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Published in final edited form as:
J Neurosci Psychol Econ. 2013 September 1; 6(3): 151–166.
Can Personality Type Explain Heterogeneity in Probability
Distortions?
C. Monica Capra,
Department of Economics and Center for Neuropolicy, Emory University
Bing Jiang,
Department of Economics and Business, Virginia Military Institute
Jan B. Engelmann, and
Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, Department of Economics, University of
Zurich, Switzerland
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Gregory S. Berns
Department of Economics and Center for Neuropolicy, Emory University
Abstract
There are two regularities we have learned from experimental studies of choice under risk. The
first is that the majority of people weigh objective probabilities non-linearly. The second
regularity, although less commonly acknowledged, is that there is a large amount of heterogeneity
in how people distort probabilities. Despite of this, little effort has been made to identify the
source of heterogeneity. In this paper, we explore the possibility that personality type is linked to
probability distortions. Using validated psychological questionnaires, we clustered participants
into distinct personality types: motivated, impulsive, and affective. We found that the motivated
viewed gambling more attractive, whereas the impulsive were the most capable of discriminating
non-extreme probabilities. Our results suggest that the observed heterogeneity in probability
distortions may be explained by personality profiles, which can be elicited though standard
psychological questionnaires.
Keywords
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choice under risk; personality; experiments; probability weighting function
There are two regularities that we have learned from experimental studies of choice under
risk. The first is that the majority of people weigh objective probabilities non-linearly,
challenging the view from traditional economics that expected utility is linear in probability.
In particular, several studies suggest that people overweigh small probabilities of a gain or
loss and underweigh medium and large probabilities, and the “typical” probability weighting
function has an inverse S-shape as depicted below (see Latimore, Baker & Witte 1992;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer & Ho, 1994; Abdellaoui, 2000; Starmer, 2000). The
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to C. Monica Capra, Department of Economics and Center for
Neuropolicy, Emory University, 1602 Fishburne Dr., Atlanta, GA 30322. mcapra@emory.edu.
Publisher's Disclaimer: The following manuscript is the final accepted manuscript. It has not been subjected to the final copyediting,
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Psychological Association and its Council of Editors disclaim any responsibility or liabilities for errors or omissions of this manuscript
version, any version derived from this manuscript by NIH, or other third parties. The published version is available at www.apa.org/
pubs/journals/npe
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second regularity, although less commonly acknowledged, is that there is a large amount of
heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities (Berns et al., 2007; Bleichrodt & Pinto,
2000; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2010; Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012; Gonzalez & Wu, 1999;
Wu & Gonzalez, 1999; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996). Indeed, although in most of the abovementioned studies the authors report close median estimates of the probability weights (as
shown in Figure 1), heterogeneity in the subject-specific estimates is seldom explained.
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Interestingly, these regularities (i.e., inverse-shaped median probability weighting functions
and large heterogeneity) seem to hold when choices are defined over gains or losses, and
when outcomes are monetary or nonmonetary. For example, allowing for heterogeneity in
preferences, Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) proposed non-parametric elicitation of individuals’
utility and probability weighting functions for hypothetical gains and losses. They found
significant evidence of inverse S-shaped probability weighting both at the aggregate and the
individual level. In Berns et al. (2007), we used electric shocks to induce real and negative
outcomes in choice under risk. We found median estimated probability distortion parameters
similar to the above-mentioned. In addition, we found that, 46% of the subjects distorted
probabilities in an inverse S-shape manner, as predicted by Prospect Theory or Rankdependent Utility Theory; 14% did not distort probabilities and could be classified as
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) subjects, whereas 16% could not be classified at all with
existing theories of choice under risk. Finally, using parametric and non-parametric
estimation of the probability weighting function, Gonzalez and Wu (1999) – henceforth
G&W – found that sub-certainty (the tendency of subjective probabilities to add to a number
less than 1) failed to hold in 40% of the subjects. The implication of G&W’s result is that
some people may overestimate a larger set of probabilities than it is customarily believed.
Although little effort has been made to identify the determinants of such heterogeneity,
existing research suggests there are two possible explanations. First, differences in estimated
values of probability weighting may be due to differences in participants’ ability and
experience in processing probability. For example, Piaget and Inhelder (1975) showed that
4-year old children had a step-like function. Young children seemed to understand when a
sure thing would happen and when something would not happen, but they treated all other
probabilities equally. This suggests that very young children have flat probability weighting
functions. More recently, in a large-scale experiment, Dohmen et al. (2011) found that lower
cognitive ability was associated with greater risk aversion.
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A second possible explanation comes from the emotional response to the task. Rottenstreigh
and Hsee’s (2001) experiments, for example, showed that the weighting function depended
on affective reactions, which were influenced by the description of the outcome. They found
that affect-rich prizes, such as a trip to the Caribbean, revealed weighting functions with
jumps at the ends of the probability scale and low marginal sensitivity over a wide range of
probabilities in the middle (i.e., child-like weighting functions). However, even in affectpoor environments, people distort probability in surprisingly different ways, as mentioned
above.
Given the important modulatory role of personality on behavior, motivation, emotion and
cognition, we investigate the impact of personality on risky choices. Specifically, we explore
the possibility that the personality “type” of the decision maker is linked to probability
distortions. We choose to study personality type rather than personality traits, because an
individual’s personality consists of many dimensions. An individual may possess a set of
contradictory traits (i.e., score high in extraversion, inhibition, and neuroticism), but is best
described by a dominant personality trait or type that he or she shares with other people.
Thus, here, we identify how groups of subjects, who differ in their personality types, differ
with respect to their probability and utility weights.
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There are several reasons for why we believe that personality influences probability weights.
