Highlights by Danilo Fraga Dantas
Logos & Episteme, 2023
Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book... more Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. The goal of this paper is to discuss the assumptions of these arguments, including the measure of epistemic value. I have designed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and a nonmonotonic framework and tested how they achieve practical and epistemic value in conditions in which an alternative set of assumptions holds. In one of the tested conditions, the nonmonotonic agent, which is not opinionated and fulfills neither probabilism nor conditionalization, outperforms the Bayesian in the measure of epistemic value that I argue for in the paper (α-value). I discuss the consequences of these results for the epistemology of rationality.
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Episteme, 2022
I propose the notion of 'epistemic sanity', a property of parsimony between the holding of true b... more I propose the notion of 'epistemic sanity', a property of parsimony between the holding of true but not false beliefs and the consideration of our cognitive limitations. Where 'alethic value' is the epistemic value of holding true but not false beliefs, the 'alethic potential' of an agent is the amount of extra alethic value that she is expected to achieve given her current environment, beliefs, and reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related to the holding of (true or false) beliefs that increase the agent's alethic potential (relevant beliefs) but not of beliefs that decrease it (this is related to cognitive parsimony). Suspension of judgment, forgetting, and clutter avoidance are the main contributors to an agent's epistemic sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. I argue that rational suspension favors the holding of true and relevant beliefs (only), which is not the case for the extremes of opinionation (no suspension) and skepticism (general suspension). In the absence of evidence for propositions in their agenda, opinionated agents are forced to rely on principles such as the principle of indifference, but indifference is dominated by suspension in terms of alethic value in some conditions. A rational agent would only find it beneficial to adopt skepticism if she considers herself to be an anti-expert about her whole agenda, but then 'flipping' beliefs maximizes expected alethic value in relation to skepticism. The study of epistemic sanity results in an 'impure' veritism, which can deal with limitations of veritism (e.g. explaining the existence of false but relevant beliefs).
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Erkenntnis, 2021
I investigate two limitations of common approaches to the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality... more I investigate two limitations of common approaches to the alethic aspect of epistemic rationality. These approaches are either normative (what a reasoner ought to/may
believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where evaluative approaches are often comparative (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). The fact is that most of them fail in describing a standard of rationality satisfiable (i) on the face of blindspots and (ii) by finite reasoners (reasoners with limited cognitive resources). I propose a non-comparative evaluative function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numerical evaluation, and use this function to define a standard of rationality satisfiable on the face of blindspots and by finite reasoners. Function α also generates norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that can be used to investigate the rationality of finite reasoners and do not exhibit problems with blindspots. It is a result of this investigation that the project of providing alethic norms for finite reasoners is defective. In addition, the use of function α sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the paradoxes of lottery and preface and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
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Disputatio, 2020
The causal and the simulation theories are often presented as two radically different views about... more The causal and the simulation theories are often presented as two radically different views about declarative memory. The causal theory states that remembering requires having an accurate representation standing in a causal connection with an earlier experience (the causal condition). The simulation theory states that remembering requires having an accurate representation generated by a reliable memory process, with no causal condition. In this paper, I argue that suitable versions of these theories are closely related. I start by investigating how these theories categorize memory errors (DRM, "lost in the mall", and memory-conjunction error) as misremembering or confabulation. These are problem-cases for a strong version of the causal, but not for the simulation theory because of too strong accuracy and causal conditions. I show how to fix the causal theory for these cases. The resulting causal and the simulation theories are closely related when implemented in information theory, differing only on how memory transmits information about the past. The implementation provides insights about the distinction between confabulatory and non-
confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors has a privileged position.
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Unisinos Journal of Philosophy - Philosophy South, 2018
All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit
logical omn... more All reasoners described in the most widespread models of a rational reasoner exhibit
logical omniscience, what is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the model could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the model would describe maximum rationality, what a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences to epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In section 1, I present
an argument to this conclusion. In section 2, I discuss the consequences of this conclusion, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.
