6 Sep 2016
Research Briefing | Europe
The rise of illiberalism in Eastern Europe
Economist
Evghenia Sleptsova
Economist
+44 (0)207 620 8796
With euroscepticism on the rise and Brexit catching all of Europe off guard,
many investors and observers are reconsidering what the recently emerging
‘illiberal democracies’ further east may mean for the rest of the EU. In this
piece, we argue that rather than ‘turning away’ from a western European model
of democracy, Eastern Europe has never fully embraced it. Moreover, further
democratic reversals in the region cannot be ruled out.
First of all, we argue that history is important. Both the time spent under democracy
and the type of regimes seen previously will affect the current democratic track record.
CEE democracies are very young, which makes them prone to setbacks.
It is also important to differentiate between political and economic illiberalism. In
Hungary and Poland, similar degrees of political illiberalism involve different forms of
economic populism. Separating the two may make it easier to crystallise the economic
implications of democratic reversals.
Investment is the key channel through which economic populism affects long-term
growth. Lower policy predictability, often a characteristic of populist regimes, will hurt
investment in both physical and human capital and will also affect productivity.
Looking at Hungary’s experience with Orbanomics, we find that productivity has
declined drastically since 2010, and has not caught up with unit labour costs.
Investment, meanwhile, is hugely dependent on EU funding, and drops dramatically if
the latter dries up. Hungary’s experience does not bode well for Poland’s prospects
should the PiS remain in power for several terms.
The rise of illiberalism in Eastern Europe has political and security implications. It is
incompatible with core EU values and creates conditions for greater policy gridlock
within the EU and risks further contagion. In addition, it makes it more difficult for the
EU to have a unified voice against external security threats stemming from Russia.
Political illiberalism
Judiciary
Media
Business
freedom
alliance
The effects of
participation and
non-participation in
the EU
External
threat
Economic illiberalism
Fiscal
Wage / Foreign Central Nationalisa
easing pension capital / Bank
tion /
hikes Sectoral indepen
public
taxes dence procureme
nt
Hungary, Fidesz (2010)
Poland, PiS (2015)
Slovakia, SMER-SD (2012)
Romania, PSD (2012)
Czech Republic, SDP (2014)
Note: Red means strong degree of illiberalism, yellow = medium, green = largely liberal.
Source: Oxford Economics research
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6 Sep 2016
The rise of illiberalism and why one should care
East European
illiberalism in the
spotlight
Fast-track reformers
gone back?
Erode checks and
balances to stay in
power
Populism is on the rise across the developed world, but the economics profession is
struggling to gauge what it means for economic prospects. My colleague Gabriel Stein
recently wrote about its rise across the developed world and the risk it poses for the global
economy. While in advanced economies populism has not yet entered mainstream
politics, in Eastern Europe it has. Hungary seems to have turned from a “beacon of
democratisation” into a “beacon of illiberalism”. Prime Minister Victor Orban has openly
referred to his vision of Hungary as one of “illiberal democracy”, quoting Russia, China
and Turkey as his “role models”. Until recently Hungary was seen as the “odd one out” in
a land of successful EU-led democratisation. But since Poland overwhelmingly elected the
populist right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government, which immediately embraced
Orban’s “Budapest model”, Hungary has been less of an exception and a number of
questions arose: Are illiberalism and state interventionism becoming a new trend across
Eastern Europe? Does this risk contagion throughout the rest of the EU? What does this
mean for investors? Is the region becoming less of a safe haven in the emerging world?
These questions have been further reinforced by the UK’s vote to leave the EU – will
Brexit fuel further euroscepticism and divergence of Eastern Europe away from ‘core’
European values? We address some of these questions here, first by looking at the
causes of this drift and then offering a framework to analyse the political and economic
implications.
Both Hungary and Poland were examples of radical reformers, embracing the recipe of
the Washington consensus – liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation and structural
reforms (the latter often basically meaning privatisation). The EU was a key catalyst in this
transformation, providing both incentives to transform and a template through the adoption
of the acquis communautaire. Hungary stood out for its far-reaching FDI-based
privatisation, which made it a regional hub for multinationals, while Poland transformed
itself into a financial hub. Poland became something of an economic miracle, having
avoided recession since 1992. Against this backdrop of apparent economic liberalism,
Victor Orban’s subsequent shift towards “illiberal democracy” since 2010, and Poland’s
recent slide into Orban-style populism under the newly elected PiS party, seem to have
caught the international community totally off guard.