First, personality mediates emotion. Individuals who rank high in neuroticism, for example,
tend to experience feelings such as anxiety, anger, and depressed mood. Previous studies on
the effect of affect on choice under risk suggest that induced positive affect decreased the
perceived frequency of negative outcomes (see Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Secondly,
personality reflects generally stable patterns in behavior, motivation, and cognition
(Borghans et al., 2009; Zillig, Hemenover & Dienstbier, 2002). Borghans, Golsteyn,
Heckman and Meijers (2009) conducted an experiment on a sample of 347 Dutch high
school students; they showed that the differences in cognitive and non-cognitive personality
traits, such as IQ, the Big Five (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness,
neuroticism), and self-control accounted for the differences in preference parameters.
Zuckerman (2007) also found that differences in sensation-seeking personality traits (i.e.
impulsivity, motivation, and extraversion) were strongly related to a broad range of risky
behaviors, such as extreme sports, substance use and abuse (i.e. smoking, drinking, drugs),
unprotected sex, violence, and criminal behavior. Finally, voxel-based morphometry (e.g.,
Blankstein, et al., 2009; DeYoung et al., 2010; Omura et al., 2005) and diffusion tensor
imaging (Cohen et al., 2008) studies have identified neuroanatomical correlates of individual
differences in personality traits. Furthermore, functional imaging studies have demonstrated
significant modulation of neural correlates of emotional reactivity (e.g., Mobbs et al., 2005;
Canli et al., 2002) and functional connectivity (Adelstein et al., 2011) by personality trait.
Together, results from Personality Neuroscience underline the modulatory role of
personality traits in brain-behavior relationships.
In order to explore the link between personality and probability distortions, we designed an
experiment that consisted of two parts. In the first, participants responded to several
psychological questionnaires1 that included the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised
Version (EPQ-R; Eysenck et al., 1985), the Behavioral inhibition and behavioral activation
systems scale BIS/BAS Scales (Carver & White,1994), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,
Version 11 (BIS-11; Patton et al., 1995), and the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ;
Higgins et al., 2001). Unlike the Big Five questionnaire, which is more widely recognized,
our chosen psychological questionnaires provide validated measures of sensation-seeking
personality traits that are shown to strongly correlate with risk preference (Zuckerman,
2007; Harlow & Brown, 1990). We used the personality scores obtained from these four
questionnaires to cluster people into heterogeneous personality types. We did this to identify
how groups of individuals that exhibited differing categorizations of dominant traits
distorted probabilities and outcomes.
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In the second part, participants made a series of binary choices between a fixed amount of
sure bet and a chance of winning a larger amount. To estimate probability weighting and the
curvature of the utility function for each participant, we assumed a power utility function,
and a two-parameter probability weighting function as in Lattimore, Baker and Witte
(1992), Tversky and Wakker (1995), and Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Unlike one-parameter
probability functions, the two-parameter weighting function allowed us to identify
heterogeneity in distortions that were due to discriminability (i.e., a measure of curvature
that captures the idea that people are more sensitive to changes in probabilities as they move
away from certainty), or due to attractiveness (i.e., a measure of elevation that captures how
appealing gambling is to the decision maker). To approximate an individual’s value of a
lottery or certainty equivalent (CE), we used a modified version of the parameter estimation
by sequential testing (PEST) procedure (Luce, 2000; Cho, Luce & von Winterfeld, 1994).
1In personality studies, it is customary to include a large set of questions to better capture the complete personality profile of the
participants; not all questions capture the same attribute (see Cicchetti, 1994 for a discussion of guidelines and criteria for assessment
instruments in Psychology).
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We found that heterogeneous types of personality traits are associated with different risk
characteristics. In particular, the motivated viewed gambling more attractive, while the
impulsive were most capable of discriminating non-extreme probabilities. The remainder of
the paper is organized as follows. We begin by describing the experiment. Then we analyze
the experimental data, and finally, we discuss the implications of our experiment.
Experimental Design and Procedures
We recruited a total of 48 healthy participants (32 females) for this study. All participants
were students or staff members at Emory University. The average age was 23.40 with a
standard deviation of 5.36 years. All participants gave written informed consent to
participate. The experiment took about 2 hours to complete, and included a one-hour brain
scan, parts of which are reported elsewhere (Engelmann et al., 2009, 2012). Earnings ranged
between $44.50 and $76 with an average of $60.51.
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The sequence of experimental procedures was as follows. First, subjects were asked to
respond to a pre-survey consisting of a set of psychological questionnaires including the
EPQ-R and BIS/BAS2. After completing all psychological surveys, participants were asked
to make a series of choices between a sure win and lotteries providing ex-ante probabilities
of winning a comparatively higher payoff denominated in experimental currency (Yen), or
not winning anything. For every decision, the higher payoff was always 1,000 Yen and the
probability of winning the 1,000 Yen prize varied across conditions (0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.37, 0.8,
0.9, and 0.99). The sure win amount was adjusted according to participant’s choices on
previous trials using an iterative staircase algorithm (PEST) that is outlined in detail inthe
next section. Figure 2 depicts an example of the lottery choices in two different trials.
A typical trial consisted of a decision-making period, followed by a feedback period that
provided confirmatory information about which option was selected by the participant, but
not about how much the subject made in that trial. In order to control for wealth effects, one
of the trials was selected randomly to count towards payment at the end of the session. The
decision made on the selected trial determined payment as follows: if the sure win was
chosen on the selected trial, the respective amount was paid to the subject; if the lottery was
chosen, a “computerized coin” was tossed, giving subjects a chance to win 1,000 laboratory
Yen at the probability indicated in the lottery. Finally, an exchange rate of 1,000 laboratory
Yen = 16 USD was established at the beginning of the experiment. At the beginning of the
experiment subjects were fully informed of the payment plan and the exchange rate.
