The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland’s Gestalt Shift on Chinese Investments
Abstract in English
... more The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland’s Gestalt Shift on Chinese Investments
Abstract in English
For a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.
Keywords: China • Finland • investments • corporate acquisitions • gestalt shift • security
This Working Paper ponders whether China could exercise a role in global economic governance in t... more This Working Paper ponders whether China could exercise a role in global economic governance in the foreseeable future in a similar way to other leading economic powers, especially the United States and previously the United Kingdom. Specifically, the paper asks whether China is able and willing to assume responsibility for the five stabilising functions that Charles Kindleberger envisioned for a leading economic power. The
paper discusses each criterion in turn, providing a tentative qualitative assessment as to whether China is prepared to assume this responsibility in light of evidence from economic data and Chinese policy debates. Particular emphasis is placed on the domestic political constraints China faces in assuming these functions. The ensuing discussion indicates that China’s importance for the global economy is more akin to that of the United States in some respects (e.g. as an import market and provider of long-term lending) than in others. The paper concludes that the biggest stumbling block to China’s ability to fulfil the stabilising functions is its ability to act as a lender of last resort. Currently, domestic financial stability and financial system risks take precedence over China’s global economic governance role. Were a new global financial crisis to hit, China would not be able to fulfil the function of the lender of last resort for other countries. In particular, as long as China maintains tight capital controls and relatively closed financial markets, the United States will likely again be pushed to the centre of crisis management when the next crisis hits. The continuing dominance of the dollar and American financial markets in the global economic system ensures that, for the time being at least, the United States will remain the leading economic power by default.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION AD HOC STUDY, 2011
Five years after the launch of the ‘BRIC’ acronym, Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006 starte... more Five years after the launch of the ‘BRIC’ acronym, Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006 started a process of political dialogue, with South Africa being admitted as a new member in 2011 – leading to the transformation of ‘BRIC’ into ‘BRICS’. This study demonstrates that the BRICS countries are not acting systematically as a coherent bloc in the UN and other international forums. However, their coordination within the BRICS framework as well as within other forums such as the G20 have an impact upon international negotiations – leading to negative effects for the EU’s ability to pursue its interests. This also points to the major failure of the EU’s ’strategic partnerships‘ with the individual BRICS countries. The strategic partnership concept has been mainly important in rhetorical terms. The EU has not been able to use these partnerships to substantially upgrade its relations with the BRICS countries or to prepare itself to the shifting balance of power to the South and the Asian- Pacific region. This study presents several options for the EU to further develop the strategic partnerships and with policy recommendations to engage more actively with new and emerging powers.
This paper seeks to explain the domestic political functions of
Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referend... more This paper seeks to explain the domestic political functions of Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referendum” by outlining the referendum’s value as a strategic campaign ploy in Taiwan’s high-level elections. The way the referendum was used draws on tried and successful campaigning methods in Taiwan: mobilizing mass rallies to create the impression of strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display loyalty/support; and the instrumental use of almost any means that is deemed beneficial to election success. The article argues that these campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be understood as a form of “zaoshi.” Such instrumental use of the referendum as a means of mobilizing supporters—rather than as an aide to policymaking—helps demonstrate that Taiwan, as a society with open political contest, still lacks adequate procedural principles and established conventions for political behaviour.
Kiinan oletettu pehmeä valta ei kanna kovinkaan pitkälle, sillä Kiinan politiikkaan suhtaudutaan ... more Kiinan oletettu pehmeä valta ei kanna kovinkaan pitkälle, sillä Kiinan politiikkaan suhtaudutaan vielä epäillen erityisesti OECD-maissa. Kiina on toistaiseksi ollut haluton käyttämään pakottavaa valtaa, erityisesti sotilaallisia väliintuloja. Kiina on kuitenkin vastikään tukenut tiukempia pakotteita Pohjois-Koreaa vastaan. Kiinan poliittisen vaikutusvallan perusta on taloudellisissa kannustimissa, joita se taloudellisen voimansa kautta pystyy tarjoamaan. Kiinan tarjoama yhdistelmä sijoituksia, avokätistä rahoitusta ja kasvavia markkinoita on houkutteleva. Kiinalaiset valtiolliset lainoittajat ovat muodostuneet merkittäviksi rahoituksen lähteiksi kehittyvissä maissa. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan Kiina myöntää jo enemmän lainoja kuin Maailmanpankki. Kilpailu vaikutusvallasta Yhdysvaltojen ja Kiinan välillä on saamassa samankaltaisia piirteitä kuin Yhdysvaltojen ja Neuvostoliiton välillä kylmän sodan aikana. Euroopan unioni joutuu tulevaisuudessa ottamaan kantaa kiistoihin, joissa vastakkain ovat Kiina ja Yhdysvallat.
