationsmightalsoprovide
reviewsofnationalreports,althoughthesewouldhavean
unofficialstatus.
Aprocesswherebyanindependentbodyevaluates
implementationofSD-PAMsmightassistinthelearning
processandhelpbuildcapacitytotakefurtheractions.
Thiskindofreviewmightuncoverunderlyingreasons
whysomeSD-PAMsdidnotachievetheirdesiredresults.
Insomeinstances,itcouldbethatpromisedfinancialor
technologytransferwasnotdelivered(forexample,ina
mutualpledge).Inotherinstances,itcouldbethatthe
effectsof“unpledged”policiesandmeasuresnullifiedthe
expectedinfluenceonGHGsofthepledgedpolicies.For
example,theremovalofcoalproductionsubsidiescould
becounterbalancedbyincreasesinsubsidiesforcombustionofcoalinelectricpowergeneration.SD-PAMs,by
theirnature,wouldcaptureonlytheformerandtherefore
wouldgiveanincompletepicture.
Thereareprecedentsforthesekindsofapproachesin
otherareasofinternationalrelations.TheWorldTrade
Organization’sTradePolicyReviewMechanism,for
example,providesakindof“peerreview”ofacountry’s
tradepoliciesandpractices,whichhelps“enableoutsiderstounderstandacountry’spoliciesandcircumstances,”
while“providingfeedbacktothereviewedcountryonits
performance….”6Thissystemprovidesforreportsby
boththeWTOmembercountryandareviewbyabody
independentoftheParties,theWTOSecretariat.
WithrespecttoSD-PAMs,theinformationgenerated
inareviewprocesswouldenhancetheabilityofregulators
andstakeholderstodistinguishbetweenpoliciesthatwere
effectivefromthosethatfailedtoproducedesiredresults,
eitherintermsoflocalsustainabledevelopmentbenefits
oremissionreductions.Thiswouldinformfuturepolicy
S U S TA IN A B LE D E VE LOPM EN T POLIC IES A N D M EA SU R ES A N D IN TER N ATION A L C LIMATE A GR EEMEN TS
19
widespreadbehavior.TheviabilityofKyoto’sCDM,for
instance,ispartlyafunctionofemissionreductioncommitmentsofindustrializedcountries,whichstimulates
thedemandforemission-reducingprojectsindevelopingcountries.IfPresidentBushandsubsequentU.S.
administrationscontinuetoopposesuchanapproach,
itisuncertainwhethertheEuropeanUnion,Japan,and
Canadawillbewillingtocontinuewithemissioncaps
beyond2012.Thus,broaderfutureclimatechangepolicy
considerationsfactorheavilyintotheviabilityofsome
optionsoutlinedinthissection.
5.1CleanDevelopmentMechanism
makingatthenationallevel,aswellaspromoteuseful
cross-countryexchangesofexperiences.Finally,beyond
promotinglearning,bothofficialandunofficialcountry
reviewswouldpromoteaccountabilityandincreasethe
likelihoodthatpledgedactionsarefullyimplemented.
5.QUANTITATIVEAPPROACHES:
5.QUANTITATIVEAPPROACHES:
ACCOUNTINGFOR
ACCOUNTINGFOR
EMISSIONREDUCTIONS
SD-PAMsarequalitativeinnatureandareclearly
distinguishablefromquantitativeapproachestoclimate
protectionsuchasemissiontargetsandtheCleanDevelopmentMechanism.However,itmaybepossibleoreven
desirabletoconnectthepledgedactionstotheseandother
quantitativeapproachesinordertoharnessthepotential
benefitsoftheinternationalcarbonmarket.Thereareat
leastthreepossibilitiesofbuildingaquantitativedimensionintoSD-PAMs:theexistingCDM,anexpanded
“policy”or“sector-basedCDM”(SamaniegoandFigueres,
2002;BosiandEllis,2005),and“actiontargets”(Baumert
andGoldberg,2005).
Thesethreeoptionseachhaveadvantagesanddrawbacks,
andareexploredbrieflyinthissection.Across-cutting
issuethataffectsalloptionsiswhetheracarbonmarket
willexistafter2012and,evenifitdoes,whetheritwill
establishapricesignalsufficientlystrongenoughtoaffect
20
ThebasicelementsoftheCDMaresetoutinArticle
12oftheKyotoProtocolandelaboratedfurtherinthe
2001MarrakeshAccords.7TheCDMhasadualpurpose:
(1)toassistdevelopingcountries“inachievingsustainable
development,”and(2)toassistindustrializedcountries
inachievingcompliancewiththeiremissionlimits.This
isdonethroughGHG-reducingprojectsindeveloping
countries(suchasinstallingwind-basedpowerinsteadof
coal-firedpower),whichgenerateemissioncreditsthat,in
turn,canbeusedbyindustrializedcountriestooffsettheir
owndomesticemissions.Thesustainabledevelopment
dimensionoftheCDM,asdiscussedabove,isdecided
onaproject-by-projectbasisatthediscretionofthehost
government.
AlthoughtheCDMisaproject-basedmechanism,
itcouldbesupportiveofSD-PAMs.SD-PAMscould
providetheregulatorymandatesormarketincentivesto
developprojectsthathaveconcretesustainabledevelopmentandclimatebenefits.Thoseprojects,inturn,could
beeligibleforcreditingundertheCDM.Indirectly,this
wouldprovideafurtherincentivetoimplementSDPAMs,giventhatsomecostscouldberecoupedthrough
saleofemissionreductioncredits.
Tooperateinthismanner,CDMrulesmayneedtobe
changed.CDMrulesaredesignedtoensurethatprojects
areadditionaltowhatwouldhaveoccurredintheabsence
oftheCDM.Projectsimplementedunderexistingor
newSD-PAMscouldberendered“non-additional”by
themerefactthattheyarenowrequiredbylawormade
financiallyattractivethroughgovernmentintervention.
Inotherwords,projectsmightbeprecipitatedbyan
SD-PAM—nottheCDM—andthereforebeconsidered
non-additional.In2004,theCDMExecutiveBoard,
whichoverseesthemechanism,establishedguidelinesthat
partiallyaddressthisissue.Undertheguidelines,“climatefriendly”policyincentives(suchasanenergyefficiency
subsidy)maybeignoredbyprojectdevelopersinbaseline
formulations(UNFCCC,2004b).However,projects
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
adoptedpursuanttomandatoryregulationsarestillnot
subjecttoanyguidance,anditisnotclearwhetherthey
wouldqualifyforCDMcrediting.8
Finally,theuseofSD-PAMsasaplatformforCDM
projectdevelopmentcouldsignificantlyincreasetheoverall
flowofprojects.Whilethiswouldbefavorable,itwould
alsooverwhelmthealreadystrainedadministrativecapacityoftheCDMExecutiveBoard,whichisresponsiblefor
registeringprojects,certifyingemissionreductions,and
issuingcredits.Arenewableenergyprograminasingle
country,forexample,couldgeneratetensorevenhundredsofprojectsthatwouldallneedtobevalidatedand
registered,withsubsequentclaimedemissionreductions
verified,certified,andissued.Asignificantrestructuring
ofthemechanism’sbasicregulatoryandadministrative
systemswouldlikelybeneeded.
5.2PolicyorSectorCDM
Someobservershavealreadyexaminedtheprospectof
expandingthescopeoftheCDMtoencompasspoliciesorcoverentirenationalsectorsorgeographicareas
(SamaniegoandFigueres,2002;Schmidtetal.,2004;Bosi
andEllis,2005).Underthisvision,anSD-PAMitself,or
thesectorinwhichoneormoreSD-PAMsistargeted,
couldgenerateemissionreductioncredits.
Thisapproachhassomeapparentadvantages.Itcould
helpcreateincentivesforpositivepolicychangealongthe
linesdiscussedthroughoutthisreport.Second,restructuringthemechanismalongsectoralorpolicylinescould
alleviatesomeofthebottlenecksandhightransaction
costsofaburgeoningproject-onlymechanism.Abasketof
policiesandmeasuresinasinglesectorcould,forinstance,
allbeaggregatedtogetherforadeterminationofemission
reductions.Allofthepoliciesandprojectsundertaken
inChina’stransportationsector,discussedinChapter4,
mightbetreatedcollectively,forexample.
Therearealsoanumberofchallengesandshortcomings
associatedwithasector-orpolicy-basedCDM.Themost
significantchallengewouldbedeterminingtheamountof
emissionreductions(oravoidance)associatedwithPAMs.
Evenunderthepresentproject-orientedCDM,thishas
provencontroversialandmoredifficultthanexpected.
Disagreementisparticularlyrifewithrespecttodeterminationsof“additionality,”asitisverydifficulttodevelop
simplerulescapableofreasonablyensuringthatcreditsare
issuedonlytoprojectsthatwouldnothaveoccurredabsenttheCDM.Additionalityassessmentsinthecontextof
SD-PAMswouldbevirtuallyimpossible.Indeed,thevery
conceptofadditionalityisatoddswithSD-PAMs,which
arelikelytobeimplementedfornon-climatereasons.
Furthermore,theSD-PAMsapproachwouldcoverthe
implementationofexistingpolicy.
Accordingly,anewframeworkwouldbeneededfor
decidingwhichpoliciesandmeasuresarecreditworthy
andwhicharenot.Ratherthanadditionalityassessments,
amorepromisingapproachmightbetodefineasetof
activitiesorpolicies—suchassomeofthosediscussedin
thisreport—thatareunquestionablyclimate-friendlyand
thereforeapriorieligibleforcrediting,regardlessofthe
motivationforenactment.Accountingstandards,basedon
suchasetofactivitiesandpolicies,wouldthenneedtobe
developedtoenableemissionreductiondeterminationsin
amannerthatisreasonablysimpleandtransparent.9This
mightbedonethroughasystemofperformancebenchmarksorrate-basedemissionbaselines(forexample,CO2
perunitofoutput),probablyonasectororsubsectorlevel.
Evenifthisisfeasible,however,asector/policy-based
CDMstillhasaremainingproblempertainingtothe
structureandbalanceoftheoverallcarbonmarket.A
sector/policy-basedcreditingmechanismcouldgenerate
largequantitiesofemissionreductions.Asillustratedin
thisreport,justahandfuloflargesectoralinitiativescould
generatereductionsofhundredsofmillionsoftonsof
CO2.However,reductionsofthisscalemightoverwhelm
thedemandfromindustrializedcountries,orotherwise
dampenincentivesinthosecountriestocontinueabatementefforts.Thisproblemmightberemediedbydeeper
emissioncutsinindustrializedcountries.Yetsuchcuts
donotappeartobeforthcoming.Inparticular,some
countriesliketheU.S.—evenifitagreedtoanemission
limit—wouldnotlikelycapemissionsatalevelthatwould
leaveitoverlydependentoncreditsfromothercountries
tocomply.10
5.3ActionTargets
Actiontargets,summarizedinBox3,areathirdpossibilityforincorporatingaquantitativedimensioninto
SD-PAMs.Actiontargetswouldaddresssomeofthe
difficultiesdiscussedabove,thoughsubstantialchallenges
wouldremain.
Underanactiontargetsapproach,inadditiontopledgingSD-PAMs,acountrywouldpledgetoachieveaquantityofemissionreductions(the“actiontarget”).TheexpectationwouldbethattheSD-PAMs(“actions”)pledged
wouldgenerateemissionreductionsthat,inturn,would
beusedtosatisfythetarget.IfSD-PAMsweretogenerate
emissionreductionsinexcessofthetarget,allorpartof
thesesurplusreductionscouldbesoldtogovernmentsor
privatebuyers,therebygeneratingafinancialreturn.
S U S TA IN A B LE D E VE LOPM EN T POLIC IES A N D M EA SU R ES A N D IN TER N ATION A L C LIMATE A GR EEMEN TS
21
Box3.ActionTargets
Anactiontargetwouldbeapledgetoachieveoracquireanagreedamountof
GHGemissionreductions.Forexample,ifacountryadoptedanactiontarget
of2percentfortheperiod2013–17,itwouldneedtodemonstrateemission
reductionsequalto2percentofitsactualemissionsduringthisperiod.Inthis
way,anactiontargetdefinestheamountofabatementtobeachievedduring
acommitmentperiod.ThisdiffersfromKyoto-styleordynamictargets,which
definealevelofemissions(oremissionsperunitofGDP)tobeachievedduring
aparticularperiod.
Toillustrate,supposeCountryAagreestoanactiontarget(AT)of5percentfor
theyear2015.IfCountryA’semissions(E)inthatyearare100milliontonsof
carbon(MtCO2),thentherequiredamountofreductionsis5MtCO2(5percent
of100).Itfollowsthat,ifemissionsareactually100MtCO2in2015andthe
countryhasdemonstrated5MtCO2ofdomesticreductions,thenemissions
wouldhavebeen105MtCO2intheabsenceofanyactionstakentoreach
thetarget.Inthisway,actiontargetswouldhavetheeffectofbendingthe
emissionstrajectoryofacountrydownward.
Source:AdaptedfromBaumertandGoldberg(2005)
Actiontargetsentailsomeadvantagesoversector/policy
CDM.Inparticular,theriskofoverwhelmingthedemand
forcreditsfromAnnexIissubstantiallyreducedbecause
notallcreditsgeneratedaretransferable;onlyemission
reductionsachievedinexcessofdomesticactiontargets
couldbesold.Anappraisaloftheexpectedabatement
quantitiesgeneratedbyexistingSD-PAMsmightconstitute
ausefulstartingpointforsettinganactiontarget.Inthis
way,substantialquantitiesof“non-additional”credits(in
theparlanceoftheCDM)couldbeusedtosatisfydomesticactiontargets,withnewSD-PAMsgeneratingemission
reductionsthat,inwholeorpart,couldbetransferred.
Second,byadoptingquantitativecommitments,itis
possiblethatSD-PAMswhencoupledwithactiontargets
couldattractmoreconcessionalfinancingfromindustrializedcountriesundertheUNFCCC.Withtheadded
quantitativecommitment,developingcountriesmayimprovetheirnegotiatingpositionwithrespecttoadditional
funding.Ontheotherhand,developingcountrieshave
longresistedquantitativecommitmentsinanyform,and
mightcontinuetodoso.
Thechiefchallengeassociatedwithsector/policyCDM,
however,remainsforactiontargetsaswell.Namely,what
constitutesan“emissionreduction”thatcanbeusedtosatisfyanactiontargetorbesold?Howcouldanaccounting
systembedevisedthatcapturesemissionreductionsfrom
diversekindsofSD-PAMs,suchasrenewableenergyport-
22
foliostandards,productefficiencystandards,roadcharges,
andcleanenergysubsidies,amongmanyothers?Although
afullexplorationofthistopicisbeyondthescopeofthis
report,somepreliminaryobservationscanbemade.
First,becausenotallemissionreductionswouldbe
tradable,theneedforquantitativeprecisionisreduced,
andinanycaseexperienceshowsthataccuracyisunachievable.ThepurposeoftheaccountingsystemforSDPAMs,coupledwithactiontargets,wouldbetoidentify
andpromotethekindsofSD-PAMsthatareneededto
achievetheClimateConvention’sobjective,including
thoseactionstakenmainlyforeconomic,social,orother
purposes.Inthisway,itwoulddiffersubstantiallyfrom
theCDM’sadditionalitytests.Asystemofperformance
benchmarksorrate-basedemissionbaselinesmightbe
calledfor(aswithsector/policyCDM),probablyona
sectororsubsectorlevel.
Second,lessonsfromKyotosuggestsomeprocedural
safeguardsthatcouldimprovethelikelihoodofsuccess.
Mostimportantly,negotiatorsshouldagreeonanaccountingsystem—atleastthemaincontoursofone—priorto
adoptingactiontargetsunderanSD-PAMssystem.In
doingso,governmentswouldavoidtheapproachtaken
underKyoto,whichturnednegotiationsonCDMproject
eligibility,additionalitymethodologies,andotherissues
intodefactorenegotiationsofnationaltargets.Tothe
extentpossible,anaccountingsystemshouldbedeveloped
throughbroadstakeholderparticipation(giventheinevitablepolicyissuesthatwillarise)coupledwiththeinputof
technicalcompetenceandexpertise.11
6.CONCLUSION
Thischapterhasoutlinedseveralideasandparameters
forformalizingSD-PAMsinthecontextofthebroader
evolutionoftheclimatechangeregime.Anumberofelementsarelikelytorequired,includingdefinitionofeligible
typesofSD-PAMs,aswellasproceduresforpledging,
tracking,reportingon,andreviewingSD-PAMsimplementation.ResolvingGHGaccountingissuesmayalsoenable
quantificationoftheGHGbenefitsflowingfromparticular
PAMs,orsectorswithinwhichmultiplePAMsaretargeted.
Additionalfutureworkisneededintheseareas.
Whiletheconceptofpledgingnationalpoliciesand
measuresmaybeuntried,manyelementsdescribedabove
areadaptedorborrowedfromexistingpracticeunder
theConvention.Forinstance,theprocessofagreeingon
emissiontargetsinvolved,insomesense,abottom-up
pledgingprocess.Likewise,theConventionalready
employsasystemforreportingandreviewofpolicy
implementation.Tobesuccessful,anSD-PAMssystem
wouldneedtobuildonandimprovethesesystems.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
ENDNOTES
Thelinebetweenprojectsandpoliciescouldbeblurredinsome
instances,particularlyifaprojectislargescale.Large-scaleinfrastructureprojects,forinstance,mayrequireenablinglegislation,partnerships,oreveninternationalagreementsasprerequisitestoplanning,
financing,andimplementation.
2 UNFCCC,Article4.1(b),statesthat“allPartiesshall“[f ]ormulate,
implement,publishandregularlyupdatenational...programmescontainingmeasurestomitigateclimatechange...”Article4.3thenstates
thatthedevelopedcountriesshall“providesuchfinancialresources,
includingforthetransferoftechnology,neededbythedeveloping
countryPartiestomeettheagreedfullincrementalcostsofimplementingmeasuresthatarecoveredbyparagraph1ofthisArticle....”
3 Anissueforfutureconsiderationwouldbewhetherpledge“periods”
(i.e.,negotiations)shouldbesetinregularintervalsorberolling.
Partiesmayneedtoholdpledgeperiodsinregularintervals(suchas
everythreetofiveyears).
4 In-depthreviewprocessisdefinedinCOPdecisions2/CP.1(1995)
and6/CP.3(1997).
5 UNFCCC,2005.NationalCommunicationsAnnexI:Reviewof
Information.Availableat:http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_
natcom_/items/1095.php.
6 SeeWTO,1995and“Tradepolicyreviews:ensuringtransparency.”
Availableat:http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
agrm11_e.htm.
7 UNFCCC,2001.Ongoingguidanceisalsopromulgatedbythe
CDMExecutiveBoard.ForinformationabouttheExecutiveBoard,
seehttp://unfccc.int/cdm/EB.
8 UNFCCC,2004b(ReferringtotypeL-andL+policiesorregulations).
9 SeetheGHGProtocolInitiative(convenedbytheWorldResources
InstituteandWorldBusinessCouncilforSustainableDevelopment)
foranexampleofsuchaccountingstandardsatthecorporateand
projectlevel.Informationavailableat:http://www.ghgprotocol.org.
10 Seee.g.,BushAdministration,2001(Assertingthatthe“Kyoto
ProtocolwouldleavetheUnitedStatesdangerouslydependenton
othercountriestomeetitsemissiontargets...Thereisnoguarantee
thattheseallowanceswouldbeavailable.”)Similarobjectionswould
likelybeexpectedfromfutureadministrationsaswell.
11 TheGHGProtocolmaybeausefulmultistakeholdermodelfor
developingsuchstandard.Seesupranote9.
1
REFERENCES
Baumert,K.A.andD.Goldberg.2005
Baumert,K.A.andD.Goldberg.2005(forthcoming).
“ActionTargets:ANewApproachtoInternationalGreenhouse
GasControls.”SubmittedtoClimatePolicy.
Baumert,K.,T.Herzog,andJ.Pershing.2005.
Baumert,K.,T.Herzog,andJ.Pershing.2005.Navigatingthe
Numbers:GreenhouseGasDataandInternationalClimatePolicy.
Washington,DC:WorldResourcesInstitute.
Bosi,M.andJ.Ellis.2005.“ExploringOptionsforSectoral
Bosi,M.andJ.Ellis.2005.
CreditingMechanisms.”Paris:OECD/IEA.
BushAdministration.2001.
BushAdministration.2001.AnalysisoftheKyotoProtocol.
TheClimateChangeReviewissuedbytheCabinet-levelclimate
changeworkinggroup,July13.Availableat:http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/climatechange.pdf.
Chandler,W.etal.2002.
Chandler,W.etal.2002.ClimateChangeMitigationinDevelopingCountries:Brazil,China,India,Mexico,S.Africa,andTurkey.
Washington,DC:PewCenteronGlobalClimateChange.
IEA/OECD(InternationalEnergyAgencyandOrganisationfor
EconomicCo-operationandDevelopment).2001.Dealingwith
EconomicCo-operationandDevelopment).2001.
ClimateChange:PoliciesandMeasuresinIEAMemberCountries.
Paris:IEA.
OECD.2002.
OECD.2002.AidTargetingtheObjectivesoftheRioConventions
1998-2000.Paris:OECD.
Reinstein,R.A.2004.“APossibleWayForwardonClimate
Reinstein,R.A.2004.
Change.”MitigationandAdaptationStrategiesforGlobalChange
9(3):245–309.
Samaniego,J.andC.Figueres.2002.
Samaniego,J.andC.Figueres.2002.“ASector-BasedClean
DevelopmentMechanism,”inBaumertetal.eds.,Buildingon
theKyotoProtocol:OptionsforProtectingtheClimate.Washington,
DC:WorldResourcesInstitute.
Schmidt,J.etal.2004.
Schmidt,J.etal.2004.“Sector-BasedGreenhouseGasEmissions
ReductionApproachforDevelopingCountries:SomeOptions.”
CenterforCleanAirPolicyWorkingPaper.Washington,DC:
CenterforCleanAirPolicy.
UNFCCC.1992.
UNFCCC.1992.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventionon
ClimateChange.
UNFCCC.2001.
UNFCCC.2001.ReportoftheConferenceofthePartiesonits
SeventhSession,HeldatMarrakeshfrom29Oct.to10Nov.2001,
decision17/CP.7,UNFCCCDoc.FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2.
UNFCCC.2004a.
UNFCCC.2004a.ReportoftheGlobalEnvironmentFacilityto
theConferenceoftheParties.NotebytheSecretariat.Document
FCCC/CP/2004/6.Availableat:http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop10/06.pdf.
UNFCCC.2004b.
UNFCCC.2004b.ReportoftheSixteenthMeetingofthe
[CDM]ExecutiveBoardAnnex3,FCCCDoc.Ref.CDM-EB-16
(Oct.21-22).Availableat:http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/Meetings/
016/eb16repan3.pdf.
UNFCCC.2005.
UNFCCC.2005.NationalCommunicationsAnnexI:Review
ofInformation.Availableat:http://unfccc.int/national_reports/
annex_i_natcom_/items/1095.php.
UNGA(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly).1992.
UNGA(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly).1992.“Rio
DeclarationonEnvironmentandDevelopment,”inReportof
theUnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment,
UNGADoc.A/Conf.151/26(Vol.I)(August12).Availableat:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
Winkler,H.,R.Spalding-Fecher,S.Mwakasonda,and
Winkler,H.,R.Spalding-Fecher,S.Mwakasonda,and
O.Davidson.2002.“PoliciesandMeasuresforSustainable
O.Davidson.2002.
Development,”inBaumertetal.(eds.),BuildingontheKyoto
Protocol:OptionsforProtectingtheClimate.Washington,DC:
WorldResourcesInstitute.
WCED(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentand
WCED(WorldCommissiononEnvironmentand
Development).1987.“OurCommonFuture.”NewYork:
Development).1987.
OxfordUniversityPress.
WTO(WorldTradeOrganization).1995.
WTO(WorldTradeOrganization).1995.MarrakeshAgreement
EstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization.Annex3.Availableat:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm.
Goldemberg,J.andW.Reid,eds.1999.PromotingDevelopment
Goldemberg,J.andW.Reid,eds.1999.
whileLimitingGreenhouseGasEmissions:TrendsandBaselines.
NewYork:UNDPandWorldResourcesInstitute.
S U S TA IN A B LE D E VE LOPM EN T POLIC IES A N D M EA SU R ES A N D IN TER N ATION A L C LIMATE A GR EEMEN TS
23
Editor'sNote
I
nthe1970s,Brazilfacedtwo
seeminglyunrelatedchallenges.
Mostcritically,theoilcrisisand
thehugeriseinpriceshadimposed
adamagingburdenonthecountry’s
economy,pushingitsexternaldebt
uptolevelsthatwouldbedifficultto
sustain.Atthesametime,Brazil’s
sugarindustry,amajorcomponent
ofitseconomy,wasstrugglingwith
lowworldmarketprices,andrural
communityrevenuesweredepressed.
Theanswertobothoftheseproblemslayintheproductionofethanol
fromsugarcane.Thegovernmentimplementedwide-rangingmeasuresto
ensurethatethanolwasasignificant
partofthetransportfuelmix—partly
blendedwithgasoline,andpartlyfor
useasapurefuelinspecially-adapted
carengines.Sincethattime,Brazil
hassavedsome$100billioninforeign
exchange,bothinreducedimportcosts
andinreducedservicepaymenton
thedebtthatitwouldhaveincurred
fromlargeroilimports.Thissaving
isequivalentto50percentofBrazil’s
actual(sizeable)nationaldebt,and
some8percentofcurrentGDP.Over
amillionjobsinruralBrazildepend
onethanolandsugarproduction,and
theindustryhasbeenprotectedfrom
exclusivedependenceonthevolatile
worldpriceforsugar.Airquality
hasgenerallyimproved,andbiofuel
manufactureproducesaround1,350
gigawatthours(GWh)peryearof
usefulelectricityforexporttothegrid,
afigurethathasrisenfromamere80
GWhin1997andisstillrisingfastas
technologyimproves.
24
Thesedomesticgainshavebeenthe
realmeasuresoftheprogram’ssuccess,
buttheincidentalbenefitstotheclimatehavebeenconsiderable.Without
thebiofuelsprogramBrazil’scumulativeemissionsofCO2fromhigher
oilconsumptionbetween1975and
thepresentwouldhavebeen10
percenthigher—asavingofalmost
600milliontonsofCO2 .
Thestrategyexaminedinthis
chapteristheonlyoneinthisreport
whichisalreadyimplementedona
largescaleandoveralongtimeperiod.Althoughthegoalofpromoting
ethanolhasremainedconstant,the
policymixemployedtothisendhas
changedovertime.Initialsubsidies
werehigh,butasthetechnologyand
theinfrastructuredeveloped,these
havesteadilydeclinedandhavenow
beeneliminated.Amandatedlevelof
ethanoladmixtureremainscentralto
theethanolmarket,butpureethanol
salesarealsoimportant.Themarket
forrenewableelectricityisemerging
asmutuallysupportivewithethanol
production,andnew“flexfuel”
vehicletechnologymakesethanol
moreappealingtoconsumers.
Theauthorssuggestthatsome
20othercountrieshavesuitable
conditionsforasimilarexpansionof
sugarcaneethanol.Incountrieswith
moretemperateclimates,atechnologybreakthroughisstillneededto
makecellulosicethanolmoreviable.
Bothapproacheshavesomelocal
impacts,particularlyonlanduse,that
willneedcarefulmanagement,but
theauthorssuggestthatthesecanbe
overcome.Anappealofethanolisthat
itallowsagradualincreaseinitsuse
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
ratherthananall-or-nothingswitch
toanewtechnology,soadverseimpacts
canbemanagedastheyarise.
Brazil’sbiofuelsprogramrepresents,
inasense,oneendofaspectrumof
SD-PAMsandraisessomeinteresting
questionsofitsown.Brazil’sethanol
programhasreachedastageatwhich
itrequireslittleadditionalsupport,
thoughitispossiblethatthismight
changeifoilpricesreturntolowlevels.
Internationalrecognitionnodoubt
hassomeappeal,buttheadditional
benefitofexploringthisasanSD-PAM
mayseemtobelimitedforBrazil.
Conversely,anumberofcountries
mightbehelpedtoimplementsuch
aprogramwithadditionalsupport
rangingfromexchangeofinformation
andeasieraccesstorelevanttechnologies,tofinancialsupportincaseswhere
thisisneeded.Thisillustratesthe
potentiallyeclecticnatureofSD-PAMs,
asasimilartechnologychoicemay
besupportedindifferentwaysasthe
needsofthehostcountrydictate.
Theclimatebenefitsofthisdevelopmentwouldbehuge,butwouldnot
needtobetreatedexclusivelyasamitigationcost.Furthermore,astoday’soil
marketshows,thelevelsofdemand
fromonecountryaffect,toagreater
orlesserdegree,pricesforall.There
canbefewmorecompellingexamples
ofpolicyareasripeforinternational
cooperation.
chapteriii
BiofuelsforTransport,
BiofuelsforTransport,
Development,and
ClimateChange:
LessonsfromBrazil
JoseRobertoMoreira 1 ■ LuizAugustoHortaNogueira 2 ■ VirginiaParente 3
1.INTRODUCTION
Scientificconsensussuggeststhatavoidingseriousor
evencatastrophicimpactsfromclimatechangewillrequire
globalemissionsofgreenhousegases(GHGs)tobeginto
declinewithinthenextfewdecades.Whilerichindustrializedcountriesmustleadinmakingtheseemissioncuts,
largedevelopingcountriesmustalsofindwaystoavoid
emissionsgrowthandevenreducetheiremissions.However,
urgentdevelopmentneedsmeanthatfindingswaystocombinedevelopmentandemissionreductionsisimperative.
Onemajorpotentialopportunityforthiskindofsynergyisthereplacementoffossilfuelsbybiofuelsfortransport.Thisapproachhasbeenpromotedinmanycountries
asawaytoreducedependenceonimportsoffossilfuels,
reducepricevolatility,andprovidelocalenvironmental
benefits.Inaddition,biofuelscanalsobringlargepotential
climateadvantages.Brazilhasforseveraldecadesbeenat
theforefrontofintroducingthesefuels,andisanideal
placetolookforlessonsthatcanbeappliedelsewhere.
Thischapterlooksatthenon-climatereasonsbehind
Brazil’sbiofuelsprogram;thetechnical,economic,and
institutionalhurdlesitfaced;theincidentalclimateadvantages;andhowlessonslearnedinBrazilmightbeusefully
appliedelsewhere.
1.1SustainableDevelopmentPolicies
Toputthebiofuelsissueinperspective,webeginwith
afewwordsaboutBraziliansustainabledevelopmentgoals
andthepoliciesandmeasurestoachievethem.Apolicy
designedforsustainabledevelopmentmust,asaminimum,guaranteedevelopment.Sinceshortageofcapital
isafrequentproblemindevelopingcountries,economic
developmentdependsstronglyonforeigninvestment.
Unfortunately,thecountryhasfacedseveralseriouseconomiccrises.Theoverallinternationalcurrenttransaction
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
25
accountwaspositiveduringonlysixofthelast40years,
andnegativevalueshavebeenashighas4.6percentof
GNP(BancoCentral,2004).4Brazil’sexternaldebtisthe
largestofanylargedevelopingcountry.Risksassociated
withBrazil’scapacitytorepaydebtpushedinterestratesto
highlevels.Since2003,4.25percentofGNPhasbeenset
asideforexternaldebtrepaymentinthefederalgovernmentbudget,butabsolutedebtlevelshavedeclinedonly
modestly.TheseissuesunderminedBrazil’scredibility,
oftenreducingforeigndirectinvestment.
Ontheotherhand,thelow-technologyindustrialsector
andtheagriculturalsectorwerenotabletopushexports
atasignificantrateuntilrecently(2003–05).Withamodestflowofforeigncurrencyreceipts,economicsurvival
requiredsignificantlyreducingimports.Giventhelarge
costofoilexpendituresinthecountry’strade,anynational
alternativedisplacingimportedoilwouldbringmajor
benefits.Withlessspendingonoil,itwouldbepossibleto
usescarcecapitaldomestically.
Aseconomicdevelopmenthasproceeded,thenextissue,sustainability,hasgainedimportanceinthecountry’s
planning.Butseveralbarrierstosustainabledevelopmentconcernedgovernmentpolicymakers,including
(1)thenation’sloweducationlevel;(2)lackofadequate
infrastructure;(3)poorincomedistribution;and(4)
insufficientsocialwelfarespending.Anumberofthese
problemsareencapsulatedinthestateofmuchofBrazil’s
ruraleconomy.Althoughsignificantprogramsexisttohelp
addresseachoftheseproblemsdirectly,thereremainsa
significantdemandforjobsforworkerswithloweducationlevels,aswellasaneedforrevenueinruralareas.The
lackofruralemploymentaffectsbothlowruralincomes
andmigrationratestourbancenters.
Infrastructureimprovementhasoccurredinareassuch
asenergyproductionanddistribution,sewageandwater,
andconstructionofroadsand—toalesserextent—
railways.Unfortunately,restraineddemandishuge,and
infrastructuremaintenanceisnotapriority.Inessence,
demandforservicesisoutstrippingavailableresources.Environmentalprioritiesalsoarestartingtoemerge.Environmentalinstitutions,officials,andNGOsalreadyexistand
aregainingprestige.Inmoredevelopedstates,compliance
withenvironmentallegislationrequiresasignificanteffort
onthoseproposingnewprojects.Largeenergyprojectsare
facingseverelimitationsduetheenforcementofenvironmentalnorms.Sustainabledevelopmentconditionsare
beingsoughtmuchmoreemphaticallythaninthepast,
andresultsarestartingtoappear.
Weshallseeinthischapterthattheuseofbiofuelshas
hadpositiveimpactsoneachoftheseareas,asacontributiontotheruraleconomyandjobcreation;toenergyinfrastructure,includingelectricity;andtotheenvironment.
2.BIOFUELSINBRAZIL
2.1Whatisabiofuel?
Abiofuelisafuelproducedfromdryorganicmatteror
combustibleoilsproducedfromplants.Thereareseveral
kindsofbiofuels,includingalcohol(fromfermented
sugar),blackliquorfromthepapermanufacturingprocess,
wood,andsoybeanoil(IPCC,2001).Whilearange
ofbiofuelscanbeusedasautomotivefuel,eitherpure
orblendedwithfossilfuels,theimportantbiofuelfor
transportinBrazilisethanolfromsugarcane.Although
otherkindsarebeingconsidered,inparticularbiodiesel
(seeBox1),theiruseremainsminimal.Bycontrast,there
wereabout21millionvehiclesinthecountryrunningon
ethanolorethanolblendsasof2005.So,intheBrazilian
context,biofuelsarevirtuallysynonymouswithethanol.
2.2Currentstatusofbiofuels
intheBrazilianmarket
Ethanolislargelyusedasanalternativeforgasolinein
theautomobilesector.InBrazil,allethanolisproduced
fromsugarcanethroughthefermentationofsugarscontainedinsugarcanejuice.Thesameagriculturalproduct
canbeusedtoproduceeithersugarorethanol(seeFigure
1).Themarketforethanolisthereforeintimatelyinterlinkedwiththatforsugarandrelatedproducts,andthehistoryofethanolneedstobeunderstoodwiththisinmind.
Box1.BiodieselinBrazil
Whileethanolhasbeensuccessfullyintroducedasapartial
substituteforgasoline,therehassofarbeennoequivalent
replacementofdieselfuels.Dieseloilisthemostimportant
fuelinBrazil,withanannualconsumptionofabout38billion
liters,amountingto36percentoftotaloilproductdemand.
Today,15percentofBraziliandieseldemandisimported.A
nationalbiodieselprogramwaslaunchedinJanuary2005
andisnowunderdevelopment.Anofficialnationalstandard
forbiodieselisalreadyavailable.Recently,theNational
PetroleumAgency(ANP)issuedasetofregulatorydocuments
topreparethedownstreamoilindustrytodealwithbiodiesel
implementation.SinceJanuary2005,thegovernmenthasallowedtheblendingofupto2percentofbiodieselinregular
diesel.Thisamountwillbeadjustedannually,movingtoward
5percentin2008.
Source:MinistériodeMinaseEnergia,ProgramaCombustívelVerde,Brasília(2004).
Availableat:http://www.mme.gov.br.
26
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Figure1.SimplifiedFlowDiagramforSugarandEthanolProductionfromSugarcane
Source:Macedo(2003)
Sugarcaneisgrowninmorethan100countries
worldwideandaccountsforthemajorityofglobalsugar
production.Brazilplantsandharvestsalargeamountof
sugarcane:about400milliontonswereharvestedinthe
2004–05growingseason,coveringanareaof5.5million
hectares.Asidefromsugarandethanol,productsfromthe
caneincludebiodegradableplasticsandlow-gradepaper.
Thebyproducts,bagasse(residuesfromthesugarmanufacturingprocess)andbarbojo(topsandleavesremaining
fromharvesting),aregenerallyburned.Bagasse,inparticular,istraditionallyusedasasourceofheatandelectricity
fortheagroindustriesprocessingsugarcaneintoethanol
andsugar,aswellasinotheragroindustriessuchasorange
juiceproduction.
NearlyhalfofBrazil’scaneisdestinedforethanol.Brazil
hastwodistinctsugarproducingregions.TheSouthernCentralregionisdominatedbythestateofSãoPaulo,
whichaloneaccountsfor65percentofthecountry’ssugarcaneproduction.Thisregionsuppliesthree-quartersof
thecountry’scane,over70percentofthesugaroutput,and
approximately90percentoftheethanol.TheNortheast
accountsforlessthan20percentofBrazil’ssugarcaneproduction,approximately25to30percentofthecountry’s
sugaroutput,andabout10percentofitsethanol.
Table1summarizesmajorindicatorsofthesugar/
ethanolsectorinBrazilfortheyear2003.Rawandrefined
sugaraccountforroughly2to4percentofBrazil’sexports,
dependingonyields.Thelarge-scaleuseofethanolas
fuelforvehiclesinBrazildatesfrom1931.From1931to
Table1.TheSugar/EthanolSectorinBrazil,2003
AUS$12billionannualmarket
GrossTurnover
$12billion(R$36billion)
ShareofNationalIncome
3.5percentofGNP
Employment
3.6millionjobs(direct,indirect,and
someinduced)
sugarcanegrowers
70,000farmers
sugarcaneharvest
340milliontonsofsugarcane
Output–Sugar
24milliontonsofsugar
Output–Ethanol
14billionlitersofalcohol
Exports–Sugar
13.5milliontonsofsugar
Exports–Ethanol
690millionlitersofalcohol
Taxes
$1.5billion(R$4.5billion)
Investments
$1.2billion/year(R$3.5billion/year)
Producers
302mills
Source:Moreira(2004)
1975,around7percentoftotalBraziliangasolineconsumptionwasreplacedbyethanol,asestablishedbylaw.
In1975,theBrazilianAlcoholProgram(Proalcool)was
launched,increasingtheuseofgasoholandpromoting
pureethanoluseindedicatedmodels.Figure2showsthe
evolutionofalcoholproductionsincethen.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
27
Figure2.EthanolProduction(AnhydrousplusHydrous)byGrowingSeason
18
Ethanol Production (million m3)
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
2003/2004
2001/2002
1999/2000
1997/1998
1995/1996
1993/1994
1991/1992
1989/1990
1987/1988
1985/1986
1983/1984
1981/1982
1979/1980
1977/1978
1975/1976
1973/1974
1971/1972
0
Source:Datagro(2004);Datagro(2002)
Itiscommonlyassertedintheinternationalalternative
energyliteraturethatbiomass-derivedtransportfuelsare
uneconomicatpresent.However,substantialcostreductionshaveoccurredforsugarcane-derivedethanolsincethe
early1980s(Goldemberg,2005).Thistrendaccelerated
furtherafterthe1999currencydevaluation.Thiseffect,
plustheincreaseinthecostofoilsince2000,hasmade
ethanolcost-competitivewithgasoline.Thenumberof
newautomobilesrunningonpure(or“hydrous”)ethanol
wasalmostzerointheperiod1995–2000butrecentlyhas
startedtoshowsignificantimprovement(seeFigure3).
2.3AbriefhistoryofbiofuelsinBrazil
Ethanolhasbeenproposedasafuelsincethebeginning
ofautomobileuseinBrazil.In1903,anationalmeeting
onapplicationsofethanolputforwardplanstodevelop
aninfrastructuretoproduceanddistributeethanolfrom
sugarcaneasamotorfuel.5DuringWorldWarI,theuse
ofalcoholwascompulsoryinmanyareasofthecountry.
By1923,productionofethanolhadgrownto150million
litersperyear;in1927itwasblendedwithdiethyl(ethyl)
etherandcastoroil.In1931,aFederalDecreeestablished
28
thecompulsoryadditionof5percentofethanolin
gasoline;thiswaselevatedto10percentin1966.By1941,
ethanolproductionhadreached650millionliters.
Theimpetusforthehugegrowthofethanoluseinrecent
decadesstartedinthe1970s.Brazilfacedtwoseemingly
unrelatedchallenges.Theoilcrisisandtheconsequentrise
inoilpriceswereputtinggreatstrainsonBrazil’sexternal
tradebalance.Atthesametime,theinternationalmarket
priceforsugarwasfallingrapidly,andthesugarcanesector
waslookingforalternativesourcesofrevenue.In1975,
theFederalGovernmentdecidedtoencouragetheproductionofalcoholtoreplacegasoline(seeBox2).
Inasense,therehavebeentwoethanolprograms:the
somewhatfluctuatinguseofpureethanolfuel,andthe
steadysuccessofmixed(anhydrous)ethanolingasoline.
Thetargetsetin1975wastodisplaceashareofgasolinebyblendingitwith10percentanhydrousethanol
(seeFigure4).Inaddition,thegovernment,whichhadat
thattimefullcontroloverfueldistributionandpricing,
mandatedthatallfillingstationsshouldhaveatleastone
ethanolpump.Significantethanolproductionandthe
continuinghighpriceofoilpushedthegovernmentto
steadilyincreasethisproportion.In1979,carsrunning
on“neat”(pure)hydrousethanolenteredthemarket,and
boththeseand“gasohol”carsrunningonblendedethanol
andgasolinewerepopular.Between1975and1985,the
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
productionofsugarcanequadrupledandalcoholbecamea
veryimportantfuelinBrazil(seeAnnex1andFigure3).
Governmentinterventioninthesugarandalcohol
marketwassignificant(seeBox2).Althoughoilprices
declinedinthe1980s,theimpactofthisdeclineonthe
ethanolprogramwasminimized,asthegovernment
indexedthepriceofethanoltothepriceofgasoline,rangingfrom59to75percentofitsprice.Thegasolineprice
wasalwayshigherthanthatofotheroil-derivedfuelsdue
todifferentiatedfederalandstatetaxeschargedonfuels.
Evenso,interestinalcoholdeclinedsignificantlywhen
itreachedtheupperlimit(75percent)ofitspriceindex
againstgasoline.
Theneatethanolcarfacedsometechnicalproblems
duringthefirsttwoyears,butafterthatitwasasignificant
successupto1989.Inthatyear,ashortageofethanolhit
thosewithcarsthatwouldonlyrunonthatfuelandseriouslydentedconsumerconfidenceandsalesofneatethanolvehicles(Figure3).After1996,muchloweroilprices
andthedeclineingovernmentsupportmadesalesdrop
evenfurther.Ethanolsubsidiescametoanendin1998.
Eventhen,gasolinepriceswerekepthigherthanother
fossilfuelsduetoanextratax.Asthefuelmarketswere
liberalized,hydrousethanolwassoldinservicestationsat
upto90percentofthepriceofgasoline(ortobemore
precise,gasoline/ethanolblends).Thisvirtualelimination
ofitspriceadvantagecoupledwithmemoriesofthesupply
crunchofadecadebeforebroughtsalesofneatethanol
carsdownclosetozero.
By2001,however,afallingethanolpricecaused
bystrongercompetition—coupledwithasignificant
devaluationofthenationalcurrency—revivedconsumer
interestinneatethanolcars.Initially,therewasanincrease
inneatethanolcarsales,butthearrivalofflexfuelcars
onthemarketacceleratedthiseffect(seeAnnex1and
Figure3).Suchcarscanoperateeitherwithgasoline(all
gasolineinBrazilhas25percentethanolblend)orwith
hydrousalcohol,oranycombinationofthesefuels.The
Box2.OverviewofGovernmentSupportforEthanol
From1975tothe1980s
Ethanol:
Levelofguaranteedpurchase,atcontrolledprices
Fixedratioofethanol/gasolinesellingprices
Lowinterestrateinloansforinvestment(1980–85)
Sugar:
Governmentissued“productionquotas”
Exports:bythegovernment
From1990to1999
Ethanolandsugar:
Productionandcommercializationwereentirely
deregulatedforbothproducts
Source:Macedo(2003)
Figure3.Ethanol-fueledVehicleSalessince1980
800,000
Number of Cars (left axis)
700,000
% of All Car Sales (right axis)
100%
90%
80%
600,000
70%
500.000
60%
400,000
50%
40%
300,000
30%
200,000
20%
100,000
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
2004 (estimated)
Note:Since2003,totalethanolcarsalesincludeflexfuelcars.
Source:Datagro(2002);updatedbyauthors.
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
0
10%
0%
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
29
flexfueltechnologywasimprovedinBrazilanditscost
wassignificantlyreduced.Flexfuelcarswerebeingsoldat
thesamepriceasmodelsrunningexclusivelyongasoline
oronhydrousethanol.Therewasasignificantincreasein
salesin2004,whenseverallocalcarmanufacturersoffered
flexfuelmodels.
Conversely,anhydrousethanolblendedwithgasoline,
fixedbygovernmentmandate,hadasmootherpathover
thelast30years.Duringthe1980s,theshortageofethanolcausedsomevariabilityintheshareofethanolblended
withgasolineduringthisperiod,butithasstabilizedin
morerecentyears(seeFigure4).Figure5showsabreakdownofthepumppriceofgasohol,dieselandethanol
fuels(notethatpuregasolineisnotgenerallysold.)
Withanaccumulatedproductionabove280billion
litersandwithtechnicalimprovements,ithasbeen
possibletoproduceethanolatacostbelow$0.20perliter.
Figure4.ShareofAnhydrousEthanolinBrazilianGasoline
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
2002
1998
1994
1990
1986
1982
1978
1974
0
Source:BEN(2004)
3.REASONSFORTHESUCCESS
3.REASONSFORTHESUCCESS
OFBIOFUELSINBRAZIL
Asdiscussedabove,thebiofuelsprograminBrazilhad
morethanoneaimandwasinturnaffectedbyanumber
offactors.Inthissection,weexaminesomeofthese
factorsandtheirimpactonethanoluseinBrazil.
30
3.1Synergieswiththesugarmarket
Asdiscussedabove,theproductionofethanolisintimatelylinkedwithsugarproduction.Sugarcaneproduces
exceptionallygoodyieldsasanenergycrop(Figure6),and
technicalimprovementsareexpectedtopushtheseyields
further.The2001worldwideaverage(over22million
hectares[Mha]ofland)forabovegroundbiomassyieldwas
28.4drytonsperhectaresperyear(dt/ha/yr)(Halletal.,
1993,andFAO,2002).TheyieldforZambia(averaged
over10,000ha)was77dt/ha/yr(Halletal.,1993).
Brazilhasalargesugarindustry,whichhasbeenable
totakeadvantageoftheflexibilitybetweenethanoland
sugarproduction.Duringmostoftheperiodofdeclining
ethanolcarsales(1990–98)andlowsales(1999–2003),
asshowninFigure7,sugarcaneproducersexpandedsugar
production;bothsugarcaneproductivityandplantedarea
increased.Asethanolproductiondeclined,thisproduction
wasdivertedtosugar.Between1992and2004,Brazil’s
shareofworldsugarexportsgrewfrom10to30percent
duetolowercostsinBrazilanddifficultiesinotherproducingcountries.
Thecoupledproductionofalcoholandsugarcanbe
seenasasignificantdriverforthesuccessfulalcohol
programinBrazil.Thestepsinvolvedinsugarand
alcoholproductionfromsugarcane,asshowninFigure1
(p.27),allowflexibilityofproduction.Ifsugarproductionbecomeslessattractiveduetoreducedpricesinthe
internationalmarket,itmightbecomemoreprofitableto
shiftproductiontoalcohol.Incommonwithmanyagriculturalcommodities,internationalsugarpriceshavebeen
bothhighlyvolatileandonageneraldownwardtrend.
However,itisimportanttotakeintoaccounttheneedto
protectthefuelalcoholdomesticmarket;thatis,sugarcane
producersoftenhavetoproduceethanolevenwhenthey
couldmakegreaterprofitsbysellingsugar.Thiswasan
importantlessonlearnedfromthepastalcoholshortage.
Thesugarindustryhasshownsignificantimprovements
initsproductivity,whichhasinturnbenefitedethanol
production(seeTable2).
3.2Synergieswithelectricityand
heatproduction
Asecondimportantareaofsynergy,whichisstillbeing
fullyrealized,isinassociatedenergyproduction.Globally,
theenergycontentofsugarcaneresidueshasbeenevaluated
as7.7exajoules(EJ)peryear(Halletal.,1993).Updatingthisfigureusingcropareaandyielddatafor2001
(FAO,2002),wecalculatethattheenergycontentofsuch
residuestodaytobe9.83EJperyear.
Capturingthisenergyforelectricitygenerationandheat
productionisanimportantcontributortothesuccessof
biofuels.Atpresent,cogenerationofheatandelectricity
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Figure5.Gasoline,Diesel,andHydrousEthanolPrice
Composition–Oct.2002
0.50
0.45
0.40
Price for Final User (US$/l)
frombagasseresiduescoversmostoftheenergyneeds
ofthebiofuelproductionprocessitself.Italsoallowsan
increasingamountofelectricitytobeexportedtothegrid.
From1997to2004,theamountofelectricityfrombiomasssoldtothegridincreasedfrom80to1,350gigawatt
hours(GWh)intheStateofSãoPaolo(seeFigure8).This
energycamemainlyfromretrofittingexistingenergysupply
facilitiesinsome30sugarmills(fromatotalofmorethan
300presentlyinoperationinBrazil).Thisgrowthisexpectedtocontinue,sponsoredbyarenewableenergysupport
system(PROINFA)recentlyinstitutedbytheFederal
Government.Thisprogramprovidesaguaranteedprice
forbiomasselectricity($32permegawatthour[MWh]),
thesamepriceasfornewhydropowerandaroundhalfthat
($60-70perMWh)ofwind.Theaimisforatotalof9,000
MWofnewrenewablepower,ofwhichbiomasscontributesuptoonethird.Suchgoalsaredifficulttoachievedue
tothedifficultiesofcompetingwithlow-costhydropower
inBrazil.Somehydroproductioncosts(forexample,inthe
caseofItaipu)donotreallyreflecttherealcost,sincethe
costofbuildingtheplant($14billion)hasnotbeenfully
incorporatedintothefinalpriceofelectricity;thatis,much
ofthiscosthasbeenwrittenoffasforeigndebt.
0.35
Disribution/
Resale 14.7%
State Taxes
25.0%
0.30
0.25
0.20
Federal Taxes
28.5%
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
Disribution/
Resale 25.6%
State Taxes 7.0%
Federal Taxes
16.1%
Disribution/
Resale 31.4%
State Taxes 11.9%
Federal Taxes
13.0%
Product
31.9%
Product
51.3%
Product
43.7%
Gasohol
Diesel
Hydrated Ethanol
Source:Nogueira(2003)
Table2.TechnologyEvolution1975-2000(SãoPauloRegion)
3.3Institutionalsupport
Foravarietyofreasons,replacinggasolinewithanother
fuelhasbeenachallengeinseveralcountries.Onereason
hastodowitha“chicken-and-egg”probleminthesupply
chain.Consumersareafraidofbuyingcarsthatuseany
newfuelduetodifficultiesinfindingthenewfuelinthe
largeareaaroundwhichanautomobileisdesignedto
move.Servicestationownersarenotinterestedininvestinginaparallelfuelsupplydistributionsystem,sincethe
numberofpotentialusersisusuallyverysmall.
Inthiscontext,theleadershiproleoftheBrazilian
government(atboththefederalandstatelevels)in
providingincentivesandaclearinstitutionalframework
wasabsolutelyessential.Thisroleincludedthesettingof
technicalstandards,supportforthetechnologiesinvolved
inethanolproductionanduse,financialadvantages,and
marketconditions.
Thesetofincentiveshaschangedsignificantlyoverthe
lifetimeoftheethanolprogram.Inthe1970s,thegovernmentcontrolledthefuelmarketthroughitsstate-owned
oilcompanyPetrobras,whichhadamonopolyonethanol
distribution.Thegovernment’srolerecededgradually,and
themonopolyendedinthelate1990s.Thegovernment’s
remainingparticipation,accordingtoPresidentialDecree,
regulatesthelevelofethanoltobeblendedintogasoline.
Asnoted,theprogramstartedwithsubsidies,butthey
weregraduallyphasedout.Thisisanidealpolicyforrenewablefuels,butitmaynotbepossibleinmanycases.
Productionparameter
Change1975–2000
Sugarcaneyields(toncaneperha)
Sugarproductionfromcane(tonsucrosepertoncane)
Ethanolproductionfromsucrose
Fermentationproductivity:m3ethanolperm3reactorperday)6
+33%
+8%
+14%
+130%
Source:Macedo(2003).Forabsolutevalueofsomeparameters,seeTableA,Annex1.