Certainty Equivalents and Structural Estimation
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We were interested in identifying each individual’s certainty equivalents (CE) for the
lotteries. To do this, we used a modified version of the Parameter Estimation by Sequential
Testing (PEST) introduced by Cho, Luce and von Winterfeld (1994), which is a procedure
that relies on a staircase algorithm to identify the CE of a lottery. With PEST, the CE of a
lottery is found by sequentially adjusting the value of the sure win according to decisions
made by the subject. In our version of PEST, the algorithm started with a random offer that
depended on the probability condition. When the probability of winning the prize was
between 0.1 and 0.37 (i.e. low probability conditions), the sure win was between 0 and 500
Yen. In contrast, offers started between 500 and 1,000 Yen in the high probability conditions
(i.e., 0.8–0.99). In order to create choice switches between sure wins and lotteries, amounts
for sure wins were adjusted as follows: whenever the subject chose the sure win, the amount
offered on the next trial was decreased by step-size, ε. Whenever the subject chose the
2We provide a more detailed explanation of the personality surveys in the “Psychological Questionnaires” section.
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lottery, the amount of the sure win offered on the next trial was increased by ε. The
magnitude of ε was determined by the following 4 rules adapted from Luce (2000) and Cho,
Luce and von Winterfeld (1994): (1) the initial step-size was set to 1/5 of the difference
between the maximum and minimum possible payoffs (ε = 200 Yen); (2) at each choice
switch ε was halved; (3) ε was doubled after three successive choices of the same item; (4)
values were bounded at the maximum (1,000 Yen) and the minimum payoffs (0 Yen). This
was done within each probability condition, which we presented in random order. The
staircase algorithm terminated when the threshold step-size for a given probability condition
was reached. This threshold was set to 25 Yen for all conditions, except for 0.01, 0.37 and
0.99, for which the threshold was set to 12.5 Yen.
The PEST procedure allowed us to generate CEs relatively fast for many pairs of different
lotteries3. This is important because we are interested in estimating individual-level
probability weighting and utility function parameters. For this, many observations of
decisions for each subject were needed. In addition, the PEST procedure is a choice task, not
a valuation task, and previous literature has suggested that choice mode may be less
“biased” than valuation mode (see Cox & Grether, 1996). Thus, for our purposes, the PEST
procedure is preferred over alternative value elicitation mechanisms, such as auction
mechanisms and the Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure.
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After collecting all the data from subjects’ binary decisions (lottery or sure win), we
estimated each participant’s probability weighting and utility functions using Gonzalez and
Wu (1999)’s probability weighting form and power utility function. In each trial, the subject
had a choice between a sure win (sw) and a lottery that paid a fixed amount π with
probability p. The probability of choosing the lottery (Pl) was estimated using a logistic
regression specification:
where Φ represented the difference in utility between the lottery and the sure win in each
trial; that is,
The parameter σ captures the curvature of the utility function, and the subjective probability
of winning the lottery was given by:
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where parameters γ and δ control the curvature (discriminability) and the elevation
(attractiveness) of the probability weighting function, respectively.
Figure 3 shows shapes of the probability weighting for a few of our subjects. On the top
panel, subject S8 and subject S13 share very similar estimated δ (elevation), but different
estimated γ (discriminability). Subject S13 discriminates intermediate probabilities more
3The staircase algorithm terminated as soon as a threshold was reached - so there was no set number of trials; the longer the algorithm
would take, the more trials there were. Most subjects participated in more than 50 trials.
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than S8, whose w(p) at the extremes is very steep. On the bottom panel, subjects S35 and
S37 share similar γ parameters, but differ in their estimated δ, resulting in S35’s w(p) that
lies above the 45° line and S37’s w(p) that lies below the 45° line. In our study, we
estimated the three risk parameters jointly for each individual using Matlab.
Psychological Questionnaires
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According to psychologists, personality reflects the characteristic patterns of thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors that make a person unique. It originates within the individual and
remains fairly consistent throughout life (Borghans et al., 2009). To psychologists,
personality is an area of study that deals with complex human behavior, including emotions,
actions, and cognitive (thought) processes. As early as in the 90s, researchers like Harlow
and Brown (1990) studied the role of certain biological and personality traits in the
formation of economic preferences. To test the statistical relations between various
measures, they separated male and female subjects into subgroups within each gender group,
based on measures of subjects’ neurochemical activities, and their scores on sensationseeking scale and introversion scale. They found that individuals with a high level of
“sensation-seeking” personality traits (i.e. extraversion and impulsivity) exhibited a
willingness to accept economic risk. Recent studies have shown that sensation-seeking
personality traits are linked to risk taking behaviors, such as extreme sports, substance use
and abuse (i.e. smoking, drinking, drugs), unprotected sex, violence, and criminal behavior
(see Zuckerman, 2007 for a review).