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Drafts by Danilo Fraga Dantas
Dual-process theories state that human reasoning comprises processes of Type
1 (‘intuitive’; fas... more Dual-process theories state that human reasoning comprises processes of Type
1 (‘intuitive’; fast and effortless, but error-prone) and Type 2 (‘deliberative’; slow and effortful, but normative). Full-probabilistic reasoning demands Type 2 processing and much of the research in dual-processing is concerned with systematic violations of probability, which is treated as a normative model for situations of uncertain reasoning. Bayesian epistemologists argue that the tenets of probability are, in fact, requirements of rationality. But is it always rational to perform Type 2 processing in situations of uncertain reasoning? I have constructed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and in a nonmonotonic framework that is used in psychology to model Type 1 processes and tested how they perform in an epistemic version of the Wumpus World, a class of problems used in AI for studying uncertain reasoning. The results of the simulations suggest that it is rational to perform a Type 1 process (instead of Type 2 Bayesian reasoning) in situations where extreme risk aversion is rewarded (practical rationality) and where the evidence is relatively informative or difficult to gather (epistemic rationality).
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Papers by Danilo Fraga Dantas
E-Compós, 2008
Uma das principais características do rock brasileiro é que ele sempre circulou pelo mainstream f... more Uma das principais características do rock brasileiro é que ele sempre circulou pelo mainstream fonográfico. Em cinqüenta anos de história, o rock brasileiro foi lançado por grandes gravadoras, esteve em trilhas sonoras de telenovelas, entre outros elementos típicos desse modelo de distribuição. Mas, nas últimas duas décadas, é possível notar a formação de um circuito de rock brasileiro entre o mainstream e o underground, um circuito médio. Os principais fatores que possibilitaram a formação desse circuito foram a ressaca do rock brasileiro dos anos 80, o surgimento de novas tecnologias de gravação e, principalmente, a possibilidade de distribuição a partir da internet. O objetivo desse artigo é investigar se essa mudança no modo que o rock brasileiro circula pela indústria fonográfica provoca mudanças mais profundas no gênero.
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Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia, 2010
Existe uma tese que dá conta da compatibilidade entre externalismo sobre conteúdo mental e autoco... more Existe uma tese que dá conta da compatibilidade entre externalismo sobre conteúdo mental e autoconhecimento (BURGE, 1988). Esta tese, que explora a proprie-dade de autoverificação de autoatribuições do tipo “penso que p”, porém, funciona ape-nas para autoatribuições de pensamentos cuja expressão é a primeira pessoa do tempo presente do modo indicativo em seu uso assertórico. Entre os casos problemáticos estão as autoatribuições no passados e as autoatribuições de atitudes proposicionais específicas. Tal falha do compatibilismo é apontada por Boghossian (1992) como prova da in-compatibilidade entre externalismo e o autoconhecimento. Existe uma extensa biblio-grafia para dar conta das autoatribuições no passado. Em tais artigos (BURGE, 1995), defende-se a existência de uma função preservativa da memória que, salvo em situações adversas, garantiria a veracidade das autoatribuições no passado. Porém há pouca bibli-ografia sobre o outro problema da tese compatibilista, o das autoatribuiç...
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Acta Analytica, 2018
Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for similarity based theories of coun-terfactuals ... more Backtracking counterfactuals are problem cases for similarity based theories of coun-terfactuals (e.g. Lewis, 1979). Hiddleston (2005) proposes a causal theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with backtracking. In addition, the causal theory provides an unified account for non-backtracking and backtracking counterfactuals. In this paper, I present a backtracking counterfactual that is a problem case for Hiddleston's account. Then I propose an informational theory of counterfactuals, which deals well with this problem case maintaining the good features of the causal theory. In addition, the informational theory provides clues for the semantics and the epistemology of counterfactuals. The idea is that backtracking is adequate when the (possibly non-actual) state of affairs expressed in the antecedent of a counterfactual transmits less information about an event in the past than the actual state of affairs.
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Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology , 2017
The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ... more The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner that believes ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p → q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that is finite only if reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, does not believe ◊(p ∧ ¬q) on the basis of not believing p → q on a priori basis (e.g. for q ='something is conscious'). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive.