3.4Geographicalaspects
Brazilhasalargeareaofagriculturallandandanappropriateclimateforsugarcane.Itssugarcaneindustrywas
alreadydeveloped.SãoPaulo,thedominantstateinthis
industry,hasaccountedforoverhalfofthecountry’scar
fleet.Inotherareasofthecountry,thetransportcostsof
ethanolweresubsidizedinordertoensurewidegeographicalcoverage.Thispolicywasusedforallfuelsinthe
countryfordecades,withthepurposeofsettinguniform
pricesforeachfueleverywhere.Sinceethanolproduction
occursinfewerstatesthanoilderivatives,thispolicywas
veryhelpfulinpromotingthealcoholmarket.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
31
4.THESUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT
4.THESUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT
BENEFITSOFBIOFUELS
Figure6.BiomassEnergyYieldsfromVariousActivities
Thereasonsforsupportingbiofuelshavechangedsomewhatovertime.Inthebeginning,thesereasonswerepurely
economicand—afterthefirstandsecondoilcrises—were
tiedtothehighcostofoil.Morerecently,therationale
behindthissupportbroadened;itsrootsareinfactorsthat
mightimpactthecountry’seconomyintheshort-andmidterm,suchas(1)globalfutureoildepletionandenergy
security,(2)globalairpollutioncausedbyGHGs,and(3)
jobcreationopportunitiesandlocalpollutionreduction.
Evenmorerecently,theseaimshavebeentiedtomid-and
long-termissues,suchasthegrowingimportanceofrenewables,theuseoffuelcellsbasedonethanol,andpublic
policiesthatguaranteeruraldevelopment.
200
0
Wood from
commercial
forests, US
Sugarcane
(total
above-ground
biomass)
Alamo
Switchgrass,
US
Maximum stand yield, 1986–91
Average commercial yield
on 80,000 hectares, 1986–91
Average for years 2-6
for experimental plot, Alabama
Global average yield, 1987
Maize, US
(grain + stover)
Average of 5 experimental plots,
Texas (1993–94)
400
High Estimate
600
Average yield, 1985–87
800
Record yield (1994)
Iowa corn-growers’ contest
1000
Low Estimate
Energy Yield (GJ/hectare/year)
1200
Average yield for Zambia on 10,000 hectares
1400
4.1Employment,economic
development,andlandrights
Eucalyptus
at Aracruz,
Brazil
Theissueoflandrightsisaparticularlyimportantone
inBrazil,wherelandlesspeopleareamajorgroupofrural
poor.Thefederalgovernmenthasaprogramaimedatallocatingnonproductivefarmstolandlessfarmers.Anypolicy
Source:IPCC(1996)
Figure7.SugarcaneProductionforSugarandAlcohol,1975–2004
400
Amount of cane for sugar
350
Amount of cane for alcohol
300
Million tons
250
200
150
100
50
Harvesting Season
Source:Datagro(2004);Datagro(2002)
32
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
2003/2004
2001/2002
1999/2000
1997/1998
1995/1996
1993/1994
1991/1992
1989/1990
1987/1988
1985/1986
1983/1984
1981/1982
1979/1980
1977/1978
1975/1976
0
Figure8.ElectricitySalesfromCogenerationatSugarMills—ElectricitySoldtotheGrid—StateofSãoPaulo
1,600
MW
1,400
GWh
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
Source:Authors
Figure9.JobsProvidedbyVariousEnergySources
16
14
Relative Number of Jobs (Oil=1)
thataffectslandusethereforemustbeconsideredfrom
thisperspective.Itisnotclearwhattheimpactsmightbe
inthecaseofexpandedethanolproduction,butthereare
reasonstothinkthattheywillnotbesubstantiallyeither
positiveornegative.Sincesugarcanecropsareanexpandingagriculturalactivity,carriedoutingoodtomoderate
qualitysoils,andinregionswherecommercialagricultural
activitiesarewell-established,thereislikelytobelittle
impactonagriculturalreform.
Conversely,thenumberoflandlesspropertyclaims
hasbeensignificantlyreducedbythemajorcreationof
employmentbythesugar/alcoholsector.Thissectoris
amajoremployer:in2001,ananalysisusing1997data
(Guilhoto,2001)concludedtherewereroughlyonemillionjobsinethanolproductioninBrazil,ofwhichabout
65percentwerepermanentandtheremainderseasonal
(forharvesting).Theindirectcreationofemploymentin
manufacturingandothersectorsisestimatedatroughly
another300,000jobs(Macedo,1995).Ethanolproductioncreatesjobopportunitiesatalevel15timesbigger
thantheoilindustry(seeFigure9).
Thisemploymentintensitywillofcoursedeclineas
mechanizationincreases.7Manualharvestingisamajor
generatorofemployment,butforethanolderivedfrom
sugarcane,thislaborcostalonerepresents$7.60per
barrelofoilequivalent.Sugarcaneworkersinthestate
ofSãoPauloreceiverelativelyhighwages—onaverage,
80percentmorethanthelaborforceemployedinother
agriculturalsectors.Theirincomesarealsohigherthan50
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Coal
Hydroelectricity
Oil
Ethanol
Source:Goldemberg(2002)
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
33
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
0
1987
200
percentofthelaborforceintheservicessectorand40percentofthoseinindustry.Socialconditionsarereportedto
beimprovingintheNortheastregion.Speciallegislation
hasmandatedthatonepercentofthenetsugarcaneprice
andtwopercentofthenetethanolpricebechanneledinto
medical,dental,pharmaceutical,sanitary,andeducational
activitiesforsugarcaneworkers(Melquiades,1996).
Thisabilitytocreatejobsinruralareas,mostofthem
forunskilledworkers,fitsnicelywiththelaborsupplylevel
andhasmadesugarcaneplantationsattractive,particularly
indevelopingcountries.Inmanycountries,sugarcane
plantationsandsugarproductionaremanagedbypublic
enterprisesand/orareextremelyregulatedbygovernmentalbodies.However,Braziliansugarcaneproducersareall
privatelyowned.Around30percentofsugarcaneproductionisinthehandsof60,000independentproducers,
representingamajoractivityforsmallfarmers.
Table3.HarvestedAreaofMainCropsinBrazil
Crop
Harvestedarea
(millionhectares)
Shareofcultivated
land(%)
1988
1988
2004
2004
Corn
13.2
12.4
24.0
19.1
Soya
10.5
21.5
19.2
33.1
Bean
5.9
4.0
10.7
6.2
Rice
6.0
3.7
10.8
5.8
Sugarcane
4.1
5.6
7.5
8.6
Wheat
3.5
2.8
6.3
4.3
Coffee
3.0
2.4
5.4
3.7
Cotton
2.6
4.8
4.7
8.4
Cassava
1.8
1.8
3.2
2.7
Orange
0.8
0.82
1.5
1.3
Othercrops
3.7
5.1
6.7
7.8
64.8
100.0
100.0
Total
55.0
Source:IBGE(1989);FAO(2005)
4.2Landuseandcompetitionwith
foodcropsanddeforestation
Sugar/alcoholproductionfromsugarcaneisaland-
intensiveactivity.Amedium-sizeBrazilianindustrialplant
(processing300tonsperhourofcrushedcane)needs
11,000hectares(ha)tosupplyitsdemandforsugarcane.
Somedistilleriesrequireareasover55,000ha.Theseland
requirementshaveproducedaconcentrationoflandownershipanddisplacementoffoodcultivation(Oliveira,1991).
TheavailabilityofagriculturallandisaheavilydiscussedanddebatedissueinBrazil.Sugarcaneproduction
(foralcohol)competeswithfoodsupplyandotherexport
crops.Recentdata,however,showarelativelylowlevelof
utilizationofagriculturallandinBrazil,evenintheState
ofSãoPaulo,byfarthemostdevelopedinthecountry.
Furthermore,some200millionhectares(Mha)areclassifiedas“pastureland;”mostofthecaneexpansionareas
westofSãoPauloareusingthispastureland.Theymayincludeold“cerrados.”Nevertheless,anexcessiveconcentrationofcropscanbeasourceofpestsanddiseases,orwhen
poorlyplanned,cancreatedifficultaccesstofoodcrops
forsmallvillagesthatmayhavemostoftheirnearbyareas
usedfornon-foodcrops(Rosillo-Caleetal.,1996).The
riskofpestsanddiseasesisminimizedinBrazilthrough
theuseofseveralvarietiesofsugarcane.
ThecultivatedareainBrazilin1988and2004is
presentedinTable3.Sugarcanecorrespondedtoabout5.6
millionhectares,8.6percentofthetotalharvestedarea
34
withessentialcrops(Borges,1990).Thisisasmallrelative
incrementsince1988whenitrepresented7.5percentof
totalarea.Thetotalagriculturalareaincreasedbyaround
10Mhainthisperiod,whichismodestforacountrywith
alargepotentialagriculturalarea.
Inaddition,croprotationbetweenfoodcropsandsugarcaneisincreasinglybeingapplied.Thishasbeenaneffectivewaytomaintainthebalancebetweenenergyandfood,
improvingtheprofitabilityoftheland.Othercrops—such
astomatoes,soya,peanuts,beans,rice,andcorn—have
beenharvestedinrotationwithsugarcane(Borges,1990).
Whilethedisplacementoffoodcultivationisadebatableissue,furthersugarcaneplantationscanleadto
increaseddeforestationthroughindirectactivity.Displacementofextensivecattleranchingfrompresentpasture
landbystrongexpansionofsugarcaneareasorothercrops
maybecomeadriverfordeforestation.Althoughmanyof
thecurrentsugarcaneareaswerealreadybeingusedatthe
beginningofProalcoolin1975,thepracticeofcutting
forestsforsugarcaneplantationscontinuedinthefollowingdecades,althoughithasshownsignsofhavingstopped
morerecently.Mostofthelandplantedforsugarcane
camefromearliercoffeeplantations,althoughtherecent
trendhasbeentoreplacecattleranchingactivitieswith
moreadvantageouscrops.
Althoughitdoesnotleadtocompletedeforestation,the
recreationalactivitiesoftheharvestersintheseasoncan
severelydisruptthelocalecosystem.Thesmallwildlifeand
naturereservesstillexistingintheproximityoftheestates
areunderheavystress(Zandbergen,1993).In2001,a
GovernmentalDecreewasissuedrequiringthatapartof
thelandbeputasidefornon-caneuseorforrecuperation
ofnativevegetation.8
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
4.3Airquality
Cities
Theintroductionofgasoholhashadanimmediate
impactontheairqualityoflargecities,particularlySão
Paulo.Astheamountofalcoholingasolinewasincreased,
leadadditiveswerereduced(andeventuallyeliminatedin
1991).Aromatichydrocarbons,suchasbenzene,whichare
particularlytoxic,werealsoeliminated,andsulfuremissionswerereduced(Figure10).
Inaddition,carbonmonoxide(CO)emissionswere
drasticallyreduced.Before1980,whengasolinewasthe
onlyfuelinuse,COemissionswerehigherthan50grams
perkilometer(g/km).Thisamountwasreducedtoless
than5.8g/kmby1995.
Comparedtogasolineorgasohol,oneofthedrawbacks
oftheuseofethanolistheincreaseinaldehydeemissions
(formaldehyde+acetaldehyde).Thereisanincreasein
exhaustemissionofaldehydeswhenethanolisblendedto
gasoline,andthisincreaseisgreaterstillinthecaseofpure
ethanol.9Thesignificanceofthisissuetoairqualitymust
beevaluatedcarefullytoavoidmisinterpretation.Typically,
2003model-yearBrazilianvehiclesfueledwiththereferenceblend10forgovernmentalcertification(ablendwith
22percentethanolbyvolume–E22)emit0.004g/kmof
aldehydes,aconcentrationthatisabout45percentofthe
strictCalifornialimitthatisrequiredonlyforformaldehyde(CETESB,2003).Automotiveuseofdieseloilcanbe
amoreimportantsourceofaldehydesthangasoline-ethanol
blends.Datafromdieselvehiclealdehydemeasurements
Figure10.AutomobileEmissionsinBrazil,1980–2000
NOx (g/km)
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Limit in Brazil
Gasoline
Ethanol
Limit in USA
Gasohol
Limit Brazil
Ethanol
Limit USA
Model Year
Model Year
CO (g/km)
Aldehydes
0.20
60
50
Gasoline
Pre 80
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Gasohol
Pre 80
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Hydrocarbon
Gasoline
Ethanol
Limit Brazil
0.15
Gasohol
30
20
0.10
Limit in Brazil
Ethanol
0.05
10
Limit in USA 2g/km
0.00
Pre 80
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
0
Model Year
Gasoline
Gasohol
Limit USA
Pre 80
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
40
Model Year
Source:CETESB(2001)
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
35
showthatemissions(formaldehyde+acetaldehyde)are5.6
to40percenthigherthanthosefromvehiclesrunningon
E22(Abrantes,2003).Theacetaldehydefromalcoholuse
isarguablylessharmfultohumanhealthandtheenvironmentthanformaldehydeproducedwhengasolineisused.
Therehavebeenanumberofevaluationsofethanol’s
impactonairquality.Somekeyfindingsarethat:
■ A10percentblendofethanolreducescarbon
monoxide—aprecursortoground-levelozone
formation—bymorethan25percent.Thereduction
inCOemissionsincreasesasthepercentageof
ethanolinthefuelincreases.
■ Ethanolwhenusedasanadditivedisplaceshighly
toxicandvolatilecomponentsofgasoline(benzene,
toluene,andxylene).
■ Ethanolata10percentorlowerblendalsoincreases
thetotalvolatileorganiccompound(VOC)emissions
fromthegasolinebyabout15percent.However,
sincetheVOCsemittedbypuregasolinearemore
reactivethanthoseproducedwithethanolblendsand
becauseofthesignificantcarbonmonoxidereductionsresultingfromtheuseofethanol,anyincrease
inozoneformationisnegligible.
■ Athigherconcentrationsofethanol,thevolatilityof
thegasoline-ethanolblenddrops.Atconcentrations
above25to40percent,evaporativeemissionsdropbelowtheleveltheywerebeforeanyethanolwasadded
tothegasoline.Thiseliminatesvolatilityasaproblem.
■ Thereissomeconcernthatanincreaseinoxygenwill
increasenitrousoxides(NOX),alsoacontributorto
ozoneformation.ButNOXisgeneratedfromhigh
combustiontemperaturesandethanolburnscooler
thangasoline.Thatisoneofthereasonsitmakessuch
agoodracingfuel.Thenewlow-emittingvehicles
thatareenteringthemarketplaceinever-highernumbers(includinghybrids)appearnottoleadtoaNOX
increasefromanincreaseinfueloxygen.
■ Improvementsingasolinequality(lowsulfurandaromatics)togetherwithimprovedenginesandefficiency
havethemselvesimprovedairquality,makingtherelativebenefitsofethanolinthisrespectmoremarginal.
Ruralareas
Despitewidespreadconcernabouthealthimpacts,
sugarcaneisburnedinalmostallcountrieswhereitis
produced,includingtheUnitedStatesandBrazil.Preharvestburning(wheredryleavesareburned)isintended
topromotepestcontrolandlowerharvestingcosts;itis
carriedoutjustafewhoursbeforeharvesting.Post-harvest
36
burning(topsandremaininggreenleaves),whichinvolves
smalleramountsofmaterial,eliminatesresiduesand
expeditesplowingandreplanting.
Littleisknownaboutthehealtheffectsofcaneburning
emissionsonemployeesorsurroundingcommunities,
althoughitisgenerallyconsideredthatanyamountof
smokewillworsenanexistingrespiratorycondition.
Contradictoryreportsexistwithrespecttolungcancer
(EchavarriaandWhalen,1991).AccordingtoCoopersucar(Macedo,1995),thereisnoproofthattheburningof
thecane-fieldshasadamagingeffectonhumanhealth,a
statementmainlybasedonstudiesinHawaii.Thehealth
effectisconsideredtoberelativelyminor,becausethe
particlesareratherbigandinhalationisnotlikelytoresult
inlungdamagetotheextentcausedbyveryfineparticles
(Zandbergen,1993).Thenuisanceoftheparticulates,
however,isobvious.
ThereisalreadylegislationineffectinSãoPauloState
(Law11241from2002)thatsetsproceduresandlimits
forburningofopensugarcanefields.Thelandareawhere
burningisallowedisdeclining.Itwillbeprohibitedby
2021inareassuitableformechanicalharvestingandby
2031forallareas.
4.4Oilimportdependenceand
securityofsupply
The1973OPECoilembargocausedoilpricestosoar
from$3perbarrelin1973to$12perbarrelin1973–74.
Thiswaschieflyresponsiblefortheglobaleconomicrecessionthatfollowed.Thispriceriserepresentedasignificant
increaseinimportexpenses—fromaround$500million
in1972to$2.8billionin1974.11In1979,theIranian
revolutionledtoasecondsurgeinoilpricesto$40per
barrel—pushingBrazilianexpendituresforoilimports
toover$10billionandcausinganotherglobalrecession
(BrasilEnergia,2003).
Inordertopaythesehighimportbills(Figure11)
andtodevelopdomesticenergyalternatives,Brazil,like
manyothercountriesinLatinAmerica,absorbedexcessive
liquidityfromtheUnitedStates,European,andJapanese
banksintheformofloansonfavorableterms.Huge
capitalinflowsweredirectedtoinfrastructureinvestments,
andstateenterpriseswereformedinareasthatwerenot
attractiveforprivateinvestment.InthecaseofBrazil,this
occurredmostlyintheenergysector(refineriesandlargescalehydropowerplants).
Intheearly1980s,however,thesignificantriseinU.S.
interestratesbegantoaffectinternationalcapitalmarkets,
endingthefavorableconditionstoforeigndebtors.AsubstantialincreaseininterestratesworldwideforcedBrazil,
alongwithotherLatinAmericancountries,toimplement
stricteconomicadjustmentsthatledtonegativegrowth
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Figure11.NetFuelExpensesinBrazil
12
25
Historic
(left axis)
Current
(right axis)
10
20
15
6
10
4
5
2
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
0
1976
0
Source:BrasilEnergia(2003)
Figure12.AnnualSavingsfromDisplacedOilImports
4.0
Oil Import Costs Avoided
3.5
US$ billion (2003)
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
0
Source:Authors,basedonPetrobrasdata,BrasilEnergia(2003)
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
37
Billion US$ (Current)
8
Billion US$ (Historic)
rates.ThesuspensionofcapitalinflowsreducedBrazil’s
capacitytoinvest.Thedebtburdenaffectedpublic
financesandcontributedtoanaccelerationofinflation.
Thecriticalfuelsituationinthecountrystartedtobe
significantlymitigatedbythebeginningofthe1990s,
whengrowthinnationaloilproductionstartedtoovercomethegrowthindemand,thusreducingthevolume
ofimportedoil.Inthelate1970sand1980s,ethanol
productionplayedanimportantroleinpromotingfuel
securitywiththeadvantageofnotrequiringhardcurrency.
Theamountofethanolproducedwassignificant;duringa
fewyearsinthe1980s,itsurpassedgasolineconsumption.
Alcoholproductionanditsuseasanalternativefuel
havebroughtsignificantbenefitstotheBrazilianeconomy.
Since1975,ethanolhasdisplacedover240billionliters
(1.5billionbarrels)ofgasoline.Itnotonlyavoideddisbursementofmorethan$56billionindirectoilimportation(Figure12),butamuchlargeramount($94billion)
onceweincludetheavoidedcostofservicingthedebtthat
wouldhavebeenincurredtoimportthisoil(Figure13).
Duetothecountry’spooreconomicperformance,any
disbursementinhardcurrencywouldhaveaddedtothe
alreadylargeexternaldebt,implyinghigherinterestrate
payments.Typicalinterestratespaidwere5to10percentagepointsaboveLIBOR.12
Figure13.CumulativeSavingsfromAvoidedOilImportsandDebtService
100
Cumulative Interest Avoided
90
Cumulative Oil Cost Displaced
80
US$ billion (2003)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
0
Source:MoreiraandGoldemberg(1999),updatedbyauthors.
Thetraditionalapproachtoenergysecurityhasbeento
diversifyenergysourcesandsuppliers,bothinternallyand
externally.Internally,theemphasisisonmaximizingthe
useofdomesticresources,preferablybasedondomestic
technologies;externally,itisselectingavarietyofproductsfromadiversityofsuppliesfromdifferentgeographicalregions.However,thereisnoconsensusaboutthe
levelofenergyimportdependenceconsideredacceptable
orsustainable,andthisvariesfromcountrytocountry.
InthecaseofBrazil,ethanolusehasbroughtamajor
diversificationoffueloptionsinasectorthatisgenerally
dominatedbyoil.
5.THEPOTENTIALFOREXPANSIONOF
BIOFUELSUSEINBRAZIL
Thissectionexploresthepotentialforscaling-upbiofueluseinBrazil.Thediscussioniscenteredonethanol,
becausetheissuesregardingitsproductionandusearewell
documented.Biodiesel,forwhichthereisatpresentlittle
information,alsohaspotential.
EthanolproductioninBrazilin2004–05wasabout14
billionliters,correspondingto185thousandsbarrelsof
oilperday.13Thiscouldincreasesignificantlyinthenext
decade,drivenbybothescalatinginternaldemandand
thegrowinginternationaltradeforsuchbiofuels(Nastari,
38
2003).Figure14showsaprojectionfornationalethanol
demand,whileFigure15displayspotentialdemandfor
ethanolintheinternalandexternalmarkets,aswellaspotentialincreasesinsugarexports.Basedontheseforecasts,
in2013totalethanolproductionisexpectedtobe26.4
billionliters,ofwhich17percentareforexport(Macedo
andNogueira,2004).Themarketclearlyexpectssuch
growth:34newdistilleriesareunderconstruction,enough
toraisethemillingcapacity80percentby2009(Gazeta
Mercantil,2004).
Sugarproductionisalsoforecasttogrowby44percent
duringthistime.Together,theseproductswillrequire
anannualproductionof572milliontonsofsugarcane,
roughly150millionmoretonsthancurrently.Thiswould
requireapproximately3millionadditionalhectaresofland.
Inrecenttimes,Brazilianoilproductionhasincreased
significantly,anditcouldreachself-sufficiencyinthenear
future.Comingmainlyfromoffshoreoilfields,currentoil
productionisabout1.7millionbarrelsperday,90percent
ofnationaloildemand.However,consideringthelevelof
provedreservesoffossilfuels—about17billionbarrels—
andtheforecastdemand,thedurationofsuchoilreserves
isonlyabout16years.Moreover,accordingtoastudyon
theevolutionofoilproductioncurves,usingtheHubbertapproach,peakoilproductionwillprobablyoccur
in2013—associatedwithultimatereservesof27billion
barrels(AndradeandSantos,2002).Thecontinuationof
theBrazilianbiofuelsprogramisnotdependentonBrazil’s
oilproductionlevels.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Figure14.ProjectedEthanolDemandinBrazil
20,000
Ethanol Demand (billion liters)
ProductivitygrowthinBraziliansugarcaneagriculturehasbeenstrong:duringtheperiod1990to2003,
sugarcaneproductionincreased3.7percentandsugar
production4.7percentannually(seeAnnex1).Important
driversofthisevolutionwerethegeneticimprovementof
sugarcaneandtheintroductionofnewvarieties.Currently,
about550differentvarietiesaresimultaneouslycultivated,
assuringgoodbiodiversityandallowinganaturalresistanceagainstplaguesanddiseases.Manyothertechnical
improvementsenhancedproductivity,includingbetter
soilpreparation,planting,harvesting,andtransportation.
Payingforcaneaccordingtosugarcontentratherthanby
weightprovidedastrongmotivationformanyofthese
improvements.
Theareacurrentlycultivatedforethanolproductionis
about5.5millionha.AnevaluationbytheBrazilian
AgriculturalResearchAgency(Embrapa)estimatesthat
around100Mhathatarecurrentlynaturalpasturesand
low-densitysavannascouldbeusedforannual-cycle
plants.14Additionally,asaresultofimprovementsincattle
ranchingpractices,itisestimatedthatabout20million
hectaresoflowproductivitypasturescouldbeliberated
forbiofuelsproduction.Ifthishypotheticaltotalof120
millionha(14percentofthecountryareaand25percent
ofavailablelandforagriculture)wereusedfortheethanol
agroindustry,atotalannualproductionofabout312
billionliterswouldbefeasible.Thatismorethantwice
thetotalcurrentBrazilianconsumptionofalloilproducts.
Sincethebeginningof2005,therehasbeenincreasing
attentioninthemediaaboutexpandingproductionof
alcoholandsugar.Therealnumberofnewmillsunder
constructionisnotavailable,butitiscommonlyassumed
tobearound40to60unitswithanaveragecapacityto
process3milliontonsofsugarcaneperyear.Ofthese,
probably30willbesitedinthestateofSãoPaulo,where
theenvironmentauthorityhasreceivedalmost30
environmentalapplications.Othermillsareplannedin
MatoGrosso,MinasGerais,andParanastates.Some
investorsaretraditionalsugar/ethanolproducersfromthe
Northeastregion.Thetotalcost,includingsugarcanearea
expansionandnewindustrialprocessingtosugar/ethanol,
shouldbearound$4to$8billion.Investorsareexpecting
BNDES(theNationalDevelopmentBank)financingand
havealreadyraisedthenecessaryamountforequity.This
behaviorisveryunusualfordevelopingcountries,and
seemstoconfirmthatsugar/ethanolproductioninBrazil
ishighlyprofitable.
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Source:PereiradeCarvalho(2004)
Figure15.FuturesPerspectivesforBrazil
Mid-term Projection
Increased International Market Access: 6.5 million tons
Sugar
Export Increase: 2.0 million tons
Domestic Market: 18 billion liters
Ethanol
Exports: 5 billion liters
Cane
Additional 100 million tons = 2.5 million acres
Source:PereiradeCarvalho(2004)
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
39
6.BIOFUELSANDCLIMATE
TheenergybalanceoftheBrazilianbiofuelsprogramsis
inprincipleneutralintermsofCO2emissions.Inpractice,
however,planting,transporting,andtransformingenergy
cropstobiofuelsusesexternalenergy,sometimesderived
fromfossilfuels.Alifecycleassessmentisthereforeneeded
tocalculatetheneteffectonGHGemissions.
6.1GeneralOverview
TheBraziliansugarindustryisalmostenergy-self-
sufficientduetotheuseofbagasse,aprocessbyproduct.
ThefoodandbeveragesectorinBrazilishighlydependent
onsugarcanebagassethatisexportedfromthesugarmills
andonotherrenewableenergysources(seeTable4).15
Adetailedlifecycleanalysisshowshowethanoland
bagassefromsugarcanehavebeencontributingtothe
reductionofGHGemissionsinBrazilbysubstitutingfor
fossilfuels.TheresultsarepresentedinTable5.
Table4.EnergyConsumptionofBrazilianFood/BeverageIndustry,2003
1,000toe/yr
Naturalgas
%
432
Coal
58
0.4%
1,720
10.4%
11,938
71.9%
849
5.1%
Wood
Bagasse
Fueloil
Electricity
Total
2.6%
1,612
9.7%
16,609
100%
Source:BEN(2004).Toeistonsofoilequivalent.
Table5.EnergyBalanceofEthanolAgroindustrialProcessin
SãoPaulo,Brazil
Energyflows(megajoulespertonofsugarcane)
Average
consumption
Agriculturalactivities
Industrialprocess
202
Bestcase
production
consumption
192
40
production
49
Ethanolproduction
1,922
Bagassesurplus
169
316
251
2,090
232
2,368
Total
Energyoutputperunit
ofenergyinput
Source:Macedoetal.(2004)
40
8.3
2,052
10.2
Theuseofbiomassenergyintheproductionprocess,as
wellasprocessefficiencies,meanthatBrazilianbiofuelsare
highlyeffectiveatdisplacingfossilfueluse,andtherefore
atavoidingGHGemissions.GHGsourcesmaybedivided
intotwogroups:emissionsderivedfromtheuseofnonrenewableenergy(dieselandfueloil)andemissionsfrom
othersources(canetrashburning,fertilizerdecomposition).Forthefirstgroup,thecalculatedvalueswere19.2
and17.7kilogramsofCO2equivalentpertoncane(kg
CO2/t)foraverageandbestcasescenarios,respectively.For
thesecondgroup,thevalueswere12.2kgCO2/tforboth
scenarios.Theemissionsavoidedduetothesubstitution
ofethanolforgasolineandsurplusbagasseforfueloil,
deductingtheabovevalues,givesanetresultof2.6and
2.7tonsofCO2percubicmeter(tCO2/m3)anhydrous
ethanoland1.7and1.9tCO2/m3ofhydrousethanolfor
averageandbestcasescenarios,respectively.
Brazilianfuelethanolconsumptionin2002wasaround
12billionliters,reducingGHGemissionsby25.8million
tonsCO2,assumingemissionsareproportionaltothe
amountofanhydrousandhydrousethanol.ThisisapproximatelythesamelevelofavoidedCO2emissionsasin
1995(basedonresultsfromMacedoetal.,2004).
Sugarcanecropsforethanolproduction,whichcovered
2.5millionhectaresinBrazilin2002,abated11.0tCO2
perhectareperyear.Assumingtheproductionofethanol
remainsstable,inatimespanof100years1,100tCO2
perhectarewillbeavoided,showingthatinthelongterm
ethanolismoreeffective,strictlyintermsofCO2,thanthe
preservationofnativeforests16orproductionofcharcoal
fromplantations(Fearnside,1995).
Anadditionalclimatebenefitcomesfromtheexportof
surplusbiomass-generatedelectricitytothegrid(seesection1.2).The60kilowatthours(kWh)ofelectricitythat
canbegeneratedfromatonofsugarcanecouldreplace
0.65gigajoules(GJ)offueloil(assuming33percent
conversionefficiencytoelectricity).Thisamountofenergy
represents52.3GJperhectare(forayieldof80tonsof
caneperhectareannually)abating4.0tCO2perhectare
annually.Factoringinthisabatementfrombiomass-generatedelectricityincreasesthetotalCO2savingsbyabout
37percent,from11.0(quotedabove)to15.0tCO2per
hectareannually.Thereisconsiderablescopeforimprovingthisperformance;asdiscussedinsection1.2,useof
barbojoandimprovedtechnologycanraiseelectricity
productionfrom60kWhpertonto500kWhperton.
AccordingtotheBrazilianNationalCommunication,
thebiofuelsprogramhasdisplacedtheemissionof403
milliontonsofCO2from1975–2000(MCT,2004).
Basedonourfigureof11.0tCO2perhaperyear,and
takingtheproductionfiguresinAnnex1,ourestimateis
somewhathigher,at574milliontonsofCO2upto2004.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
6.2Rewardingclimateprotection
Findingthecarbonpricethatcouldleadtofurther
expansionofbiofuelsisachallengingtask.TheBrazilian
governmenthassupportedethanoluseinthecountry
throughreducedtaxation.Oneofthemostsignificant
federaltaxes,theCIDE17tax,onlyappliestofossil-fuel
use.Totaltaxesarehighlyvariablewithtime,butare
known(seeforexampleFigure5)andcanbecalculated.
Takinganannualproductionof6.1millioncubicmeters
ofhydrousethanol(averageannualproductionforthe
1998–2004period),thetotalrevenueforegonefromthis
exemptionis$710millionperyear.Onaverage,acubic
meterofhydrousethanoldisplaces1.7tonsofCO2(when
usedinflexfuelengines)(Macedoetal.,2004),which
yieldsanestimatedlossoftaxrevenueof$65.30pertonof
CO2emissionsavoided.
Thus,inmostyears,realalcoholprices(correctedfor
lowerenergycontentandpotentiallyuncollectedtaxes)
werehigherthangasoline.Theaveragedifferenceinprice
wasaroundR$0.27/literafter1998,whenpriceliberalizationwasimplemented.Thisfigure($0.074)meansthata
carboncreditequivalentof$36/tCO2addedtohydrous
ethanolwouldoffsetthepricedifference.However,with
theincreaseinoilpricesinthelasttwoyears,nofurther
carboncreditwouldbenecessarytooffsettheprice
difference.Whilethisdifferencemayvarywiththeprice
ofgasoline,ingeneralethanoluseresultsinsomelossof
revenuetothegovernment.Useofacarbonpriceinsome
formmayoffsetthisburden.
7.BIOFUELSINTHE
7.BIOFUELSINTHE
INTERNATIONALCONTEXT
7.1Whatlessonscanothercountries
learnfromBrazil’scase?
Sincethe1970s,manycountries—notablyBraziland
theUnitedStates—startedtoputethanolprogramsin
place.Argentina,Paraguay,andZimbabwealsolaunched
importantprograms.Asoilpricesdropped,government
supportwanedand,bytheendofthelastcentury,only
BrazilandtheUnitedStatesstillmaintainedthoseprograms.TheprogramsinArgentina,ParaguayandZimbabweweretoosmalltosurvivewhenoilpricesdeclined
intheearly1980s.However,China,India,Colombia,
Thailand,andAustraliahavestartedtheirownprograms,
whichmaytriggerlarge-scaleuseofethanolworldwide.
TheBrazilianexperiencedemonstratesthatitispossible
toquadruplesugarcaneproductioninlessthanadecade
andthatpublicacceptanceforanewliquidfuelcanbesecuredthroughappropriategovernmentpolicies.Nevertheless,itisimportanttorecognizethefollowingconstraints:
■ Sincesugarcaneisatropicalcrop,itrequiresappropriatelevelsofwarmthandrainfall.
■ Biomassenergy,mainlywhenderivedfromcrops,
requireslargeamountsoflabor.Thishastheadvantageofjobcreation,butisadisadvantageiflabor
costsarehigh.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
41
Despitetheadvantagesofsugarcaneinbothprimary
energyproductivityandhighconversionefficiency,
landrequirementsarehigh.Acountrywishingto
makeasignificantimpactonitsfuelconsumption
willrequirelargeamountsofavailableland.
Theseconstraintsmeanthat,aswithoil,relativelyfew
countriescanbemajorproducers,although,againlike
oil,manycountriesmayproduceonasmallerscale.With
theseconstraintsinmind,aseriesofexperiencestested
successfullyinBrazilcouldbetransferredtosomedozen
countries.Theyare,accordingtoMorris(2003):
■ Supportforrenewableelectricity,whichhasbeena
majorcomponentofthebiofuelsbusinessmodel.
ThiscanbedonethroughmeasuressuchasRenewablePortfolioStandards(RPS),whichmandate
specificnumericalgoalsforrenewableenergy.
■ Mandatedlevelsofethanolblendingingasoline.This
mightbetermedaRenewableFuelStandard(RFS)to
complementRPSstandards.Thesecouldbeginwitha
10percentlevel,andshouldencompassallrenewable
fuels—includingrenewableelectricityforelectriccars
aswellasbiofuels.
■ Movingbeyonda10percentblendwillnecessitate
thewideavailabilityofvehicleswithflexiblefuelcapa■
42
bility.18Thiscapabilitycouldbemandated.Itwould
needtobetiedtotherapidconstructionofanationwideinfrastructureofappropriatefuelingfacilities.
■ ThesuccessofbiofuelsinBrazilwastiedtotherural
economy.Encouragingsmaller,locallyownedbiorefineriesandcreatingnew,moreflexiblemarketsfor
agriculturalcropsoffersgreatpotentialforcountries
thatmightbepoorinfossilfuelsbutrichinsunlight
andplantmatter,aswellasinrurallabor.
Inaddition,somerecommendationsshouldbeconsidered
bymostofthedevelopedcountriesthatfacesignificant
limitationsintheuseofsugarcane.
■ Toenablebiofuelstomovebeyonda10percent
blend,policymakersshouldacceleratethecommercializationofcellulose-to-ethanolplants.Thisinvolves
financingofcommercial-sizedfacilitiestestingdifferenttechnologicalapproaches.Italsoinvolvesresearch
anddevelopmentintolowcostandenvironmentally
benignwaystocollectandstorecellulose.Production
ofethanolfromcelluloseiswelcomenotonlyforeconomicreasons,butasawaytoguaranteelowcarbon
emissionsfromrenewableenergy.Asdiscussedearlier,
ethanolfromsugarcanedisplacesaconsiderable
amountofCO2emissions,sinceitsenergybalanceis
between8and10.Thismeansthatforeachunitof
fossilfuelinvestedinallphasesofethanolproduction,
itispossibletoget7or9unitsoffullyrenewable
fuelscreatedbyphotosynthesis.Unfortunately,the
samerecordformaizeandwheatismuchlower.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
EthanolfrommaizeproducedintheUnitedStates
hasanenergybalanceofaround1.3(Shapouriet
al.,2002).ThisimpliesverymodestCO2abatement
capabilityofthealcoholprogram,whichcanbeabarrierforitsfutureexpansionasglobalclimatechange
gainssocialimportance.
■ Ontheotherhand,althoughsweetsorghumhas
neverbeencommerciallyusedasasourceofalcohol
inBrazil,19itcouldbeagoodcandidatefortemperatecountries.Theprimaryproduct(juice)andmain
byproduct(bagasse)aresimilartosugarcane,andthe
availabletechnologiesandpoliciesalreadydeveloped
couldbeusedforsweetsorghum.
7.2Lessonslearnedthatmaybe
appliedelsewhere
Wecanidentifyseveralrelevantdriversthatexplain
thesignificantamountofethanolbeingusedinBraziliancars.Nevertheless,itisnecessarytoaskwhy,after30
yearsofuse,itsshareonlyrepresentsonethirdofallliquid
fuelusedforpassengercars.Thefirstexplanationisthe
difficultyofcompetingwithlowoilprices.Duringthe
firsttenyears,productioncostswerenotamajorconcern
ofalcoholproducersbecauseofsubsidiesandthedecline
inproductioncosts.Inthenextdecade(1985–95),supportprovidedbysubsidiesandregulationsstartedtobe
reduced,whileeconomicefficiencyinalcoholprocessing
continuedtooccurbutnotatapacesufficienttojustify
furtherprivateinvestment.Themostimportantbarrier
appearedin1989whentherewasamismatchbetween
supplyanddemand.ConsideringBrazilwastheonlyfuel
ethanolproducer,20theshortageofsupplycouldnoteasily
becompensatedbyimports.Theneatethanolcardriver
wasexposed,forseveralmonths,toarealfuelshortage.
Thiswasminimizedbyreducingtheamountofethanol
blendedingasoline,blendingofimportedmethanolto
gasoline,andimportationofout-of-specificationethanol.
Thiscrisisimmediatelypusheddownneatethanolcar
sales,whichresultedindecliningdemandforethanolas
theoldcarsretired.
After1995,itwasclearthatonlyethanolblended
ingasolinewouldsurvivesinceitwassetbylegislation.
Consequently,ethanolproductionwoulddecline;by
2010,itshouldreturntothe1997peaklevel,whenthe
growthincarsaleswouldguaranteeanincreaseinethanol
consumption.Internaleconomiccrisesoccurredinthe
period1999–2001,andthefurtherdevaluationofnational
currencyin2002(duetopoliticalchangesinthecountry’s
leadership)revivedinterestinneatalcoholcars.Onlyby
2003—withthelaunchingofflexfuelcars—wastherea
recoveryinethanolconsumption.Alreadyin2004,oil
priceincreasespushedupsalesofflexfuelcarsfurther.Itis
thusclearthatshortageofsupplypostponedtheinterest
inalcoholusebymorethanadecade.By2005,investors
announcedtheconstructionofaround50newsugarmills
(withanaveragecapacityof3milliontonsofsugarcane
peryear),whichisunderwayhavinghadlittledifficultyin
securinginvestment.
Theoilindustry
Theparticipationoftheoilsectorisarealnecessity,
sinceonlythroughthemisitpossibletodistributea
blendedliquidfuel.However,thissectoralsohaspowerfulintereststhatcanbethreatenedbythewidespreaduse
ofbiofuels.Alcoholstockstorageandmanagement,and
thecollectionofsubsidiesdesignedforalcohol,wasalso
transferredtotheoilsector.Theseactivitiesshouldbethe
responsibilityofprivateand/oranothergovernmentorganization.Poorstockmanagementwasthemajorreason
forthealcoholshortagein1989anddelayedthesuccessof
Proalcoolforalmostadecade.
Technologydevelopment
Duetotheimmediatedemandforneatalcoholcarsset
bygovernmentinstitutionalmeasures,therewaslittletime
forperformancetestingofthenewfuel.Neatalcoholautomobilesbuiltin1979and1980sufferedexcessivedamage
tosomepartsthatwereindirectcontactwiththefuel.
Thesemistakeshavesincebeencompletelyaddressed.This
doesnotprecludedifficultiesfornewcomers;itispossible
thatthemainproblemsforsomecountrieswillarisefrom
aninadequateagronomicbasis(sugarcanevarieties,agriculturalprocessesandlogistics,management)ratherthan
fromlackofindustrialtechnology,whichcanbemore
easilytransferred.
Powerproduction
Until1997,theelectricsectorwasinthehandsofpubliccompanieswithoutanyopportunityforsmallproducers
tosellelectricitytothegrid.Assoonasnewlegislation
allowedelectricityproducerstodeliverenergytothegrid
andforcedutilitiestoacquireandtransportit,thesugarmillsectorstartedtoretrofittheirenergy-producingplants
togeneratesurpluselectricity.Consideringthesignificant
potentialofsurpluselectricityandtheenvironmentally
safeopportunityofco-productionofethanolandelectricity,westronglyrecommendthatsuchexperiencebe
implementedinanyothercountryseekingtoproduce
liquidfuelfromsugarcane.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
43
7.3Valuinginternationalcoordination
onbiofuelspromotion
Coordinatedeffortsbetweencountriestopromote
biofuelsarealreadyineffectintheEuropeanUnion(EU)
throughtheacceptanceofrenewablefueltargetsandtimetables.Theeffortcouldbemoreeffectiveanditstarget
improvediftakenonestepforwardthroughtheinvolvementofbiomass-richcountriesinaninternationalagreement.Asalreadystated,largeproductionofbiofuelswill
onlybepossibleinsome10or20developingcountries.
Thesecountriesprobablywillproducebiofuelsatlower
costthantheEUandcouldhelpprovideenoughbiofuels
formoreambitioustargets.Withlong-termagreementsin
place,suchbiomass-richcountrieswouldbemotivatedto
developtheirbiomasspotential.Ontheotherside,theEU
wouldbeabletocombineinternallyproducedhigh-cost
biofuelswithlow-costimportedbiofuels,reducingthe
averagepriceandminimizingtheeconomicburdenfor
itscitizens.Withmoreambitiousbiofuelsconsumption
targets,thereisroomforincreasedBrazilianproduction,
keepingopportunitiesforlocalfarmersandforimports.
Withconsumptionlevelofbiofuelsaround20to30
percentofallliquidfuels,itisclearthatarealalternativesforoilexists,finallysettinganeconomicceilingto
theinternationaloilprice.
Althoughthiswouldentaildependenceonimportsfor
somecountries,thelargenumberofpotentialbiofuels
suppliersmeansgreaterdiversityofsupplyandtherefore
supplysecurity.Suchtradewouldalsopromotesustainable
developmentbyimprovingeconomicconditionsinthe
biomass-richcountries.Essentially,therewouldbetransfer
ofashareofrevenuesfromoil-richtobiomass-richcountries,thoughitwouldbealongtimebeforelossestooil
exportersbecamesignificant.Frompreviousexperiencesin
theethanolarea,itispossibletoestablishinitialguidance
tosetsuchinternationalcooperation.Examplesarethe
EthanolGovernorsCoalitionintheUnitedStatesandthe
EthanolCoalitioninIndia.Suchnationaleffortshave,at
least,thefollowingpurposes(Winrock,2000):
■ Toserveasasourceofreliableinformationformembers,media,andotherinterestedpartiesonrenewable
fuelusageanddevelopment.
■ Toprovideinformationtopolicymakers,government
officials,themedia,andotherkeyindividualsand
organizations,whichwillpromotepolicyinitiatives
beneficialtoethanolfueldevelopmentandusage.
44
Torepresentandpromotefuelethanolinterestsat
meetingsofgovernmenttaskforces,commissions,
committees,andotherrelatedevents/initiatives
pertinenttothisindustry.
■ Toorganizeseminarsandmeetingsacrossthecountry
topresentanddiscussfuelethanolusageand
development,andtoencouragemarketexpansion.
■ Togenerateandmaintainconsumerinterestin
renewablefuels.
■ Tohelpkeepmembersabreastofnewtechnological
developmentsonrenewablefuelsabroad.
■
8.CONCLUSION
Biofuelsareresponsibleforalargeandgrowingshare
ofBrazil’senergymix.Afterdecadesofdevelopmentthe
ethanolprogramcanbeconsideredamatureandproven
renewableoptiontosupplyautomotivefuels.Thisclear
successcanbeobservedinthelargeandindisputableinterestinflexiblefuelcarsinBrazil,whichareusingalmost
exclusivelyethanol.Brazilianethanolhasseveralrelevant
characteristics,includingcurrentpricesattheproducer
gateofabout$0.25perliter,removalofallsubsidies,
theverypositiveenergybalance(8to10energyunitsfor
eachunitofenergyputintheagroindustrialsystem),and
beneficialimpactsforairquality,jobsgeneration,electricityproduction,andnationaleconomicgrowth.These
factorsexplainthestrongsupportofBraziliansocietyfor
sugarcanebiofuel.Inanyforeseeablefuture,ethanolwill
beanimportantfuelinBrazil.Thenextstagewillbetosee
howmanycountriescanreapsimilarbenefitsinthefuture.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Annex1.
Annex1.
TableA.Sugarcane,Sugar,andAlcoholProductioninBrazil
Season
Sugarcane
(1000tons)
Alcohol
Anhydrous
(1000m3)
Hydrous
(1000m3)
Total
(1000m3)
Sugar
(1000tons)
TRS
(1000tons)
1970/1971
79,753
525
385
910
5070
1971/1972
79,595
390
23
413
5081
6437
1972/1973
95,074
389
292
681
5926
7441
1973/1974
91,994
306
260
566
6680
8021
1974/1975
95,624
217
409
626
6673
8113
1975/1976
91,525
233
323
556
6017
7304
1976/1977
103,173
300
364
664
6851
8375
1977/1978
120,082
1177
293
1470
8306
11388
1978/1979
129,145
2096
395
2491
7476
12392
1979/1980
138,899
2712
671
3383
6980
13498
1980/1981
148,651
2104
1602
3706
7844
14935
1981/1982
153,858
1413
2750
4163
7912
15772
1982/1983
166,753
3550
2274
5824
8843
19837
1983/1984
197,993
2469
5392
7861
9086
23637
1984/1985
202,765
2102
7150
9252
8849
25832
1985/1986
224,364
3208
8612
11820
7819
29386
1986/1987
227,873
2168
8338
10506
8157
27338
1987/1988
224,496
1983
9474
11457
7983
28833
1988/1989
221,339
1726
9978
11704
8070
29345
1989/1990
223,410
1341
10557
11898
7301
28857
1990/1991
222,163
1309
10474
11783
7365
28718
1991/1992
228,791
1984
10768
12752
8665
31845
1992/1993
223,881
2216
9470
11686
9249
30581
1993/1994
216,963
2523
8774
11297
9326
29990
1994/1995
240,869
2867
9825
12692
11696
34973
1995/1996
251,346
3040
9631
12671
13235
36558
1996/1997
285,664
4600
9634
14234
13467
39681
1997/1998
302,169
5688
9720
15409
14845
43282
1998/1999
315,641
5692
8236
13928
17961
43916
1999/2000
310,049
6134
6934
13068
19380
43907
2000/2001
257,969
5616
4998
10615
16221
36216
2001/2002
291,924
6440
5062
11502
19096
40850
2002/2003
320,683
7010
5628
12638
22533
46182
2003/2004
356,079
8790
5839
14629
24860
52226
6458
YearlyGrowthRate(%)
1975/1985
9.4
30
38.9
35.8
2.7
14.9
1985/2003
2.6
5.8
-2.1
1.2
6.6
3.2
1985/1993
-0.4
-3.0
0.2
-0.6
2.2
0.3
1993/2003
5.1
13.3
-4.0
2.6
10.3
5.7
1990/2003
3.7
15.8
-4.4
1.7
9.8
4.7
Source:Datagro(2004)no06;Datagro(2002)n.o05.TRSisTotalReducibleSugars.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
45
ENDNOTES
CENBIO-CentroNacionaldeReferênciaemBiomassa,R.Álvaro
Rodrigues,283,SaoPaulo,SP,Brazil,04582-000,bun2@tsp.com.br.
2InstitutodeRecursosNaturais,UniversidadeFederaldeItajubá,
Itajubá,MinasGerais,horta@unifei.edu.br.
3EnergyProgram,InstitutodeEletrotécnicaeEnergia,Universityof
SaoPaulo(IEE/USP),Av.Prof.LucianoGualberto,1289,SaoPaulo,
SP,Brazil,05508-900,vparente@iee.usp.br.
4Totalexternaldebtattheendof2004was$221billion,including
loansfromtheWorldBank.Thisisasignificantburdencompared
withBrazil’sGNPof$604billion.Notonlyistheamountofdebt
large,butthescheduleofpaymentsisshort;totaldebtservicein2004
was$53billion(WorldBank,2005).
5InstitutoNacionaldeTecnologia,PrimeiroCongressoNacionalde
AplicaçõesIndustriaisdoÁlcool,RiodeJaneiro,1903.
6Cubicmetersofethanolproducedpercubicmeteroffermentation
tankcapacityperday.
7Anincreaseinmechanizationwouldbeuseful,forexamplebypromotingtheneedtostopsugarcaneburning(particularlyinmanyareas
ofSãoPauloneartownsandroads).Increasingemploymentopportunitiesoutsidethesugarcaneindustryandthelowprestigeofsomejobs
(suchascanecutters)hasresultedinshortages(orhighcosts)oflabor
insomeareas.
8GovernmentalDecree2166-67ofAugust24,2001,BrasiliaBrazil.
AvailableinPortugueseat:http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/
MPV/2166-67.htm.
9Totalaldehydeemissionsfromalcoholenginesaretypicallyhigher
thanfromgasolineones,buttheyarepredominantlyacetaldehydes,
notformaldehydes.Acetaldehydeemissionsproducelessharmful
healtheffectsthantheformaldehydesemittedbygasolineanddiesel
engines.In1993,CETESBobtainedtheconcentrationratioof
acetaldehyde/formaldehydebasedonambientairmonitoringdata.
Theresultswereintherangeof1.7–1.8andin1996/97,1.6–2.1.
ComparingthesefigurestothetypicalvaluesencounteredinLos
Angeles,Atlanta,andChicago(0.18–0.96),thehigherconcentrationsofacetaldehydeswereobservedinSãoPauloduetotheintensive
ethanoluseasanautomotivefuel.Itmustbeemphasizedthatduring
thismonitoringcampaignperiod,onlyaverysmallportionofthe
Brazilianlight-dutyfleetwasequippedwithcatalyticconverters,which
helpsignificantlyinthereductionofaldehydeemission.
10Currently,light-dutyvehiclesinBrazilusepredominantlytwo
majortypesoffuel:gasohol,whichisablendof22to25percentof
dehydratedethanoland75to78percentgasoline,orneatethanol
(hydratedform,whichcontains4percentwater).
11AllpricesmentionedhereareincurrentUS$.
12TheLondonInterbankOfferedRate,aninternationalbenchmarkrate
forinterestchargedonloans.
13Theconversionfactorwas1.3litersethanol/litergasoline,takinginto
accountthelowerheatingvalueandthehigherefficiencyallowedby
ethanolinengines.
14VâniaBeatrizR.Castiglioni,EMBRAPA,2004.PersonalCommunication.
15Around90percentofelectricitygenerationinBrazilcomesfromhydrosources.Thismeansthataround90percentofthetotalBrazilian
energyconsumptioninthissectorisrenewable.
16Protectionofnativeforestsdoesofcoursebringotherbenefits.
17Aimingtosimplifythefederaltaxstructure,since2002theBrazilian
governmenthasimposedavalue-addedtaxonfossilfuels,whichis
usedtofinanceroadsandfuellogistics.
1
Thelimitof10percentethanolblendingasolineisdebatable.In
Brazil,morethan15millioncarshaveusedethanolblendsofaround
25percentformorethanadecade.Brazilian-madecarsarealready
manufacturedforsuchfuel,andafewpartsaredesignedtobemore
resilienttoalcoholcorrosion.Butitisworthwhiletomentionthata
fewpercentofthecarsareimported.Someimportedcardealersclaim
thatthecarisadjustedtoBrazilianfuelthroughminorretrofit.Asa
conclusion,wecansaythattherearefewindicationsthata20percent
alcoholblendimposesarealdifficultyforcarowners.
19Althoughseveralinternationalstudiesfoundthatsweetsorghumcould
replacesugarcaneusedfortheproduction(see,forinstance,report
preparedbytheHinduLineathttp://www.blonnet.com/2004/08/13/
stories/2004081301211200.htmorarticle“BeyondCorn:AlternativeFeedstockforEthanolproduction”athttp://www.ksgrains.
com/ethanol/Altfeedstocks.pdf ),experimentaltestsinBrazilbefore
theimplementationofthePróalcoolprogramfoundthatsugarcane
wasmoresuitableinalcoholproduction(Serra,1977).Anotherfactor
isthatoncethecommercialsectorselectedsugarcane,interestinsweet
sorghumdisappeared.
20TheUnitedStateshadalreadystartedalcoholproduction,butthe
volumeproducedwastoosmalltomitigateBrazil’sinternalshortage.
18
REFERENCES
Abrantes,R.A.2003.
Abrantes,R.A.2003.“EmissãodeAldeídoseHidrocarbonetos
PolicíclicosAromáticosdeVeículosComerciaisaDiesel.”
CETESB,SIMEA,SãoPaulo,Brazil.
Andrade,C.A.,E.M.Santos.2002.
Andrade,C.A.,E.M.Santos.2002.“HubbertCurveforBrazilian
OilProduction.”EnergyandElectrotechnologyInstitute.
SãoPauloUniversity.
BancoCentral.2004.
BancoCentral.2004.“BoletimdoBancoCentraldoBrasil,
AnnualReport2003.”Brasilia:BancoCentraldoBrasil.
BEN.2004.
BEN.2004.“BalançoEnergéticoNacional–2004.”Brasilia:
MinistériodeMinaseEnergia(MME).
