World Bank, World Development Report 2023, Migrants, Refugees and Societies

What’s Worth Reading, May 2023. World Bank, World Development Report 2023: Migrants, Refugees, and Society, World Bank, 2023. The long-awaited (or at least, long delayed) 2023 World Development Report, Migrants, Refugees, and Societies, has finally appeared, and it is essential reading. If you were going to read one thing in order to understand the way the World Bank looks at the world (not something that is well understood), this would be it. And it is an added benefit that it includes a wealth of empirical information on some currently pressing issues in international politics and political economy. It is a remarkable thing about the Bank that ever since the first such Report appeared in 1978, it has promoted a liberal vision of global capitalism, supporting development on a global scale, inciting competitiveness, and above all advocating policies that subject workers around the world to the disciplining power of capital (Paul Cammack, The Politics of Global Competitiveness, OUP, 2022). It has done so unwaveringly, regardless of changes of President, through periods of expansion, recession and crisis alike, and systematically, with the result that its successive reports continually reinforce and up-date its project. It has been consistently hostile to restrictions on trade (protectionism) and on the free movement of labour, and in this latest report it turns its attention to the contrasting demographic profiles of the high\middle- and low-income countries respectively, and particularly the growing proportion of elderly and retired in the former, and the considerable surplus of young people seeking work in the latter. Its solution: surplus workers should move to countries where they are in relatively short supply, they should enjoy appropriate rights, and, a point on which it insists repeatedly, they should have access to work in the formal economy. This brings it up against barriers to free movement and anti-immigrant feeling, which vary considerably in scale from country to country, but are widespread. As usual, then, it is a highly strategic document. It is of particular significance because of the global sensitivities noted above around 'economic migrants', refugees and what it calls 'distressed migrants': 'Migrant[s] who move to another country under distressed circumstances but who [do] not meet the applicable criteria for refugee status, [and whose] movements are often irregular and unsafe' (Glossary). It is of particular interest because promotes 'economic migration', as it always has, and brings refugees and 'distressed' migrants within the same discursive frame - treating them in the first instance as potential and welcome additions to the workforce: it rejects any hard-and-fast distinction between these categories, explores the synergy between labour economics and international law, and encourages governments to recognise the potential economic benefits brought by refugees and 'distressed' migrants. Uncritically viewed, this might appear to be a progressive approach. It is not. As noted, the Bank has been set for decades on turning the poor into an exploitable proletariat, and it long ago moved away from a narrow focus on economic development. From the turn of the century on it colonised the UNDP, turning its once humanitarian approach to development to the purpose of promoting capitalism on a global scale through the mechanism of the Millennium Development Goals. A decade later, its 2010 and 2011 reports, Development and Climate Change and Conflict, Security and Development, prompted intensive activity focused on the concepts of resilience and adaptability, deployed as an all-embracing framework centred on scientific and technological revolution, private enterprise, and jobs. Its overall purpose is to subject every area of life to the discipline of capital. It is logical that it should now turn its attention to the toughest nut to crack, and the most important for its overall project - the movement of people, viewed through the prism of the free movement of labour on a global scale. The upshot is a central focus on the economic gains from migration (reasonably enough in itself, as the Bank estimates that over 80 per cent of migrants move in search of opportunities in the destination country, p. 49), and a perspective on refugees and 'distressed' migrants that looks first at their potential in the workforce, and advocates collective international action to manage them in accordance with international law if they lack it. Above all, then it seeks to address and intensify the global competition for workers, and stabilize the broader environment within which capitalist development proceeds. If implemented, this policy framework would make labour market demand the ruling criterion, and subject those individuals deemed of little value to sometimes punitive and inherently discriminatory regimes of national and international law. This logic is first announced by the Bank's current and about to be former President, David Malpass (stepping down in June 2023): 'Destination countries can harness the potential of migration to meet their long-term labor market needs, especially to meet labor shortages triggered by aging or a lack of particular skills' (Foreword, xvi), then laid out systematically throughout the report. The overall argument is summarised in 'key takeaways' (xxiii-xxiv), expanded in the 'Overview' (1-20), and developed in full over nine chapters, beginning with 'The Match and Motive Matrix' (21-40), described as a practical framework for policy makers. The focus is not on naturalised citizens who have migrated in the past, but on the estimated 184 million people around the world, including 37 million refugees, who lack citizenship in the country in which they live; and the premise of the report is that rapid demographic change is making migration increasingly necessary for all countries at all income levels: 'High-income countries are aging fast. So are middle-income countries, which are growing older before they become rich. The population of low-income countries is booming, but young people are entering the workforce without the skills needed in the global labor market. These trends will spark a global competition for workers' (xxiii, emphasis mine). The 'match and motive' framework produces a three-point guide to policy making 'based on how well migrants' skills and related attributes match the needs of destination countries and on the motive for their movement': 1. When the match of migrants is strong, the gains are large for themselves and for countries of origin and destination. This is the case for the vast majority of migrants, whether highor low-skilled, regular or irregular. The policy objective should be to maximize gains for all. 2. For refugees, when the match is weak, the costs need to be shared—and reduced— multilaterally. Refugee situations can last for years. The policy objective should be to lower the hosting costs while maintaining adequate standards of international protection. 