I recently completed my HBA at the University of Toronto, with double majors in Political Science and Prehistoric Archaeology. I am currently applying for Master's programs in international public policy and security studies.
Peacekeeping is a global public good that demands political cooperation from the most powerful st... more Peacekeeping is a global public good that demands political cooperation from the most powerful state actors; surprisingly however, the task of analyzing, organizing, and executing the provision of this good is delegated to an international institution—the United Nations (UN). This creates a series of principal-agent problems that originate from the differential preferences and information asymmetry existing between the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) and the UN Peacekeeping Secretariat (DPKO), which result in the formulation of peacekeeping mission mandates with varying degrees of specificity and stringency. This paper explores how the transaction costs facing the P5 for controlling the bureaucratic behaviour of the DPKO influence the scope of peacekeeping mission mandates. Two conclusions are drawn from the findings. First, a higher ratio between contributor-specific benefits and transaction costs leads to increased specificity and stringency in the mission mandate. Second, a higher degree of heterogeneity of interests among the P5 leads to decreased bureaucratic control over the DPKO.
Peacekeeping is a global public good that demands political cooperation from the most powerful st... more Peacekeeping is a global public good that demands political cooperation from the most powerful state actors; surprisingly however, the task of analyzing, organizing, and executing the provision of this good is delegated to an international institution—the United Nations (UN). This creates a series of principal-agent problems that originate from the differential preferences and information asymmetry existing between the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P5) and the UN Peacekeeping Secretariat (DPKO), which result in the formulation of peacekeeping mission mandates with varying degrees of specificity and stringency. This paper explores how the transaction costs facing the P5 for controlling the bureaucratic behaviour of the DPKO influence the scope of peacekeeping mission mandates. Two conclusions are drawn from the findings. First, a higher ratio between contributor-specific benefits and transaction costs leads to increased specificity and stringency in the mission mandate. Second, a higher degree of heterogeneity of interests among the P5 leads to decreased bureaucratic control over the DPKO.
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Papers by Beom-Jun Park