Syme on Nerva’s Accession: A Reconsideration “… senatorial enthusiasm, backed by literary genius, has so glossed and embellished the dawn of the new era of 'libertas restituta' that a modern historian can be betrayed into saying that Nerva passed away 'after enjoying a placid rule of sixteen months.' There would be better warrant for speaking of a period of anarchy such that before long even a senator could rebuke Nerva and hint that there were, after all, worse things than the despotism of Domitian, an anarchy that continued in extravagance and disorder and was already on the edge of disaster when that weak old man, helpless and beleaguered in his palace, was driven to associate in his discredited authority the commander of the army that lay nearest to Rome. Nerva was certainly a 'frugalissimus senex,' but the government of which he was the head, if it can be called a head, was costly and ruinous and all but responsible for a great civil war.” Ronald Syme, 1930 Trying to develop a valid qualitative assessment of the reign of Nerva, together with a reasonable assessments of his reasons for adopting Trajan, is not an easy task. This is not simply because the source material is scarce and scattered, but because examinations of this reign have had a strong tendency to polarise either towards complete praise of Nerva,1 or to violent hostility such as exhibited by Syme in the above quote.2 Partly, this must stem from the ambivalent attitude of some of the sources, particularly the epitomised rendition of Dio’s account of the reign. There, having previously recorded some definite problems in Nerva’s actions in his reign – notably the chaos generated by the newly presented opportunity to accuse past informers – the account goes on to assess the quality of the reign very favourably by quoting a remark of Nerva. This was to the effect that he felt he could return safely to private life, i.e. without fear of reprisals.3 What I think has to be properly appreciated, is the difficulties facing Nerva at the time, and this must be taken into account along with the brevity of the reign. From the start of the conspiracy against Domitian, Nerva must have felt himself to be in a strange and dangerous position. The known conspirators seem to have consisted of Domitian's wife, the Praetorian Prefects and a few high ranking imperial freedmen.4 Why they chose Nerva as a successor is hard to say. Dio records that he was not the first man to be asked, and that there were a number of refusals because, he explains, they all feared that it must be a trap.5 Such an attitude is completely understandable, and it may be that Nerva was chosen simply because he accepted. The invitation probably came from one or both of the Prefects, because without the support of the guard, the commitment to such a venture was likely to be suicidal. The need for a successor was probably brought to mind by the memory of the aftermath of Gaius’ assassination, when, uncontrolled, the guard had produced and carried to the Salmon, E.T., A History of the Roman World: 30BC to AD138 (6th edit,). London, Methuen, 1968, pp. 268 – 273. 2 Syme, R., “The Imperial Finances under Domitian, Nerva and Trajan” J.R.S. Vol.20 (1930) pp. 61 – 62. Hereafter cited as Syme. 3 Dio LXVIII.1 – 3. 4 Dio Vol.8. pp. 351-353, 5 Dio Vol.8. pp. 353, 1 1 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 throne their own candidate, Claudius, against the wishes of the Senate. One result of this was the eventual execution of the assassins, at Claudius’ order.6 One clear motive for picking a successor then, must have been the hope of ensuring their own survival. But Nerva was old and childless and it is possible that even at this time he was not in the best of health, since he would only continue living for less than a year and a half.7 To many, including perhaps the conspirators, his presence on the throne must have been seen as a temporary measure, to be replaced, perhaps by force, when a better candidate could be found. Even if such ideas were not being seriously considered by many, and especially by the conspirators, it is probable that Nerva, himself, felt that such a possibility had to be considered and dealt with, if he was to survive. And further to his survival was the need to broaden the base of his authority and his popular support, since at the start, he was based solely on the support of the guard, as directed by the Prefects. Such support cannot have been too sure, since Domitian had remained popular with the troops and the Prefects were implicated in his murder. It is in this light that many of Nerva’s early actions must be interpreted. He seems to have concentrated his moves on winning support largely in the Senate, indulging for a time; at least in accusations, if not in so many carried convictions; the charges brought against informers.8 With this, as well, is to be taken the abolition of the charge of maiestas, the restoration of the exiles, the prevention of slaves and freedmen making charges against their masters, the return of property confiscated by Domitian, Nerva’s oath not to slay any senators,9 and the issuing of coins in the name of the Senate.10 This is not to say that he ignored the interests of the lower classes, or of the army. To the