Borges,J.M.1990.“TheBrazilianAlcoholProgram-FoundaBorges,J.M.1990.
tions,Results,andPerspectives.”Energysources12:451–61.
BrasilEnergia.2003.
BrasilEnergia.2003.Petrobras50anos.RevistaBrasilEnergia,
ediçãoespecial,No275,Outubro.RiodeJaneiro.
Castiglioni,VâniaBeatrizR.2004.
Castiglioni,VâniaBeatrizR.2004.EmpresaBrasileirade
PesquisaAgropecuária.PersonalCommunication.
CETESB.2001.
CETESB.2001.CompanhiaEstadualdeTecnologiae
SaneamentoBasico,2001.RelatoriodeEmissõesAutomotivas,
GovernodeSãoPaulo.
CETESB.2003.
CETESB.2003.CompanhiadeTecnologiadeSaneamento
Ambiental,2003,RelatóriodeQualidadedoArnoEstadode
SãoPaulo,Brazil.
Datagro.2002.no.5.P.Nastari,ed.SãoPaulo.
Datagro.2002.
Datagro.2004.no.6.P.Nastari,ed.SãoPaulo.
Datagro.2004.
Echavarria,M.andS.Whalen.1991.
Echavarria,M.andS.Whalen.1991.“CaneBurningand
FactoryEmissions.”PaperpresentedattheInternational
ConferenceonEnergyfromSugarCane,Hawaii.
FAO(FoodandAgricultureOrganizationofUnitedNations
ForestryDatabank).2002.Availableat:http://faostat.fao.org/
ForestryDatabank).2002.
faostat/collection?version=ext&hasbulk=08subset=agriculture.
46
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
FAO.2005.
FAO.2005.Availableat:http://faostat.fao.org/faostat/collection?
version=ext&hasbulk=08subset=agriculture.
MCT.2004.
MCT.2004.MinistérioCiênciaeeTecnologia.Availableat:
http://www.mct.gov.br/clima/comunic/Default.htm.
Fearnside,P.M.1995.
Fearnside,P.M.1995.“GlobalWarmingResponseOptionsin
Brazil’sForestSector:ComparisonofProject-levelCostsand
Benefits.”BiomassandBioenergy8(5):309–322.
Melquiades,A.1996.
Melquiades,A.1996.“AProduçãodeenergia,acriaçãode
empregoeasrelaçõescapital-trabalho.OÁlcooleanovaordem
econômicamundial.”FrenteParlamentarSucroalcooleira.,Brasília.
Availableat:http://www.mct.gov.br/clima/ingles/comunic_old/
alcohol7.htm.
GazetaMercantil. 2004.“Metaéelevarem80%produçãode
GazetaMercantil.2004.
álcoolaté2009.”SãoPaulo.Nov.5.
Goldemberg,J.2002.
Goldemberg,J.2002.“TheBrazilianEnergyInitiative—
SupportReport.”PaperpresentedattheJohannesburg2002
WorldSummitforSustainableDevelopment.Secretariade
MeioAmbiente,SãoPaulo(TheBrazilianSãoPauloState
EnvironmentalSecretariat).
Goldemberg,J.2005.
Goldemberg,J.2005.“BioenergyDevelopmentandDeployment:
GettingBenefitsfromtheUseofInternationalCooperation.”
PreparatoryMeetingInternationalPartnershiponBioenergy,
Rome,September6.ConsiglioNazionaledelleRicerche,Italy.
Guilhoto,J.M.M.2001.
Guilhoto,J.M.M.
2001.Geraçãodeempregonossetores
produtoresdecanadeaçúcar,açúcareálcoolnoBrasilesuas
macro-regiões;RelatórioCenáriosparaaproduçãodeaçúcare
álcool.SãoPaulo:MBAssociadoseFIPE.
Moreira,J.R.2004.
Moreira,J.R.2004.“TheBrazilianBiomassExperience–ASuccess
Story.”PaperpresentedattheLAMNETWorkshoponBiomass
OpportunitiesinVenezuela,Caracas,Venezuela,October22.
Moreira,J.R.andJ.Goldemberg.1999.
Moreira,J.R.andJ.Goldemberg.1999.“TheAlcoholProgram.”
EnergyPolicy27(4):229–245.
Morris,D.2003.
Morris,D.2003.“NewRulesforaSustainableTransportation
System.ABetterWaytoGetfromHeretoThere.ACommentaryontheHydrogenEconomyandaProposalforanAlternative
Strategy.”Minneapolis:TheNewRulesProjectoftheInstitute
forLocalSelf-Reliance.
Nastari,P.2003.
Nastari,P.2003.“DemandForecastforEthanolandSugarin
BrazilforMediumandLongTerm.”IIIConferênciaInternacional
DATAGROsobreAçúcareÁlcool,SãoPaulo.
Guilhoto,J.M.M.etal.2002.
Guilhoto,J.M.M.etal.2002.“MechanizationProcessofthe
SugarCaneHarvestanditsDirectandIndirectImpactoverthe
EmploymentinBrazilandinits5Macro-Regions.”Piracicaba:
RelatórioESALQ–CEPEA.
Nogueira,L.A.H.2003.OsPreçosdeCombustíveisnoBrasil.
Nogueira,L.A.H.2003.
SeminarioInternacionalPoliticasdePreciosdelaEnergiaysu
ImpactoenelDesarolloSustentable,CEPAL,SantiagodoChile,
December3–4.
Hall,D.O.,F.Rosillo-Calle,R.H.Williams,andJ.Woods.
Hall,D.O.,F.Rosillo-Calle,R.H.Williams,andJ.Woods.
1993.“BiomassforEnergy:SupplyProspects.”InT.B.Johansson
1993.
etal.,eds.RenewableEnergy-SourcesforFuelsandElectricity.
Washington,DC:IslandPress.
Oliveira,A.1991.
Oliveira,A.1991.“ReassessingtheBrazilianAlcohol
Programmes.”EnergyPolicy19(1):47-55.
IBGE.1989.
IBGE.1989.InstitutoBrasileirodeGeografiaeEstatistica,
RiodeJaneiro,Brazil.
IPCC.1996.
IPCC.1996.ClimateChange1995–Impacts,Adaptationsand
MitigationofClimateChange:Scientific-TechnicalAnalyses.
ContributionofWorkingGroupIItotheSecondAssessment
ReportoftheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.R.T.
Watson,M.C.Zinywera,andR.H.Moss,eds.Cambridge,UK,
andNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
IPCC.2001.ClimateChange2001–Mitigation.Contribution
IPCC.2001.
ofWorkingGroupIIItotheThirdAssessmentReportofthe
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.B.Metz,O.
Davidson,R.Swart,andJ.Pan,eds.Cambridge,UK,andNew
York:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Macedo,I.C.,R.LimaVerdeLeal,andJ.E.A.R.Silva.2004.
Macedo,I.C.,R.LimaVerdeLeal,andJ.E.A.R.Silva.2004.
“AssessmentofGreenhouseGasEmissionintheProduction
andUseofFuelEthanolinBrazil.”SãoPaulo:Secretariatofthe
Environment,GovernmentoftheStateofSãoPaulo.
Macedo,I.1995.
Macedo,I.1995.[then]ResearchDirectorofCOPERSUCAR,
Piracicaba,Brazil.PersonalCommunication.
Macedo,I.andL.A.H.Nogueira.2004.
Macedo,I.andL.A.H.Nogueira.2004.“EvaluationofEthanol
ProductionExpansioninBrazil.”Brasilia:CGEECentrode
GestãodeEstudosEstratégicos.
PereiradeCarvalho,E.2004.
PereiradeCarvalho,E.2004.“BrazilianSugarandEthanolMarket
2004.”UNICAPresentation,SugarDinner,March,NewYork.
Rosillo-CaleF,P.Furtado,M.E.A.Rezende,andD.O.Hall.1996.
Rosillo-CaleF,P.Furtado,M.E.A.Rezende,andD.O.Hall.1996.
TheCharcoalDilemma:FindingSustainableSolutionsforBrazilian
Industry.London:IntermediateTechnologyPublications.
Serra,G.E.1997.
Serra,G.E.1997.“OSorgoSacarinocomomatéria-primapara
aproduçãodoálcooletílico.”ReportpreparedfortheBrazilian
SymposiumonSorghum,Brasilia,Brazil.
Shapouri,H.,J.A.Duffield,andM.Wang.2002.
Shapouri,H.,J.A.Duffield,andM.Wang.2002.“TheEnergy
BalanceofCornEthanol:AnUpdate.”AgriculturalEconomic
ReportNo.813.Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofAgriculture,OfficeoftheChiefEconomist,OfficeofEnergyPolicyand
NewUses.
Winrock.2000.
Winrock.2000.“Ethanol2000:SustainableFuelfortheTransport
Sector.”PaperpresentedataworkshopinNewDelhi,India,
February25.
WorldBank.2005.
WorldBank.2005.Dataavailableat:http://www.worldbank.
org/data/countrydata/aag/bra_aag.pdf.
Zandbergen,P.1993.“EnergyandEnvironmentalPolicyin
Zandbergen,P.1993.
LatinAmerica:TheCaseofFuelEthanolinArgentinaand
Brazil.”Mastersthesis,DevelopmentStudiesattheTechnology
andDevelopmentGroup,UniversityofTwente,Enschede,the
Netherlands.
Macedo,I.C.2003.
Macedo,I.C.2003.“Technology:KeytoSustainabilityand
Profitability–aBrazilianView.”Paperpresentedatthe
WorkshoponTechnologyandProfitabilityinSugarProduction,
InternationalSugarCouncil,Cebu,Philippines,May27.
B IOFU ELS FOR TR A N SPOR T, D EVELOPMEN T, A N D C LIMATE C HA N GE
47
Editor'sNote
A
lmosteveryachievement
indevelopment,andevery
challengesurroundingit,is
writlargeinChina.Thecountry’s
spectaculareconomicgrowthduring
recentdecadeshaspulledhundredsof
millionsoutofpoverty,buthasalso
producedwrenchingsocialchanges
andenvironmentalchallenges.
Fewsectorsdemonstratethis
achievementandthischallengemore
clearlythantransport.Famedbarely
twodecadesagofortheirstreetsoverrunbybicycles,China’smajorcities
arenowincreasinglydominatedby
privatecars.Thoughcarownership
isverylowcomparedtorichcountries—thetotalnumberisabout9
carsper1,000people,ascompared
toover700per1,000peopleinthe
UnitedStates—itisgrowingatimpressiverates,asChina’surbanmiddle
classembracestheautomobilejust
asAmericansdidinthe1930s.This
growthissymptomaticofChina’seconomicsuccess,buttheauthorsargue
thatthissuccesscanonlybesustained
throughcreativepolicymaking,as
thisrapidgrowthincarownershipis
beingaccompaniedbylocal,national,
andglobalproblems.
WithinChina,thegrowthin
mobilityfacestwomajorconstraints.
First,locally,therapidgrowthincar
useisleadingtogridlockincitiesthat
werenotdesigned,andcannotbeeasilyadapted,forsuchtraffic.Second,
nationally,China’srapidlygrowing
oildemandismakingthepriceand
provenanceofitsimportedoilan
48
increasingconcern.Afterbeinganet
exporteradecadeago,Chinanow
importsaboutone-thirdoftheoilit
consumes,afigurethatispoisedto
continuerising.
Atthegloballevel,themannerin
whichChina’stransportsectordevelops
overthecomingdecadeshasworldwideimplicationsfortheclimatesystem.ThefutureCO2emissionsgrowth
willdependonvehicleefficiency,the
choiceoffuels,andthedistancedriven
pervehicle.ThesefactorsarealsoimportantforaddressingChina’scongestionandoilsecurityconstraints.This
isfortunate,becausetheseconstraints,
havingmoreimmediateinfluenceon
policymakersthanclimatechange,
willbethedecisiveconsiderationsin
China’sevolvingtransportpolicy.
Theauthorsconsidertheimpact
ofpoliciesandmeasuresdesignedto
anticipateandavoidcongestionand
oilsecurityconcerns.Thesepolicies
leadtomoreefficientenginetypes(hybrids,compressednaturalgas);smaller
vehiclestoadapttoconstrainedroad
andparkingspace;andlowervehicle
mileageaspeopleusepublictransportalternatives.Theauthorsareat
painstopointoutthatthesemeasures
donotamounttoreducedmobility
forurbanChinese;tothecontrary,
byavoidingoratleastdeferringthe
constraintsmentionedabove,mobilitywillbeincreased.Theresultsare
striking.Comparedtoa“businessas-usual”scenario,energyuse(and,
therefore,toaroughapproximation
CO2emissions)is78percentlower
withapolicymixdesignedtosavethe
citiesfromacongestioncrunchand
avoidexcessoildependence.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
SD-PAMsseektofindclimate
benefitsfrommeetingnon-climate
developmentgoalsand,assuch,this
isafascinatingcase.Chinaisalready
awareoftheconstraintsitfaces,and
hastakenaction—witnessitsrecently
appliedvehicleefficiencystandards,
morestringentthanthoseinthe
UnitedStates.Butthescopetodo
moreislargeindeed,andthebenefits
toChinaofreducingitsgrowing
dependenceonexpensiveandvolatile
oilsuppliesandkeepingitscitiesmovingareobvious.Anythingthatcanbe
donetoacceleratemeasurestoaddress
thesechallengesisclearlyimportant
bothforChinaandfortheclimate.
Finally,theeconomicsectorsthatwill
playavitalroleinmakingtheseresponseswork(includingmostnotably
theautosector)areinternationalin
scopeanddeveloptheirproductsfor
globalmarkets.Acoordinatedeffort
betweenChinaandothermajormarketstofavortheintroductionofmore
efficientvehicletechnologieswouldbe
farmoreeffectivethancountriesactinginisolation.
chapteriv
ChinaMotorizationTrends:
PolicyOptionsinaWorldofTransportChallenges
Wei-ShiuenNg ■ LeeSchipper
1.INTRODUCTION
Asthefastestgrowinglargeeconomyintheworld,
Chinaisexperiencingarapidincreaseinmotorvehicle
ownershipanduse,intheprocessgainingimmense
economicandpersonalmobilitybenefits.However,this
explosionincarownershipisunsustainable,asevidenced
bytheimpactsofrisingcongestion,increasedairpollution,increasedoilconsumption,andhighratesoftraffic
fatalities.Asustainabletransportationsystemwouldmeet
theincreasingdemandforprivatemotorizationwithout
compromisingtheeconomicandwelfaregainsfrom
greatermobility.Therapidgrowthofprivatevehiclesin
China,whichwillnodoubtincreaseinownershipanduse,
threatensthissustainability,eventhoughprivatevehicles
currentlycontributeaslittleas10percentofthetotaldaily
tripsinmostcities.
Scenariosareusedinthischaptertoillustrate,butnot
predict,howaseriesofassumptionscanleadtodifferentoutcomes.Thescenariosshowhoweffectivemobility
management,withtheaidofadvancedandalternative
fuelvehicletechnologies,couldreduceoilconsumption
andmanyoftheimpactsofrapidprivatemotorization
thatthreatensustainability.Inaddition,advancedfueland
vehicletechnologiesandapproachescouldhelpreducethe
conflictbetweentheeconomicdevelopmentandenvironmentalsustainabilitygoalsofthecountrybyproviding
relativelysmaller,safer,andcleanervehiclestomeetthe
growingdemand.Theforecastsofhighprivatemotor
vehicleownershipandthesubsequentoildemandimply
enormousstrainsonurbaninfrastructure,aswellasenergy
imports.Thesestrainswouldbemucheasiertoavoidwith
sustainabletransportpoliciesenactednow,ratherthanbeingrectifiedoneortwodecadeslater.
ThischapterexploresexistingandpotentialChinese
transportandenergypolicyoptionsrelatedtoprivate
individualmotorvehiclesthathavebeenormaybeimplementedinresponsetoenergysecurity,airpollution,and
otherchallengesassociatedwithmotorization.Itdevelops
threedifferentpersonalmobilityscenariosthatprojectoil
andenergydemandoutcomesin2010and2020,revealing
awiderangeoffutureoildemandlevelsandpotential
oilimports.Theresultsalsotranslateintoawiderangeof
futurecarbonemissionsfrompersonaltransportation.
TheseoutcomesdependprimarilyonchoicesChinese
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
49
policymakersmakenow.Differentpolicyoptionsarelinked
tothescenarios,suggestinghowdifferentpoliciescould
affectvehicleuse,aswellashowadvancedandalternative
fuelvehicletechnologiescouldreducesomeofthenegative
impactofmotorizationandimproveenergyefficiency.
Section2describesmotorizationtrendsinChinaand
theenergyandenvironmentalconsequencesthatfollow.
Section3reviewscurrenttransport-relatedpolicies,
targets,andstandardsinChina.Thescenariosandkey
resultsareexplainedinsections4and5.Policyoptions
thatcouldcreatetheoptimaltransportscenarioare
presentedinsection6.Section7providesthefinal
discussionandconclusion.
2.TRANSPORTTRENDSAND
2.TRANSPORTTRENDSAND
CHALLENGESINCHINA1
2.1Theriseofthetransportsector
TransportationinChinatodayisdominatedbypublic
transitandtraditionaltransportmodes.Publictransport
carriesapproximately50percentofallurbantripsin
China,withcyclingandwalkingcarryinganother40percent(SchipperandNg,2005).MostChinesecitieshave
goodtransportsystemsbuiltonbuses,metros,andlocal
railsystemsthatareextendedtoagreaterregion.Virtually
allintercity(long-distance)travelisbyrailorair.TheaverageChinesepersontravelsabout1,000kilometers(km)
peryear,comparedwithaveragesof15,000kmperyear
forEuropeansandover24,000kmperyearforAmericans.
AlthoughmobilityinChina(measuredinannualpersonal
travel)stillhasalongwaytogrow,increasesintravel
distancedonotalwaysimplysocialbenefits,asthebenefits
ofprivatemotorizationcouldbeeasilyexceededbyits
incurredhighcosts(TheNationalAcademies,2003).
Onereasonforlowmobilityisthelownumberofmotorvehicles.In2004,therewereonly27millionprivately
ownedmotorvehiclesinChina(Brown,2004),withmost
ofthemconcentratedinlargeChinesecities.Thetotal
numberofcars—privateandstate-owned—wasapproximately12million,or9carsper1,000people,farbelow
theglobalaverage(Heetal.,2004).Bycomparison,there
areover700cars(includingpersonalvans,lighttrucks,
andSUVs)per1,000peopleintheUnitedStates,400
50
inJapan,350–500inEurope,and150–200inmiddle-
incomecountrieslikeMexico,Brazil,andKorea.
MotorizedmobilityinChina,however,issettochange
significantlyasprivatecarownershiptakesoff.
ThegrowthofthetransportsectorinChinaacceleratedmarkedlyafter1978,whenthecountryunderwent
massivepolicyreformsleadingtosignificanteconomic
development,industrialization,andurbanization.These
changeshaveresultedinrapidincreasesinmotorization
andurbanmobility.Iflessonsfromtherestoftheworld
applytoChina,existingtransportmodeswillfaceincreasinglystiffcompetitionfromindividualcars.Withan
increasingnumberofmiddle-classfamilies,carownership
isnolongerrestrictedtoaselectivegroupofgovernmental
officialsandhigh-incomefamilies.Nationalpassengercar
salesincreasedby76percentfrom2002to2003while,
overthesameperiod,passengercarproductionincreased
by86percent(CATARC,2004).
Givenitslargepopulationandthesmallabsolute
numberofvehiclesinChina,presenttrendspointto
enormousincreasesinmotorvehicleownershipandfuel
use.Chinaappearstobefollowingapathdefinedbyother
diversenations.Figure1portraysmotorizationinrelation
toincome.Onapercapitabasis,China’smotorization
in2003(thepointfarthesttotherightandhighestfor
China)iscomparabletotheU.S.in1907,thoughChina’s
percapitaGDPin2003wasonlyhalfofU.S.levelsin
1907.ThelastdozenpointsforChinainFigure1(bottom
left)areveryclosetothefirstdozenpointsforKorea(from
the1970s),whichfallsomewherebetweenthoseofWest
GermanyandJapan,whenKoreawasatincomelevelsthat
thosecountriesachievedinthe1960sand1970s.
Rapidgrowthinmotorizationisbringingbothcosts
andbenefitstoChinesesocieties(SchipperandNg,2005).
Benefitsincludeeconomicgrowth—duetobetteraccessibilityforcommercial,public,andprivatetransportation—andimprovedsocialwelfareasaresultofincreased
flexibilityandmobility.Costsareincurredinareassuch
asenergyconsumptionandsecurity,environmentaland
healthimpacts,congestion,andtrafficfatalities.
2.2Energyconsumptionandsecurity
Energyconsumptionandoilimports,whichare
increasinglydrivenbythetransportsector,haveraised
concernsoverenergysecurity.In2003,Chinaconsumed
approximately275millionmetrictonsofoil,ofwhich30
percentwasimported(BP,2004)(Figure2).Theincrease
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
2.3Environmentalpollution
Figure1.ComparisonofCar/LightTruckOwnershipinU.S.,China,
Korea,Japan,andWestGermany
1000
Cars and personal light trucks – SUVs/1000 people
inenergyconsumptionhasresultedinChina’stransformationfromanoilexporterpriorto1993toalargenetoil
importer.Absentspecificmeasures,thedemandforcrude
oilisexpectedtoincreaseby12percentannuallyuntil
2020(Heetal.,2004).
TheChinesetransportsector,whichisalmostentirely
dependentonoil,isincreasinglyaleadingdriverofoverall
consumptionincreases,contributingmorethanone-third
ofChina’stotaloilconsumptionin2002comparedto
about16percentin1980(IEA,2004b).From1990to
2002,gasolineanddieselconsumptioninthetransport
sectorincreased157percent(IEA,2004b).Withinthe
transportsector,itisnotablethatprivatecaruseconstitutesarelativelysmallshareofChina’soilconsumption—
about10percentin2001(Figure3).Intheensuingthree
years,however,thenumberofcarsinChinaincreasedby
75percent.Asmotorizationtrendscontinue,theshareof
oilconsumptionfromcarswillquicklybecomedominant.
100
United States 1910-2003
China 1987-2003
10
Korea 1970-2002
Japan 1965-2000
W. Germany 1960-1995
1
Pollutantsproducedduringthecombustionofgasoline
ordieselfuelinvehicleengineshavemajorenvironmental
impacts.Suchpollutantsincludecarbonmonoxide(CO),
ozone(O3),volatileorganiccompounds(VOCs),nitrogen
oxides(NOx),andfineparticulatematter(Walsh,2003a).
Respiratorydiseasessuchasinfections,asthma,and
decreasedlungefficiencyarecommoninpollutedurban
cities(StaresandLiu,1996),inadditiontoreductionin
$1,000
$100,000
$10,000
GDP/Capita, 1990 USD (PPP)
Notes:ThehorizontalaxisshowspercapitaGDPconvertedtoUS$atpurchasingpowerparity(PPP).
TherangeofyearsforeachcountrycoveredbythisGDPrangeisshowninthelegend.
Source:U.S.FederalHighwayAdministration(variousyears),NationalStatisticalAbstractsand
Transportationyearbooks(vehicles),InternationalEnergyAgencyEnergyIndicatorsDatabase
(vehiclesforWestGermanyandJapan)andOECD(forPPPconversions,GDP,andpopulationdata).
Figure2.OilProduction,Consumption,andExportsinChina
300
Consumption
250
Production
Exports
Millions of Tons of Oil Equiv.
200
150
100
50
0
-50
2004
1999
1994
1989
1984
1979
-150
1974
-100
Source:IEA(2004b)withestimatesfor2003and2004basedonBP(2004and2005).Negativevaluesindicateimports.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
51
pulmonaryfunction.Thesepublichealthimpactswillnot
onlyleadtolossesinindividualwelfare,theycouldalso
inflictsubstantialeconomiccostsuponthesociety.
Airpollutionfromindustryandhouseholdsisgradually
declining;asaresult,vehicularemissionscompriseahigh
andrisingproportionoftotalurbanairpollutioninmany
Chinesecities(Table1).Studieshaveshownthat45-60
percentofNOxemissionsand85percentofCOemissions
arefrommobilesourcesinmostChinesecities(Walsh,
2000).Itisestimatedthatby2010inShanghai,vehicular
emissionswillproduce75percentoftotalNOxemissions,
94percentoftotalCOemissions,and98percentoftotal
hydrocarbon(HC)emissions(WangandWu,2004).
Evenwithimprovedemissionscontrolsandcleanerfuels,
mobile-sourcepollutioninChinesecitiesislikelyto
continuerisingduetoincreaseduseofindividualvehicles
andthetotaldistancetraveled.
Table1.MotorVehicleSharesofCriteriaPollutantsinChineseCities
CO(%)
HC(%)
NOx(%)
Beijing(2000)
City
77
78
40
Shanghai(1996)
86
96
56
Guangzhou(2000)
84
50
45
Source:AdaptedfromMaoetal.(2001)
Figure3.SharesofOilConsumptioninRoadTransportation
inChina,2001
Motorcycles
9%
Rural Vehicles
18%
Cars
10%
Buses
21%
Trucks
42%
Source:AdaptedfromAn(2003)
52
3.CHINA’STRANSPORT-RELATED
3.CHINA’STRANSPORT-RELATED
PRIORITIESANDPOLICIES
TheGovernmentofChinahasenactedvariouspolicies
andregulationsrelatingtotransportationandfueluse.
Thesearetargetedatimprovingambientairqualityin
urbancities,reducingcongestion,andimprovingtransport
energyefficiency.Manyofthesepolicieswillreducethe
impactofeachkilometerdrivenortraveledinChina.Policiesarealsotargeted,however,atpromotingthedevelopmentoftheautomobileindustryandgreaterdomestic
consumptionofmotorvehicles.ThechallengeforChinais
toresolvethetensionsbetweenthesecompetingpriorities
andpolicies.
3.1Developingtheautomobileindustry
TheChineseautomobileindustryhasbeenoneof
themostrapidlygrowingintheworld;Chinanowranks
astheworld’sthirdlargestautomobileproducer.Over
the1999to2004period,Chineseproductionofmotor
vehiclesincreasedby177percent,fromabout1.8to5.7
millionvehiclesperyear(OICA,2005).China’sshareof
globalproductionintermsofquantityhasrisenfrom3.3
percenttoalmost8percentinfiveyears.Theautomobile
industryhasbeena“pillar”ofeconomicdevelopment
since1988;thisrolehasbeenreaffirmedbythegovernmentinpreparingits11th5-yearplan(2006-2011).
ThedevelopmentoftheChineseautomobileindustry
hasresultedinsignificanteconomicbenefits.Thesector
hasemployed1.8millionpeopleandhastotalassetsof
$61.3billion(TheNationalAcademies,2003),aswell
asreceivingsignificantlevelsofforeigndirectinvestment
(Gallagher,2003).Totalinvestmentinnewautomobile
manufacturingcapacityinChinaisprojectedtoreach
$25.5billionby2007(Xinhuanet,2004a).
TherapidgrowthanddevelopmentoftheChinese
automobileindustryhasresultedinanewautoindustry
policy,whichwaslaunchedbytheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommissioninJune2004(Xinhuanet,
2004b).Thispolicyisaimedatslowinginvestmentand
consolidatingtheautoindustry,whichhasbeenoneofthe
mostover-investedindustrialsectorsinChina—mainly
becauseofmassiveinvestmentfromforeignautomakers
anddomesticstateandprivateenterprises.Newrestrictionswillincludetheregulationofnewforeigninvestors
enteringthemarket.Nevertheless,foreigninvestorswill
stillplayanimportantroleintheproductionofvehiclesin
theChineseautomobileindustry.
Anothergoalofthispolicyistofurtherdevelopan
automobilemarketlargelydominatedbyprivateconsumption,ratherthanstate-ownedvehicles.Asthebenefits
ofworldwideproductionpracticesandlower-priced
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
advancedautomotivetechnologiesarenowavailablein
China,carshaveincreasinglybecomemoreappealingto
Chineseconsumers.However,thetypeofvehicletechnologieslikelytodominatethemarketisstilluncertain.The
2004autoindustrypolicyalsosupportsalternativefuel
andadvancedvehicletechnologies,anditisexpectedthat
researchanddevelopmentintheseareaswillincrease.
3.2Savingtransportenergy
Theneedandurgencytorestrainthegrowthinenergy
demandhasbecomeanationalpriorityinrecentyears,
mainlyduetotheexperienceoffrequentenergyshortages
since2000,broughtonbyChina’sboomingeconomy.
China,whichnowranksastheworld’ssecondlargestenergyconsumeraftertheU.S.,hasintroducedenergyconservationplansandincreasedpublicawarenessofenergy
conservation.TherecentlyagreedChinese11th5-yearplan
nationalplanhasrestatedandstrengthenedthiscommitmenttoimprovedenergyefficiency.
PremierWenJiabaohasannouncedthatChinawill
buildanenergy-savingsocietyandimplementstatepolicies
topromoteefficienttechnologicalprocessesandencourage
sustainableconsumptionthrougheconomicrestructuring
(Xinhuanet,2004c).Accordingly,energy-efficiencypoliciesforindustryandthetransportsectorareexpectedto
increase.Overall,energydemandwillstillrisewithChina’s
neardouble-digiteconomicgrowth,buteconomicgrowth
couldcontinuetooutpaceenergydemandifenergyconservationpoliciesincreasinglytakehold.Thishasgenerally
beenthecasesincethe1980s,largelyasaresultofindustrialmodernization.
Policychangesarereflectedinthe2004National
EnergyPolicy,whichhasshiftedthefocusfromenergy
exploitationtoenergyconservationandimprovingenergy
efficiency,whencomparedwiththepreviousenergy
policyimplementedin1998.TheNationalEnergyPolicy
launchedalong-termenergy-savingplanandiscurrently
thebiggestandmostambitiousenergy-savingplanin
China’shistory(Mai,2004).Theburdentoreduceenergy
consumptionwillnodoubtbedistributedacrossallindustriesandsectors,includingthetransportsector,which,as
noted,isbecomingasignificantoilconsumer.
ThefueleconomystandardsannouncedinOctober
2004areakeyregulationtoaidenergysecurity.These
standardsrequiretheautoindustrytoproducemorefuelefficientvehicles,whichcouldincludecleaneradvanced
vehiclesoralternative-fuelvehicletechnologies.Thefirst
phaseofthestandardswillbeimplementedfornewly
introducedvehiclessoldfromJuly1,2005.Forcontinued
vehiclemodels,vehiclessoldmustmeetthesamestandards
byJanuary1,2006.Astrictersecondphasefornewcar
modelsenteringtheChinesemarketwillbeineffectby
January1,2008(AnandSauer,2004).
Thesestandardsestablishmaximumfuelintensities(fuel
perkm)fornewvehicles,whichareafunctionofweight
andtransmissiontype.Forpassengervehiclesweighing
lessthan750kilograms,themaximumnewvehiclefuel
intensityis7.2litersoffuelper100km(equivalentto33
milespergallon[mpg])foravehiclewithmanualtransmissionand7.6liters/100km(32mpg)forvehicleswithan
automatictransmission.Permittedfuelintensitythenrises
withnewvehicleweightin15additionalweightclasses.
Futureuncertaintiesregardingconsumerpreferences
andvehicleweightsmakeitdifficulttoevaluatetheoverall
likelyimpactofthefueleconomystandards.Ashifttowardlightercarscouldleadtoloweraveragefuelintensity
thanthoserequiredbythestandardsalone.2The2003
averagenewvehicleweightinChinawasabout1,500kilograms(SauerandAn,2004),whichisconsideredheavy
byinternationalstandards.Theprominentshareoflarge
importedcarsandSUVsinthesalesmixoverthepastfive
yearsmaycontributetothishighaveragevehicleweight.
Asseeninmanyothercountries,theweightandengine
sizeofnewvehiclestendstoincreaseasincomerises.
BecauseChina’sfueleconomystandardsareweight-based,
theywouldnotinhibitsuchatrend.However,itisunclear
ifthiswillapplytoChina,asanincreasingnumberof
smallervehiclesarebeingpurchasedbythegrowinggroup
ofmiddle-classhouseholds.
3.3Reducingairpollution
Throughaseriesoflegislativeacts,regulations,and
standards,theChinesegovernmenthasrespondedtothe
growingairpollutionandpublichealthrisksdescribed
insection2.3.Theseincludenationalambientairquality
standardsfordifferentairpollutants,emissionstandards,
andfuelqualitystandards.Generally,theestablishedlegislationstatesthatthenationalgovernmentisresponsible
formeasurestocontrolairpollutants,whilelocalgovernmentshavetheresponsibilityforimplementationand
enforcement(WangandWu,2004).
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
53
The2000ChineseCleanAirActrequiresmotorvehicles
tomeetemissionstandardsandprohibitsthemanufacture,
sales,orimportofmotorvehiclesthathavelevelshigher
thanthestandardssetbytheStateEnvironmentalProtectionAdministration(SEPA).The2002CleanAirActalso
encouragesthedevelopmentandsaleofcleanfuelsfor
motorvehicles.TheenforcementoftheCleanAirActand
otherrequirements,however,isstillweak,especiallywhen
certainregulationsarenotcomprehensiveenough.
Becauseairpollutantsfrommobilesourcesarehighly
dependentuponfuels,improvingfuelqualityisanimportantapproachtoreducingmobilesourceemissions.The
“EmissionStandardforExhaustPollutantsfromLightDutyVehicles”wasimplementedin1999bySEPAand
wentintoeffectinJanuary2000.Thislawsetemissions
standardsequivalenttoEuroIstandards(HeandCheng,
1999).3Increasingly,ChinaisfollowingemissionstandardsregulationsfromtheUnitedStates,Europe,and
Japan,eventhoughthelevelofcontrol(i.e.,gramsper
kmpermitted)andenforcementisstilllessstringentin
China.Thegovernmentneverthelessrecognizestheneed
toimproveitsairqualityandhasimplementedEuroII
equivalentfuelqualitystandardsinBeijingandShanghai
in2003.SEPAinBeijinghasalsochartedemissionstandardsthatareequivalenttoEuroIIIandexpectstheentire
countrytoadopttheEuroIIIlevelby2008(Li,2004).
Table2showstheEuropeanUnionemissionstandardsfor
passengercarsandtheiryearofimplementation.Other
transportpolicies,suchasthosethatrestrainautomobile
use,willofcoursealsohaveairpollutionbenefits.
Table2.EUEmissionStandardsforPassengerCars(gramsperkm)
Date
CO
HC
HC+NOx
NOx
PM
Diesel
EuroI
1992
2.72
–
0.97
–
0.14
EuroII
1996
1
–
0.7
–
0.08
EuroIII
2000
0.64
–
0.56
0.5
0.05
EuroIV
2005
0.5
–
0.3
0.25
0.025
EuroV
mid-2008
0.5
–
0.25
0.2
0.005
Petrol(Gasoline)
EuroI
1992
2.72
–
0.97
–
–
EuroII
1996
2.2
–
0.5
–
–
EuroIII
2000
2.3
0.2
–
0.15
–
EuroIV
2005
1
0.1
–
0.08
–
EuroV
mid-2008
1
0.075
–
0.06
0.005
Source:AdaptedfromtheEuropeanCommissionDirective70/220/EEC(2002)andDieselNet(2005).
54
3.4Publictransportation
Accordingtothe2004NationalEnergyPolicy,public
transportation—busesandtaxis—shouldbethemainaccessmethodinbigcities,withrailtransportationsupportingthetransportnetwork,whilepersonalcarsandbicycles
shouldbeusedassupplements.Inmediumandsmall
cities,publictransportationwillbedeveloped,aswellas
theuseofpersonalcars.
Publictransportsystemsareinhighdemandinmegacities,aswellasmiddle-sizedcities,wheresomeare
alreadyactivelyadoptingurbantransportpoliciesthat
encouragepublictransport.Forinstance,municipal
authoritiesinShanghaiarenowputtingahighpriorityon
busesandareseekingtoincreasepublictransporttravel
volume(People’sGovernmentofShanghaiMunicipality,
2002).Overall,theGovernmentofChinaispublicly
encouragingtheconstructionofbusrapidtransit(BRT)
andotherpublictransitmodes.Beijingisprojectedto
haveanincreaseof100kilometersinBRTbusroutes,
leadingtoatotallengthof360kilometersfortheentire
networkby2008.Kunming,Shanghai,Xi’an,Chengdu,
Chongqing,Tianjin,Hangzhou,andShenyangare
eitheralreadyintheprocessofdevelopingBRTsystems,
planningBRTdesigns,orawaitingapprovalfortheir
BRTproposals.
3.5UnitedNationsClimate
Conventioncommitments
Asapartytothe1992FrameworkConventionon
ClimateChangeand1997KyotoProtocol,Chinahasalso
committedtotakingstepstolimitgreenhousegas(GHG)
emissions.Developingcountriesdonothavequantified
emissionlimitationsundertheseagreements,thoughall
countrieshavecommittedintheConventiontoimplementpoliciesandmeasurestomitigateclimatechange
(UNFCCC,1992,Art.4.1b).TheKyotoProtocolaffirms
theseobligationsfordevelopingcountriesandalsoadds
someadditionaldetailbyspecifyingparticularsectors—includingtransport—wheremeasuresmightbestbetargeted
(UNFCCC,1997,Art.10b).
In1990,ChinasetupaNationalClimateChange
CoordinationCommittee—composedof15government
departmentsandinstitutions—tolookatpolicymaking
andscientificresearch(QinandZhu,2004).Chinahas
alsocompletedandsubmitteditsfirstnationalcommunicationstotheUNFCCC,whichincludesaGHGinventory,andisincreasinglyengagedinemission-reducing
projectsthroughKyoto’sCleanDevelopmentMechanism.
Withrespecttopolicies,anumberofexistingpoliciesand
measuresinthetransportsector,suchasthefuelintensity
standardsfornewvehicles,arelikelytohavebeneficial
effectsonCO2emissions.Manyofthepolicyapproaches
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
outlinedinthesectionsthatfollowwouldlikewise
contributesignificantlytoChina’snationalprioritieson
energysecurityandairpollution,butalsotoChina’s
obligationsundertheUNFCCC.
4.FUTUREMOTORIZATIONAND
4.FUTUREMOTORIZATIONAND
MOTORVEHICLEUSETRENDSINCHINA:
THESCENARIOS
ThefutureoftheChinesetransportationsectoris
difficulttomodelorpredict.Thereisinadequatedataon
fueluse,carownership,fueleconomy,anddrivinghabits,
amongotherparameters.Evenwhendataisavailable,
itmaybeunreliable,inpartbecausefuturecarowners
inChinawillbedifferentfromtoday’s.Historically,the
majorityofcarownersandusersweretaxiandprofessional
drivers,highfunctionaries,andcompanyemployees.
Modelingtheirfuturebehaviortellsuslittleabouthowthe
averageChinesefamilywillbehave.Furthermore,discon-
tinuitiesareexpected,inpartduetonewlyimposedfuel
economyandemissionsstandards,policiestoencourage
alternativefuels,andotherpoliciesandconditionsthat
couldstronglyreshapeandregulatecaruse.
Tobetterunderstandthefutureofthetransportsector
andtheinfluenceofpolicies,thischapterdevelopsthree
scenariosthatusedifferentassumptionsaboutthelevelof
transportactivity,4vehiclesize/characteristics,andvehicle
technology.Thescenariosareconstructedinabottom-up
fashion,inpartusingparametersandextrapolationsbased
onexperiencesintwocountries,JapanandKorea(South).
Eachscenarioisaccompaniedbypolicies(orlackofpolicies)thatcouldplausiblyleadtotheoutcomeswedescribe.
Thesescenariosareaccounting,notbehavioral,models.
Themaininputassumptionsforthescenariosare
showninTable3.Fueltaxes,vehicleusefees,andother
policiesarenotquantitativeandaresimplyusedasqualitativemeasurestotriggertheotherinputassumptionsin
Table3.TransportandTechnologyScenariosAssumptions
Scenarios
RoadAhead(Baseline)
OilSaved
IntegratedTransport
GDPandPopulation
GDPprojectedtoincrease
at6%annually
GDPprojectedtoincrease
at6%annually
GDPprojectedtoincrease
at6%annually
MotorizationRateofIncrease
By2020,Chinareachesthe
car/GDPratiothatKoreahad
inthemid-1990s
Withhigheroilpricesand
taxes,thenumberofcarsin
2020is10%lowerthanitis
in“RoadAhead”
Withspacebeingasevere
constraintinChinesecitiesand
theimplementationofparking
charges,fees,andtaxes,the
numberofcarsin2020is50%
lessthanin“RoadAhead”
TotalNumberofCars(Millions)
2010:22.8
2020:145.7
2010:20.5
2020:131.2
2010:18.2
2020:72.9
CarCharacteristics(Weight)
Averageweightfallsto
1,200kg
Averageweightfallsto
1,200kgandpowerislower
thanin“RoadAhead”
Averageweightfallstoless
than1,000kgasmini-cars
becomepopular
CarUtilization-Distance
Traveled(km/vehicle/year)
2010:14,496
2020:12,484
2010:13,466
2020:10,238
2010:12,948
2020:8,775
FuelChoices
Almostallcarsrunonoil,
with1%oftotalmotor
vehiclefleetbasedonCNGin
2015and2%in2020
20%ofmotorvehiclesuse
conventionalgasoline;
15%ofvehicleshareareHEVs
in2010and50%in2020;
10%ofvehiclesareCNGin
2010,20%in2020,and
10%areelectricin2020
In2020,30%oftotalmotor
vehiclesaregasolinevehicles,
ofwhich15%aresmall
vehicles;marketpenetration
ofHEVsis25%,smallelectric
cars25%,andCNGcars20%
Assumptionsinthescenarios
Assumptionsmadebutnotquantifiedinthescenarios
FuelTaxes
(Crudeoilpricein2005assumedtobe
approximately$50[2005]perbarrel)
U.S.leveloftaxation,i.e.
approximately$0.20(2005)
perliter
Japanese/Europeanlevelof
taxation,i.e.approximately
$0.70(2005)perliter
Japanese/Europeanlevelof
taxation,i.e.approximately
$0.70(2005)perliter
VehicleUsefees
None
None
Significantchargesonvehicle
useincitiessuchasroad
pricingandparkingcharges
OtherPolicies
None
Encouragementofalternatives
totraditionalgasolinecars
(hybrids,CNG,mini-cars)
Urbantransportpoliciesactively
promotingtheuseofpublic
transportationsystems
Acronyms:GDP(grossdomesticproduct);HEV(hybridelectricvehicle);CNG(compressednaturalgas).
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
55
Box1.IntroductiontoAdvancedandAlternativeFuel
VehicleTechnologies
1.HybridElectricVehicles(HEVs)
HEVsareacrossbetweenconventionalautomobilesandelectricvehicles,combininganelectricdrive(motorandelectricitystorage)andaninternalcombustionengine.HEVsconsumelessenergybyregeneratingenergywhilebraking,
usingsmallerengines,allowingtheenginestobeturnedoffduringstops,
brakingorcoasting,andinsomeconfigurations,themotoralonecanbeusedto
acceleratefromastop(Santinietal.,2001).Apartfromenergyandoilsavings,
HEVswillalsoimproveairqualityandreduceCO2emissions.HEVsarerelatively
lessexpensivetointroducetothemarketthanothertechnologiessuchasfuel
cells,astheydonotrequirenewinfrastructuresforfuelproductionanddistribution(Wang,2003).Plug-inhybridsarenotconsideredinthischapter.
2.CompressedNaturalGas(CNG)
VehiclespoweredbyCNG,asanalternativefuel,couldreduceairpollution
andrelianceonoil.Pervehicle-kilometertraveled,CNGvehiclescouldemit25
percentlesscarbondioxide,90-97percentlesscarbonmonoxide,and35-60
percentlessnitrogenoxidethanconventionalgasolinevehicles,dependingon
theenginedesign(USEPA,2002).Otherthanbeingacleanerfuel,CNGalsohas
potentialadvantageswithrespecttocost,performance,anddurability(dueto
acleancombustionprocessofnaturalgas)(USEPA,2002).Ontheotherhand,
itsfueleconomycouldbeloweroridenticaltoconventionalgasolinevehicles
(USDOE,1999),andsuchvehiclesgenerallyhavehighervehiclecapitaland
infrastructurecosts.
Naturalgasiscurrentlyusedforpublicvehicles,includingbusesandtaxisin
about11cities,includingBeijing,Shanghai,Chongqing,Xi’an,andSichuan.
Therearecurrently50,900natural-gas-fueledvehiclesinChina(He,2003).
WhencomparedwiththeUnitedStates,whichhadabouttwiceasmanynatural
gasvehiclesin2003,themarketpenetrationofnaturalgasvehiclesisrelatively
higherduetoChina’ssignificantlylowernumberoftotalvehicles.SinceCNG
offersthemostengineandvehiclediversities(Rubin,2003),thismarketislikely
tofurtherexpandasChinasearchesforsustainableenergyresources.
3.SmallConventionalGasolineVehicles
Formanydecades,“minicars”withdisplacementoflessthan600ccwere
commoninspace-constrainedJapan(SchipperandKiang,1995).Morerecently,
anumberofmajorcompanies,notablyMercedesBenz,havebeguntodevelop
somewhatlarger“mini-cars.”Createdbythestylish“smart”ofMercedesBenz
andSwatchGroupLtd.,thesecarsarepopularfortheirsmallsizeandarefitted
forurbanparkinganddriving.At40-60mpg,thesearesomeofthemostfuel
efficientinternalcombustioncarsinthemarketand,ateightfeetinlength,
smallenoughtobackintoaparallelparkingspot,withtwofittinginasingle
parkingspace.Withaluminumenginesweighingonly60kilogramsandacurb
weightofabout730kilograms(SMART,2004),itslightweightcontributesto
excellentfueleconomy.
4.SmallElectricVehicles
Electriccarstendtohaveloweroverallprimaryenergyrequirementsperkilometerthangasolinecarsofthesamesize(Delucchi,2005),dependingonprimary
energysources.However,theirlowerspeedsandperformancemeanstheywill
notbedrivenasmuchorasfastasconventionalgasolinecars,thusindirectly
contributingtoenergysavings.Smallelectricvehiclesaremostsuitableforurban
low-speeddrivingenvironmentsandcouldformakeycomponentincreatinga
sustainabletransportsystem.Electricvehiclesareemissions-freeatthepointof
useandcouldpotentiallytransferemissionstolesspopulatedandpollutedareas
(Laveetal.,1995),reducingtransportemissionsinurbancities.Iftheelectricity
usedtorechargesuchvehiclesisproducedusingefficienttechnologiesandrenewableenergyresources,pollutionandenergy-savingbenefitswouldincrease.
Likewise,withfutureadvancementonalternativebatterytechnologies,energy
andcost-efficiencywouldimprove.
56
thescenarios.Box1includessummariesofthedifferent
vehicletechnologies.Amorecompletedescriptionofthe
assumptionscanbefoundinAppendix1.Theoutputsof
thescenarios—measuredinenergyandoilconsumption,
andresultingcarbonemissions—areofcourseonlyasrobustastheparametersandpoliciesappliedtothescenarios.
Theseoutcomesarenotpredictions,butbysettingup
threepossiblefutures,weprovideapictureofthepotential
impactofvarioustechnologiesandotheroptionsthatcould
significantlyaffectpersonalautomobilesandtheiruse.
4.1RoadAhead
The“RoadAhead”(baseline)scenarioassumesthatthe
currentgrowthrateofmotorizationcontinues.Conventionalgasolinevehiclesarethedominantvehicletechnology,caruseisnotrestricted,andnosignificantfueltaxes
areimplementedthrough2020asChinesepolicymakers
followapricingpolicywithminimaltaxes.Itisalsoassumedthatnoothervehicleorfuelpoliciesotherthanfuel
economystandardswillbeimplementedandenforced.In
thisscenario,themarketpenetrationofHEVsis5percent,CNG2percent,andsmallelectriccars0.5percent
by2020.China’slevelofmotorizationisderivedfrom
Korea’s,assuggestedbyFigure1.China,inthisscenario,
reachesthesamenumberofcarsperunitGDPin2020as
KoreawhenKoreahadChina’sprojected2020percapita
GDPin1993.ThebestestimateofChina’son-roadfuel
economytodayis9.5liters/100km.IntheRoadAhead
scenario,thisfigureimprovessimplybecauseofimproved
technologyandthelikelyriseindemandforsmallercars
(i.e.,under1,500kilograms).
4.2OilSaved
“OilSaved”isdrivenbyaclearmovetosaveoil,backed
byphasing-inoffueltaxesuntiltheyreachthelevelof
thoseinJapaninearly2005,atapproximately$2.70/gallon(OilMarketReport,2005).Apartfromconventional
gasolinevehicles,CNGfuels20percentofcarsby2020,
obtaining5percentbetterfueleconomy(USDOE,2005),
andsmallelectricvehiclespower10percent,usingless
primaryenergythangasolineorevenCNGvehicles.In
thisscenario,thereare10percentfewercarsthaninRoad
Ahead,consistentwiththesmalleffectofhigherfuelprices
oncarownershipobservedbyJohanssonandSchipper
(1997).Spurredbyhigherfuelprices,fueleconomyimprovesmuchfasterthaninRoadAhead.Thisencourages
amarketshareof15percentHEVby2010andamore
significant50percentby2020.Thehybridvehicles
useonly80percentofthefuelperkmofconventional
gasolinecars,afigurethatfallsto75percentby2020as
technologyimproves.Higheroilpriceswillpushcaruse
downward,implyingthat25percentofallvehiclessoldin
the2006–10periodarehybrids.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
The“IntegratedTransport”scenarioisaresultof
thoughtfulandsuccessfulresistancetocongestionby
theChineseauthorities.Theoutcomeisbolsteredbythe
popularityofverysmallgasolineandelectriccarswhose
requiredroadspaceislessthanthatofconventionalcars,
andparkingspacesignificantlyless.Additionally,such
smallcarsarenotasfastasconventionalcars;hence,the
overallutilizationpercarinthisscenarioisthelowest
inallthreescenarios.Inthisscenario,smallandhighly
efficientvehicleswillplayaconsiderableroleinreducing
fuelconsumption.Hybrids—togetherwithsmallgasoline,
electric,andCNGvehicles—dominatethemarket,with
conventionalgasolinevehiclesconstitutingonly30percent
ofthetotalmarketby2020.Withthegeneralreductionin
congestiontime,hybridshavelessofanadvantageunder
IntegratedTransportthantheydointheurbantraffic
conditionsillustratedinthefirsttwoscenarios.
Congestion,parkingandaccessdifficulties,aswell
astheimplementationofEuropean-levelfueltaxesand
differenttransportpolicies,suppressthetotalnumberof
carstoapproximately50percentofwhatisestimatedin
RoadAheadin2020.Similarly,annualdistancetraveled
plummetsto9,000kmpervehicleby2020becauseofthe
highcostsofdrivingandtheextraadvantagesofpublic
transport,suchasbusrapidtransit(BRT)andmetrosystemsdesignedtogivealternativehighspeedtravel.5Higher
oilpricessupportbetterfueleconomytogetherwiththe
popularityofverysmallcars,whichareassumedtobe25
percentgasolineand25percentelectricby2020.
5.SCENARIORESULTS
6000
140
Road Ahead
Oil Saved
5000
120
Integrated Transport
100
4000
80
3000
60
2000
40
1000
20
0
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
Energyuseineachscenarioisbrokendownbyvehicle
andfueltypeinFigure5.ComparedtoRoadAhead,energyuseis38percentlowerby2010and78percentlowerby
2020intheIntegratedTransportscenario,assumingthat
strongtransportpoliciesandmeasuresareimplemented.
Total2020oiluseinOilSavedisapproximately55percent
lessthaninRoadAhead,butitisstillmorethantwotimes
higherthanoiluseinIntegratedTransport.Additionally,
thetotaloilconsumedin2020intheIntegratedTransportscenarioisonlymarginallyhigherthanin2003.This
distinction,whilefullyaconsequenceofourassumptions,
showshowpowerfultransportpoliciescanbeinleading
indirectlytohugeoilsavingsandincreasingenergysecurity.
Oilconsumptioncomprisesmostofthetransport
energyuseinRoadAheadat450thousandbarrelsperday
(kbpd)in2010and2,500kbpdin2020.Oilusein2010
inOilSavedis300kbpdandrisesto800kbpdby2020.
InIntegratedTransport,oiluseisamere300kbpdby
2020,12percentofitsvalueinRoadAhead.
5.1Energyconsumption
TheRoadAheadscenariodemonstratesthatifcar
ownershipanduseisunconstrained,oilconsumptionwill
continuetoincreaserapidlyasthenumberofautomobiles
increasesinChina.Thetwootherscenariosofferconsiderablycontrastingresultsandpresentimportantalternative
outcomesledbypolicyoptionsthatareworthconsidering
(Figure4).
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
57
Total Primary Energy, Mtoe
4.3Integratedtransport
Figure4.EnergyConsumptionLevelsintheThreeScenarios
Total Primary Energy, PJ
Theassumptionsusedareconsistentwithexperiencein
Europe,wherethepriceelasticityofcaruseiswithinthe
rangefrom-0.2to-0.3(JohanssonandSchipper,1997).
SincerealfuelpricesinOilSavedareroughly2to3times
higherthanintheRoadAheadscenario,whichused2003
prices,annualdistancetraveledisreducedbyroughly40
percentoveritsinitialvalue,arrivingat10,238kmper
vehicleby2020.Thefactthatcarusedoesnotfurtherdecreaseisareflectionofanimprovementinfueleconomy.
Figure5.EnergyUseforCars,byFuelandPropulsion
120
Oil in Hybrids
1.5
Oil in Conventional
Gasoline Cars
80
1
60
40
0.5
Gasoline equiv, mn bbl per day
CNG
100
Energy Use for Cars, by source, Mtoe
2
Electricity,
as Primary Energy
20
0
Road Ahead
Oil Saved
2020
2015
2010
2005
2003
2020
2015
2010
2005
2003
2020
2015
2010
2003
2005
0
Integrated Transport
Note:Primaryenergyrequiredforelectricitygenerationandtransmissionisincluded,butnoprimaryadjustmentsweremadeforproduction,transmissions,ordistributionofgasolineorCNG.
