Is Venezuela Democratically Governed?

Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt Leuphana University Lüneburg Public Economics, Law and Politics WS 2013/14 Government & Politics Dr. Frieder Wolf Essay #1 Is Venezuela Democratically Governed? Venezuelan history has been continuously haunted by the idea of a strong and mighty leader. Ever since our origins as an independent nation, the lack of social cohesion within the country’s borders has been calling for a powerful, single commander to guide and decide upon the national fate. Throughout the last two centuries, caudillos and dictators came and went leaving a kind of helplessness over the population, who became accustomed of being governed by leaders who took advantage of their position and favored either their own class or their own family. The lack of an appropriate educational system to provide the birth of an intellectually challenging citizenry set the grounds for a tranquil and accepting population. Ever since 1830 mostly military leaders have governed Venezuela. During the first third of the 20th Century, dictator Juan Vicente Gómez brought an end to the regional caudillos problem and brutally repelled all opposition. The discovery of Venezuelan oil during this period, made his time in office a very prosper one for the rise and creation of infrastructure for the country. International powers supported and legitimized this regime without considering the consequences for the Venezuelan people in order to satisfy their need for the “black gold”. After Gomez’s death in 1935, his successor tried to establish a democratic rule, which couldn’t last longer than three years and Venezuela underwent a new military dictatorial regime that lasted another 10 years. 1958 was the year when democracy finally met with the Venezuelan people and Acción Democrática’s leader Rómulo Betancourt was elected president. From this time on, a two-party system (AD and COPEI) characterized Venezuelan politics. Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt The unfortunate distribution of the country’s oil wealth, the dishonesty of the democratically elected leaders, the lack of strong institutions, and the absence of political will to educate the population gave rise to enormous social discontent. A new military leader emerged and promised to change this situation. After a failed military coup in 1992 he appeared to join the democratic path (cf. Brooker, 2009, p.6) and ran for the 1998 presidential election. Somewhat into the 21st Century, Venezuela finds itself again in colonial times, helpless to the dangers of an empire trying to take control over its riches and only a strong chiefcharacter figure seems like the right option to avoid such an unfortunate fate. The people eagerly gave every power possible to the new commander and this soon gave formal birth to the Bolivarian Revolution. The first step towards the consolidation of the new Republic came through a Constituent Assembly – not provided for in the 1961 Constitution – and a popular referendum towards the end, agreeing to unlimited reelections for all executive officers. Is Venezuela under a democratic regime? Close to 15 years after the rise of the Bolivarian Revolution to power, the country seems to be facing an even more deteriorated system, with virtually no separation of powers; no constructive dialogue between the government, the opposition and the Venezuelan people (cf. Sartori “government by discussion”, 1987, p.xi); no freedom of press, according to the latest Freedom House Index Report, and a dubious – yet extraordinarily modern – electronic voting system. “A long time has […] gone by, and what is supposed to come ‘after the revolution’ remains – in its configuration – a well-kept secret” (Sartori, 1987, p.74). Democracy Defining democracy has proven to be a highly complicated task because more than a mere word, democracy is a concept: it “stands for something” (Sartori, 1987, p.7). Throughout the years many authors and political scientists have tried to come up with a comprehensive definition for democracy, but “there appear to be at least as many Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt conceptions of democracy, and hence as many sets and rankings of democratic values, as there have been theorists” (Katz, 1997, p.8). The Online Etymology Dictionary explains the origins of this word as coming “from the Greek demokratia (δηµοκρατία), which means “popular government”, from demos (δῆµος) “common people”, originally “district” + kratos (κράτος) “rule, strength”. This definition literally means “power of the people” and represents the ancient understanding of the word. An attempt to ignore the transformation of mankind and thus the perception of this concept in current times might end up reducing the underlying meaning of this word or, even worse, appointing a false definition to it, what could just “make democracy go wrong” (Sartori, 1987, p.3). The arbitrary nature of concept creation in the present and the subjectivity of each author in the definition of the terms around it have made way to “the age of confused democracy” as stated by Sartori. However complicated this assignment may be, a “useful” approach for this paper could be one that helps identify some implicit values of the