3. When the match is weak and people are not refugees, difficult policy challenges arise, especially when migrants are in irregular and distressed circumstances. It is the prerogative of destination countries to regulate entry of these migrants, but deportation and refusal of entry can lead to inhumane treatment. The restrictive policies adopted by destination countries can also impose costs on some transit countries. The policy goal should be to reduce the need for distressed migration—and development can play a critical role (xxiii). In sum, 'origin countries should actively manage migration for development'; 'destination countries can also manage migration more strategically'; and 'international cooperation is essential to turn migration into a strong force for development' (xxiv). Some policy makers (and others) may well read no further, and, to be fair, they will indeed get the 'key take-aways' if they don't - the report does follow the trajectory they indicate. But a critical reading of the full text brings richer rewards. The 'Overview' gives some basic information (on demographic change and labour needs, for example, sets out the Match and Motive framework, and usefully summarises policy recommendations (the latter on p. 16). Along the way, it expands on the key theme of the report: 'destination countries should not let social and cultural controversies overshadow the economic gains of migration' (7-8), and 'origin countries should actively manage migration for its development benefits' (9-10): the message is that origin countries should prepare their citizens to migrate for work, while receiving countries should facilitate and support the entry of migrants with relevant skills, and give refugees as well as 'economic migrants' the right to work. Chapter One sets out the Match and Motive framework in more detail. Chapter Two reviews basic data on migration, and is followed by a brief critical review of sources of data and their limitations. Practically everyone will learn a lot from this chapter and the report as a whole - but consider yourself exempted if you know, for example, the percentage of migrants in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, excepting Saudi Arabia (p. 44), and, in the correct order, the six countries that account for more than three quarters of the refugees in the world today (p. 54), the four that receive almost three quarters of resettled refugees (p. 213), and the five that are the largest recipients of remittances (p. 128). In an ideal World Bank world, nobody would be forced to migrate for well-founded fear of persecution (refugees), or for reasons of distress. Otherwise, following the logic that not only are there too many people in the world, but that also many of them are in the wrong place, as demographic trends 'chang(e) where workers are needed and where they can be found' (2), individuals wherever they live should be endowed with mobile skills, and free to move seamlessly around the world for work. As we do not live in such a world, its view is that refugees should be treated properly in accordance with international law, distressed migrants should be absorbed, or returned humanely to their country of origin, and the driving forces behind distressed migration should be addressed in the longer term by growth and development. The over-riding goal should be to maximise the development and recognition of portable skills, and give active encouragement and support to the free movement of labour: 'The benefits of migration—for both origin and destination societies as well as for migrants—are significantly higher when migrants can contribute more to their destination society, when they can earn higher wages, and when they can transfer larger remittances (and knowledge) to their countries of origin. All this requires both providing legal channels for entry of those who have adequate skills—at all levels—and attributes and allowing them to engage in the formal labor market. It may be complemented by building skills in the country of origin—to serve both the global and the domestic labor markets and in the process to mitigate the negative impacts of high-skilled migration (brain drain), which may need international support. Achieving better matching of skills often requires cooperation between the countries of destination and origin' (32). Chapter Three looks ahead to a future in which destination countries will compete for a shrinking pool of qualified workers, while the pressures of climate change will increase distressed migration. Broadly, while the world is ageing rapidly, low-income countries will remain young throughout the century: 'Overall, the elderly population in high-income countries is projected to grow by about 118 million by 2050, while the working-age population (ages 20– 64) will decline by about 53 million. ... In the high-income member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the ratio of working-age adults (20–64 years) to the elderly (65 years and above) went from 7.1 in 1950 to 2.9 in 2022. It is projected to drop to below 2.0 by 2050 (72); and middle-income countries face the same challenge: 'Considerable policy challenges will confront countries trying, while they are still middleincome, to make up for a shrinking workforce and to finance retirement and care for an aging population' (73). 