Papers by ANDRÉS RIVADULLA
Las Ciencias Sociales Revisitadas, 2024
Mis objetivos en este trabajo son múltiples. Empiezo analizando si la filosofía popperiana genera... more Mis objetivos en este trabajo son múltiples. Empiezo analizando si la filosofía popperiana general de la ciencia, vinculada a una posición epistemológica tan restrictiva como el realismo científico, se adecúa a la ciencia real, pues sólo una comprensión completa de la filosofía popperiana de la ciencia puede hacer inteligible su metodología de las ciencias naturales y sociales. Ahora bien, como la filosofía popperiana de las ciencias sociales está indisolublemente ligada a la de las ciencias de la naturaleza, cualquier ataque que pueda sufrir ésta repercute, si su resultado es negativo, también en su filosofía de las ciencias sociales.
La última parte de "La miseria del historicismo" está ampliamente dedicada a la homologación de los métodos de las ciencias naturales y sociales. Precisamente los modelos de las situaciones sociales constituyen para Popper las hipótesis ‘testables’ de las ciencias sociales. Pues bien, el papel que los modelos juegan en la metodología de las ciencias, ampliamente desarrollado en su artículo “Modelos, instrumentos y verdad”, donde el entrelazamiento metodológico entre ciencias naturales y sociales aparece expuesto de forma precisa, constituirá precisamente uno de los puntos centrales de mi trabajo.
En él procedo de la siguiente manera. En primer lugar, analizo el entronque entre metodología y epistemología en la filosofía popperiana de las ciencias y presento un enfoque crítico del realismo científico. Seguidamente enmarco históricamente al racionalismo crítico, al tiempo que ofrezco algunas aproximaciones a la tesis de la unidad de método en ciencias naturales y sociales. La sección “Modelos teóricos y realismo científico” contiene un planteamiento crítico de la concepción realista de los modelos teóricos de la ciencia. Finalmente, en la última sección continúo la discusión en torno al papel que desempeña el principio de racionalidad en los modelos de las ciencias sociales y su repercusión para la tesis de la unidad de método.
Entre mis conclusiones destaco que si Popper hubiera procedido de forma menos rígida no sólo habría desechado el fetichismo del método en el que incurre, desprendiéndose del monopolio del criterio del test deductivo de hipótesis como único criterio de cientificidad, sino que se habría percatado de la importancia de las prácticas de descubrimiento científico y de la existencia de una pluralidad de métodos o estrategias, abducción y preducción entre otras, que muestran la variada riqueza de la actividad científica, al tiempo que ponen en evidencia el mito del método. El problema de la no unicidad del método no se resuelve pues desde un falsacionismo estricto, sino desde una posición más próxima a la práctica científica, que tome en consideración tanto el contexto de justificación como el de descubrimiento.
