Jon Litland
I'm an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin. Before that I was a post.doc at the "Plurals, Predicates and Paradox" project directed by prof. Øystein Linnebo at the University of Oslo. My main areas of research are metaphysics and the philosophy of logic.
In metaphysics I'm particularly interested in metaphysical grounding, especially logical issues in connection with grounding. I'm also very interested in the question of combining logics and what light this might throw on metaphysical issues. I'm working on combining logics for vagueness and mathematical modality with logics for metaphysical modality. I'm also interested in the notion of essence and its connection to modality.
In the philosophy of logic my main interest has been proof-theoretic semantics in the style of Dummett-Prawitz. I'm also very interested in the notion of indefinite extensibility.
Supervisors: Warren Goldfarb, Peter Koellner, and Ned Hall
Address: Department of Philosophy,
2210 Speedway,
WAG 316,
Stop C3500
In metaphysics I'm particularly interested in metaphysical grounding, especially logical issues in connection with grounding. I'm also very interested in the question of combining logics and what light this might throw on metaphysical issues. I'm working on combining logics for vagueness and mathematical modality with logics for metaphysical modality. I'm also interested in the notion of essence and its connection to modality.
In the philosophy of logic my main interest has been proof-theoretic semantics in the style of Dummett-Prawitz. I'm also very interested in the notion of indefinite extensibility.
Supervisors: Warren Goldfarb, Peter Koellner, and Ned Hall
Address: Department of Philosophy,
2210 Speedway,
WAG 316,
Stop C3500
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Papers by Jon Litland
of logic. One takes the introduction rules for granted and tries to justify
the elimination rules. This gives rise to verificationist meaning-theories.
The other takes the elimination rules for granted and tries to justify the
introduction rules. This gives rise to pragmatist meaning-theories. In part
, I give a streamlined presentation of verificationist meaning-theories
for the intuitionistic logical constants and prove that if we start with
intuitionistic introduction rules we can justify exactly the intuitionistic
elimination rule. This settles a conjecture of Prawitz’s (, ). I then
rigorously develop a pragmatist meaning-theory for the intuitionistic log-
ical constants. I prove that if we start with the intuitionistic elimination
rules the strongest introduction rules that are validated are the intuition-
istic introduction rules. In part I consider verificationist and pragmatist
meaning-theories based on arbitrary introduction and elimination rules
and prove that, in a precise sense, intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic
which can be validated by either a verificationist or pragmatist meaning-
theory. I end by discussing the notion of stability and make precise and
prove a conjecture of Dummett’s about stability and total harmony.
deal with iterated grounding claims. The logics are developed in naturaldeduction form and the grounding operators are equipped with bothintroduction and elimination rules. I prove normalization results for pplg and pnlg and determine their relationship to Fine’s Pure Logic of Ground.