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To measure sensation-seeking personality traits, we used well-established psychological
questionnaires/scales including the EPQ-R, the BAS/BIS, the BIS-11, and the RFQ. The
EPQ-R contains 100 Yes/No questions assessing biologically-based categories of
temperament including Extraversion/Introversion, Neuroticism/Stability, Psychoticism/
Socialisation, and Lie. Extraversion is characterized by being outgoing, talkative, high on
positive affect (feeling good), and in need of external stimulation. Neuroticism is
characterized by having high levels of negative affect such as anger, depression, and
anxiety. Psychoticism is associated not only with the liability to have a psychotic episode (or
break with reality), but also with aggression. Last but not the least, Lie scale measures the
tendency of lying when lying makes one socially better off. The second questionnaire (BAS/
BIS) contains behavioral questions. According to Gray (1981, 1982) two general
motivational systems underlie behavior and affect: a behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and
a behavioral activation system (BAS). A behavioral activation system (BAS) is believed to
regulate appetitive motives, in which the goal is to move toward something desired. A
behavioral inhibition system (BIS) is said to regulate aversive motives, in which the goal is
to move away from something unpleasant. The BIS/BAS scales assess individual differences
in the sensitivity of these systems. The Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Version 11 (BIS-11;
Patton et al., 1995) is a 30 item self-report questionnaire designed to assess general
impulsiveness, which includes attentional impulsiveness, motor impulsiveness, self-control,
and planning impulsiveness. Finally, the RFQ is an 11 item self-report questionnaire
designed to assess individuals' subjective histories of success or failure in promoting and
preventing self-regulation. According to focus theory (Higgins, 1998), all goal-directed
behavior is regulated by two distinct motivational systems. These two systems, termed
promotion and prevention, each serve as a distinct survival function. The promotion system
is concerned with obtaining nurturance (e.g. nourishing food) and underlies higher-level
concerns with accomplishment and advancement. The promotion system's hedonic concerns
relate to the pleasurable presence of positive outcomes and the painful absence of positive
outcomes. In contrast, the prevention system is concerned with obtaining security and
underlies higher-level concerns with safety and fulfillment of responsibilities. The
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prevention system's hedonic concerns relate to the pleasurable absence of negative outcomes
and the painful presence of negative outcomes.
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Results
Table 1 displays a summary statistics of parameter estimates among the 48 subjects. The
median estimates suggest an inverse-S probability weighting function similar to those
reported in previous literature.
At the individual level, we observed a large variability in individual’s estimated probability
weighting parameters (see Chart A in the Appendix). To determine how personality profiles
differed with respect to their probability and outcome distortions, we used clustering
analysis4 to identify participants based on their responses to the four psychological
questionnaires5. We used hierarchical clustering analysis (Complete Linkage method6) to
classify 47 subjects7 into different clusters; we identified four distinct personality types.
Personality Type 1 (henceforth PersType1) had a total of 9 subjects who, on average, were
older and mostly women. PersType2 was comprised of 21 subjects, and had a higher
proportion of males than the other groups. PersType3 had 16 subjects and the female/male
ratio mirrored our participant population. Finally, PersType4 had 1 subject only. We
excluded PersType4 from the rest of the analysis.
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What kind of personality profiles do these clustered types have? To answer this question and
label the types, we performed factor analysis (i.e. varimax rotation) and identified four
factors with eigenvalues greater than one, which accounted for 68.3% of the variance. Table
2 shows the loadings and the uniqueness scores for each personality attribute. As the table
suggests, Factor 1 is mainly defined by impulsivity traits (NP-BIS11; Mot-BIS-11; CogBIS-11; Psychoticism; BAS-funskg). Factor 2 is mainly defined by affective traits
(Extraversion; Neuroticism; BIS). In contrast, Factor 3 is influenced by motivational traits
(Reg-promote; BAS-drive; BAS-rewards). Finally, Factor 4 is defined by loss avoidance/
prevention traits (Lie-all; Reg-prevent).
For each clustered type, we identified which factors had positive average scores. For
PersType1, the average score of Factor 3 (motivation) was positive, the rest were negative.
For PersType2, the average score for Factor 1 (impulsiveness) was positive, the rest were
negative. For PerstType3, only Factor 1’s average score was negative, the rest positive.
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We tested whether the factor scores among these three personality types were statistically
different. PersType2 differed from the other two personality-types (PersTypes1 and 3) with
respect to the Factor 1 (Median test p=0.012 and p<0.001, respectively), with PersType2
being relatively more impulsive. With respect to Factor 2, PersType3 was different from the
two other personality types (Median test p=0.001 and p<0.001) with PersType3 being
relatively more emotionally reactive, or more affective. In addition to these personality
differences, we noticed that PersType1 were older and had relatively more females (see
4The criterion for classifying subjects into clustered personality types is the measure of traits similarity or distances (dissimilarity
measures) between individual subjects. At each stage, it computes the distances between all the existing clusters to determine which
clusters are the closest to each other. The closest clusters are combined to form a new, large cluster and the algorithm stops clustering
whenever membership in clusters stabilizes. As a result, items within a cluster are similar, and/or the distance between them is small;
and items in different clusters are dissimilar, and/or the distance between them is large.
5Although correlating personality to risk parameters without clustering the data may seem reasonable, this method hides the fact that
the effect of a specific trait (e.g. extraversion) on preferences is conditional on the general personality profile of the individual. For
example, more extraversion in an inhibited person has a contradictory effect compared to more extraversion in an impulsive one.
6We also tried out other clustering algorithms that apply different criteria to measure distances such as Single, Median, Centroid
Linkage, and obtained the same results.
7One female subject didn’t complete all the personality questionnaires, so this observation was excluded.
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Table C in the Appendix for a summary of demographic variables by clustered type). The
above results suggest that we could label three types in the following manner: PersType1 (9
subjects) were relatively more “Motivated”. PersType2 (21 subjects) were more
“Impulsive”. Finally PersType3, which had 16 subjects, were more “Affective” (see Table B
and C for further details).