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Perspectiva Filosófica, 2020
Este artigo discute o uso de simulações de computador em Epistemologia(Epistemologia Computaciona... more Este artigo discute o uso de simulações de computador em Epistemologia(Epistemologia Computacional). O objetivo o artigo é fundamentar e discu-tir a ideia de uma Epistemologia Computacional, além de apresentar umexemplo de estudo nesse campo. Na Introdução, discuto as objeções maiscomuns aos métodos da Epistemologia Tradicional e à proposta de Quine deuma Epistemologia Naturalizada. Argumento que a Epistemologia Compu-tacional não está sujeita a nenhuma destas objeções. Na Seção 1, apresentouma revisão bibliográfica dos estudos em Epistemologia Computacional(tanto em Epistemologia individualista quanto em Epistemologia Social) ediscuto a estrutura geral destes estudos. Na Seção 2, apresento alguns resul-tados de um estudo em Epistemologia Computacional que realizei em minhatese de doutorado.
ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology.
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Voluntas, 2019
Nesse artigo, investigo três casos de erros de memória obtidos em laboratório como forma de avali... more Nesse artigo, investigo três casos de erros de memória obtidos em laboratório como forma de avaliar as principais teorias da memória : teoria causal e simulacionismo. De maneira geral, a teoria causal afirma que alguém lembra de algo somente se sua lembrança está numa relação causal adequada com uma experiência anterior daquilo que é lembrado. No simulacionismo, essa relação não é necessária. Os casos de erros de memória investigados são DRM, “perdido no shopping” e erro de conjunção de conteúdo. Esses casos são difíceis para a teoria causal, especialmente em sua versão direta, mas não para o simulacionismo. Minha hipótese é a de que essa dificuldade se deve especificamente ao critério causal adotado.
I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not ne cessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory -conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of the causal requirement.
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DRAFT The most widespread model of a rational reasoner (the model based in modal epistemic logic)... more DRAFT The most widespread model of a rational reasoner (the model based in modal epistemic logic) is inadequate for describing nite reasoners (e.g. humans). The reasoners described in the model exhibit logical omniscience and nite reasoners cannot be logically omniscient. This inadequacy is the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the model using a notion of beliefs dierent from explicit beliefs (e.g. implicit beliefs). In this paper, I survey two versions of this strategy: one using accessible beliefs; another using stable beliefs. Both strategies avoid the problem in classical settings, but they dier in an essential feature: while the second considers the reasoning sequence that would result in the relevant beliefs, the rst considers only whether this reasoning is possible (in principle). This dierence has consequences in nonmonotonic settings, where the strategy based in accessible beliefs exhibits the problem of logical omnipotence: the reasoners described in the model may have inferential capacities higher than any nite reasoner, but the model is insensitive to that.
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Dissertatio, 2019
Um argumento recorrente contra a liberalização do aborto parte do pressuposto de que, desde o mom... more Um argumento recorrente contra a liberalização do aborto parte do pressuposto de que, desde o momento da fertilização, seres humanos são indivíduos (no sentido de serem algo que necessariamente ocorre em uma entidade apenas). Nesse artigo, parto da possibilidade de geminação monozigótica e do fato de identidades serem necessárias para argumentar que esse não é o caso. No artigo, discuto as premissas do argumento e as possíveis interpretações de sua conclusão. Argumento que a conclusão desse argumento está em concordância com a conclusão de um argumento semelhante, que parte de noções correntes de ‘organismo’.
ENGLISH: A common pro-life argument assumes that humans are individuals (in the sense that they necessarily occur in one entity only) from the moment of fertilization. In this paper, argue that this is not the case because of the possibility of monozygotic twinning and the necessity of identities. I will defend the premises of the argument and discuss the possible interpretations of its conclusion. I argue that the correct interpretation of the conclusion of this argument is in agreement with the conclusion of a similar arguments from the notion of organism.