The key lesson that both Orban and Jaroslaw Kaczynski (the leader and ideological father
of PiS) learned from their previous terms in power (1998-2002 and 2005-07 respectively)
was that cultural shifts were insufficient. In order to be successful, they needed to be
accompanied by a capture of key institutions to eliminate checks and balances,
particularly in the judiciary and the media, which is precisely what both did when coming
back to power. But the speed at which PiS did so was truly remarkable, triggering fierce
criticism from EU institutions, street protests and a credit rating downgrade from S&P. As
Annex 1 shows, it took Orban about a year to reform the media to make it loyal to the
state and 20 months to curb the powers of the judiciary. PiS did the same in a matter of
weeks. These shifts have been all the more puzzling given that Hungary and Poland are
among the largest recipients of EU funding, the scale of which as a share of GDP has
exceeded the Marshall Plan to post-war Europe and significantly boosted their growth in
the past two decades.
Causes of illiberal drift
Post-2008 downturn and the immigration crisis have undoubtedly contributed to the rise of
populism across the world. As data from Swedish think tank Timbro shows, however,
support for populist authoritarian parties in Eastern Europe has been on the rise from the
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6 Sep 2016
early-2000s and on a much larger scale than in Western Europe. Populists have been
particularly strong in Hungary and Poland. The refugee crisis boosted populism in Poland
and Slovakia, but less so in other countries. It therefore seems that reasons other than the
global financial or refugee crises have been behind the rise of illiberalism in Eastern
Europe since the early-2000s.
Figure 2
1
Democratic capital: the notion of democratic capital suggests the less time a
country has spent as a democracy, the more likely regime switch is to happen. 1
Eastern Europe’s track record of democracy is very short, mostly dating back to
post-communist times, which makes it less entrenched and prone to reversal.
Pre-communist history: if one looks at the region in the context of modern statebuilding, Hungary was never truly a democracy. Following the end of WWI, it was
stripped of two-thirds of its population and three-quarters of its territory and left
with a sentiment of injustice surpassing that of Germany. Following only one year
as a republic (in 1918), it slipped into left- and right-wing dictatorships, and then
into an openly anti-Semitic and authoritarian monarchy (which later allied with
Nazi Germany). Elsewhere in the region, most of the newly-established
democracies crumbled in the next 10-15 years, mainly through military takeovers.2
Czechoslovakia was the exception, managing to preserve broadly democratic
institutions throughout this period.
Suppressed identity and nationalist revival: some 43 years under communism
only strengthened the feeling of lost national identity across Eastern Europe, and
did nothing to help build a responsible civil society or a culture of checks and
balances. The democratic revival in the early-1990s across the region was
therefore marked by a rise of widespread nationalist, ethno-religious and
revanchist sentiments, seen as part and parcel of the process of rebuilding an
independent nation-state.
Technocratic liberals versus rent-seeking elites: technocratic liberalists, who
established key economic and political institutions, have also accommodated the
forces and interests of rent-seeking elites and cultural conservatism. Meanwhile,
the civil society – a key but often underestimated democratic institution –
remained under-developed. This configuration generated a mirage of liberal-
Persson and Tabelini (2009)
2
Democracy in Poland and Lithuania ended in 1926, giving rise to fascist-populist regimes, while in Yugoslavia it
ended in 1929, and in Estonia and Latvia in 1934, while in Romania it never really took hold and reverted back to
monarchic dictatorship in 1920.
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6 Sep 2016
democratic progress and mainstream moderate politics, obscuring a deeply
running elite collusion and limits to cultural change. 3
Nationalism versus ownership: the above two points are inter-related. Although
transition economies regained independence following the fall of the Berlin wall,
the speed of required reforms meant that they did not have full ownership of the
process, largely following the Washington consensus recipe. This put the liberals
in a weaker position in terms of national ideologies.
Inequality: inequality has often been quoted as one of the key reasons for the
PiS coming to power, with the country’s eastern regions feeling left behind.
