Joseph Enge
I am an American former guest lecturer of history, originally from San Francisco, at the University of Tartu. The most recent classes I have taught at UT were Military History for the M.A. Cyber-Defense Program and 20th Century American History for the history department. I received in the U.S. a secondary teaching certificate for history in 1988 and English in 1990. I have taught both subjects in the United States, Europe, and China. My connection with Estonia started in 1993 when I taught in Tartu as a Fulbright teacher for the United States Information Agency. I have authored two world history textbooks for TeachingPoint Publishing in 2004 and 2005 and was awarded a James Madison Fellowship in history in 2005 for my work in teaching American history, curriculum design, and technology applications. I have taught both the most gifted and challenged students with equal enthusiasm.
Supervisors: Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann
Supervisors: Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann
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Drafts by Joseph Enge
The aim is to analyze how the Baltic republics’ movements to re-establish their legitimate independence was eventually met with illegitimate means of coercion and force from Gorbachev and assess the political and military dynamics that started the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union after the Vilnius massacre on January 13, 1991 and culminated with the August 1991 coup. The scope is focused on how Gorbachev’s misapplication of military force in Vilnius and Riga to unilaterally force a political solution only served to make the Baltic problem worse and created more domestic and international political problems as unintended consequences. The ultimate consequence was the fall of the Soviet Union.
Papers by Joseph Enge
Scholars have been divided in the six decades since the truce in Korea ended the war, or “police action” using the Truman administration’s euphemism. The debate and historiography centers on cynicism regarding the effectiveness of “massive retaliation” as a defense policy in general, and specifically whether President Eisenhower’s hint of considering the utilization of nuclear weapons to break the deadlock in Korea produced the truce. Some scholars assert no such nuclear threat occurred; and as David Mayers contends it was the combination of Stalin’s death in March of 1953 with the new Soviet leadership wishing to reduce tensions with the U.S. to concentrate on political consolidation and economic development. It is also asserted China and North Korea were weary of the war and also wanted to focus on domestic economic development as their primary motivation to end the fighting in Korea.
Military technology, crusade theology, and economic opportunity combined at the end of the twelfth century and the start of the thirteenth century to carve out the new Christian kingdom of Livonia and Danish Estonia. Knights, monks, and merchants mixed piety with profit. The fall of the Soviet Union has allowed greater academic research, discourse, and archeological digs to expand the historical knowledge and better understand the collision between Christians and pagans natives during this lesser known crusade, a crusade with longer lasting effects than the more famous Middle East conflicts.
The aim is to analyze how the Baltic republics’ movements to re-establish their legitimate independence was eventually met with illegitimate means of coercion and force from Gorbachev and assess the political and military dynamics that started the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union after the Vilnius massacre on January 13, 1991 and culminated with the August 1991 coup. The scope is focused on how Gorbachev’s misapplication of military force in Vilnius and Riga to unilaterally force a political solution only served to make the Baltic problem worse and created more domestic and international political problems as unintended consequences. The ultimate consequence was the fall of the Soviet Union.
Scholars have been divided in the six decades since the truce in Korea ended the war, or “police action” using the Truman administration’s euphemism. The debate and historiography centers on cynicism regarding the effectiveness of “massive retaliation” as a defense policy in general, and specifically whether President Eisenhower’s hint of considering the utilization of nuclear weapons to break the deadlock in Korea produced the truce. Some scholars assert no such nuclear threat occurred; and as David Mayers contends it was the combination of Stalin’s death in March of 1953 with the new Soviet leadership wishing to reduce tensions with the U.S. to concentrate on political consolidation and economic development. It is also asserted China and North Korea were weary of the war and also wanted to focus on domestic economic development as their primary motivation to end the fighting in Korea.
Military technology, crusade theology, and economic opportunity combined at the end of the twelfth century and the start of the thirteenth century to carve out the new Christian kingdom of Livonia and Danish Estonia. Knights, monks, and merchants mixed piety with profit. The fall of the Soviet Union has allowed greater academic research, discourse, and archeological digs to expand the historical knowledge and better understand the collision between Christians and pagans natives during this lesser known crusade, a crusade with longer lasting effects than the more famous Middle East conflicts.