Books by Theodore Arabatzis
Authored by a diverse group of contributors, Big Science in the 21st Century offers a multifacete... more Authored by a diverse group of contributors, Big Science in the 21st Century offers a multifaceted view of the challenges, merits, and transformations of Big Science across different disciplines and geographical boundaries. It delves into the transformative role of Big Science in shaping the world we live in, from its historical roots in the aftermath of the Second World War to its contemporary interdisciplinary and international nature. The book is organized in five parts, each offering unique insights into the impact of Big Science. The first part looks at lessons from Big Science organizations and best practices in increasing the return of benefits to society. The second part offers the voice of key economists who have worked on assessment exercises concerning the socioeconomic benefits of large-scale research infrastructures. The third part traces the development of Big Science in the aftermath of World War II. The fourth part focus on the educational and cultural impacts that Big Science has beyond the laboratory, from the art gallery to the school classroom. The last part brings a more global perspective with contributions from other continents outside North America and Western Europe. The book is aimed at professionals involved in science policy and administration, economists interested in evaluating the results of scientific research, historians of science and technology, and anyone with an interest in scientific outreach and communication.
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Papers by Theodore Arabatzis
J. Schickore, W. R. Newman (eds.), Elusive Phenomena, Unwieldy Things, Archimedes 71, 2024
Theory and experiment went hand in hand in the work of Lord Rayleigh, in which the quest for rigo... more Theory and experiment went hand in hand in the work of Lord Rayleigh, in which the quest for rigor was a ubiquitous theme. To Rayleigh’s mind, though, and in contrast to mathematicians, physicists could proceed in their investigations without seeking absolute rigor. In his experimental practice, pursuing rigor involved the application of control strategies, which pervaded his work at various levels. Moreover, experimental control had various aims, such as standardizing measurement units in determining the ohm and validating experimental results in the discovery of argon. In the former case, Rayleigh and his team varied the design of their apparatus to control the experimental conditions. Dealing with errors was the main aim of their control practices and lay at the heart of their methodology. In the latter case, control was present in every step of the discovery process: the detection of discrepancies between the densities of atmospheric and “chemical” nitrogen, the identification of argon as a constituent of the atmosphere, and the subsequent exploration of its properties. The aim of this paper is to investigate and contrast the strategies of control employed in those two cases and to clarify their various purposes.
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P. Charitos et al (eds.), Big Science in the 21st Century: Economic and Societal Impacts, 2023
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Science in Context, 2021
The aim of this article is to make a case for the pertinence of a biographical approach to the hi... more The aim of this article is to make a case for the pertinence of a biographical approach to the history of scientific objects. I first lay out the rationale of that approach by
revisiting and extending my earlier work on the topic. I consider the characteristics of scientific objects that motivate the biographical metaphor, and I indicate its virtues and limitations by bringing out the positive and negative analogies between biographies of scientific objects and ordinary biographies. I then point out various ways in which scientific objects may pass away and argue that their demise should be conceptualized as a process. Finally, I sketch the history of the concept of “ether” in nineteenth and early twentieth century physics and suggest that it lends itself particularly well to a biographical treatment. To that effect, I discuss the identity, heuristic character, and recalcitrance of the ether and examine the reasons that may have led to its passing.
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Quantum Chemistry in Historical Perspective, 2022
Quantum chemistry is a firmly established branch within theoretical chemistry. However, in the la... more Quantum chemistry is a firmly established branch within theoretical chemistry. However, in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the first foundational papers and books appeared, mostly written by physicists as well as by chemists or chemical physicists, the disciplinary identity of the emerging field was a contentious issue: Was it physics or was it chemistry? This question was tied to the problem of reductionism and received different answers, which led to different ways of practicing quantum chemistry and eventually stabilized its identity as an in-between/boundary discipline. During its subsequent development the question of disciplinary identity continued to be central, as quantum chemistry established connections to other disciplines and was deeply shaped by computing technology. In this chapter we discuss the historical development of quantum chemistry, integrating several strands, conceptual, institutional, methodological, and epistemological.