No obstante, en mi anexo reconozco que al menos en las ciencias teórico-experimentales de la Naturaleza, la exigencia popperiana de falsabilidad cuenta con la adhesión de una parte importante de la comunidad científica. Lo que constituye un ejemplo espléndido de colaboración entre ciencia y filosofía. Pero la testabilidad no es el requisito exigible a la totalidad de la ciencia, que debe gozar de libertad para la elección de procedimientos metodológicos en las disciplinas particulares. La metodología no puede ser impuesta desde instancias filosóficas, sino que la filosofía debe reconocer la existencia de diversas prácticas metodológicas propias en las diferentes ciencias particulares
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Pablo Lorenzano y Óscar Nudler (eds.), El camino desde Kuhn. La inconmensurabilidad hoy, 2012
En 2022 Bojana Mladenovic edita The Last Writings of Thomas S. Kuhn. Incommensurability in Scien... more En 2022 Bojana Mladenovic edita The Last Writings of Thomas S. Kuhn. Incommensurability in Science. En él la resucitación anunciada por Kuhn del concepto de inconmensurabilidad sabe a poco. Y la posibilidad de comparación a pesar del no-overlap principle nos deja con la miel en los labios, pues el capítulo donde debería desarrollarse en The Plurality of Worlds no existe
El objeto de este artículo, publicado diez años antes, es mostrar, en primer lugar, la improcedencia de reconocer la existencia de inconmensurabilidad en tres casos típicos a los que Kuhn recurre reiteradamente: planeta, masa, flogisto. En el caso del término planeta lo que prevalece es la existencia de incompatibilidad interteórica entre astronomías pre y poscopernicana, que hace que vaya de suyo su no intertraducibilidad. El conflicto en química en torno al flogisto se resuelve fácilmente cuando el experimento crucial de Lavoisier deja en claro que una sustancia como el flogisto simplemente no existe. Y el término masa tampoco se puede tomar como un ejemplo de inconmensurabilidad local porque en física masa es simplemente inercia, también es siempre en cualquier teoría la razón entre la fuerza que experimenta un objeto y la aceleración que sufre, y es una propiedad invariante del mismo se mida en el sistema de referencia que se elija; no hay cambio de significado. Finalmente, teorías incompatibles entre sí son susceptibles de combinación, cumpliendo siempre el requisito de homogeneidad dimensional, con el resultado de la obtención de productos teóricos interesantes. Incompatibilidad no implica siempre incomparabilidad.
El escaso éxito de Kuhn a la hora de alumbrar un concepto de inconmensurabilidad claro y bien asentado en la ciencia y su historia no debe llevarnos a no reconocer la importancia de su pensamiento en la filosofía actual de la ciencia.
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Revista Iberoamericana de Argumentación, 2024
La meta de este trabajo es presentar las dos formas principales de argumentación de que se sirve ... more La meta de este trabajo es presentar las dos formas principales de argumentación de que se sirve la ciencia a fin de lograr sus objetivos de innovación y explicación. Éstas son las abducción y la preducción, que ilustro con ejemplos traídos de la física. Pero también destaco el recurso a conjeturas y tanteos como una forma que muestra la fuerza de la imaginación en ciencia. En particular acentúo el carácter dialógico de la abducción cuando hace posible la sustitución o complementación de hipótesis previas, donde adquiere la forma de un macroargumento al servicio del descubrimiento científico.
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Fifty years ago, Carl Gustav Hempel published his famous book "Aspects of Scientific Explanation"... more Fifty years ago, Carl Gustav Hempel published his famous book "Aspects of Scientific Explanation". Since then the number of publications on this subject has grown exponentially. An occasion like this deserves to be commemorated. In this article I offer a modest tribute to this great methodologist of science.
This paper tackles the uses of explanation in theoretical sciences. In particular it is concerned with the possibility of causal explanations in physics. What I intend to do is to focus on the issue of whether the explanation of Kepler's empirical laws of the planetary motions can be a causal explanation. More specifically my point is: can the deductive subsumption of Kepler's 3rd Law (also known as Kepler's 1-2-3 law) under theoretical principles provide a causal explanation for the planetary motions?
My answer is a definitive no. As a matter of fact, on occasions subsumptions occur under differing theoretical principles that are incompatible with one another. I such cases we would have incompatible scientific explanations. This is precisely the situation facing the scientific explanation of Kepler's laws, in particular the third law. Since there exist incompatible gravitational theories, it is impossible for the scientific account of Kepler's law to be a causal explanation of the planetary motions. This is just one example of the difficulties faced by causal explanations in sciences such as theoretical physcis.
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Western science and philosophy are from the beginning inextricably linked with each other. As phi... more Western science and philosophy are from the beginning inextricably linked with each other. As philosophical reflection accompanies the history of science, a good number of questions have accumulated over time: Do the theories or theoretical models of science faithfully represent the reality in itself? Does science touch reality? Does science reveal the intrinsic nature of things? Is the search for truth, as correspondence with reality, the goal of science? Does science converge towards truth? Does scientific rationality depend on the existence of a scientific method, the scientific method? To all these questions Rorty's pragmatism, a philosophy on a human scale, gives convincing answers. Now, these are the most burning questions of the current philosophy of science. Therefore my aim in this paper is to show that Rorty's philosophy fit well within a reasonable epistemology of science. And this is why I also claim that Rorty's pragmatism and Van Fraassen's empiricism converge basically in a philosophical proposal that is compatible with an instrumentalist conception of science.