Behavioral differences among Types
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Table 3 presents summary statistics of the estimated risk parameters gamma, delta, and
sigma by personality type (additional data are found in the appendix). We compared and
contrasted the three different personality types with respect to the estimated probability
weighting and utility functions parameters. Acknowledging the fact that we had three groups
of multivariate data, we performed group comparison tests using non-parametric
MANOVA8. We found noticeable overall differences among the three characteristic types
(test statistics based on distances to centroids, F=3.092, p=0.056). In particular, PersType1
(Motivated) differed significantly from PersType3 (Affective) with regard to the three
estimated risk parameters (test statistics based on distances to centroids, t=2.521,
permutation p-value=0.054). With respect to comparisons between types, we found
differences in attractiveness (i.e., a measure of elevation that captures how appealing
gambling is to the decision maker) and discriminability (i.e., a measure of curvature of the
probability weighting function that captures the idea that people are more sensitive to
changes in probabilities as they move away from certainty). PersType1 (Motivated) subjects
had different estimated delta values, as compared to PersType2 (Impulsive) and PersType3
(Affective) (MWT, Z= 1.924, p=0.054; and Z=1.981, p=0.048, respectively). This suggests
that the motivated viewed gambling significantly more attractive, PersType2 and PersType3
or the Impulsive vs. the Affective (but not impulsive) differed with respect to their estimated
gamma values (MWT, Z=2.115, p=0.034) suggesting that the impulsive were the most
capable of discriminating non-extreme probabilities. Finally with respect to sigma,
PerstType1 (Motivated) and PersType2 (Impulsive) differed significantly (MWT, Z=−1.969,
p=0.049).
It’s also interesting to study the gender effect on individual’s risk preferences. Aggregating
across all types (47 subjects), only with respect to the curvature of the utility function
(sigma) did we observe significant differences between men and women (MWT, Z= 2.613,
p= 0.009). This result is consistent with other works that have identified gender differences
in risk attitudes (see Borghans et al., 2009). However, we did not observe statistically
significant differences between men and women with respect to discriminability and
elevation.
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Discussion
Several studies of choice under risk that report individual parameter estimates show that
there is a high level of heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities. Despite of this,
little effort has been made to identify the source of this heterogeneity. In this paper, we put
forward the idea that personality type is a determinant of choice under risk, and that
different personality types exhibit different risk preferences. Using four widely utilized
psychological tests, we were able to classify participants into three distinct personality types.
We then compared these types with respect to their estimated risk parameters. PersType 1,
or “motivated” individuals, who were controlled and emotionally stable, tended to be more
8Non-parametric MANOVA (Multivariate Analysis of Variance) is to test significant difference between two or more groups of
multivariate data, based on any distance measure of choice (Anderson, 2001). In our analysis, we used Euclidean distances and
performed 9999 permutations. Manly (1997) pointed out that for tests at an α-level of 0.05, at least 999 permutations should be used;
for tests at an α-level of 0.01, at least 4999 permutations should be used.
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risk averse as measured by the curvature of the utility function, but they were also more
optimistic, as measured by the elevation of the probability weighting function. These results
fit well with predictions from regulatory focus theory (RFT, Higgins, 1998) that people with
a promotion focus have a heightened sensitivity for positive outcomes. It could be argued
that motivated individuals by focusing on rewarding outcomes, they place a greater weight
on payoff magnitude relative to payoff probability leading to more optimistic risk attitudes.
PersType 2 or “impulsive” individuals were reward and fun seeking, and they tended to be
less risk averse. Finally, PersType 3 or “affective” individuals were inhibited and neurotic,
and they were shown to discriminate probabilities less around the middle and have curvier
probability weighting functions around the reference points. Our results, thus, suggest that
heterogeneity in probability weighting and more generally, in choice under risk may be
explained by personality profiles, which can be elicited though standard psychological
questionnaires. We also found that females were more risk averse than males, confirming
previous findings.
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Recent literature has shown that personality affects risk preferences (see Borghans et al.,
2009). In addition, psychologists believe personality is a stable trait, but that personality also
often interacts with the environment to produce a certain outcome (Weber et al., 2002). This
can explain why risk preferences are stable when elicited through a single choice mode
(Harrison & Rutström, 2000; Andersen, Harrison, Lau & Rutström, 2008), yet, may differ
when elicited through valuation mechanisms (e.g., auction vs. lottery choice – see Eckel &
Grossman, 2002; Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 2005; Issac & James, 2000). Issac and James
(2000), for example, showed that the estimated numerical values of individuals’ implied risk
parameters were not stable within individuals across the BDM and first-price auction
institutions. Furthermore, the rankings across subjects of the numerical values of risk were
not preserved. In a more recent paper, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (2005) replicated these
findings with an improved paradigm. They concluded by saying that “…there simply might
not be such things as preferences (“they” ain’t nothing til we call em”). However, our study
highlights the important role of personality type in explaining choices under risk, and it is
the first step towards formulating the hypothesis that the observed instability of preferences
may be due to an interaction between personality and the choice environment. Indeed, this
could be an interesting path for future research.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank participants at workshops and conferences where this work was presented. We
acknowledge support from NIDA (R01 DA016434 and R01 DA025045 to Gregory S. Berns and T32 DA15040 to
Jan B. Engelmann). Jan B. Engelmann is grateful for support from the NCCR Affective Sciences and the Mercator
Foundation Switzerland. All errors are ours.