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Intuitio, 2018
O argumento zumbi negativo parte das premissas de que p ∧ ¬q é idealmente negativamente concebíve... more O argumento zumbi negativo parte das premissas de que p ∧ ¬q é idealmente negativamente concebível, de que o que é idealmente negativamente concebível é possível e de que o fisicalismo é incompatível com a possibilidade de p ∧ ¬q para concluir que o fisicalismo é falso. No argumento, p é a conjunção das verdades e leis físicas fundamentais e q é uma verdade fenomenal qualquer. Uma sentença φ é idealmente negativamente concebível sse um raciocinador ideal não acredita que ¬φ em reflexão priori. Uma versão da tese da escrutabilidade pressuposta pelo argumento afirma que, para todo φ que sobrevém em p, o raciocinador ideal acredita que p → φ em reflexão a priori. Nesse artigo, argumento que, dado algumas interpretações relevantes da noção de probabilidade (pr(.)), o raciocinador ideal acredita verdadeiramente, para todo φ, que p → pr(φ) = x em reflexão a priori. Mas então, dependendo do valor de pr(q) e das correlações entre q e outras sentenças, o raciocinador ideal também acredita (provavelmente, verdadeiramente) que p → q em reflexão a priori. Então, para alguns qs relevantes, p ∧ ¬q não é idealmente negativamente concebível e o argumento zumbi tem uma premissa falsa. A escolha de um q adequado dependeria de informação empírica, o que faria o argumento zumbi não ser nem conclusivo, nem a priori.
The negative zombie argument has as premises that p∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable, that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, and that Physicalism is incompatible with p∧¬q being possible and as conclusion that Physicalism is false. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is an arbitrary phenomenal truth. A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable if and only if an ideal reasoner does not believe that ¬φ on a priori reflection. The argument presupposes a version of the scrutability thesis stating that, for all φ that supervene on p, the ideal reasoner believes that p → φ on a priori reflection. In this paper, I argue that, given relevant interpretation of probabilities, the ideal reasoner believes truly, for all φ, that p → pr(φ) = x on a priori reflection. But then, depending on the value of pr(q) and the correlations between q and other sentences, the ideal reasoner also believes (probably, truly) that p → q on a priori reflection. For some relevant qs, p∧¬q is not ideally negatively conceivable and the zombie argument has a false premise. The choice of an adequate q depends on empirical information, what makes the zombie argument neither conclusive nor a priori.
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Analytica, 2018
A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema 'φ é verdadeira sse φ'... more A teoria minimalista da verdade consiste em todas as instâncias do esquema 'φ é verdadeira sse φ' e na afirmação de que nossa aceitação (primitiva) dessas instâncias é suficiente para explicar nossas atitudes em relação a todas sentenças envolvendo ‘verdade’. Filósofos têm apontado que o minimalismo tem dificuldades em explicar nossas atitudes em relação a generalizações envolvendo ‘verdade’ bem como em lidar com instanciações contraditórias do esquema para sentenças paradoxais (ex. paradoxo do mentiroso). Proponentes do minimalismo apresentam soluções para esses problemas. Nesse artigo, argumento que essas soluções entram em conflito, analiso algumas estratégias para resolver esse conflito e concluo que o minimalismo não pode evitar conflitos desse tipo mantendo seu caráter minimalista.
ENGLISH: The minimalist theory of truth consists in all the instances of the schema 'φ is true iff φ' and in the claim that our primitive acceptance of these instances explains our attitudes in relation to propositions involving truth. Philosophers point that minimalism has difficulties in explaining our attitudes in relation to generalizations involving truth and with the contradictory instances of the schema for paradoxal sentences (e.g. the liar). Minimalists present solutions to these problems. In this paper, I argue that these solutions conflict with each other. I analyze some strategies to resolve this conflict. I conclude that minimalism cannot avoid the conflict maintaining it minimalist character.