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The Law of Large Numbers is one of the greatest achievements in the history of mathematics. In th... more The Law of Large Numbers is one of the greatest achievements in the history of mathematics. In this article, I reconstruct the process from the Bernoullian formulation of the Propositio Principalis in the Ars conjectandi to the current form of Bernoulli's Theorem. Then I discuss Bernoulli's main aim: to infer probabilities from observed frequencies. This question, which is known as the inverse use of probability, is shown to be impossible in the context of Bernoulli's probability theory. Finally, after presenting the historical debate on this issue, I conclude with the analysis of the problem of statistical inference and claim that, despite its failure, Jakob Bernoulli illuminates the basis of the modern theory of statistical inference.
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Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía, 2017
" No book has been devoted to the dimensional analysis until 1922 –a hundred years after the appe... more " No book has been devoted to the dimensional analysis until 1922 –a hundred years after the appearance of Fourier's Traité – as P.W. Bridgman published the course he taught at Yale University. " This is what Monod-Herzen (1976, p. 25) affirms. Between both books, Fourier's 1822 and Bridgman's 1922, James Clerk Maxwell paved the way for the consolidation of this discipline, and his seed did not fall on barren ground. In Spain, without going any further, Maxwell's work took root very soon. So much history belies the French epistemologist. Yes, there is a book on dimensional analysis between Fourier and Bridgman. It is Physical Units written by the Spanish physicist José Muñoz del Castillo, who published it in 1890, that is thirty-two years before the publication of the book by Bridgman. Physical Units thus becomes the first treatise devoted to dimensional analysis. Naturally I will not question that Bridgman's Dimensional Analysis has been the first complete treatise on this discipline. But it is not the first book in which the theory of dimensions is presented, as it could be known in the nineteenth century, twenty four years before the proposal by Buckingham of his famous theorem π. The purpose of this article is to highlight the acceptance and development of dimensional analysis in Spain in the 19th century, a circumstance so far not sufficiently appreciated by the specialized historiography.
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Metascience, 2012
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As the title of this article indicates, its aim is to investigate in the origins of Karl Popper’s... more As the title of this article indicates, its aim is to investigate in the origins of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. In particular, find out the roots of what for him were at the time the two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge. Thus, the fundamental questions in this work are: 1. What did Popper know of European philosophers of science that he mentions and criticizes? 2. Where does Popper's anti-inductivism and falsificationism come from? 3. Were Popper's basic positions original? 4. To what extent was Popper in his beginnings a realist philosopher? 5. How contributed Popper to the theory of scientific explanation? 6. What does contemporary scientific instrumentalism owe to Popper?
Even if reading this article may cast some doubts on the solidity of Popper's basic approaches, what is indubitable is that Popper is an indispensable figure in the contemporary philosophy of science.
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Three are the objectives of this article. First, to complement abduction, as a practice of discov... more Three are the objectives of this article. First, to complement abduction, as a practice of discovery in the methodology of science, by means of theoretical preduction. Preduction, which is a deductive practice of scientific discovery, allows the anticipation of previously unknown results by means of the combination, compatible with dimensional analysis, of already accepted results of different theories and disciplines. But, secondly, since standard abduction is not always sufficient to provide best explanations, the methodology of science sometimes has to proceed more preductivo: abduction resorts to preduction. I call this form of abductive reasoning sophisticated abduction.
