"This study examines Australia’s interests in seaborne trade and the legal rights and limitations... more "This study examines Australia’s interests in seaborne trade and the legal rights and limitations Australia and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) faces in protecting those shipping interests. It also establishes the basic character of the relevant international law that is very restrictive in assigning jurisdiction over ships. Australian shipping interests involve far more than just the small number of vessels flying the Australian flag, however, and include the actual cargoes being shipped to and from Australia and the safety of Australian nationals on board merchant shipping. More generally, Australia has a broader interest in the safety and security of the global maritime trading system, as demonstrated by the RAN’s contributions to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden region.
The study first outlines the nature of international seaborne trade followed by a short analysis of Australia’s seaborne trade. The maritime industry is fundamentally important to the Australian economy. As an island nation, the Australian economy is profoundly dependent upon the oceans. The efficient, cost-effective and safe transport of the nation’s agricultural, mining and manufactured goods to their intended domestic and international destinations and the safe arrival of essential imports via the sea is vital to Australia’s economic and social development. The strategic context of securing Australia’s shipping and seaborne trade involves consideration of economic, national security, defence and environmental implications. This context includes the identification of conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism and the implications of technological, legal and regulatory changes and innovation for the protection of shipping. The second chapter establishes the international law related to jurisdiction over vessels. Chapter 3 sets out the international legal framework for interdiction at sea, whilst Chapter 4 outlines the Australian domestic framework. Chapter 5 covers the rules governing the protection of shipping and interdiction of ships during wartime. The study concludes that the legal framework for jurisdiction over vessels is very restrictive, particularly given that the vast majority of Australia’s trade is carried on foreign-flagged ships, a situation is likely to persist. International efforts, including the promulgation of UN Security Council resolutions, to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off Somalia are very specific to that problem and are unlikely to be more widely applicable. The options available to Australia are thus very limited, but might include the negotiation of bilateral ship boarding agreements with major flag states, as the United States has done in the context of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the Proliferation Security Initiative."
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Dec 1, 2016
The Philippines at a Crossroads Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte will be profoun... more The Philippines at a Crossroads Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte will be profoundly different from the one pursued by the previous administration of President Benigno Aquino III. The priorities, philosophy and dynamics that inform the policies of Duterte will be fashioned and influenced by his background as a local politician from the southern Philippines, predicated on his anti-establishment position as a virtual outsider in national politics and a neophyte in foreign affairs. On the sombre stage of global diplomacy where tradition, protocol and etiquette are primordial values, the raw honesty, populist theatrics, impulsiveness and frivolity of Duterte have not been well-received in other countries, though he remains very popular at home. Duterte's conciliatory and amicable stance towards China seems a conundrum in stark contrast with his usual intrepid, volatile and pugnacious temperament. The President's colourful language, which reveals a deep-seated resentment towards the United States, is a thin veneer covering a hollow foreign policy on a dangerously isolationist path. While Duterte has demonstrated his embarrassing histrionics, he has yet to unveil a carefully crafted and detailed policy towards China and how his administration intends to deal with the complex disputes in the South China Sea. An Overwhelming Victory On 12 July 2016, the final award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the case filed by the Philippines against China over the South China Sea in January 2013 represented an overwhelming legal and moral victory for Manila. The Tribunal decisively declared that China's nine-dash line claim had no basis in international law and was incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, China's defiance of the ruling and refusal to honour it pose a serious challenge to Manila's victory. There were initially high expectations--riding on a global tide of favourable public opinion after the Hague ruling--that the Philippines would call on other countries to help enforce the verdict, demand reparations over the damage done to the marine environment, negotiate a fisheries access agreement at Scarborough Shoal, conduct navigational operations, and peacefully contest China's hegemonic ambitions through regional support and diplomatic pressure. These options now endure only in the realm of wistful thinking. The strategic imperatives behind Manila's muted jubilation in response to the ruling are justifiable, but the shortsighted, amnesic foreign policy reaction to accommodate China is inexplicable. The all-encompassing victory was subduely received. After the award was issued, the reaction from Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay was so sullen that casual observers unaware of the positive ruling might have formed the conclusion that the Philippines had actually lost the case. Yasay's terse official statement merely called for "restraint and sobriety", echoing President Duterte's "no-taunt, no-flaunt" policy. Both men advocated for carefully calibrated actions so as to cushion the blow of a positive ruling against China. (1) This was in sharp contrast to the Aquino administration's more bellicose stance towards Beijing. The tight-lipped, almost cryptic response from Duterte--known for his animated language and unpredictable demeanour--was atypical of him. China's optimism in the Duterte administration indicates that the conciliatory approach of the new administration has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. (2) President Duterte has since avoided extended discussion of the legal victory, and has yet to reveal a well thought-out strategy that the country can employ towards Beijing. Yasay, for his part, appears less bullish as well, and in recent ASEAN forums was quoted as not pushing strongly for inclusion of the award in the organization's official statements, a position that earned him heavy criticism from seasoned Philippine diplomats. …
Page 1. 238 The Cambridge Law Journal INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS*CECIL A. WRIGHT HE recogni... more Page 1. 238 The Cambridge Law Journal INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS*CECIL A. WRIGHT HE recognition of 'torts' as a separate and distinct branch of th . law is, as things legal go, extremely recent. The first English ...