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Kinesis, 2010
Existe uma tese que dá conta da compatibilidade entre externalismo sobre conteúdo mental e autoco... more Existe uma tese que dá conta da compatibilidade entre externalismo sobre conteúdo mental e autoconhecimento (Burge, 1988). Esta tese, que explora a propriedade de autoverificação de autoatribuições do tipo "penso que p" , porém, funciona apenas para autoatribuições de pensamentos cuja expressão é a primeira pessoa do tempo presente do modo indicativo em seu uso assertórico. Entre os casos problemáticos estão as autoatribuições no passados e as autoatribuições de atitudes proposicionais específicas. Tal falha do compatibilismo é apontada por Boghossian (1992) como prova da in-compatibilidade entre externalismo e o autoconhecimento. Existe uma extensa bibliografia para dar conta das autoatribuições no passado. Em tais artigos (Burge, 1995), defende-se a existência de uma função preservativa da memória que, salvo em situações adversas, garantiria a veracidade das autoatribuições no passado. Porém há pouca bibliografia sobre o outro problema da tese compatibilista, o das autoatribuições de atitudes proposicionais específicas. Este artigo propõe expandir o alcance da teoria da memória preservativa, para que ela dê conta do autoconhecimento de atitudes proposicionais passadas. Para tanto, propomos critérios que definam quando uma autoatribuição de pensamentos passados é verdadeira, mesmo nos casos em que atitude e conteúdo dos pensamentos não sejam idênticos, mas apenas similares. O critério para similaridade de conteúdos (que garantiria a verdade de autoatribuições deste tipo) foi proposto por Bernecker (2009), o critério para as atitudes é novo: a atitude que S pensa em t2 como tendo tido em t1 é similar à atitude em t1 sse a atitude atual for implicada pela anterior.
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Intuitio , 2009
Pesquisas em psicologia e filosofia mostram que a memória não apenas armazena como também process... more Pesquisas em psicologia e filosofia mostram que a memória não apenas armazena como também processa a informação armazenada. Assim, num caso de memória de um pensamento passado, conteúdo e atitude proposicional da representação presente poderiam diferir do conteúdo e atitude do pensamento do qual ela deriva causalmente. Resta a pergunta: admitido que este tipo de lembrança não requer identidade de conteúdo e atitude, quais transformações na informação original respeitam o requisito de verdade da memória? Este artigo propõe critérios que definam quando uma representação atual pode ser qualificada como lembrança de um pensamento passado e que deem conta dos casos em que estes pensamentos não partilham o mesmo conteúdo ou atitude. O critério apresentado para tratar a similaridade entre conteúdos é o proposto por Bernecker, o critério para atitudes é novo: a atitude que S pensa (em t2) como tendo tido (em t1) é suficientemente similar à atitude que, de fato, S teve (em t1) se a atitude do pensamento posterior for implicada pela atitude anterior.
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E-Compós, 2007
Uma das principais características do rock brasileiro é que ele sempre circulou pelo mainstream f... more Uma das principais características do rock brasileiro é que ele sempre circulou pelo mainstream fonográfico. Em cinqüenta anos de história, o rock brasileiro foi lançado por grandes gravadoras, esteve em trilhas sonoras de telenovelas, entre outros elementos típicos desse modelo de distribuição. Mas, nas últimas duas décadas, é possível notar a formação de um circuito de rock brasileiro entre o mainstream e o underground, um circuito médio. Os principais fatores que possibilitaram a formação desse circuito foram a ressaca do rock brasileiro dos anos 80, o surgimento de novas tecnologias de gravação e, principalmente, a possibilidade de distribuição a partir da internet. O objetivo desse artigo é investigar se essa mudança no modo que o rock brasileiro circula pela indústria fonográfica provoca mudanças mais profundas no gênero.
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Highlights by Danilo Fraga Dantas
believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where evaluative approaches are often comparative (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). The fact is that most of them fail in describing a standard of rationality satisfiable (i) on the face of blindspots and (ii) by finite reasoners (reasoners with limited cognitive resources). I propose a non-comparative evaluative function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numerical evaluation, and use this function to define a standard of rationality satisfiable on the face of blindspots and by finite reasoners. Function α also generates norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that can be used to investigate the rationality of finite reasoners and do not exhibit problems with blindspots. It is a result of this investigation that the project of providing alethic norms for finite reasoners is defective. In addition, the use of function α sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the paradoxes of lottery and preface and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors has a privileged position.
logical omniscience, what is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the model could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the model would describe maximum rationality, what a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences to epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In section 1, I present
an argument to this conclusion. In section 2, I discuss the consequences of this conclusion, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.