NIH-PA Author Manuscript
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Appendix
Chart A
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Estimates of individual risk parameters and demographics
Subject
Probability weighting
Utility
Gender
Age
Payment (USD)
γ
δ
σ
1
0.0853
1.2584
0.5319
F
25
63
2
0.3957
0.683
0.4908
F
25
65
3
0.4799
0.8599
0.4711
M
24
60
4
2.486
1
0.2042
F
22
63
5
0.5213
0.8688
0.5087
M
22
53.5
6
0.6797
0.549
0.4384
F
19
45
7
0.4468
0.7275
0.4583
F
22
54
8
0.3837
1.0797
1.1982
M
23
72.5
9
0.7624
0.5704
0.4435
M
20
60
10
0.8733
0.4662
0.5514
F
25
75
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11
0.5
0.423
0.3203
M
20
70
12
0.9256
2.1918
2.1249
F
20
76
13
0.6497
1.0735
0.6437
M
22
72
14
2.5545
2.3059
0.5174
F
21
50
15
0.3752
0.8255
0.3904
F
21
45
16
0.4731
0.8646
0.3818
F
28
60.5
17
1.4804
1.7078
0.5141
F
21
63
18
1.5707
0.25
0.7073
F
22
65
19
2.0405
1
0.195
F
45
60.5
20
0.8703
1.8744
1.4863
M
18
44.5
21
3.9056
1
0.1971
F
21
62
22
0.7369
0.5405
0.4068
M
19
52
23
0.8854
1.5476
1.3497
M
20
49.5
24
0.2967
0.8436
0.4243
F
26
61
25
0.1007
1.4416
0.6182
F
19
60
26
0.322
0.4858
0.4132
F
28
69
27
0.5042
0.5529
0.4023
F
25
60
28
0.7625
0.5956
0.5099
F
20
47.4
29
0.3792
0.9213
0.4735
F
20
52.75
30
0.9842
1.5192
1.5306
M
28
60.48
31
1.9884
0.4115
1.3041
F
34
61
32
0.2693
0.7404
0.4328
F
21
76
33
0.9271
0.5443
0.5085
M
21
76
34
0.7157
0.5902
0.5337
F
21
60
35
0.9388
1.2865
1.2663
M
28
60
36
0.3772
0.5444
0.4234
F
25
51.84
37
1.0113
0.4968
0.4426
M
18
47
38
0.4277
1.0278
0.4483
F
21
60
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Subject
Probability weighting
Utility
Gender
Age
Payment (USD)
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γ
δ
σ
39
0.8149
0.4496
0.4087
F
18
60
40
0.9161
0.4595
0.5182
M
23
61
41
0.19
2.4983
0.2835
F
21
60
42
0.8443
0.7622
0.5592
M
20
62.25
43
1.0656
0.5107
0.5369
M
18
60
44
0.8914
1.0918
0.837
F
23
68
45
0.5135
0.6051
0.4884
M
28
76
46
0.4722
0.574
0.2462
F
36
59.93
47
1.63
2.8992
0.4218
F
36
66
48
1.1985
5
0.269
F
20
48
Table B
Description of Variables (47 Subjects)
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Category
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Personality Traits
Variable
Name
Description /
Range of Values
Mean
(Std)
Median
Mode
95% C. I.
NP-BIS-11
Non-planning
impulsiveness (a
lack of “futuring”
or planning).
Values range from
13 to 29
21.09 (3.79)
21.00
21.00
(19.97, 22.20)
Cog-BIS-11
Cognitive
impulsiveness (i.e.
making quick
cognitive
decisions). Values
range from 11 to
26
17.17 (3.46)
18.00
18.00
(16.15, 18.19)
Mot-BIS-11
Motor
impulsiveness (i.e.
acting without
thinking). Values
range from 13 to
32
21.13 (3.78)
21.00
20.00
23.00
(20.02, 22.24)
Reg-promote
Promotion focused
self-regulation to
approach matches
to desired endstates. Values
range from 16 to
30
23.38 (3.22)
23.00
21.00
23.00
24.00
(22.44, 24.33)
Reg-prevent
Prevention focused
self-regulation to
approach matches
to desired endstates. Values
range from 6 to 25
18.09 (4.18)
17.00
17.00
(16.86, 19.31)
Psychoticism
Liability to have a
psychotic episode
(or break with
reality), and
aggression. Values
range from 1 to 12
6.04 (2.65)
6.00
6.00
(5.27, 6.82)
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Category
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Four Factors
Variable
Name
Description /
Range of Values
Mean
(Std)
Median
Mode
95% C. I.
Extraversion
Being outgoing,
talkative, high on
positive affect
(feeling good), and
in need of external
stimulation. Values
range from 5 to 21
14.51 (4.88)
16.00
19.00
(13.08, 15.94)
Neuroticism
Emotionality,
characterized by
high levels of
negative affect
such as depression
and anxiety.
Values range from
0 to 23
9.89 (5.51)
10.00
4.00 5.00
(8.27, 11.51)
Lie-all
Tendency of lying
when lying makes
one socially better
off. Values range
from 2 to 14
8.15 (3.01)
8.00
7.00
(7.26, 9.03)
BAS-drive
Behavioral
activation
sensitivity to
driving motives.
Values range from
6 to 16
10.94 (2.50)
11.00
11.00
(10. 20, 11.67)
BAS-funskg
Behavioral
activation
sensitivity to funseeking motives.
Values range from
5 to 16
11.30 (2.62)
11.00
14.00
(10. 53, 12.
07)
BAS-reward
Behavioral
activation
sensitivity towards
rewards. Values
range from 13 to
20
17.53 (1.85)
18.00
18.00
(16. 99, 18.08)
BIS
Behavioral
inhibition
sensitivity to
unpleasantness.
Values range from
13 to 28
19.96 (3.68)
20.00
20.00
(18. 88, 21.04)
Factor1
Impulsivity traits,
defined by Nonplanning
Impulsiveness,
Cognitive
Impulsiveness,
Motor
Impulsiveness,
Psychoticism and
BAS Fun-seeking.
Values range from
−1.71 to 3.08.
3.80E-09 (1.00)
−0.24
___
(−0.29, 0.29)
Factor2
Affective traits,
defined by
Extraversion,
Neuroticism and
BIS. Values range
from −2.01 to 1.96.
4.29E-08 (1.00)
0.14
___
(−0.29, 0.29)
Factor3
Motivational traits,
defined by
Regulatory-
−2.85E-08 (1.00)
−0.11
___
(−0.29, 0.29)
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Category
Description /
Range of Values
promotion, BASdrive and BASreward. Values
range from −2.33
to 2.36.
Mean
(Std)
Median
Mode
95% C. I.
