What kind of vulnerability?

The intention of this chapter is to discuss the concept of vulnerability, which is practically always considered negative. In particular, gender issues will be raised for this discussion, starting from the present idea in our society that vulnerability is a female attri- bute much more than a male one. This imaginary leads to efforts of its denial, on behalf of boys and men, and, countless times, to the practices of acute violence against women, who are seen and see themselves as impotent and vulnerable beings par excellence. This issue will be addressed in the first session of the text to support the demand for a less negative and more universal concept of vulnerability. In the following section, I will try to offer a general image of the two most important contemporary lines of discussion on vulnerability: the philosophical - which defines it as something inherent and ontological; and socio-political - which defines it as linked to contingent and contextual issues. In the third part of the text, I will present the ideas of the philosopher Erinn Gilson, who works with a concept that unites the two ways of thinking and presents vulnerability as a plastic and ambivalent condition. The Gilsonian concept helps us to think of the positive aspects of this human condition. Finally, I will present some considerations about the ethical and epistemic closure that an exclusively negative concept of vulnerability can represent.