'In many high-income countries,' the Bank concludes, 'increased immigration will have to be part of the response to demographic changes' (77). Here and in middle-income countries too, 'policies will have to be adapted to these changing circumstances, thereby requiring a shift of perspective for policy makers and society at large'. At the same time, 'to fulfill labor market needs, migrants must possess the skills and attributes needed to match the demand in destination societies. ... There may be more opportunities for migration, but only to the extent that would-be migrants can acquire skills that are in demand in destination countries. Countries, especially low-income, urgently need to develop transferable, marketable skills' (77). Here, in a nutshell, is the World Bank's view of the policy challenges surrounding the issue of the free movement of productive labour across the global economy. The picture is complicated by the likely consequences of climate change (78-83), which, the Bank has long accepted, 'poses an unprecedented and growing threat to human societies', threatening the lives and livelihoods of around 40 per cent of the world's population (78). The ensuing summary is chilling, if that is the right word in the circumstances. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on 'economic' migration, and constitute the core of the report. The main points of interest, along with unequivocal support for the prospect of the free movement of labour around the world, and the confidence with which the Bank advances its case (a reflection of its unwavering commitment to capitalism on a global scale), are (1) its insistence on the need for migration to be facilitated, and for migrants to be given access to the formal labour market, including documented status, the right to work and change employers, and recognition of professional licences and qualifications; (2) the case made for origin countries to commit to preparing their young populations for migration, and (3) its concern for the difficult politics and political economy of liberal immigration policies in destination countries. On the first of these points, the cost of migration should be minimised, with bilateral labour agreements and government-led job matching services replacing the costly use of exploitative intermediaries (98-9), and above all, migrant workers should be given legal and socioeconomic rights, and a promise of eventual citizenship: 'Secure prospects of stay, access to formal jobs, and complementary legal rights are critical to better labor market outcomes. To succeed, migrants often need to make certain investments specific to the destination country, such as learning a new language, establishing social and professional connections, or acquiring relevant skills. Secure prospects of stay and legal employment rights increase their incentives to do so. Naturalization goes hand in hand with further enhanced economic outcomes. It allows access to a wider set of jobs in the labor market (such as in civil service and regulated professions) and has positive signaling effects for employers. Moreover, those who are offered a chance to be naturalized are often among the most successful migrants. To best contribute to the destination economy, migrants also need access to a range of complementary rights such as to move across the country, to open a bank account and obtain credit, or to create a business. The faster migrants gain legal status and access to the labor market, the better are their labor market outcomes' (100). It would be reckless, and wrong, to dismiss this as empty rhetoric - it is a fundamental aspect of the Bank's longstanding commitment to a liberal global economy regulated in such a way as to maximise the hegemony of capital and the prospects for sustained accumulation. It is matched by explicit condemnation of reliance on undocumented migrants relegated to the 'informal' sector (in the United States and the GCC in particular: 'Relegation to the informal sector means lower wages and fewer opportunities for advancement. Because undocumented migrants cannot readily report abuses to the police or access court systems, they are more easily exploited and underpaid. When they return to their country of origin, undocumented migrants fare worse relative to documented migrants, especially if they have been deported' (ibid). Migrants and their families should have equal access to housing, schooling and health care, all of which are in turn dependent on legal status, and social inclusion and support programmes should be provided (105). On the second point, the Bank sees the strategic use of migration as a means of speeding the process of national development - citizens equipped with the skills to find work abroad will benefit personally from greatly increased income ('Even after adjusting for the differences in the cost of living, a truck driver in Canada earns over five times more than a truck driver in Mexico. Nurses in Germany earn nearly seven times more than nurses in the Philippines. A physician in Canada earns 20 times more than a physician in Zambia, around 10 times more than a physician in Côte d’Ivoire or Malawi, and about four times more than a physician in South Africa', p. 96), but at the same time they will remit a proportion of their earnings to families at home, and in many cases invest in and return to their country of origin in due course, as an estimated 40 per cent do (105). This is the Bank's liberal take, if you like, on 'combined and uneven development'. Chapter 5 develops the argument that origin countries benefit most when they make labour emigration an integral part of their development and poverty reduction strategies (127). Remittances in particular figure largely: they increase household income, increase consumption and food security, allow households to spend more on education and health care, enable some household members to reduce their working hours, help close some gender gaps, protect households from shocks, facilitate entrepreneurship by easing financial constraints, and even reduce poverty