Factor4
Loss avoidance/
prevention traits,
defined by
Regulatoryprevention and
Lie-all. Values
range from −2.37
to 1.83
1.80E-08 (1.00)
−0.06
___
(−0.29, 0.29)
Male/Female
Sex of the student
subjects. Dummy:
0 Male, 1 Female
0.64 (0.49)
1.00
1.00
(0.50, 0.78)
Age
Age of the student
subjects. Age
ranges from 18 to
45.
23.47 (5.40)
22.00
21.00
(21.88, 25.05)
Payment
Subject’s earnings
from the
experiment.
Maximum is 76,
minimum is 44.5
60.18 (8.46)
60.00
60.00
(57.70, 62.67)
Estimated
Gamma-WG
The curvature of
the probability
weighting function.
It measures how
one discriminates
probabilities.
Maximum is 3.91,
minimum is 0.085
0.89 (0.82)
0.74
___
(0.67, 1.10)
Parameters
Delta-WG
The elevation of
the probability
weighting function.
It measures how
attractive one
views gambling.
Maximum is 5,
minimum is 0.25
1.03 (0.33)
0.83
1.00
(0.79, 1.27)
Sigma-CU
The curvature of
the CRRA utility
function.
Maximum is 1.53,
minimum is 0.20
0.57 (0.33)
0.47
___
(0.41, 0.74)
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Variable
Name
Demographics
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Table C (i)
Summary Statistics by Personality Type (47 subjects)
Factor1
Type
Mean
(Std)
Median
Maximum
Minimum
[95% Conf. Interval]
1
−0.93 (0.47)
2
0.56 (0.74)
−1.00
−0.30
−1.59
(−1.29, −0.57)
.59
1.60
−1.18
(0.22, 0.89)
3
4
−0.40 (0.68)
−.49
0.79
−1.71
(−.76, −0.04)
3.08 (0.00)
3.08
___
___
___
Total
3.80E-09 (1.00)
−0. 24
3.08
−1.71
(−0.29, 0.29)
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Page 16
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Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
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Gamma_WG
Delta_WG
Type
Mean
(Std)
Median
Maximum
Minimum
[95% Conf. Interval]
1
−1.06 (0.69)
2
−0.30 (0.71)
−1.35
0.21
−1.98
(−1.59, −0.53)
−.31
0.81
−2.01
(−0.62, 0.03)
3
4
0.91 (0.58)
.91
1.96
−0.03
(0.60, 1.21)
1.35 (0.00)
1.35
___
___
___
Total
4.29E-08 (1.00)
0.14
1.96
−2.01
(−0.29, 0.29)
1
0.22 (0.83)
.19
1.55
−1.13
(−0.42, 0.87)
2
−0.48 (0.79)
−.45
0.55
−2.33
(−0.83, −0.12)
3
0.42 (1.11)
.31
2.36
−1.50
(−0.17, 1.01)
4
1.27 (0.00)
1.27
___
___
___
Total
−2.85E-08 (1.00)
−0.11
2.36
−2.33
(−0.29, 0.29)
1
−0.07 (0.45)
−.15
0.60
−0.69
(−0.42, 0.28)
2
−0.14 (1.06)
−.22
1.64
−2. 21
(−0.62, 0.34)
3
0.26 (1.16)
.368
1.83
−2.37
(−0.36, 0.88)
4
−0.59 (0.00)
−.59
___
___
___
Total
1.80E-08 (1.00)
−0.06
1.83
−2.37
(−0.29, 0.29)
1
0.91 (0.69)
.48
2.04
0.09
(0.39, 1.44)
2
1.06 (0.87)
.87
3.91
0.30
(0.67, 1.46)
3
0.67 (0.51)
.50
1.99
0.10
(0.40, 0.94)
4
0.5 (0.00)
.50
___
___
___
Total
0.89 (0.82)
0.74
3.91
0.09
(0.67, 1.10)
1
1.67 (1.43)
1.03
5.00
0.57
(0.57, 2.77)
2
0.90 (0.50)
.73
2.31
0.46
(0.67, 1.13)
3
0.87 (0.56)
.78
2.50
0. 25
(0.57, 1.17)
4
0.42 (0.00)
.42
___
___
___
Total
1.03 (0.33)
0.83
5.00
0.25
(0.79, 1.27)
Table C (ii)
NIH-PA Author Manuscript
Sigma_CU
Gender
Type
Mean
(Std)
Median
Maximum
Minimum
[95% Conf. Interval]
1
0.40 (0.13)
.45
0.53
0. 20
(0.30, 0.50)
2
0.65 (0.39)
.52
1.53
0. 20
(0.47, 0.82)
3
0.58 (0.31)
.44
1.35
0. 28
(0.41, 0.74)
4
0.32 (0.00)
.32
___
___
___
Total
0.57 (0.33)
0.47
1.53
0. 20
(0.47, 0.67)
1
0.89 (0.33)
1.00
1.00
0.00
(0.63, 1.15)
2
0.52 (0.51)
1.00
1.00
0.00
(0.29, 0.76)
3
0.69 (0.48)
1.00
1.00
0.00
(0.43, 0.94)
4
0 (0.00)
0.00
0.00
___
___
Total
0.64 (0.49)
1.00
1.00
0.00
(0.50, 0.78)
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Page 17
Table C (ii)
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Age
Payment
Type
Mean
(Std)
Median
Maximum
Minimum
[95% Conf. Interval]
1
28.11 (8.75)
25.00
45.00
20.00
(21.38, 34.84)
2
22.43 (3.19)
22.00
28.00
18.00
(20.98, 23.88)
3
22.44 (4.30)
21.00
34.00
18.00
(20.14, 24.73)
4
20 (0.00)
20.00
20.00
___
___
Total
23.47 (5. 40)
22.00
45.00
18.00
(21.88, 25.05)
1
60.60 (5.24)
60.50
66.00
48.00
(56.57, 64.63)
2
60.48 (9.48)
60.48
76.00
44.50
(56.17, 64.80)
3
58.94 (8.78)
60.00
76.00
45.00
(54.27, 63.62)
4
70 (0.00)
70.00
60.00
___
___
Total
60.18 (8.46)
60.00
76.00
44.50
(57.70, 62.67)
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Figure 1. Typical one-parameter probability weighting functions
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Subjective probability weights [w(p)] representing how individuals perceive objective
probabilities throughout the [0, 1] interval. Under the Expected Utility Theory (EUT), there
is no probability distortion, as presented by the 45-degree straight line. However, several
studies suggest that people overweigh small probabilities of a gain, and underweigh medium
and large probabilities; the “typical” probability weighting function has an inverse S-shape
(i.e. Latimore, Baker & Witte 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Camerer & Ho, 1994;
Abdellaoui, 2000; Starmer, 2000). In addition, many studies also report that there is a large
amount of heterogeneity in how people distort probabilities (Berns et al., 2007; Bleichrodt &
Pinto, 2000; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2010; Fehr-Duda & Epper, 2012; Gonzalez &
Wu, 1999; Wu & Gonzalez, 1996).