contrary, Dio mentions the ‘granting of land allotments to the poor to the value of 60,000 sesterces11 and coins of 96 record a congiarium to the people.12 Further, as Garzetti points out, though a donative to the troops is not recorded, it is not likely to have been ignored.13 Nerva seems to have been completely lacking in the experience of military command and had apparently had no previous contact with the armies of Rome. Consequently, I think it was Nerva’s hope to win over the support of the troops through the loyalty of their commanders. Such a policy may help to explain his action of replacing Norbanus with Casperius Alienus as one of the Praetorian Prefects. Such an action replaced a man to whom he was indebted, with one who, in theory, should have been indebted to him. It was a plan not fated to be successful.14 The concerns Syme expressed in his early assessment of Nerva’s reign15 had eased by the time he came to write his two volumes on Tacitus. But in his writing there is still a great Suetonius Life of Claudius 10 – 11. Dio LXVIII 1 – 2, 4. Syme, R., Tacitus.(London, Oxford University Press, 1958) p.2. Afterwards cited as Syme Tacitus. 8 Garzetti, A,, From Tiberius to the Antonines. (tr. J. R. Foster) London, Methuen, 1960 p. 300. 9 Dio LXVIII.1, 2. 10 Salmon, p.271. 11 Dio LXVIII. 2. 12 Garzetti, p.299. 13 Garzetti, p.299. 14 Dio LXVIII. 3. Garzetti, pp.304-305. That it was Norbanus who was replaced is implied by Eutropius recording that Petronius Secundus was killed while Praetorian Prefect, Eutropius 8.1. 15 Syme pp.61-62. 6 7 2 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 reluctance to acknowledge much of worth in Nerva's reign.16 Again, as Syme admits, the problem is one of lack of documentation, and the often poor quality of that which survives. However, what remains directs us to view Nerva as a man who, though he may have made mistakes, was still a stronger, more capable and concerned ruler than Syme has presented. Bolder too, for it was a bold move to replace one of his first and strongest supporters, with another man. He may have made many concessions to the Senate, but he conceded no real power. He maintained his ban against charges of maiestas even when the crime was directed at others than himself. Baumar in his book Impietas in Principem shows that the Lex Maiestas was used by Augustus to protect Inlustres as well as himself and that it was continued to be so used at least down to the time of Domitian.17 Furthermore, he argues that Pliny’s attack on Publicus Certus (without naming him) as cited in one of his letters,18 was an implied charge of maiestas against Certus for his part in the execution of Helvidius in 93.19 That Pliny did not name the accused is one of the four points cited by Bauman in evidence of his assertion, saying that Pliny could not do so because the charge of maiestas was no longer permitted.20 Furthermore, the letter implies that Pliny expected the matter to be decided by the Emperor in a relatio to the Senate. None was forthcoming though he did concede to deprive Certus of positions both expected and held.2121 Nerva's position was difficult and his management of it is to his credit. His ban on charges of maiestas had probably, as noted, been already published. So he had an escape clause to fall back on, if he wanted. As well, as Syme says, Nerva needed counsellors in the confidence of the last ruler.22 To give way to Pliny’s charge could have quickly left him stripped of those advisors. But the issue was an emotional one, charged with a cry for justice that demanded some recompense. In answer, Nerva chose silence, tacitly expressing his intention not to go against his own directive without actively supporting the object of their enmity. In this way, he showed tactfully that he did not wish such charges to be made, thus securing the position of other advisors. When the matter was allowed to drop, Nerva then granted a concession to the Senate, by removing Certus from office, leaving Pliny free to think that he had won his point.23 As well, Nerva instigated programs that his successor would see fit to continue, in particular the institution of the Aliment.24 With this, too, should be placed Frontinus' appointment to the care of the Aqueducts25 and possibly also, the introduction toItaly of State horse depots for the Imperial Messenger Service.26 With works such as these, I think it is clear Syme has strongly underrated the quality of Nerva’s reign. 16 Syme Tacitus pp.1-12, 628-630. Bauman, R.A., Impietas in Principem. Munich, C. H. Beck’shhe Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1974, pp. 32 – 35. 18 Pliny Letters IX. 13. 19 Pliny Letters Introduction p. 22. Bauman, pp. 169 – 171. 20 Bauman, pp. 169 – 171. The other points are the inclusion of women as Subscriptores, the proposal of a quasicensorial nota was essentially an alternative to maiestas, and that Nerva did not make a relatio. 21 Pliny Letters p. 242. 22 Syme Tacitus p. 6. 23 Pliny Letters p. 242. 24 Epitome de Caesaribus 12. 4. Salmon. p. 269. 25 Frontinus Aqueducts. 1. Garzetti, p. 331. 26 Rostovtzeff, H., The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire. (London, Oxford University Press, 1957) p. 372 (b) and plate, p. 704 n. 40. 