Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 2019
Cet essai traite de la conception que Deleuze se faisait du critere a adopter quand on s’interess... more Cet essai traite de la conception que Deleuze se faisait du critere a adopter quand on s’interesse aux controverses metaphysiques et meta-metaphysiques, tout en repondant, au nom de Deleuze, a l’objection tres repandue parmi les philosophes analytiques selon laquelle il ne disposerait d’aucun critere pour envisager des telles controverses. On soutient qu’il est possible de tirer de l’œuvre de Deleuze meme un critere pour decider de ces controverses metaphysiques et meta-metaphysiques, celui de la compatibilite avec une pratique gauchiste de la politisation. Cette pratique est caracterisee par ses defenseurs comme une tendance a mettre en avant leur pouvoir de maniere a temoigner de l’empathie a autrui et par l’objectif qui est le leur de mettre en lumiere la nature politique des traitements apparemment ou supposement apolitiques de ces controverses, a l’instar des traitements que leur reservent les philosophes analytiques eux-memes.
Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. (i) In hi... more Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. (i) In his Proslogion , Saint Anselm argued that the claim “God exists” is true. (ii) If an intuition that a claim c is a useful a-priori justificatory resource, this can only be because such an intuition is a justification that c is true. And (iii) if an intuition that c is a justification that c is true, c can stand, not only for mathematical or logical claims, but also for controversial philosophical ones, e.g., “God exists”. This essay addresses (i) to (iii) while dialoguing with the literature on Anselm and intuition and articulating an alternative reading of the Proslogion . The alternative reading is that regardless of whether the Proslogion backs up or aims to back up the claim that “God exists” is true, it implicitly articulates the Meaning Argument whose conclusion is that all persons of faith are able to understand that the claim “God exists” is meaningful. This argument, it is argued, is evidence that an intuition that c may be a useful a-priori justificatory resource even if such intuition does not track truth, but merely meaning in being a justification for taking c to be meaningful. It is also supported that an intuition that “God exists” is not a justification that this claim is true. This is an indication that there may be reasons for thinking that the same applies to other controversial philosophical claims.
This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions ... more This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions to the fact that, throughout history, persons have been engaged in metaphysical disputes. Nietzsche embraces a libertarian reaction that is in agreement with his anti-democratic aristocratic political views, whereas Carnap endorses an egalitarian reaction aligned with his democratic and socialist political views. After characterizing these reactions, the essay argues for two claims. The first claim is that the stated contrasting reactions are to be considered, not only by the few scholars who are interested both in Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s writings, but by a far larger group that includes those who have addressed the continental-analytic gap; those who are concerned with the development of contemporary philosophy; and/or those who are interested in the writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, David Lewis and/or Peter van Inwagen. The second claim is that we have to entertain a synthesis of Nietzsche’s libertarian and Carnap’s egalitarian reaction in order to overcome the continental-analytic gap.
An often-adopted use of the predicate, "to be colonized", is one that applies i... more An often-adopted use of the predicate, "to be colonized", is one that applies it loosely, not in reference to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of enslaved persons, but to academics who are citizens of former colonies like Brazil, their ways of thinking, philosophical works, academic communities, etc. But under what conditions one is to do that? And how can one avoid the attribution of such predicate to oneself or one's works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, "to be 'subtly' philosophically colonized", according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have the thirteen features described in the essay or at least most of them.
Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 2019
Cet essai traite de la conception que Deleuze se faisait du critere a adopter quand on s’interess... more Cet essai traite de la conception que Deleuze se faisait du critere a adopter quand on s’interesse aux controverses metaphysiques et meta-metaphysiques, tout en repondant, au nom de Deleuze, a l’objection tres repandue parmi les philosophes analytiques selon laquelle il ne disposerait d’aucun critere pour envisager des telles controverses. On soutient qu’il est possible de tirer de l’œuvre de Deleuze meme un critere pour decider de ces controverses metaphysiques et meta-metaphysiques, celui de la compatibilite avec une pratique gauchiste de la politisation. Cette pratique est caracterisee par ses defenseurs comme une tendance a mettre en avant leur pouvoir de maniere a temoigner de l’empathie a autrui et par l’objectif qui est le leur de mettre en lumiere la nature politique des traitements apparemment ou supposement apolitiques de ces controverses, a l’instar des traitements que leur reservent les philosophes analytiques eux-memes.
Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. (i) In hi... more Consider three widely shared claims that have not been discussed vis-à-vis one another. (i) In his Proslogion , Saint Anselm argued that the claim “God exists” is true. (ii) If an intuition that a claim c is a useful a-priori justificatory resource, this can only be because such an intuition is a justification that c is true. And (iii) if an intuition that c is a justification that c is true, c can stand, not only for mathematical or logical claims, but also for controversial philosophical ones, e.g., “God exists”. This essay addresses (i) to (iii) while dialoguing with the literature on Anselm and intuition and articulating an alternative reading of the Proslogion . The alternative reading is that regardless of whether the Proslogion backs up or aims to back up the claim that “God exists” is true, it implicitly articulates the Meaning Argument whose conclusion is that all persons of faith are able to understand that the claim “God exists” is meaningful. This argument, it is argued, is evidence that an intuition that c may be a useful a-priori justificatory resource even if such intuition does not track truth, but merely meaning in being a justification for taking c to be meaningful. It is also supported that an intuition that “God exists” is not a justification that this claim is true. This is an indication that there may be reasons for thinking that the same applies to other controversial philosophical claims.
This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions ... more This essay presupposes that Friedrich Nietzsche and Rudolf Carnap champion contrasting reactions to the fact that, throughout history, persons have been engaged in metaphysical disputes. Nietzsche embraces a libertarian reaction that is in agreement with his anti-democratic aristocratic political views, whereas Carnap endorses an egalitarian reaction aligned with his democratic and socialist political views. After characterizing these reactions, the essay argues for two claims. The first claim is that the stated contrasting reactions are to be considered, not only by the few scholars who are interested both in Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s writings, but by a far larger group that includes those who have addressed the continental-analytic gap; those who are concerned with the development of contemporary philosophy; and/or those who are interested in the writings of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, David Lewis and/or Peter van Inwagen. The second claim is that we have to entertain a synthesis of Nietzsche’s libertarian and Carnap’s egalitarian reaction in order to overcome the continental-analytic gap.
An often-adopted use of the predicate, "to be colonized", is one that applies i... more An often-adopted use of the predicate, "to be colonized", is one that applies it loosely, not in reference to original Africans or indigenous people enslaved by Europeans or heirs of enslaved persons, but to academics who are citizens of former colonies like Brazil, their ways of thinking, philosophical works, academic communities, etc. But under what conditions one is to do that? And how can one avoid the attribution of such predicate to oneself or one's works? These issues have not received much attention. While dialoguing with authors associated with decolonial studies, Brazilian, continental and analytic philosophers, this essay aims to contribute to change this situation. It does so by proposing an alternative use of the predicate, "to be 'subtly' philosophically colonized", according to which this predicate is to be applied to philosophical works that have the thirteen features described in the essay or at least most of them.
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