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Centaurus, 2022
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Physics in Perspective, 2021
In this paper, we employ Ian Hacking’s insight that ‘‘unity’’ has a double meaning, singleness an... more In this paper, we employ Ian Hacking’s insight that ‘‘unity’’ has a double meaning, singleness and harmonious integration, to revisit a major episode from the recent history of CERN: the UA1 and UA2 experiments in the early 1980s, which led to the discovery of the W and Z bosons. CERN is a complex institution, where diverse groups are called upon to cooperate. We argue that this lack of unity, in the first sense of the term, is counterbalanced by specific mechanisms of integration, so that CERN achieves its standing as a unified organization. The UA1/UA2 episode highlights this interplay between unity and disunity. The UA2 experiment was designed and carried out in order to confirm the validity of the results obtained by UA1. The two experimental teams, working independently and with different
mentalities, built separate detectors and refrained from systematically sharing their data. This gave rise to strong antagonisms and diametrically opposed opinions over what conclusions could legitimately be drawn from the resulting data. Our analysis focuses on the mechanisms which compensated for that disunity and eventually led to a unified consensus between UA1 and UA2.
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Philosophical Inquiries, 2021
In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and phil... more In this paper we attempt a critical appraisal of the relation between history of science and philosophy of science in Ian Hacking’s styles of scientific reasoning project. In our analysis, we employ a distinction between “historical philosophy of science” and “philosophical history of science”: the former aims at addressing philosophical issues, while the latter aims at telling stories about the scientific past that are informed by philosophical considerations. We argue that Hacking practices historical philosophy of science; discuss how his approach is differentiated from the so-called confrontation model; and show that he opts for a strong integration between history and philosophy of science. Finally, we discuss the historiographical implications of his approach and suggest that his aim to maintain a middle position, on the one hand, between contingency and inevitabilism, and, on the other, between internalism and externalism in the explanation of the stability of scientific knowledge, is compromised by his philosophical commitments.
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Kevin McCain, Kostas Kampourakis (eds.), What is Scientific Knowledge? An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology of Science, 2019
Scientific concepts play representational and heuristic roles in the acquisition of scientific kn... more Scientific concepts play representational and heuristic roles in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. On the one hand, they represent entities, properties, and processes in nature. On the other hand, they facilitate, or even make possible, the investigation of those entities, properties, and processes. Concepts are supposed to be things in the head: mental representations of objects, properties, process and so on. In that sense, they are theoretical constructs of cognitive psychology. They are posited to account for various abilities that humans have, such as the ability to unify and to discriminate. The public character of scientific concepts, such as ‘electron’, ‘field’, ‘gene’, and so on, as opposed to their private mental counterparts, makes it possible for historians and philosophers of science to study them by examining the evolving representations associated with them; their uses, that is, the objects, properties, and processes to which they are applied; and their relations to other concepts.
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Isis, 2019
The author brings out the many faces of explanation in history of science by commenting on the co... more The author brings out the many faces of explanation in history of science by commenting on the contributions to a Focus section of Isis on historical explanation. The essay starts by indicating several ways in which the term “explanation” is used in historiographical discourse. It then distinguishes the object of explanation from the process of explanation and points out common themes and points of contention among the thirteen contributions. It also discusses two of those points in more detail: the problems of causal explanation in history of science and the imperative of avoiding anachronism in historical interpretation. The essay concludes by suggesting a pluralist take on explaining science historically.
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Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2018
I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), ... more I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious.
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 2017
In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by ... more In this article, I explore the value of philosophy of science for history of science. I start by introducing a distinction between two ways of integrating history and philosophy of science: historical philosophy of science (HPS) and philosophical history of science (PHS). I then offer a critical discussion of Imre Lakatos’s project to bring philosophy of science to bear on historical interpretation. I point out certain flaws in Lakatos’s project, which I consider indicative of what went wrong with PHS in the past. Finally, I put forward my own attempt to bring out the historiographical potential of philosophy of science. Starting from Norwood Russell Hanson’s insight that historical studies of science involve metascientific concepts, I argue that philosophical reflection on those concepts can be (and, indeed, has been) historiographically fruitful. I focus on four issues (epistemic values, experimentation, scientific discovery and conceptual change) and discuss their significance and utility for historiographical practice.