Drafts by Danilo Fraga Dantas
1 (‘intuitive’; fast and effortless, but error-prone) and Type 2 (‘deliberative’; slow and effortful, but normative). Full-probabilistic reasoning demands Type 2 processing and much of the research in dual-processing is concerned with systematic violations of probability, which is treated as a normative model for situations of uncertain reasoning. Bayesian epistemologists argue that the tenets of probability are, in fact, requirements of rationality. But is it always rational to perform Type 2 processing in situations of uncertain reasoning? I have constructed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and in a nonmonotonic framework that is used in psychology to model Type 1 processes and tested how they perform in an epistemic version of the Wumpus World, a class of problems used in AI for studying uncertain reasoning. The results of the simulations suggest that it is rational to perform a Type 1 process (instead of Type 2 Bayesian reasoning) in situations where extreme risk aversion is rewarded (practical rationality) and where the evidence is relatively informative or difficult to gather (epistemic rationality).
Papers by Danilo Fraga Dantas
ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology.
I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not ne cessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory -conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of the causal requirement.
ENGLISH: A common pro-life argument assumes that humans are individuals (in the sense that they necessarily occur in one entity only) from the moment of fertilization. In this paper, argue that this is not the case because of the possibility of monozygotic twinning and the necessity of identities. I will defend the premises of the argument and discuss the possible interpretations of its conclusion. I argue that the correct interpretation of the conclusion of this argument is in agreement with the conclusion of a similar arguments from the notion of organism.
The negative zombie argument has as premises that p∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable, that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, and that Physicalism is incompatible with p∧¬q being possible and as conclusion that Physicalism is false. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is an arbitrary phenomenal truth. A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable if and only if an ideal reasoner does not believe that ¬φ on a priori reflection. The argument presupposes a version of the scrutability thesis stating that, for all φ that supervene on p, the ideal reasoner believes that p → φ on a priori reflection. In this paper, I argue that, given relevant interpretation of probabilities, the ideal reasoner believes truly, for all φ, that p → pr(φ) = x on a priori reflection. But then, depending on the value of pr(q) and the correlations between q and other sentences, the ideal reasoner also believes (probably, truly) that p → q on a priori reflection. For some relevant qs, p∧¬q is not ideally negatively conceivable and the zombie argument has a false premise. The choice of an adequate q depends on empirical information, what makes the zombie argument neither conclusive nor a priori.
ENGLISH: The minimalist theory of truth consists in all the instances of the schema 'φ is true iff φ' and in the claim that our primitive acceptance of these instances explains our attitudes in relation to propositions involving truth. Philosophers point that minimalism has difficulties in explaining our attitudes in relation to generalizations involving truth and with the contradictory instances of the schema for paradoxal sentences (e.g. the liar). Minimalists present solutions to these problems. In this paper, I argue that these solutions conflict with each other. I analyze some strategies to resolve this conflict. I conclude that minimalism cannot avoid the conflict maintaining it minimalist character.
Chapters/books by Danilo Fraga Dantas
https://wp.ufpel.edu.br/nepfil/serie-investigacao-filosofica/?fbclid=IwAR2aX2GWXYn3w4MA8DbNGLEa2Gj4fnO5kf-BU6zhZzbXS0qur5w7h1iBGFY
believe?) or evaluative (how rational is a reasoner?), where evaluative approaches are often comparative (one reasoner is evaluated compared to another). The fact is that most of them fail in describing a standard of rationality satisfiable (i) on the face of blindspots and (ii) by finite reasoners (reasoners with limited cognitive resources). I propose a non-comparative evaluative function α, which accepts a set of beliefs as input and returns a numerical evaluation, and use this function to define a standard of rationality satisfiable on the face of blindspots and by finite reasoners. Function α also generates norms and evaluation methods (comparative and non-comparative) that can be used to investigate the rationality of finite reasoners and do not exhibit problems with blindspots. It is a result of this investigation that the project of providing alethic norms for finite reasoners is defective. In addition, the use of function α sheds light on important epistemological issues, such as the paradoxes of lottery and preface and the principles of clutter avoidance and reflection.