A normative EU policy towards China:
Mission impossible?
0
Published 7.9.2010
Mikael Mattl... more A normative EU policy towards China: Mission impossible?
0
Published 7.9.2010 Mikael Mattlin Finnish Institute of International Affairs Download PDF (166 Kb) A vigorous debate is raging on the EU’s normative roles in the global context. The EU actively promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries. Yet, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not always share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as unserious or half-hearted. This paper discusses EU normative policy towards China, identifying loss of the moral high ground, conflicting interests of EU members and lack of leverage towards China as the three main factors hampering it. The paper argues that instead of a half-hearted offensive normative approach towards China, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. More broadly, the EU faces a stark choice between its desire to be a Normative Power and its wish to be a Great Power.
This paper reviews recent reforms of the relationship between the Chinese central government and ... more This paper reviews recent reforms of the relationship between the Chinese central government and strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE), following the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Specifically, it examines the government's re-evaluation of its ownership policy and the introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs. The Chinese central government has re-established tighter financial control over strategic SOEs, both on the income and the expenditure side. The paper argues that the government aims to maintain significant ownership control over SOEs operating in industries deemed to be strategic, while relinquishing control of less important enterprises. Topics: State-owned enterprises. JEL-codes: G32, G38, P26.
This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central governmen... more This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central government's ownership and authority over the capital allocations of strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE). The paper examines the reform of the central government's relationship with key SOEs as a consequence of the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the coming introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs, and the government's ongoing re-evaluation of its ownership policy. SASAC appears to have the potential to develop into a major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic financing and restructuring of key sectors of the Chinese economy. The data reviewed for this paper strongly suggests that the Chinese central government aims to retain significant ownership control over key SOEs and, by extension, over a major part of the domestic economy. The new operating and budgeting system is set to significantly enhance central government control over SOEs' capital allocation.
Keywords: state-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China
This book explores a relatively uncharted area of democratic transitions: the empirical study of ... more This book explores a relatively uncharted area of democratic transitions: the empirical study of intensely politicized transitional societies. In particular, it addresses the problems of protracted democratic transitions that occur when a one-party state has been incompletely dismantled.
Due to an initially smooth political transition from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party politics, Taiwan’s gradual process of democratization has been celebrated as one of the most successful cases of political transformation. However, this political transition was not completed and, especially since 2000 when the first non-Kuomintang president was elected, Taiwan has been marked by protracted political struggles together with an intense politicization of society that persists to this day.
In Taiwan, rather than supporting democracy, many of the political practices associated with representative democracy, such as election campaigning, political demonstrations, vote mobilization and political debate in the media, can appear to undermine the future sustainability of democratic politics through the ways in which they are pursued.
However, the book maintains that institutional flaws are not enough to explain the shortcomings of Taiwan’s democratic politics or those in other transitional democracies. The practices established before the political transition continue to affect politics after the transition. Thus, when an old dominant party like the Kuomintang continues to thrive even after the end of one-party rule, the process of political liberalization and transition contains within itself the seeds of structural politicization.
As such, not only does this study have empirical value – warning that extreme politicization is the main internal threat to the sustainability of Taiwan’s democratic politics – but also its analysis is pertinent to the situations of many other transitional democracies around the world. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese and East Asian politics, as well as to those concerned with political developments in other transitional societies.
This paper probes into a hypothesised opportunism towards political party affiliation among local... more This paper probes into a hypothesised opportunism towards political party affiliation among local politicians in Taiwan since the power transition from Kuomintang (KMT) to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule began in 2000. Longitudinal changes in election candidates' party affiliation are analysed to see what happened to the KMT's supposedly strong base of local politicians after the change of governing party.