Finally, the automation of ampliative inferences such as induction and abduction in the field of computational discovery of scientific knowledge encourages the hypothesis of computational preduction. Computational preduction extends the possibilities of machine learning, which in the past forty years has facilitated the possibilities of computational systems both to rediscover empirical laws and to automatically discover equations in data bases. Automated preduction should also facilitate scientific creativity in theoretical physics.
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Three are the main questions on theoretical models that this article deals with. First, the theor... more Three are the main questions on theoretical models that this article deals with. First, the theoretical models are idealized constructions about a singular phenomenon or about a limited phenomenal domain. The main aim of the theoretical models is to save phenomena and facilitate scientific predictions. In no case are they more or less faithful or credible representations of reality. Secondly, theoretical models, although using existing theories, are indispensable in domains that lack theories. Finally, in a historical sequence of models about a given domain, not every subsequent model is always compatible with precedent ones. This is the case of the Ptolemaic, Copernican, Newtonian and Einsteinian cosmological models. The incompatibility between theoretical models or between scientific theories about the same domain is the most important challenge facing convergent scientific realism. In this article, special attention is given to the issue of incompatibility theoretical models of nuclear physics.
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Theoretical models are hypotheses restricted to single phenomena. They are particularly relevant ... more Theoretical models are hypotheses restricted to single phenomena. They are particularly relevant in domains where there are no theories available. In any case theoretical models make use of extant theories in order to save observable phenomena or to provide empirically testable predictions. Nonetheless they are not true or verisimilar representations of reality. They are just tools for prediction. The use of theoretical models offers an excellent argument against realism in the philosophy of physics. As the revolutionary displacements of theories normaly imply intertheoretical incompatibility it is meaningless to say that the models represent verisimilarly or approximately the empirical reality.
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This article analyzes the problem of induction from its origins in Aristotle, naturally through H... more This article analyzes the problem of induction from its origins in Aristotle, naturally through Hume and Popper, to the frequentist and Bayesian concepts of mathematical statistics. Thus it tackles Popper's arguments about the impossibility of inductive probability and the contemporary approaches to the theory of statistical estimation. Its two most important conclusions are: 1. that Popper fails to prove that the inductive probability is impossible, and 2. that in the context of mathematical statistics statistical inferences are only deductive inferences.
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1994
This papers tackles the question of the possibility of inductive probability. My aim is to show t... more This papers tackles the question of the possibility of inductive probability. My aim is to show that Popper and Miller do not prove that probabilistic support cannot be inductive. Nonetheless this does not imply that inductive probability is possible, since induction cannot be incorporated into the contexto of probability theory.
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In this paper I argue that statistical inferences are deductive ones. Thus I reject Ronald Fisher... more In this paper I argue that statistical inferences are deductive ones. Thus I reject Ronald Fisher's inductive view of theoretical statistics and I adhere to Jerzy Neyman's deductive approach. Moreover I assert that both Neyman-Pearson's testing theory and Fisher's tests of significance properly belong to decision theory.
Furthermore I disagree with Ian Hacking's evidentialist criticisms of Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics and with Deborah Mayo's interpretation of Neyman-Pearson testing theory as a model of learning from experience.
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Erkenntnis, 1987
The possibility of inductive probability, i. e. the question if a sufficiently confirmed theory ... more The possibility of inductive probability, i. e. the question if a sufficiently confirmed theory is more probably true than a less confirmed or even a refuted rival theory is one of the most controversial philosophical issues. This paper deals with Popper-Miller's proof of the impossibility of inductive probability and I argue that this proof is not correct.
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Can deductive reasoning be applied to the context of discovery of mathematical physics? I term 'p... more Can deductive reasoning be applied to the context of discovery of mathematical physics? I term 'preduction' the way of reasoning that, starting from the available theoretical background as a whole, allows for the anticipation of previously unknown results, provided that the combination of the already accepted results of different theories -those taken as premises of the deductive reasoning- is compatible with dimensional analysis. This is the method by which may hypotheses, laws and theoretical models are introduced into physics. Computational preduction extends the possibilities of machine learning and it would facilitate scientific creativity in theoretical physics.