17 3 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 Is he then right in his judgement of Nerva's role in the matter of the succession. Even in his later work, Syme felt justified in making the statement that “it cannot with safety be believed that Nerva was a free agent when he adopted the legate of Upper Germany”27 and suggesting that there was some sort of conspiracy behind the mutiny of the guard.28 Such an interpretation of the mutiny will always remain possible, but the sources provide no good evidence of a conspiracy. There is only one actual statement of some form of conspiring, and the source is a late one and would normally be regarded as suspect.29 Syme’s interpretation is a cynical one. An equally cynical one could argue for a very different sort of conspiracy. There was unrest in the guard because the killers of Domitian had gone unpunished. Nerva having removed from power, one of the conspirators, probably wished to quickly remove the other, and he saw here the opportunity to placate the guard as well. There is, after all, something very theatrical in Dio’s story of Nerva presenting his throat in a vain effort to stop the executions.30 If it was so planned by Nerva, it may have been a mistake, as it left behind an impression of weakness. Or, it may simply have been that Nerva's replacement of Norbanus inspired the Praetorians with the idea that the influence of the conspirators was waning. Casperius may have given way to their demands then, or stirred them up to revolt with some strange hope of increasing his influence by a demonstration of force. Two things argue against Syme’s interpretation. Firstly, if the conspiracy had been directed by and for persons other than Trajan, it is surprising that no evidence of this has come down to us in the surviving pro-Trajan propaganda as a further vindication of his accession. On the other hand, if Trajan had directed the incident, why did he put the leaders of the mutiny out of the way so quickly.31 It could be argued that he feared they would expose him, but such disposals are rarely effective in stopping the spread of correct rumors and the act would not inspire confidence in his other supporters and agents, especially in those who had to act in more confidential and discrete matters. Yet, if there was no actual conspiracy, why did Nerva chose Trajan for his heir. The best answer is another question; who else should he have picked? He was only a few months from death, and while he may not have known when to expect it, he must have guessed it was near. So he knew that he had to see to the succession, or risk plunging the empire into civil war. He had relatives living,32 but no son or even son-in-law known and the few possible relatives that Syme has discerned are distant and obscure. It is unlikely that Nerva would have considered them as serious candidates, or felt any need to give them preference over other possible candidates, unrelated to him. As Salmon notes, the accession of an adopted son in preference to a real son was the usual practice under the Julio-Claudians and the choice of heir depended more on his acceptability to the troops than on a close blood relationship.33 From the accession of Claudius onwards, it had slowly become more and more apparent that the apparent rigid criteria for winning the army to the heir, were not very rigid at all. Nerva’s own ability to reign must have shown him that he did not need to apply the strict criteria of the past. But he had one strong 27 Syme Tacitus p. 630. Syme Tacitus p. 13. 29 Epitome De Caesaribus 13. 6. 30 Dio LXVIII. 3. 31 Dio LXVIII. 5. 32 Dio LXVIII. 4. 33 Salmon p.272. 28 4 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 example from the past warning him to choose carefully, Galba’s choice of Piso and its consequences. Parallels have been drawn between a passage on Trajan's succession in Pliny Panegyricus and Galba's speech adopting Otho in Tacitus’ History.34 Whether one used the other or not, the parallels were there and it is quite possible that Nerva drew on Galba both as a model and a warning of mistakes to be avoided. That of itself could suggest a reason why Trajan was chosen, because looking .to the past would show the region he governed to have a history of insurrection in its legions, which had more than once tried to put a usurper on the throne.35 Against this is the fact that the Rhine region no longer had the strongest concentration of legions, having ceded that position to the Danube region.36 Also, Nerva, himself, had appointed Trajan to that command.37 Nerva would have been aware both of that province’s history and Trajan’s conspicuous loyalty under Domitian, when he chose Trajan for the task and the most likely reason that Trajan was sent there, was that he was regarded as the best man available to maintain order there. It may even have been that at this time, Nerva was already considering him as a possible heir. Passing aside family considerations, the other group to which Nerva was likely to turn for a candidate, was the Army Commanders. In an appendix to his Tacitus, Syme provides a list of the known Consular Legates from 92 – 106,38 but no name stands forth as an obvious alternative. Syme points to a possible rival in the Governor of Syria.39 But the man defies