5.2Carbonemissions
Usingourinputassumptions,weestimated2003
carbonemissionsfromcarsinChinaataround8.8million
metrictonsofcarbon(MtC).6Emissionsgrowto20MtC
in2010and102MtCin2020inRoadAhead,assumingthatnoadditionalpoliciesotherthanexistingfuel
economyregulationswillbeimplemented(Figure6).The
onlyboundaryconditionforourbasecaseisthatimposed
bytheexistingfueleconomystandards.Forcomparison,
IEA(2004a)foreseesChina’stransport-relatedCO2emissionsat162MtCby2020,upfrom67MtCin2002.The
sharefromcars,whilesmallnow,risesrapidly.
Inthesecondscenario,OilSaved,improvedfueleconomy,largelyduetoahighpenetrationofhybridsand
58
restraintsinthesizeandpowerofcars(aidedbyreduced
drivingdistances),couldreducecarbonemissionsin2020
by50percent(Figures6and7).Oneofthedrivingforces
forthisdecreaseincarbonemissionsisashiftfrompresent
fuelpricingtotheJapaneseorEuropeanleveloffueltaxation,whichwouldboostpricesbyafactorofthree.
InIntegratedTransportthoughtfultransportpolicies,
listedinSection6,haveaprofoundimpactonenergyuse,
leadingto40percentlowercarbonemissionsin2010and
79percentin2020comparedtoRoadAhead(Figure7).
Despitemorethantentimestoday’snumberofcars,primaryenergyuseincreasesbyonlyafactorof2.5,only22
percentofthelevelintheunconstrainedcasein2020.In
IntegratedTransport,distancetraveledpervehicleishalf
comparedtoOilSaved.This,combinedwiththeimportantshareofmini-cars,reducesoveralloiluseandcarbon
emissionssignificantly.
6.POLICYOPTIONS
Chinaalreadyhasastrongsetofpolicymeasuresthat
canassistinachievingitsenergysecurity,airquality,and
othergoals.Thissectionproposesadditionaloptionsthat
willhaveanimpactonvehicleownership,vehicleuse,
infrastructureuse,infrastructureaccess,roadspaceuse,
andfueldemand,leadingtoincreasedenergyefficiency,
increasedmobility,andreducedtransportemissions.Most
ofthesepoliciesareimpliedintheassumptionsunderlying
ourscenariosinsection4,wheretheirimpactsarereflected
inthescenarioresultsinsection5.Thepoliciesassumedin
thescenariosandproposedtobeimplementedarediscussedbelowandincludetechnologyrequirements,motor
vehicletaxation,fueltaxation,roadandcongestionpricing
policies,andpublictransportsystemimprovements.
6.1Vehicletechnologyrequirements
Asdescribedearlier,Chinahasalreadystarteddevelopingitsadvancedandalternative-fuelvehicletechnologies.
Forexample,HEVswillbeavailableinthemarketbythe
endof2005.ToyotahasstartedbuildingitsPriushybrid
sedansinChinawithaChinesepartner(FirstAutomotiveWorks).Ifthiseffortisasuccess,itwillleadtogreater
availabilityofHEVtechnologyinChinaandcouldleadto
moreHEVproduction.TheGovernmentofChinahasthe
optiontocontinueattractingandencouragingsuchjoint
efforts,andtoincreasethediversityofadvancedvehicle
technologiesinChina.
Fuelsotherthangasolineanddieselhavealreadybeen
usedinthetransportsector.Thetwoalternativetransport
energysourcesdiscussedinthischapterareCNGandelectricity.Itislikelythattheuseofnaturalgasfortransportationwillcontinuetoincreaseinordertomeetthegrowing
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
6.2Motorvehicletaxation
Vehicletaxationhasbeenimplementedinmany
developedanddevelopingcountries.Whenintegrated
intotransportpolicies,itmayleadtoimprovedtransport
demandmanagementandbeagoodsourceofrevenue.
Vehicletaxationmayalsoencouragedemandtoshiftto
othertransportmodes.Currenttaxesapplicabletomotor
vehiclesinChinaincludevalueadded(VAT),excise,vehicleacquisition,andvehicleusagetaxes(Huang,2005).
AvehicleusagetaxinChinaiscollectedonanannualbasis
andtheamountoftaxpaiddependsonthetypeofvehicle.
Anannualtaxoffersmoreflexibilitythansalestax,astax
ratescanbealteredovertimeandtheburdenisdistributed
overalongertimeperiodforvehicleowners(Schwaaband
Thielmann,2002).
Differentfeaturesmightbeincorporatedintovehicle
taxationaccordingtodifferenttransportstrategies.For
instance,taxationcouldbeimplementedbyvehicletype,
vehicleprice,vehiclesize,ortestemissionandnoiselevels.
Adifferentiatedsystem,asappliedinSwedenandGermany,
offersincentivesforvehicleownerstoswitchtolow
emissionvehicles(IEA,2000;Breithaupt,2002).Thisis
oftentruewhenvehicletaxationisdifferentiatedaccording
tospecificemissionstandards,wheretaxesarehigheron
morepollutingvehicles.Vehiclemanufacturersmayalso
Figure6.TotalCarbonEmissionsfromRoadTransportationinthe
ThreeScenarios,2005–20
120
Road Ahead
Oil Saved
100
Total Carbon Emissions (Mt)
needforcleantransportfuel.Naturalgasisnowusedin
approximately110,000vehicles(mostlybusesandtaxis)
in12Chinesecities(Walsh,2003b).However,thisfuel
isconstrainedbythesupplyofnaturalgas,andthefact
thatitishardertotransportthanoil.Therefore,despiteit
beingarelativelycleanfuel,CNG-operatedvehiclesmight
belimitedtoasmallerroleinthetransportsector,but
couldbeusedinpublicvehiclesinpollutedurbanareas.
Electricityisanothercleantransportenergysourcewith
minimalemissionsimpact.Itisimportanttonotethat
althoughemissionsmaybeproducedduringtheproductionofelectricity,dependingonthetypeofelectricpower
generation,electricvehiclesarestilleffectivewhenusedfor
shorttraveldistances,especiallysmallelectriccarsusedin
urbancities.Sincethemainbarriertousingelectricityin
motorvehiclesisthestorageofelectricity(Walsh,2003b),
furthervehicletechnologydevelopmentisrequiredfor
greaterbatterystoragesystems.
Althoughmosttechnologiesarealreadyavailable,China
needstocreatetherightmarketforsuchtechnologiesto
bedevelopedcommercially.Thedemandforadvanced
andalternative-fuelvehicletechnologiesshouldalsobe
encouraged.
Integrated Transport
80
60
40
20
0
2005
2010
2015
2020
beencouragedtodeveloplesspollutingvehiclesthatcould
bepreferredbyconsumersduetolowertaxation(Schwaab
andThielmann,2002).However,itisimportanttonote
thatvehicletaxation,unlikeothertaxationoptions,does
notcontributetovariablecostsoftransportationand
thereforeisunlikelytoinfluencevehiclemilestraveledor
otherdrivinghabits.
Vehicletaxationwouldbethehighestinthethird
scenario,IntegratedTransport,asauthoritiesreduce
congestionandprivatemotorizationdemandbyincreasingvehiclecosts.Intheothertwoscenarios—RoadAhead
andOilSaved—theownershipanduseofvehiclesarenot
taxedassubstantially.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
59
Figure7.CarbonEmissionsfromMotorVehiclesofDifferent
TechnologiesbyFuel
90
0.09
CNG
Oil
80
0.08
Carbon/km
70
0.07
60
0.06
50
0.05
40
0.04
30
0.03
20
0.02
10
0.01
0
Road Ahead
Oil Saved
2020
2015
2010
2005
2003
2020
2015
2010
2005
2003
2020
2015
2010
2003
0
2005
Carbon Emissions (Mt)
0.1
Electric Cars
Carbon (kg/km)
100
Integrated Transport
6.3Fueltaxation
Usingfueltaxationasapolicyinstrumentcanrecover
thevariablecostsofdrivingbychargingvehicleusersfor
transportinfrastructureindirectlythroughindividualuse.
Sincefuelisoneofthehighestandmostvisiblevariable
costsofvehicleuse,fueltaxesencouragedriverstomake
moreefficientuseoftheirvehicles,reducetripfrequencies,andevenswitchtolessfuel-intensivevehicles.Most
importantly,fueltaxeshelpreflecttherealcostsofdependencyonforeignoilsupplies,storingoilintheeventofan
interruption,andotherexternalities.
Theleveloffueltaxesimposedshouldbeenoughto
abatevehicleemissionsandserveasrevenuefortransport
infrastructureandmaintenancepurposes.Therevenues
collectedfromtransportfuelareusuallyallocatedfor
transportpurposes,asseeninmanyotherdeveloped,
transition,anddevelopingcountries(Carruthers,2002).
Fuelpricesshouldincludetaxestoreflecttheperceived
60
externalitiesandrisksofforeignoilimports,andfeesto
reflecttheenvironmentaldamagesrelatedtofuelquality.
ThelatterwasthegoaloffueltaxationreforminSweden
inthelate1980sandearly1990s,astaxesroseonmore
pollutingfuelsbutfelloncleanerfuels(IEA,2000).
FueltaxesinChinaarevirtuallynonexistentatpresent.
Iffuelpricescontinuetoremainlow,energyconsumption
andemissionsfromthetransportsectorcouldfollowthe
projectionsintheRoadAheadscenario.IfChinawantsto
reduceitsenergyconsumptiontolevelsprojectedinthe
OilSavedandIntegratedTransportscenarios,aJapaneseequivalentrateoffueltaxesshouldbeimplementedin
ordertoencouragelessoilconsumptionbyindividual
consumers.Anincreaseinfueltaxeswillleadtoastronger
interestforadvancedvehiclesandalternativefuelvehicle
technologies.
6.4Roadpricing
Roadpricingisanotherdemandmanagementstrategy
throughwhichdriverspaydirectlyforutilizingpublic
services.Someexamplesaretollroads,tollbridges,and
congestionpricingsystems,wherebydriversarecharged
whenenteringspecificzonesduringcertaintimeperiods.
Roadpricingisusuallyimplementedbypublicorprivate
highwayagenciesorlocalauthoritiesaspartoftransportationdemandmanagementprograms;thiswouldbethe
caseforChinaaswell.Revenuecollectedcanbeusedto
coverinvestmentcostsoftransportinfrastructureand
maintenance,includingalternativestocars.
Theseapproachescanreduceoverallvehicleuseand
shiftsometravelpatternstolesscongestedtimes.Since
fueluseperkilometerriseswithcongestion,congestion
measurestendtoslightlyimprovefueleconomy.ExperiencefromLondon,forexample,showsthattheimpositionofa£5feeonbringingacarintoawell-defined
zoneduringbusinesshoursledto15percentfewercars
enteringthatzone.Singaporehasalsoachievedsimilar
results(Menon,2000).Giventhecongestioninmost
largeChinesecities,theimplementationofsuchsystems
isanoptiontoconsider.
Chargingforscarceroadspaceisanimportantstrategy
forChinesecities,wherecentralareashaveaslittleasone
fifthofthespacepercapitacomparedwithevenmore
trafficcongestedcitiessuchasLondon,Paris,andNew
York(Mao,2004).TheShanghaiMetropolitanTransport
WhitePaper(People’sGovernmentofShanghaiMunicipality,2002)7discusseselectronicroadpricing,whichisa
modelthatSingaporehasfollowedinitsgeneraltransport
strategyforthepasttwodecades(Menon,2000).This
pricingschemeissophisticated,asvehiclesarechargedon
aperentrybasisandcouldvarydependingontheday,
timeofday,thetypeandsizeofvehicle,congestionlevel,
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
andtheroadandplaceofentry(Breithaupt,2002).Here,
publiceducationwasnecessarybeforetheimplementation
ofthesystemtobetterinformmotoristsandtoensurea
smoothtransition.
Alessonthatemergesfromexistingexperienceis
thataneffectiveroadpricingsystemhastobedesigned
specificallytoacity’sneedsandtomatchthelocaltraffic
conditions.Applyingonecity’sapproachtoanothercity
withoutcarefuladaptationisrisky.TheVehicleQuota
SystemimplementedinSingaporein1990,forinstance,
couldbeapplicableelsewherebutwouldrequireadaptation.Thisquotasystemdeterminesthenumberofnew
vehiclesallowedforregistration,whilethedemandfornew
vehicleregistrationsdeterminesthepricetoregister.The
vehiclequotaforagivenyearisadministeredthroughthe
monthlyreleaseofCertificatesofEntitlement,whichmay
costasmuchasacar.
Roadpricingpoliciesareextremelyimportantinthe
IntegratedTransportscenario,wherecongestionislargely
avoidedasasignificantproblembecauseofroadpricing
andothercomplementarymeasurestoregulatecaruse.If
thisscenarioistoberealized,itisimportanttoannounce
andimplementroadpricingpoliciesearly,beforetoo
muchinvestmentinprivateautomobilesandoninfrastructurethatisdependentonprivatevehicleuseismade
inthemostcongestedzones.Ofparticularappealfor
Chinesecitiesisthefactthatwithafewexceptions,private
carownershipislow,hencetheinitialimpactswillonly
befeltbyconsumersofrelativelyhigherincomelevels.A
majorimpactoftheLondonschemewastheclearingof
cartrafficthatotherwiseslowedbuses(andbicycles),even
ata20percentreductionincartraffic.Therefore,theearly
impositionofcongestioncharginginChinesecitieswould
likelybenefitthemajorityofpresentnon-carusers,aswell
ascaruserswhodoelecttopaycarusefees.
6.5Publictransportationand
non-motorizedtransport
Tobeanattractivealternative,apublictransportsystem
hastoprovidespeed,convenience,comfort,andaffordability.Thisrequirespolicychangesandsignificantinvestment.Ifmasstransitsystemssuchasconventionalbuses,
fastbusesindedicatedcorridors(i.e.BRT),metros,and
otherrail-boundsystemsaretocompetewithprivatecars
orevenmotorbikes,theymustimprovewithrespectto
speedandcost,asanincreasingnumberofChinesefamilieswillbeabletoaffordprivatemotorvehicles.Doingso
wouldalsodeliverenvironmentalbenefitsandtransport
efficiencybenefits.
Themostimportantandcost-effectivewayofpromotingeffectivepublictransportsystemsinChinaisthrough
BRT.Thesesystemshavehighcapacityvolume,segregated
buslanes,rapidembarkinganddisembarkingfeatures,
transitprioritizationatintersections,andmodalintegrationatbusstationsandterminals.Suchcharacteristicsare
appealingtopassengers,andwillaidinachievingsustainableurbantransportationinhigh-population-densityurbancitiesbyreducingcongestion,vehicularemissions,and
byprovidingacost-effectivealternativetransportmode.
Someofthesebenefitscanalsobeattainedbynonmotorizedtransport(NMT).Pedestriansandcyclistsgenerate
neitherconventionalairpollutionnorCO2.Pedestrians
andcyclistsarealsomoreefficientusersofscarceroadspace
thanprivatemotorvehicles,alongwithbeingthemost
efficientandenvironmentallysustainablewhenmaking
relativelyshorttrips(Hook,2002).Invirtuallyeveryother
country,however,NMThasyieldedtomotorizedpublic
transportandthenindividualvehicles.Themostnotable
countrieswhereNMTretains20percentormoreshareof
alltripsinurbanareasareDenmarkandtheNetherlands,
butthehighshareofNMTcomesprincipallyatthecostof
bustravelandshortcartrips.Highfueltaxes,carefulurban
planning,anintegratednetworkofdedicatedbikelanes,
andastrongcomponentoflocalcommercialactivitieskeep
thesealternativestocarsimportant.
TheGovernmentofChinacouldcontinuetoencouragepublictransportinvestmentstoenhanceitsqualityand
promotecyclingandwalkingwithinurbancities.Good
alternativetransportmodesprovideoptionstoprivatecar
ownershipanduse,andwilllimitcongestionandtransport
pollution.ThisphenomenonisprojectedintheIntegrated
Transportscenario,whereseveretrafficcongestionstarts
torestricttotalcarutilizationandsignificantchargesare
addedtoincreasethetotalcostofdrivingatthesametime.
IntheOilSavedscenario,theuseofpublictransportation
willalsoincreaseashigheroilpricesandtaxeswilldiscourageprivatevehicleuse.Agoodpublictransportsystem
willhenceaidindecreasingprivatevehicleusebybeinga
moreaffordableandefficientalternative.Thechallengefor
Chinaistoincreasethespeed,reliability,andconvenience
ofitspublictransportationsystemsbeforetoomanyindividualschoosetouseprivatetransportmodes.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
61
6.6Parkingcharges
Asurbanlandforparkingbecomesscarcer,parking
chargesshouldbeincreasedasameasuretoefficiently
allocateparkingspaces.Parkingisfreeorchargedata
subsidizedrateinmanycountries(Breithaupt,2002).
However,asademandsidemanagementmeasure,the
costsofparkingfacilitiesoron-streetparkingshouldbe
distributedtomotorists.Everymotoristshouldknowwhat
itreallycoststobringacarintoazonewherelandspace
isscarce.Parkingchargescancreatesubstantialrevenues
forlocalmunicipalitiesandcouldbeusedfortransport
infrastructuremaintenance.
Theimplementationofparkingfeeswillincreasethe
costofdrivinginurbanareas,whichwillmakeprivatecar
uselessappealing.ForChina,thiswillcertainlyinfluence
futurepatternsofcaruse.Congestion,aswellasvehicular
emissions,coulddecrease,especiallywhenpublictransport
modesareencouraged.Raisingparkingfeestoreflectthe
realcostsandvalueofspace—andenforcingexistingparkingrules—discouragestheuseofcarsincongestedregions.
62
7.CONCLUSION
Thetrendsandscenariosexaminedinthischapter
illustrateimportantchoicesChinesepolicymakersmust
confront.Onanationallevel,Chinaisinthe“infancy”of
personalmotorization;Chineseauthoritieshavenearly100
yearsofexperiencetodrawonfromothercountriesonthe
positiveandnegativeimpactsofmotorization.Giventhe
rapidityofmotorizationgrowthinChina,authoritieshave
toactfastinordertoavoidtrafficsafety,urbancongestion,
pollution,andenergyproblemsthatwillincreasetogether
withcontinuedrapidmotorization.Cleaner,safer,rapid
transportationsystemsthatincreaseaccesstomorepeople
havetobedeveloped,ratherthanfollowingthenarrower
pathofrapidindividualmotorization,asscenesfrom
congestedBeijingandothermajorChinesecitiesalready
suggest.Thesoonermeasuresareconsidered,themoreeffectivetheywillbe.Thelongerpolicymakerswait,themore
technologies,fuelchoices,andtravelpatternswillbelocked
inbythefixedinvestmentsrequiredtosupportthem.
AkeyissuesofaroverlookedbyChineseauthorities
isthatmanymotorizationimpactsdependnotonlyon
theemissionsperkilometer,butalsoonthetotaldistance
driven.Inthecaseofurbanairpollution,thecurrent
focusonemissionsperkilometerisproper,giventheneed
toimprovefuelqualityandtheenforcementofmore
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
stringentemissionsstandards.Ifthepresenttrendsincar
usecontinue,thehugeincreaseindistancetraveledwill
increaseemissionssignificantly,henceoffsettingmuch
ofthepromiseofimprovedemissionscontrolthrough
currentairqualityandemissionsregulations.Thus,there
aregoodreasonsforauthoritiestoconsiderstrategiesthat
willslowtheriseintotaldistancetraveled,particularlyin
urbancities.
Similarly,thenumberofmotorvehiclesandthetotal
distancetraveledarethekeyfactorsindeterminingtotal
energyconsumptionandcarbonemissions.Nevertheless,
sincethegrowthofmotorizationinChinaislikelyto
continuetoincreaseforthenextfewdecades,theuseof
advancedandalternative-fuelvehicletechnologiesshould
alsoreducetheexternalitiesofmotorizationwhilemeeting
thedemandsforprivatecaruse.Withtheappropriate
policyactions,itisalsopossibletohavewidespreaduse
ofclean,small,andefficientcarsinthefuture,especially
ifcaruseisregulatedbybothrestraintpoliciesandthe
strategicprovisionofalternativetransportmeans.
Ourthirdscenario,IntegratedTransport,isdrivenby
avisionofanidealfutureChinesecitywithminimalcongestiondelay.Oilisalimitingconcern,butnotthedriving
factorfortheresultsshowninthisscenario.Theissues
thatdecidethequalityoflifeinChinesecities—including
populationdensityandsize,landuse,andthestructureof
economicandculturalactivities—arefartooimportant
tobedeterminedsolelybyoilmarkets.However,Chinese
authoritiesmayrecognizethatahigh-oil,high-car-use
modelofacityinChinamayactuallyleavemostChinese
withfewerchoicesandalowerqualityoflifebecauseof
theconstraintsofspaceandairpollution.
Fueltaxationandroadpricingplayamajorrolein
reducingvehicleuse,energyconsumption,andcarbon
emissionsinIntegratedTransport.Thetimingoffuel
taxationiscrucial,asearlyimpositiongivestheautomobile
industrymoretimetoadapttoitsgrowingproduction
capabilitiestoproducevehiclesthatcapturethedesired
socialbenefitsofthetaxes.Theearlierpoliciesareimplemented,thelargerthefractionofChina’spotentialfuture
driverswillhavegrownupunderapolicywiththegoalof
asustainabletransportsysteminmind.Sinceonlyasmall
minorityofChineseownprivatecarstoday,andmost
ofthemarefromrelativelywell-to-dourbanhouseholds,
imposingfueltaxesandroadpricingislikelytobringa
netsocietalbenefit.Privatecaruserswillbeartheburden
ofincreasedtaxesandcharges,butthepotentialresultsof
lessdrivingandcongestionwillbenefitthelargemajority
ofpedestrians,cyclists,andbusriders.Themorerevenue
ischanneledintoinfrastructureprojects,congestion-alleviatingprojects,andalternativetransportdevelopment,
themorethepublicwillaccepttheimpositionofrelevant
charges.Finally,assuchchangesareintroduced,itwould
beimportantforChineselocalandnationalauthorities
tomeasuretheimpactofpricingpoliciesthroughsurveys
ofcarandfueluse,traveltime,andotherimpactsofthe
policies,ashasbeendoneinLondonandSingaporein
connectionwithcongestioncharging.
Advancedvehicles,alternativevehicles(suchasminicars),andalternative-vehiclefueltechnologiesalready
existandcouldbeaffordableifChinacreatesamarketfor
thesetechnologies.Sincethetransportsector,intermsof
privatemotorization,isstillrelativelyyoungcomparedto
mostothercountries,Chinahasanopportunitytotruly
revolutionizeitsautoindustryandprivateautomobile
market.Itisimportanttonote,however,thatevenifthe
entireChinesefleetofmotorvehiclesistransformedto
advancedoralternativefuelvehicles,thebasicproblemsof
motorization,suchasheavycongestionandroadtrafficaccidents,willstillpersist.Additionally,cleanervehiclesand
fuelsalonemaynoteliminateairpollutionifthedistance
traveledpervehicleisnotalsoreduced(Walsh,1996).
Vehicledemandhastobeoptimallymanagedand
regulatedinordertoreducetheadverseimpactsoftransportation,includingenergyconsumption,congestion,air
pollution,andultimatelyGHGemissions.Advancedand
alternativefuelvehicletechnologiesarepartofthesolution
toreducesuchadversemotorizationimpacts,butappropriatepolicymeasuresthatcouldchangetravelpatternshave
tobeimplementedandenforcedascomplementarytools.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
63
ENDNOTES
REFERENCES
Furtherbackgroundontrendsandimpactsofrapidmotorizationin
ChinacanbefoundinSchipperandNg,2005.
2Numerouspressreportsinthefirstthirdof2005suggestoverall
slowingofcarsales,andashifttowardsmaller,lessexpensivemodels
aswell.The1,500kilogramaverageshouldfall,atleastduringthe
presentphaseofmarketexpansion.Atighteningmarketforcarloans
istheprincipalreasonforthismarketweakening.
3Euroemissionsstandardsforpassengercarsandlightvehicleswere
implementedintheEuropeanUnionasearlyasin1993(EuroI)to
reduceairpollutionfromtransportation.Vehiclesmustmeetcertain
exhaustemissionsstandardsbeforetheycanbeapprovedforsalein
theEuropeanUnion.TheEuroIVemissionsstandardiscurrently
implementedintheEuropeanUnion.
4“Activitylevel”includesthenumberofcars,thedistancescarsare
driven,andtheoveralldistancepeopletravelincars,onfoot,andon
allothermodes,whichisreferredtoas“modalsplit”asdescribedin
Schipperetal.(2002).
5Sincebustravel,particularlybyBRT,wouldonlyuse10percentas
muchfuel/passenger-kmascartravel,theincrementaloilneedsfor
shiftstobusesindicatedherearesmall.
6CO from“roadtransport”in2002,accordingtoIEA(2004c),was
2
about41MtC.Calculationsheresuggestthatcarsconstitutejust
over20percentofthisfigure.Trucks,buses,two-wheelers,andother
motorvehiclesoperatingonroadwaysarelikelytoconstitutethelarge
(butdeclining)partoftransport-relatedemissionsfromChina.
7TheShanghaiMetropolitanTransportWhitePaperisthefirstcomprehensivetransportplanforthecitythatoutlinescurrentandfuture
transportationneedsandsetsspecificobjectivesandactionsforcity
plannersandmanagers.ThewhitepaperwasissuedinApril2002,
andisthefirstofitskindforanycityinChina.Thewhitepaperwas
createdtorespondtothetransportationneedsShanghaiwillfaceas
itspopulationexpandsinthenext20yearsandasprivateautomobile
ownershipgrowsalongwithit.
8“Privatevehicles,”definedascarsandprivatelyownedhouseholdlight
trucksandSUVs,numberedapproximately12millionin2003,or9.2
per1000population.Thenumberofcarswehavechosenforhistoricalanalysisisfromatimeseriesdevisedandusedasthebasisofthe
workinHeetal.(2004).
9Inadditiontothekeyscenarioassumptionsnotedhere,thenumberof
cars,shareofcarsbyeachfueltype,distancedriven,fueleconomy,and
improvementinfueleconomyfromhybridizationarejustasimportant.Otherassumptionsmadeinthescenariosincludetheavailability
ofnaturalgasusedforcompressinggasatfillingstations,theexact
fuelcyclecarbonemissionforgasoline,naturalgas,andfuelsusedfor
electricpowerproduction.Theseminorassumptionsdifferverylittle
amongthescenariosandthereforedonot“cause”thevariationsdriven
bythekeyassumptions.
An,F.2003.
An,F.2003.GHGEmissionsandOilConsumptionsfrom
TransportationSectorsinUSandChina:CurrentStatusand
FutureTrend.PowerPointPresentation.SustainableMulti-Modal
TransportationforChineseCitiesInternationalSeminar.
Shanghai,China.Availableat:http://www.autoproject.org.cn/
Chinese/new_advance_cn/2003_shanghai.pdf(May10,2005).
1
An,F.andA.Sauer.2004.ComparisonofAutomobileFuel
An,F.andA.Sauer.2004.
EfficiencyandGHGEmissionsStandardsaroundtheWorld.Pew
CenteronGlobalClimateChange.
Bezlova,Antoaneta.2005.
Bezlova,Antoaneta.2005.SuspicionsRemainoverChina’s
GreetingofKyotoProtocol.IPS-InterPressService.Availableat:
http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=27475(May9,2005).
BP.2004.EnergyinFocus.BPStatisticalReviewofWorld
BP.2004.
Energy.June.
Breithaupt,Manfred.2002.
Breithaupt,Manfred.2002.“Module1d:EconomicInstruments.”SustainableTransport:ASourcebookforPolicy-makersin
DevelopingCities.GTZ,TZVerlagsgesellschaftmbH.
Brown,Warren.2004.“AutomakersfindChinaripefornew
Brown,Warren.2004.
technology.”WashingtonPost.Oct.17.
Carruthers,Robin.2002.
Carruthers,Robin.2002.ImplementingaTransportFuelCharge
inChina.EastAsiaTransportSectorUnit.TheWorldBank.
CATARC.2004.
CATARC.2004.ChinaAutomotiveIndustryYearbook.China
AutomotiveTechnology&ResearchCenter.Tianjin,China.
Chen,Changhongetal.2005.
Chen,Changhongetal.2005.ShanghaiMobileSource.
EmissionsInventoryStudy.FinalReport.ShanghaiAcademyof
EnvironmentalSciences.
Delucchi,MarkA.2005.ResearchScientist,Institute
Delucchi,MarkA.2005.
ofTransportationStudies,UniversityofCalifornia–Davis.
PersonalCommunication.
Demirdöven,N.andJ.Deutch.2004.
Demirdöven,N.andJ.Deutch.2004.“HybridCarsNow,
FuelCellCarsLater.”Science.Vol.305:974-976.
Dieselnet.2005.
Dieselnet.2005.EmissionStandards.EuropeanUnion.
Availableat:http://www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/ld.html
(Oct.6,2005).
Duvall,M.etal.2002.
Duvall,M.etal.2002.ComparingtheBenefitsandImpacts
ofHybridElectricVehicleOptionsforCompactSedanandSport
UtilityVehicles.TechnicalReport,ElectricPowerResearch
Institute(EPRI).
EuropeanCommissionDirective70/220/EEC.2002.
EuropeanCommissionDirective70/220/EEC.2002.Official
JournaloftheEuropeanCommunities.TheEuropeanParliament.
Gallagher,K.S.2003.“ForeignTechnologyinChina’sAutomoGallagher,K.S.2003.
bileIndustry:ImplicationsforEnergy,EconomicDevelopment,
andEnvironment.”ChinaEnvironmentSeries.WoodrowWilson
CenterforInternationalScholars,WashingtonDC.
He,K.andC.Cheng.1999.“PresentandFuturePollution
He,K.andC.Cheng.1999.
fromUrbanTransportinChina.”ChinaEnvironmentalSeries,3.
WoodrowWilsonCenter.
64
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
He,D.2003.
He,D.2003.NaturalGasVehicleDevelopmentinChina.
PresentationatBetterAirQuality(BAQ)2003.TheChina
SustainableEnergyProgram,EnergyFoundationBeijing.
OICA(InternationalAssociationofAutomobileManufacturers).
2005.“OICAStatistics”(for2004and2000)Availableat:
2005.
http://www.oica.net/htdocs/statistics/statistics.htm(June7,2005).
He,Kebinetal.2004.“OilConsumptionandCO2Emissions
He,Kebinetal.2004.
inChina’sRoadTransport:CurrentStatus,FutureTrends,and
PolicyImplications.”EnergyPolicy,articleinpress.
OilMarketReport.2005.IEA.Availableat:http://omrpublic.
OilMarketReport.2005.
iea.org/(October6,2005).
Hook,Walter.2002.
Hook,Walter.2002.“Module3d:PreservingandExpanding
theRoleofNon-motorizedTransport.”SustainableTransport:
ASourcebookforPolicy-makersinDevelopingCities.GTZ,TZ
VerlagsgesellschaftmbH.
Huang,Y.2005.“LeveragingtheChineseTaxSystemtoPromote
Huang,Y.2005.
CleanVehicles.”CATARC.StudiesonInternationalFiscalPolicies
forSustainableTransportation.EnergyFoundation.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2000.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2000.TheRoadfromKyoto:
CurrentCO2andTransportPoliciesintheIEA.Paris:OECD/IEA.
IEA.2004a.WorldEnergyOutlook.Paris:OECD/IEA.
IEA.2004a.
IEA.2004b.
IEA.2004b.EnergyBalancesforOECDCountriesandEnergy
Balancesfornon-OECDCountries(2004editions).Paris:
OECD/IEA.
IEA.2004c.CO2EmissionsfromFuelCombustion(2004edition).
IEA.2004c.
Paris:OECD/IEA.Availableat:http://data.iea.org/ieastore/co2_
main.asp.
Johansson-Stenman,O.andL.Schipper.1997.
Johansson-Stenman,O.andL.Schipper.1997.“Measuring
Long-runAutomobileFuelDemand;SeparateEstimations
ofVehicleStock,MeanFuelIntensity,andMeanAnnual
DrivingDistance.”JournalofTransportEconomicsandPolicy
31(3):277-92.
Kiang,N.andL.Schipper.1996.
Kiang,N.andL.Schipper.1996.“EnergyTrendsintheJapanese
TransportationSector.”TransportPolicy3(1/2):21-35.
Lan,X.2005.
Lan,X.2005.“WhatWilltheKyotoProtocolMeanforthe
LargestDevelopingCountryintheWorld?”BeijingReview11.
Availableat:http://www.bjreview.com.cn/En-2005/05-11-e/
11-china-2.htm(May6).
Lave,L.B.etal.1995.
Lave,L.B.etal.1995.“EnvironmentalImplicationsofElectric
Cars.”Science268(5213):993-995.
Li,J.2004.“EuroIIIinthePipeline.”GlobalTimes.Available
Li,J.2004.
at:http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Aug/103326.htm
(June7,2005).
Li,Y.2000.
Li,Y.2000.“TheCostsofImplementingtheKyotoProtocol
anditsImplicationstoChina.”InternationalReviewfor
EnvironmentalStrategies1(1):159-174.InstituteforGlobal
EnvironmentalStrategies.
People’sGovernmentofShanghaiMunicipality.2002.
People’sGovernmentofShanghaiMunicipality.2002.“Shanghai
MetropolitanTransportWhitePaper.”DocumentNo.[2002]
35.(April30).
Plotkin,S.etal.2001.
Plotkin,S.etal.2001.HybridElectricVehicleTechnologyAssessment:Methodology,AnalyticalIssues,andInterimResults.Center
forTransportationResearch,EnergySystemsDivision,Argonne
NationalLaboratory.
QinChuanandZhuBaoxia.2004.
QinChuanandZhuBaoxia.2004.“Governmentmovesto
complywithKyoto.”ChinaDaily.Availableat:http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-11/17/content_392361.
htm(May9,2005).
Rubin,J.2003.
Rubin,J.2003.“DrivingtoNewSourcesofTransportation
Energy:GainingFlexibility,EnsuringSupply,andReducing
Emissions.”TRNews226.(May—June)TransportationResearch
Board.
Santini,D.etal.2001.HybridElectricVehicleTechnologyAssessSantini,D.etal.2001.
ment:Methodology,AnalyticalIssues,andInterimResults.Center
forTransportationResearch,ArgonneNationalLaboratory.
UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergy.
Sauer,A.andF.An.2004.TakingtheHigh(FuelEconomy)
Sauer,A.andF.An.2004.
Road:WhatDotheNewChineseFuelEconomyStandardsMean
forForeignAutomakersinChina?Washington,DC:World
ResourcesInstitute.
Schipper,L.,C.Marie-Lilliu,andR.Gorham.2000.
Schipper,L.,C.Marie-Lilliu,andR.Gorham.2000.Flexingthe
LinkbetweenTransportandGreenhouseGasEmissions:APathfor
theWorldBank.Paris:IEA.
Schipper,LeeandWei-ShieunNg.2005.
Schipper,LeeandWei-ShieunNg.2005.“RapidMotorization
inChina:EnvironmentalandSocialChallenges.”Background
paperforConnectingEastAsia:ANewFrameworkforInfrastructure.AsianDevelopmentBank,JapanBankforInternational
Cooperation,andtheWorldBank.Availableat:http://lnweb18.
worldbank.org/eap/eap.nsf/Attachments/background+2/$File/
China_Motorization.pdf(June16,2005).
Schipper,Leeetal.2002.
Schipper,Leeetal.2002.RapidMotorizationintheLargest
CountriesinAsia:ImplicationforOil,CarbonDioxideand
Transportation.Paris:IEA.
Mao,Z.etal.2001.
Mao,Z.etal.2001.TrafficandUrbanAirPollution:TheCaseof
Xi’ancity,P.R.China.PresentedattheAsianDevelopmentBank
(ADB)TransportPlanning,DemandManagement,andAir
QualityWorkshop,Manila,Philippines,Feb.26—27.Available
at:http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2002/RETA5937/
Manila/downloads/tp_15C_maozhongan.PDF(June7,2005).
Menon,G.2000.“ERPinSingapore:APerspectiveOneYear
Menon,G.2000.
On.”TheERPExperienceinSingapore,tec,February.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
65
USEPA.2002.
USEPA.2002.CleanAlternativeFuels:CompressedNatural
Gas.EPA420-F-00-033.TransportationandAirQuality,
TransportationandRegionalProgramsDivision,UnitedStates
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.
USDOE.1999.
USDOE.1999.AlternativeFuelCaseStudy:BarwoodCabFleet
StudySummary.OfficeofEnergyEfficiencyandRenewable
Energy,UnitedStatesDepartmentofEnergy.
Walsh,MichaelP.1996.“ThemePaper2:MotorVehicle
Walsh,MichaelP.1996.
PollutionControlinChina:AnUrbanChallenge.”China’sUrbanTransportDevelopmentStrategy.Proceedingsofasymposium
inBeijing,November8–10,1995.(eds.S.StaresandLiuZhi).
TheWorldBankDiscussionPaperNo.352,theWorldBank.
Walsh,MichaelP.2000.“TransportationandtheEnvironment
Walsh,MichaelP.2000.
inChina.”ChinaEnvironmentSeries(3).WoodrowWilson
CenterEnvironmentalChangeandSecurityProject.The
WoodrowWilsonCenter.
Walsh,MichaelP.2003a.TheNeedforandPotentialBenefits
Walsh,MichaelP.2003a.
ofAdvancedTechnologyVehiclesinChina.HybridVehicle
TechnologyWorkshop.TheChinaSustainableProgram,the
EnergyFoundation.
Walsh,MichaelP.2003b.“MotorVehiclePollutionandFuel
Walsh,MichaelP.2003b.
ConsumptioninChina:theLong-termChallenges.”Energyfor
SustainableDevelopmentVII(4).
Schwaab,J.andS.Thielmann.2002.
Schwaab,J.andS.Thielmann.2002.PolicyGuidelinesfor
RoadTransportPricing:APracticalStep-by-stepApproach.United
NationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaandthe
Pacific&DeutscheGesellschaftfurTechnischeZusammenarbeit
(GTZ)GmbH.
SMART.2004.
SMART.2004.TechnicalData.SmartFortwoCoupe&Smart
FortwoCabrioCatalogue.Availableat:www.thesmart.co.uk.
(Feb.2,2005).
Stares,S.andZ.Liu.1996.
Stares,S.andZ.Liu.1996.“MotorizationinChineseCities:
IssuesandActions.”InChina’sUrbanTransportDevelopment
Strategy.ProceedingsofaSymposiuminBeijing,November8–10,
1995,WorldBankDiscussionPaperNo.352.EastAsiaand
PacificRegionSeries,theWorldBank.
TheNationalAcademies.2003.
TheNationalAcademies.2003.PersonalCarsandChina.
ChineseAcademyofEngineering,NationalResearchCouncilof
theNationalAcademies.TheNationalAcademiesPress.
UNFCCC.1992.
UNFCCC.1992.UnitedNationsFrameworkConventionon
ClimateChange.
UNFCCC.1997.
UNFCCC.1997.KyotoProtocoltotheClimateChange
Convention.
Walsh,MichaelP.2004.“MotorVehiclePollutionandFuel
Walsh,MichaelP.2004.
ConsumptioninChina.”Urbanization,Energy,andAirPollution
inChina:TheChallengesAhead,ProceedingsofaSymposium.
TheNationalAcademiesPress.
Wang,H.andC.Wu.2004.“EnvironmentalInstitutionsin
Wang,H.andC.Wu.2004.
China.”Urbanization,Energy,andAirPollutioninChina:
TheChallengesAhead,ProceedingsofaSymposium.The
NationalAcademiesPress.
Wang,Michael.2003.
Wang,Michael.2003.HybridElectricVehicleStatusand
DevelopmentintheU.S.HybridVehicleTechnologyWorkshop.
TheChinaSustainableProgram,theEnergyFoundation.
Wang,M.Q.andH.S.Huang.1999.
Wang,M.Q.andH.S.Huang.1999.AFullFuel-CycleAnalysis
ofEnergyandEmissionsImpactsofTransportationFuelsProduced
fromNaturalGas.CenterforTransportationResearch,Energy
SystemsDivision,ArgonneNationalLaboratory.
Xinhuanet.2004a.“ChinaNewAutoRulesExplainedbythe
Xinhuanet.2004a.
ChinaDaily.”APECCNewsBriefing,1(2)July.Supplementary
IssueonChina’sNewAutoPolicy.AutoProjectonEnergyand
ClimateChange(APECC),ChinaProgram.
Xinhuanet.2004b.
Xinhuanet.2004b.“ChinaIssuesNewAutoRules.”APECC
NewsBriefing,1(1)July.AutoProjectonEnergyandClimate
Change(APECC),ChinaProgram.
Xinhuanet.2004c.
Xinhuanet.2004c.“BPClaimsWorldReservesofOil,Gasin
GoodShape.”APECCNewsBriefing,1(1)July.AutoProjecton
EnergyandClimateChange(APECC),ChinaProgram.
Yan,W.2005.
Yan,W.2005.“NewStartforCleanAir:TheKyotoProtocol
PlacesNewLimitsonGlobalEmissions,butChallengesRemain.”
BeijingReview10.Availableat:http://www.bjreview.com.cn/
En-2005/05-10-e/10-world-5.htm(May6,2005).
66
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Appendix1.SCENARIOANDTECHNICALASSUMPTIONS
Appendix1.
Thevariablesinthischapterincludebasicmotorization
factorsandtrendsinChina,estimatesofcarownership,
caruse,andfueleconomy.ThenumberofcarsinChina
inagivenfutureyearistheparameterwiththegreatest
likelyvariation.Thisandothervariablesareprojectedinto
thefuturewithtrendsderivedfromneighboringcountries
withhigherincomelevels.Descriptionoftheassumptions
includethefollowing:
3.FinalandPrimaryEnergyConsumption
Totalenergyuseconsistsofthenumbersofcars,
distancescarstraveled,andfueleconomyvaluesassumed,
whichwilldependonthetypeofvehiclessuchasHEVs,
conventionalgasolinecars(includingmini-cars),CNG
cars,andelectriccars.Forelectricpower,theelectricityper
kilometerreflectswhatisputintothebattery(Delucchi,
2005).Hence,totalenergyconsumption(EN)is:
1.Caruse:distancetraveledpercarperyear
ThecurrentaverageannualdistancetraveledinChina
is18,000kilometerspercar,excludingtaxiswhoseannual
usageisprobablywellabove50,000kilometers(Chenet
al.,2005).The18,000averagedistanceisswollenbythe
largenumberofgovernmentandcompanycarswithhigh
usage.Sincetheprivatecarfleetisexpectedtogrowmuch
fasterthanthetaxiorgovernment/companyfleet,average
usewillfall.Indeed,asthenumberofcarsgrewfrom
lownumbersinJapanorWestGermany,usagepercarfell
slowly.Thisreflectedbothfewerpeople“sharing”thesame
car,andmoretrulyprivatecarsasopposedtoheavilyused
companycars.
EN=∑(Ne*FIe*De )(1)
where,FIeisthefuelintensity(theinverseoffueleconomy)foreachcartypee(inenergy/km),Neisthetotal
numberofcarsofeachtype,andDeistheaveragedistance
traveledbyeachtypeofcar.Electricityisconvertedto
primaryenergyusingthefiguresmodeledinWorldEnergy
Outlook2004.
4.CarbonEmissions
Carbonemissionsarecalculatedforeachfuelusing
IPCCcoefficientsofCO2(convertedtocarbon)perunit
ofenergyinfuelatthelowerheatingvalue.Tomodel
approximatelythefullfuelcycleemissionsofeachfuel,
wehaveadded7percent“overhead”toCNGandoil,and
5percenttoutilityfuels.Thelowerfigureforutilityfuels
reflectsthefactthattheyarelargelydeliveredinmuch
greaterquantities,andatleastforoil,notrefinedasmuch
asisgasolinedeliveredtovehicles.Theoverallresultsare
notverysensitivetotheassumed“overheads”wehave
addedhere.
2.Fuelconsumption
Foreachscenario,fueluseiscalculatedasaproductof
thenumberofvehicles,distancetraveledpercarperyear,
andfuelperunitofdistance(fueleconomy),inaccordance
withtheASIFmodelofSchipperetal.(2000).Withthe
introductionofgasolinehybrids,mini-cars,CNGvehicles,
andelectricvehicles,separateassumptionsaremadeforfuel
economyofeachkindofvehicle.Fueleconomydepends
onbothcarweight/powerandtheefficiencyofpropulsion.Wecannotseparatethesetwovariables,butwecan
estimatetherangeoffueleconomyexpectedforacarof
3,000kilograms(forexample,aHummer)incontrastto
oneweighingcloseto750kilograms(forexample,a
MercedesSmart).LyingbetweentheseextremesistheaveragenewChinesecarof1,500kilograms.Previousanalysis
(Heetal.,2004)hasusedtheroadfueleconomyatabout
11km/liter,or9.1liter/100km.Thebestestimateof
China’son-roadfueleconomytodayis9.5liters/100km.
C H IN A MOTOR IZATION TR EN D S
67
Editor'sNote
R
uralelectrificationisapivotaldevelopmentissueinmany
partsoftheworld.Electricity
providesahugerangeofdevelopment
advantages,facilitatingbettereducation,betterhealth,andmoreeconomic
activity.Therearefewhigherpriorities
thanprovidingmodernenergyservices
tothepoor,mainlyrural,populations
aroundtheworldthatlackthem.
Butitisalsoveryhardtodeliverand
requirestheestablishmentofeffectiveinstitutions,deliverymechanisms
andpolicyincentives.Nowherebetter
illustratesthesechallengesthanIndia.
Despiterepeatedefforts,56percentof
Indianhouseholdshavenoelectricity
supply,andtheproblemisgrowing
worseasnewconnectionsfailtokeep
pacewithpopulationgrowth.The
newgovernmenthassetambitious
targetsforprovidingfullelectrification,
butitisfarfromclearthatthesegoals
canbemet.
Theauthorsconsiderthreescenarios
underwhichelectrificationgoalscould
bemet:anextensionofthegridusing
India’sexistinggenerationmix;a
scenariodominatedbyoff-griddiesel
generators;andonedominatedbyoffgridrenewableenergygeneration.
Itcomesasnosurprisethatthescenariodominatedbyrenewableenergy
resultsinsignificantlylowerGHG
emissions—dependingondemandlevelsthisapproachsavesfrom14to100
milliontonsofCO2peryearcompared
tothegrid-basedmodel.Theauthors
alsopointoutthatthelonger-term
effectcouldbemoreimportantstill:
ifrenewableenergyisimportantin
theruralelectricitymixnowitwill
probablyremainsoasdemandgrows
inthefuture.However,thechoicesfor
68
Indianeedtobetakenprimarilyon
non-climategrounds,andtheauthors
consideranumberofthese:howfast
electrificationcanbedelivered,the
qualityofsupply,costissues,andimplicationsforIndia’senergysecurity.
TheauthorsexpressseriousreservationsastowhetherIndia’screaking
powerdeliveryinstitutionscanbe
expectedtodelivergridelectrification
inruralareasbeforefundamental
problemsaresolved.Itishardto
envisagehowagrid-basedelectrificationcanmeetthegovernment’stargets.
Disperseddieselgenerationisfarmore
promising,withentrepreneurialsuppliersalreadyspringingtotheaidof
customerseagertoescapeerraticgrid
power,andinmanywaysitcanbe
expectedtoplayanimportantrole.
However,theauthorspointoutthat
highlevelsofdieselusedopresenta
significantimportdependenceand
securityproblemforIndia.This“DieselFirst”scenarioleadstoanincrease
inoilproductimportsofbetween6
and41percentover2004levels,as
opposedtobetween1and11percent
intheothertwoscenarios.Whatthis
meansincosttermsdependsonthe
priceofoil;theauthorsconsider$30
and$70perbarrelasanindicative
range.TheDieselFirstscenariounder
highdemandassumptionsadds$8.4
billionperyear(at$30perbarrel
crude)or$15.8billionperyear(at
$70).Thesecurityimplicationsofthis
additionaldependencearewellbeyond
thescopeofthischaptertopredict,but
itissafetosaythatsuchsignificant
additionalimportdependencewillat
leastbeaconcern.
Amodelbasedonoff-gridrenewableenergythereforeoffersconsiderable
attractions,providedthatappropriate
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
deliverymechanismsandpolicyincentivescanbedeveloped.AlthoughIndia
alreadyoffersarangeofsupportfor
renewableenergy,itremainsarelativelyminorpartoftheenergymix.
Theauthorssuggestthattheadvantagestheyidentifyherepartlymakethe
caseforamuchmoresignificantuseof
renewableenergytechnologies.Butare
thesereasonsenough?Althoughhigh
fuelpricestiltlife-cyclecostsinfavor
ofrenewableenergy,therelativelyhigh
capitalcostofthesetechnologiesisa
majorbarrierinacountrylikeIndia
wherecapitalisexpensive.
Thisisaninterestingcaseinwhich
framingthechallengeasanSD-PAM
maymakeadifference.Indiamust
reachitsgoalofprovidingelectricityto
allitscitizens,andtheinternational
communityhasaninterestinhelping
itmeetthisgoalonalow-emission
trajectory.Indiawouldseesubstantial
benefitsfromhavingahighuseof
renewableenergyinmeetingrural
electricitydemand,butishampered
bythelackoflow-costcapital.This
isanareainwhichtheinternational
communityiswell-placed(throughinternationallendinginstitutions,export
creditagenciesandotherfinancial
support)tohelp.
Comparedtotheexampleswehave
consideredearlierinthisvolume,
thedegreeofassistanceislikelyto
begreaterandwillprobablyhavea
greaterfinancialcomponent.Butthe
interestsofbothIndiaanditsinternationalpartnersseemsufficiently
well-alignedtomakethisanattractive
areainwhichtoexplorethepotential
forSD-PAMs.
chapterv
PathwaystoRural
PathwaystoRural
ElectrificationinIndia:
ElectrificationinIndia:
AreNationalGoalsAlsoanInternationalOpportunity?
NavrozK.Dubash ■ RobBradley
1.INTRODUCTION
Inthefirstdecadeofthe21stcentury,ruralIndia
remainsindarkness.Whiletherestofthecountrydebates
whetherornotIndiaisshining(acatchy,butultimately
unsuccessfulelectionslogan),whether7to8percent
growthratesaresustainable,andwhetherornotIndia’s
creakyelectricityinfrastructureandcobwebbedinstitutionscansupporta21stcenturyeconomy,thesequestions
areacademicformorethanhalfofIndia’spooresthouseholds.Theyhavenoaccesstoelectricity.
Afteradecadeofinattention,however,ruralelectrificationhasslowlyclimbedupthepoliticalagenda.The
ElectricityAct,passedin2003,promisesanewapproach
toruralelectrification.Supportforruralareas,including
electrification,wasprominentintheelectoralprogramof
thegoverning“UnitedProgressiveAlliance,”(UPA)which
cametopowerinmid-2004.Followingbolddeclarations
ofelectricityforallwithinambitioustimeframes,bureaucratsandtechnocratshavescrambledtopreparepolicies
andplanstomeetthesecommitments.
Thischapterisanattempttobetterunderstandhow
thecountrycanbestgoabouttheenormoustaskof
providingelectricitytohalfitspopulation.Ourpremise
isthatruralelectrificationiscentraltoIndia’sdevelopmentefforts,andthatachievingthisoutcomeshouldbe
drivenbynationaldevelopmentgoals,suchasproviding
electricityrapidly,effectively,cheaplyandsecurely.We
evaluate—quantitativelywherepossible,otherwisequalitatively—arangeofdifferentapproachestoruralelectrificationagainstthesecriteria.Weaddtothislisttheimpact
ofelectrificationonIndia’snationalenergysecurityand
itsdependenceonfossil-fuelimports.Consistentwiththe
approachofthisvolume,wealsorecognizethatamajor
effortlikeruralelectrificationinIndiaalsohaspotential
globalclimateimplications—negative,ifgrowingconsumptionrestsprimarilyonfossilfuels,andpositive,ifelectricityusedisplaceskeroseneorreducespressureonforestsby
reducingtheneedforunsustainably-harvestedwood.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
69
Regardlessoftheclimateimpacts,however,thedevelopmentadvantagesofelectrificationshouldbepursued.
Sincethereareactiveglobalnegotiationsanddeliberationsonaddressingtheproblemofclimatechange,itis
relevanttotheseglobalprocesses,andcertainlytoIndia’s
bargainingstancewithinthem,toaskifthoseapproaches
toruralelectrificationthatbestmeetnationaldevelopment
goalsarealsothosethatminimizegreenhousegas(GHG)
emissions.Iftheruralelectrificationoptionthatbestmeets
India’sdevelopmentgoalsisconsistentwithclimatereductiongoals,thecountryhasapotentiallystrongcaseto
maketotheglobalcommunityforinternationalsupport
forIndia’sruralelectrification.Thischapterassessesthe
strengthofthisclaim.
1.1 Importanceofelectrification
fordevelopment
Provisionofenergyservicesisacentralelementofa
developmentagenda.Whileelectricityisbynomeans
theonlysourceofenergyforruralpopulations,asahigh
qualitysourceofenergy,itisanimportantelementin
alargerdevelopmentframework.1Electricityreduces
householddrudgery,freesuptime,providesopportunities
foreconomicentrepreneurship,supportseducation,supportshealth-enhancingeffortsthroughrefrigerationand
pumpedwater,iscriticalforagriculture,andenablesmore
effectivecommunicationwiththeworldbeyondthevillage.Ruralelectrificationcanparticularlybenefitwomen.