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Can Newtonian mechanics be derived from relativity theory? Physicists agree that classical mechan... more Can Newtonian mechanics be derived from relativity theory? Physicists agree that classical mechanics constitutes a limiting case of relativity theory. By contrast some philosophers claim that this cannot be the case because of the incommensurability between both theories. In this article I focus on the alleged incommensurability associated with the term 'mass'. Contradicting Kuhn and Feyerabend I affirm that the mass of moving objects is a relativistic invariant, Thus 'mass' preserves the reference through the change of theory. A result that can be considered devastating to the thesis of incommensurability.
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The realism-instrumentalism debate has been the most important issue in the history of Western ep... more The realism-instrumentalism debate has been the most important issue in the history of Western epistemology since Plato. Realism and instrumentalism interlace in Popper's understanding of science. In my view the existence of limiting cases in physics provides the way for the comparison among competing theories. If furthermore, the predictive balance is overwhelmingly favourable to one of the theories, then there can be no doubt about whether, without resorting to truth or verisimilitde, the better one has been rationally chosen.
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The Role of Mathematics in Physical Sciences, 2005
Many physicists wonder at the usefulness of mathematics in physics. For instance, Einstein, Jeans... more Many physicists wonder at the usefulness of mathematics in physics. For instance, Einstein, Jeans, Wigner, Dirac, Barrow and many others.
Wondering at the usefulness of mathematics in the physical description of reality is understandable indeed, if we assume that the laws, hypotheses and theories do describe, represent or mirror Nature. But the fact that these physical constructs are sometimes empirically acceptable is no compelling reason for claiming that they are are true or verisimilar representations of the independent reality. The inference from empirical success to truth is logically illegitimate.
In particular it is sometimes claimed that mathematical physics attemps to simulate reality by means of theoretical models. But as the history of physics shows, it is perfectly possible to have different models for the same domain of phenomena, both empirically successful and based on entirely different assumptions. Thus theoretical models cannot be supposed to represent or simulate the reality.
If instrumentalism about theories and theoretical models is adopted instead of realism in the philosophy of science, then the alleged unreasonable usefulness of mathematical for the physical description of reality becomes less alarming. And this has important consequences for the doctrine of theoretical explanation.
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Papers by ANDRÉS RIVADULLA
La última parte de "La miseria del historicismo" está ampliamente dedicada a la homologación de los métodos de las ciencias naturales y sociales. Precisamente los modelos de las situaciones sociales constituyen para Popper las hipótesis ‘testables’ de las ciencias sociales. Pues bien, el papel que los modelos juegan en la metodología de las ciencias, ampliamente desarrollado en su artículo “Modelos, instrumentos y verdad”, donde el entrelazamiento metodológico entre ciencias naturales y sociales aparece expuesto de forma precisa, constituirá precisamente uno de los puntos centrales de mi trabajo.
En él procedo de la siguiente manera. En primer lugar, analizo el entronque entre metodología y epistemología en la filosofía popperiana de las ciencias y presento un enfoque crítico del realismo científico. Seguidamente enmarco históricamente al racionalismo crítico, al tiempo que ofrezco algunas aproximaciones a la tesis de la unidad de método en ciencias naturales y sociales. La sección “Modelos teóricos y realismo científico” contiene un planteamiento crítico de la concepción realista de los modelos teóricos de la ciencia. Finalmente, en la última sección continúo la discusión en torno al papel que desempeña el principio de racionalidad en los modelos de las ciencias sociales y su repercusión para la tesis de la unidad de método.
Entre mis conclusiones destaco que si Popper hubiera procedido de forma menos rígida no sólo habría desechado el fetichismo del método en el que incurre, desprendiéndose del monopolio del criterio del test deductivo de hipótesis como único criterio de cientificidad, sino que se habría percatado de la importancia de las prácticas de descubrimiento científico y de la existencia de una pluralidad de métodos o estrategias, abducción y preducción entre otras, que muestran la variada riqueza de la actividad científica, al tiempo que ponen en evidencia el mito del método. El problema de la no unicidad del método no se resuelve pues desde un falsacionismo estricto, sino desde una posición más próxima a la práctica científica, que tome en consideración tanto el contexto de justificación como el de descubrimiento.