even in households that do not receive them by virtue of the demand they create. But they have mixed effects on inequality, and work best when countries make it easy for migrants and their families to open savings accounts linked to remittances, provide financial literacy training, enable land ownership by women, and incentivise investment in education (129-32). Because they are a relatively stable source of foreign exchange (even in periods of economic crisis), they contribute to macroeconomic stability. But the cost of transfer is still too high, at an average 6 per cent - making the case, the Bank argues, for increased competition and better information (classic liberal remedies). In addition, the Bank proposes the notion of 'social remittances' for the beneficial transfer of institutional and social norms in relation for example to professional and commercial knowledge and experience, democracy and accountability, and gender relations (135). And on the third point, the Bank makes four claims: (1) destination countries gain significantly from the contributions of migrants whose skills and attributes strongly match their needs, irrespective of migrants’ legal status or motivation; (2) benefits arise from migrants’ contributions in the labor market and to higher productivity and greater availability and lower prices for some goods and services, as well as their fiscal contributions. These benefits are larger if migrants are allowed and able to work formally at the level of their qualifications; (3) costs are associated with the use of public services and the negative wage or employment effects on some nationals (typically among the lower-skilled). Social integration can have a cost as well, but the debate must be placed in context: destination societies are not identical, culturally uniform, or static; (4) destination countries can adopt policies that improve how well migrants’ skills and attributes match countries’ needs—and thus their gains—by creating adequate legal pathways for entry and by facilitating economic and social inclusion (159). The significant feature of the Bank's approach is its insistence on the benefits that arise from incorporation of migrants into the formal labour market. In low- and middle-income countries, where migrants are predominantly lower-skilled and the informal economy is relatively large, 'migrants, irrespective of their skills, typically act as competitors with other informal workers [but when] they can engage in the formal sector, migrants are more likely to be complementary to other workers' (161). More generally, the arrival of low-skilled migrants prompts national workers to invest in education and increase their skills, and: 'When migrants’ skills complement those already in the labor market, productivity increases, spreading substantial benefits across the destination country’s economy' (163). Along with the productivity gains and spillovers associated with highskilled migrants (in medicine, technology, and finance for example), the Bank argues, 'Migrants in low-skilled occupations can also provide complementary skills. As education levels have increased and the workforce has aged rapidly in many high- and upper-middle-income economies, the share of national workers without a high school degree has declined. Immigration is making it possible for employers to hire the low-skilled workers they need to keep their businesses sustainable. Migrant workers represent 12 percent of agricultural workers across the European Union and over 40 percent in Spain. They account for 64 percent of agricultural workers in the United States. Similarly, the vast majority of the construction workers in the GCC countries and plantation workers in Malaysia are also migrants. The presence of lowskilled workers has additional effects. The cost of domestic household services declines when immigrants perform housework and childcare in higher-income countries. Women nationals, released from these tasks, can then join the labor force in larger numbers—especially highskilled married women—leading to overall economic gains. This pattern has been observed in a wide range of economies, such as Germany; Hong Kong SAR, China; Italy; Spain; Switzerland; the United Kingdom; and the United States. Migrants also facilitate trade, investment, and other economic flows between destination and origin countries. They bring their social capital and business networks to the destination country, along with their knowledge of the origin country’s language, regulations, market opportunities, and institutions, thereby creating opportunities for trade and investment in the origin country and lowering the corresponding transaction costs' (ibid). At this point, the Bank turns to the political economy of immigration and the policy implications. While consumers and employers or owners of capital may benefit, migration 'can be disruptive at the local level', with short-term negative effects on some nationals' wages and employment levels, especially among the lower-skilled, and on other recent migrants with whom new waves compete. Adjustment costs can be significant, and for many workers 'it is difficult to switch jobs, firms, or geographic locations to adjust to the presence of immigrant workers', but 'markets eventually adjust through a reallocation of capital and the movement of workers to other occupations, sectors, and regions. Over time, the adverse impacts of migration tend to decline, especially when product and labor markets are flexible and social protection mechanisms are effective' (164). Migrants often arrive with skills and qualifications acquired and funded in their country of origin, and because they are predominantly of working age they tend to make higher net contributions to fiscal income than do nationals, especially if they return home before retirement and old age. However: 'Migrants’ legal status and formal employment are the single most important determinant of a migrant’s net fiscal contribution. Whereas all migrants—whether documented or undocumented— pay consumption and value added taxes, only documented migrants pay income or social security taxes. Having the right to work