MathurandMathur(2005)reportthatinhouseholdswith
electricity,womenspendsignificantlylesstimecollecting
woodforfueland,becauseoftheavailabilityoflighting,
areabletospendaportionoftheirdayreading.
Moreover,accesstomoreefficienttechnologiessuch
aselectricityforlightingcanactuallysavemoney,in
additiontoprovidinghealthanddevelopmentbenefits.
InruralIndia,poorhouseholdsspend8percentoftheir
incomes(whicharelowincashterms)onkerosenefor
lighting(Saghir,2004),aproportionthatislikelytofall
withuseofelectricityforlighting.
70
1.2 Indiahasalottodo
Ruralelectrificationishardtoaccomplish.Rural
householdsareremoteandthereforecostlytoserve;they
donotusemuchelectricity,whichmakesthemrelatively
unprofitable(undertheprevalenttariffstructure,theyare
loss-making),andtheyarepoorcreditrisks.Intherecent
past,effortsatrestructuringStateElectricityBoardsand
attractingprivatecapitaltotheelectricitysectorhave
contributedtotheneglectofruralelectrification(Singha
etal.,2004).While220,000villageswereelectrifiedinthe
1980s,justunder40,000villageswereelectrifiedinthe
1990s(MinistryofPower,2003).2
India’srecordsinceindependencehasbeenpoor.In
2001,78millionofIndia’s138millionhouseholds(56
percent)didnothaveanyconnectiontoanelectricitysupply(MinistryofPower,2003;WorldBank,2004).Atthe
recentpaceofamillionhouseholdsayear,Indiaisactually
seeinganannualincreaseinnumbersofhouseholdswithoutelectricity,sincethehouseholdpopulationisgrowing
evenfaster,atarateof1.85millionhouseholdsayear
(WorldBank,2004).India’sperformancealsofallswell
behindinternationalstandards.China,forexample,iswell
onitswaytocompleteelectrification(Figure1andBox1).
Inrecentyears,ruralelectrificationhascomeback
topoliticalcenterstage,drivenbytherealizationofits
neglectandbyarealignmentofpoliticalforces.Inmid2005,theUPAgovernmentannouncedthe“RajivGandhi
GrameenVidyutikaranYojana”orvillageelectrification
schemetoelectrify125,000villagesand78millionhouseholdsinfiveyears.Thisambitiousschemepromises,in
essence,tocompletethetaskofruralelectrificationinone
massivefive-yearpush.Theschemeisevenmoreambitious,promisingelectricityforruralindustryandlivelihoodsona24-hourbasis(MinistryofPower,2005a).The
backdropforthisannouncementisthecommitmentto
ruralIndiaintheUPAgovernment’sCommonMinimum
Programandsubsequentpronouncementsaboutprovidingelectricitytoallremainingunelectrifiedhouseholdsby
2009.ThepreviousNationalDemocraticAlliance(NDA)
governmentsoughttoreachthismilestoneby2012.
TheIndiangovernmenthasatrackrecordofunderachievingonambitioustargets.Tongia(2003)notesthat
“unlikeinChina,wheretheplanningmechanismisoften
gospel,inIndiaactualplantconstructionsaretypically
abouthalftheofficialPlantarget,andinrecentyearsthe
gapbetweenPlansandrealityhasgrown.”
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Althoughthechancesthatthegovernmentwillredeem
itspromiseinfullremainslight,thereareatleasttworeasonstoexpectamoreseriouseffortatruralelectrification
thaninthepast.
First,theUPAgovernment’ssurprisevictoryinthe
2004generalelectionisoftenattributedtoaprotestvote
fromruralconstituencieswhofeltexcludedfromtheimageof“IndiaShining”portrayedbythethen-governing
NDA.3Whetherthisexplanationistrueornot,theperceptionisfirmlyrooted,andtheUPAclearlyseesitssupportasrural-driven.Forthisreason,ruraldevelopment,
includingelectrification,iscentraltoitselectoralplatform
andmanyofitspoliciesinitsyearingovernment.The
UPA’scommitmenttothisagendawillhelpensurethatthe
spotlightremainsonruralelectrificationatleastthrough
theelectoralcycle.
AsecondreasonistheElectricityActof2003.Previously,responsibilityforelectrificationrestedinthehands
ofvariousstateinstitutions,notablytheRuralElectrificationCorporationincoordinationwiththeStateElectricity
Boards(SEBs).Theirperformancewasuneven,marked
byrelativelyrapidelectrificationinsomedecadesandextremelylowlevelsofactivityinothers,notablythe1990s
(seeSection2).Perhapsmoresignificantthanthepaceof
newconnections,thelevelandqualityofservicehasbeen
poor,asruralelectrificationhasbeencaughtupinalarger
malaiseofinefficientadministration,poortechnology,and
financialcollapsethathasafflictedtheSEBs(WorldBank,
2004).Ruralelectrification,whichisheavilyloss-making,
actuallyhasbeenanimportantcontributingfactortothis
financialimbroglio.
TheElectricityActof2003openstheelectricitymarket
tonewinstitutionsandnewthinkinginruralelectrification.Itallowsfordecentralizedprovisionofelectricity
withoutpriorneedforalicenseby,forexample,Panchayats(villagecouncils),userassociation’scooperatives,
NGOs,andfranchisees.Thesuccessofthisapproachremainstobetested,anditcertainlybringsitsownrisksand
dangers,suchasthepotentialfornewunregulatedentrants
toundulyexploitruralconsumers(Dubash,2004).However,thechangeinapproachcertainlyopensthedoortoa
greatdealmoreactivity,ferment,andexperimentationin
ruralelectrification,andmarksadeparturefromthepast.
Theexistenceofnewpoliticalmomentumandsupportinglegislationbehindruralelectrificationbynomeans
guaranteessuccessinrapidlyenhancingaccesstoelectricity
inruralIndia.Indeed,thereremainconsiderableobstacles,
notablyinstitutionalandfinancial,toachievingrural
Figure1.PopulationWithoutAccesstoElectricity
900
800
700
600
Millions
1.3 ANewPoliticaland
InstitutionalContext
500
400
300
200
100
0
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
North Africa
Middle East
East Asia/China
Sub-Saharan Africa
Latin America
South Asia
Source:InternationalEnergyAgency(2002b)
electrification.Forexample,whatservicedelivery
mechanism(s)aremostappropriatetodeliverrural
electricityservices?Howcanelectrificationbesustainably
financed,whetherthroughcostrecoveryorpublic
expenditures?Viablyaddressingsuchshort-andmediumtermissuesisnecessarytojump-startIndia’srural
electrification.Inthispaper,werecognizethesecentral
andpracticalissuesthatstandinthewayofruralelectrificationinIndia.Theseissuesareextensivelydebated
withinIndiaandelsewhere;wedrawonthesedebates
forportionsoftheanalysisthatfollows.4
1.4 FrameworkandApproach
Thischapterisfocusedonunderstandingtheimplicationsofalternativetrajectoriesofruralelectrification.We
understandthisexplorationtobecomplementaryto,and
bynomeansasubstitutefor,workontheinstitutional
andfinancialconcernsthataretheprimaryroadblocksto
ruralelectrification.Inassessingthepromiseofvarious
approachestoruralelectrification,weexaminethepotential
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
71
2030
Box1.TheChineseSuccess
ChinaandIndiaareinmanyrespectsverydifferentcountries,butoverthelast
fewdecadestheyhavefacedsimilarelectrificationchallenges.Thedifferencein
thelevelsofsuccessatruralelectrificationbetweenthetwocountriesisstriking.
SohowdidChinadoit?
Forthefirstdecadeorsoaftertherevolution(1949),electrificationinrural
areasfelllargelytotheruralcommunitiesthemselves.Increasinglyawareofthe
advantagesofelectricpower,suchcommunitiesestablishedoff-gridgeneration
usinglocallyavailablefuels—coal,diesel,andhydropower.Theseeffortswere
small-scale,typicallyusedonlyforlightingandfoodprocessing.By1957,they
stillaccountedforaround0.6percentofChina’spowerconsumption.
Startingin1958,thecentralgovernmentbegantotakeanactiveroleinpromotingruralelectrification,firstforirrigationandfloodprevention,andlaterfor
otherproductiveuses.Thedominanttechnologywassmallhydropower(SHP),
anenormousresourceinChina.Thecentralgovernmentsupplieddemonstration
projects,workshops,andotherencouragement,whiletheturbinesweregenerallymanufacturedlocally.
In1979,thegovernmentestablishedtheNationalPrimaryRuralElectrification
CountyProgram(NPRECP),targetedatspecificcountieswithlowlevelsofelectrification.Bankswereinstructedtogivehighprioritytoruralelectrificationintheir
lending.Evenasinvestmentintransmissioninfrastructuremeantthatnewareas
couldbeconnectedtothegrid,thegovernmentrecognizedtheimportanceof
SHPinalleviatingpowersupplyconstraints,andsupportwasmaintained.From
thelate1980son,theshiftawayfromgovernmentcontrolandtowardamarket
economygaverisetonewsourcesofdemand,andtheNPRECPwasexpanded.
Twocodesforrenewableenergyweredeveloped:oneforsystemsinremote
areas,generallybasedonSHP,andoneforgrid-basedelectrification.Theseare
expectedtoproducethesamestandardofpowersupply.Theresultshavebeen
spectacular:by1997,96percentofChinesehouseholdshadanelectricitysupply.
Since1998,thefocushasbeenonthereformofruralpowermarkets.Thegovernmenthasalsocommittedpublicfunds(180billionyuan,roughly$22billion
overthreeyears)tostrengtheningruralelectricitygrids.Clearlythereismuch
intheChinesestorythatcannotbeappliedinIndia—thecentralgovernment
doesnothaveequivalentpowerstoinstructbankstolendtocertainsectors,for
instance.Nevertheless,thefactthattheelectrificationofruralareaswasledby
decentralizedapproaches,withcentralgovernmentpolicysupportingit,isnoteworthy.ItisalsoimportantthatChinawasabletoapplyidenticalqualitycriteria
tobothon-andoff-gridpowersupplies.
Source:BasedonYaoandBarnes(2005)
ofarangeofapproachestomeetnationaldevelopment
goals.Inbrief,thesethreeapproachesare(1)largelygridbasedelectrificationwithconventionalthermalsources,(2)
largelyoff-gridelectrificationwithdieseltechnology;and
(3)off-gridelectrificationwithrenewableenergytechnology.
Forthepurposeofthisstudy,theGovernmentofIndia’s
statedgoalsinitsproposedRuralElectrificationPolicies
(MinistryofPower,nodate)provideastartingpointfor
developingaframeworkagainstwhichtoassessruralelectrificationapproaches.Therearefivecomponentstothe
government’sapproach:(1)accessibility,orthespeedand
72
effectivenesswithwhichaccesstoelectricityisprovidedto
thosethatotherwiselackit;(2)availability,ortheprovisiontoeachconnectionofthefullpowerdemandofthe
user;(3)reliability,ortheproportionoftimeduringwhich
thispowerisavailabletotheuser(blackoutsandbrownoutsareindicatorsoflowreliability);(4)quality,orthe
consistencyofsuchfeaturesasthevoltageandfrequency
ofthepower—poorqualitycanbothreducetheusefulnessofthepoweranddamageappliancesandequipment,
amajorproblemwithruralelectricityinIndiatoday;and
(5)affordability,ortheappropriatepricingofthepowerto
ensurethatthosewhoneeditcanaffordit.
Fortractability,wecombineavailability,reliability,and
quality,allthreeofwhicharecloselyrelated,intoasingle
goalofqualitysupply.Wealsoaddanotherimportant,
butoftenforgottengoal—ensuringenergysecurity.While
Indiahasplentifulcoalreserves,itsstocksofotherfossil
fuelsarelimited.Amassivefutureexpansionofdemand
couldbecomeafactorinIndia’senergysecurityandin
relatedmacroeconomicconsiderations.Consequently,the
frameworkofnationaldevelopmentgoalsagainstwhich
weexaminealternativeruralelectrificationapproachesis:
1.Speedatwhichaccessisprovided
2.Qualityofsupply,includingavailability,reliability
andconsistency
3.Affordabilityorcostcriteria
4.Securityofsupply
Fromaglobalpointofview,climateimpactsarealso
relevant.Thisistreatedseparatelyfromthefour“national”
policypriorities,asIndiadoesnotcurrentlyhavespecific
commitmentstoabateGHGemissions,andisnotexpectedtohavesuchcommitmentsintheforeseeablefuture.
GHGemissionsfromruralIndia,certainlyinpercapita
termsbutalsoinabsoluteterms,arelikelytoberelatively
minorintheshortrun.Butitisimportanttokeepin
mindalongertimeframe,when“lock-in”toparticular
technologiesandformsofelectrificationmayresultina
tighterthannecessarylinkagebetweeneconomicdevelopmentandelectricityconsumptiononetheonehand,and
GHGemissionsontheother(seeSection3.2.5forfurther
discussion).
WhileIndiahasnospecificobligationstoreduceGHG
emissions,itisinthenation’slong-terminteresttounderstandthecongruence(orlackthereof )ofnationalgoalsand
globalclimateprotectiongoals.AcountryofIndia’ssize,
representingaroundonesixthoftheworld’spopulation,
willsurelybedrawnintoclimatepolicyinthelongrunas
itsdevelopmentpermits.Furthermore,Indiawithitsmany
vulnerableecosystemsandpoorcommunitiesisexpectedto
suffersignificantimpactsfromclimatechange.5
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Toanticipatetheconclusionsofthisstudy,wefind
thatthereisatleastacasetofurtherexplorerenewable
energy-basedruralelectrificationasawaytomeetthefour
nationaldevelopmentgoalsoutlinedabove,and,unsurprisingly,itisalsotheclearwinnerfromaclimatepoint
ofview.Alynchpinofourargumentisthelikelyvalueof
renewableenergyinensuringenergysecurity,acriterion
wehaveaddedontothegovernment’sowngoals.While
thisconclusionrestsonassumptionsandjudgmentsthat
arecertainlyopentoquestionandcomment,wehaveattemptedtolaytheseassumptionsoutclearly.Theassumptionsandtheensuinganalysiswill,wehope,serveasthe
basisforabroaderdiscussionaboutalternativetrajectories
forIndia’sruralelectrification,andspecificallyaboutthe
appropriateroleofrenewableenergy.
Section2undertakesthetaskofdefiningreasonable
demandparametersforruralelectrification.
Section3spellsoutthreepathwaystomeetingdemand,
andassessesthesepathwaysagainsttheframeworkof
nationalgoalsandglobalclimategoalspelledoutabove.
Section4providessomeconcludingobservations.
2.ESTIMATINGRURALDEMAND:
2.ESTIMATINGRURALDEMAND:
HOWMUCHPOWERTOTHEPEOPLE?
Howmuchelectricitydopeopleneed?Itisnotoriously
difficulttoidentifythelatentdemandforelectricityin
ruralcommunities(ESMAP,2000).Inmostcases,actual
consumptionisconstrainedbythequantityorquality
ofsupply,aswellastheabilitytopayforboththepower
itselfandtheappliancesthatuseit.Thissectionwillconsiderwhatanaspirationalgoalmightbeforagovernment
determinedtoprovideadequateelectricitysupplytoits
ruralpopulations.
Between2003and2005,ablizzardofevermorechallengingruralelectrificationpronouncementsandtargets
wereputforwardbytwodifferentgovernments.Themost
recentsuchtargetcallsforthegovernmenttoprovide
electricityto78millionhouseholds—alltheremaining
unelectrifiedhouseholds—inashortfive-yearspan;thatis,
by2009(MinistryofPower,2005a).Thedescriptionofthe
targetintermsofhouseholdsissignificant,sincepasttargetshavebeenintermsofvillagesthatareprovidedaccess
andwerebasedonanincompleteandmisleadingdefinition
ofwhatconstitutesanelectrifiedvillage(Box2).
Fromarangeofperspectives,thetimescaleapplied
tothetargetsishighlyinfeasible.6Toachievethemore
modesttargetofvillageelectrificationinfiveyearswould
requireconnecting20,000villagesayear—basedonthe
definitioninBox2(Rejikumar,2005).Thispacewas
achievedduringthe1980s,butonlyaccordingtotheold,
Box2.ChangingDefinitionofVillageElectrification
FiguresfortheextentofelectrificationinIndiacanbeconfusing.Governmentfigureshavereported87percentofIndianvillagesasbeing“electrified.”
However,thisisbasedontheverymodestdefinitionthatavillageiselectrified
ifelectricityisusedforanypurposeanywhereinthevillage.Inrecognitionthat
thisisaninadequatedefinitionthatfailstocapturewhetherelectricityisactuallybeingused,bywhom,andhow,aproposedreviseddefinitionenumerates
multiplecriteriathatcollectivelywoulddefineanelectrifiedvillage:
1.Basicelectricityinfrastructureisavailablewithinthevillage,includingin
adjoininghamletsoccupiedbydisadvantagedgroups.
2.Electricityisavailableinpublicplacessuchasschools,thePandhayat
office,andhealthcenters.
3.Atleast10percentofvillagehouseholdshaveaccesstoelectricity.
4.Thevoltageissufficienttoenablelightingduringpeakeveninghours.
Thesecriteriaseektoarticulateadefinitionofelectrificationthatencompasses
actualuseratherthansimplytheoreticalavailability,makingitafarmoresatisfactorydefinitionofelectrification.Moreover,thegovernment’stargetfor2009
extendsbeyondthismoreambitiousdefinitionofvillageelectrificationtoaimat
fullhouseholdelectrification.
Source:MinistryofPower(2005b)
farmoremodestdefinitionofvillageelectrification.
Infact,thepacehassloweddowninrecentyears(See
Figure2).Basedonthenewdefinition,only2,626villages
wereelectrifiedin2002–03and4,589in2003–04.To
achievethetargetwouldrequireacceleratingthepaceby
amultipleoffourorfive.Ifanything,thetaskiseven
harderatthehouseholdlevel.Electrifyingallhouseholds
by2012wouldrequireconnecting10millionhouseholds
ayear,tentimestherecentpaceofhouseholdelectrification(Dubash,2004).Toimaginethatfullelectrification
canbeachievedwithinthistimeframehastoberegarded
asframinganaspirationratherthanasarealisticplan.
Theseobservationssuggestthatmakingsignificant
progresstowardmeetingthegovernment’stargetswill
meanaquantumleapintherateofelectrification.Itmay
equallyimplyachangeintheapproachtoelectrification.
Forthepurposesofthisstudy,weassumethat2020isa
morerealisticdatebywhichtoachievethegovernment’s
targets,andwillusethisdateinfurtheranalysis.
Connectinghouseholdsisonlypartofthechallenge;
thecapacitymustexisttoservenewlyconnectedhouseholds.Howmuchpowerwillbeneededtoserverural
India?Whiledemandwillriseovertimeashouseholds
becomemoreaffluent,somenear-termideaisneededfor
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
73
2.1 Householddemand
Figure2.VillagesElectrified(OldDefinition)by5-YearPlan
600
100%
Cumulative
% of Villages
500
81.47
83.07
80%
400
64.11
60%
300
43.36
40%
37.64
200
27.20
Percent of Villages
Number of Villages (thousands)
86.59
Actual
20%
100
12.80
7.83
IX: 1996-2001
VIII: 1991-96
VII: 1986-91
VI: 1980-85
1978-79
V: 1974-78
IV: 1969-74
1968-69
III: 1961-66
II: 1956-61
I: 1951-56
1947
1.26
0
3.77
0%
Five year Plans
Source:Sinha(2005)
planningpurposes.Whetherextendingtransmissionlines
orinstallingdistributedgenerators,thespecificationsneed
tobeasaccurateaspossibletoavoideitherfrustrating
demandoraddingtothecostbyover-engineering.
Theaimofthisstudyisnottomakedetailedpredictionsoffuturedemand,butrathertoillustratethescale
involvedinmeetingcertainfuturestandardsofservice.
Wehavethereforemadesimplifyingassumptionsineach
case,whicharediscussedintheremainderofthissection.
Villageelectricityconsumptioncanbedividedintothree
categories:(1)consumptioninhouseholds,forlighting,
televisionandotherdomesticappliances;(2)consumptionincommunalbuildings,suchasclinicsandschools;
and(3)consumptionforproductiveapplications,suchas
machineryandagriculturalpumping.
74
Towhatusesdorural,typicallylow-income,usersput
electricity?Electricity’sfirstroleisalmostalwayslighting.Thisdisplaceskerosene,whichisgenerallythefirst
commercial(andexpensive)formofenergyusedinpoor
households.Electricityprovidesamuchhigherquality
light,withouttheproblemsassociatedwithkerosene,
whichincludeindoorpollutionandsafetyissues.Second,itallowsseveralappliancesthatcannotbepowered
withoutelectricity—radio,television,electricironsand
refrigeration,electricfans(inhotclimates),andeventually
computersandassociatedtechnologyandservices.7Electricityforpoorusersdoesnotreplacetraditionalfuelsfor
cookingandheatinguntilanumberofthesehigh-value
serviceshavebeenprovided.Forcookinginparticular,
manypeopleprefertousetraditionalfuelsevenatquite
highincomelevels(ESMAP,2000;Victor,2002).
Ruralelectricitydemandisshapedbyarangeoffactors,
allofwhichareuncertainandcontingent.Household
incomelevelsareoneimportantfactor.Ruralhouseholds
areunlikelytospendmorethanabout5percentoftheir
householdbudgetonelectricity.Thecostofelectricityis
certainlyalsorelevanttotranslatinghouseholdbudgetfiguresintodemandestimates.Oneoften-usedcompositeway
ofexamininghouseholduseistoscrutinizehouseholds’
“willingnesstopay”forelectricity.Willingnesscanbehigh
forthefirstfewunitsofelectricity,whichareinvariably
usedforlighting(ESMAP,2000).However,assumptions
aboutthereliabilityandqualityofsupplycertainlyaffect
estimatesofwillingnesstopay;householdsarehardlylikely
tobuyelectricitytopowerarefrigeratorfortwohoursa
day.Inaclimateofunreliableandsubsidizedelectricity,
demandprojectionsareatbestinformedguesses.
Thequestionofdemandestimatesisfurtherconfused
byunderlyingassumptionsabouttheefficiencyofuse.
Ruralpopulationsultimatelycareaboutelectricityservices,
nottheamountofelectricitydelivered.Forexample,the
sameamountoflightcouldbeprovidedbya60-watt
incandescentbulboran18-wattcompactfluorescentbulb.
Thelatterwillrapidlypayforitshigherpricethroughsavingsinoperatingcost,anduseafractionoftheelectricity,althoughforruralpopulationstheup-frontcostcan
behardtopay,evenifitsavesmoneylater.Sinceevery
unitsavedisatleastonelessunitgenerated,investment
inend-useefficiencycanbeasubstituteforinvestment
ingenerationcapacityand,inthecaseofgrid-connected
electricity,intransmissioncapacityaswell.IntheIndian
contextwhereruralelectricityisloss-making,energyefficiencycanalsoreduceutilitylosses.Whilethedemand
estimatesderivedbelowarebasedonhouseholdelectricityconsumption,itisimportanttokeepinmindthatin
reality,effectiveservicedeliveryforeachunitofelectricity
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
consumedwillbemuchhigherifaccompaniedbyadeliberateeffortatenhancingend-useefficiency.
Turningtodemandestimates,westartwithactual
demandfrompoorruralhouseholdsthatreceivegridelectricity.AlthoughdatafromIndiaaredifficulttoobtain,
studiesof“lowdemandhouseholds”inSenegal,Brazil,
Indonesia,andVietnamsuggestaconsumptionrangeof
91to182.5kWhperhousehold-year(Gabler,2004).In
thisstudy,weusetheupperendofthisestimateasthe
low-demandscenario.
TheNationalElectricityPolicy(GovernmentofIndia,
2005)alsoprescribesaminimumof365kWhperhouseholdperyearasa“meritgood,”orbasicentitlement.This
istwotofourtimeshigherthantheactuallow-demand
consumptionrecordedfromthecountriesnotedabove.
Thisisintendedasaminimum,notasatargetformean
householdconsumption.Weusethefigureof365kWh
perhousehold-yearasthemedium-demandscenariofor
thisstudy.
Ruralelectrificationshouldaspiretomorethanminimal
service.Victor(2004)advocatesabenchmarkminimum
consumptionof1000kWhperperson-year(equivalentto
about5,000kWhperhousehold-year),notingthataverage
percapitaconsumptionisalreadyhigherthanthisin50
percentofChineseprovinces.8However,ifheatingand
cookingneeds(whicharegenerallymetwithotherfuels
inIndia)areexcluded,250kWhperperson-yearwould
coverthe“core”electricservicesforwhichelectricityis
thestronglypreferredoronlychoice.Thiswouldinclude
suchservicesaslighting,televisionand/orradio,anelectric
iron,andalimitedamountofdomesticrefrigeration.Althoughalloftheseappliancesarenotinreachoftherural
poortoday,theexampleofChinasuggeststhataspurchasingpowerincreasestheappetiteforsuchappliancesgrows
rapidly.IfIndiacontinuestogrowat4to6percentper
annum,theeconomyin2020willbe75to150percent
largerthanin2005.Atleastsomeofthisincreasedwealth
willlikelybereflectedintheconsumptionpowerofrural
households.Asaresult,weconsider250kWhperpersonyearasareasonableaspirationfortheruralelectrification
program,andweusethisfigureasaplausiblehigh-end
demandforourpurposes.AsIndianhouseholdsaverage
overfivepeople,9atargetof250kWhperperson-year
isroughlyequivalentto1,250kWhperhousehold-year.
Forcomparison,atypicalU.S.householdconsumes25to
40kWhperday(Byrneetal.,1998),some7to12times
morethanourhigh-endscenario.
Howmanyhouseholdswillrequireelectrification?In
2001,Indiahad137millionruralhouseholds(Censusof
India,2001),ofwhich57percentlackelectricity(UNDP,
2003).By2020,thenumberofruralhouseholdsisexpectedtogrowto161million.10Projectionsdonotallowusto
sayhowmanyofthesenewhouseholdswillariseinareas
alreadyservedbythegridandhowmanywillrequirenew
connections.Forsimplicityweassumethatthecurrent
ratioof57percentpersists.By2020,Indiawillhaveto
providenewgridconnectionsoroff-gridelectricitysupply
for57percentof161million,or91millionhouseholds.
Thesesimplecalculationsshouldberefinedwithmore
detailedfutureanalyses;heretheaimisonlytoestablish
theorderofmagnitudeofthechallenge.
2.2 Non-householddemand
Asidefromhouseholds,villageshavetwoothermain
sourcesofdemand.
■ Publicbuildings,suchasschools,Panchayatoffices,
healthcenters,dispensaries,andcommunitycenters.
■ Waterpumping:Hereweconsiderpumpedwater
fordrinkinganddomesticuse—notforagriculture,
whichisconsideredaproductiveuse(seebelow).
Fewdataexistforaveragevillagerequirementsofthese
services.Forthepurposesofthisstudyweusetheelectricityrequirementsofaminimalsetofapplicationsforan
“electrified”village(Box3).Theoneareathisleavesunexaminedistheuseofelectricityforproductivepurposes
suchasmachinery.
Box3.The“ModelVillage”
UnderthenewdefinitionofruralelectrificationadoptedbytheMinistryof
Power,avillagewillonlybeconsidered“electrified”if,interalia:“publicplaces
likeSchools,PanchayatOffices,HealthCenters,Dispensaries,Communitycentersetc.haveavailablepowersupplyondemand.”Additionally,powertopump
waterfordomesticpurposes(thatis,notincludingirrigation)isanimportant
developmentbenefitofelectrification.
Fewdataexisttoestimatethelikelyadditionthesevillagepublicutilitieswill
maketoelectricitydemand.Inordertogetareasonableapproximation,wehave
madea“reasonableguess”listofapplicationsforanaveragevillage(roughly
250households).Toestimatepowerconsumptionfromspecificapplications,we
haveusedacasestudybyNREL(1998).Theapplicationsare:
Refrigerator
Vaporizer
Vaccinerefrigerator/freezer
Oxygenconcentrator
Lights(10)
Overheadfan(4)
VHFRadio(2)
Waterpumps
Centrifuge
TV(onebig,onesmall)
VCR
AM/FMstereo
Thisincludesboththeessentialequipmentforaclinic,lightingandentertainmentforacommunitycenter,andpumpingforthevillage’sdomesticwater
demand.Thetotaldemandfortheseamountsto5.47TWhperyearandis
assumedtobeconstantacrossallthehouseholddemandscenarios.Thesecommunalfacilitiesconstitutebetween5and30percentoftheelectricitydemandin
anaverage-sizevillage,dependingonthehouseholddemandscenarios.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
75
2.3 Productiveusedemand
Athird,andvitalelementofelectricitydemandinrural
villagesistheuseofelectricityforproductiveapplications.
Byfarthemostimportantoftheseiswaterpumpingfor
agriculture,whichremainstheunderpinningoftherural
economy,butotherapplicationsincludericeandflour
milling,metalworking,machinetools,andlarge-scale
refrigeration.
Onereasonthatproductiveuseisimportanttothese
scenarios,aswellastothedevelopmentofruralelectrificationingeneral,isthatthegrowinguseofelectricityin
householdsandvillagespresupposesagreaterabilitytopay
forthepower,andthusincreasingeconomicgrowth.Much
ofthegrowthinruraleconomicactivitywillrequirepower.
Thisisanareainwhichdataarescarceanddifficultto
compareacrossstates.Therangeofdifferentapplications
andthedifferenteconomicconditionsindifferentpartsof
thecountrymakeitdifficulttoextrapolatefromexisting
casestudies.
Fortractability,webaseourproductivedemand
estimatesolelyontheuseofelectricpumpingforagriculture.Thisisbyfarthemostsignificantproductiveuseof
electricityinruralareas;instateswheremechanicalpumps
arewidelyused,theyareamajorsourceofenergydemand.
Therearefewstudiesofagriculturalpumpingthatoffer
comparabledataandmethodologiesacrossmultiplestates.
Thebroadestofthese(ESMAP,2002)coverssixofIndia’s
25states,althoughpumpingdatawasonlyavailablefor
fivestates,andthesestatesdifferwidelyintheiruseof
pumpedirrigation.11Weadoptedthefiguresfromthis
studyasthebasisforourestimates,butweavoiddrawing
detailedconclusionsaboutprecisedemandlevels.12
Inthesample,anaverageof14percentoffarming
householdsuseelectricpumps,andtheseconsumean
averageof4,579kWhofelectricityeachyear.Inaddition,
about10percentofhouseholdsonaverageownadiesel
pumpforirrigation,mostlybecauseoflackofavailability
ofelectricity.Assumingthatatleasthalfofthesewould
switchtoelectricitypumpswithlowerrunningcostsifthe
optionwereavailable,weassumethat20percentofhouseholdsarelikelytoownelectricpumpsforirrigation.Based
ontheseassumptions,eachruralhouseholdcanbesaidto
demandonaverage918kWhperyear.
76
Thisestimatemaybehighfornewlyelectrifiedareas
foratleasttworeasons.First,investmentinnewwellsand
irrigationequipmentfollowstheavailabilityofelectricity
withatimelag.Hencethedemandinnewlyelectrified
areaswilltakesometimetobuilduptolevelscomparable
totheareassurveyedbyESMAP.Second,manyareas
whereelectricityhaslongbeenavailablehavesuffered
fromfallingwatertables,whichrequiresextractingwater
fromgreaterdepthandthereforehigherenergydemand
(Dubash,2002).Newlyelectrifiedareaswilllikelyhave
moreshallowwaterlevelsandlowerdemandperunitwaterconsumer.Toaccountforthesefactors,hereweassume
thatelectricitydemandforirrigationinnewlyelectrified
areaswillbeabouthalfthatinareaswithlong-standingaccesstoelectricity,orabout457kWh/household-yr.Given
theenormousvariabilityineconomic,hydrologic,and
agronomicconditionsacrossstates,thisestimateshouldbe
seenatbestasanorder-of-magnitudeapproximation.
Insummary,Table1showstheaveragehousehold
demandpredictionsusedforthisstudy.Noneoftheseis
intendedtobepredictive,butrathertoprovideareasonableindicationofthescaleofthenewdemandthatwill
havetobemet.
Table1.SummaryoftheDemandScenarios
Scenario
Low
Demand
kWh/yr
Medium
Demand
kWh/yr
High
Demand
kWh/yr
HouseholdDemand
182.5
365
1250
CommunalDemand
34
34
34
457
216.5
409
1741
Productiveuse
Total
3.MEETINGTHEDEMAND
Thissectionwillconsideranddescribethreebroad
approachestosatisfyingdemandforruralelectricity:
GridFirst:Extensionofthegrid,andexpansion
ofon-gridgeneratingcapacity
Thefirstscenariotakesasitsstartingpointthe
MinistryofPower’sapproach,whichaimstoprovide
electrificationonthegridexceptwheretheremotenessof
thecommunityorthelowpopulationdensitymakethis
infeasible.TheMinistryestimatesthat78percentofthe
remainingvillageelectrificationcanbeachievedonthe
grid.13Weassumethatforoff-gridelectrification,thebalancebetweendieselandrenewableenergy-basedgenerationremainsconstantattoday’slevelof77percentdiesel
and23percentrenewable.14
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
DieselFirst:Off-gridgenerationbasedondiesel
Thesecondscenarioisbasedonamuchmorerapid
penetrationofoff-griddieselgenerationinresponseto
theremovaloflicensingrequirementsundertheElectricityAct2003.Sinceinexpensivedieselgensetsarea
readilyavailableandwell-knowntechnology,ifelectricityistobeprivatelysuppliedinruralareaswithminimal
furthergovernmentintervention,itislikelytobebased
ondieseltechnology.Indeed,thereissomeevidencethat
entrepreneursarealreadyoperatingdiesel-basedelectricity
provisioninsmalltownsasaback-upsupplytothegrid
(Kishore,2003).Thismarketmaywellexpandtolarger
villagesbeforelong.WeassumethereforethattheassumptionsoftheMinistryofPowerarereversed,andthat78
percentofhouseholdelectrificationtakesplaceoffthe
grid.Wefurtherassumethat80percentofthisoff-grid
generationisbasedondieseltechnologyandtheremainderonrenewableenergyincommunitieswhereremotenesspreventsdieselsupplyatacceptablecost.
RenewablesFirst:Off-gridgenerationbased
onarangeofrenewableenergysources
Thethirdscenariopresentsanoptionthatfavors
renewableenergytechnologies.Implicitinthisscenarioare
policiesandothermeasuresthathelpjump-starttheuseof
renewableenergyinoff-gridapplications.Theassumption
fortheuseofoff-gridgenerationis78percent,asinDiesel
First.Butinthisinstance80percentoftheoff-gridpower
isgeneratedfromrenewablesourcesandonly20percent
fromdiesel.
Eachofthesecasesconsidersatechnologymixrather
thananinstitutionalorfinancialmodelfordelivering
thepowersystems.Findinganddeployingsuchmodelsis
essentialforthesuccessofanyofthetechnologymixes
discussedinthissection,butthequestionisbeyondthe
scopeofthisreport.Therangeofapproachesisbriefly
discussedinBox4.
3.1 Quantitativeandqualitative
aspectsofoptions
3.1.1Gridelectricity
India’sgridelectricitysystemisinachaoticstateand
seeminglydefiesarangeofdifferentstrategiesadopted
overtheyearstofixit.15By1999–2000,revenuesgeneratedbystateelectricityboardswere26percentlowerthan
theircosts,andin2000–01accountedfor23percentof
thecombinedfiscaldeficitofstategovernments(Planning
Commission,2002b).
Theproblemmanifestsitselfinperiodicelectricitycrises
instateafterstate.ArecentexampleisIndia’smostheavilyindustrializedstate,Maharashtra,anditscommercial
Box4.InstitutionalandBusinessModelsforRuralElectrification
Itisbeyondthescopeofthisreporttoconsiderindetailtheimplementation
ofruralelectrificationprojectsandsystems,butitisworthbearinginmindthe
varietyofavailableapproaches.Theseapproachescanbebroadlycategorized
accordingtotwofactors:(1)theamountofgovernmentinvolvement,and(2)
thedegreeofcentralization.Likeanycategorization,thisrisksbeingsimplistic—
forinstance,thecentralgovernmentmightapplyasubsidytoequipmentthat
isthenboughtandinstalledbyindividualsonacashbasis.Butitisareasonable
waytolookatsomeinstitutionalstructures.
Acentralized,governmentalapproachinvolvessupportfromeithernationalor
stategovernments.Thissupportcanbepassive,providingsubsidies,taxincentivesortechnicalsupportandleavingprojectimplementationtootheractors,
asinmanycountries.Itcanalsobemoreactive,withthecentralgovernmenta
majorpartnerinprojectimplementation;anexampleistheChineseTownship
ElectrificationProgram.
Indiahasanumberofcentralizedgovernmentalinitiatives:theMinistryof
NewEnergySources(MNES)isinvolvedinbothgrid-connectedandoff-grid
renewableenergy,aswellastheRuralElectrificationCorporationandtheIndian
RenewableEnergyDevelopmentAgency.
Centralized,nongovernmentalactionsarelessprevalentinIndia.Thiscategory
mightincluderegionalconcessions,underwhich(sometimesinexchangefor
givenlevelsofsubsidy)privatecompanies,cooperatives,orotheroperatorsare
awardedtheprovisionofelectricityforeveryonewithintheirconcessionarea.In
Brazil,forinstance,dispersedoff-griddieselgeneratorsareownedandoperated
centrallybyregionalconcessionaires.Similarmodelshavebeenappliedinthe
UnitedStates,Argentina,andSouthAfrica.
Decentralized,governmentalmodelsarecommoninmanycountries.Localgovernments,municipalcouncils,andpanchayatsoftenplayacrucialroleineither
supportingelectrificationprojectsorevenimplementingandmanagingthem.
ManyearlyelectrificationprojectsinChinafallunderthismodel(seeBox1).
Indecentralized,nongovernmentalmodelsthemainactorscanbehighlyvaried,
includingcooperatives,privatesectorentrepreneurs,andnonprofitassociations.
India’sElectricityActof2003createdsignificantnewopportunitiesforthiskind
ofstructure.Theopportunityhasbeenopenedupforsmall-scaleenterprises
thatprovideenergyservices.Examplesincludethedieselgeneratorsdiscussedin
Box5,butIndiaalreadyhassomesmallenterprisesprovidingrenewableenergy
systemsandmini-gridinstallations.Cooperativesareequallyimportantinprovidingthesekindsofservices,bothinIndiaandelsewheresuchastheUnited
StatesandthePhilippines.
Justastheinstitutionalapproachvaries,arangeoffinancialmodelsareused.A
surprisingnumberofenergymarketsoperateonacashbasiswithoutsubsidies:
PVsystemssalesinAfricaandWesternChinaaregoodexamples:consumers
purchaseequipmentoutrightandinstallitthemselves.Insomecasesconsumers
purchaseenergyequipmentwithlow-interestfinancing.Inothermodels,some
companiesofferleasefinance,andsomeactasmini-utilities,owningandoperatinggenerationequipmentandfinancingthroughpowersalesonalocallevel.
Noneofthesecategoriesisexclusive.Entrepreneurswillfrequentlytake
advantageofcentralgovernmentsubsidies,localgovernmentinitiativesmay
useprivatesectorturnkeyoperators,andsoon.TheimportantpointinIndia,
particularlyfollowingtheElectricityAct,isthatwearelikelytoseeconsiderably
morevarietyinthebusinessmodelsemployed.
Source:BasedonZerriffi&Victor(2005)
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
77
capital,Mumbai.InMay2005,advertisersacrossMumbai
wereinstructedtoturnofftheirneonbillboardsasasmall
gestureofelectricityconservation(HindustanTimes,
2005).Meanwhile,itsheavilyindustrializedhinterland
wassufferingrollingblackoutsof3to12hoursperday.
Smallbusinessesweredevastated.Largeones,generally,
werenot;majorcompaniesincreasinglygeneratetheirown
poweronsite.AstheMaharashtraexperiencetestifies,the
Indiangridsystemhasnotcomeclosetoprovidingquality
andreliablepowertocitizens.
InIndiandebatesoverruralelectrification,itiscommonlyassumedthatcentralizedelectricityprovided
throughthegridisthefirstchoice,andthatdecentralized,
ordistributed,generationissuitableonlyforremoteareas.
YettheelectricitygridthroughoutIndiapromisesmore
thanitdelivers.AccordingtotheIEA(2002b),“thedurationandnumberofblackoutsandbrownoutsarebeyond
acceptablelimits,leadingtoshortfallsofupto15percent
ofdemand.”
Thegridisalsopronetolosses.Withtechnicaland,
moreimportant,commerciallosses(ortheft)accounting
forabout25percentofgeneratedelectricity,Indiahas
oneofthehighestratesofelectricitylossesintheworld
(Figure3).Indeed,recentestimates,includingthoseby
StateElectricityRegulatoryCommissions,suggestthe
actuallosslevels,includingtheft,couldbeevenhigher,
intherangeof30to40percent.Thismeansthatifthis
78
dismalperformancecontinues,tomeetaruraldemandof
100terawatthours(TWh)onthegridIndiawouldhave
togeneratesome143to167TWh.
Fixingthetechnicallossesandqualityproblemsinthe
gridwilltakemoney—afterbeingrelativelyneglectedin
publicspending,transmissionnowrequires,thoughit
doesnotreceive,asmuchpublicinvestmentasgeneration
(IEA,2002a;PlanningCommission,2001).Fixingthe
nontechnicallosses,whichmakeupthebulkofthelosses
fromthegrid,requiresmorefundamentalreform.The
greatestlossescomefromtheftbythosewhohavenolegal
electricitysupply,andfromfarmersandothersthatarenot
billed(MinistryofPower,2003).16Enforcingbillpayment,
chargingfarmersforpower,andstoppingphysicaltheftare
allhighpriorities,butpoliticallydaunting.
ThenecessarychangestoIndia’sgridsystemneedtobe
viewedinthepoliticalcontextframedbythenewElectricityAct.Aplausibleinterpretationofthelikelyimpactof
theincentivesembeddedintheactisthatitwillresult
inafragmentationintofourconsumerclasses(Prayas,
2004).First,largeindustrialandcommercialconsumers,
whotendtobearhighelectricitycostsduetoacross-subsidytohouseholdandruralconsumers,willlikelygain
fromthebenefitsofshoppingaroundforelectricityand
fromeffortstoreducethecross-subsidy.Second,urban
highconsumptionandwealthyconsumersarelikelyto
betakenoverbydedicatedurbanutilitiesandwillalsobe
gainers.Third,existingconsumersfromsmalltownsand
ruralareaswillcontinuetobecaptiveconsumers,butwill
bestarvedofresourcesasthecross-subsidytapisturned
off.Withnoreplacementsourcesofrevenue,theymay
falldeeperintoaspiraloflowquality,lowrevenue,no
investment,andbadperformanceleadingtoever-lower
revenue.Thefourthcategoryarethosewhoareunserved;
undercurrentconditions,theyaremostlikelytomove
intothethirdcategoryofelectrifieduserswithdeclining
prospects.Itremainstobeseenwhethertheeffectofnew
marketentrants,andpossiblyre-targetedsubsidies,can
alterthisgloomyscenario.
Itisworthlookinginmoredetailatthethirdcategory.
AcrossIndia,farmersandruralareasreceiveelectricityat
apricewellbelowaveragecost,althoughtheypayforthis
withpoorqualityelectricity,oftenforonlyafewhoursa
dayandofteninthemiddleofthenight.Nonetheless,the
policyofcheaporevenfreepowertofarmersisjealously
defendedbypoliticallypowerfulfarmerlobbies.While
manyconsiderthisanecessarysubsidy,itisalsotruethat
theformandadministrationofthissubsidy—through
cross-subsidiesratherthantransparentallocations—has
negativespill-overeffectsforthesectorasawhole.For
thesereasons,theprovisionofelectricitytofarmersisa
politicalhotpotatoinIndia,andformanyisthesingle
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
biggestobstacleinthewayofreformingthepowersector.
Notwithstandingtherhetoricaboutruralelectrification,
manyarequietlyleeryaboutadramaticefforttoexpand
thegridtoruralareas,sinceitwillexpandthenumberof
low-payingcustomerswithoutbringingmorerevenue,
placinganevengreaterfiscalburdenonstates(Godbole,
2002).Thisconundrumseldomgetsopenlydiscussedin
therecentfeel-goodclimateofIndia’sruralelectrification
efforts.
Figure3.LossesfromtheElectricityGridbyCountry
3.1.2Off-gridelectricity
Giventhechronicproblemsofgrid-basedelectricityin
India,off-gridsolutionsareincreasinglyattractive.Bygeneratingelectricityclosetoitspointofuse,distributedgenerationeliminatestransmissionlosses.Thescopefortheft
mayalsobereduced,particularlyifsmall-scalegeneration
ismatedwithlocal-leveldistributionthroughpanchayats
orfranchisees,althoughthispropositionisyettobetested.
Finally,giventhepoorstateofthegrid,distributedgenerationmayactuallyleadtomorereliableanddependable
supplythangrid-connectedsupply.
TheElectricityActof2003opensthedoortooff-grid
generationtoamuchgreaterextentthanbefore.Someof
themostsignificantchangesfromthisviewpointare:
■ Mostlicensingrequirementsforgenerationareremoved(theoneexceptionisforhydropower).
■ Licensingrequirementsarealsoremovedforentities
suchascooperatives,ruraldistributors,andnonprofit
associations,whichareallowedtodirectlypurchase
powerinbulk.
■ Provisionofelectricityto“notified”ruralareas,from
generationthroughtodistribution,isallowedwithno
priorneedforalicense,openingthedoortodedicatedruralelectricitybusinesses.
Theterm“off-gridgeneration”istakenheretomean
anypowergenerationthatdoesnotdependonconnectiontothehigh-voltagetransmissionnetwork.Thismay
includemini-gridssetuptoserveisolatedcommunities
aswellassingleinstallationstoserveindividualbuildings,
suchasdomesticphotovoltaicsystems.
Arangeoftechnologiescanbeusedforoff-gridgeneration.Inkeepingwithourscenarios,herewewillconsider
twomaingroupsoftechnologies:dieselengines,and
distributedrenewableenergysources.
Philipines
Dieselgeneration
Dieselgenerationsetsareinwidespreaduseforoff-grid
poweraroundtheworld.Theyoffersomeimportant
advantages:
■ Thetechnologyisafamiliarone,withlargeestablishedvendorsforboththegeneratorsandthefuel.
OECD
China
Ethiopia
Indonesia
Egypt
Sudan
Algeria
Eritrea
Cameroon
Zimbabwe
Kenya
Togo
India
Nigeria
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
Percent of Electricity Lost from Grid
Source:IEA(2002b)
Comparedwithalternativessucharenewables,a
relativelylowproportionofthelifecyclecostisupfrontcapital.
■ Maintenanceandrepairskillsarewidelyavailablein
bothcitiesandruralcommunities.
■ Theycanprovidehigh-qualityACpowerondemand.
Toweighagainstthis,dieselpresentsanumberof
challenges:
■ Thefuelisincreasinglyexpensive,particularlyincases
whereitmustbetransportedlongdistances,asin
muchofruralIndia,leadingtohigherlife-cyclecosts
inmanycases.
■ Large-scaleuseaddstoIndia’sgrowingdependency
onoilimports.
■ Dieselenginesemitnoxiousfumes,aswellasCO .
2
Thereissomepreliminaryevidencethatsmall-scale
diesel-basedpowersystemsareexpandingrapidlyinsmall
towns,particularlyinstateswheregridpowerisunreliable
andpoor(Box5).
■
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
79
35%
Box5.TheDieselEntrepreneurs
InthesmalltownofMuzaffarpurinthenorthernstateofBihar,privateentrepreneurshaveseizedonconsumerdiscontentasamassivebusinessopportunity.
Startingwithgeneratorspurchasedtosupplypowertopartiesduringthe“marriageseason”butthatotherwiselieidle,entrepreneurshaveexpandedtofull
backupandeven24-hoursupplytohotelsandothercommercialestablishments.
Oldgeneratorsphasedoutfromindustrialunitsprovideacheapandready,if
inefficientanddirty,supplyofcapacity.Kishorereportsgeneratorsstrivingto
captureenoughofthemarkettoreachscale.Electricityisoftendistributed
usingthepolesandlinesoftheSEB,withSEBemployeesreceivingacutofthe
profit.Thereisevidenceoffurthercollusion,withprivateentrepreneurspaying
SEBemployeestokeepthelightsoffforaslongaspossibletomaximizetheir
market!PricesareashighasRs.7to10perkWh(UScents15to22),morethan
doubleratespaidbyhouseholdsandconsiderablyhigherthancommercialrates.
Whileruralareasofferasmallerandlessdensemarket,therapidsaturationof
thesmallurbanmarketcouldseeanexpansiontoatleastthelargervillages.
MuzaffarpurcouldbetheshapeofthingstocomeinruralIndia.
Source:Kishore(2003)
Renewableenergy
Theterm“renewableenergy”coversawiderangeof
technologiesandapplications.Fourseemparticularly
promisingforruralelectrificationinIndia:smallhydropower,wind,solar,andbiomass.Thesewillbediscussed
individuallybelow,buttheyshareseveralcharacteristics:
■ Theyarecapital-intensive,withlowrunningcosts.
RelativelyhighcapitalrequirementsareamajorobstacleinIndia,wherefinanceisexpensive.Allexcept
biomasshavenofuelcostsatall,sorunningcosts
areessentiallyjustmaintenance.Whilebiomassdoes
requirefuel,muchofthisisavailableonanon-cash
basis(seebelow).
■ Theyarerelativelyunfamiliartechnologies.While
manyofthetechnologies,particularlyinthecaseof
hydro,haveexistedforalongtime,theytendtobe
lessfamiliarandarethusseenasmorerisky.Inaddition,thislackoffamiliaritymeansthattherelevant
maintenanceskillsarelesscommon.
■ Theydonotrelyonoutsidefuelsupply.While
perhapsobvious,thisisanimportantadvantage,
especiallyformoreremoteapplications.
■ Insomecasestheyarerelativelybenignintermsof
localimpactsontheenvironment,thoughsome
hydroandbiomassusecanhavesignificantimpacts.
■ TheyproduceverylowGHGemissions,even
consideredoverthewholelifecycle.17
80
Renewableenergysourceshavetendedtobemore
expensiveonaperkilowatthour(kWh)basisthanconventionalenergysources.However,technologyimprovementandeconomiesofscalehavebroughtcostsdown
dramaticallyoverrecentdecades(WEA,2000;G8,2001).
Indiamaybetheonlycountrytohaveaministry
specificallydedicatedtorenewableenergypromotion—the
MinistryforNon-ConventionalEnergySources(MNES).
Unlessstatedotherwise,informationonrenewableenergy
inIndiabelowisderivedfromMNES(2005).
Small-scalehydropower
HydropowerasawholeplaysasignificantroleinIndia’s
electricitymix,ataround11percentofpowergeneration.
Thegreatmajorityofthiscomesfromlargedams.However,smallhydropower—definedinIndiaasinstallations
ratedatunder25megawatts(MW)—accountsforsome
1,519MWintotal,withjustover55MWmoreunder
construction.MNESestimatesaneconomicpotentialfor
15,000MWofsmallhydropower,andoffersincentivesto
encouragetheirdevelopment.InChina,about20percent
ofruralelectricityisprovidedfromsmallhydropowerinstallations,amountingto28,500MWofinstalledcapacity
in2002(Tong,2004).
Hydropowercanbeusedtosupportmini-gridscoveringoneormorevillages,aswellasworkingwellata
smallscale.
Biomass
Biomasscanbeconvertedtoelectricitywitharange
oftechnologies.Thesecaninvolvegasification,charcoal
production,orsimplecombustion.Biomasspoweroffersa
numberofadvantagesinmanypartsofruralIndia.
First,unlikesomerenewablesourcesitdoesnotsuffer
fromintermittencyandcanthereforebeusedasabasisfor
powerondemandwithoutneedforadditionalstorageor
backuptechnology.
Perhapsmoreimportantly,itofferssubstantialadvantagesforruralcommunities,whicharemainlyengagedin
agriculture.Mostvillageshaveareadysupplyofagriculturalresiduethatcanbeusedasfuel,althoughthereare
complexsocialquestionsofownershipofthisresource,
particularlywherevillagecommonsareinvolved.Agriculturalresiduecanbetradedonpart-barterbasisfor
electricity:animportantadvantageovercommercialfuels
incommunitiesthatarepoorincash.Byaddingvalueto
ruralfarming,thisalsocreateseconomicopportunity.
TheIndianPlanningCommission(2002)notesthat
biomasshas“theaddedadvantageofpotentiallycreating
millionsofruralemploymentopportunitiesandcontributingtohigherruralincomes,ratherthanhigheroutflowsof
foreignexchange.”
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
MNES(2005)estimatesthepotentialforpowergenerationfromfuelwood,cropresidues,woodwaste,and
bagasseatabout19,500MW.ThePlanningCommission
goesfurtherandestimatesthat“establishmentof40millionhectaresofenergyplantationwouldbesufficientto
generate100,000MWofpowerandprovideyear-round
employmentfor30millionpeople.”AsofMarch2003,
Indiahadjustunder500MWofbiomasspowergenerationcapacity,sothisresourceisclearlyatanearlystage
ofexploitation.
Windpower
Windenergydevelopmentisasignificantdomestic
industryinIndia,whichiscurrentlytheworld’sfifthlargestwindmarket.18Viablepotentialforpowergeneration
isestimatedataround13,000MW(Bakshi,2002),of
whicharound3,000MW(GlobalWindEnergyCouncil,2005)havebeenexploitedtodatebothonandoff
thegrid.OverhalfofthecurrenttotalisinTamilNadu.
Smallsystemscanusebatterystoragetoprovidepower
ondemand,butlargerapplicationsoff-gridwillusesome
combinationofsolar,biomass,and/ordieseltoensurea
moreconsistentoutput.