No obstante, en mi anexo reconozco que al menos en las ciencias teórico-experimentales de la Naturaleza, la exigencia popperiana de falsabilidad cuenta con la adhesión de una parte importante de la comunidad científica. Lo que constituye un ejemplo espléndido de colaboración entre ciencia y filosofía. Pero la testabilidad no es el requisito exigible a la totalidad de la ciencia, que debe gozar de libertad para la elección de procedimientos metodológicos en las disciplinas particulares. La metodología no puede ser impuesta desde instancias filosóficas, sino que la filosofía debe reconocer la existencia de diversas prácticas metodológicas propias en las diferentes ciencias particulares
El objeto de este artículo, publicado diez años antes, es mostrar, en primer lugar, la improcedencia de reconocer la existencia de inconmensurabilidad en tres casos típicos a los que Kuhn recurre reiteradamente: planeta, masa, flogisto. En el caso del término planeta lo que prevalece es la existencia de incompatibilidad interteórica entre astronomías pre y poscopernicana, que hace que vaya de suyo su no intertraducibilidad. El conflicto en química en torno al flogisto se resuelve fácilmente cuando el experimento crucial de Lavoisier deja en claro que una sustancia como el flogisto simplemente no existe. Y el término masa tampoco se puede tomar como un ejemplo de inconmensurabilidad local porque en física masa es simplemente inercia, también es siempre en cualquier teoría la razón entre la fuerza que experimenta un objeto y la aceleración que sufre, y es una propiedad invariante del mismo se mida en el sistema de referencia que se elija; no hay cambio de significado. Finalmente, teorías incompatibles entre sí son susceptibles de combinación, cumpliendo siempre el requisito de homogeneidad dimensional, con el resultado de la obtención de productos teóricos interesantes. Incompatibilidad no implica siempre incomparabilidad.
El escaso éxito de Kuhn a la hora de alumbrar un concepto de inconmensurabilidad claro y bien asentado en la ciencia y su historia no debe llevarnos a no reconocer la importancia de su pensamiento en la filosofía actual de la ciencia.
This paper tackles the uses of explanation in theoretical sciences. In particular it is concerned with the possibility of causal explanations in physics. What I intend to do is to focus on the issue of whether the explanation of Kepler's empirical laws of the planetary motions can be a causal explanation. More specifically my point is: can the deductive subsumption of Kepler's 3rd Law (also known as Kepler's 1-2-3 law) under theoretical principles provide a causal explanation for the planetary motions?
My answer is a definitive no. As a matter of fact, on occasions subsumptions occur under differing theoretical principles that are incompatible with one another. I such cases we would have incompatible scientific explanations. This is precisely the situation facing the scientific explanation of Kepler's laws, in particular the third law. Since there exist incompatible gravitational theories, it is impossible for the scientific account of Kepler's law to be a causal explanation of the planetary motions. This is just one example of the difficulties faced by causal explanations in sciences such as theoretical physcis.
Even if reading this article may cast some doubts on the solidity of Popper's basic approaches, what is indubitable is that Popper is an indispensable figure in the contemporary philosophy of science.
Finally, the automation of ampliative inferences such as induction and abduction in the field of computational discovery of scientific knowledge encourages the hypothesis of computational preduction. Computational preduction extends the possibilities of machine learning, which in the past forty years has facilitated the possibilities of computational systems both to rediscover empirical laws and to automatically discover equations in data bases. Automated preduction should also facilitate scientific creativity in theoretical physics.
Furthermore I disagree with Ian Hacking's evidentialist criticisms of Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics and with Deborah Mayo's interpretation of Neyman-Pearson testing theory as a model of learning from experience.