Poland’s Gini coefficient, at 32.4, is higher than that of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (at 26.1) and Hungary (30.6), but is not far from Italy and lower than the
EU average. In fact, globally, no consistent relationship has been found between
inequality and social unrest or radicalisation. The perception of inequality (what
Amartya Sen called relative deprivation) may matter more, particularly its
evolution over time. If we look at this year’s Happiness Report, Poland indeed
scores much lower than many of its CEE peers (apart from Hungary4), and the
degree of “unhappiness” has increased since 2012. Among the countries where
“happiness” has declined one can also spot the UK, Greece, Italy, the US, Spain
and France – all countries where support for populism has surged recently.
Macroeconomic instability: Hungary’s much earlier shift to illiberalism is also
reminiscent of Latin America in 1990s, where neoliberal populists came into
power on the back of financial and debt crises, setting out to restore financial and
fiscal stability (e.g. Argentina’s Carlos Menem, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori or Brazil’s
Fernando Collor). As Hungary narrowly avoided default in 2008, following years of
fiscal profligacy that swelled the fiscal deficit to 10% of GDP by 2006, Orban won
in 2010 on a platform of macroeconomic stabilisation which he achieved, albeit by
populist measures such as nationalisation of private pensions and distortive
sectoral taxes targeting foreign capital.
This complexity of causes goes some way to explain why populism gained popularity
much earlier in Eastern Europe than in the West, and why it’s been much stronger. The
fact that these causes are systemic and not unique to Poland and Hungary suggests that
more democratic reversals in the region cannot be ruled out.
Economic consequence of populism
Before discussing the economic impact, it is worth drawing a distinction between political
and economic illiberalism and populism.
3
Political illiberalism: liberalism is associated with free political institutions,
religious tolerance, and prioritises freedom and rights of individuals over those of
the state. In illiberal democracies, such as Victor Orban’s Hungary or Vladimir
Putin’s Russia, elections still take place but checks and balances are significantly
eroded and the opposition is often suppressed. Democratic illiberalism may or
may not be accompanied by outright economic populism.
Dawson and Hanley (2016)
4
Interestingly, Hungary, which scores among the most “unhappy” countries in Europe, appears to have become
“happier” since Victor Orban has been in power, climbing twenty places from 110th to the 91st “happiest” country
between 2013 and 2016. Poland, meanwhile, slid from 51st to 60th.
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6 Sep 2016
Economic populism: traditionally, populism has been associated with left-wing
economic policies – protectionism and fiscal expansion, to maintain voter support,
and reduced independence for central banks, hence often inflationary.
Neoliberal populism: but Latin America in the 1980s and even Russia under
Boris Yeltsin have shown that political illiberalism can also be based on neoliberal
(right-wing) economics, market reforms and fiscal consolidation. Victor Orban’s
economic policies are not neo-liberal, but the focus on fiscal consolidation means
they are not left-wing populist either. We prefer to refer to them as “conservative
populism”.
As an example of this left-right schism, Figure 2 shows how broadly equally illiberal
governments of Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania (albeit in their different ways)
have very different attitudes to fiscal discipline. While Orban came to power on a platform
of aggressive fiscal consolidation (narrowing the fiscal deficit by 3.3% of GDP since taking
office in 2010), Poland’s PiS came to office on a much more fiscally expansive platform,
which risks expanding the budget deficit by more than 1% of GDP in 2017-18, despite
already pushing the 3% threshold.
Politically illiberal regimes can
have very different degrees of
economic populism.
Figure 2
Note: Fiscal easing refers to a
change in fiscal balance by the
current government as a % of
GDP. Political liberalism is
measured by the OE-Control
Risks EPRE Ideology
Indicator.
While left-wing populism is known to compromise macroeconomic stability in the mediumto long-run, the impact of neoliberal or conservative populism is less straightforward,
making it harder for investors to assess the longer-term growth implications and hence the
risk premium that needs to be charged.
Democracy and
growth
Broadly speaking, the economic impact of populism is an old question of whether
democracy facilitates growth.
Democracy and growth: although cross-country studies struggled to find
conclusive evidence on the impact of democracy on growth, when measured over
time democracy has been found to be strongly associated with growth.5
Regime change: regime changes matter.6 Democracy was found to be more
strongly associated with growth in newer countries 7; and regime change from
5
See Barro (1996) and Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) for cross-country evidence, and Rodrick and Wacziarg
(2005); Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Persson and Tabellini (2009) for studies that incorporate intertemporal dimension.