OneappealofwindpoweristhehighlevelofproductivecapacitywithinIndia.Anestimated80percentofthe
valuechainislocatedinthecountry,andtheIndianwind
industryhasanannualproductioncapacityofabout500
MWperyear,includingallbutthelargestturbinesizes
(MNES,2005).
areas,thisbecomescost-competitive.Theirlackofmoving
partsalsomeansthattheyrequirelittlemaintenance,
thoughtheydorequirebatteriesinordertodeliverpower
ondemand.
3.2Whataretheimpactsoftherural
electrificationscenarios?
Hereweexaminetheimpactsofthescenariosinterms
ofthefourcriteriadiscussedinsection1.4:(1)thespeed
atwhichaccessisprovided;(2)thequalityofsupply,
includingavailability,reliability,andconsistency;(3)
affordabilityorcostcriteria;and(4)securityofsupply.
Inaddition,weexaminetheimplicationsforGHG
emissionsofeachscenario.
Table2summarizestheadditionalelectricityconsumptionfromruralelectrificationunderthethreescenarios.
3.2.1Speedatwhichaccessisprovided
TheIndiangovernmenthassethugelyambitiousgoals
foracceleratingtherateofnewelectricityconnections.
Ifthetimeframesrecentlybeingdiscussedaretobetaken
seriously,grid-connectedelectricitywillfaceformidable
challenges.Theseareintwoareas:(1)generation,and(2)
transmissionanddistribution(T&D).
Generation
Therequirementfornewgenerationcapacityisenormous.Ourscenariossuggestthatgrid-dominatedrural
electrificationwillrequirethedeliveryof23to157TWh
ofpowertonewlyelectrifiedruralareas.According
toIndia’sPlanningCommission,capacityutilizationfor
thermalplantsis70percent(PlanningCommission,
2002b),butruralpoweris“peaky”(thatis,demandis
concentratedinsmalltimeperiodsduringtheday),and
thuscapacityfactors19aremuchlower.Usingarateof30
to50percent,between6and65gigawatts(GW)ofnew
Solarphotovoltaics
PVcells,whichproduceDCpowerdirectlyfrom
sunlight,haveanobviousappealinacountryasdrenched
insunshineasIndia.Thepowertheyproduceisrelatively
expensive(typically20to24UScentsperkWh).However,forsmall-scaleapplications,particularlyinremote
Table2.TheThreeScenariosunderDifferentDemandAssumptions
Scenario
GridFirst
DieselFirst
RenewablesFirst
Demand
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
Gridelec.consumption(TWh)
22
38
157
6
11
44
6
11
High
Dieselelec.consumption(TWh)
4
7
27
14
24
100
4
6
26
RenewablesConsumption(TWh)
1
2
8
4
6
26
14
24
100
44
Note:Gridlossesareassumedtofallto20percent.TheCEAestimatesthattechnicallossescanbereducedto10to15percent.Giventhatthisdoesnotinclude
lossesfromtheftandnon-billing,thismeansthatour20percentestimatefortotallossesassumesconsiderablereductioningridlossesofalltypes.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
81
capacitywillneedtobebuilttosupplythegrid.Atanapproximatecapitalcostof$1millionperMW,thismeans
from$6billionto$65billion,andmaybesignificantly
higherdependingonthetechnologiesused.
Traditionalgenerationtechnologieshavelonggestation
times—threetofiveyearsforacoal-firedplantand10
to15yearsforahydroplant(seeTable3).Smaller-scale
powerplantsaregenerallylesschallengingintermsof
theirlocalimpacts,andrequireshorterleadtimes.Most
distributedgenerationtechnologiesoperateonmuch
shortertime-scalesofonetotwoyears,bringingrealizationofambitiouspoliticaltargetsclosertothebounds
ofreality.Transmissionlinesareobviouslynotnecessary,
thoughlow-voltagedistributioninfrastructuremaybe.Itis
importanttonotethattheimplementationrateofgenerationcapacityisdrivenbyarangeoffactors,whichmay
varyovertime.Theseincludetheinstitutionalcapacityfor
delivery(whichwediscussbrieflybelow)andtheability
tomobilizecapital.Whileafulltreatmentoftheseissues
isbeyondthescopeofthisstudy,itisreasonabletoexpect
thatintroducingnewtypesofprovidersinadditiontothe
SEBswillincreasetheoverallinstitutionalcapacityfor
delivery.Althoughnewmarketentrantsoftenhaveahard
timeaccessingcapital,theirfreedomfromthechronic
financialproblemsoftheSEBsmayevengivetheman
advantageinthisarea.
Thereisaquestion,however,regardingwhetherthe
respectiveindustrieswouldbeabletorespondquickly
enoughtosucharapidincreaseindemand.Assuminga
capacityfactorof30to50percentforoff-griddiesel,generating100TWhperyearimpliesnewinstalledcapacity
ofsome23to38GWby2020,orroughly1,500–2,500
MWperyear.Thisisequivalenttoadding15to25
percentofIndia’spresentinstalledcapacityofdistributed
dieselgenerationeachyear.Thisissignificantgrowth,but
therapidresponseofentrepreneurstotheElectricityAct
andtherelativeabundanceofdieselenginesuppliersgive
somereasontothinkthatitisplausible.
Table3.TypicalUnitSizeandConstructionTimeforSelected
Technologies
Type
Typicalunitcapacity(MW)
Constructiontime(years)
LargeHydro
30–250
10–15
MicroHydro
0.01–1
3–5
Coal
60–700
3–5
Gascombinedcycle
100–300
1–2
Diesel
0.5–10
1–2
Wind
0.25–1
1–2
Source:Prayas(2004)
82
Forrenewableenergythepictureisnotquitesoclear.
Usingageneralizedloadfactorforrenewableenergy
systemsisdifficult,sincethevarioustechnologiesthis
includesvarywidely—fromatypicalcapacityfactorof
25percentforsolarPVtoaround70percentformany
biomassapplications(Banerjee,2006).Assuminganaveragecapacityfactorof30to40percent,meetingdemand
of100TWhperyearin2020wouldimplyinstallingsome
29to38GWover15years,or1,900to2,500MWofoffgridrenewableenergycapacityperyear.Whilethisisnot
overwhelmingintermsofthetechnology—Spainalone
installsalmosttwicethatamounteveryyear—furtherwork
needstobedonetoevaluatethepotentialtoinstalllarge
numbersofdispersedrenewableenergyprojects.Indiahas
asignificantdomesticmanufacturingbaseinmostofthe
renewableenergytechnologies,butanexpansionofthis
scalewouldalmostcertainlyrequiretheactiveinvolvement
ofinternationalprovidersaswell.
Transmissionanddistribution
India’sT&Dinfrastructurealreadysuffersfromunderinvestment,withblackoutsandbrownoutscommonacross
thecountry.Ruralelectrification,whichbydefinition
meanslessdensepopulationsandthusgreaterT&Dneeds,
maywellplacetoomuchdemandonIndia’screakinggrid.
Exactlyhowmuchtransmissioninfrastructureinvestmentwillbeneededwilldependonarangeoffactors,but
wecanconsiderthescaleofthechallengewithsomerough
calculations.
AgeneralruleforcapitalinvestmentinIndia’spower
infrastructureholdsthatinvestmentintransmissionand
distributionshouldroughlyequalthatingeneration(IEA,
2002a;PlanningCommission,2001).Assumingthisratio
holdsforruralelectrification,andassuminganoptimistic
loadfactorof50percent,wewouldexpecttoseea$5
billionto$36billioninvestmentinT&Dover15yearsin
additiontoinvestmentneededtostrengthenthegridand
improvereliabilityinexistingdemandcenters.
Thisisatallorder.Forpurposesofcomparison,the9th
ten-yearplaninvested$1.2billioninT&Doverfiveyears.
Evenunderthelowestofourdemandscenarios,India
wouldneedtomaintainitsrecentlevelofT&Dinvestment
justtosupportruralelectrification(seeFigure4)—without
countinganyfurtherinvestmentinitsurbanandother
areasthatalreadyhavesomegridconnection.Atthehigh
levelofdemand,annualinvestmentinT&Dwouldneed
toincreasealmostsixfold.
Basedontheabove,wemakeaqualitativeappraisalof
thescenariosintermsofthespeedofprovisionofelectricity(Table4).Notethattheseassessmentsarebasedmainly
onthecapacityoftheinstitutionalanddeliveryframeworksinIndia,ratherthanontechnology.Therearesome
technologicalconstraints—forinstancetheneedforT&D
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
GridFirst
DieselFirst
Renewables
First
Speed
Low
High
Medium
infrastructureoftenaddstothetimeneededtoprovide
newconnections—butthesearegenerallymuchlesssignificantthanthoseofinstitutionalanddeliverymodels.
3.2.2Qualityofsupply,includingavailability,
reliabilityandconsistency
Thegrid-basedapproachisinsomewaysthemost
difficulttoassess,sincemuchdependsonrecentefforts
toreformandfixIndia’sgrid-basedsupply.Agridcanin
principlebewell-suitedtothedeliveryofpowerwithhigh
levelsofavailability,reliability,andquality.Withsufficientimprovement,agridconnectionoffersthepotential
for“scalability”—thatis,theabilitytomatchincreased
demandwithreadysupply.
Asdiscussedin3.1.1,however,theobstaclesthatlie
inthewayofbettergridelectricityareformidable.The
potentialforcash-strappedSEBstosimultaneouslyexpand
connectionsandimprovequalityforthebottomtwosegmentsoftheelectricitymarket—currentruralconsumers
andanticipatedfutureruralconsumers—isremote.
Onlyifservingtheruralpoorisnolongeraloss-making
propositioncanthisoutcomebereversed.Todosowill
eitherrequireasteepincreaseintransparentsubsidies
fromthestate,orasteepincreaseinprice,alongwithfar
greatercollectionefficiency.Neitherseemslikely.State
governmentsarestrugglingtocoverexistingsubsidies,let
aloneenhancedsubsidiesfromanadditional161million
households.Sinceexistingruralconsumersareorganized
topreventpricehikesandareremarkablyeffectiveat
avoidingcollection,thereisnoreasontoexpectnew,and
likelypoorer,userstobenoticeablymorepliant.These
argumentssuggestthatforperhapsseveraldecades,gridbasedruralelectrificationwillmostlikelybepoorquality
andunreliableelectrification.
Bycontrast,distributedgenerationhasthepotentialto
breakoutofthiscycleforatleasttworeasons.First,studiessuggestthatruralpopulationsarewillingtopaymore
ifqualityimprovescommensurately(WorldBank,2001).
Thisleadstoachicken-and-eggsituation,whererural
userswaitforservicequalitytoincrease,andtheSEBs
seekhigherpricesbeforeinvestinginservicequality.New
distributedgenerationprovidershavetheopportunityto
establishgreatertrustandcredibilitythantheSEBs.Ifthey
provideadequatequalityandreliability,theymaywellbe
abletochargeremunerativeprices.Second,byintroducingmoreknowledgeoflocalcontext,decentralizationin
Figure4.IndicativeAnnualT&DInvestmentNeedsunderthe
Grid-DominatedScenarioComparedtothe9th5-YearPlan
2.5
T&D Investment per Year (US$ billion)
Table4.QualitativeAssessmentoftheSpeedof
ElectricityProvisionundereachScenario
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
9th 5-year plan
Low demand
Medium demand
High demand
Source:Authors,basedonparitywithrequiredgenerationinvestment.
collectioninconjunctionwithdistributedgenerationmay
wellhelpsolvethecollectionproblem.Althoughdecentralizedcollectionhasbeenattemptedforcentralgrid
poweraswell,notablyinthestateofOrissa,preliminary
reportssuggestthatsincethechainofcommandbetween
localcollectionagentsandtheutilitywasundulylong,
localcollectorsdidnothavetheabilitytoprovidequick
solutionstolocalproblems,undercuttingthebenefitof
localknowledge(Mishra,nodate).Anintegratedsmall-
scaleprovider—whetherusingdieselorrenewabletechnologies—wouldnothavethesameproblemandmaywell
beabletoprovidebetterserviceandextractahigherprice.
Fromatechnologicalpointofview,dieselandrenewableenergyprojectsbothofferpotentiallyhigherquality
andreliabilitythanthepresentIndiangrid.However,this
willdependinbothcasesontheexistenceofasufficient
workforceofcompetentprojectdevelopersandassociated
experts.Ingeneral,dieselgeneratorshavetheadvantageof
beingfamiliartechnologywithareadysupplyofmechanicstomaintainandrepairthegenerators.However,some
fieldexperienceinChinasuggeststhatruralconsumers
preferrenewableenergysystemsfortheirgreaterreliability
(Byrneetal.,1998).
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
83
Windandsolartechnologiesbothdependonavariable
resource,whichaddsanobviouschallengeinproviding
aconsistentandhighqualitysupply.Thesolutiontothis
problemvarieswiththescaleofthegeneration.Small
systems,particularlysolarPV,tendtousebatteries(WEA,
2000).Forlargersystems,topowermini-gridsforinstance,batteriescanbeuneconomic,andtypicallyhybrid
systemsareused.Thesepairwindand/orsolartechnologieswithdieselorbiomassback-upsupply.Thesolarand
windequipment,notrequiringfuel,isusedwhenthesun
orwindisavailable;atothertimesthebackuptechnology
kicksin.Projectexperiencesuggeststhatwell-designed
systemscanrelyonthebackupforaslittleas20percentof
thepowerdemand(GoldembergandJohansson,2004).
Basedontheabove,wemakeaqualitativeappraisal
ofthescenariosintermsofqualityofsupply(Table5).
Asinthecaseofspeedofdelivery(seeprecedingsection)
thisappraisalisbasedoninstitutionalfactors.Thereis
notechnologicalreasonwhygridelectricityshouldbeof
lowerquality.------Table5---removethislater
Table5.QualitativeAssessmentoftheQualityof
ElectricityundereachScenario
GridFirst
DieselFirst
Renewables
First
Quality
Low
High
Medium
3.2.3Affordability
Apersistentcriticismofoff-gridelectrificationin
general,andrenewableenergytechnologiesinparticular,
isthattheydeliverpowerataconsiderablyhighercost
thanthegrid.InCambodia,forinstance,off-gridschemes
chargeanaveragetariffthreetimeshigherthanthatpaid
bycustomersonthegrid(WorldBank,2004).
However,suchcomparisonscanbemisleading.ComparingcostsonaperkWhbasisbetweensuchdifferent
technologiesanddeliverystructuresasareconsideredhere
isnotstraightforward,sincetariffswilldependonawide
rangeoftechnologyfactorsorcomplexcross-subsidies.
Whateverapproachisused,providingelectrificationto
dispersedruralpopulationsisinherentlymoreexpensive
thantoconcentratedurbanpopulations.Conversely,urban
populationsareoftenricherthantheirruralcounterparts.
Thisprovidesastrongpoliticalrationaletosubsidizerural
electricityintheinterestofequity.
Subsidiesforgrid-basedtechnologies—whichcouldjust
asfeasiblybeusedforoff-gridelectrification—canbe
complexandhidden.Figure5showsthedifferencebetween
thecostofprovidingpower,thepricesetbytheRegulatory
Commission(RC),andthepriceaftergovernmentsubsidy
forpowertoarangeofsectorsintheStateofAndhraPradesh.
In2002,theaveragecostofsupplyfromthegridwas
3.5rupeesperkWh(7cents),buttheaveragetariffwas
2.4Rs(4.8cents).Thecustomerthuspaidonaverage
abouttwo-thirdsofthecostofsupply—considerablyless
thanthisforruralcustomers.(Prayas,2004).
Nordothese“costofsupply”figuresproperlyreflect
thetotalcostsinvolved.Thesomewhatcounter-intuitive
figuresabovesuggestthatthecostperkWhofservinga
largeindustrialconsumerishigherthanservingruralconsumers—somethingthat,iftrue,wouldstandinmarked
contrasttotheexperienceinotherelectricitymarkets.The
discrepancyseemstobeduetothefactthatcommercial
andindustrialusersrequirereasonablyhighlevelsofquality
inthepowertheyconsume.Ruralcostsseemlowbecause
theyreflectthecostofdeliveringlow-quality,intermittent
power.Thetruecostofruralelectrificationthatmeetsthe
government’squalitycriteriawouldbefarhigher.
Thecostestimatesforoff-gridsourcesvarywidely
acrosssources,andwithineachsourcebecauseoflocation-specificfactors(Table6).Solaristhemostexpensive
becauseofitssignificantcapitalinvestment.Forthisreason,ittendstobeusedlargelyforlow-loadapplications,
whereitisbetterabletocompetewithothertechnologies.
Indiahasinvestedheavilyinwindcapacity,andhasthe
5thlargestinstalledwindcapacityintheworld(European
WindEnergyAssociation,2003).BecauseofIndia’sagrarianbase,biomassisperhapsthemostpromisingsource
forIndia(Pathak,2004).Finally,dieselisthemosttried
andtestedoftheoff-gridtechnologies.However,thecost
dependsconsiderablyonthedistanceoverwhichfuelhas
tobedelivered.20
AfirstglanceatTable6suggeststhatoff-gridpower
sourcesdeliverpoweratahigherpriceperkWhthan
gridpower.However,thismaywellnotbethecasefor
atleastthreereasons.First,becauseoftheheavycapital
andoperatingsubsidiesforgridpower,directcomparisonsbetweentheseunsubsidizedgenerationcostsand
subsidizedgridpricesarenotmeaningful.Second,much
dependsonthecharacteristicsofthesite.Variablessuchas
remoteness(fromthegridorfuelsupply),availabilityof
anappropriaterenewableresource,andsuitableoperation
andmaintenancecapabilitiescanallmateriallyaltercost
Table6.IndicativePricesforOff-gridTechnologies
20-9421
Wind
3.6-11.722
Biomass
Diesel
84
PriceperkWh(UScents)
Solar
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
4-1023
1024
Table7.QualitativeAssessmentoftheAffordability
ofElectricityundereachScenario
GridFirst
DieselFirst
Renewables
First
Affordability
Medium
Medium
Low/Medium
abilityofruralhouseholdstopayforpowerislikelytobe
limitedinallcases.Notealsothattheapplicationof
subsidiesislikelytobethedominantfactorinensuring
affordability,andthesesubsidiesmaybeappliedtoanyof
thetechnologymixesconsideredhere.------Table7--3.2.4Energyimportdependenceand
securityofsupply
Thephrase“securityofsupply”asoftenusedconflates
twodistinctconcernsforanenergy-importingstate.The
firstoftheseisimportdependence.Large-scaledependenceonimportedfuelsimposesaburdenonacountry’s
foreigncurrencyreservesandbalanceofpayments,and
thevolatilityofinternationaloilpricespresentsanunpredictableeconomiccost.Thisappliestoallfuelsthathave
tobeimported.Thesecond,securityofsupply,refersto
Figure5.PriceperkWhforPowertoVariousSectorsin
AndhraPradesh
7
Cost to serve
6
RC Tariff
Tariff after subsidy
5
US cents per kWh
4
3
2
Railway
Industry,
High voltage
Industry,
Low voltage
Commercial
Rural Co-op
0
Agriculture
1
Residential
comparisonsofspecificoff-gridtechnologieswithgridbasedpower.Third,thecostofrelativelynewrenewable
off-gridtechnologies,andwindenergyinparticular,has
beensteadilydecliningovertime,andislikelytodecline
evenfurtherasscaleeconomiesofmanufacturearerealized.Overtime,therefore,off-gridrenewabletechnologies
arelikelytobeevermorecompetitive(Goldembergand
Johanssen,2004).
Insum,itisextremelyhardtomakegeneralstatements
aboutcostcomparisonsacrossgenerationtechnologies.
Theeconomicsofgridgenerationandtransmissionare
extremelymurkyinIndia,anditisbynomeansclearthat
futureruraluserswillhaveaccesstoelectricityatthecosts
thatcurrentusersenjoy,especiallyifcost-recoverydisciplineisimposedinthesector.Amongoff-gridtechnologies,dieselgeneratorsarethemostestablished,butcosts
dependonfuelavailabilityandtransportcosts.Off-grid
renewableenergysourcesrangefromhighcosttocosts
thatarecompetitivewithgridsources,inthecaseofwind.
Inpractice,thereisunlikelytobeasinglewinnerfrom
amongsources.Instead,eachofthesetechnologiesmaybe
used,aloneorinconjunctionwithothertechnologies(for
example,wind-diesel),whereconditionsareripe.
Basedonthisdiscussion,wemakeaqualitativeappraisal
ofthescenariosintermsofaffordability(Table7).Note
thatnooptionisveryaffordable—inotherwords,the
Source:Prayas(2004)
aphysicalandpoliticalriskthatsuppliesatbearablecost
mightbecomeunavailable.Giventhevitalimportance
ofenergysuppliesforalleconomies,thedependenceon
politicallyvulnerableorunstableregionsforthesesupplies
isworrying.Thissecondconsiderationappliesmoreto
fuelssuchasoilandnaturalgas,whicharegenerallyfound
inlessstableregions,thantocoal,whichcomesfrom
countriesthatpresentlesspoliticalrisk.
Asgovernmentsbecomemoreconcernedaboutthe
economicandpoliticalconsequencesofdependence
onimports,embarkingonanapproachsuretoincrease
thatdependencelooksimprudent.Indiaisincreasingly
dependentonforeignsuppliesofoil,andthisconcern,
asinmanyothercountries,isgrowing.------Table8--ItisnotcleartowhatextentIndiawoulddependon
importingrefineddiesel.Atpresent,somedieselproductsareimported,thoughIndiahassignificantrefining
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
85
Table8.OilandOilProductImportIncreasesfromtheScenarios,2020
Scenario
GridFirst
Demand
DieselFirst
RenewablesFirst
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
Dieselconsumption(millionbarrels/year)
9
16
68
34
60
251
9
16
65
Percentageincreaseover2003-4imports
2%
3%
11%
6%
10%
41%
1%
3%
11%
Oilimportincrease(billionUS$/year)at
$30/barrelcrude
0.4
0.7
3.1
1.5
2.7
11.3
0.4
0.7
2.9
0.81.45.8 2.9 5.121.3
0.8
At$70/barrelcrude
capacityofitsown.However,itsoilresourcesaresmall
andunlikelytorisesignificantly.Thus,theriseindiesel
consumptionwillleadtoincreasedimports,whetherof
crudeoilorrefineddiesel.Hereweassumeforsimplicity
thattheadditionaldieseldemandismetwithimportsof
refineddiesel.AsTable8shows,dependingonthelevel
ofdemandtheDieselFirstscenarioraisesIndia’simports
bytheequivalentofbetween6percentand41percentof
thosein2003/4.25Bycontrast,theGridFirstandRenewablesFirstscenariosraisedieselimportsbybarelyaquarter
asmuch.
Suchanincreaseinimportsrepresentsasignificant
financialburden,particularlyasoilpricesseemlikelyto
remainhigh.Predictingoilpricesisnotoriouslydifficult,
buttoindicateaplausiblerangeinTable8weconsiderthe
effectsoftheincreaseatcrudeoilpricesof$30perbarrel
and$70perbarrel.26
At$30perbarrel,theDieselFirstscenarioimpliesan
increaseintheimportbillof$1.5to$11.3billionper
year(dependingontheassumeddemand)overa200304importbillofabout$17.4billion.TheRenewables
Firstscenario(usingthesameoilprice)raisesimportsby
$0.4to$2.9billion,thussavingthecountryanet$0.9to
$8.4billionperyear.At$70perbarrel,thissavingrisesto
between$2.1and$15.8billion.Intermsofimpactonoil
importsthereislittledifferencebetweentheGridFirstand
RenewablesFirstscenarios.
Theimportfiguresrepresentpotentiallysignificant
costs.Atthehighendofthisrange(oilpricesof$70a
barrel),$15.8billionisequivalentto90percentofIndia’s
currentimportbillforoilandrefinedproducts,and14
percentofthenationalexternaldebt.27
High
1.3 5.5
Inadditiontothepurelyfinancialburden,another
issueisthedependenceonpotentiallyvolatilesuppliers.
WhileIndianrefinersalsobuyonthespotmarket,their
mainsourcesofcrudeundertermcontractsareSaudi
Arabia,Kuwait,UAE,andIran(MinistryofPetroleum
andNaturalGas,2005).Thisconcentrationofsuppliers
inapoliticallyvolatileregionleavesIndiamoreexposedto
potentialsupplydisruptionsthanitmightwish.
OilraisestroublingdependencyissuesforIndiadue
tothesensitivesecurityconcernsitraises.However,coal
importsmayalsohavetorise.Inthecalculationspresentedhere,weassumethatthegenerationmix—thatis,the
shareofthedifferentpowertechnologiesonthegrid—
willremainbroadlyconstant.However,“peaky”loads
suchasthoseinruralareasarenotwellservedbybaseload
plantssuchasthelargethermalgeneratorsinwideuse
inIndia.Hydropowerandnaturalgastechnologiesare
commonfordealingwithpeakloads,butneitherhas
largemedium-termpotentialforexpansion.Thisleaves
thepossibilitythatsmallercoalplantswillcomeonlineto
dealwiththemorevariablegridload.Thesesmallerplants
tendtobelessefficientandmorepolluting,andwill
ofcoursedemandcoal.India’scoalindustryfacesmajor
constraintsinitsabilitytoincreaseeitherproductionor
transportofcoal.However,evenadoublingofIndia’s
coaloutputwillnotallowittokeeppacewithspiraling
projecteddemandforpowerontheexistinggrid(Planning
Commission,2002a).ThisraisesthepossibilitythatIndia,whichhasalargedomesticcoalresource,willbecome
increasinglydependentoncoalimports.Thispossibility
isreflectedinourqualitativeassessmentofenergysecurity
implications(Table9).Table9--Table9.QualitativeAssessmentoftheProtection
ofIndia’sDomesticEnergySecurityunder
eachScenario
Energysecurity
86
GridFirst
DieselFirst
Renewables
First
Medium
Low
High
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Table10.CO2EmissionsArisingfromtheScenarios
Scenario
GridFirst
DieselFirst
RenewablesFirst
Demand
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
High
Low
Medium
CO2emissions(Mt)
23
40
167
19
33
137
9
16
65
Figure6.CO2EmissionsundertheScenarios
200
Low
Medium
High
150
CO2 emissions (Mt/year)
3.2.5Greenhousegases
AsillustratedinTable10,thethreescenariosshow
markeddifferencesintheirresultingGHGemissions.
Highdependencyonthegridproducesthehighestlevels
ofGHGemissions.28TheDieselFirstscenarioproduces
slightlyloweremissions,largelythroughreducinggrid
lossesandthusloweringtotalgenerationrequired.
TheRenewablesFirstscenarioleadstoemissions
roughly60percentlowerthanGridFirst:adifferenceof
14to100millionmetrictonsofCO2peryeardepending
onthedemandlevel.ThemiddleofthisrangeisequivalenttoalmosttwiceasmuchastheyearlyCO2emissions
ofBangladesh.
Thenear-termsignificanceofthisimpactshouldnotbe
overstated.EvenundertheGridFirstscenario,theimpact
of500millionIndiansgainingaccesstoelectricityforthe
firsttimeleadstotheequivalentof1to5percentofU.S.
GHGemissions.Thisishardlytrivial,butitdoesnot
makeruralelectrificationanobviousplacetofocusefforts
atlower-carbongrowth.-----------Figure6-------Apotentiallymoreimportantissueistheextentto
whichthetechnologyandinstitutionalchoicesmade
nowwillpersist.Forinstance,highinvestmentingrid
infrastructureinthecomingdecademaymakegrid-based
electricitydeliverythenormandensuretheuseoflarge,
centralizedthermalplantswellintothefuture.Inthecase
oflarge-scaleT&Dinfrastructureandon-gridgeneration,
thetechnologiesthemselveshavelonglifetimes.Alarge
thermalgenerationplantcanhavealifeof50yearsor
moreand,oncethecapitalhasbeendepreciated,canbe
hardtoreplaceeconomically.Investmentsmadenowmay
lastwellintothesecondhalfofthecentury.Thismightbe
describedasatechnological,orinfrastructure“lock-in.”
Conversely,distributedoroff-gridenergysystemsentail
asetofinstitutionalandbusinessstructuressuchasmarketing,installation,maintenance,andrepairnetworksthat
taketimetodevelop.Inaddition,usersneedtoaccustom
themselvestotheideaofgeneratingtheirpowerlocally.
Alarge-scaleadoptionofoff-gridelectricitytechnologies
nowbycommunitiesthatarenewpowerusersmightbe
expectedtobuildalastingsetofinstitutionalstructures
thatwillcontinuetofacilitatetheintroductionofother
off-gridgenerationinthefuture.Sincethesesystemsdo
notrelyonlargediscretecapitalinvestments,theyallow
newtechnologiestopenetratethemarketastheyaredeveloped.Thusthe“lock-in”effectinthiscaseisinstitutional
ratherthantechnological.
High
100
50
0
High Grid
High Diesel
High Renewables
Evenaftertheheroiceffortsneededtoelectrifyall
householdsby2020,demandcanbeexpectedtogrow
substantially.Thereissomeevidenceofasubstantialtechnologicalinertiainenergysystems.29Thisinertialeffectis
aninterestingareaforfurtherresearch,whichisbeyond
thescopeofthisstudy.Thesalientpointhereisthatthe
longer-termclimateimpactsoftoday’schoicesmaybesignificant,andtheinterestinfindinglower-carbonoptions
isstrongerthanonlythenear-termemissionreductions
wouldsuggest.Basedonthisdiscussion,wequalitatively
scorethevariousscenariosinTable11.--Table11--Table11.QualitativeAssessmentoftheLevelofClimate
ProtectionundereachScenario
Climateprotection
GridFirst
DieselFirst
RenewablesFirst
Low
Low/Medium
High
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
87
4.CONCLUSIONS
ThischapterhasattemptedtoputsomerealisticcontoursonthetaskaheadforruralelectrificationinIndia,to
constructthreeplausiblepathwaystowardthisgoal,and
toassessthepathwaysagainstfivecriteriaforsuccess—four
developmentcriteriaofnationalinterestandoneglobal
criterionofclimatechange.Suchanexerciseisintended
toinformandstimulatedebateratherthanprovideany
definitiveconclusions.Inadditiontotheissuesdiscussed
here,thereareimportantquestionsofinstitutionalformof
servicedelivery,localenvironmentalimpacts,andend-use
efficiencythatonlyreceivecursorytreatmenthere,butare
deservingoffurtherattention.Table12brieflysummarizes
therelativeperformanceofourthreescenariosagainst
theseperformancecriteria.
Table12.SummaryofScenariosbyPerformanceCriteria
Approach
GridFirst
DieselFirst
Speedofprovision
Low
High
RenewablesFirst
Medium
Qualityofsupply
Low
High
Medium
Affordability
Medium
Medium
Low/Medium
Securityofsupply
Medium
Low
High
Climateprotection
Low
Low/Medium
High
RuralElectrificationandNational
DevelopmentGoals
Grid-dominatedruralelectrificationinIndiaislikelyto
sufferthescarsofIndianelectricity’srecentpast.Itislikely
totakealongtime,provideinadequatequalityelectricity,
andwhileitmaydelivercheaperelectricityperkWhto
existingusers,itisnotclearthattheoverallcostoftheinfrastructureinvolvedmakesthisthecheapestapproach.It
mayalsoexacerbatesomeintractableissuesofcoalsupply.
Diesel-basedelectrification,helpedbytheElectricity
Act2003,appearstohaveconsiderablepromisewhen
viewedthroughthelensofspeedandqualityofsupply.
However,diesel-basedelectrificationhasoneconsiderable
flaw:itwillalmostcertainlyexacerbateIndia’slong-term
dependenceonoilimports,increasingtheseimportsin
88
volumetermsby6to41percentofcurrentlevels.Thisisa
significantfindingofthestudy,andpotentiallydisqualifies
diesel-basedsupplyasthespearheadofaruralelectrificationstrategy.
Thethirdoption,renewableenergy-basedsupply,
promisesreasonablespeedofinstallationandreasonably
goodquality.Bothcriteriaarelikelytobeevermorecomprehensivelymetasthetechnologiesmature.However,in
theshortrunrenewableenergywillbeunlikelytoprovide
electricityasfastasdieseland,dependingonthespecific
technology,perhapsnotaswellasdiesel.Comparedto
theotheroptions,however,renewableenergydramatically
strengthensIndia’senergysecurity.
Intheshortrun,thecostcriterionislikelytohavethe
heaviestweightindecisionmaking.However,itisalsothe
hardesttoassess,becauseofdifferencesinthetechnologiesandthecomplexityoftheunderlyingassumptions.
Clearly,moredetailedworkneedstobedoneonthisissue.
Moreover,thediscussionheresuggeststhatadecision
basedoncostalonewouldbeshortsighted.Atminimum,
anIntegratedResourcePlanning(IRP)approachthat
assessesthefulllifecyclecostsofalternatives,including
end-useefficiency,andfactorsinrealratherthansubsidizedpriceswouldyieldmorecompleteresults.Ideally,
wesuggestthatconsideringafullrangeofcriteriasuchas
thosedescribedhere,inadditiontocost,yieldsvaluable
additionalinsightsforpolicymakerstoconsider.
Tosummarizeourresults,wefindstrongreasonsto
doubtthesuccessofaGridFirststrategyonvariouscriteria,notablyspeedandquality.Itisalsothemostproblematicfromaclimateperspective.ADieselFirststrategy
promisesthebestshort-runoutcomes,butexposesthe
countrytoapotentiallycripplingenergysecuritythreat.
TheRenewableFirststrategyisthemostunknown,but
oncurrentevidencepromisesmoderateresultsintheshort
run,whilecomingoutstrongestonlong-termconsiderationssuchassecurityandclimateprotection.
Thisexercisedoesnotanointaclearwinner,whichis
anargumentforamoreeven-handedtreatmentacross
differentruralelectrificationpathwaysthanexistsatpresent.Specifically,theanalysissuggeststhereareconvincing
benefitstooff-gridrenewableenergywithinsuchanIRP
approachthathavenotbeenexploredinrecentplanning.
Atthemoment,theGovernmentofIndia’spolicyisbased
onanapriorijudgmentthatrenewableenergyshould
bereservedformarginalareaswheregridextensionisa
challenge.Thisrunscountertothefindingsofthisstudy,
whichsuggestthatfromthebroaderperspectiveofthe
fournationaldevelopmentcriteriaexaminedhere—speed,
quality,cost,andsecurity—renewableenergyshouldbe
integralandnotmarginaltoIndia’sruralelectrification.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
RuralElectrificationandGlobalClimateGoals
Weturnnowtothefifthcriteriaofglobalclimate
change,whichwedeliberatelyseparatedfromthefour
nationalcriteria.Thedecisiononruralelectrification
shouldbebasedonnationalcriteria;internationalcriteria
shouldplayaroleonlyiftheycanprovideanadditional
strategicimpetusforonepathway,andpossiblenational
benefits.Thatrenewableenergyistheclearwinnerfroma
climateperspectiveprovidessuchanimpetus.Inthenearterm—until2020—GHGemissionsfromIndia’srural
electrificationarelikelytobeontheorderofmagnitudeof
1to5percentofU.S.emissions.However,the“lock-in”
effect—theimpactofnear-termtechnologicalchoiceson
futureemissions—hasthepotentialtocontributesignificantlytoGHGemissionsinthelongerterm,particularly
ifIndia’sexpectationsofbecomingamajoreconomic
powerlaterthiscenturyarerealized.
Theimportanceofthis“lock-in”willdependonthe
futureevolutionofIndia’spowermarketandofenergy
technologies.ExperienceinOECDcountriessuggeststhat
bothgenerationandT&Dinfrastructureremainsinplace
formanydecades.Off-gridgeneration,whichusessmaller
generatingunits,mayshowlessinertia.Thesecurityand
climateimplicationsofagrid-basedapproachmayalsobe
mitigatedifon-gridrenewableenergyisrapidlyadopted
andaccountsforthebulkoffuturegrowthpast2020.
Despitetheseimponderables,thediscussionheresuggeststhattheGovernmentofIndiahasanopportunityto
seekinternationalsupportforamorerenewableenergyintensivepathwaytoruralelectrification.Todoso,the
governmentwillhavetoworktoshapethenextphaseof
internationalclimatenegotiationstobetterprovideinstrumentsforsuchclimatefriendlypolicy(ratherthanonly
project)choices.
Todate,theGovernmentofIndiahasbeenareluctant
partnerinthesediscussions,justifiablyconcernedthat
Indiamightbesaddledwithemissionlimitsthatthreaten
itseconomicgrowth.Butifmoreattentiontorenewable
energyforruralelectrificationisinthenationalinterest
fordomesticpurposes,asthischaptersuggestsispossible,
thenIndianpolicymakersmaybemissinganopportunitytoobtainbroaderinternationalsupportforitsrural
electrificationprogram.Giventhepotentialadvantages
tobothIndia’snationalinterestsandthebroaderconcern
ofcombatingclimatechange,thereisconsiderable
scopetoexplorehow—throughpolitical,technical,and
financialmeans—India’sambitiouselectrificationgoals
couldbesupportedbysustainabledevelopmentpolicies
andmeasuresaimedatincreasingtheroleofdistributed
renewableenergy.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
89
ENDNOTES
SeeReddy(1999)foralargerconceptualframeworkwithinwhich
tounderstandruralenergyneeds.SeeDas(2004)foradiscussionof
variouslinkagesbetweenelectricityandruraldevelopment.
2Thisslowdowninpacemayalsobepartiallyexplainedbythe
government’sinsistence,basedonaverylimiteddefinitionofrural
electrification,thatthetaskofvillageelectrificationisalmostdone,
leavingonlythemostremoteandinaccessiblevillages.AsofMarch
2003,87percentofvillageshavebeendeclaredelectrified(Ministryof
Power,2003).
3Foradetailedpoliticalanalysisofthe2004generalelectionseethe
collectionofarticlescontainedintheEconomicandPoliticalWeekly,
Dec.18,2004.
4Forasnapshotofthecontemporarydebatesonruralelectrification,
seeMinistryofPower(2003),WorldBank(2004),Dubash(2004).
Foradiscussionofinstitutionalissues,seeRejikumar(2004)and
Namashivayametal(2004).
5SeeforinstanceIPCC(2001)Chapter11.
6SeeforinstanceWorldBank(2004).
7SeeforexampleTuanandLefevre(1996)forabreakdownofrural
householddemandinVietnam.
8TheIndiangovernment’sstatedaimistohaveanaverageavailable
electricitysupplyof1000kWhperpersonby2012,thoughitis
reasonabletoassumethatthisaverageincludeshigherconsumption
byurbanindividualsandlowerinruralareas(GovernmentofIndia,
2005).
9In2001(CensusofIndia,2001)Indiahadaruralpopulationof
737,283,492livingin137,235,518households,atameanof5.37
peopleperhousehold.
10PopulationandhouseholdsizeprojectionsfromtheUnitedNations
HumanSettlementsProgramme(UN-HABITAT,2005).Thereis
considerableuncertaintyinsuchprojections.TheWorldBank(2004)
estimates157millionruralhouseholdsin2012.Thisisbroadly
consistentwiththeUN-HABITATprojection,whichhasIndia’srural
populationdecliningfrom2015onwardsasurbanizationoutstrips
populationgrowth.
11ThesixstatesareAndhraPradesh,HimachalPradesh,Maharashtra,
Punjab,RajasthanandWestBengal;nodatawasavailableforHimachalPradesh.
12Otherstudiesthatdocumentgroundwateruseandthatwehave
usedasabasistocross-checktheESMAPstudyincludeWorldBank
(2001),Dubash(2002),andDossaniandRanganathan(2004).
13TheMinistry,usingtheolddefinitionofvillage“electrification,”
estimates80,000villagesremaintobeelectrified,ofwhich62,000
canbeprovidedwithconnectiontothegrid(MoP,2005c;Planning
Commission,2002a)
14Off-gridcapacityinIndiatodayisaround13,000MW,ofwhich
10,000MWisdieseland3,000MWisrenewableenergy(Banerjee,
2006).
1
90
TherecentliteratureontheIndianpowersectorisvoluminous.See
SLRao(2004).Foracomprehensiveassessmentofoptions,seeRuet
(2003and2005).Forahistoricalreviewofthepoliticaleconomyof
thesectorinthe1990s,seeDubashandChellaRajan(2000).
16Recentstudiessuggestthatagricultureconsumeslessthanpreviously
thought.Consequently,consumptionformerlyaccountedforasagriculturaluseismostlikelytheft,whichpushesuptherealestimatesof
losses.ForareviewofstudiesbyElectricityRegulatoryCommissions,
seeHonihal(2004).OtherstudiesoflosslevelsincludeReddyand
Simithra(1997),DixitandSant(1997),andWorldBank(2001).
17ThelifecycleGHGemissionsassociatedwithvariousenergytechnologiesvarywidelyaccordingtomanufacture,location,andtechnology
type.SomerenewableenergysourcescancausesignificantGHG
emissions—forinstance,biomassthatisnotreplacedbynewgrowth.
However,ifmanagedappropriatelyrenewableenergysourceshave
negligiblelifecycleGHGemissionscomparedtotheirfossilfuel
counterparts.HereweconsiderGHGemissionsfromrenewable
energytobezero.
18Bytheendofthe1990s,70percentofwindturbinesinstalledinIndia
weremanufactureddomestically(EuropeanWindEnergyAssociation,
2003).
19Capacityfactorrepresentstheoutputofaplantasaproportionof
whatitsoutputwouldhavebeenifithadoperatedconstantlyatfull
capacity.Windturbines(whichonlyoperateatfullcapacitywhenthe
windisblowingatoptimalspeed)haverelativelylowcapacityfactors,
fossilfuelandbiomassrelativelyhigh.However,ifthedemandis
highlyintermittentallplantswillhavelowcapacityfactors.
20OnestudyofruralelectrificationinthreewesternChineseprovinces
foundthatthecostperkWhfromdieselgeneratorswas$1.09to
$1.19,leadingtotheconclusionthatintheseregionsrenewableenergysystemsofferedsuperioreconomicperformance,withouttaking
environmentalorsocialbenefitsintoaccount(Zhou&Byrne,2002).
21Theexactcostwithintherangedependsoncapitalcostandload
factor;rangetakenfromArizonaSolarCenter(2005),Banerjee
(2006),Byrneetal(1998),Zhou&Byrne(2002).
22Forwindregimesthatallowcapacityfactorsof30percent;pricealso
variesdependingonsizeandcapitalcost(Banerjee,2006).
23Dependingontheresourceandtechnology(MNES,2002).Thecost
islowerwherethereiscogenerationofheatandpower.
24(Banerjee,2006).Thisfigurevariesgreatlydependingonloadfactor,
fuelprice,andremoteness.
25In2003–04,India’snetimportsofcrudeandoilproductstotaled614
millionbarrels,valuedat$17.4billion(MoPNG,2005).
26Diesel(whetherimportedordomestic)costsapproximately$15per
barrelmorethancrude.Assumingamedium-termoilpriceof$30to
70perbarreltherefore,dieselcosts$45to$85.
27India’sexternaldebtinApril-June2004was$112billion(Ministryof
Finance,2005).
28Thismightbereducedbyadeclineintheemissionsintensityofthe
electricitymix,forinstancebyarisingshareofnaturalgasforpower
generation.Conversely,theresultpresentedhereassumesareduction
ingridlosses—ifthisdoesnottakeplace,thenemissionswouldbe
higherstill.
29SeeforexampleLloyd(2001),whosuggeststhathouseholdconservatismiskeepingSouthAfricanusersofkerosenefromswitchingto
demonstrablybetteralternatives.
15
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
REFERENCES
ArizonaSolarCenter.2005.
ArizonaSolarCenter.
2005.Availableat:http://
www.azsolarcenter.com.(Sept.29,2005).
Banerjee,Rangan.2006.“ComparisonofOptionsfor
Banerjee,Rangan.2006.
DistributedGenerationinIndia.”EnergyPolicy34:101-111.
Byrne,J.,B.Shen,andW.Wallace. 1998.“TheEconomicsof
Byrne,J.,B.Shen,andW.Wallace.1998.
SustainableEnergyforRuralDevelopment:aStudyofRenewableElectricityinRuralChina.”EnergyPolicy26(1):45-54.
CensusofIndia.2001.
CensusofIndia.2001.Availableat:http://www.censusindia.
net/results/hh_series/web/HH1_India.pdf.
Chaury,Akanshka,MaliniRanganathan,andParimitaMohanty.
Chaury,Akanshka,MaliniRanganathan,andParimitaMohanty.
2004.“ElectricityAccessforGeographicallyDisadvantagedRural
2004.
Communities–TechnologyandPolicyInsights.”EnergyPolicy
32:1693-1705.
Das,Keshab.2004.“ElectricityandRuralDevelopment
Das,Keshab.2004.
Linkage.”PaperpresentedatInstituteofRuralManagement,
SilverJubileeSymposiumonGovernanceinDevelopment,
Anand,Dec.14–19.
Dharmendra,Jore.2005.
Dharmendra,Jore.2005.“LightsOutinIndia’sPowerhouse:
Part-II:InSummerofDiscontent,MumbaiFacesStateIre,”
TheIndianExpress,May2.
Dixit,Shantanu,andGirishSant. 1997.“HowReliableare
Dixit,Shantanu,andGirishSant.1997.
AgriculturalPowerUseData?”EconomicandPoliticalWeekly
April12-18.
Dossani,RafiqandV.Ranganathan.2004.
Dossani,RafiqandV.Ranganathan.2004.“Farmers’Willingness
toPayforPowerinIndia:ConceptualIssues,SurveyResults,and
ImplicationsforPricing.”EnergyEconomics26:359-369.
Dubash,NavrozK.2004.
Dubash,NavrozK.2004.“ElectrifyingRuralIndia:TheSearch
foraViableandSustainableApproach.”Paperpresentedat
InstituteofRuralManagement,SilverJubileeSymposiumon
GovernanceinDevelopment,Anand,Dec.14–19,2004.
Gabler,Hansjoerg.2004.
Gabler,Hansjoerg.2004.“Off-gridElectricitySupplywith
PhotovoltaicSolarEnergy–CurrentTrendsinHousehold
Electrification”InternationalPVSEC-14,Bangkok,Thailand.
Jan.26–30.
Dubash,NavrozK.2002.
Dubash,NavrozK.2002.TubewellCapitalism:Groundwater
DevelopmentandAgrarianChangeinGujarat.NewDelhi:
OxfordUniversityPress.
Godbole,Madhav.2002.
Godbole,Madhav.
2002.“PowerSectorReforms:IfWishesWere
Horses.”EconomicandPoliticalWeekly.37(7).Feb.16.
Dubash,NavrozK.andSudhirChellaRajan.2000.
Dubash,NavrozK.andSudhirChellaRajan.2000.“Power
Politics:ProcessofIndia’sPowerSectorReform.”Economicand
PoliticalWeekly36(35):3367-3390.
ESMAP(EnergySectorManagementAssistanceProgramme).
ESMAP(EnergySectorManagementAssistanceProgramme).
2000.EnergyServicesfortheWorld’sPoor.Washington,DC:
2000.
TheWorldBank.
ESMAP.2002.
ESMAP.2002.“EnergyStrategyforRuralIndia:Evidencefrom
SixStates.”Availableat:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000094946_
03012304145641.
Goldemberg,JoséandThomasB.Johansson,eds.2004.
Goldemberg,JoséandThomasB.Johansson,eds.2004.“World
EnergyAssessmentOverview—2004Update.”NewYork:United
NationsDevelopmentProgramme.
GovernmentofIndia.2003.
GovernmentofIndia.2003.“TheElectricityAct2003.”
Availableat:http://www.powermin.nic.in/JSP_SERVLETS/
internal.jsp.
GovernmentofIndia.2005.
GovernmentofIndia.2005.“NationalElectricityPolicy.”
GazetteofIndia.No.23/40/2004-R&R(Vol.II),Feb.12.
Availableat:http://powermin.nic.in.(Sept.29,2005).
EuropeanWindEnergyAssociation.2003.
EuropeanWindEnergyAssociation.2003.“WindEnergy:the
Facts.”Availableat:http://www.ewea.org.
G8.2001.“FinalReportoftheG8RenewableEnergyTask
G8.2001.
Force.”PresentedtotheG8SummitinGenoa,June.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
91
GWEC(GlobalWindEnergyCouncil).2005.
GWEC(GlobalWindEnergyCouncil).2005.“GlobalWind
PowerContinuesExpansion.”Pressrelease.Availableat:
http://www.ewea.org/.(Sept.29,2005).
Mishra,Sudhakar.
Mishra,Sudhakar.Nodate.“AlternativeInstitutionsof
ElectricityRetailing:AssessmentofOrissaExperiments.”
Unpublishedmanuscript.
HindustanTimes.2005.“UnrestinMaharashtraasPower
HindustanTimes.2005.
CrisisWorsens.”May2.
MNES(MinistryofNon-ConventionalEnergySources).2005.
MNES(MinistryofNon-ConventionalEnergySources).2005.
DatafromMNESwebsite.Availableat:http://mnes.nic.
in/business%20oppertunity/pgtsh.htm.
Hoff,ThomasE.1997.“UsingDistributedResourcesto
Hoff,ThomasE.1997.
ManageRisksCausedbyDemandUncertainty,”inYvesSmeers
andAdonisYatchew,eds.“DistributedResources:Towarda
NewParadigmoftheElectricityBusiness.”SpecialIssueof
TheEnergyJournal.
Honnihal,Siddharth.2004.
Honnihal,Siddharth.
2004.“EstimatingPowerConsumptionin
Agriculture.”EconomicandPoliticalWeekly39(8):790-792.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2002a.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2002a.ElectricityinIndia:
ProvidingPowertotheMillions.Paris:InternationalEnergy
Agency.
IEA.2002b.
IEA.2002b.WorldEnergyOutlook2002.Paris:International
EnergyAgency.
IPCC(IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange).2001.
ClimateChange2001:Impacts,AdaptationandVulnerability.
Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Kishore,Avinash.2003.
Kishore,Avinash.2003.“PrivateProvisioninginStateFailure:
ACaseStudyofPrivatePowerSuppliersinMuzaffarpur,Bihar.”
Anand:InternationalWaterManagementInstitute(IWMI).
Lloyd,P.J.D. 2001.MarketObstaclestoHouseholdEnergy&
Lloyd,P.J.D.2001.
TechnologyforImprovedIndoorAirQualityinSouthAfrica.Cape
Town:EnergyResearchInstitute,UniversityofCapeTown.
Mathur,JaskiranKaur,andDhirajMathur.2005.
Mathur,JaskiranKaur,andDhirajMathur.2005.
“DarkHomesandSmokyHearths.”EconomicandPolitical
Weekly.40(7).Feb.12.
MNES.2002.
MNES.
2002.AnnualReport2001–2.NewDelhi:Ministryof
Non-ConventionalEnergySources.
Navashivayam,V,ChandrasekharIyerandManishaMisri. 2004.
Navashivayam,V,ChandrasekharIyerandManishaMisri.2004.
“ExistingInstitutionsandInstitutionalMechanismsforRural
ElectricityinIndia.”PaperpresentedatInstituteofRural
Management,SilverJubileeSymposiumonGovernancein
Development,Anand,Dec.14–19.
Pathak,B.S. 2004.“TechnologicalOptionsandCostofSupplyPathak,B.S.2004.
ingElectricitytoRuralAreas.”PaperpresentedatInstituteof
RuralManagement,SilverJubileeSymposiumonGovernancein
Development,Anand,Dec.14–19.
PlanningCommission. 2001.AnnualReportontheWorkingof
PlanningCommission.2001.
StateElectricityBoards&ElectricDepartments.NewDelhi:
PlanningCommission.
PlanningCommission. 2002a.TenthFiveYearPlan(2002-2007).
PlanningCommission.2002a.
NewDelhi:GovernmentofIndia.
PlanningCommission. 2002b.AnnualReport(2001-02)onthe
PlanningCommission.2002b.
WorkingofStateElectricityBoardsandElectricityDepartments.
NewDelhi:GovernmentofIndia.
Prayas.2004.
Prayas.2004.KnowyourPower:aCitizen’sPrimeronthe
ElectricitySector.Pune,India:Prayas.
Rao,S.L.2004.
Rao,S.L.2004.GoverningPower.NewDelhi:TERI
Publications.
MinistryofFinance2005.“NationalSummaryDataPage.”
MinistryofFinance2005.
Availableat:http://finmin.nic.in/stats_data/nsdp_sdds/index.
html.(Sept.232005).
Reddy,AmulyaK.N.andGladysD.Sumithra.1997.
Reddy,AmulyaK.N.andGladysD.Sumithra.1997.
“Karnataka’sPowerSector-SomeRevelations.”Economicand
PoliticalWeekly32(12):585-600.
MinistryofPetroleumandNaturalGas,2005.
MinistryofPetroleumandNaturalGas,2005.AnnualReport
2005.NewDelhi:GovernmentofIndia.
Rejikumar,R.2005.“NationalElectricityPolicyandPlan:
Rejikumar,R.2005.
ACriticalExamination.”EconomicandPoliticalWeekly.
40(20)May14.
MinistryofPower.2003.“DiscussionPaperonRural
MinistryofPower.2003.
ElectrificationPolicies.”NewDelhi:MinistryofPower.
MinistryofPower.2005a.
MinistryofPower.
2005a.“RajivGandhiGrameenVidytikaranYojana.”Pressrelease.Availableat:http://powermin.nic.
in/whats_new/pdf/Rajiv_gandhi.pdf.(Sept.28,2005).
MinistryofPower.2005b.
MinistryofPower.2005b.“AboutRuralElectrification.”
Availableat:http://powermin.nic.in.(Sept.29,2005).
MinistryofPower.2005c.“BlueprintforPowerSectorDevelopMinistryofPower.2005c.
ment.”Availableat:http://powermin.nic.in.(Sept.29,2005).
Rejikumar,R.2004.“InstitutionalFrameworkforEffectively
Rejikumar,R.2004.