allows documented migrants to earn higher wages, which, in turn, increases their fiscal contributions' (167-8). In short, the contribution migrants make will be largest in countries with 'a high complementarity between migrants and nationals across all skill levels': 'Specifically, those are countries in which it is possible for migrants to work formally and at their level of qualification and in which the business environment enables capital and labor to be allocated swiftly across regions and sectors of the economy' (168). A series of policy recommendations follow, all oriented towards the achievement of such an outcome: varied channels of entry should exist, to cope with a wide variety of situations and needs; entry policies should acknowledge market forces rather than impose restrictions in defiance of them; consultative mechanisms should be in place to establish labour needs from sector to sector; potential migrants should be evaluated (for example, through a points system) for their fit with labour needs; temporary pathways, sometimes in the nature of a conditional 'trial period', should be available alongside schemes for permanent migration; and seasonal schemes (in which the migrant generally travels alone, without other family members) are appropriate in such activities as agriculture and tourism. However: 'Temporary migration ... is less suitable to address longer-term labor needs. When temporary work permits are extended or renewed over long periods of time, the integration challenges may be heightened. Temporary visas lower incentives to acquire languages and invest in country-specific human capital and social networks, and the destination country usually does not implement measures to support integration' (172). Beyond this, the Bank advocates the development of qualifications frameworks to evaluate and recognise degrees and skills qualifications (already in place, for example, in the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN), the provision of language training and integration support, and student visas, and draws attention to pilot Global Skills Partnerships (such as those between Belgium and Morocco in the information and communication technology sector and by Germany and Tunisia in the nursing sector) as another possible option. All in all, then, the bank's approach turns on three complementary recommendations. First, migrants need secure legal status and formal employment rights if they are to realise the greatest benefits to themselves and to destination countries (172): 'Providing migrants with a secure legal status and formal employment rights facilitates their inclusion in the labor market and makes it possible for them to engage in formal activities at the level of their skills and qualifications. Having a secure legal status—whether it involves having a valid employment visa, asylum or residency status, or citizenship—means predictable prospects of stay, protection of the rule of law, and other legal rights. Migrants then have greater incentives to invest in their destination community, workplace, or country, and they learn a new language, engage in entrepreneurial activities, acquire additional educational degrees, and become part of social networks. With secure legal status, migrants can move more freely within the economy and society, increase their income and personal ties, and further integrate socially and economically' (172-3). Second, there needs to be appropriate support for affected nationals: 'Labor market flexibility is key to supporting nationals whose skills are similar to those of migrants and who are negatively affected because of a decline in wages or employment. Flexibility allows complementary workers and capital to move to areas and sectors that migrants entered, and it allows workers with similar skills to move to other regions, sectors, or occupations. Similarly, flexible capital markets can facilitate the entry of new firms in a sector or the expansion of existing firms, both of which increase the demand for labor and reduce the negative impacts of migration on wages and employment. By contrast, market rigidities that hamper capital or labor market adjustments increase the negative effects of immigration. These restrictions are particularly pervasive in low- and middle-income countries where migrants are concentrated in the informal economy, the mobility of nationals is low, and firms’ capacity to expand is limited because of lack of access to financial markets and low productivity, as documented in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Workers who face job losses and mobility costs may also need support as they search for employment in other regions or sectors. Social protection programs and active labor market policies reduce the adverse effects of immigration. In high-income countries where the aggregate gains from migration create the necessary fiscal resources, it is possible to support those who are temporarily affected by job loss. However, experience with the adjustment to trade liberalization reveals the complexity of such efforts if, for example, people are unwilling or unable to move to new areas or activities. In lower- and middle-income destination countries, where the skills of nationals and migrants are more similar and fiscal resources are more limited, implementing such social protection programs may be even more challenging' (173). And third, linking the two, a pro-active approach must be taken to social inclusion and integration, especially where 'divisions along the lines of ethnicity, race, religion, or national origin can worsen productivity by reducing cooperation between workers' (173). The Bank discusses housing, education, health care, and crime and insecurity, and identifies the number and concentration of migrants, economic conditions, linguistic and cultural familiarity, and perceptions and prejudice as relevant factors. It then reverts to its core argument, citing formal labour market inclusion as 'a critical element of the social integration agenda' (180), before commenting briefly on dispersion policies (on which there are mixed results), investment infrastructure in areas where