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Figure 2. Examples of Lottery Choices
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In each trial, participants were asked to make a choice between a sure win and a lottery
providing ex-ante probabilities of winning a comparatively higher payoff denominated in
experimental currency (Yen), or not winning anything. For every decision, the higher payoff
was always 1,000 Yen and the probability of winning the 1,000 Yen prize varied across
conditions (0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.37, 0.8, 0.9, and 0.99). The sure win amount was adjusted
according to participant’s choices on previous trials using an iterative staircase algorithm
(PEST). The decision made on the selected trial determined payment as follows: if the sure
win was chosen on the selected trial, the respective amount was paid to the subject; if the
lottery was chosen, a “computerized coin” was tossed, giving subjects a chance to win 1,000
laboratory Yen at the probability indicated in the lottery.
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Figure 3. Examples of subjects with different curvature (top) and elevation (bottom)
Shapes of the probability weighting for a few of our subjects.
On the top panel, subject S8 and subject S13 share very similar estimated δ
(elevation=1.07~1.08), but different estimated γ (discriminability=0.38, and 0.65,
respectively).
On the bottom panel, subjects S35 and S37 share similar γ parameters
(discriminability=0.93~1.02), but different estimated δ (elevation=1.29, and 0.50,
respectively).
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Table 1
Population Estimates
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Statistics
Probability weighting
Utility
Discriminability (γ)
Attractiveness (δ)
Curvature (σ)
Mean
0.888
1.052
0.601
SE
0.104
0.120
0.057
Median
0.750
0.835
0.481
Note. Table 1 displays a summary statistics of parameter estimates among the 48 subjects. The median estimates suggest an inverse-S probability
weighting function similar to those reported in previous literature.
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Table 2
Variable
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Factor1
Impulsivity
Factor2
Emotional
Reactivity
Factor3
Approach
Motivation
Factor4
Loss Avoidance
/Prevention
Uniqueness
NP-BIS-11
0.7377
0.1058
−0.3183
−0.0734
0.3379
Cog-BIS-11
0.5483
0.4701
−0.0864
0.0798
0.4646
Mot-BIS-11
0.8017
−0.0941
0.0300
−0.1255
0.3317
Reg-promote
−0.3350
−0.2232
0.6944
0.2662
0.2848
Reg-prevent
−0.4416
0.0191
−0.1432
0.7109
0.2788
Psychoticism
0.6744
−0.1415
0.1212
−0.2413
0.4522
Extraversion
0.3885
−0.5098
0.4913
0.1610
0.3219
Neuroticism
0.0451
0.9149
0.0099
−0.0761
0.1550
Lie-all
0.0067
−0.1266
0.1321
0.8585
0.2294
BAS-drive
0.2735
−0.0178
0.6239
0.0186
0.5353
BAS-funskg
0.5972
−0.2760
0.4609
−0.1293
0.3380
BAS-rewards
−0.0253
0.2050
0.8292
−0.0882
0.2619
BIS
−0.0982
0.9248
0.0202
−0.0266
0.1340
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Factor Loadings and Uniqueness Scores
Note. NP-BIS-11, Cog-BIS-11 and Mot-BIS-11 are indicators of impulsiveness, obtained from the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Version 11. Reg-promote and Reg-prevent assess individuals’ levels of selfregulation, given by the RFQ questionnaire. Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism and Lie-all belong to categories of the EPQ-R questionnaire, measuring different aspects of temperament. BAS-drive,
BAS-funskg, BAS-rewards and BIS are components of the BAS/BIS scales that assess two motivational systems underlie behavior and affect. For a more detailed description of trait variables, see Table B
in the Appendix.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics of Estimated Mean and Median Risk Parameters by PersType
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PersType
Dominant
Personality
Traits
Discriminability γ
Mean (std)
Median
Attractiveness δ
Mean (std)
Median
Curvature σ
Mean (std)
Median
1
Motivated
.912 (.685) .480
1.668 (1.435) 1.028
.399 (.127) .448
2
Impulsive
1.062 (.867) .870
.900 (.495) .728
.646 (.387) .517
3
Affective
.668 (.510) .497
.874 (.563) .783
.577 (.312) .443
All
---
.896 (.732) .750
1.041 (.824) .835
.574 (.332) .481
Note. Table 3 presents summary statistics of the estimated risk parameters gamma, delta, and sigma by personality type (additional data are in the
appendix).
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