Kevin W . Fogg
For more information, see his website: www.kevinwfogg.net
Trained at Duke and then Yale, with research collaboration across the State Islamic University network in Indonesia, Dr Fogg is a historian of Islam in Indonesia in the twentieth century.
Phone: 919-843-9065
Address: Carolina Asia Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Campus Box 7582
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7582
Trained at Duke and then Yale, with research collaboration across the State Islamic University network in Indonesia, Dr Fogg is a historian of Islam in Indonesia in the twentieth century.
Phone: 919-843-9065
Address: Carolina Asia Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Campus Box 7582
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-7582
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Sejarah Revolusi Indonesia dipenuhi penggambaran perang revolusi sebagai perang nasionalistis atau berbasis kelas. Dalam kajian baru ini, Kevin W. Fogg meninjau ulang Revolusi Indonesia (1945-1949) sebagai perjuangan umat Islam. Dalam spirit keagamaan inilah, kaum Muslim taat--yang jumlahnya hampir separuh populasi--berperang. Mereka teryakinkan dengan seruan jihad dari ulama dan kiai bahwa mereka sedang menjalankan perang sabil melawan kaum kafir penjajah.
Namun di kancah politik, para pemimpin nasional mengesampingkan unsur Islam ketika mereka merumuskan dokumen-dokumen pendirian Indonesia. Dengan cara itu, mereka menciptakan presenden revolusi yang terus berdampak pada negara sampai saat ini. Studi tentang perang anti-penjajah negeri berpenduduk Muslim terbanyak di dunia ini menunjukkan bagaimana Islam berfungsi sebagai ideologi revolusi pada era modern.
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Doctoral Dissertation
This dissertation traces the fate of groups in Indonesia who sought to make their country an Islamic state by transforming politics and society. Although these groups played a critical role in winning Indonesia's independence during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), divisions between political leaders, theological leaders, and the grassroots split the movement, and by 1960 these divisions caused the failure of Islam as a political movement for an Islamic state.
During revolution, Dutch-educated political leaders took the leadership of the Islamic movement through appointments in the Socialist-led cabinets. These political leaders brought their Western norms to the struggle to establish an Islamic state. Theological leaders, prominent for their roles in Islamic education and mass organizations, also sought to establish an Islamic state, but they were less involved in Indonesia's modern governance. Across Indonesia, pious Muslims disconnected from the national leadership of the Islamic movement also contributed to the revolution. At this grassroots level, the Indonesian Revolution was experienced as an Islamic fight for independence. The diversity of Muslim experiences in the revolution, including many heterodox practices, demonstrated the distance between the syncretic Islamic grassroots and the new leadership of the Islamic movement nationally.
After Indonesia's independence was recognized in late 1949, Islamic political parties and mass organizations sought to shape the state and nation to make them more Islamic. They were hindered in this by tensions between the political and theological leaders in the Islamic bloc, tensions that climaxed in the 1952 departure of Nandlatul Ulama from the major Islamic party Masjumi. The Islamic movement experienced many successes after independence, such as the expansion of Islamic organizations and education, but national trends such as the standardization of language limited the influence of Islamic ideas and activists.
Things came to a head in the national elections of 1955, when the political leaders, theological leaders, and Islamic grassroots not only battled political parties opposed to Islam but also battled each other. Facing the elections, political interests proved to be paramount over existing social and cultural interests in the Indonesian Islamic movement. Although they expected an unambiguous victory, Islamic parties won only 45% of the seats in the resulting parliament and Constituent Assembly, severely restricting their ability to implement their vision of an Islamic state.
After this defeat, the strain between the Islamic political elite and the Islamic grassroots and theological leaders became too great. Islamic political leaders were pushed into increasing irrelevance, failing to pass legislation, failing in the constitutional assembly, and committing half-heartedly to the PRRI rebellion of 1958-61. As a result, the debilitated Masjumi party was dissolved. Islamic mass organizations freed themselves from political parties and embraced the Sukarno regime. The Islamic movement as a bloc struggling for Indonesia to become an Islamic state fell apart.
Book Reviews
Sejarah Revolusi Indonesia dipenuhi penggambaran perang revolusi sebagai perang nasionalistis atau berbasis kelas. Dalam kajian baru ini, Kevin W. Fogg meninjau ulang Revolusi Indonesia (1945-1949) sebagai perjuangan umat Islam. Dalam spirit keagamaan inilah, kaum Muslim taat--yang jumlahnya hampir separuh populasi--berperang. Mereka teryakinkan dengan seruan jihad dari ulama dan kiai bahwa mereka sedang menjalankan perang sabil melawan kaum kafir penjajah.
Namun di kancah politik, para pemimpin nasional mengesampingkan unsur Islam ketika mereka merumuskan dokumen-dokumen pendirian Indonesia. Dengan cara itu, mereka menciptakan presenden revolusi yang terus berdampak pada negara sampai saat ini. Studi tentang perang anti-penjajah negeri berpenduduk Muslim terbanyak di dunia ini menunjukkan bagaimana Islam berfungsi sebagai ideologi revolusi pada era modern.
This dissertation traces the fate of groups in Indonesia who sought to make their country an Islamic state by transforming politics and society. Although these groups played a critical role in winning Indonesia's independence during the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), divisions between political leaders, theological leaders, and the grassroots split the movement, and by 1960 these divisions caused the failure of Islam as a political movement for an Islamic state.
During revolution, Dutch-educated political leaders took the leadership of the Islamic movement through appointments in the Socialist-led cabinets. These political leaders brought their Western norms to the struggle to establish an Islamic state. Theological leaders, prominent for their roles in Islamic education and mass organizations, also sought to establish an Islamic state, but they were less involved in Indonesia's modern governance. Across Indonesia, pious Muslims disconnected from the national leadership of the Islamic movement also contributed to the revolution. At this grassroots level, the Indonesian Revolution was experienced as an Islamic fight for independence. The diversity of Muslim experiences in the revolution, including many heterodox practices, demonstrated the distance between the syncretic Islamic grassroots and the new leadership of the Islamic movement nationally.
After Indonesia's independence was recognized in late 1949, Islamic political parties and mass organizations sought to shape the state and nation to make them more Islamic. They were hindered in this by tensions between the political and theological leaders in the Islamic bloc, tensions that climaxed in the 1952 departure of Nandlatul Ulama from the major Islamic party Masjumi. The Islamic movement experienced many successes after independence, such as the expansion of Islamic organizations and education, but national trends such as the standardization of language limited the influence of Islamic ideas and activists.
Things came to a head in the national elections of 1955, when the political leaders, theological leaders, and Islamic grassroots not only battled political parties opposed to Islam but also battled each other. Facing the elections, political interests proved to be paramount over existing social and cultural interests in the Indonesian Islamic movement. Although they expected an unambiguous victory, Islamic parties won only 45% of the seats in the resulting parliament and Constituent Assembly, severely restricting their ability to implement their vision of an Islamic state.
After this defeat, the strain between the Islamic political elite and the Islamic grassroots and theological leaders became too great. Islamic political leaders were pushed into increasing irrelevance, failing to pass legislation, failing in the constitutional assembly, and committing half-heartedly to the PRRI rebellion of 1958-61. As a result, the debilitated Masjumi party was dissolved. Islamic mass organizations freed themselves from political parties and embraced the Sukarno regime. The Islamic movement as a bloc struggling for Indonesia to become an Islamic state fell apart.