The European Union’s (EU) normative roles in global politics have in recent years been a hotly de... more The European Union’s (EU) normative roles in global politics have in recent years been a hotly debated topic. The EU promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries and small developing countries. However, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as halfhearted. This article discusses EU normative policy towards China. It identifies loss of the moral high ground, conflicting positions of EU members and lack of leverage as the three main factors hampering it. It needs to be recognised that these problems are fundamental and stem from the very nature of the EU itself. The article argues that instead of a halfhearted offensive normative approach towards China or ubiquitous dialogues with partners, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. This would entail being more insistent in upholding European values within our own community rather than seeking to export them outside of the Union, and favouring demand-driven cooperation. The choice stands between altering the self-image of the EU to make it better correspond to reality, or making reality live up to the self-image.
The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland’s Gestalt Shift on Chinese Investments
Abstract in English
... more The Canary That Fell Silent. Finland’s Gestalt Shift on Chinese Investments
Abstract in English
For a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.
Keywords: China • Finland • investments • corporate acquisitions • gestalt shift • security
This Working Paper ponders whether China could exercise a role in global economic governance in t... more This Working Paper ponders whether China could exercise a role in global economic governance in the foreseeable future in a similar way to other leading economic powers, especially the United States and previously the United Kingdom. Specifically, the paper asks whether China is able and willing to assume responsibility for the five stabilising functions that Charles Kindleberger envisioned for a leading economic power. The
paper discusses each criterion in turn, providing a tentative qualitative assessment as to whether China is prepared to assume this responsibility in light of evidence from economic data and Chinese policy debates. Particular emphasis is placed on the domestic political constraints China faces in assuming these functions. The ensuing discussion indicates that China’s importance for the global economy is more akin to that of the United States in some respects (e.g. as an import market and provider of long-term lending) than in others. The paper concludes that the biggest stumbling block to China’s ability to fulfil the stabilising functions is its ability to act as a lender of last resort. Currently, domestic financial stability and financial system risks take precedence over China’s global economic governance role. Were a new global financial crisis to hit, China would not be able to fulfil the function of the lender of last resort for other countries. In particular, as long as China maintains tight capital controls and relatively closed financial markets, the United States will likely again be pushed to the centre of crisis management when the next crisis hits. The continuing dominance of the dollar and American financial markets in the global economic system ensures that, for the time being at least, the United States will remain the leading economic power by default.
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION AD HOC STUDY, 2011
Five years after the launch of the ‘BRIC’ acronym, Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006 starte... more Five years after the launch of the ‘BRIC’ acronym, Brazil, Russia, India and China in 2006 started a process of political dialogue, with South Africa being admitted as a new member in 2011 – leading to the transformation of ‘BRIC’ into ‘BRICS’. This study demonstrates that the BRICS countries are not acting systematically as a coherent bloc in the UN and other international forums. However, their coordination within the BRICS framework as well as within other forums such as the G20 have an impact upon international negotiations – leading to negative effects for the EU’s ability to pursue its interests. This also points to the major failure of the EU’s ’strategic partnerships‘ with the individual BRICS countries. The strategic partnership concept has been mainly important in rhetorical terms. The EU has not been able to use these partnerships to substantially upgrade its relations with the BRICS countries or to prepare itself to the shifting balance of power to the South and the Asian- Pacific region. This study presents several options for the EU to further develop the strategic partnerships and with policy recommendations to engage more actively with new and emerging powers.
This paper seeks to explain the domestic political functions of
Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referend... more This paper seeks to explain the domestic political functions of Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referendum” by outlining the referendum’s value as a strategic campaign ploy in Taiwan’s high-level elections. The way the referendum was used draws on tried and successful campaigning methods in Taiwan: mobilizing mass rallies to create the impression of strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display loyalty/support; and the instrumental use of almost any means that is deemed beneficial to election success. The article argues that these campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be understood as a form of “zaoshi.” Such instrumental use of the referendum as a means of mobilizing supporters—rather than as an aide to policymaking—helps demonstrate that Taiwan, as a society with open political contest, still lacks adequate procedural principles and established conventions for political behaviour.
