Renaissance Averroism (review forthcoming in BJHP) Anna Akasoy & Guido Giglioni (eds.): Renaissance Averroism and Its Aftermath: Arabic Philosophy in Early Modern Europe. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013, pp. 405. Averroism, Guido Giglioni tells us in the introduction to this volume, is something distinct from the philosophy of Ibn Rushd. It is a set of philosophical views associated with ‘Averroes’, defined as Ibn Rushd’s ‘literary incarnation in translations and philosophical treatises of the Latin West’ (1). The doctrines most commonly associated with Averroism are the unity of the intellect for all humankind, the eternity of the world, and the theory of ‘double truth’ (10). As a philosophical position it first rears its head not long after Ibn Rushd’s works were translated into Latin in the thirteenth century, and a number of medieval philosophers have been labelled Averroists, Siger of Brabant probably being the best known (10). However others have denied that these thinkers were Averroists, merely secular Aristotelians instead, and indeed have gone on to challenge the very category of Averroism altogether (e.g. P. O. Kristeller; see 11). Even so, although medieval cases may be contentious, in the Renaissance Averroism was a firmly established philosophical position, embraced by some (for lists of names see 11, 12) but perhaps more often set up as a position to be attacked (by e.g. Ficino; see 5). Perhaps less well known is the extent to which Averroism continued as a philosophical point of reference well into the eighteenth century, transformed into a brand of free-thinking libertinism (2, 7). The story of Averroism, Giglioni says, is one of ‘creative appropriations and reuses’ (3), ‘a tale of many creative misunderstandings’ (5). 2 This volume offers a series of chapters examining Renaissance Averroism, early modern Averroism, and more recent historiographical treatments of the subject. It is based on a conference held at The Warburg Institute in 2008. The standard is high, the discussions are rich, and the volume as a whole offers an impressive overview of this important theme that cuts across the usual boundaries between medieval, Renaissance, and early modern philosophy. It will not be possible here to discuss all sixteen chapters in the detail they deserve so what follows is merely a sample of its contents. One question we might ask is why it is that Averroism flourished in the Renaissance in particular. One answer would be because Averroes was seen as a philosopher who knew well the ancient Greek commentators on Aristotle, especially Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius, and so offered a window back onto antiquity (Martin, 69-70). Thus Averroes was important as a secondhand source of knowledge. Ironically, for some others Averroes was himself known merely second hand. Ficino’s polemics against Averroism were based, in part if not in whole, on the image of Averroism he found in the works of Aquinas (5). His polemics involved striking rhetorical imagery alongside more formal arguments: the doctrine of the single intellect for all humankind was, for instance, described as ‘a monstrous octopus with a giant head and countless tentacles’ (17). Others were more sympathetic to Averroism, notably Agostino Nifo, who is the only figure who has two chapters devoted to him (Holland, Spruit). While many others, before and after, have been concerned about the ethical implications of Averroism, Nifo offered an account of human beatitude based on Averroistic psychology (Spruit). While the presence of Averroism in Renaissance debates is well established, its role in early modern philosophical discussions is perhaps less well known. Sarah Hutton brings out the role that it played for the Cambridge 3 Platonists, including Cudworth, Smith, Culverwell, and especially Henry More (204-10). Carlos Fraenkel tackles both Elijah Delmedigo, ‘the foremost Jewish Averroist of the Renaissance’ (213) and Spinoza, arguing that there is a ‘distinctively Averroistic side to the way Spinoza conceives of the relationship between philosophy and religion’ (214), and that this was most likely transmitted via Delmedigo. In particular he argues that Delmedigo’s own version of Averroist claims about the relationship between philosophy and religion shapes Spinoza’s own comments on the topic in his early works prior to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. During this period Averroism also featured in the then developing historiography of philosophy, and this is examined by Gregorio Piaia. Averroism continued to figure as a point of reference in the eighteenth century and in particular in the German Enlightenment. Johann Gottfried Herder attacked Kant’s transcendental idealism as just another version of Averroism (Sgarbi, 256, 266). A number of points of contact have been identified by commentators, the most notable being oneness of mind in the agent intellect and the transcendental subject (256-8). Marco Sgarbi concludes his fascinating review of such claims by saying that while Kant was certainly no Averroist, his philosophy was open to Averroistic interpretations (269). Sidelined at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Averroism found a new spokesman later that century in the form of Ernst Renan, whose important book Averroès et l’averroïsme of 1852 is discussed by John Marenbon. Renan’s book was important for offering an account of Averroism as a philosophical tradition, running through Jewish philosophy and medieval and Renaissance philosophy. Marenbon argues that Renan’s account and his methodology are subtler than is usually supposed (274). James Montgomery’s critical discussion of Straussianism does not explicitly address Averroism but has much to say about that approach 4 to Arabic philosophy that is relevant to the concerns of the volume as a whole. The volume concludes with Anna Akasoy’s discussion of the label ‘Averroist’ from Aquinas onwards, asking the question whether Ibn Rushd himself was an Averroist. This involves a second discussion of Straussian and anti-Straussian approaches, which she tries to map onto analytic and continental approaches to the history of philosophy respectively. These final chapters might be said to wander off topic a little, but they are far from irrelevant and add a welcome methodological dimension to the collection. As a volume of conference proceedings it would be unfair to expect a complete, joined-up history of Averroism from the Renaissance to the present. Even so the chapters taken together do offer surprisingly full coverage, making the whole more than merely the sum of its parts. John Sellars King’s College London