MeetingtheElectricityNeedsofRuralPopulation.”Paper
presentedatInstituteofRuralManagement,SilverJubileeSymposiumonGovernanceinDevelopment,Anand,Dec.14–19.
Ruet,Joel.2005.
Ruet,Joel.2005.PrivatisingPowerCuts?Ownershipand
ReformofStateElectricityBoardsinIndia.NewDelhi:Academic
Foundation.
Ruet,Joel.2003.
Ruet,Joel.2003.AgainsttheCurrent:OrganizationalRestructuringofStateElectricityBoards.NewDelhi:ManoharPublishers.
Saghir,Jamal.2004.“EnergyandPoverty.”Paperpresentedto
Saghir,Jamal.2004.
theInternationalEnergyForum,Amsterdam,May.
Singha,AshokKumar,N.V.Ramana,andVijayMahajan. 2004.
Singha,AshokKumar,N.V.Ramana,andVijayMahajan.2004.
“ExperiencesofPowerSectorReform:StrategiesforIncluding
thePoor.”PaperpresentedatInstituteofRuralManagement,
SilverJubileeSymposiumonGovernanceinDevelopment,
Anand,Dec.14–19.
92
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Sinha,S.2005.
Sinha,S.
2005.“ReachingtheUn-reached—EnergySector
ReformsandRuralEnergyinIndia:Alleviatingor
AggravatingEnergyPoverty?”Enschede:Universityof
Twente(thesisinprogress).
Sudipta,DattaandKartykVenkatraman.2005.
Sudipta,DattaandKartykVenkatraman.2005.“LightsOut
inIndia’sPowerhouse,Part-I:HelloDarkness.”TheIndian
Express,May1.
TongJiandong.2004.
TongJiandong.2004.SmallHydroPower:China’sPractice.
Beijing:ChinaWaterpowerPress.
Tongia,R. 2003.“ThePoliticalEconomyofIndianPower
Tongia,R.2003.
SectorReforms.”ProgramonEnergyandSustainable
DevelopmentWorkingPaper#4,December.Availableat:
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20192/India,_10_May_04.pdf.
UNDP.2003.“RuralEnergyProgrammeSupport.”
UNDP.2003.
Availableat:http://www.undp.org.in/programme/rrlenrgy/default.htm.
UN-HABITAT.2005.
UN-HABITAT.2005.“UnitedNationsHumanSettlements
Programme.”IndiaDemographicdata.Availableat:http://
www.unhabitat.org/habrdd/conditions/socentasia/india.htm.
(Sept.28).
Victor,D.2002.“AVisionforGlobalElectrification.”Program
Victor,D.2002.
onEnergyandSustainableDevelopmentWorkingPaper#7.
Availableat:http://siis.stanford.edu/publications/20184/.
WorldBank.2001.
WorldBank.2001.India:PowerSupplytoAgriculture.
Washington,DC:TheWorldBank.
WorldBank.2002.
WorldBank.2002.India:PowerSectorReformsandthePoor.
Washington,DC:TheWorldBank.
WorldBank.2004.
WorldBank.2004.RuralAccesstoElectricity:StrategyOptionsfor
India.Washington,DC:TheWorldBank.
Yao,XiangjunandDouglasF.Barnes.2005.
Yao,XiangjunandDouglasF.Barnes.2005.“NationalSupport
forDecentralizedElectricityGrowthinRuralChina.”inMeeting
theChallengeofRuralElectrificationinDevelopingNations:the
ExperienceofSuccessfulPrograms:247-282Washington,DC:
TheWorldBank.
Zerriffi,Hisham,andDavidVictor.2005.
Zerriffi,Hisham,andDavidVictor.2005.“BusinessModelsfor
DistributedRuralElectrification:IntroductionandResearch
Methods.”WorkingPaper.ProgramonEnergyandSustainableDevelopment.PaloAlto,California:StanfordUniversity
(forthcoming).
Zhou,AimingandJohnByrne.2002.
Zhou,AimingandJohnByrne.2002.“RenewableEnergyfor
RuralSustainability:LessonsfromChina.”BulletinofScience,
Technology&Society22:123–131.
PATH WAYS TO R U R A L ELEC TR IFIC ATION IN IN D IA
93
Editor'sNote
S
outhAfricahasseveralfeatures
thatitshareswithcountries
suchasIndiaandChina:it
ispoorbutgrowing;itfacesrising
demandforenergyandinparticular
electricity;anditisnaturallyendowed
withlargecoalsuppliesthatdominate
itspowergenerationmix.
ThedominanceofKingCoalin
theUnitedStatesandpartsofEurope
hasgivenrisetoaninterestincarbon
captureandstorage(CCS)—the
captureofCO2emissionsfrompower
plantsorindustrialprocessesand
itslong-termdisposalingeological
formations.Forcountrieslookingto
makedeepcutsinemissionswithout
fundamentalchangestotheirenergy
systems,itoffersanimportanttechnologyoption.Oftenthisattractivenessto
AnnexIcountriesisassumedtomean
thatitwillbeequallyappropriatein
developingcountries.
HerewereachoneofthelimitationsoftheSD-PAMsapproach.
True,theauthorsfindthatSouth
Africahasalargepotentialforcarbon
storage(20gigatons).Butwiththe
exceptionofafewinstallations(see
below)theseentailprohibitivecosts.
CCSbringsfewsustainabledevelopmentbenefits,andindeedmaywork
againstsustainabledevelopmentgoals.
IfSouthAfricanresourceswereto
bedivertedtowardsCCSitwould
increasethecostofpowersignificantly,
slowingtheincreaseinelectrification
(andtheprovisionofsomefreepower
94
tohouseholds)thatisacentralaimof
governmentpolicy.AlthoughCCSmay
reducesomepollutionfromcoaluseby
encouragingtheuseofmoremodern
coalplants,itwillalsoincreasetotal
coaldemand,withacorresponding
increaseinthelife-cycleimpactsofcoal
use.Inshort,thereseemslittlechance
ofmakingthisapproachworkinthe
absenceofexplicitmitigationcommitments.Thesemitigationcommitments
wouldnotneedtobeonthepartof
SouthAfrica:itwouldbepossiblefor
donorcountriestofinancethefuture
captureandstorageofSouthAfrican
emissions.Buttheamountsofmoney
involvedwouldbeastepchangeinthe
willingnesstopayforGHGmitigation.Andwerethisapproachtobe
appliedinmuchlargercountriessuch
asChinaandIndia,thecostwould
befarhigher.Sinceothersustainable
developmentgoalsarenotbeingmet,
usingtraditionalsourcesoffunding
suchasofficialdevelopmentassistance
wouldnotbeappropriate.
Sowheredoesthisleaveus?First,
thereispotentialforsomerelatively
low-costemissionabatementwith
CCSfromspecificinstallations
whicharewell-suitedtothetechnology.Theseincludemainlyplantsfor
gasifyingcoalfortheproductionof
liquidfuelsandsyntheticchemicals—installationsthatmayrepresent
30milliontonsofCO2peryearthat
couldbesequesteredforaround$20
perton.Thiswouldnotstrictlybe
anSD-PAMsactivityasitwouldbe
a“pure”mitigationmeasure,butis
animportantfindingnonetheless.It
isnotimpossiblethatinthefuture
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
therewillbesufficientinternationalconcernaboutrunawayGHG
emissionsthatdevelopingcountries,
donorcountriesorbothwillfindthe
resourcesneededtoimplementCCS
inemergingeconomies.SouthAfrica
isagoodexampleofanadvanced
developingcountrythatmayintime
adoptCCStechnologies,withor
withoutinternationalsupport,though
itshouldbestressedthatthattimestill
looksfaroff.Theauthorsidentifya
numberoffactorsthatmarkimportantdifferencesbetweendeveloped
anddevelopingcountriesintheway
thatthisimplementationmighttake
place,inparticularinquestionsof
safetystandardsandinstitutionalcapacity—thoughpossiblySouthAfrica
isnotarepresentativeexampleofa
developingcountryinthisregard.
Nevertheless,thefinalconclusionis
that,forthetimebeing,CCSdoesnot
seemstosupportthecentralsustainabledevelopmentaimsofSouth
Africainawaythatotheroptions
suchasgasandrenewableenergy
suppliesmay,andCCSmayeven
conflictwithnationaldevelopment
goals.Whilethedominanceofcoalin
SouthAfrica,China,andIndiahas
ledsomecommentatorsandpolicymakerstoputtheirhopesinCCS,the
particularcircumstancesofdevelopingcountriesmaymakeotheroptions
morerealistic.
chaptervi
CarbonCaptureand
CarbonCaptureand
StorageinSouthAfrica
StanfordMwakasonda ■ HaraldWinkler
1.INTRODUCTION
Somethree-quartersofSouthAfrica’sprimaryenergy
supplyand93percentofitselectricityarederivedfrom
coal(NER,2002;DME,2003b).Eveninmoreoptimisticenergypolicyscenarios(DeVilliersandothers,1999;
EDRC,2003;Banks&Schäffler,2005),coalcontinues
toprovideforthemajorityofSouthAfrica’senergyneeds
overthenext20to30years.Almost80percentofGHG
emissionscomefromtheenergysector—bothsupplyand
use—andmostoftheseareintheformofcarbondioxide
(VanderMerwe&Scholes,1998;RSA,2004).
MakingSouthAfrica’senergysystemmoresustainableisatransitionthatwilltakedecades.Makingenergy
developmentinSouthAfricamoresustainablewillrequire
attentiontosolutionsthatdealwithCO2emissionsfrom
coal.Together,thesefactorsmeanthatanevaluationof
thesustainabilityofcarboncaptureandstorage(CCS)
technologiesisanimportantelementofclimatepolicy.
1.1 Context:climatechangeand
sustainabledevelopmentinSouthAfrica
SouthAfrica’sdevelopmentobjectiveshavebeenshaped
deeplybyApartheid—ahistoryofracialoppressionand
patternsofeconomicexploitation.Apartheidsystematicallyunderdevelopedblackworking-classcommunities
andleftadeeplegacyofbacklogsofbasicservicesinrural
andurbanareas.Acentraldriverforpolicysince1994has
beentheredressoftheimbalanceofApartheidandthe
promotionofthesocioeconomicdevelopmentofpoor
communities.AcoredocumentcapturingthemajorobjectivesistheReconstructionandDevelopmentProgramme
(RDP).However,theimperativesofreconstructionand
developmenthavebeenintensionwithamacroeconomic
frameworkthatemphasizeseconomicgrowthasthedriver
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
95
ofdevelopment—theGrowth,EmploymentandRedistribution(GEAR)strategy(2002).Themainfeatureofthe
visionofGEARwasacompetitivefast-growingeconomy
thatcreatessufficientjobsforallwork-seekers.Toachieve
theGEARemploymentgoal,aminimumgrowthrateof
3percentperyearwouldhavetobemet.
Manyofthedetailedsocioeconomicdevelopment
objectivesweresetintheAfricanNationalCongress’RDP
(ANC,1994).Itoutlinedjobcreationthroughpublic
worksandmeetingarangeofbasicneedsaskeypriorities.
Quantifiedgoalsweresetfordeliveryofbasicservices,
including(a)building300,000housingunitseachyear
forthefirstfiveyears(toaddressahousingbacklogof
some2–3millionhouses);(b)redistributing30percent
oftheland;(c)providing25litersofwaterperpersonper
day;and(d)providingelectricityto250,000households
peryear(thistargethasactuallybeenexceeded)(Borchers
etal.,2001).
Relativetoothersectors,theenergysectorhasperformedwellinmeetingsuchtargets.Significantprogress
hasbeenmadeinextendingaccesstoelectricityinparti-
cular,althoughaffordabilityandproductiveuseremain
issues.Yetmoreremainstobedone,andthechallengeof
deliveringenergyinasustainablemannerremains.
Energymakesacriticalcontributiontosustainable
developmentbyprovidinghouseholdswithaccessto
affordableenergyservicesandcontributingtoeconomic
development.However,itisimportanttomanagethe
environmentalimpactsofenergysupplyanduse.South
Africa’snationalclimatechangeresponsestrategy,approvedbytheCabinetinOctober2004,isbuiltaround
sustainabledevelopment;itspointofdepartureisthe
achievementofnationalandsustainabledevelopment
objectiveswhilesimultaneouslyrespondingtoclimate
change(DEAT,2004).Anytechnologicaloption,
includingCCS,needstofitwithinthebroaderSouth
Africanapproachtoclimatepolicy.
1.2 CCSandSouthAfrica’s
commitmentsunderUNFCCC
SouthAfrica’sclimatepolicyisrootedinafirmcommitmenttothemultilateralprocessundertheUnited
NationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange
(UNFCCC)anditsKyotoProtocol.SouthAfricaisa
signatorytoboththeUNFCCCandtheProtocol.1
BeingasignatorytotheUNFCCC,SouthAfricahas
ageneralcommitmentto“implement…measuresto
mitigateclimatechange”(UNFCCC,1992:Article4.1b).
Asanon-AnnexIcountry,however,itdoesnothavea
quantifiedemissionslimitationorreductiontargetunder
theKyotoProtocol.Nonetheless,theclimatechange
responsestrategyrecognizesthatthecountrycanbenefit
frommovingtoacleanerdevelopmentpath.Forexample,
oneofthemajorobjectivesoftheWhitePaperonEnergy
Policyistosecurethenation’senergysupplythrough
diversity(DME,1998).TheCleanDevelopmentMechanism(CDM)andotherclimatefundingopportunitiesare
seenaskeyindrivingthisdevelopment.Domesticpolicy
hasalsorecentlyresultedinavoluntaryrenewableenergy
targetof10,000GWhby2013(DME,2003c).
Atleastinprinciple,CCSoffersanoptiontousecoal
withlowerGHGemissionsthanunderabusiness-as-usual
approach.InitialresearchintothepotentialofCCS(Engelbrechtetal.,2004)hasfocusedonSasol,thechemicals
andsyntheticfuelsproducingcompany,andtheexistence
ofpureCO2streamsinthecoal-to-liquidsprocess,as
themostpromisingoptionforcapture.Thepotentialto
generatecreditsundertheCDMhasbeenhighlighted:“At
$10perton[ofcarbonCDMcreditprice],thesequestrationofthis30milliontonsperyearcouldbeworth$300
millionperyear”(Surridge,2004).Thisassumesthat
suitablestoragesitescanbefoundatreasonablecostin
environmentallyacceptableconditions.Afurtherquestion
ishowlongthiscarbonstorageavenuewillexist,since
Sasolisswitchingitsfeedstockfromcoaltogaspipedfrom
Mozambique(Poggiolini,2001;ECON,2004).Thekey
sourcesofCO2inSouthAfricaareshowninTable1.
AnyproposaltocaptureCO2forstoragemusttakeinto
accountthefactthatanumberofsources—forinstance,
thoseinvolvingtransportation—areunlikelytobesuited
tothecaptureoftheiremissions,becausetheyaregenerally
toodistributed.Table1providesthebreakdownofsources
ofcarbondioxideinSouthAfrica.Basedonthesource
categorytechnologiesamenabletocaptureprocesses,the
hypotheticalmaximumamountofcapturablecarbon
dioxideinSouthAfricaisabout212Mt/a,or58percent
ofallanthropogenicCO2released(Lloyd,2004).The
distributionofsourcesisdiscussedfurtherinsection3.
1.3 Purposeofthischapter
SouthAfrica,adevelopingcountrywithanenergy
economydominatedbycoal,haspotentialforcarbon
captureandstorage(CCS).Givenitsstrongcommitment
tosustainabledevelopment,thecountrymaywantto
96
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
understandtheimplicationsofthisclimatechangemitigationoptionforlocaldevelopment—initseconomic,
social,andenvironmentaldimensions.
SouthAfricaisexpectedtoremaindependentoncoal
fordecadestocome(DME,2003a),butwillincreasingly
bechallengedtocontributetotheglobaleffortofclimate
changemitigation,orreducingemissionsofgreenhouse
gases(GHGs).Inthiscontext,CCSmightbeattractivetoSouthAfrica’smineralsandenergysector,withits
highrelianceoncoalandtheexistenceofpurecarbon
dioxide(CO2)streamsinthecoal-to-liquidfuelprocess.
Its“minerals-energycomplex”(Fine&Rustomjee,1996)
hasalreadybecomeinvolvedinexploringCCS2through
participationintheCarbonSequestrationLeadership
Forum(CSLF)andtheIntergovernmentalPanelon
ClimateChange(IPCC)processes.Thisreportseeksto
understandthebroaderimplicationsofCCSforsustainabledevelopment,andhowitcomparestoalternatives:
CCSmightmakesenseaspureclimatepolicy,buthow
doesCCSlineupalongsideothermitigationoptionswith
respecttodevelopment?
Thereportconsidersthepolitical,technological,and
institutionalprerequisitesformakingCCSworkina
developingcountry,andthediscussionofitspotentialto
becomeanimportantcomponentofacoherentclimate
strategy.Giventhatclimatepolicyhaslowpriorityrelative
todevelopmentforbasichumanneeds,thereporttriesto
addressthequestionofwhether(andtowhatextent)CCS
cancontributetolocalsustainabledevelopment.
ResearchonCCShasbeenreceivingmuchattention
recently;forexample,theIPCCispreparingaspecial
reportonthesubject.Whiletherehasbeenincreasing
Table1.SourcesofCarbonDioxideinSouthAfrica,1990
CO2,Mt/a
Likelytobecapturable
Electricitygeneration
Industry
Otherenergyproduction
Manufacturing
Totalcapturable
137
24
26
26
212
CO2,Mt/a
Unlikelytobecapturable
Waste
Agriculture
Fugitive
Transport
Heatproduction
Totalnon-capturable
9
41
36
34
32
152
TotalEmissions(capturable&non-capturable)364Mt/a
Source:Lloyd(2004),drawingonEngelbrechtetal.(2004)
interestinCCSinthedevelopedworld,itsonlyserious
considerationindevelopingcountrieshasbeeninlocations
whereinternationalenergycompaniesareactive.
2.WHATISCARBONCAPTURE
2.WHATISCARBONCAPTURE
ANDSTORAGE
Carboncaptureandstorageisatechnologyenvisaged
tomitigateGHGemissionsbyproducingaconcentrated
streamofCO2thatcanbetransportedtoastoragesite.It
ismostlikelytobeapplicableinlargecentralizedsources,
includingpowerplants,otherenergyindustries(oil
refineries,syntheticfuelplants),andfossil-fuel-intensive
industries(iron&steel,cement,chemicals).Fourstagesof
theprocessareidentifiedinFigure1.Afterinitialcapture
ofthegas,theCO2needstobetransportedtoasuitable
storagesiteforinjection.MonitoringCO2afterinjectingit
intoastoragearea(geologicalformations)isimportantto
ensurepermanentstorageandsafetyforhumanhealthand
theenvironment.
Figure1.ProcessofCarbonCaptureandStorage
CO2 SOURCE
Industrial source of CO2, e.g.:
Power station ~ 12% CO2
Sasol synfuel ~ 95% CO2
CAPTURE
CO2 separation
from other gaseous effluents
by chemical
or physical techniques
TRANSPORT
Pipelines
Tanker
Ship
INJECTION
Injection of CO2 into
geological long-term storage,
e.g.: Depleted Oil & gas
Underground saline
Coal seams
CO2 SOURCE
Long-term storage security
and closure
Source:Surridge(2004)
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
97
“energypenalty”(Bolland&Undrum,1999).Internationalreviewssuggestthattheefficiencyofpulverized
coaldeclinesfrom46percentto33percentforpulverized
coalandfrom56percentto47percentfornaturalgas
combinedcyclepowerplants(Lloyd,2004).IntheSouth
Africancase,therefore,thelargeEskom(SouthAfrica
powerutility)powerstations,withunitsontheorderof
600MWe,wouldnotbeabletoretrofitprovensystemsfor
post-combustionCO2capture(Lloyd,2004).
2.2 Carbonstorage
2.1 Carboncapture
Insomeexistingprocesses,CO2isseparatedfrom
othergasesroutinely,suchasinnaturalgasprocessingand
ammoniaproduction(Kohl&Nielsen,1997).InSouth
Africa,SasolproducespurestreamsofCO2intheprocess
ofgasifyingcoal.3ThesestreamsofCO2canbecaptured
atminimaladditionalcost,althoughtheystillneedtobe
transportedandstoredappropriately.
Alternatively,captureofCO2willdependonthecombustiontechnology.Therearethreeclassesofcombustion
technologiesunderconsideration.First,theoxy-fuelcombustiontechnology,inwhichahydrocarbonorcarbonaceousfueliscombustedineitherpureoxygenoramixture
ofpureoxygenandaninertgasratherthaninair(whichis
79percentnitrogen)(Lloyd,2004).Themajordrawback
tooxy-fuelcombustionisthecostofoxygenseparation.
Secondly,separationcanbecarriedoutbeforecombustion.Pre-combustionprocessingoftheprimaryfuel
inashiftreaction4couldseparateCO2andH2,withthe
formerstoredandthelatterusedasfuel.SouthAfrica’s
extensiveexperiencewithgasificationandre-formingfor
bothsyngasandhydrogenproductionhavegivenitan
excellentknowledgebasefromwhichtocontributeto
pre-combustiontechnologiesgenerally.
Thirdly,CO2canbecapturedusingpost-combustion
technologies.Inpost-combustiontechnology,CO2is
separatedfromfluegasafterthefuelhasbeenburned(IEA
GHG,2000).Thebestproventechniquetoseparatethe
CO2fromfluegasistoscrubitwithmono-ethanolamine
(MEA)solution(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).Thedisadvantagesofpost-combustioncapturearethattheequipment
sizesarelargeduetothelargefluegasvolumesandthe
lowCO2concentrationinthefluegas(10–15percent)
(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).Theenergyrequirementsof
CCSreducetheefficiencyofpowerplants,imposingan
98
Oncecaptured,CO2canbekeptinstorageareassuch
asgeologicalformations.TheCO2canbetrappedphysicallybelowimpermeablerock,dissolvedorionizedin
groundwater,retainedinporespaces,oradsorbedonto
organicmatterincoalandoilshale(Hitchon,1996).All
theseformsofstoragehavelongresidencetimes(thousandstomillionsofyears).Possibletypesofstoragesites
includedepletedoilandgasfieldsanddeepunderground
formationsfilledwithsalinewater.
Existingtechnologyrequiredtoinjectcarbonindeep
geologicformationshasbeendevelopedbytheoilandgas
explorationindustry(Bajura,2001).Projectsspecifically
designedtostoreCO2havestartedtodevelopexperience
withstorageforCCSspecifically,althoughthescaleis
stillsmallrelativetothefuturerequirements.Costsare
variableandarelocation-specific(Knaussetal.,2001).
Environmentalconcernsrelatetothepermanenceofthe
storageandthehealthandsafetyimplicationsofpossible
concentratedreleasesinthefuture.Criteriaforsiteselectionincludethestoragecapacity(relatedtoitsporosity),
permeability,anyphysicalorhydrologicalbarrierstoCO2
storage,andthestabilityofthegeologicalformation.
Oceanscanalsobeusedforcarbondioxidestorageby
releasingCO2tothedeeperoceanwaterlayers,atleast
1,000metersbelowsealevel.OceanstorageofCO2is
madepossiblebythefactthatthecolddeepseawatersof
theoceansareunsaturatedwithCO2andthereforehavea
significantpotentialtodissolveit.Oceanstoragerelieson
thefactthatbelowacertaindepth,CO2becomes“supercritical,”withliquid-likedensities,andbeinglessbuoyant
thanwater,willnotrise(Gunter,2001).However,slow
turnoverintheocean’slayers,evenatgreatdepths,means
eventualreleaseonthetimescaleofcenturies.
3.THEPOTENTIALFORCCS
3.THEPOTENTIALFORCCS
INSOUTHAFRICA
Areport(Engelbrechtetal.,2004)bytheCouncilfor
ScientificandIndustrialResearch,CSIR,commissionedby
theDepartmentofMineralsandEnergy,madeapreliminaryassessmentregardingthepotentialforCO2sequestrationinSouthAfrica(Surridge,2004).Unsurprisingly,the
majorpotentialforcaptureliesinthemajorpointsources
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
ofCO2emissions—electricitygeneration,synfuels(Sasol),
oilrefineries,andenergy-intensiveindustriessuchasiron
andsteel,nonferrousmetals,pulpandpaper,andcement
(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).
3.1 Thepotentialforcarboncapture
inSouthAfrica’senergysector
ThisfirstscopingreportidentifiedtheSasolcoal-to-
liquidsprocessaswell-suitedforCO2sequestration.In
theircoalgasificationprocess,therearereportedlyCO2
streamsof90to98percentpurity,meaningthatminimal
captureisneeded(onlypressurizing).Sincecapturecosts
dominatetheoverallcostsofCCS,thisisasubstantialadvantage(seesection4.1).Slightlylowerconcentrations(80
to90percent)arereportedatMosselBay(Engelbrechtet
al.,2004),wherePetroSAgeneratessyntheticfuelfromgas.
Theotherpotentiallylargesourceiscoal-firedelectricitygeneration,whichprovides93percentofelectricity
supply(NER,2002)throughthepubliclyownedcompanyEskom.However,thefluegasescontainmuchlower
concentrationsofCO2at10-15percent,5implyingthat
thecostsofcapturewillbesignificant.Coalprovidessome
three-quartersoftotalprimaryenergysupply(DME,
2002),andindustryuseslargeamountsofcoalastheother
majorenergycarriernexttoelectricity.
Theelectricitysectorcontributesalmosthalf(47.4
percent)6ofCO2emissionsinSouthAfrica(Vander
Merwe&Scholes,1998;RSA,2004).CO2emissionsin
SouthAfricaareconcentratedinthecentralindustrialarea.
1.4billionm3/y.Discountingthisfigureby50percent
aftersomeallowancesproducesaCO2storagecapacityof
about0.7billionm3/y(approximatedatonemilliontonof
CO2peryear)at80barpressure(Lloyd,2004).
AbandonedcoalandgoldminesinSouthAfricaoffer
anotherpotentialforCO2storage.Storagecapacityof
CO2inabandonedmineswasbasedonproductionrates.
Abandonedcoalmineshavepreviouslybeenusedasstorage
facilitiesforoil(Engelbrechtetal.,2004),butappearedto
offerlittleCO2storagecapacity.Nofigureswereavailable
whentheCSIRstudywasconducted.Forabandonedgold
mines,assumingproductionof390tonsofgoldannually,
20millionm3oforeremovedannually,andthenumber
ofexhaustedgoldminesavailableinSouthAfrica,ayearly
CO2storagefigureofmorethan10millionm3wouldbe
possibleat80barsofpressure(Lloyd,2004).
AnotherpotentialareaofgeologicalCO2storagein
SouthAfricaisdeepsalinereservoirs(Figure2).The
KarooSupergroupSedimentsofferthehighestpotential
comparedtoothersedimentzonesinthecountry,which
lackatrappingorsealingmechanism.Twomajorareasin
theKaroosedimentsaretheVryheidFormationand
KatbergFormation.Thesetwoformationsarerelatively
oldandhighlyconsolidated.TheVryheidformationhas
anestimatedCO2storagecapacityof183,750millionm3
(approximately183,750milliontonsat80barpressure)
(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).TheCSIRstudyfound,
Figure2.SouthernAfrica’sGeologicalZonesforCO2Storage
3.2 Reviewofpotentialfor
geologicalandoceanstorage
3.2.1Geologicalstorage
GeologicalsequestrationofCO2involvestheuseof
geologicalformationslikedepletedoilandgasreservoirs,
abandonedgoldmines,deepsalineaquifers,orunminable
coalseams.SuchstorageofCO2wouldinvolveinjection
intotheformationsaftercapturingitatsourcepoints.GeologicalgasandoilreservoirscanbeidealforCO2storage
becausetheinjectedCO2canbeusedtorestorethereservoir
toitsoriginalpressure,therebyreducingtheriskofpossible
collapse.Further,thenaturalsealingmechanismthatretainedthehydrocarboninthefirstplaceoffersasignificant
advantageinensuringthattheCO2doesnotescapetothe
surface.However,oilorgasdevelopmentactivitiesmightbe
apotentialsourceofrisksduetoreservoirfractures.
ForSouthAfrica,thepotentialforusingdepletedoil
andgasfieldsforCO2storageisnotsignificantbecauseof
thelowprevalenceofoilandgasactivitiesinthecountry
(Lloyd,2004).IntheCSIRstudy(Engelbrechtetal.,2004),
thestoragecapacityofoilandgasfieldsinSouthAfrica
hasbeenbasedontheircurrentproductionrateofabout
0
100
200
300
KILOMETRES
Source:Engelbrechtetal.(2004).ShadedareasarethosesuitableforCO2storage.
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
99
however,that“thesesandstonesarecharacterizedby
lowporosity(3to5percent)andpoorpermeability”
(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).Makingallowancesforpoor
permeabilityofthesedimentsandotherfactors,astorage
capacityfigureof18,375milliontonswasestimated.
TheKatbergFormationwasestimatedwithaCO2
potentialstoragecapacityof8billionm3.Thisfigurewas
discountedtoapproximately1.6billionm3(1,600million
tonsofCO2at80barpressure)toallowforpoorstorage
capacityaswellasgeologicalandotherconstraints.
ThecombinedCO2storagecapacityforthetwoformations,giventhelowporosityandpermeability,comesto
about20GtCO2,sufficienttostorevirtuallyallthecapturableCO2producedinthenext100years(Lloyd,2004).
ForSouthAfrica,itwouldprobablybereasonableto
assumeadistanceofabout250kmbetweensourceand
sink,althoughthiswouldclearlydependonimproved
source-sinkmatching.
Oceanstorage
Deepoceanstorageis“nearlyunlimited,”butSouth
Africanstoragepotentialhasnotbeenquantified,norhas
thatthatfromoceanfertilizationtoincreasetheuptakeof
CO2(Engelbrechtetal.,2004).TheCSIRstudyconcludedthat“deepoceansequestrationofCO2ispotentially
possible;however,environmentalandlegalconsequences
arepoorlyunderstood.”InordertounderstandthepotentialofoceanstorageofCO2inSouthAfrica,onewould
needtostudytheseabedprofileofsubmarinecontours
adjacenttomajorsourcesofCO2.
TotaltheoreticalCO2storagepotential
Table2summarizesthetheoreticalpotentialgeologicalandoceanstorageforcarbondioxidesequestrationin
SouthAfrica.
Table2.PotentialforGeologicalandOceanCO2StorageinSouthAfrica
Potentialsink
OilandGas
reservoirs
Goldmines
VryheidFormation
KatbergFormation
Deepocean
(AtlanticandIndian)
Tonnage
(MtCO2/y)
PotentialStorage
Duration(years)
Comments
1
10ormore
18,373
milliontotal
1,600
milliontotal
Nearly
unlimited
Verylong
(millionsofyears)
Sitespecific
Verylong
(millionsofyears)
Verylong
(millionsofyears)
Severalhundred
years
Theremaybeenhanced
gasrecovery
Morestudyrequired
Relativelypoorporosityand
permeability,morestudy
required
Relativelypoorporosityand
permeability,morestudy
required
Deepoceanecosystems
poorlyunderstood;impacts
ofCO2apotentialcausefor
concern
Table2showsthatSouthAfricahaspotentiallylarge
geologicalstorage,particularlyinsalinereservoirs.The
potentialforCO2sequestrationinexhaustedgasfieldsat
MosselBayneedsmorestudy,alsobecauseitmayenhance
gasrecovery.Thereisalsoapotentialtouseexhaustedgold
minesforCO2sequestration,butthisareaneedsmore
studyasminingactivitiesmighthavereducedthesealing
effectforcarbonstorage.Ongeologicalformationstorage,
itappearsthattheporosityandpermeabilityisratherlow,
butthepotentialforCO2sequestrationislargeandthereforefurtherstudyisrequired.
Oceanstorageinthecountryispotentiallylarge,but
quantifiedestimatesareunknown.Oceanstoragealso
raisesenvironmentalandlegalissuesthathaveledtowidespreadoppositioninternationally,andtothesuspension
ofsomehigh-profileresearchactivities.
4.CCSANDSUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT
CCSneedstobeassessedagainstthevariousdimensions
ofsustainabledevelopment.Theindicatorsusedbythe
DesignatedNationalAuthorityfortheCDMinSouth
AfricaareshowninTable3.Sustainabledevelopmentis
definedinthreedimensions—ecological,economic,and
social.Theecologicaldimensionconsidersimpactsonlocal
environmentalquality,naturalresourceuse,andimpacts
onecosystems.Economicsconsidersnotonlycost,foreign
exchange,andlocaleconomicdevelopment,butalso
includesappropriatetechnologytransfer.Thedetailofthe
socialindicatorsrevealsanemphasisondeliveryofservices
atalocalcommunitylevelandthealleviationofpoverty.
Whilenosetofindicatorsisperfect,theindicators
reflectthebroadprioritiesoftheRDPoutlinedinsection
1.1.NotonlyaretheseparticularindicatorsusedoperationallyinmitigationprojectsinSouthAfrica,butthey
wereinformedbysomestakeholderconsultation.Inour
analysistheimplicationsofCCSforsustainabledevelopmentareevaluatedverysimply,aspositive,negative,or
neutral.Keyimpactshavebeenhighlightedinbold.
ThekeypositiveimplicationsforCCSarethereductionofGHGemissions,makingproductioncleaner,and
introducingnewtechnology.Theneedtoimportsignificantcomponentsofnewtechnology(andthenegative
impactonforeignexchangerequirements)offsetsthe
latterbenefit.Negativeimplicationsthatstandoutarethe
increasedcostofenergyandotherservices.Theeconomic,
social,andenvironmentalimplicationsofCCSaredescribedinmoredetailinthefollowingsections.
Source:Engelbrechtetal.(2004)
100
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Table3.ReviewofCCSandSustainableDevelopmentinSouthAfrica
Criterion
ReferencetoCCS
Indicator
Positiveor
negative
contributionto
localsustainable
development
Ecological
Impactonlocal
environmental
quality
•Willtheprojectincreaseairpollutioninthearea?
No
•Willtheprojectincreasewaterpollutioninthearea?
Possible
Negative
•Willtheprojectincreasesolidwasteinthearea?
No
Positive
•Willtheprojecthaveanyothernegativeenvironmentalimpacts
(suchasnoise,safety,property,value,visualimpacts,traffic)?
Possible,incaseof
pipelineconstruction,
abruptleakage
Negative
Changeinusageof
naturalresources
•Willtheprojectreducecommunityaccesstoresources?
No
Positive
•Willtheprojectincreasethesustainabilityofusageofwater,
minerals,orothernonrenewablenaturalresources?
No
Negative
•Willtheprojectachievemoreefficientresourceutilization?
Notapplicable
Neutral
Impactsonbiodiversity
andecosystems
•Willtheprojectresultinalossoflocalorregionalbiodiversity?
Possible
Negative
Positive
Economic
Economicimpacts
•Willtheprojectsubstantiallyincreaseforeignexchangerequirements?
Yes
Negative
•Willtheprojecthaveanegativeimpactonexistingeconomic
activityinthearea?
Unlikely
Neutral
•Willtheprojectincreasethecostofenergy?
Yes
Negative
Appropriate
technologytransfer
•Willtheprojectresultintheintroductionofappropriate
technologyintoSouthAfrica?
Yes
Positive
•Willtheprojectresultinlocalskillsdevelopment?
Yes
Positive
•Willtheprojectprovidedemonstration&replicationpotential?
Limited
Positive
•Willtheprojectincorporatecleanerproductiontechnology?
Yes
Positive
Alignmentwith
national,provincial,
andlocal
development
priorities
•Willtheprojectundermineothergovernmentobjectives?
No
Positive
•Willtheprojectincreasethecostofotherservices?
Yes
Negative
•Willtheprojectresultinrelocationofcommunities?
Possible,incaseof
pipelines
Negative
•Willtheprojectprovideinfrastructureoressentialservicesto
thearea(suchasincreasedaccesstoenergy)?
No
Negative
•Willtheprojectcomplementotherdevelopmentobjectivesinthearea?
No
Negative
•Willtheprojectcontributetoaspecificsectoralobjective?
Example:toincreaseaccesstorenewableenergy.
No
Negative
Socialequityand
povertyalleviation
•Willtheprojectresultinthecreationofjobs?(providedetailsasabove)
Possible,highskills
Positive
Unlikely
Neutral
•Willtheprojectprovideanysocialamenitiestothecommunityin
whichitissituated?
•Willtheprojectcontributetothedevelopmentofapreviously
underdevelopedarea?
No
Negative
Social
Source:AdaptedfromthosepublishedbytheDesignatedNationalAuthority,DME(2004).Keypositiveornegativeimpactsarehighlightedinbold.
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
101
4.1Economic
4.1.1ComparingCCStoalternative
mitigationoptions
Comparedtoalternativemitigationoptions,theinitial
costsforCCSstoragetechnologiesarelikelytobehigh,
withexpectationsofadecreasewhentheybecomemore
widespreadandpopular.Thisisthegeneraltrendforall
newtechnologies.IthasbeenarguedthatCCS,comparedtomostothermitigationorsequestrationprojects,
doesnotofferothersustainabledevelopmentbenefits,
apartfromthereductionofGHGsintheatmosphere.
Thesustainabledevelopmentaspectwillbediscussedin
alatersection.
CCStechnologytransferelementsbecomerelevantto
SouthAfricawhenconsideringtheenvisageddevelopmentofthenaturalgasindustry.SouthAfricahassmall
reservesofnaturalgasandcoalbedmethane—notenough
tojustifyanextensivepipelineinfrastructure.Theexisting
pipelinesystemlinksGauteng,Durban,andSecunda,
whereSasolplantsarelocated.Anextensivepipeline
infrastructurewillbenecessarytoaccessgasfieldsin
neighboringcountries,includingAngola,Namibia,and
Mozambique.Angolahaslargegasfields;inthefuture,
gascouldbepipedtoSouthAfricafromthere.SinceCO2
transportbypipelinehassimilaritiestothatofnaturalgas,
thisiswheretherelevanceofCCStechnologytransfer
comesintoplay.Similaritiesincludetheneedforpipeline
constructionthatisnotintrusivetocommunities,aswell
asissueslikesafety,efficiencyofpipelineoperations,and
improvingtelecommunicationsandcomputersystemsfor
monitoringandremotecontrolofpipelines.Otherareas
includedevelopingtoolsandtechnologiesthatdetectareas
ofpotentialdeteriorationfromdents,corrosion,metal
loss,andpipelinecracks.
4.1.2Internationalcostestimatesand
firstSouthAfricanestimates
CCSwouldclearlyimposeadditionalcostsforEskom’s
generationofelectricityorproducingsynfuelatSasol.
Theothercostcomponentsrelatetotransportandstorage
costs.Therehavebeenfewattemptstoquantifymonitoringcostsinexistingstudies.
102
Internationalcostestimates
WithnolocalCCSexperience,mostofthestudies
arebasedoninternationalexperience.Table4shows
increasedcostsofelectricityintheUnitedStates.With
post-combustioncapture,theincreaseinelectricitycost
tocaptureCO2is87percent.Forintegratedgasification-
combined-cycle(IGCC)plantswithpre-combustion
capture,theincreaseinelectricitycostis52percent.For
in-combustioncapture,thecostincreaseisestimatedat
34percent.ForSouthAfrica,someinitialindicationsof
thecostpatternsinSouthAfricaemerge(Lloyd,2004).
CostsofCCSincoal-to-liquidsplantandindustry
Thelowestcostsforcapturearethosewherethereare
alreadyhighconcentrationsofcarbondioxidepresent.In
thecaseofpureCO2streams,suchasthoseavailableat
Sasol’sSecundaplantandPetroSA,thereareonlycompressioncosts.Sincecapturecoststypicallydominatetotal
costsofCCS,theseoptionsarebeinginvestigatedfortheir
potential(Surridge,2004).Furthermore,anumberof
industrialprocessessuchasironandsteelandcement
probablylendthemselvestolow-costcapture(Lloyd,2004).
CostsforCCSfromelectricitygeneration
Forpost-combustionsystemsonnew300–500MW
unitsofelectricgeneratingcapacity,thecapitalcostis
likelytoincreaseby65to90percent.Thecostofelectricitysentoutincreasesby60to85percent,andthecost
ofCO2emissionsavoidedis$40to$55perton($/t).
Retrofittingincreasesthesefurtherbyabout10percent;
thatis,thecostofCO2emissionsavoidedisabout$45
to$60/t.Thesecostsaresimilarforbothcoal-firedand
natural-gas-firedstations,althoughthenatural-gas-fired
stationsreportsomewhatlowercosts,particularlyinthe
combined-cyclemode(Lloyd,2004).
InthecaseofnewIGCCpowerstations,CO2recovery
addsabout20to60percenttothesent-outpowercost
andgivesaCO2emissions-avoidedcostofbetween$15
and$40/t.Retrofittinganexistingpowerstationwithan
IGCCisabout20percentcheaperthanretrofittingthe
samestationwithpost-combustioncapture.
Itisunlikelythatthelowestcostoption,pre-combustion,
canbeavailableforatleast10to15years,asmostnew
generatingcapacitywillprobablybeconventionalpowdered
fuelcombustion,forwhich,evenonnewstations,acost
penaltyofatleast$40/tCO2avoidedislikely.
Forpost-combustioncarboncaptureonoperating
plants,currentgenerationproducesabout190MtCO2
annuallyinproducingabout190TWh(Lloyd&Trikam,
2004).PresentelectricitypricesareaboutR150,000/
GWh.ThecostpenaltyforcapturingonetonCO2would
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Table4.CostofCO2CaptureintheUnitedStates
Capture
technology
Technology
status
Electricitycost
USc/kWh
US$/ton+CO2
Capturecost
US$/tonCO2
Totalcost
US$/tonCO2
Increasein
electricitycost(%)
Post-combustion
Current
3.1
30.3
26.4
56.8
87
Pre-combustion
Demoplants
4.2
41.2
21.5
62.7
52
In-combustion
Pilotplants*
3.5
34.3
11.7
46.0
34
*Estimatedcost.
+
ElectricitycostbasedonCO2emitted.
Source:Engelbrecht(2004)(CitingCanmetEnergyTechnologyCentre.)
beabout$40,orR265—a175percentincreaseinpresent
prices.Thuspost-combustioncaptureofCO2fromthe
generationindustrydoesnotseemlikelyformanyyears
(Lloyd,2004).
Transportcosts
TransportofCO2isthesecondmajorstepintheprocess,asshowninFigure1.Afterinitialcaptureofthegas,
theCO2needstobetransportedtoasuitablestoragesite
forinjection.
ThetechnologytotransportCO2iswell-developed
andfullyproven.Typicallyitinvolvesdryingthegasand
ensuringitmeetstherequiredcomposition(typically>95
percentCO2and<5ppmwater);compressingthegasto
above6Mpa(apressuresimilartothatusedtotransport
naturalgas);andpassingitdownapipeline(Lloyd,2004).
CostsoftransportoftheCO2fromthepointofcapture
tothepointofstoragearedifficulttoestimate,asthey
aredeterminedbythetonnagebeingtransportedandthe
distancebetweensourceandsink.Assumingadistanceof
about250kmbetweensourceandsinkinSouthAfrica,
fromFigure4,thiswouldsuggestatransportcostof
around$1.50/tCO2transported(Lloyd,2004).
Storagecosts
Storagecostsaredifficulttodetermineintheabsence
ofsite-specificinformation,butitseemsreasonableto
supposethat,giventheratherimpermeablenatureof
muchofSouthAfrica’ssedimentaryrocks,thecostswould
beattheupperendofthosefoundelsewhere,thatis,
about$10/tCO2.
Thecostsofcapture,transport,andstoragehavetobe
addedtogethertoprovidetheoverallcostsofCCS,even
beforemonitoringcostsarequantified.Giventherangeof
costsfordifferentaspects,thereisnosinglecostforCCS
asamitigationoption.
AsshowninTable4,capturecostsarethelargestcomponentoftotalcosts.Pre-combustionoptionsintheiron
andsteelandcementsectorsmayprovidefurtheroptions,
attotalcostsaround$20/tCO2.Costsofcarboncapture
inelectricitygeneration,thelargestsourceofCO2inSouth
Africa,arestillmuchhigherthancurrentmarketpricesof
carbon(around$5to$10/tCO2).Newplantswouldadd
$50to$65/tCO2(captureplusstoragecosts),whichis
high.Thiswouldmorethandoubleelectricityprices,and
thereforedoesnotseemlikelyforquitesometime.
Insum,therefore,itseemsentirelypossiblethatas
muchas20percentofSouthAfrica’scapturableCO2
emissions,or12percentofitstotalemissions,couldbe
captured,transportedandstoredforabout$70/t,based
onmaximumcostestimates.Theseareimportantfigures,
becausea12percentreductioninemissionsislargein
comparisonwiththereductionsacceptedbythecountries
inAnnexItotheKyotoProtocol,andbecause$70/tCO2
isbetweenfourteenandseventimesthepriceofferedfor
CDMandJIcreditsatpresent.Thecarbonemissions
creditsbeingtradedatpresentarethelow-hangingfruit,
wheresimplebenefitsarebeingboughtcheaply,butitis
stillunlikelythatinthelongrunthepriceofcarbonwill
riseclosertothelevelatwhichsignificantquantitiescan
becapturedandstored.However,thecoal-to-liquid,iron
&steel,andcementindustriesofferabetterchancefor
carboncredits,sinceinthisareacapturecostsaresignifi-
OverallcostsofCCS
ThepatternsoflikelycostsofCCSinSouthAfricaare
broadlyapparent.Evenwithoutknowingexactcosts,it
isapparentthattheSasolplantwouldbethemostcost-
effective,sinceitavoidsthelargestportionofcosts,namely
capture.Importantgapsremaininunderstandingthecosts
ofmonitoringCO2toensureitremainsstoredingeologicalformationsorundertheocean.
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
103
cantlylower,atamaximumof$10/tCO2(Table5).This
impliesatotalof$20/tforcapturing,transportation,and
storage.Thisislowcomparedtothe$70/tgivenabove,
butstilloutofrangeofthecurrentcarbonpriceof$5to
$10/tCO2.
1.6
8
1.4
7
1.2
6
4.2 Social
1
5
0.8
4
0.6
3
0.4
2
0.2
1
ThesocialbenefitsofCCSinSouthAfricacanbe
viewedintermsofthegovernmentprioritiesinthearea
ofsocialdevelopmentandstandardofliving.Generically,
CCSisanoptioninaddressingclimatechangeissues,an
initiativewithglobaldimensions.Thesocialbenefitsthat
willaccruetoSouthAfricaasaresultoffollowingthis
sequestrationoptionareprincipallythesameasthosethat
wouldresultinanyotherinitiativetoreduceCO2inthe
atmosphere.Atgroundlevel,however,CCShasthedisadvantagethatitdoesnothavedirectsocialbenefitstocommunities,whichmaybethecaseinotherclimatechange
mitigationorsequestrationprojectsthatwouldhavesome
oralltheingredientsofCDMprojects.
ForSouthAfrica,wheregovernmentpolicyhassought
tokeepincreasesinretailelectricitypricesbelowinflation,
increasedpricesduetoCCSwouldaddsignificantpressure
onsocialdelivery.Inthenextfewyears,asnewpowerstationswillbeneeded,thepriceofelectricityisexpectedto
riseanyway.AddingCCSwouldaddtothecostburden.If
implemented,specialmeasurestoprotectpoorhouseholds
fromsuchincreaseswouldbeneeded.Currently,thegovernmenthasapolicyonprovidingfreeelectricitytothe
poor,aninitiativecalled“povertytariff ”inwhicharange
of20to50Kwhpermonthoffreeelectricityisprovided
topoorhouseholds.
0
Opex, US$ per ton
Capex, US$M per km
Figure4.RangesofCapitalandOperatingCostsforHigh-pressure
CO2Pipelines(basedondistanceof250km)
0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Diameter, m
Low capex
High capex
Low opex
High opex
Source:Engelbrechtetal.(2004)
Table5.SummaryofCostEstimatesforCarbonCaptureandStorage
Costestimates
Capture
Coal-to-liquidplants
Iron&steel,cement
Electricity–newplant
Retro-fit
IGCC
Transport
Storage
Monitoring
Verylow
<$10/tCO2
$40-55/tCO2
$45-60/tCO2
$15-40/tCO2
$1.50per250km
$10/tCO2
104
Considerations
VerypureCO2stream,only
compressioncosts
Similarforpulverisedcoalandsimple
gas;lessfornaturalgascombinedcycle
Addsabout10%
NotlikelyinSAforthenextcouple
ofdecades
Costriseswithdistanceofstoragesite
fromsources;beststorageoptionsmay
beoutsideofSAorinocean
Notquantifiedyet
Co-benefitsforlocalsustainabledevelopment
TheaspirationalgoalsoftheRDP(seesection1.1)
servetoillustratetheimportanceofsocioeconomicdevelopment,conceivedarounddeliveryofbasicservices,inthe
broadercontextofSouthAfricanpolicy.Whilethestatus
ofRDPhasbecomeuncertainandlivesintensionwith
macroeconomicpolicy,theseoveralldevelopmentobjectivescontinuetoprovideanimportantcontextforenergy
policyaswell.
CCSposesaconflictintermsofenergypolicy.Onthe
onehand,itoffersapotentialtoreducetheenvironmental
impactsofcoal,particularlyinthesynfuelindustry.On
theotherhand,atcurrentcosts(seesection4.1),implementingCCSwouldraisepricesofelectricityandliquid
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
fuels.Affordableaccesstomodernenergyservicesisan
importantenergypolicyobjective(DME,2004,1998).
Thesuccessinraisingratesofelectrificationofhouseholds
fromaboutone-thirdintheearly1990sto67.9percent
by2002(NER,2002)wasmadepossibleinpartbycheap
coal-firedgeneratingcapacity.Giventhatalternativesupplyoptionsarenotyetcost-competitivewithcoal-fired
power,thereisatensionbetweenthegoalsofuniversal
accesstoelectricityandmovingtowardacleanerfuelmix.
AsshowninTable3,thekeyareawhereCCS,inaccordancewithsustainabledevelopmentcriteriaforSouth
Africa,playsasignificantroleisintheareaoftechnology
transfer.Directsocialbenefitstocommunitiesarequite
low.Asamitigationoptionfocusedexclusivelyonclimate
change,CCSwouldneedtobemotivatedonlyonthe
basisoftheglobalbenefitsaccruedfromthereductionof
CO2intheatmosphere.Impactsonenvironmentalquality,
equity,andpovertyalleviationaremixed,somepositive
andnegative.
Thekeynegativeimpactappearslikelytobesocio-
economic.Atcurrentpricesinthecarbonmarket,
therevenuesfromsellingcarboncreditswouldnotbe
sufficienttooffsetthecostsofCCS.IfaCCSprogram
weretobereviewedunderthedualadvantagestypical
ofCDMprojects,thenitwouldbequiteunlikelytoget
governmentapproval,sinceitofferslittleintermsofdirectlocalorevenregionalbenefits.Infact,CCSislikely
tobeseenasadisadvantagetocommunitiessince,as
shownabove,theycanresultinincreasedcostsofenergy
services.Presumably,thecostofCCSwilleventuallybe
relayedtotheenergyservicecustomers.Itispossible,
however,thatcustomerscouldbecushionedfromsuch
addedoperationcostsifCCSprojectsweretobeeligible
forCDM.Thismightrequiremakingsomeallowances
inthesustainabledevelopmentcriteriaforCCSCDM
projectstobeapproved.
CCSmightplayaroleinslowingthetransitionof
SouthAfrica’senergyeconomytoamorediversefuelmix.
Coalaccountsforaboutthree-quartersoftotalprimary
energysupplyinSouthAfrica(DME,2002),and93percentofelectricitygeneration(NER,2002).Inthecontext
oftheclimatechangedebate,akeyenergydevelopment
objectivehastobeborneinmind—increasingaccessto
affordableenergyservices.Thispolicygoalhasassumed
thestatusofa“non-negotiable”issueinSouthAfrica
energypolicy.However,ifextendingaccesstoelectricity
continuestorelyoncoal-firedgenerationcapacity,the
environmentalimplicationsareconsiderable.Concerns
aboutjoblossesinboththeelectricityandcoalmining
sectorsareadditionalargumentsinfavorofagradual
transitiontoalower-carbonenergyeconomy,although
theseshouldbeweighedagainsttheemploymentpotential
ofotheroptions(AGAMA,2003).CCSmightmitigate
theGHGeffectsoncontinueduseofcoal,andhence
dilutemotivationfordiversiontootherenergysourcesin
additiontocoal.
ThisargumentraisesanumberofotherissuesconcerningtheimplicationsofaglobalCCS.Woulditmeanacon-
tinuationorabusiness-as-usualscenarioforCO2-emitting
technologiessimplybecausethereisahugepotentialfor
capturingandstoringtheemittedCO2?Woulditbeatthe
costofothercarbon-savingtechnologieslikerenewable
energy?SouthAfrica’ssustainabledevelopmentcriteria
putsignificantweightonsocialissueslikejobavailability.
ACCSinitiativethatmaintainsthestatusquoofthecoal
industryintermsofexportsandjobavailabilitymightfind
considerablefavoramongdecisionmakersinSouthAfrica.
Institutionalcapacity
AsolidinstitutionalframeworkinSouthAfricawould
benecessaryforeffectiveimplementationofCCSmitigationoptions.TheenvironmentalimplicationsofCCSand
infrastructurerequirementswillnecessitatekeyplayersbecominginvolved.Forexample,organizationsdealingwith
environmentalmonitoringandregulationofpipelinesmay
needtobestrengthened.
Wherepipelinetransportationinfrastructureisin
place,thenissuesofaccessbydifferentplayerstothe
pipelinenetworkwouldhavetobeconsidered,justas
innaturalgaspipelinetransportation.Thesameissues
wouldberelevanttoCO2storageareaaccess.Adecision
wouldhavetobemadetoeitheruseexistingregulatoryorgans,suchastheGasRegulator,andredefineits
mandate.Furtherfunctionswouldneedtobeintegrated
intoaNationalEnergyRegulatoryAuthority,whichis
expectedtocombineelectricity,gas,andpetroleum
regulatorsinSouthAfricawithinfiveyears.