confabulatory memory, where memory-conjunction errors has a privileged position.
logical omniscience, what is impossible for finite reasoners (real reasoners). The most common strategy for dealing with the problem of logical omniscience is to interpret the models using a notion of beliefs different from explicit beliefs. For example, the model could be interpreted as describing the beliefs that the reasoner would hold if the reasoner were able reason indefinitely (stable beliefs). Then the model would describe maximum rationality, what a finite reasoner can only approach in the limit of a reasoning sequence. This strategy has important consequences to epistemology. If a finite reasoner can only approach maximum rationality in the limit of a reasoning sequence, then the efficiency of reasoning is epistemically (and not only pragmatically) relevant. In section 1, I present
an argument to this conclusion. In section 2, I discuss the consequences of this conclusion, as, for example, the vindication of the principle 'no rationality through brute-force'.
1 (‘intuitive’; fast and effortless, but error-prone) and Type 2 (‘deliberative’; slow and effortful, but normative). Full-probabilistic reasoning demands Type 2 processing and much of the research in dual-processing is concerned with systematic violations of probability, which is treated as a normative model for situations of uncertain reasoning. Bayesian epistemologists argue that the tenets of probability are, in fact, requirements of rationality. But is it always rational to perform Type 2 processing in situations of uncertain reasoning? I have constructed AI agents based on the Bayesian model and in a nonmonotonic framework that is used in psychology to model Type 1 processes and tested how they perform in an epistemic version of the Wumpus World, a class of problems used in AI for studying uncertain reasoning. The results of the simulations suggest that it is rational to perform a Type 1 process (instead of Type 2 Bayesian reasoning) in situations where extreme risk aversion is rewarded (practical rationality) and where the evidence is relatively informative or difficult to gather (epistemic rationality).
ENGLISH: This paper is about the use of computer simulations in Epistemology (Com- putational Epistemology). The goal of the paper is to ground and discuss theidea of a Computational Epistemology, and to present an example of studyin this field. In the Introduction, I discuss the most common objections tothe methods of Traditional Epistemology and to Quine’s Naturalized Episte-mology. I argue that Computation Epistemology is not subject to any of the-se objections. In Section 1, I review the literature on Computational Episte-mology (both in individualistic Epistemology and in Social Epistemology)and discuss the general structure of these studies. In Section 2, I presentsome results of my PhD dissertation on Computational Epistemology.
I investigate three lab cases of memory error and test their consequences to the main theories of (declarative) memory: causal theory and simulationism. Roughly, the causal theory states that a subject remembers something only if her remembering is in a causal relation with a past experience of that thing. In simulationism, this relation is not ne cessary. The cases of memory error are DRM, “lost in the mall”, and memory -conjunction error. These are problem cases for the causal theory, but not for simulationism. My hypothesis is that this difficulty is because of the causal requirement.
ENGLISH: A common pro-life argument assumes that humans are individuals (in the sense that they necessarily occur in one entity only) from the moment of fertilization. In this paper, argue that this is not the case because of the possibility of monozygotic twinning and the necessity of identities. I will defend the premises of the argument and discuss the possible interpretations of its conclusion. I argue that the correct interpretation of the conclusion of this argument is in agreement with the conclusion of a similar arguments from the notion of organism.
The negative zombie argument has as premises that p∧¬q is ideally negatively conceivable, that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, and that Physicalism is incompatible with p∧¬q being possible and as conclusion that Physicalism is false. In the argument, p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is an arbitrary phenomenal truth. A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable if and only if an ideal reasoner does not believe that ¬φ on a priori reflection. The argument presupposes a version of the scrutability thesis stating that, for all φ that supervene on p, the ideal reasoner believes that p → φ on a priori reflection. In this paper, I argue that, given relevant interpretation of probabilities, the ideal reasoner believes truly, for all φ, that p → pr(φ) = x on a priori reflection. But then, depending on the value of pr(q) and the correlations between q and other sentences, the ideal reasoner also believes (probably, truly) that p → q on a priori reflection. For some relevant qs, p∧¬q is not ideally negatively conceivable and the zombie argument has a false premise. The choice of an adequate q depends on empirical information, what makes the zombie argument neither conclusive nor a priori.