migrants are heavily concentrated, anti-discrimination campaigns, and targeted integration policies. It is evident here that the authors of the report don't have much to say that goes beyond their central theme of the importance of formal labour market inclusion, and this is borne out again in the chapters on refugees and 'distressed' migrants, which have a wealth of useful empirical detail, and reflect a broadly humane approach that roundly condemns racism and other forms of discrimination, and calls on all countries to cooperate for the greater good, but don't go far beyond the suggestion that they should be given 'an opportunity to rebuild their lives' by 'the right to move freely within the host country, to work, and to access services' (210). This posture is characteristic of the work of the Bank over decades. It has only one guiding idea - that policies should favour the development of capitalism on a global scale through the inculcation of competitiveness at all levels - and it seeks to order all areas of life around it. As regards refugees, it may be an idea whose time has come: the UN's 2018 Global Compact on Refugees reflects it, specifically at section 2.2, paras 70 and 71, p. 27, and section 3.4, para 99, p. 39. Generally, what the World Bank has to say parallels the Compact closely, so I can be brief. Its recommendations for internal mobility ('For refugees, being able to move to locations where there are opportunities is critical to finding a job', p. 217), self-reliance and access to the labour market ('Enabling refugees’ labor market participation from a very early stage—even while they are applying for asylum—can yield positive long-term results', p. 219), and inclusion in national services ('Integrating refugees into functioning national systems—for education, health, and social protection—can improve financial sustainability and fairness with nationals in access and quality', p. 222) dominate its approach, and lead to the summary argument that durable solutions depend upon combining legal status and access to opportunities (222-8), and the suggestion that 'Offering the option to access a labor migration status that falls short of naturalization but provides socio-economic rights in a predictable manner may allow progress in some situations' (226), with Colombia's treatment of refugees from Venezuela given as an example (227-8). For distressed migrants, the message is the same - 'the challenge is to reduce the need for distressed migration, including by extending the scope of international protection, shifting incentives through the establishment of legal entry pathways, and strengthening the match of migrants’ skills and attributes with the needs of destination economies through development' (245). While in the longer term development can endow potential migrants with skills that will make them attractive in formal labour markets, and reduce the attraction of migration through irregular channels, in the near term the focus is on legal pathways to work: 'Establishing legal pathways for people at all levels of skills to enter destination countries and work in the formal sector—and doing so at scale—can help reduce the incentives for distressed movements. It can also transform distressed movements into mutually beneficial migration, in which migrants bring skills and attributes in demand in the destination labor market. Such legal pathways can include temporary or even seasonal arrangements. By providing legal pathways, destination countries shift potential migrants’ incentives, including for those who otherwise would engage in high-risk movements through irregular channels. For example, by offering legal entry pathways to people with certain qualifications, destination countries can encourage would-be migrants—and the communities that often help finance their movements—to acquire the skills and other attributes needed to contribute in the new country. This process can help shift the composition of migratory movements—who moves and under what circumstances— toward an outcome that more closely matches the needs and preferences of the destination society. Moreover, the availability of legal pathways reduces the incentives for migrants who are already in the country to overstay their visas and end up in a protracted irregular situation. In designing legal pathways, destination countries need to closely reflect the needs of their labor market. In many countries, legal entry pathways are primarily available to high-skilled migrants. However, many destination countries also need lower-skilled workers. By recognizing and acknowledging unmet needs in their labor markets and providing migrants who have the corresponding skills with legal entry pathways—including for relatively lower-skilled jobs, such as in agriculture, construction, or household services—destination countries can shift potential migrants’ incentives and reduce the pressure for distressed movements. This effort requires engaging with employers, labor unions, and other stakeholders to determine which skills are in demand' (256). This World Development Report is important, because it makes the case for free movement and formal labour markets, and takes it as a starting point for the treatment of refugees and distressed migrants. This reveals the core content of its project, and shows how it seeks to make it hegemonic, extending in principle across all areas of life. It also grounds its analysis in a single logic, so that once it has set out its main argument, and repeated it in various ways, it doesn't have much more to say. It is not surprising, then, that it concludes with an 'overview' chapter that repeats much of what has gone before, not least in the initial Overview itself, or in the first chapter. Notably, Table O.1 (16) and Table 9.1 (278), 'Main policy recommendations', are identical (except that the first is blue and the second is orange - nice try), and many of the figures are duplicates or nearly so. Then again, the Bank has been repeating itself since 1978, and the congruence of global governmental policy orientations with its recommendations has never been higher, so it is a force to be reckoned with.