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International handbook of research on …, 2008
13 The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science Theodore Arabatzis a... more 13 The Problem of Conceptual Change in the Philosophy and History of Science Theodore Arabatzis and Vasso Kindi University of Athens INTRODUCTION The problem of conceptual change has been widely discussed in the philosophy of science since the early 1960s, when Thomas ...
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In this paper, we revisit the discovery of argon by Lord Rayleigh and William Ramsay. We argue th... more In this paper, we revisit the discovery of argon by Lord Rayleigh and William Ramsay. We argue that to understand historically how argon was detected, conceptualized, and accommodated into chemical knowledge we need to take into account the philosophical insight that scientific discovery is often an extended process. One of argon’s most intriguing properties was that it did not react with other elements. Reactivity, however, had been a constitutive property of elements. Thus, the discovery of argon could not have been accepted by chemists without a reconceptualization of ‘element’. Furthermore, there were difficulties with the accommodation of argon in the Periodic table, because argon appeared to undermine the conception of matter that underlay the Periodic table. The discovery of argon was complete only after those conceptual difficulties had been removed. This is why it has to be understood as an extended process, rather than as an event. Furthermore, we will suggest that some of the factors that complicated the discovery of argon were related to the legitimization of physical techniques of investigation in chemistry and the emergence of physical chemistry.
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R. L. Numbers and K. Kampourakis (eds.), Newton's Apple and Other Myths about Science (Harvard University Press)., 2015
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The significant role of models and analogies in scientific practice has been widely recognized. M... more The significant role of models and analogies in scientific practice has been widely recognized. Modern scholarship on analogy takes its departure from the work of Mary Hesse, who pointed out the existence of negative analogies between two different physical systems, that is, those respects in which the two systems clearly differ. However, she underappreciated the role of negative analogies in model-building. In our paper we will stress the significance of negative analogies for the development of Bohr’s atom. We will argue that it was the negative, rather than the positive, analogy between intra-atomic electrons and the rings of Saturn that motivated Bohr to adopt and develop Rutherford’s atomic model. The elaboration of the negative analogy led to the conclusion that the electron could move only in certain discrete orbits and its energy and angular momentum were accordingly restricted. Furthermore, a related analogy between electrons and planets played a significant role in Bohr’s subsequent articulation of the model. On the one hand, the positive analogy suggested that electrons (like planets) revolved around the center of mass of the atom (solar system). On the other hand, the extremely high speed of electrons (unlike that of planets) suggested that relativity be brought into the picture.
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Books by Theodore Arabatzis
Papers by Theodore Arabatzis
revisiting and extending my earlier work on the topic. I consider the characteristics of scientific objects that motivate the biographical metaphor, and I indicate its virtues and limitations by bringing out the positive and negative analogies between biographies of scientific objects and ordinary biographies. I then point out various ways in which scientific objects may pass away and argue that their demise should be conceptualized as a process. Finally, I sketch the history of the concept of “ether” in nineteenth and early twentieth century physics and suggest that it lends itself particularly well to a biographical treatment. To that effect, I discuss the identity, heuristic character, and recalcitrance of the ether and examine the reasons that may have led to its passing.
mentalities, built separate detectors and refrained from systematically sharing their data. This gave rise to strong antagonisms and diametrically opposed opinions over what conclusions could legitimately be drawn from the resulting data. Our analysis focuses on the mechanisms which compensated for that disunity and eventually led to a unified consensus between UA1 and UA2.
revisiting and extending my earlier work on the topic. I consider the characteristics of scientific objects that motivate the biographical metaphor, and I indicate its virtues and limitations by bringing out the positive and negative analogies between biographies of scientific objects and ordinary biographies. I then point out various ways in which scientific objects may pass away and argue that their demise should be conceptualized as a process. Finally, I sketch the history of the concept of “ether” in nineteenth and early twentieth century physics and suggest that it lends itself particularly well to a biographical treatment. To that effect, I discuss the identity, heuristic character, and recalcitrance of the ether and examine the reasons that may have led to its passing.
mentalities, built separate detectors and refrained from systematically sharing their data. This gave rise to strong antagonisms and diametrically opposed opinions over what conclusions could legitimately be drawn from the resulting data. Our analysis focuses on the mechanisms which compensated for that disunity and eventually led to a unified consensus between UA1 and UA2.