Page 5
6
Acemoglu (2015), Sylwester (2015) and Nax and Schorr (2015)
7
Sylwester (2015)
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autocracy democracy also boost growth. This typically happens with a delay, and
results in GDP being 16-49% higher in 25 years after democratisation. 8
Risk of reversal: beyond a certain level of democratic and economic
development, as the room for catch-up narrows there are incentives for dedemocratization in order to boost short-run growth at the cost of higher sustained
long-run growth.9
Expectations of reversal: investor confidence tends to depend heavily on the
expectation of a stable democracy and no regime change, and therefore a risk of
an exit from democracy has been found to hurt investment and thus growth10.
All of the above is of particular importance for Eastern Europe’s relatively young
democracies. As we discussed in our recent research, regime change towards democracy
and market economy, further boosted by EU accession, was initially accompanied by a
sharp rise in productivity and potential growth. As both of the latter receded in the wake of
the crisis, populism is on the rise again.
Key transmission
channels into
potential growth
Populist economic policies can affect potential growth in a number of ways:
8
Investment and policy predictability: this is by far the key channel of
transmission. Risk of policy reversals or tax changes, often characteristics of
populist regimes, will hurt investment in both physical and human capital, and
thus also cut productivity.
Fiscal expansion: populism depends on the persistence of popular support,
which is often achieved by excessive wage, pensions and benefits increases. If
not offset by tax hikes, government debt will keep rising; beyond a certain
threshold it will also start suppressing growth. When income growth outpaces
productivity, it erodes competitiveness.
Populist fiscal consolidation: even when setting out to correct macroeconomic
imbalances, as was the case in Hungary or in 1990s Latin America, conservative
or neoliberal populists still tend to “over-promise” income increases to the
electorate to maximise their hold on power. Such conflicting goals of fiscal
consolidation and generous spending promises result in an even more distortive
redistribution of wealth away from the corporate sector to households than would
be the case in a classical left-wing populism.
Quality of investment: this can also go down as wrong incentives prevail and it
becomes more profitable to invest in short-term projects like housing than in
productivity-enhancing physical or human capital.
Cronyism and corruption: these undermine property rights, also hurting longterm investment.
Distortive price signals: accumulation of strategic sectors in the hands of rentseeking elites, often in the form of monopolies or oligopolies, distorts price
signals, thus making resource allocation less efficient, also hurting productivity.
Nax and Schorr (2015)
9
Nax and Schorr (2015).This effectively addresses the inconclusive results of cross-country studies, which fail to
find faster growth for rich democratised economies.
10
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Persson and Tabellini (2009)
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Typology of illiberal
policies in Eastern
Europe
Based on the above, one can see that populism involves both economic and political
levers to consolidate and maximise power. We follow the approach that Kaufman and
Stallings (1990) applied to analyse the political economy of Latin American populism, and
construct our own typology of illiberal policy measures pursued by East European
governments.
Political illiberalism
Judiciary
Media
Business
alliance
freedom
Figure 3
External
threat
Economic illiberalism
Fiscal
Wage / Foreign Central Nationalisa
tion /
easing pension capital / Bank
public
hikes Sectoral indepen
taxes dence procureme
nt
Hungary, Fidesz (2010)
Poland, PiS (2015)
Slovakia, SMER-SD (2012)
Romania, PSD (2012)
Czech Republic, SDP (2014)
Note: Red means strong degree of illiberalism, yellow = medium, green = largely liberal.
Source: Oxford Economics, drawing on Kaufman and Stalllings (1990)
As Figure 3 shows, despite fiscal consolidation Orban’s economic policies have been
populist across the board: generous wage and pension increases financed by distortive
sectoral taxes; preferential ownership by vested interests of some strategic assets; and
loss of independence for the central bank. In order to maintain power, Orban applied a
range of politically illiberal measures: scaling back media and judicial freedom; mobilising
nationalist sentiments, including through the use of an external threat such as migration;
and maintaining a culture of deeply entrenched cronyism.