term democracy (cf. Katz, 1997, p.5) for its comparison with the Venezuelan case. As Sartori wisely cites H. R. G. Greaves “There is certainly a stage at which it is pointless to ask further questions or demand more reasons, but in the process of reaching that stage we may expect to find common ground with others in making our appraisals, and this common ground is of great importance”. (Sartori, 1987, p. 257) Santiso’s UNESCO Discussion Paper (2002) analyses two concepts, which define democracy by identifying several of the main values and characteristics it should have. For the purposes of this paper, the analysis will be based on the definition provided by “Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Martin Seymour Lipset on the basis of Robert Dahl’s concept of poliarchy “democracy denotes . . . a system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular, free and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.” (Santiso, 2002, p. 11) It is my understanding that the first two elements – competition and participation – are connected to the electoral process and that the third – civil and political liberties – are an important factor towards the involvement of the citizenry in these processes and the outcome of the elections. Nevertheless, authors like “Bachrach (1967) or Ginsberg (1982) would not be persuaded that an election can, in itself, produce real democracy” (LeDuc, Niemi, Norris; 1996, p.344). Venezuelan Elections 2010-2013 According to Freedom House, “Over the past 12 years, Venezuela has seen a steady decline in democratic governance resulting in a more restrictive environment for activists and the press”. In order to be able to understand this statement, an analysis of three of the most recent electoral processes in the country might shed some light on the aforementioned decline as well as on the deterioration of the quality of the democracy in Venezuela. Parliamentary Elections 9/26/2010 Preceding this election, the National Assembly set forth a law in 2009 that modified the way votes would be translated in parliamentary seats. Venezuela has a mixed system for the election of the National Assembly deputies, as stated by Tarre (2011), in which nominal elections (of specific candidates) are combined with proportional representation through list voting. The author accuses the government of manipulating the electoral reform in a way that it no longer provides for the linkage of the results of Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt nominal elections with those of list voting thus, eliminating the safeguard of proportional representation and augmenting the number of nominal deputies relative to list deputies. The author states also that this enables the Electoral Council to “aggressively gerrymander” the constituencies in favor of the “Sole Socialist Party of Venezuela” (PSUV for its initials in Spanish) thus inclining the results towards the ruling party. The Freedom House Report for year 2010 states that the ruling party “enjoyed a massive advantage in television exposure, and the promotion of social and infrastructure projects often blurred the line between [their] official role and [their] electoral campaign” which was often conducted by Chávez, even though he was not running himself for any position. Later that year, the “Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Protests” was modified to prevent party members to change sides and also compelled protesters to request permission to protest. PSUV activist and current Minister of the Penitentiary System, Iris Varela, stated back then that the law “sought to ensure the Venezuelan electorate that the deputies who promoted their candidature in a certain way, would not betray them during their term in the National Assembly” 1 promoting absolute party discipline. Additionally, the enforcement of this law prevented by the use of force several student protests that tried to raise awareness on another law, which undermined University autonomy in Venezuela, as reported by BBC News on December 2010. As stated in the Freedom House Report on Venezuela for year 2010 “Freedom of peaceful assembly is guaranteed in the constitution, but the right to protest has become a sensitive topic in recent years”. 1 Personal translation of “Es una ley que garantiza al pueblo venezolano que el diputado que se ofertó de una determinada manera no lo traicione”. Noticiero Digital Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt Presidential Election 10/7/12 Venezuelan Opposition agreed for the first time since Chávez’s rise to power to promote a single candidate for the presidential election. The Freedom House Report for year 2012 remarks, “it was revealed that Chávez was being treated for an undisclosed form of cancer. After weeks of rumors (…) Chávez acknowledged (…) that he was (…) being treated for cancer, though he refused to divulge specifics” undermining the right of the Venezuelan people to be timely informed of any situation that might have consequences for them. Later that year, as stated in the aforementioned report “The government insisted that Chávez’s prognosis was excellent, and he made clear his intention to run for reelection in 2012”. After an unequal campaign due to the abuse of power manifested by the