A construção de “existe” como um predicado de primeiraordem ou real é defendida contra a ortodoxi... more A construção de “existe” como um predicado de primeiraordem ou real é defendida contra a ortodoxia prevalente.
Resumen: El artículo presenta una crítica a la adopción por Samuel Cabanchik del irrealismo de ... more Resumen: El artículo presenta una crítica a la adopción por Samuel Cabanchik del irrealismo de Goodman para clarificar y extender las observaciones de Austin acerca del significado de real. Siguiendo a Cora Diamond, se distingue el realismo metafísico del ...
Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his de... more Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.
Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) ... more Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative.
A construção de “existe” como um predicado de primeiraordem ou real é defendida contra a ortodoxi... more A construção de “existe” como um predicado de primeiraordem ou real é defendida contra a ortodoxia prevalente.
Resumen: El artículo presenta una crítica a la adopción por Samuel Cabanchik del irrealismo de ... more Resumen: El artículo presenta una crítica a la adopción por Samuel Cabanchik del irrealismo de Goodman para clarificar y extender las observaciones de Austin acerca del significado de real. Siguiendo a Cora Diamond, se distingue el realismo metafísico del ...
Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his de... more Russell's theory of memory as acquaintance with the past seems to square uneasily with his definition of acquaintance as the converse of the relation of presentation of an object to a subject. We show how the two views can be made to cohere under a suitable construal of 'presentation', which has the additional appeal of bringing Russell's theory of memory closer to contemporary views on direct reference and object-dependent thinking than is usually acknowledged. The drawback is that memory as acquaintance with the past falls short of fulfilling Russell's requirement that knowledge by acquaintance be discriminating knowledge - a shortcoming shared by contemporary externalist accounts of knowledge from memory.
Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) ... more Judgments about the validity of at least some elementary inferential patterns (say modus ponens) are a priori if anything is. Yet a number of empirical conditions must in each case be satisfied in order for a particular inference to instantiate this or that inferential pattern. We may on occasion be entitled to presuppose that such conditions are satisfied (and the entitlement may even be a priori), yet only experience could tell us that such was indeed the case. Current discussion about a perceived incompatibility between content externalism and first-person authority exemplifies how damaging the neglect of such empirical presuppositions of correct reasoning can be. An externalistic view of mental content is ostensibly incompatible with the assumption that a rational subject should be able to avoid inconsistency no matter what the state of her empirical knowledge may be. That fact, however, needs not be taken (as it often is) as a reductio of externalism: alternatively, we may reject that assumption, adding to the agenda of a philosophical investigation of rationality an examination of the vicissitudes of logical luck. I offer an illustration and defense of that alternative.
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KEYWORDS. Inference. Presupposition. Content externalism. Logical luck.
KEYWORDS. Inference. Presupposition. Content externalism. Logical luck.