Poland’s PiS is also following the populist playbook, albeit a more classically left-leaning
one: generous spending promises, partially financed by distortive sectoral taxes (largely
targeting foreign capital) and (most likely) partial pension nationalisation. However, central
bank independence has so far been preserved and the degree of business collusion is
also less than in Hungary.
While Hungary and Poland have stolen the spotlight, one can see that Slovakia and the
Czech Republic also share some of these illiberal policies, in particular the degree of state
capture by vested interests. This makes them ripe for further democratic retrenchment
down the line.11
What can we infer
from the Hungarian
experience
All of these channels usually take several years to manifest themselves in headline growth
numbers. While in Poland it is too soon to judge, in Hungary after six years of Orbanomics
there are already clear signs of an economic impact.
Competitiveness: unit labour costs in Hungary have been consistently outpacing
productivity growth, unlike in the Czech Republic where the two are broadly in line, or in
Poland, where productivity appears to outpace labour costs, eroding Hungary’s
competitiveness.
11
E.g. the Czech Finance minister, an oligarch who also appropriated most of the mainstream media, may
become a Prime Minister after next year’s general elections; the Czech and Slovak presidents Milos Zeman and
Robert Fico are both outspoken supporters of Putin and his “strong” model of governance, which suggests Victor
Orban may not be the last European leader to emulate Russia’s illiberal model.
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6 Sep 2016
Figure 4
Financial intermediation: punitive taxes on banks and a compulsory FX mortgage
conversion have hit credit growth, which has been in decline since 2010. Although most
large corporates preserved access to finance by channelling their borrowing through
parent banks, a structural decline in credit also hurts productivity and budget revenues.
Investment: broken financial intermediation channels and unpredictable policy
environments have affected private sector investment. While very strong in recent years,
fixed investment is mainly dependent on EU funding, as first half of 2016 has shown
(when investment slumped 20% on the previous year) clearly demonstrated (seen in
figure 5).
Productivity: as a result, productivity growth has been around zero since 2009. Although
some scope for improved productivity remains (e.g. from repairing relations with banks,
and hence credit growth), the latter is set to remain among the lowest in the region. We
therefore see potential growth averaging only 1.8% in the next 5-10 years.
Figure 5
Poland’s starting point is very different from that of Hungary – while Hungary was on the
verge of an economic collapse when Orban took power, Jarsolaw Kaczynski found Poland
in a much better shape, with solid growth and strong macroeconomic fundamentals.
Orban had to combine populist spending promises with fiscal consolidation. Poland does
not need radical fiscal consolidation, but PiS’ spending promises are much more generous
than those in Hungary. Hence, the Polish economy has a bigger “cushion” against
populism, and it may take longer for Polish macroeconomic balances to unwind. However,
the Hungarian experience suggests that the trajectory of Poland’s long-term growth may
decline should PiS stay in power for several terms.
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Political and security implications
Domestic political
considerations
While Orban has successfully modified institutions and solidified voter support, one of the
key questions now is how long will PiS stay in power.
Upside risks: on the one hand, Poland’s track record with right-wing parties is much
shorter than that of Hungary; its civil society and opposition are stronger; popular opinion
is strongly in favour of the EU (indeed at 72% it is the strongest in the EU).
Downside risks: but the arguments for longer PiS rule may eventually outweigh the
upside risks. Populist spending tends to mobilise voter support in the initial years in office,
while in the meantime the ruling party is modifying political institutions in such a way that
may make the return of the opposition impossible. The general drift to the right across
Europe may continue to provide support to PiS and even reinforce other right and far-right
parties in the region and Europe more broadly. Moreover, unlike in other European
economies, where illiberalism tends to correlate with euroscepticism, in Eastern Europe it
does not. According to opinion polls, Hungary is the second most pro-EU member state
(with 61% support) after Poland. This does not preclude Hungarians from giving two-thirds
of their votes to the right and far-right parties (Fidesz and Jobbik).
Security
considerations
Brexit and EU
stability
The relatively short democratic track record leaves the region exposed to the influence of
Russia. Even when openly pro-NATO, many conservative East European leaders
gravitate towards Putin’s style of governance, expressing scepticism towards western
values. This trend has further strengthened as the global financial crisis has undermined
the European model that CEE economies sought to emulate. Capitalising on this, Russia
has fostered direct links with right-wing parties across Europe and has used East
European media for its information war. The leaked tapes that brought down Civic
Platform in Poland were reportedly recorded by someone with links to both Russia and
PiS. The unified EU response to Russia’s threats to democracy has also become more
complicated, as Hungarian, Slovak and Czech political leaders all strongly oppose
sanctions on Russia.