"This study examines Australia’s interests in seaborne trade and the legal rights and limitations... more "This study examines Australia’s interests in seaborne trade and the legal rights and limitations Australia and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) faces in protecting those shipping interests. It also establishes the basic character of the relevant international law that is very restrictive in assigning jurisdiction over ships. Australian shipping interests involve far more than just the small number of vessels flying the Australian flag, however, and include the actual cargoes being shipped to and from Australia and the safety of Australian nationals on board merchant shipping. More generally, Australia has a broader interest in the safety and security of the global maritime trading system, as demonstrated by the RAN’s contributions to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden region.
The study first outlines the nature of international seaborne trade followed by a short analysis of Australia’s seaborne trade. The maritime industry is fundamentally important to the Australian economy. As an island nation, the Australian economy is profoundly dependent upon the oceans. The efficient, cost-effective and safe transport of the nation’s agricultural, mining and manufactured goods to their intended domestic and international destinations and the safe arrival of essential imports via the sea is vital to Australia’s economic and social development. The strategic context of securing Australia’s shipping and seaborne trade involves consideration of economic, national security, defence and environmental implications. This context includes the identification of conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism and the implications of technological, legal and regulatory changes and innovation for the protection of shipping. The second chapter establishes the international law related to jurisdiction over vessels. Chapter 3 sets out the international legal framework for interdiction at sea, whilst Chapter 4 outlines the Australian domestic framework. Chapter 5 covers the rules governing the protection of shipping and interdiction of ships during wartime. The study concludes that the legal framework for jurisdiction over vessels is very restrictive, particularly given that the vast majority of Australia’s trade is carried on foreign-flagged ships, a situation is likely to persist. International efforts, including the promulgation of UN Security Council resolutions, to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off Somalia are very specific to that problem and are unlikely to be more widely applicable. The options available to Australia are thus very limited, but might include the negotiation of bilateral ship boarding agreements with major flag states, as the United States has done in the context of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the Proliferation Security Initiative."
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Dec 1, 2016
The Philippines at a Crossroads Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte will be profoun... more The Philippines at a Crossroads Philippine foreign policy under President Duterte will be profoundly different from the one pursued by the previous administration of President Benigno Aquino III. The priorities, philosophy and dynamics that inform the policies of Duterte will be fashioned and influenced by his background as a local politician from the southern Philippines, predicated on his anti-establishment position as a virtual outsider in national politics and a neophyte in foreign affairs. On the sombre stage of global diplomacy where tradition, protocol and etiquette are primordial values, the raw honesty, populist theatrics, impulsiveness and frivolity of Duterte have not been well-received in other countries, though he remains very popular at home. Duterte's conciliatory and amicable stance towards China seems a conundrum in stark contrast with his usual intrepid, volatile and pugnacious temperament. The President's colourful language, which reveals a deep-seated resentment towards the United States, is a thin veneer covering a hollow foreign policy on a dangerously isolationist path. While Duterte has demonstrated his embarrassing histrionics, he has yet to unveil a carefully crafted and detailed policy towards China and how his administration intends to deal with the complex disputes in the South China Sea. An Overwhelming Victory On 12 July 2016, the final award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the case filed by the Philippines against China over the South China Sea in January 2013 represented an overwhelming legal and moral victory for Manila. The Tribunal decisively declared that China's nine-dash line claim had no basis in international law and was incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, China's defiance of the ruling and refusal to honour it pose a serious challenge to Manila's victory. There were initially high expectations--riding on a global tide of favourable public opinion after the Hague ruling--that the Philippines would call on other countries to help enforce the verdict, demand reparations over the damage done to the marine environment, negotiate a fisheries access agreement at Scarborough Shoal, conduct navigational operations, and peacefully contest China's hegemonic ambitions through regional support and diplomatic pressure. These options now endure only in the realm of wistful thinking. The strategic imperatives behind Manila's muted jubilation in response to the ruling are justifiable, but the shortsighted, amnesic foreign policy reaction to accommodate China is inexplicable. The all-encompassing victory was subduely received. After the award was issued, the reaction from Foreign Affairs Secretary Perfecto Yasay was so sullen that casual observers unaware of the positive ruling might have formed the conclusion that the Philippines had actually lost the case. Yasay's terse official statement merely called for "restraint and sobriety", echoing