Kiinan oletettu pehmeä valta ei kanna kovinkaan pitkälle, sillä Kiinan politiikkaan suhtaudutaan ... more Kiinan oletettu pehmeä valta ei kanna kovinkaan pitkälle, sillä Kiinan politiikkaan suhtaudutaan vielä epäillen erityisesti OECD-maissa. Kiina on toistaiseksi ollut haluton käyttämään pakottavaa valtaa, erityisesti sotilaallisia väliintuloja. Kiina on kuitenkin vastikään tukenut tiukempia pakotteita Pohjois-Koreaa vastaan. Kiinan poliittisen vaikutusvallan perusta on taloudellisissa kannustimissa, joita se taloudellisen voimansa kautta pystyy tarjoamaan. Kiinan tarjoama yhdistelmä sijoituksia, avokätistä rahoitusta ja kasvavia markkinoita on houkutteleva. Kiinalaiset valtiolliset lainoittajat ovat muodostuneet merkittäviksi rahoituksen lähteiksi kehittyvissä maissa. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan Kiina myöntää jo enemmän lainoja kuin Maailmanpankki. Kilpailu vaikutusvallasta Yhdysvaltojen ja Kiinan välillä on saamassa samankaltaisia piirteitä kuin Yhdysvaltojen ja Neuvostoliiton välillä kylmän sodan aikana. Euroopan unioni joutuu tulevaisuudessa ottamaan kantaa kiistoihin, joissa vastakkain ovat Kiina ja Yhdysvallat.
A normative EU policy towards China:
Mission impossible?
0
Published 7.9.2010
Mikael Mattl... more A normative EU policy towards China: Mission impossible?
0
Published 7.9.2010 Mikael Mattlin Finnish Institute of International Affairs Download PDF (166 Kb) A vigorous debate is raging on the EU’s normative roles in the global context. The EU actively promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries. Yet, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not always share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as unserious or half-hearted. This paper discusses EU normative policy towards China, identifying loss of the moral high ground, conflicting interests of EU members and lack of leverage towards China as the three main factors hampering it. The paper argues that instead of a half-hearted offensive normative approach towards China, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. More broadly, the EU faces a stark choice between its desire to be a Normative Power and its wish to be a Great Power.
This paper reviews recent reforms of the relationship between the Chinese central government and ... more This paper reviews recent reforms of the relationship between the Chinese central government and strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE), following the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Specifically, it examines the government's re-evaluation of its ownership policy and the introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs. The Chinese central government has re-established tighter financial control over strategic SOEs, both on the income and the expenditure side. The paper argues that the government aims to maintain significant ownership control over SOEs operating in industries deemed to be strategic, while relinquishing control of less important enterprises. Topics: State-owned enterprises. JEL-codes: G32, G38, P26.
This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central governmen... more This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central government's ownership and authority over the capital allocations of strategic state-owned enterprises (SOE). The paper examines the reform of the central government's relationship with key SOEs as a consequence of the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the coming introduction of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs, and the government's ongoing re-evaluation of its ownership policy. SASAC appears to have the potential to develop into a major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic financing and restructuring of key sectors of the Chinese economy. The data reviewed for this paper strongly suggests that the Chinese central government aims to retain significant ownership control over key SOEs and, by extension, over a major part of the domestic economy. The new operating and budgeting system is set to significantly enhance central government control over SOEs' capital allocation.
Keywords: state-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China
This book explores a relatively uncharted area of democratic transitions: the empirical study of ... more This book explores a relatively uncharted area of democratic transitions: the empirical study of intensely politicized transitional societies. In particular, it addresses the problems of protracted democratic transitions that occur when a one-party state has been incompletely dismantled.
Due to an initially smooth political transition from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party politics, Taiwan’s gradual process of democratization has been celebrated as one of the most successful cases of political transformation. However, this political transition was not completed and, especially since 2000 when the first non-Kuomintang president was elected, Taiwan has been marked by protracted political struggles together with an intense politicization of society that persists to this day.
In Taiwan, rather than supporting democracy, many of the political practices associated with representative democracy, such as election campaigning, political demonstrations, vote mobilization and political debate in the media, can appear to undermine the future sustainability of democratic politics through the ways in which they are pursued.