identification, and the whole incident derives from a vague account in one of Pliny’s letters referring to unconfirmed rumours from the east,40 circulating at a time probably soon after Nerva’s accession when such rumours were bound to be rife. The real significance of the passage is, as SherwinWhite sees it, that the passage shows the uncertainty felt about the prospects of Nerva at the time.41 Again, Radice, in her translation of Pliny’s Panegyricus, records rioting, mutiny and a breakdown of discipline in the army, but at the two points at which she does this the word translated as army is castrensem.42 I would suggest that a better translation would be “camp” and specifically, the camp of the praetorian guard. If so, it is their actions to which Pliny is referring. And even if Pliny was speaking in a wider sense, this is only in keeping with the exaggerated and flattering style of his speech. There is no good evidence supporting Syme’s assertions about the reign of Nerva or the accession of Trajan, and much to the contrary. Two factors may have directed Nerva to Trajan, Trajan’s broad experience in the army and the provinces,43 and the fact that like Nerva, Trajan Pliny Panegyricus (tr, B.Radice) 7 – 8, n. 3 p. 337. Tacitus History I. 15 – 16. Garzetti. pp. 660 – 661. For example, the Vitellian uprising in 69, and the revolt of Antonius Saturninus in 89. Garzetti. pp. 199 – 200, 271. 36 Garzetti. p. 281. 37 Syme Tacitus p. 648. 38 Syme Tacitus pp. 645 – 648. 39 Syme Tacitus pp.631-632. 40 Pliny Letters p.241 41 Sherwin-White, A.N., The Letters of Pliny. (London, Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 494. 42 Pliny Panegyricus 5. 43 Garzetti p. 311. 34 35 5 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 had been one of the last men to share a consulship with Domitian,44 a strong indication of Domitian’s favour and respect. I cannot help but feel that there is an elusive significance in the fact that the next two men to reign after Domitian had both been among the last three men to share the consulate with him, one following the other by only a year. Unfortunately, hard evidence to clarify the matter is lacking, and the question must be left open. This should not, however, be used as an excuse to permit anything more than acknowledged speculation and theorising in the absence of hard facts. Such a course has not been followed by Syme in this area. The lack of contradictory evidence, leaves the safest conclusion to stand as the most acceptable. This is the traditional view that Nerva acted as a relatively free agent who may have been guided by advisors, but was not necessarily forced into his choice. 44 Garzetti. Trajan was Consul in 91, p.311. Nerva was consul with Domitian in 90, p.274. The last man to be consul with Domitian was executed soon after, p 293 6 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bauman, R.A., Impietas in Principem. Munich, C. H. Beck’shhe Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1974. Garzetti, A., From Tiberius to the Antonines, (tr. J. R. Foster). London, Methuen, 1960. Rostovtzeff, M., The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (2nd.edit. in 2 volumes). London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Salmon, E.T., A History of the Roman World: 30BC to AD138 (6th edit,). London, Methuen, 1968. Sherwin-White, A.N., The Letters of Pliny, London, Oxford University Press, 1966. Syme, R., Tacitus (2 Volumes). London, Oxford University Press, 1958. Historicum Romanorum Reliquiae. Vol. 2 (edit. H. Peter). Lipsiae In Aedibus B.G. Teubneri 1906. Smallwood, E. M., Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian. London, Cambridge University Press, 1966. S. Aurelius Victor, Liber De Caesaribus; Uncertain Author, Epitome De Caesaribus (edit. R.Gruendel). Leipzig, BSB B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1970. Dio Roman History (tr, E. Cary). London, Heinemann, 1925 (Loeb Classical Library, Vol.8). Eutropius Brevarium ab Urbe Condita (edit. F. Ruehl). Lipsiae in Aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1909. Frontinus The Aqueducts of Rome. (tr. C. E. Bennott) London, Heinemann, 1925 (Loeb Classical Library). Philostratus Life of Apollonius of Tyana, (tr. F. C. Conybeare) London, Heinemann, 1912 (revised 1950) (Loeb Classical Library). Pliny The Letters of Pliny the Younger. (tr.B.Radice) Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1963. Pliny Panegyricus. (tr, B.Radice) London, Heinemann, 1969 (Loeb Classical Library, Letters and Panegyricus Vol. II). Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars. (tr. R. Graves) Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1957. Tacitus Complete Works. (tr. A. J. Church and W. J. Brocribb) New York, Random 'louse, 1942. Lives of the Later Caesars. (tr.A.Birley) Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976. 7 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023 Hammond, M., “The Transmission of the Powers of the Roman Emperor from the Death of Nero in A.D.68 to that of Alexander Severus in A.D.235”. Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Vo1, 24, (1956) pp.63 – 133, Syme, R., “The Imperial Finances under Domitian, Nerva and Trajan” J.R.S. Vol.20 (1930) pp. 55 – 70. 8 © Kathleen Toohey 5-11-2023