Papers by Thomas Kjeller Johansen
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2021
Plato in the Timaeus shows a strong interest in what we today would call ‘embodied cognition’, de... more Plato in the Timaeus shows a strong interest in what we today would call ‘embodied cognition’, developing a detailed account of the physiology of perception. One striking aspect of this account is that he presents the whole body as involved in perception. The cardiovascular system allows the blood to transmit sensory affections to all parts of the body, while the soul-filled marrow, which is particularly sensitive, extends via the bones throughout body. Timaeus reserves for the intellectual part (to phronimon) a distinctive role in perception providing rational content and reflexivity to our perceptual experiences. He seeks to integrate the intellect within the perceptual system, not just anatomically, but also by showing perception itself to be a form of intelligence (phronêsis). The whole ensouled body thus emerges as a single perceptual system, gathering, sharing and reflecting on perceptual information as one. The paper concludes by placing Timaeus´ theory in the context of Pre-Socratic views about the involvement of the whole body in perception.
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The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and ... more The volume presents essays on the philosophical explanation of the relationship between body and soul in antiquity from the Presocratics to Galen, including papers on Parmenides on thinking (E. Hussey, R. Dilcher), Empedocles' Love (D. O'Brien), tripartition in Plato (T. Buchheim), Aristotle (C. Rapp, T. Johansen, P.-M. Morel), Peripatetics after Aristotle (R. Sharples), Hellenistic Philosophy (C. Rapp, C. Gill), and Galen (R. J. Hankinson).
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Aristotelian Metaphysics. Essays in Honour of David Charles, ed. by D.Bronstein, T.K.Johansen, and M.Peramatzis, OUP, 2024
David Charles has argued that, according to Aristotle, a psychological state such as anger is an ... more David Charles has argued that, according to Aristotle, a psychological state such as anger is an ‘inextricably psycho-physical phenomenon because it has a matter-involving (inextricably psycho-physical) form.’ Agreeing with this claim, this paper asks how one should further explicate the involvement of matter. For Charles the involvement demands an explicit mention of the specific matter of the psychological state in the definition of its form. So matter plays a role in defining the form itself, as nose, for example, occurs in the definition of snubness. The alternative explored in this paper is that the specific matter is not present in but follows from the definition of the form. In that case the definition of form is not like that of snubness in explicitly mentioning matter. Nor, however, is it like the mathematician’s account of concavity, which has no implications as to its material realisation. Rather, the formal definition of a psychological state may imply a certain material realisation by hypothetical necessity. I develop this suggestion and consider its strength against certain objections raised by David Charles.
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G.Betegh, V.Tsouna (eds.), Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy, CUP, 2024
The paper explores the claim that the development of our cognitive powers follows the path of con... more The paper explores the claim that the development of our cognitive powers follows the path of conceptual differentiation in our souls. On the account offered Aristotle´s position is neither rationalist nor empiricist in any straightforward sense. It is not simply rationalist since the process of conceptual differentiation does not presuppose a full-fledged intellect or nous from the outset. The intellect has itself to develop gradually into nous through perception, memory and experience, just as also memory and experience have to develop as states and capacities from their starting point in perception. Nor is the position straightforwardly empiricist since it is the intellect itself that at each stage responds to percepts, memories or experiential judgments by recognising ever more general, unified concepts in the deliveries of lower cognition. Our intellect develops naturally through these stages by forming concepts that are ever closer to representing the basic features of reality.
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P.Destrée and M.R.Johnson (eds.), Aristotle on Philosophical Exhortation, 2024
Metaphysics I.1-2 is, I argue in this paper, a protreptic to first philosophy. Aristotle shows ho... more Metaphysics I.1-2 is, I argue in this paper, a protreptic to first philosophy. Aristotle shows how we can only realize our human desire for knowledge through a cognitive development which leads to wisdom (sophia). We can only fulfil ourselves as human beings if we attend to philosophy. There could be no greater protreptic than that. Whether the Protrepticus underlies the composition of Metaph. I.1-2 is a matter of dispute. However, I want to show that on key points the Protrepticus serves to confirm, and give detail to, interpretations which can plausibly be established on the basis also of other texts in the corpus. Together the Metaph. I.1-2 and the Protrepticus present a consistent theory of the power of knowledge to satisfy our human nature and, as Aristotle would have it, "set us free".