Wondering at the usefulness of mathematics in the physical description of reality is understandable indeed, if we assume that the laws, hypotheses and theories do describe, represent or mirror Nature. But the fact that these physical constructs are sometimes empirically acceptable is no compelling reason for claiming that they are are true or verisimilar representations of the independent reality. The inference from empirical success to truth is logically illegitimate.
In particular it is sometimes claimed that mathematical physics attemps to simulate reality by means of theoretical models. But as the history of physics shows, it is perfectly possible to have different models for the same domain of phenomena, both empirically successful and based on entirely different assumptions. Thus theoretical models cannot be supposed to represent or simulate the reality.
If instrumentalism about theories and theoretical models is adopted instead of realism in the philosophy of science, then the alleged unreasonable usefulness of mathematical for the physical description of reality becomes less alarming. And this has important consequences for the doctrine of theoretical explanation.
La última parte de "La miseria del historicismo" está ampliamente dedicada a la homologación de los métodos de las ciencias naturales y sociales. Precisamente los modelos de las situaciones sociales constituyen para Popper las hipótesis ‘testables’ de las ciencias sociales. Pues bien, el papel que los modelos juegan en la metodología de las ciencias, ampliamente desarrollado en su artículo “Modelos, instrumentos y verdad”, donde el entrelazamiento metodológico entre ciencias naturales y sociales aparece expuesto de forma precisa, constituirá precisamente uno de los puntos centrales de mi trabajo.
En él procedo de la siguiente manera. En primer lugar, analizo el entronque entre metodología y epistemología en la filosofía popperiana de las ciencias y presento un enfoque crítico del realismo científico. Seguidamente enmarco históricamente al racionalismo crítico, al tiempo que ofrezco algunas aproximaciones a la tesis de la unidad de método en ciencias naturales y sociales. La sección “Modelos teóricos y realismo científico” contiene un planteamiento crítico de la concepción realista de los modelos teóricos de la ciencia. Finalmente, en la última sección continúo la discusión en torno al papel que desempeña el principio de racionalidad en los modelos de las ciencias sociales y su repercusión para la tesis de la unidad de método.
Entre mis conclusiones destaco que si Popper hubiera procedido de forma menos rígida no sólo habría desechado el fetichismo del método en el que incurre, desprendiéndose del monopolio del criterio del test deductivo de hipótesis como único criterio de cientificidad, sino que se habría percatado de la importancia de las prácticas de descubrimiento científico y de la existencia de una pluralidad de métodos o estrategias, abducción y preducción entre otras, que muestran la variada riqueza de la actividad científica, al tiempo que ponen en evidencia el mito del método. El problema de la no unicidad del método no se resuelve pues desde un falsacionismo estricto, sino desde una posición más próxima a la práctica científica, que tome en consideración tanto el contexto de justificación como el de descubrimiento.
No obstante, en mi anexo reconozco que al menos en las ciencias teórico-experimentales de la Naturaleza, la exigencia popperiana de falsabilidad cuenta con la adhesión de una parte importante de la comunidad científica. Lo que constituye un ejemplo espléndido de colaboración entre ciencia y filosofía. Pero la testabilidad no es el requisito exigible a la totalidad de la ciencia, que debe gozar de libertad para la elección de procedimientos metodológicos en las disciplinas particulares. La metodología no puede ser impuesta desde instancias filosóficas, sino que la filosofía debe reconocer la existencia de diversas prácticas metodológicas propias en las diferentes ciencias particulares
El objeto de este artículo, publicado diez años antes, es mostrar, en primer lugar, la improcedencia de reconocer la existencia de inconmensurabilidad en tres casos típicos a los que Kuhn recurre reiteradamente: planeta, masa, flogisto. En el caso del término planeta lo que prevalece es la existencia de incompatibilidad interteórica entre astronomías pre y poscopernicana, que hace que vaya de suyo su no intertraducibilidad. El conflicto en química en torno al flogisto se resuelve fácilmente cuando el experimento crucial de Lavoisier deja en claro que una sustancia como el flogisto simplemente no existe. Y el término masa tampoco se puede tomar como un ejemplo de inconmensurabilidad local porque en física masa es simplemente inercia, también es siempre en cualquier teoría la razón entre la fuerza que experimenta un objeto y la aceleración que sufre, y es una propiedad invariante del mismo se mida en el sistema de referencia que se elija; no hay cambio de significado. Finalmente, teorías incompatibles entre sí son susceptibles de combinación, cumpliendo siempre el requisito de homogeneidad dimensional, con el resultado de la obtención de productos teóricos interesantes. Incompatibilidad no implica siempre incomparabilidad.