However, the book maintains that institutional flaws are not enough to explain the shortcomings of Taiwan’s democratic politics or those in other transitional democracies. The practices established before the political transition continue to affect politics after the transition. Thus, when an old dominant party like the Kuomintang continues to thrive even after the end of one-party rule, the process of political liberalization and transition contains within itself the seeds of structural politicization.
As such, not only does this study have empirical value – warning that extreme politicization is the main internal threat to the sustainability of Taiwan’s democratic politics – but also its analysis is pertinent to the situations of many other transitional democracies around the world. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese and East Asian politics, as well as to those concerned with political developments in other transitional societies.
This paper probes into a hypothesised opportunism towards political party affiliation among local... more This paper probes into a hypothesised opportunism towards political party affiliation among local politicians in Taiwan since the power transition from Kuomintang (KMT) to Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) rule began in 2000. Longitudinal changes in election candidates' party affiliation are analysed to see what happened to the KMT's supposedly strong base of local politicians after the change of governing party.
The European Union’s (EU) normative roles in global politics have in recent years been a hotly de... more The European Union’s (EU) normative roles in global politics have in recent years been a hotly debated topic. The EU promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries and small developing countries. However, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as halfhearted. This article discusses EU normative policy towards China. It identifies loss of the moral high ground, conflicting positions of EU members and lack of leverage as the three main factors hampering it. It needs to be recognised that these problems are fundamental and stem from the very nature of the EU itself. The article argues that instead of a halfhearted offensive normative approach towards China or ubiquitous dialogues with partners, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. This would entail being more insistent in upholding European values within our own community rather than seeking to export them outside of the Union, and favouring demand-driven cooperation. The choice stands between altering the self-image of the EU to make it better correspond to reality, or making reality live up to the self-image.
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Abstract in English
For a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.
Keywords: China • Finland • investments • corporate acquisitions • gestalt shift • security
paper discusses each criterion in turn, providing a tentative qualitative assessment as to whether China is prepared to assume this responsibility in light of evidence from economic data and Chinese policy debates. Particular emphasis is placed on the domestic political constraints China faces in assuming these functions. The ensuing discussion indicates that China’s importance for the global economy is more akin to that of the United States in some respects (e.g. as an import market and provider of long-term lending) than in others. The paper concludes that the biggest stumbling block to China’s ability to fulfil the stabilising functions is its ability to act as a lender of last resort. Currently, domestic financial stability and financial system risks take precedence over China’s global economic governance role. Were a new global financial crisis to hit, China would not be able to fulfil the function of the lender of last resort for other countries. In particular, as long as China maintains tight capital controls and relatively closed financial markets, the United States will likely again be pushed to the centre of crisis management when the next crisis hits. The continuing dominance of the dollar and American financial markets in the global economic system ensures that, for the time being at least, the United States will remain the leading economic power by default.
Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referendum” by outlining the referendum’s
value as a strategic campaign ploy in Taiwan’s high-level elections. The
way the referendum was used draws on tried and successful campaigning
methods in Taiwan: mobilizing mass rallies to create the impression of
strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display
loyalty/support; and the instrumental use of almost any means that is
deemed beneficial to election success. The article argues that these
campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be
understood as a form of “zaoshi.” Such instrumental use of the
referendum as a means of mobilizing supporters—rather than as an aide
to policymaking—helps demonstrate that Taiwan, as a society with open
political contest, still lacks adequate procedural principles and established
conventions for political behaviour.
KEYWORDS: referendum; zaoshi; election strategy; instrumentalism; procedural principles.
Kiina on toistaiseksi ollut haluton käyttämään pakottavaa valtaa, erityisesti sotilaallisia väliintuloja. Kiina on kuitenkin vastikään tukenut tiukempia pakotteita Pohjois-Koreaa vastaan. Kiinan poliittisen vaikutusvallan perusta on taloudellisissa kannustimissa, joita se taloudellisen voimansa kautta pystyy tarjoamaan. Kiinan tarjoama yhdistelmä sijoituksia, avokätistä rahoitusta ja kasvavia markkinoita on houkutteleva.
Kiinalaiset valtiolliset lainoittajat ovat muodostuneet merkittäviksi rahoituksen lähteiksi kehittyvissä maissa. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan Kiina myöntää jo enemmän lainoja kuin Maailmanpankki.
