Isaac B. Kardon
Supervisors: Peter J. Katzenstein, Phillip C. Saunders, Jerome A. Cohen, Peter Dutton, Allen Carlson, and Matthew Evangelista
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China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China.
We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.
China’s interpretation of transparency nonetheless remains conditional and selective, elevating optics and public relations above substantive disclosures. Indeed, the Chinese practice of military transparency is marked by its omissions. Rather than embracing transparency as an end in itself, the PLA selectively addresses foreign demands for greater transparency without necessarily “providing information about military capabilities and policies that allow other countries to assess the compatibility of those capabilities with a country’s stated security goals” [1]. The subsequent analysis of some recent statements and behaviors provides insight into how the risks and rewards of increased military transparency are portrayed within China, offering some indication of likely PLA practices in the future.
The memo is divided into four sections; the first is an examination of what Taiwan wants. We argue that Taiwan’s pursuit of the status quo is dynamic; hence, there are at least three facets to the status quo, all of which will take hard work by Taiwan and others to maintain. The next two sections present strategies composed of a combination of unilateral initiatives, mediation, and multi-track activities that could be employed by the Philippine and U.S. governments, respectively, to help Taiwan achieve its goals. Guided by the “status quo” framework, the strategies aim to (1) ensure that Taiwan continues to be able to expand its role in the international community, (2) help Taiwan maintain economic growth, (3) help Taiwan maintain and receive recognition for its democratic institutions, and lastly, (4) help Taiwan maintain stability in relations with mainland China.
We conclude that though there are many things the Philippines and the United States could do to help Taiwan achieve its goals, some of these things may not be in the strategic interests of these countries, or may simply not be high priorities. Taiwan needs to think more carefully about its own priorities, where it needs the most help, and what sacrifices it is willing to make in exchange for wins on other fronts. Then, it needs to get policymakers in both parties articulating those priorities in a way that helps decision-makers in the Philippines, and the U.S. understand what Taiwan wants.