As we wrote recently, despite being the largest beneficiaries of the EU funding
programme, many of the countries in the region have been emboldened by the Brexit vote
and are calling for less integration (despite paradoxically showing very strong pro-EU
opinion polls). The Brexit process may reinforce this sentiment, particularly as the CEE
has a sizeable voice in the Brexit debate given the number of their citizens in the UK.
Conclusions
Page 9
With both Poland and Hungary now in the “illiberal camp”, Eastern Europe is
emerging as a strong antagonist to the EU’s core values and principles.
Illiberalism could spread across the rest of the CEE and Europe (Austria, on
course for a far-right president in a re-run of elections in October, may be the next
in line).
These trends may contribute to further discord and greater policy gridlock within
the EU.
The EU’s liberal set-up – the need for all countries to agree to penalise any
member state – has made it institutionally incapable of confronting illiberalism.
Despite the EU’s attempts to prevent Hungary’s slide into illiberalism, Orban’s
tactics of “two steps forward – one step back” allowed him to succeed in
retrenching democracy in Hungary.
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As long as the EU does not use its strongest levers (budget and migration), the
continuation of generous financial support and liberal migration policies will
continue to validate euroscepticism across the rest of the EU. This, in itself, may
be the greatest risk to the unity of the EU going forward.
As far as economic and financial implications are concerned, illiberal and populist
policies may boost short-term growth through higher consumption, but tend to hurt
longer-term growth as underlying private sector confidence is eroded. Besides,
given the region’s huge dependence on the EU investment funds and one major
industry (the automotive supply chain with Germany), investors are better served
by looking at a longer-term picture than the short-term headline numbers.
Timeline of key reforms by Fidesz and Hungary and PiS in Poland
Annex 1
Date
Political / Institutional reforms
Electoral law
Judiciary
Media control
Nr. of
months
since
election
Poland's PiS' agenda
New electoral law favours the
incumbent party
Jul-05
21
Constitutional reform curtailing
power of the judiciary.
Dec-16
2
Feb-11
10
Amending media law, imposing
strict regulation on all media
outlets. Eased after EU
intervention, but 'soft censorship'
persists.
Referendum on EU plans to
relocate migrants to be held on 2
October 2016
Jan-16
3
0.53% asset tax imposed on
banks
Early repayment scheme for FXdenominated mortgages at
favourable exchange rates,
followed by compulsory
conversion from 2014
Subsidised mortgage and small
business lending
New central bank law reducing
MNB independence. Partially
reversed in Apr 2012 after EC and
IMF intervention
Nationalisation of mandatory
private pension savings (about
$14bn)
Feb-16
3
0.44% asset tax imposed on banks
Aug-16
8
Plan proposes voluntary conversion
of CHF mortgages into PLN. Less
severe than feared.
Economic reforms
Banking sector
Jul-10
2
Nov-11
29
2013-2016
Page 10
Nr. of
months
since
election
20
Jul-16
Central bank
Dec-11
19
Pension reforms
Dec-11
19
Real economy
Date
Dec-11
Migration
Fiscal policy
Victor Orban's agenda
N/A. PiS does not have
constitutional majority to change
constitution
Replaced five judges with loyal
judges loyal to PiS; Imposed a
chronological order for reviewing
cases.
New media law. Replaced the
leadership at all major channels;
Subordinates major media outlets
to the govt.
N/A
Subsidised lending mentioned in
the electoral campaign
Central Bank independence so far
preserved
Feb-Jun
2016
Jul-Aug
2016
7
Fiscal consolidation along with
aggressive redistribution
Increasing the role of the state /
nationalisations in several
sectors, primarily energy and
banking.
Vested interests gained
preferential ownership in certain
sectors (tobacco, alcohol)
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Partial nationalisation of the
mandatory private pension savings
(25% of total, or $8.8bn). Govt
approves lowering retirement age
from 67 for both to 60 for women
and 65 for men.
Fiscal expansion
Intention to increase ownership of
the banking sector from about 30%
to 70% in two decades