Kilpailu vaikutusvallasta Yhdysvaltojen ja Kiinan välillä on saamassa samankaltaisia piirteitä kuin Yhdysvaltojen ja Neuvostoliiton välillä kylmän sodan aikana. Euroopan unioni joutuu tulevaisuudessa ottamaan kantaa kiistoihin, joissa vastakkain ovat Kiina ja Yhdysvallat.
Mission impossible?
0
Published 7.9.2010
Mikael Mattlin
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Download PDF (166 Kb)
A vigorous debate is raging on the EU’s normative roles in the global context. The EU actively promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries. Yet, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not always share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as unserious or half-hearted. This paper discusses EU normative policy towards China, identifying loss of the moral high ground, conflicting interests of EU members and lack of leverage towards China as the three main factors hampering it. The paper argues that instead of a half-hearted offensive normative approach towards China, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. More broadly, the EU faces a stark choice between its desire to be a Normative Power and its wish to be a Great Power.
Keywords: state-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China
JEL Classification: G32, G38, P26, P31
Due to an initially smooth political transition from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party politics, Taiwan’s gradual process of democratization has been celebrated as one of the most successful cases of political transformation. However, this political transition was not completed and, especially since 2000 when the first non-Kuomintang president was elected, Taiwan has been marked by protracted political struggles together with an intense politicization of society that persists to this day.
In Taiwan, rather than supporting democracy, many of the political practices associated with representative democracy, such as election campaigning, political demonstrations, vote mobilization and political debate in the media, can appear to undermine the future sustainability of democratic politics through the ways in which they are pursued.
However, the book maintains that institutional flaws are not enough to explain the shortcomings of Taiwan’s democratic politics or those in other transitional democracies. The practices established before the political transition continue to affect politics after the transition. Thus, when an old dominant party like the Kuomintang continues to thrive even after the end of one-party rule, the process of political liberalization and transition contains within itself the seeds of structural politicization.
As such, not only does this study have empirical value – warning that extreme politicization is the main internal threat to the sustainability of Taiwan’s democratic politics – but also its analysis is pertinent to the situations of many other transitional democracies around the world. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese and East Asian politics, as well as to those concerned with political developments in other transitional societies.
Abstract in English
For a mixture of historical, economic and security policy reasons Finland can be regarded as a least likely case with regard to apprehensiveness over Chinese investments. Within the EU, Finland has had the highest relative trade dependence on China. Since 2016, Finland is also one of the EU member states that have attracted the most Chinese investment in absolute terms. Finland, which is not a NATO member, has unproblematic relations with China and an open economy that up until a few years ago welcomed Chinese investments. The country also has an unusually long unbroken tradition of domestic legislation regarding foreign investments, which since 1992 can be characterised as liberal. However, during the last two years, there has been a drastic change in views on Chinese investments, both among the policy elite and in the public debate. This change can be regarded as a veritable gestalt shift. As a corollary, a need for a better overview of Chinese investments has been identified. Information exchange and coordination between various governmental departments has been improved in several ways. Simultaneously, cooperation and information exchange between relevant Nordic authorities regarding relevant legislation and praxis has also deepened. Although the 2009 Stoltenberg recommendations did not encompass cooperation on foreign investments, this can be seen as a natural leg in intensified Nordic security cooperation.
Keywords: China • Finland • investments • corporate acquisitions • gestalt shift • security
paper discusses each criterion in turn, providing a tentative qualitative assessment as to whether China is prepared to assume this responsibility in light of evidence from economic data and Chinese policy debates. Particular emphasis is placed on the domestic political constraints China faces in assuming these functions. The ensuing discussion indicates that China’s importance for the global economy is more akin to that of the United States in some respects (e.g. as an import market and provider of long-term lending) than in others. The paper concludes that the biggest stumbling block to China’s ability to fulfil the stabilising functions is its ability to act as a lender of last resort. Currently, domestic financial stability and financial system risks take precedence over China’s global economic governance role. Were a new global financial crisis to hit, China would not be able to fulfil the function of the lender of last resort for other countries. In particular, as long as China maintains tight capital controls and relatively closed financial markets, the United States will likely again be pushed to the centre of crisis management when the next crisis hits. The continuing dominance of the dollar and American financial markets in the global economic system ensures that, for the time being at least, the United States will remain the leading economic power by default.