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K.Corcilius (ed.), Aims and Methods of Aristotle’s De anima, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen , 2024
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Rhizomata, 2020
This paper considers Theophrastus’ use in the De sensibus of the principles that like perceives l... more This paper considers Theophrastus’ use in the De sensibus of the principles that like perceives like and that unlike perceives unlike to criticise his predecessors. It is argued that the aporiai that arise from either position serve to motivate the view of perception articulated by Aristotle in the De anima.
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Philosophical Inquiry, 2017
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Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2016
This paper reassesses the relationship between the way of Truth and the way of Opinion (doxa) in ... more This paper reassesses the relationship between the way of Truth and the way of Opinion (doxa) in Parmenides’ poem. Parmenides’ criteria or ‘signs’ of intelligible inquiry are paradigmatically met by being; however, by fulfilling those criteria, albeit partially and in a different manner from being, the cosmos comes to resemble being and achieve a degree of intelligibility and reality. Being and the cosmos appear in this way to be related as model to likeness. I argue on this basis that Parmenides’ cosmology anticipates the likely story of Plato’s Timaeus. Already Proclus in his commentary on the Timaeus had made a similar suggestion, but this paper is the first to attempt to spell out and assess it.
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Theory and Practice in Aristotle's Natural Science
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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Plato's Natural Philosophy, 2004
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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The Powers of Aristotle's Soul, 2012
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Maieusis, 2007
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A study of the Timaeus-Critias
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A study of the Timaeus-Critias, 2004
It is common to distinguish between two kinds of teleological account. One kind explains an outco... more It is common to distinguish between two kinds of teleological account. One kind explains an outcome as the result of intentional agency. In this sense I might explain why I went to the circus by saying that I wanted to have fun. Another kind of teleological explanation does without intentions and posits goals without reference to thoughts or other intentional states. Aristotle's natural teleology is normally taken as an example of the latter, unintentional sort. In contrast, Plato's cosmology in the Timaeus is, with good reason, taken as an example of the intentional sort of teleology, or ‘unnatural’ teleology as James Lennox has called it.So at the beginning of his account Timaeus tells us that the cosmos was created by a craftsman, a ‘demiurge’ (Greek, dēmiourgos ), who wanted to make the world as good and beautiful as possible (30a2–3). Throughout his account Timaeus reminds us that the demiurge made this or that feature of the cosmos as well as he could or that he made it in order that such-and-such an end should come about. The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of the demiurge in the creation of the cosmos in the light of this contrast between natural and unnatural teleology. I shall first consider Timaeus' reasons for introducing the demiurge. I then look at and reject some ways in which one might try to dispense with the demiurge when interpreting the Timaeus .
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Papers by Thomas Kjeller Johansen
Contents
Thomas Kjeller Johansen: Introduction
Edward Hussey: Protagoras on Political Technê
Tamer Nawar: Dynamic Modalities and Teleological Agency: Plato and
Aristotle on Skill and Ability
Rachel Barney: Technê As a Model for Virtue in Plato
Thomas Kjeller Johansen: Crafting the Cosmos: Plato on the Limitations of Divine
Craftsmanship
Ursula Coope: Aristotle on Productive Understanding and Completeness
Robert Bolton: Technê and Empeiria: Aristotle on Practical Knowledge
Voula Tsouna: The Stoics on Technê and the Technai
Voula Tsouna: The Epicureans on Technê and the Technai
Stefan Sienkiewicz: The Sceptic’s Art: Varieties of Expertise in Sextus Empiricus
Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson: Plotinus on the Arts
Jan Opsomer: Productive Knowledge in Proclus