constant use of television and radio time cadenas2, Opposition spokesperson Carlos Vecchio denounced “the quadruplicating of President Chávez’s “air time”, what promoted an uneven and biased political contest as opposed to what is stated in the Venezuelan Electoral Law about equal access to the media”.3 A healthy 79% of voter turnout, representing over 15 million Venezuelans, was reported after the election in which Chávez won about 55% of the popular vote. International reporter López (2013) also brings attention in her Georgetown Public Policy Review article to the fact that no international observers where allowed to monitor this election, but only “international accompaniers” were allowed to cover the news. After Chávez’s death in March 2013, some five months after being reelected President, Venezuela needed to elect a new leader. As the Freedom House Report for 2013 states “in a sign of the gravity of (Chávez’s) condition, before leaving he anointed Vice 2 3 (Literal translation: chains; block-like control of all radio and TV programs) Personal translation of statement “Ha cuadruplicado el tiempo de exposición mediática durante la campaña electoral lo que genera un desequilibrio en la campaña porque no hay igualdad en el acceso a los de medios de comunicación como lo exige la Ley Electoral”. Diario Crítico Online. Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt President and Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro as his preferred successor; in the event of the president’s death, new elections would be required within 30 days”, showing that he “could cope with the problem of succession … passing the torch of collective leadership to a new political generation” (Brooker, 2009, p.7). Chávez’s absence in his “re-proclamation” as president on January 10th gave way to a debate on whether or not he should be declared “absent” as defined in the Venezuelan Constitution. The openly Chávez-supporting National Constitutional Court emitted a sentence stating that there had been no violation of the constitutional principle, that only the President himself could declare his absence and that there was no need for a “re-proclamation” because he had been elected to hold the same office4. Rumors of Chávez’s death filled the country and the feeling of uneasiness of the population started to grow. On March 5, 2013, Maduro declared the death of the President and a new campaign for the upcoming election began. Municipal Elections 12/8/13 337 Majors were elected very recently in Venezuela. As stated by Harold Trinkunas of the Brookings Institution, this election was “widely portrayed as a referendum on Maduro’s performance in office”. As Trinkunas points out, “in spite of a deepening economic crisis” the official party won 260 districts and municipalities across the country. Whereas the Opposition won fewer constituencies it is also to be noted, that it received the support of every major city, including Barinas, home of the late Chávez. What makes this election worth mentioning in this paper is, first of all, the fact that “massive use of state resources favored the government’s candidates and that the opposition was harassed” thus endorsing the idea that elections in Venezuela might not be “truly fair and free”. The second and most recent post-electoral development according to international newspaper commentator Ewald Scharfenberg of “El País” is the fact that Maduro appointed “parallel Majors” on the cities where the Opposition had 4 Paraphrase of news as stated on http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/144913/tsj-se-pronunciara-sobre-la- legalidad-de-postergar-la-toma-de-posesion-del-presidente-chavez/ Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt won, in an attempt to regain control of the lost territories. If the elected officials decided not to comply, they would not receive the centrally administered budget that belongs to each of the municipalities and is needed to carry on their plan of office. This provides for a tight central-grip on all local governments, and it clearly invalidates the decision of the Venezuelan people in a very undemocratic way and resembles Chávez’s conduct on 2009, when he appointed Jacqueline Faría to assume control over the District Capital, which had fallen into “Opposition hands” on an electoral process. Freedom House Report for year 2013 stresses that “Venezuela is not an electoral democracy. While the act of voting is relatively free and the count is fair, the political playing field favors government-backed candidates, and the separation of powers is nearly nonexistent. Venezuela was ranked 172 out of 183 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index”. Conclusion Contrary to what LeDuc, Niemi and Norris declare (2010, p. 4), the Freedom House Report for the year 2013 states that Venezuela is not an electoral democracy. This leaves open the question as to what kind of government it does have. The three electoral processes that were mentioned stress the increment of undemocratic practices in Venezuela over some of the past years. Also, there seems to be no meaningful competition either before or after the elections take place. The rules by which the parties run for elections are not promoting equality but rather favor the central government, and even if they were, the government still reserves the power to appoint officers to control the democratically elected leaders thus belittling the opinion of Venezuelans adn leaving them over and over with a bitter feeling of hopelessness. Furthermore, their power to change the rules of the electoral game every time they see fit just seems to deepen the concern of the population. Nonetheless, the same Freedom House Index classifies the country as “Partly free”… So, how may we classify the Venezuelan government? Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt As stated on the introductory note by Erdmann and Kneuer in their “Regression of Democracy?” article for the Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft (2011) “The cases of Russia and Venezuela have been of central interest and focus in recent years, both being important players not only in their regions but also beyond, and both also experiencing a regression of democratic status: Russia degraded from a hybrid regime to an autocracy and Venezuela from a liberal democracy to a hybrid regime”. The use of an electoral/democratic façade stresses the recognition of undemocratic governments on the fact that public offices should be “owned” by the people (cf. Brooker, 2009, p.136). Whenever the Venezuelan people are internationally congratulated for having participated in a new electoral process, the legitimacy of the government seems to be strengthened and this sets the grounds for a continuous and unyielding oppression of the population (ibid.: p.10). “Semi-competitive elections offer a dictatorship the most credible claim to electoral/democratic legitimacy and therefore have been the preferred choice of any new dictatorships that have emerged in our present ‘age of democracy’” (ibid.: p. 139). As Frankenberg and Graf (Elections, Democratic Regression and Transitions to Autocracy: Lessons from Russia and Venezuela, 2011) state “The case of Venezuela illustrates that elections can be used to legitimize undemocratic leadership styles like governing by decree”. This process can be seen, as argued by Frankenberg and Graf, as a transition towards autocracy (2011, p. 202). The government has effectively closed its political system by “circumventing or even eliminating democratic standards, e.g. through the centralization of power, the restructuring of federalism, the devaluation of political parties and the rise of informal institutions as neo-patrimonial or clientelist structures” (ibid.: p. 202). The aforementioned authors underscore the fact that whereas (national and regional) elections can play a key role in the democratic process, they can also be the essential Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt element in the transition towards an autocracy. It is my personal understanding that Venezuela is currently undergoing a period of “electoral authoritarianism” (as cited by Frankenberg and Graf on Schedler 2002, 2006). In his paper on “The Logic of Electoral Authoritarianism”, Schedler (N/A) defines “electoral authoritarian regimes” as players in the game of multiparty elections but with the key characteristic that they violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule, rather than “instruments of democracy” (as cited from Powell 2000). The author explains that electoral contests are subject to such severe systematic and widespread state manipulation that they do not qualify as democratic. Authoritarian manipulation may come under many guises, but the main result is that they are “all serving the purpose of containing the troubling uncertainty of electoral outcomes”. “Rulers may devise discriminatory electoral rules, exclude opposition parties and candidates from entering the electoral arena, infringe upon their political rights and civil liberties, restrict their access to mass media and campaign finance, impose formal or informal suffrage restrictions on their supporters, coerce or corrupt them into deserting the opposition camp, or simply redistribute votes and seats through electoral fraud” (Schedler, N/A, p. 3). As stated by Corrales (2011) on his Huffington Post article, “Chávez has managed to convert a frail but nonetheless pluralistic democracy into an authoritarian regime”. The author also stresses the fact that “whereas many authoritarian regimes – such as those in China, Saudi Arabia or Singapore – seek political legitimacy by attempting to deliver at least the appearance of order, Chavismo advances its objectives by enabling chaos”. The main problem with this approach is that Venezuelans thrive on chaos, leaving thus open the question on whether we will ever find the will to organize ourselves and also if we will ever find the political will to educate the population as a means of creating the intellectually challenging citizenry that will recognize and stop governmental abuse. Cristina M. Carbonell Betancourt References • Brooker, P. 2009. Non-Democratic Regimes: Second Edition (Comparative Government and Politics). 2 Edition. Palgrave Macmillan. • Corrales, J. (2011) “Chavez Regime Has Launched Autocratic Blitzkrieg: Analysis. 2013” [ONLINE] Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/02/chavez-regime-has- launche_n_210401.html. 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