Taiwan’s 2004 “defensive referendum” by outlining the referendum’s
value as a strategic campaign ploy in Taiwan’s high-level elections. The
way the referendum was used draws on tried and successful campaigning
methods in Taiwan: mobilizing mass rallies to create the impression of
strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display
loyalty/support; and the instrumental use of almost any means that is
deemed beneficial to election success. The article argues that these
campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be
understood as a form of “zaoshi.” Such instrumental use of the
referendum as a means of mobilizing supporters—rather than as an aide
to policymaking—helps demonstrate that Taiwan, as a society with open
political contest, still lacks adequate procedural principles and established
conventions for political behaviour.
KEYWORDS: referendum; zaoshi; election strategy; instrumentalism; procedural principles.
Kiina on toistaiseksi ollut haluton käyttämään pakottavaa valtaa, erityisesti sotilaallisia väliintuloja. Kiina on kuitenkin vastikään tukenut tiukempia pakotteita Pohjois-Koreaa vastaan. Kiinan poliittisen vaikutusvallan perusta on taloudellisissa kannustimissa, joita se taloudellisen voimansa kautta pystyy tarjoamaan. Kiinan tarjoama yhdistelmä sijoituksia, avokätistä rahoitusta ja kasvavia markkinoita on houkutteleva.
Kiinalaiset valtiolliset lainoittajat ovat muodostuneet merkittäviksi rahoituksen lähteiksi kehittyvissä maissa. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan Kiina myöntää jo enemmän lainoja kuin Maailmanpankki.
Kilpailu vaikutusvallasta Yhdysvaltojen ja Kiinan välillä on saamassa samankaltaisia piirteitä kuin Yhdysvaltojen ja Neuvostoliiton välillä kylmän sodan aikana. Euroopan unioni joutuu tulevaisuudessa ottamaan kantaa kiistoihin, joissa vastakkain ovat Kiina ja Yhdysvallat.
Mission impossible?
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Published 7.9.2010
Mikael Mattlin
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
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A vigorous debate is raging on the EU’s normative roles in the global context. The EU actively promotes its political values outside of the Union, especially with regard to prospective accession countries. Yet, a normative foreign policy approach encounters considerable challenges when confronted with major powers, such as China and Russia that do not always share the political values promoted by the EU. Attempts at pursuing a normative policy towards these countries often come across as unserious or half-hearted. This paper discusses EU normative policy towards China, identifying loss of the moral high ground, conflicting interests of EU members and lack of leverage towards China as the three main factors hampering it. The paper argues that instead of a half-hearted offensive normative approach towards China, the EU may be better off with a more determined policy of defensive normativity. More broadly, the EU faces a stark choice between its desire to be a Normative Power and its wish to be a Great Power.
Keywords: state-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China
JEL Classification: G32, G38, P26, P31
Due to an initially smooth political transition from one-party authoritarianism to multi-party politics, Taiwan’s gradual process of democratization has been celebrated as one of the most successful cases of political transformation. However, this political transition was not completed and, especially since 2000 when the first non-Kuomintang president was elected, Taiwan has been marked by protracted political struggles together with an intense politicization of society that persists to this day.
In Taiwan, rather than supporting democracy, many of the political practices associated with representative democracy, such as election campaigning, political demonstrations, vote mobilization and political debate in the media, can appear to undermine the future sustainability of democratic politics through the ways in which they are pursued.
However, the book maintains that institutional flaws are not enough to explain the shortcomings of Taiwan’s democratic politics or those in other transitional democracies. The practices established before the political transition continue to affect politics after the transition. Thus, when an old dominant party like the Kuomintang continues to thrive even after the end of one-party rule, the process of political liberalization and transition contains within itself the seeds of structural politicization.
As such, not only does this study have empirical value – warning that extreme politicization is the main internal threat to the sustainability of Taiwan’s democratic politics – but also its analysis is pertinent to the situations of many other transitional democracies around the world. It will be of interest to scholars and students of Taiwanese, Mainland Chinese and East Asian politics, as well as to those concerned with political developments in other transitional societies.