ENGLISH: The minimalist theory of truth consists in all the instances of the schema 'φ is true iff φ' and in the claim that our primitive acceptance of these instances explains our attitudes in relation to propositions involving truth. Philosophers point that minimalism has difficulties in explaining our attitudes in relation to generalizations involving truth and with the contradictory instances of the schema for paradoxal sentences (e.g. the liar). Minimalists present solutions to these problems. In this paper, I argue that these solutions conflict with each other. I analyze some strategies to resolve this conflict. I conclude that minimalism cannot avoid the conflict maintaining it minimalist character.
https://wp.ufpel.edu.br/nepfil/serie-investigacao-filosofica/?fbclid=IwAR2aX2GWXYn3w4MA8DbNGLEa2Gj4fnO5kf-BU6zhZzbXS0qur5w7h1iBGFY
dissertation, I investigate the conditions under which an ideal reasoner may be used as a parameter of rationality for finite reasoners. In addition, I present and justify the research program of computational epistemology, which investigates the parameter of maximum
rationality for finite reasoners using computer simulations.
In chapter 1, I investigate the use ideal reasoners for stating the maximum (and minimum) bounds of rationality for finite reasoners. I propose the notion of a strictly ideal reasoner which coincides with the notion of maximum rationality. The notion of a strictly ideal reasoner is relative to a logic and a notion of beliefs (explicit, implicit, etc). I argue that, for some relevant logics, a finite reasoner may only approach maximum rationality at the limit of a reasoning sequence (stable beliefs) 1 . In chapter 2, I investigate the use of ideal reasoners in the zombie argument against physicalism (Chalmers, 2010). This notion is used in the principle that ideal negative conceivability entails possibility.
The conclusion is that the zombie argument is neither an a priori nor a conclusive argument against physicalism. In chapter 3, I investigate the notion of maximum (and minimum) epistemic rationality for finite reasoners. Epistemic rationality is often related to maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs. I argue that most of the existing models of maximum epistemic rationality have problems in dealing with blindspots and propose a model in terms of the maximization of a function g, which evaluates sets of beliefs regarding truth/falsehood. However, function g may only be maximized at the limit of a reasoning sequence. In chapter 4, I argue that if maximum (epistemic) rationality for finite reasoners must be understood in terms of the limit of a reasoning sequence, then issues about the computational complexity of reasoning are relevant to epistemology. Then I propose the research program of computational epistemology, which uses computer simulations for investigating maximum (epistemic) rationality for
finite reasoners and considers the computational complexity of reasoning. In chapter 5, I provide an example of an investigation in computational epistemology. More specifically, I compare two models of maximum rationality for situations of uncertain reasoning: theory of defeasible reasoning (Pollock, 1995) and Bayesian epistemology (Joyce, 2011).
Publication is forthcoming.
Published paper in my profile.
arbitrary phenomenal truth. A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable if and only if an ideal reasoner does not believe that ¬φ on a priori reflection. The argument presupposes a version of the scrutability thesis stating that, for all φ that supervene on p, the ideal reasoner
believes that p → φ on a priori reflection. In this paper, I argue that, given relevant interpretation of probabilities, the ideal reasoner believes truly, for all φ, that p → pr(φ) = x on a priori reflection. But then, depending on the value of pr(q) and the correlations between q and other sentences, the ideal reasoner also believes (probably, truly) that p → q on a priori
reflection. Then, for some relevant qs, p ∧ ¬q is not ideally negatively conceivable and the zombie argument has a false premise. The choice of an adequate q depends on empirical information, what makes the zombie argument neither conclusive nor a priori.