El escaso éxito de Kuhn a la hora de alumbrar un concepto de inconmensurabilidad claro y bien asentado en la ciencia y su historia no debe llevarnos a no reconocer la importancia de su pensamiento en la filosofía actual de la ciencia.
This paper tackles the uses of explanation in theoretical sciences. In particular it is concerned with the possibility of causal explanations in physics. What I intend to do is to focus on the issue of whether the explanation of Kepler's empirical laws of the planetary motions can be a causal explanation. More specifically my point is: can the deductive subsumption of Kepler's 3rd Law (also known as Kepler's 1-2-3 law) under theoretical principles provide a causal explanation for the planetary motions?
My answer is a definitive no. As a matter of fact, on occasions subsumptions occur under differing theoretical principles that are incompatible with one another. I such cases we would have incompatible scientific explanations. This is precisely the situation facing the scientific explanation of Kepler's laws, in particular the third law. Since there exist incompatible gravitational theories, it is impossible for the scientific account of Kepler's law to be a causal explanation of the planetary motions. This is just one example of the difficulties faced by causal explanations in sciences such as theoretical physcis.
Even if reading this article may cast some doubts on the solidity of Popper's basic approaches, what is indubitable is that Popper is an indispensable figure in the contemporary philosophy of science.
Finally, the automation of ampliative inferences such as induction and abduction in the field of computational discovery of scientific knowledge encourages the hypothesis of computational preduction. Computational preduction extends the possibilities of machine learning, which in the past forty years has facilitated the possibilities of computational systems both to rediscover empirical laws and to automatically discover equations in data bases. Automated preduction should also facilitate scientific creativity in theoretical physics.
Furthermore I disagree with Ian Hacking's evidentialist criticisms of Neyman-Pearson's theory of statistics and with Deborah Mayo's interpretation of Neyman-Pearson testing theory as a model of learning from experience.
Wondering at the usefulness of mathematics in the physical description of reality is understandable indeed, if we assume that the laws, hypotheses and theories do describe, represent or mirror Nature. But the fact that these physical constructs are sometimes empirically acceptable is no compelling reason for claiming that they are are true or verisimilar representations of the independent reality. The inference from empirical success to truth is logically illegitimate.
In particular it is sometimes claimed that mathematical physics attemps to simulate reality by means of theoretical models. But as the history of physics shows, it is perfectly possible to have different models for the same domain of phenomena, both empirically successful and based on entirely different assumptions. Thus theoretical models cannot be supposed to represent or simulate the reality.
If instrumentalism about theories and theoretical models is adopted instead of realism in the philosophy of science, then the alleged unreasonable usefulness of mathematical for the physical description of reality becomes less alarming. And this has important consequences for the doctrine of theoretical explanation.
La física teórica contemporánea permite concluir, por medio de la combinación de resultados aceptados de la mecánica cuántica, la teoría general de la relatividad y la relatividad especial, que el espacio es discontinuo, e. d. que hay una longitud mínima tal que cualquier otra distancia tiene que ser igual o superior a ella.
La forma de razonamiento que permite alcanzar este resultado es el razonamiento preductivo.
Este breve ensayo trata armónicamente de estas cuestiones.