President Duterte's "no-taunt, no-flaunt" policy. Both men advocated for carefully calibrated actions so as to cushion the blow of a positive ruling against China. (1) This was in sharp contrast to the Aquino administration's more bellicose stance towards Beijing. The tight-lipped, almost cryptic response from Duterte--known for his animated language and unpredictable demeanour--was atypical of him. China's optimism in the Duterte administration indicates that the conciliatory approach of the new administration has not gone unnoticed in Beijing. (2) President Duterte has since avoided extended discussion of the legal victory, and has yet to reveal a well thought-out strategy that the country can employ towards Beijing. Yasay, for his part, appears less bullish as well, and in recent ASEAN forums was quoted as not pushing strongly for inclusion of the award in the organization's official statements, a position that earned him heavy criticism from seasoned Philippine diplomats. …
Page 1. 238 The Cambridge Law Journal INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS*CECIL A. WRIGHT HE recogni... more Page 1. 238 The Cambridge Law Journal INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS*CECIL A. WRIGHT HE recognition of 'torts' as a separate and distinct branch of th . law is, as things legal go, extremely recent. The first English ...
Separating the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and ... more Separating the Malay Peninsular and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore form the most convenient route connecting the East and the West. The East Asian economic powerhouses of Japan, China and South Korea rely on these Straits to transport oil from their Middle Eastern suppliers. The emergence of China as one of the world\u27s major economic power has enhanced the usage of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as important maritime conduits for the Chinese economy
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The study first outlines the nature of international seaborne trade followed by a short analysis of Australia’s seaborne trade. The maritime industry is fundamentally important to the Australian economy. As an island nation, the Australian economy is profoundly dependent upon the oceans. The efficient, cost-effective and safe transport of the nation’s agricultural, mining and manufactured goods to their intended domestic and international destinations and the safe arrival of essential imports via the sea is vital to Australia’s economic and social development. The strategic context of securing Australia’s shipping and seaborne trade involves consideration of economic, national security, defence and environmental implications. This context includes the identification of conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism and the implications of technological, legal and regulatory changes and innovation for the protection of shipping. The second chapter establishes the international law related to jurisdiction over vessels. Chapter 3 sets out the international legal framework for interdiction at sea, whilst Chapter 4 outlines the Australian domestic framework. Chapter 5 covers the rules governing the protection of shipping and interdiction of ships during wartime. The study concludes that the legal framework for jurisdiction over vessels is very restrictive, particularly given that the vast majority of Australia’s trade is carried on foreign-flagged ships, a situation is likely to persist. International efforts, including the promulgation of UN Security Council resolutions, to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off Somalia are very specific to that problem and are unlikely to be more widely applicable. The options available to Australia are thus very limited, but might include the negotiation of bilateral ship boarding agreements with major flag states, as the United States has done in the context of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the Proliferation Security Initiative."
The study first outlines the nature of international seaborne trade followed by a short analysis of Australia’s seaborne trade. The maritime industry is fundamentally important to the Australian economy. As an island nation, the Australian economy is profoundly dependent upon the oceans. The efficient, cost-effective and safe transport of the nation’s agricultural, mining and manufactured goods to their intended domestic and international destinations and the safe arrival of essential imports via the sea is vital to Australia’s economic and social development. The strategic context of securing Australia’s shipping and seaborne trade involves consideration of economic, national security, defence and environmental implications. This context includes the identification of conventional threats such as piracy and terrorism and the implications of technological, legal and regulatory changes and innovation for the protection of shipping. The second chapter establishes the international law related to jurisdiction over vessels. Chapter 3 sets out the international legal framework for interdiction at sea, whilst Chapter 4 outlines the Australian domestic framework. Chapter 5 covers the rules governing the protection of shipping and interdiction of ships during wartime. The study concludes that the legal framework for jurisdiction over vessels is very restrictive, particularly given that the vast majority of Australia’s trade is carried on foreign-flagged ships, a situation is likely to persist. International efforts, including the promulgation of UN Security Council resolutions, to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden and in the waters off Somalia are very specific to that problem and are unlikely to be more widely applicable. The options available to Australia are thus very limited, but might include the negotiation of bilateral ship boarding agreements with major flag states, as the United States has done in the context of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the Proliferation Security Initiative."