SouthAfricawouldprobablyhavetheinstitutional
capacitytoimplementaCCSproject.However,CCS
wouldstillpresentnewareasinwhichcapacitydevelopmentwouldberequired.Animportantconcerniswhether
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
105
therewouldbesufficientcapacitytomonitorand/or
independentlyverifythelong-termstorageofCCS.These
institutionalissuesarelikelytohaveimplicationsforthe
overallcostofimplementingCCSinitiativesinSA.
Itwillalsobenecessarytoenactlegislationthatwillnot
onlyexplicitlyconsidertransportationandstorageofCO2,
butalsoconsiderliabilityandenvironmentalrequirements.TheDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsand
Tourism(DEAT)andtheDepartmentofMineralsand
Energy(DME)wouldnaturallybeimportantplayers.
4.3 Environmentalandsafetyconcerns
Safetyissues
Carbondioxideoccursnaturallyintheair;atatmosphericconcentrations,itisnontoxic.Beinganonflammablegas,themostprobableconcernforhumans,plants
andanimalswouldbeexposuretohighconcentrationsof
carbondioxide.WithCCS,risksfromCO2wouldoccur
wherethereisthepossibilityofhighconcentrationsdueto
leakage,eitheracuteorlong-term,orduetotheformsin
whichitwouldbetransportedorstored.Intheatmo-
106
sphere,theconcentrationofCO2isaround0.3percent.At
highconcentration,above10percent,CO2isquitelethal,
causingdeathduetoasphyxiation.Itis1.5timesasdense
asair,andifatmosphericoxygenisdisplacedsuchthat
oxygenconcentrationis15to16percent,signsofasphyxia
willbenoted.IfCO2leaksintosurfacesoils,displacement
ofoxygencanbelethalforplantlife.
Inmostcases,CO2wouldbehandledunderhighpressure,whetherintransportationorstorage.Thesafetyrisks
herewouldmainlybethoseassociatedwithprocess,structuralengineering,ortransportinfrastructurefailure.Some
intermediatestorageofCO2willbeneededtocopewith
variabilityinsupply,transport,andstorage,particularlyif
CO2istransportedbyrail,road,orship.Thehighestexposureislikelytoresultfromfailureoftransportpipelines,
causingalargereleaseofCO2ingaseousform.Itispossible
thatsuchreleasescouldendangerhumanlifeandother
biodiversity.Theriskofproblemsfrompipeleakageisvery
small;tominimizerisks,CO2pipelinescouldberouted
awayfromlargepopulationcenters.Generallyspeaking,
handlingofCO2shouldberelativelysafe,especiallywhen
weconsiderthatotherpotentiallyhazardousgasessuch
asnaturalgas,ethylene,andLPGarealreadybeingtransportedandstoredwithrelativelyfewproblems.
AnextremeexampleofthehazardsofCO2isthatof
LakeNyos,avolcaniccraterlakeinCameroon,which
emittedlargequantities(estimatedat80millioncubic
meters)ofCO2,causing1,700deathsandlossoflivestock
upto25kmfromthecrater(JohnstonandSantillo,2002).
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Thisnaturalphenomenon,whileillustrativeofthedangers
ofhighconcentrationsofCO2inlow-lyingareas,isunlikelytobereflectiveoftherisksposedbyCCS.
WhileabovegroundequipmentforhandlingCO2
wouldbesubjecttothesameprocessesandstandardsfor
handlinggaseousproductsunderhighpressure,monitoringofCO2levelswouldstillbeimportant.Thiscanbe
donebyplacingsensorsatselectedlocationsthatwould
measuretheamountofCO2intheatmosphere.The
monitoringsystemsshouldbeabletosoundanalarmsiren
ifCO2gasconcentrationsintheairaroundlargevolume
storagepointsreachdangerouslevels.Forpeopleliving
nearCCSinfrastructure,itwouldbecriticallyimportant
toprovideawareness-raisingprogramsregardingpossible
hazardsandhowtorespondtohazardoussituations.
Geologicalstorageconcerns
Withgeologicalreservoirs,theassumptionisgenerally
madethatsuchformationshaveheldhydrocarbonsor
liquidsforconsiderabledurationsoftime,andthusinjectionofCO2intothereservoirsandproperlysealingthem
islikelytomaintaintheoriginalconditions.However,
thepressureatwhichCO2wouldbestoredinthereservoirswouldbeanimportantfactortoconsider,albeitin
maintainingsimilarconditionsasthecasemighthave
beenbeforedepletionofgasoroil.Injectionofnaturalgas
intodepletedoilorgasfieldsisacommonpracticeinthe
petroleumindustry,andanumberofoilandgasreservoirs
havebeensuccessfullyusedtostorenaturalgas.CO2storagewouldthereforepresentasimilarpractice,andexperienceonnaturalgasstoragecanprovideausefulexample
fordevelopmentofCO2storageinoilandgasreservoirs.
Withabandonedgoldorcoalmines,however,more
attentionwouldbeneeded,sinceminingprocessesinthis
caseusuallyinvolveduseofexplosiveandotherequipmentthatcausesconsiderablevibrations.MinesinSouth
Africahavecreatedareasofseismicactivityassociatedwith
miningprocesses.Thereisthusastronglikelihoodthat
subsidencewillhaveinducedfracturesintherocks,which
wouldcreateapoorsealingoftherockandapossible
routeforCO2toescapetotheatmospherebyslowleakage
orabrupteruption.
Research,development,anddemonstrationprojectsexaminingenvironmentalconcernsofCO2storageareunder
wayinCanada,Europe,andJapan.Therearestillalotof
uncertaintiesandinformationalgapsrelatedtooceanand
geologicalstorageofCO2.Theenvironmentalconcernsof
CCSwouldthusneedtoincludeanunderstandingofboth
exposureandeffectsofcarbondioxideinvarioussituations
associatedwithcarbondioxidetransportation,injection
intostoragepoints,orleakagefromstoragepoints.
5.CONCLUSION
ItisclearthatSouthAfricahasapotentialforCCS.
Themajorpotentialforcaptureliesinthemajorpoint
sourcesofCO2emissions—electricitygeneration,synfuels,oilrefineries,andenergy-intensiveindustriessuch
asironandsteel,nonferrousmetals,pulpandpaper,and
cement.Thehighestquantifiedstoragepotentialisin
geologicalformations.Thereislimitedstoragepotentialin
abandonedmines,oceanstorage,andinoilandgasfields.
Majorissuesofconcernincludeporosityandpermeability
ofthegeologicalformations,aswellasenvironmental,
safety,andlegalissues.
InpursuingtheCCSinitiativeinSouthAfrica,major
obstaclesincludethehighcostofcaptureandstorage,
whichwouldincreasethecostofenergyservices.Thebenefitsfrominternationalcarbontradearehighlyunlikelyto
offsetthecostsofCCS,eveninthelongrun.Intermsof
SouthAfrica’ssustainabledevelopmentcriteria,CCScould
haveanumberofpositiveelements,themostoutstandingbeingtechnologytransfer.Socialbenefitsappeartobe
quitelow.
CCS,inthecontextofSouthAfrica’sclimatechange
strategy,couldbepartofanagendatofacilitatethe
transitionfromacoal-dependentenergysystemtoamore
diversifiedone,makingthecoal“cleaner,”butthereisa
needtoconductfurtherstudiesonhowCCScompares
toothermitigationandsequestrationoptionsintermsof
costsandlong-termsustainabledevelopmentbenefits.
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
107
ENDNOTES
SAratifiedtheUNFCCCinAugust1997andtheKyotoProtocol
in2003.
2TheDepartmentofMinerals&EnergyandEskomparticipateinthe
CSLF’spolicygroup.Theparticipantsinthetechnicalgrouparefrom
SasolandAngloCoal(Surridge,2004).Togetherwithotherresearchers,
EskomandSasolarealsoinvolvedinthepreparationoftheIPCC
specialreportonCCS.
3
Sasolis,however,switchingfeedstockfromcoaltogasoveraperiod
oftime;agaspipelinefromMozambiquestartedtodelivergasin
February2004.
4Reactthefuelwithoxygenorsteam,createsyngas(COandH );shift
2
reactiontoCO2andH2;CO2separatedbychemicalabsorption.
5Therangedependsinteraliaonloadfactors,excessairsupplyand
similarfactors;somemeasurementshavebeenconductedbyLloyd&
Trikam(2004).
6CO emissionsdominateSouthAfrica’stotalGHGemissions.Electric2
ityCO2emissionsconstituted37percentoftotalGHGemissions
inthe1994inventory.However,sincethisreportconsiderscapture
ofCO2ratherthanotherGHGs,thecomparisontototalCO2isthe
relevantone.
1
REFERENCES
AGAMAEnergy.2003.“EmploymentPotentialofRenewable
AGAMAEnergy.2003.
EnergyinSouthAfrica.”AstudycommissionedbySustainable
EnergyandClimateChangePartnership,aprojectof
EarthlifeAfricaJohannesburg,inpartnershipwithWWF
(WorldWildlifeFund),Denmark.Johannesburg:SECCP.
ANC(AfricanNationalCongress).1994.
ANC(AfricanNationalCongress).1994.TheReconstruction
andDevelopmentProgramme:APolicyFramework.
Johannesburg:Umanyano.
Bajura,R.A.2001.
Bajura,R.A.2001.“TechnologicalOptionstoAddress
GlobalClimateChange.”FirstNationalConferenceon
CarbonSequestration.Availableat:http://www.netl.doe.gov/
publications/proceedings/01/carbon_seq/ps1a.pdf.
Banks,D.andJ.L.Schäffler.2005.
Banks,D.andJ.L.Schäffler.2005.“Thepotentialcontribution
ofrenewableenergyinSouthAfrica.”PreparedfortheSustainableEnergy&ClimateChangePartnership,EarthlifeAfrica.
Pretoria:RAPSConsulting&NanoEnergy.
Bolland,O.andH.Undrum.1999.“RemovalofCO2fromGas
Bolland,O.andH.Undrum.1999.
TurbinePowerPlants:EvaluationofPre-andPost-combustion
Methods.”GHGT-4,Interlaken,Switzerland,Aug.30–Sept.2.
Availableat:http://www.ieagreen.org.uk/sessions.htm.
Borchers,M.,N.Qase,T.Gaunt,J.Mavhungu,H.Winkler,
Borchers,M.,N.Qase,T.Gaunt,J.Mavhungu,H.Winkler,
Y.Afrane-Okese,andC.Thom.2001.“NationalElectrification
Y.Afrane-Okese,andC.Thom.2001.
ProgrammeEvaluation:SummaryReport.”Evaluation
commissionedbytheDepartmentofMinerals&Energyand
theDevelopmentBankofSouthernAfrica.CapeTown:Energy
&DevelopmentResearchCentre,UniversityofCapeTown.
108
DeVilliers,M.,M.Howells,andA.Kenny.1999.
DeVilliers,M.,M.Howells,andA.Kenny.1999.“Sustainable
EnergyforSouthAfrica:EnergyScenariosfrom1995to2025.”
ReportforEskomandNationalResearchFoundation.Cape
Town:EnergyResearchInstitute,UniversityofCapeTown.
DEAT(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism).
2004.“ANationalClimateChangeResponseStrategy.”Pretoria.
2004.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).1998.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).1998.“White
PaperonEnergyPolicyforSouthAfrica.”Pretoria:DME.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2002.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2002.
“SouthAfricaNationalEnergyBalance2000.”Pretoria:DME.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003a.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003a.
“IntegratedEnergyPlanfortheRepublicofSouthAfrica.”
Pretoria.Availableat:www.dme.gov.za.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003b.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003b.
“SouthAfricaNationalEnergyBalance2001.”Pretoria:DME.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003c.
DME(DepartmentofMineralsandEnergy).2003c.
“WhitePaperonRenewableEnergy.”Pretoria.Availableat:
www.dme.gov.za.
DME(DepartmentofMinerals&Energy).2004.
DME(DepartmentofMinerals&Energy).2004.“SustainableDevelopmentCriteriaforApprovalofCleanDevelopment
MechanismProjectsbytheDesignatedNationalAuthorityofthe
CDM.”Pretoria.Availableat:www.dme.gov.za.
ECON(ECONCentreforEconomicAnalysis).2004.
ECON(ECONCentreforEconomicAnalysis).2004.“The
PotentialforCarbonFinancetoSupporttheIntroductionof
NaturalGasintoMozambique.”Draft.Report2004-077.Oslo.
EDRC(Energy&DevelopmentResearchCentre).2003.
EDRC(Energy&DevelopmentResearchCentre).2003.
“PoliciesandMeasuresforRenewableEnergyandEnergy
EfficiencyinSouthAfrica.”PreparedfortheSustainableEnergy
&ClimateChangePartnership.CapeTown:EDRC,University
ofCapeTown.
Engelbrecht,A,A.Golding,S.Hietkamp,andR.J.Scholes.
2004.“ThePotentialforSequestrationofCarbonDioxidein
2004.
SouthAfrica.”ReportfortheDepartmentofMinerals&Energy.
Pretoria:CouncilforScientificandIndustrialResearch.
Fine,B.andZ.Rustomjee.1996.
Fine,B.andZ.Rustomjee.1996.ThePoliticalEconomyof
SouthAfrica:fromMinerals-energyComplextoIndustrialization.
London:C.Hurst.
Gunter,W.D.2001.
Gunter,W.D.2001.“RoleofHydrodynamicandGeochemical
TrappinginSecureGeologicalStorageofCarbonDioxide.”
FirstNationalConferenceonCarbonSequestration.Availableat:
http://www.netl.doe.gov/publications/proceedings/01/
carbon_seq_wksp/4aAquifers.PDF.
Hitchon,B.,ed.1996.
Hitchon,B.,ed.1996.AquiferDisposalofCarbonDioxide:
HydrodynamicandMineralTrapping-ProofofConcept.Alberta,
Canada:GeosciencePublishing.
IEAGHG(InternationalEnergyAgencyGreenhouseGasR&D
Programme).2000.“LeadingOptionsfortheCaptureofCO2
Programme).2000.
EmissionsatPowerStations.”ReportPH3/14.Cheltenham.
Availableat:www.ieagreen.org.uk/.
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
Johnston,P.andD.Santillo.2002.
Johnston,P.andD.Santillo.2002.“CarbonCaptureand
Sequestration:PotentialEnvironmentalImpacts.”Greenpeace
ResearchLaboratories,forIPCCWorkshopforCarbonCapture
andStorage.Exeter,UK:UniversityofExeter.
Knauss,K.G.,J.W.Johnson,C.I.Steefel,andJ.J.Nitao.2001.
“EvaluationoftheImpactofCO2,AqueousFluid,and
ReservoirRockInteractionsontheGeologicSequestrationof
CO2,withSpecialEmphasisonEconomicImplications.”
FirstNationalConferenceonCarbonSequestration.
Availableat:http://www.carbonsequestration.us/Websites/
htm/NETL-conf-carbon_seq01.html.
Kohl,A.L.andR.B.Nielsen.1997.GasPurification.Houston:
Kohl,A.L.andR.B.Nielsen.1997.
GulfPublishingCo.
Lloyd,P.J.D.2004.
Lloyd,P.J.D.2004.“CarbonCaptureandStorageinSouth
Africa:DevelopmentandClimateChange.”Technicalinput.
CapeTown:EnergyResearchCentre,UniversityofCapeTown.
Lloyd,P.J.D.andA.Trikam.2004.
Lloyd,P.J.D.andA.Trikam.2004.“TheDeterminationof
EmissionFactorsforSouthAfricanPowerStations.”Eskom
Contract1RE-000046.CapeTown:EnergyResearchCentre,
UniversityofCapeTown.
NER(NationalElectricityRegulator).2002.
NER(NationalElectricityRegulator).2002.ElectricitySupply
StatisticsforSouthAfrica2002.Pretoria:NER.Availableat:
www.ner.org.za/publs.htm.
Poggiolini,D.2001.
Poggiolini,D.2001.“SALayingGasPipelineinMozambique.”
EngineeringNews(June29-July5,2001).
RSA(RepublicofSouthAfrica)2004.
RSA(RepublicofSouthAfrica)2004.“SouthAfrica:Initial
NationalCommunicationundertheUnitedNationsFramework
ConventiononClimateChange.”SubmittedatCOP-9.Pretoria.
Availableat:unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/zafnc01.pdf.
Surridge,A.D.2004.
Surridge,A.D.2004.“CarbonSequestrationLeadershipForum:
SouthAfricaStatusReport.”ReporttotheNationalCommittee
onClimateChange,August27,Pretoria.
UCT(UniversityofCapeTown).2002.
UCT(UniversityofCapeTown).2002.OptionsforaBasic
ElectricitySupportTariff:Analysis,IssuesandRecommendations
fortheDepartmentofMinerals&EnergyandEskom.
CapeTown:UCT.
UNFCCC.1992.
UNFCCC.1992.UnitedNationsFrameworkConvention
onClimateChange.NewYork:UnitedNations.Availableat:
http://unfccc.int/resource/conv/index.html.
VanderMerwe,M.R.andR.J.Scholes.1998.
VanderMerwe,M.R.andR.J.Scholes.1998.SouthAfrican
GreenhouseGasEmissionsInventoryfortheYears1990and1994.
Pretoria:NationalCommitteeonClimateChange.
C A R B ON C A PTU R E A N D STOR A GE IN SOU TH A FR IC A
109
chaptervii
Conclusion
RobBradley ■ JonathanPershing
Sustainabledevelopmentpoliciesandmeasures(SDPAMs)areatoncebothanoldandanewidea.Whilethe
ClimateChangeConventionlaysoutthebasiccontoursof
theconcept,itisonlyrecentlythatconcreteproposalshave
emergedthatexplainhowtointegratebasicdevelopment
needswithclimateprotection.Thisreportreviewsthe
SD-PAMsconcepts,evaluateshowtheyfitintoaformal
greenhousegas(GHG)mitigationframework,andreviews
specificcasesofhowtheconceptsapplyintherealworld.
Itmakesclearthatwecanmovefromconcepttoreality,
andthatSD-PAMscanindeedbeasteppingstonetoa
betterclimatefuture
Climatepolicyintherealworld
TheSD-PAMsapproachhasanumberofpotential
shortcomings,whichwillbesummarizedbelow,butithas
oneoverridingvirtue:itrootsclimatepolicyinpractical
reality.Afullerengagementofkeydevelopingcountries
inemergingclimatepolicyisbynomeansasufficient
conditionforstrongerclimateprotection—theleadership
ofindustrializedcountriesremainsessential—butitisa
necessaryone.
Thefactremainsthatmostdevelopingcountriesare
unlikelytoacceptcommitmentsformulatedasemissions
limitsfortheforeseeablefuture.Theirreasonsfordoingso
arenotarbitraryorunreasonable,butareagainrootedin
theirownrealities—largepopulationsinneedofeconomic
development.Itisonlybykeepingthefocusondevelopmentthatwecanstarttoleveragethemajorclimategains
thatareachievablebysteeringthatdevelopmentdown
amoresustainablepath.Thetaskinfrontofthosethat
believethatGHGemissionreductionsareimportantfor
thefuturewell-beingofhumanityistomakethesecutsa
politicalpriority.Thismeanslookingoutsidethenarrow
confinesofthetraditionalclimatepolicyarena,whichlacks
politicalprominencerelativetoenergyservices,transportationinfrastructure,andotherissuesmoredirectlyconnectedtoeconomicdevelopmentandpovertyalleviation.
Thisreportarguesthatinsomeimportantcasespolicy
andtechnologyoptionsexisttohelplimitemissionswhile
furtheringthesedevelopmentgoals.Brazil’sexperience
hasshownthatdeterminedgovernmentpolicycanmake
majordifferencetotheenergymix,andthustoGHG
emissions.Brazilhasbenefitedenormouslyinnon-climate
termsfromitsethanoluse:itsexternaldebtwouldbe$100
billionhigherifithadreliedexclusivelyongasolinefor
transport,asalmostallothercountrieshavedone.
Notallclimatepolicieshaveacounterpartindevelopmentneeds.Asthecasestudiesinthisreportshow,some
initiatives—carboncaptureandstorage(CCS)isagood
example—areunlikelytoworkunderthismodel.In
C ON C LU SION
111
essence,thesustainabledevelopmentbenefitsofapolicyor
measure,seenfromthepointofviewofthehostcountry,
needtoprovideasignificant(thoughnotnecessarily
complete)partofthereasontoimplementit.Theclimate
benefitsmaybereasonfortheinternationalcommunity
toassisttoanappropriatedegree.Wherethesesustainable
developmentbenefitsaresmallorzero,moretraditional
measuresaimedexclusivelyatpayingtheincrementalcost
ofcarbonabatementaremoreappropriate.Thisreinforces
thepointthatSD-PAMswillcomplement,ratherthan
replace,existingmechanisms.SD-PAMsarenotapanacea,
butanadditionaltoolofclimatepolicy.
Thepotentialclimategainsarereal
Thecountrystudiespresentedinthisvolumeillustrate
thepotentialformajorreductionsinGHGemissions,
dependingonthedevelopmentchoicesmade.Theseare
generallymadewithoutclimateconsiderationsplayinga
role.However,whereclimateanddomesticgoalsaremutuallyreinforcingthereisrealpotentialforinternational
cooperationtoenhancebothsetsofgoals.
Brazil’sbiofuelsprogramhassavedtheequivalent
of10percentofBrazil’sCO2emissionsovertheperiod
1975-2004duetodisplacedoilconsumption.Thissaving,equivalenttotakingallofSweden’scarsofftheroad
duringthattime,wasachievedwithoutclimateprotection
beinganovertaim,butisneverthelessoneoftheworld’s
mosteffectivepolicyregimesforreducingGHGemissions.Thestudiesinthisvolumesuggestthatconsiderable
scopeexistsforsimilar“incidental”climatewins.The
Chinastudy(Chapter4),calculatesthatasuiteofpolicies
andmeasuresaimedatmanagingoildemandcanreduce
China’sforecastedoildemandfortransportin2020by50
percentbelowabusiness-as-usualscenario.Whenpolicies
toreducethestressonovercrowdedurbaninfrastructure
areadded,thissavingrisesto79%.Andwhiletheeffective
reductioninCO2emissionsin2020wouldbeof187and
295MtCO2peryearrespectivelyunderthesescenarios,
thisbenefitwouldbeentirelyindependentofclimate
policyperse.ForChinathepolicygoalsaretoreduceoil
importdemandandstressonoverburdenedurbaninfrastructure,whileimprovingmobilityforthemasses.
Theexamplesinthisvolumeareillustrative,chosen
becausetheyaddressedimportantsectorsanddevelopmentissues.Thepowerandtransportsectorsareamong
thefastestgrowingineachofthecountriesincludedin
thisreport,andamongthemostcriticalfordevelopment.Moreneedstobedonetoidentifyopportunities
forapplyingtheselessonsmorewidely,andforamore
112
systematicmethodofidentifyingSD-PAMopportunities.
Butacrucialrequirementwillremaintheleadershipofthe
hostcountryitselfinidentifyingitspolicyprioritiesand
providingthepoliticalwilltoimplementthem.
SD-PAMsbuildon,ratherthanreplace,
existingpolicy
TheUNFCCC,theKyotoProtocol,andtheplethoraof
implementingmeasuresbyPartiesrepresentasubstantial
investmentinclimatepolicy.FormanyPartiesthiswill
remainthecoreoffuturepolicy:forcountriesthathave
acceptedtheneedtoreducetheiremissionsasanexplicit
policygoal,emissioncapscombinedwithtradingandprojectmechanismsrepresentanefficientandeffectivemeans
ofimplementingthisgoal.SD-PAMs,byhelpingtoengage
countriesthatarenotyetreadytoundertakeexplicit
emissionscommitments,complementsthesemechanisms.
ParticularlyimportantinthiscontextwillbetherelationshipbetweenSD-PAMsandtheCleanDevelopment
Mechanism(CDM).Bothdevelopingcountries(hoping
formoreinvestment)andindustrializedcountries(lookingforloweremissionabatementcosts)haveplacedgreat
hopesontheCDM.TheCDMhasdemonstratedsome
effectivenessinfindinglow-costabatementoptions,but
therearelimitstothepotentialforsuchaprojectmechanismtomakethepolicy-based,systemicchangesconsideredinthisvolume.SD-PAMsthusfillavoid,ratherthan
competingdirectlywiththeCDM.
AstrengthofSD-PAMsisthattheyalsobuildonexistingdevelopmentpolicyineachcountry.Indeveloping
countries,climatechangeassuchhaslittlestandingasa
politicalpriority,whiledevelopmentobjectivessuitablefor
SD-PAMshavemuchgreaterprominenceforpolicymakers.InthecaseofIndia,discussedinChapter5,theauthors
derivetheirelectrificationscenariosfromtheIndian
government’sownpriorities.Theirstudydemonstratesthat
evenwhendiscussingalternativewaysofmeetingapredefinedpolicygoal,thechoicesmadecanhaveprofound
impactsonbothnationaldevelopmentandemissionlevels.
Whiletheystartfromexistingpolicyobjectives,the
purposeofSD-PAMsisofcoursetoachievemore,inboth
climateanddevelopmentterms,thanmighthavebeen
doneotherwise.“Achievingmore”cantakeanumberof
forms.BuildingonthecaseofBrazil’sethanolprogram,
whichhasbeenaconsiderablesuccess,futureSD-PAMs
couldleadtomorecountriesadoptingsimilarapproaches.
IntheChinesecasethegovernmentisalreadytakinginitialstepstowardsimprovingtheefficiencyofitstransport
systems.Here“achievingmore”withSD-PAMsmight
focusonpushingthatprocessfasterandfurther.Insome
cases,suchastheIndianexample,internationalinstitutionsorotherdonorsmayhavearoleinimprovingaccess
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
tocapitalforrenewableenergyprograms.Inothers,such
asthemarketsforbiofuelsandefficientcars,itisrather
aquestionofpoolingdevelopedanddevelopingcountry
efforts.Thekeyineachcaseistostartwiththeexistingdevelopmentpriority,andseektoaddtoitelements
thatbothmoreeffectivelyaddressthatissueandthatalso
reduceemissions.
Financingremainsaproblem,butSD-PAMs
offerthepotentialtomovebeyondabattleover
“climatechangemoney”
IfmoneyforSD-PAMsisnottocome(primarily)
fromgeneratingemissionreductioncredits,thenwhere
willitcomefrom?Thisquestionisboundtobenearthe
topofanynegotiator’slist.Thecrucial,unresolvedissueis
that,todate,thefundsthatPartiesarewillingtocommit
tofightingclimatechangeareoutofallproportionto
thescaleofthechallenge.Resourcesputtoemissions
reductionsamountatbesttoafewbillionsdollars;too
littletotransformthe$16trillionof(largelyprivate)
capitalneededintheenergysectoroverthenext25years
(IEA,2004).Todate,noproposalwithsignificanttraction
innegotiationscomesclosetogeneratingtheresources
needed.Theimportantquestionthereforeishowto
influenceexistingfinancialflows.TheGlobalEnvironmentFacility,establishedundertheUNFCCCasthe
mechanismtoprovidefortheincrementalcostsofclimate
mitigation,providedlessthan$2billionfrom1991–2004
(UNFCCC,2004).OverseasDevelopmentAssistance,
whileconsiderablylarger,isnotlikelytobeenough:total
resourcesin2003wereonly$69billion,andlittleofthis
goestoclimateprotectionefforts(WorldBank,2005).
Privatesectorfinancialflowsareconsiderablyhigher:net
flowsofequityandforeigndirectinvestmentwere$192
billionin2004(WorldBank,2005),heavilyconcentrated
inlargecountriessuchasthoseconsideredhere.Export
creditagenciesleveragesubstantialpartsoftheseprivate
financialflows—some$81billionofinvestmentflowsin
2003weresupportedwithinvestmentinsuranceorexport
creditinsurance—andthesearesubjecttothepolicyconstraintsofthelendingcountries(Harmonetal.,2005).
Avitalpointtorememberisthattheroleofinternationalsupportandinvestmentcanonlybetohelpleverage
thefargreaterdomesticinvestmentflows.Inallthefour
countriesweconsiderinthisvolume,domesticcapitalis
overwhelminglydominantinenergyandtransportsector
investment.Thusthecommitmentofthehostcountrygovernmentandtheimplementationofdomesticpoliciesand
measuresarethekeyfactorsforthesuccessofanSD-PAM.
SD-PAMsbynomeansprovideafullanswertothe
problemofprovidingfinanceforcleanerenergyonthe
scaleneeded,butthennothingdoes.Thequestionis
whetheranSD-PAMsapproachmakesitmoreorless
likelythattheseresourcescanbeleveraged.Inthisvolume
wearguethatSD-PAMsimprovetheoutlookfor
resourcesfortworeasons.
First,byintegratingclimateconsiderationsintowhat
aregenerally(forthehostcountry)largerdevelopment
concerns,itaimsmoretoimprovetheclimateperformanceofexistinginvestmentflowsthantogeneratenew
funds.Thisisamajoradvantage:experienceunderthe
UNFCCCgiveslittlecauseforoptimismthatfundsaimed
atclimatemitigationwillbelargeenough.Byaimingat
broaderdevelopmentefforts,SD-PAMsofferatleastthe
potentialtoleveragebothdomesticandinternational
investmentflows.Thecaseofcarboncaptureandstorageisoneforwhichlittlesuchleveragingwillbepossible,
andthusmajornewresourceswouldhavetobeprovided
foranexclusivelyclimate-relatedbenefit.IntheIndian
examplehowever,ruralelectrificationisinevitablygoingto
befinancedfromdomesticsources.TheroleofSD-PAMs
canbetomakearenewableenergyapproach—already
attractivefordomesticpolicyreasons—thefirstchoicefor
Indianpolicymakers.
Second,andperhapsmoreimportantly,countries
aremorelikelytoprovidefundsforaknownpolicy
ortechnologyobjective.Numerousproposalspositan
emissiontradingregimeinwhichdevelopingcountries
takegrowthtargets,suchthatdevelopedcountriesmake
large-scalefinancialtransfersofpurchaseemissionrights.
Thenotionthatrich-worldgovernments(andvoters)
willprovidesuchablankcheckisonethat,inthewords
ofThomasSchelling(2002),“requiresasenseofhumor
toappreciate.”Experiencewithdevelopmentassistance
suggestsratherthatcountrieswillbemorewillingtoput
resourcesintoactivitiesthatcanbemutuallyagreedwith
therecipient.
ItisimportanttostressthatsupportingSD-PAMsneed
notbeexclusivelyaboutfinancialflows.Totakeoneexample,developedanddevelopingcountriesmightcollaborateinpromotingbiofuelsthroughacombinationoftrade
agreements,sharingintellectualproperty,collaboratingon
researchanddevelopmentandothersuchmeasures,as
wellasstraightforwardfinancialsupportwhereappropriate.
One“free”encouragementforSD-PAMsisrecognition.
Thoughthismightseemtrivial,theacknowledgement
oftheeffortsbeingmadeindevelopingcountrieswilldo
muchtodebunkthemyththatindustrializedcountriesare
shoulderingtheburdenofmitigationalone.
C ON C LU SION
113
HowmightSD-PAMsbeestablished?
Chapter2discusseswaysinwhichSD-PAMsmight
bepledgedoragreed.Animportantquestioniswhether
SD-PAMswillbenegotiated,withaneffortbyPartiesto
ensurethattheyareeachtakingamutuallyacceptablelevel
ofeffort;orsimplypledged,witheachPartypresentingits
ownSD-PAMproposalsasitseesfit.Inpracticethedistinctionbetweentheseapproachesmaynotbesoclear-cut.
First,thepossibilityofsectoralagreements,particularlyin
industriesexposedtosignificantinternationaltrade,means
thatsometypesofSD-PAMsmayrequiremorenegotiationthanothers.Second,somegroupsofcountrieswith
similarnationalcircumstancesmightchoosetonegotiate
similarSD-PAMstomoreefficientlymeettheirgoals—for
instance,establishingarenewableenergymarket,ordevelopinganddeployingnewtechnology.Third,anSD-PAM
mayentailamutualcommitment,forinstanceengaging
adonortoprovideassistancetoadevelopingcountry,on
conditionthatcertainpolicyconditionsaremet.
TheeclecticnatureofSD-PAMs,andthefactthatthey
areshapedbythesustainabledevelopmentprioritiesofthe
hostcountry,meansthattheyaredifficulttocompare,and
noattemptismadeheretodescribeastandardofcomparison.AnimportantdistinctionbetweenSD-PAMsand
mostotherformsofclimatecommitmentisthatthecountryundertakestoimplementcertainpoliciesandmeasures,
nottomeetaspecifictargetorresult.Thecommitmentis
notexpressedintermsofemissionreductions.
Unlikeemissionstargets,whichatleastinprinciple
canbesetsoastoentaila“comparableeffort”between
countries(or,justasimportant,tocreatethatimpression),comparingeffortinthecaseofSD-PAMsishighly
subjective.Therecanbenosimpleformula,andthe
SD-PAMsapproachwilllikelyentailsomelevelofmutual
scrutinyandnegotiationamongParties.However,variousforaexistforreviewingandevaluatingtheefficacyof
suchpolicies.Analogsexistintherealmoftradenegotiations,inthecontextregionalorganizations(suchasthe
OECD),andwithintheWorldBank.Additionalopportunitiesexisttoexpanddiscussionswithintheinternationalclimatechangeframework.
WhileanagreementonanSD-PAMsframeworkis
likelytobechallenging,itmaybesubstantiallymore
plausiblethanalternativenegotiationsinvolvingemissions
orintensitytargets,whichareproblematicfordevelopingcountriesandwhichpresenttrickyframingproblems.
RatherthanfomentperennialNorth-Southacrimony,
SD-PAMshavethepotentialtoopenupnewspaceforinternationalcooperationonclimatechangeandsustainable
development,includingcooperativefundingarrangements,
harmonizedactionsatthesectorlevel,anduniquecountryspecificapproachesthatarereflectiveofdifferentnational
circumstances.
Thewayforward
ThisreportseekstofurtherdeveloptheSD-PAMs
concept,butitisbynomeansdefinitive.Severalissues
needfurtherinvestigationincluding:
■ TheapplicationofSD-PAMsinsectorsotherthan
powerandtransport.Agriculture,watermanagement,
forestryandbuildingefficiencyareallareascentralto
developmentprioritiesthatalsoofferlargepotentials
foremissionreductions.
■ ElaborationonthelinkbetweenSD-PAMsandenergy
security.Itisnoteworthythatenergysecurityhas
emergedasanimportantissueineverycaseevaluated
inthisvolume,andoffersobviousscopeforinternationalcooperation.
■ FurtherexaminationoffinancingofSD-PAMs,and
howmutualcommitmentsmightworkinpractice.
■ InteractionbetweenSD-PAMsandotherinstruments,particularlytheprojectmechanismssuchas
theCDM.
Theworldisinsoreneedofsomewaytojointlyengage
developedanddevelopingcountriesmoreconstructivelyto
tacklethetwin(andintertwined)challengesofpromoting
humandevelopmentandpreventingdangerousclimate
change.TheevolvingconceptofSD-PAMsmayjustprovidethatopportunity.
REFERENCES
Harmon,James,CrescenciaMaurer,JonSohn,andThomas
Carbonell.2005.DivergingPaths:WhatFutureforExportCredit
Carbonell.2005.
AgenciesinDevelopmentFinance?Washington,DC.World
ResourcesInstitute.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2004.
IEA(InternationalEnergyAgency).2004.WorldEnergy
Outlook.Paris.
Schelling,Thomas.2002.
Schelling,Thomas.2002.“WhatMakesGreenhouseSense?”
ForeignAffairs,May/June2002.Washington,DC.
UNFCCC.2004.
UNFCCC.2004.ReportoftheGlobalEnvironmentFacilityto
theConferenceoftheParties.NotebytheSecretariat.Document
FCCC/CP/2004/6.Availableat:http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
cop10/06.pdf.
WorldBank.2005.
WorldBank.2005.GlobalDevelopmentFinance2005:Analysis
andSummaryTables.Washington,DC.
114
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
GlossaryandAbbreviations
Note:Alltonsaremetrictons.Unlessotherwisenoted,alldollarsareU.S.dollars.
AnnexICountries
DevelopedCountries
TheindustrializedandtransitioncountrieslistedinthisAnnex
totheClimateConvention.ThesecountriesincludeAustralia,
Austria,Belarus,Belgium,Bulgaria,Canada,Croatia,Czech
Republic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,
Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Italy,Japan,Latvia,Lithuania,
Luxembourg,Netherlands,NewZealand,Norway,Poland,
Portugal,Romania,Russia,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,
Switzerland,Turkey,Ukraine,UnitedKingdom,UnitedStates
ofAmerica.
SeeAnnexICountries.Wherenoted,theterm“developing
countries”insteaddenotesthecollectivememberstatesofthe
OECD.
Bagasse
Therefuseofsugarcane;thecrushedouterstalkmaterialthat
remainsafterthejuiceisextracted.
Biofuel
Arenewableenergysourcethatincludesanyfuelderivedfrom
recentlylivingorganismsortheirbyproducts.
CCS
CarbonCaptureandStorage.Thecapture,separationand
compressionofcarbondioxidefromfuelcombustion,industrial
processesornaturalgas,anditspermanentremovalfromthe
atmospherebyinjectionintoageologicalformation.
CDM
CleanDevelopmentMechanism.Aproject-basedemissions
tradingsystemundertheKyotoProtocolthatallowsindustrializedcountriestouseemissionreductioncreditsfromprojectsin
developingcountriesthatbothreducegreenhousegasemissions
andpromotesustainabledevelopment.
ClimateChangeConvention.
SeeUNFCCC.
CO2
Carbondioxide.Anaturallyoccurringgasthatisalsoabyproduct
ofburningfossilfuelsandbiomass,otherindustrialprocesses,
andland-usechanges.CO2istheprincipalanthropogenicgreenhousegasaffectingtheEarth’stemperature.
CO2equivalent
TheamountofCO2byweightemittedintotheatmospherethat
wouldproducethesameestimatedradiativeforcingasagiven
weightofanotherGHG.Carbondioxideequivalentsarecomputedbymultiplyingtheweightofthegasbeingmeasured(for
example,methane)byitsestimatedglobalwarmingpotential
(seeGWP).Oneunitofcarbonisequivalentto3.664unitsof
carbondioxide.
DevelopingCountries
ThosecountriesnotdesignatedinAnnexIoftheConvention.
SeeAnnexI.Thisgroup,asusedinthisreport,includessome
countriesthatmaybeconsideredindustrializedortransitional.
EIA
EnergyInformationAdministration.Anindependentstatistical
agencyoftheU.S.DepartmentofEnergy.See:http://www.eia.
doe.gov.
EnergyUse(Consumption)
Energyusereferstoapparentconsumption,whichisequalto
indigenousproductionplusimportsandstockchanges,minus
exportsandfuelssuppliedtoshipsandaircraftengagedin
internationaltransport.Energyusemayalsobereferredtoas
energysupply.
EnergyProduction
Productionofprimaryenergy;thatis,petroleum(crudeoil,
naturalgasliquids,andoilfromnonconventionalsources),
naturalgas,solidfuels(coal,lignite,andotherderivedfuels),and
combustiblerenewablesandwasteaswellasprimaryelectricity
production(nuclear,hydro,renewables).Productionisusually
convertedintounitsofoilequivalents.
EPA
U.S.EnvironmentalProtectionAgency.See:http://www.epa.gov.
Ethanol
Aclean-burning,high-octanefuelthatisproducedfromrenewablesourcessuchascorn,sugarcane,wheat,barley,orpotatoes
andcanbemixedwithunleadedgasolineformotorfuel.Ethanol
isgrainalcohol,producedbythefermentationanddistillationof
thefeedstock.
EU
EuropeanUnion.Includeseither15memberstates(EU-15)or
25memberstates(EU-25).Foralistingofmembercountries,see
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=notes&chapt=4.
FAO
FoodandAgriculturalOrganizationoftheUnitedNations.
See:http://www.fao.org.
Coal
Includesprimarycoalproducts(forexample,hardcoaland
lignite)andderivedfuelssuchaspatentfuel,cokeovencoke,
gascoke,BKB,cokeovengas,andblastfurnacegas.Peatisalso
includedinthiscategory.
GLOSSA RY A N D A B B R EVIATION S
115
FossilFuels
Non-AnnexICountries
Naturalresources,suchascoal,oilandnaturalgas,containing
hydrocarbons.Theburningoftheseresourcesfeedsindustrial
developmentandfuelsmotorvehiclesbutalsocontributestothe
emissionofcarbondioxideintotheatmosphere.
ThosecountriesthatarenotlistedinAnnexIoftheClimate
ChangeConvention(seeAnnexIParties).Thisgroupconsists
primarilyofdevelopingcountries.Foralistingofmembers,see:
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=notes&chapt=4.
GDP
NaturalGas
GrossDomesticProduct.Thetotalvalueofgoodsandservices
producedbylaborandpropertylocatedinagivencountry.
Agaseousmixtureofhydrocarboncompounds,consisting
mainlyofmethane.
GHG
OECD
GreenhouseGas.Anygasthatabsorbsandre-emitsinfrared
radiationintotheatmosphere.Themaingreenhousegases
includewatervapor(H2O),carbondioxide(CO2),methane
(CH4),andnitrousoxide(N2O).
OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.An
internationalorganizationconsistingofthemajorindustrialized
countries.Memberstatesinclude:Australia,Austria,Belgium,
Canada,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Finland,France,Germany,
Greece,Hungary,Iceland,Ireland,Italy,Japan,SouthKorea,
Luxembourg,Mexico,theNetherlands,NewZealand,Norway,
Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,
Turkey,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.See:
http://www.oecd.org.
IEA
InternationalEnergyAgency.See:http://www.iea.org.
IndustrializedCountries
ThosecountriesdesignatedinAnnexIIoftheConvention;
namely,membersoftheOECD,butexcludingMexicoand
SouthKorea.SeeOECD.
IPCC
IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange.Anorganization
establishedin1988bytheWorldMeteorologicalOrganization
andtheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme.Itconducts
rigoroussurveysoftheworldwidetechnicalandscientificliteratureandpublishesassessmentreportswidelyrecognizedasthe
mostcredibleexistingsourcesonclimatechange.
KyotoProtocol
AninternationalagreementadoptedbyPartiestotheClimate
ConventioninKyoto,Japan,inDecember1997.TheProtocol
enteredintoforcein2005.See:http://unfccc.int.
MtCO2
Millionmetrictonsofcarbondioxideequivalent.Thismeasure
canaggregatedifferentGHGsintoasinglemeasure,usingglobal
warmingpotentials(seeGWP).Oneunitofcarbonisequivalent
to3.664unitsofcarbondioxide.MtCdenotesonemilliontons
ofcarbon,or3.664MtCO2.
OPEC
OrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountries.Aninternationalorganizationmadeupofoil-producingcountriesthataimto
influenceworldoilprices.Memberstatesinclude:Algeria,Indonesia,Iran,Iraq,Kuwait,Libya,Nigeria,Qatar,SaudiArabia,the
UnitedArabEmirates,andVenezuela.See:http://www.opec.org.
Oil
Amixtureofhydrocarbonsusuallyexistingintheliquidstatein
naturalundergroundpoolsorreservoirs.
PPP.PurchasingPowerParity.Aninternationaldollar“currency”
forGDPthathasthesamepurchasingpoweroverlocalGDPas
aU.S.dollarhasintheUnitedStates.
Reserves(orprovedreserves)
Estimatedquantitiesofenergysourcesthatanalysisofgeologic
andengineeringdatademonstrateswithreasonablecertaintyare
recoverableunderexistingeconomicandoperatingconditions.
Thelocation,quantity,andgradeoftheenergysourceareusually
consideredtobewellestablishedinsuchreserves.
SD-PAMs
SustainableDevelopmentPoliciesandMeasures.Anapproach
toclimateprotectionthatbuildsonsustainabledevelopment
priorities.
UNFCCC
UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange
(ClimateConvention,orConvention).Atreatysignedatthe
1992EarthSummitinRiodeJaneirotowhichnearlyall
countriesoftheworldhavejoined.See:http://unfccc.int.
WRI
WorldResourcesInstitute.See:http://www.wri.org.
116
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
AbouttheAuthors
KevinA.BaumertisaSeniorAssociateinWRI’sClimate,EnergyandPollution(CEP)program.Hisresearch
focusesontheKyotoProtocolandclimatechangepolicyinstruments.Mr.Baumert’sareasofexpertiseincludeinternationalemissionstrading,theCleanDevelopmentMechanism,internationalinvestmentlaw,publicparticipation,
climatepolicyinCentralandEasternEurope,andgreenhousegasemissionsdata.HewasleadeditorofBuildingon
theKyotoProtocol:OptionsforProtectingtheClimate,publishedin2002.PriortojoiningWRIin1998,hereceiveda
B.A.inEconomicsfromtheUniversityofNotreDameandaMastersdegreefromColumbiaUniversity’sSchoolof
InternationalandPublicAffairs.
RobBradleyisaSeniorAssociateinWRI’sClimate,EnergyandPollution(CEP)program.Hisresearchfocuses
onclimatepolicyinstrumentsandtherelationshipbetweenclimatechangeanddevelopment.Mr.Bradley’sareasof
expertiseincludeinternationalemissiontrading,cleanenergytechnologies,andEuropeanclimateandenergypolicy.
Mr.BradleyhasbeenaregularparticipantintheU.N.ConferencesofthePartiestotheUNFCCCsince1998,and
hasbeenactiveinEUclimateandenergyformulation,asamemberoftheEuropeanCommission’sEuropeanClimate
ChangeProgrammeWorkingGroupsandasanadvocate.Hehasspokenpubliclyandpublishedarticlesandreports
onsubjectssuchasemissionstrading,renewableenergyfinance,climatechangeandhealth,andEast-WestEuropean
energycollaboration.PriortojoiningWRIin2004heworkedasaconsultantonenergyandenvironmentpolicyissues.
HehasaBScinPhysicalSciencesfromUniversityCollegeLondonandaMastersdegreeinEnvironmentalSciences
fromtheUniversityofEastAnglia.
NavrozK.DubashisIDFCChairProfessorofGovernanceandPublicPolicyattheNationalInstituteofPublic
FinanceandPolicy(NewDelhi).Hisworkfocusesonthedevelopmentofinstitutionsandthedesignofgovernance
mechanismswithparticularrelevancetoelectricityandwaterinfrastructure.PriortojoiningNIPFP,heworkedasa
SeniorAssociateattheWorldResourcesInstitute(WRI)inWashingtonDC,co-directingWRI’sInternationalFinancialFlowsandtheEnvironment(IFFE)project.Hisareasofpublicationandexpertiseincludethepoliticaleconomy
ofelectricityrestructuring,internationalfinancialinstitutionsanddevelopmentassistance,theimplicationsofaglobal
investmentagreementfordomesticpolicyindevelopingcountries,climatechangepolicy,mechanismsfordemocratic
globalgovernance,andlocalinstitutionsforgroundwatermanagement.Dr.DubashholdsPh.D.andM.A.degreesin
EnergyandResourcesfromtheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,andanA.B.inPublicandInternationalAffairsfrom
PrincetonUniversity.
JoséRobertoMoreiraisaretiredprofessorofphysicsandenergyfromtheUniversityofSãoPaulo.Presentlyhe
isChairmanofNationalReferenceCenteronBiomassinBrazil,aconsultantoftheSecretariatofEnvironmentforthe
governmentoftheStateofSãoPaulo,andamemberoftheScientificCommitteeoftheIndustrialTransationgroup,one
oftheactivitiesoftheInternationalHumanDevelopmentProgram.HeisalsoaleadauthoroftheIPCCAssessment
ReportandSpecialReports.
StanfordMwakasondaisaSeniorResearcherattheEnergyResearchCentreoftheUniversityofCapeTown
inSouthAfrica.HeholdsaMastersinBusinessAdministration(MBA)andB.Sc.Engineering.Hisresearchinterests
includeenergy,climatechangeandsustainabledevelopment.
Wei-ShiuenNgistheResearchAnalystforEMBARQ,theWorldResourcesInstitute(WRI)CenterforTransport
andtheEnvironmentandisengagedinthemanagementofEMBARQ’sAsiaandChinaprojects,includingtheShanghai
SustainableTransportProject(SSTP)andthePartnershipforSustainableUrbanTransportinAsia(PSUTA).Sheconductstransportandenergyresearch,dataandpolicyanalyses,andfocusesontheenvironmentalandsocialconsequences
ofmotorizationandmitigationmeasures.Wei-ShiuenholdsaMastersinEnvironmentalSciencefromYaleUniversity
SchoolofForestryandEnvironmentalStudies.ShereceivedherBachelorofScienceinEnvironmentalEconomicsand
EnvironmentalManagementfromtheUniversityofYorkintheUnitedKingdom.
A B OU T TH E A U TH OR S
117
LuizAugustoHortaNogueira,isaprofessoratItajubáFederalUniversityinBrazil.Heisamechanical
engineer,withMScandPhDdegreesfromCampinasStateUniversity,Brazil.Hehasbeenworkingwithbioenergyfor
thelasttwodecades,withFAO/UnitedNations,PNUD/UnitedNationsandotherprivate,nationalandmultilateral
institutions,doingtechnicalandeconomicalstudiesforethanolandbioelectricity.
VirginiaParenteisanassistantprofessorattheEnergyProgramoftheUniversityofSaoPauloinBrazil.Shehas
aPhDinFinanceandEconomicsfromtheFudaçãoGetúlioVargas,Brazil.Herresearchinterestsincluderegulation
appliedtoenergyandtheenvironment,infrastructureanddevelopment,andscenarioanalysis.
JonathanPershingisDirectoroftheClimate,EnergyandPollutionProgram(CEP)attheWorldResources
Institute.Heisactiveinworkondomesticandinternationalclimateandenergypolicy,includingemissionstrading,
energytechnologyandtheevolvingarchitectureofinternationalclimateagreements.PriortohismovetoWRI,he
servedforfiveyearsastheHeadoftheEnergyandEnvironmentDivisionattheInternationalEnergyAgencyinParis.
From1990to1998,Dr.PershingservedintheUSDepartmentofState,wherehewasbothDeputyDirectorand
ScienceAdvisorfortheOfficeofGlobalChange,andaUSnegotiatorfortheUNclimatechangeconventionand
itsKyotoProtocol.Dr.Pershingistheauthorofseveralbooksandnumerousarticlesonclimatechange,energy,and
environmentalpolicy,andhasservedasaReviewEditorandleadauthorfortheIPCC.Heholdsadoctoratein
geologyandgeophysicsfromtheUniversityofMinnesota.
LeeSchipperisChiefofResearchofEMBARQ,WRI’sCenterforTransportandEnvironment.Dr.Schipper
obtainedhisBAinMusicfromBerkeleyandearnedhisPhDinastrophysicsbuthasdevotedhiscareertoearthly
problemsofenergyandenvironmentasanenergyeconomist.HecametoEMBARQatitsfoundinginApril2002.
HiscurrentprojectsatEMBARQincludetestingofcleanfuelsinMexicoandthedevelopmentofindicatorsof
sustainabletransportationinanumberofAsiancities.Dr.Schipperhasauthoredover100technicalpapersanda
numberofbooksonenergyeconomics,use,andconservationaroundtheworld.Hehasbeenaguestresearcherat
theOECDDevelopmentCentreinParis,transportadvisortotheShellFoundation,andstaffseniorscientistatthe
LawrenceBerkeleyLaboratory.HewasamemberoftheSwedishBoardforTransportationandCommunications
ResearchandiscurrentlypartoftheUSTransportationResearchBoard’sCommitteeonSustainableTransport.
Hetakespartinnumerousprestigiousinternationalpanelsandstudiesonenergyandtransportationandisonthe
editorialboardsoffivemajorjournalsinthefields.
HaraldWinklerisaSeniorResearcherattheEnergyResearchCentreattheUniversityofCapeTown.Hisresearch
interestsfocusonenergyandenvironment,inparticularclimatechangeandtheeconomicsofmitigation.Recentworkhas
addressedthefuturecommitmentstoclimateaction;energyscenariosforSouthAfricaandCapeTown;thelinksbetween
sustainabledevelopmentandclimatechange;policiesandmeasuresforrenewableenergyandenergyefficiency;CDM
projectbaselines;andvaluationofclimatechangeimpacts.HaraldhasservedasamemberoftheMethodologiesPanel
totheCDMExecutiveBoard,theSAdelegationtothenegotiationsundertheUNFrameworkConventiononClimate
Change,andisaleadauthorfortheIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange’sWorkingGroupIIIonmitigation.
118
GR OWIN G IN T H E GR E E N H OU S E : P R OT E CT IN G T H E CLIM ATE BY PU TTIN G D EVELOPM EN T FIR ST
AboutWRI
WorldResourcesInstituteisanenvironmentalresearchandpolicyorganizationthatcreatessolutionsto
protecttheEarthandimprovepeople’slives.
Ourworkisconcentratedonachievingprogresstowardfourkeygoals:
■
ProtectEarth’slivingsystems
■
Increaseaccesstoinformation
■
Createsustainableenterpriseandopportunity
■
Reverseglobalwarming
Ourstrengthisourabilitytocatalyzepermanentchangethroughpartnershipsthatimplementinnovative,
incentive-basedsolutionsthatarefoundeduponhard,objectivedata.Weknowthatharnessingthepowerof
marketswillensurereal,notcosmetic,change.
Weareanindependent,non-partisanorganization.Yet,weworkcloselywithgovernments,theprivate
sector,andcivilsocietygroupsaroundtheworld,becausethatguaranteesownershipofsolutionsandyieldsfar
greaterimpactthananyotherwayofoperating.
A B OU T WR I
119