The article introduces the term “political Arab Jew,” its nature and meaning. It will show that p... more The article introduces the term “political Arab Jew,” its nature and meaning. It will show that proponents of the Arab Jew seek to separate the ethnic from the national, the Jew from the Zionist, and realign ethnic identities: Arabs, who include Jews and Muslims, vs. Ashkenazim/Zionists. They do so by creating an “imagined community,” by rejecting an ascriptive identity based on an ethnic/national juxtaposition, and by suggesting their own kind of identity, a self-ascriptive identity that separates the ethnos from the nation. They have failed in their mission, as the majority of Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin reject the Arab Jew definer as representing their own identity. Even the more militant Mizrahim, who are fighting to change Mizrahi-Ashkenazi relations, limit their activities to the cultural field; when their goal is to redefine the place of the Mizrahim in Israel, they do so from within, not outside of, Jewish/Zionist society.
The accepted approach to American-Israeli relations during Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-1957) ho... more The accepted approach to American-Israeli relations during Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-1957) holds that Eisenhower was aloof and distant in his attitude toward Israel. In fact, however, the Eisenhower administration’s policy and attitude toward Israel during those years were nuanced and sophisticated, intertwining interests with ideals. With the onset of the Cold War, it aimed to preserve and increase US influence in the Middle East, but in a way that would not put Israel at risk, on the one hand, while being attentive and responsive to the voices emanating from the United States regarding American policy toward Israel and the Middle East, on the other. Furthermore, the policy carried out by the Eisenhower administration toward Israel was one of continuity with the Truman administration more than it was a policy of change, as Eisenhower and Dulles would have had us believe. This is evident in four main aspects: the way the administration presented its policy of “friendly impartiality” toward Israel; its attentiveness to Israel’s military needs; its attentiveness to Israel’s economic needs; and its sensitivity to what American Jews had to say.
This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic a... more This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms during the Cold War, from 1969 to 1979. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, which were concluded in two agreements SALT I and SALT II (with only the first ratified), marked a major change in the history of arms control negotiations. For the first time, in the relatively short history of nuclear weapons and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, the two major nuclear powers had agreed to put limits on the size of their nuclear strategic arms. However, the negotiations between the US and USSR were the easy part of the process. The more difficult part was the negotiations among the Americans. Through the study of a decade of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in the Cold War, this book examines the forces that either allowed US presidents and senior officials to pave a path toward a US arms limitation policy, or prevented them from doing so. Most importantly, the book discusses the meaning of these negotiations and agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and seeks to identify the intention of the negotiators: Were they aiming at making the world a safer place? What was the purpose of the negotiations and agreements within US strategic thinking, both militarily and diplomatically? Were they aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union, or only at enhancing the strategic balance as one component of the strategic nuclear deterrence between the two powers? This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, arms control, US foreign policy and international relations in general.
The history of Israel is framed by wars. However, the nature of Israel’s wars has changed over ti... more The history of Israel is framed by wars. However, the nature of Israel’s wars has changed over time, from mainly infantry-based warfare to modern armor warfare, and from conventional warfare to regular armies clashing with nonstate combatants, known in the professional literature as low intensity conflict (LIC). Conventional warfare took place within a clear and well-defined territory, with relative separation between civilians and soldiers. Low intensity conflict has blurred the battlefield boundaries, and armed operations take place in civilian areas. With these changes, the meaning of victory has changed as well. The decisive military victory that marked the military campaigns of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 is no longer relevant in the LIC battlefield. Conquest of territory and destruction of the enemy’s military forces, the hallmark of victory during the days of the conventional wars, are much less important in a mode of fighting in which the image of being able to continue to in...
A new look at the 1956 Suez War, David Tal Suez - the last imperial war or an imperial hangover?,... more A new look at the 1956 Suez War, David Tal Suez - the last imperial war or an imperial hangover?, Aron Shai Eisenhower and the Sinai campaign of 1956 - the first major crisis in US-Israeli relations, Isaac Alteras France and the crisis in Suez - an appraisal, 40 years on, Paul Gaujac the Soviet Union and the Suez, Laurent Rucker Britain's slow march to Suez, Keith Kyle the protocol of Sevres, 1956 - anatomy of a war plot, Avi Shlaim the origins of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal - a reappraisal, Rami Ginat the Snai War, 1956 - three partners, three wars, Motti Golani Egyptian perspectives on the Suez War, Yoram Maital regaining lost pride - the impact of the Suez affair on Egypt and the Arab world, Elie Podeh.
The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and polit... more The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and political movement toward nuclear disarmament. Across the globe, heads of state, high-ranking ministers, and bureaucrats led intense efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements. Ultimately these efforts failed. In "The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma", David Tal offers a detailed analysis of U.S. policy from 1945 to the summer of 1963, exploring the reasons for failure and revealing the complex motivations that eventually led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.While previous books have focused on the policies of specific administrations, Tal's is the first to consider negotiations as an evolving phenomenon that preoccupied three presidents, from Truman to Kennedy. Drawing on extensive archival research, the author examines the profound dilemma faced by leaders on all sides - forced by political pressure to engage in negotiations whose success they saw as injurious to national interests. Far from believing that the nuclear arms race would inevitably lead to war, the United States regarded nuclear weapons as the greatest guarantee that war would not happen.
ABSTRACT Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel... more ABSTRACT Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel left him no choice. The Israeli government rejected his peace proposals during 1971–73, and Sadat initiated the war in order to demonstrate his refusal to agree to the status quo and to the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories it occupied in June 1967. However, when the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 is carefully studied, it appears the terms of the treaty were in fact much closer to the Israeli position and terms as presented before the 1973 war than to those set by Sadat. Careful reading of the relevant documents in general and Sadat's claims and arguments in particular will show that it was actually Sadat who needed the war, and he needed it not in order to force Israel into a political process, but for himself, so as to accept terms he could not accept without a war.
Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was o... more Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.
The article introduces the term “political Arab Jew,” its nature and meaning. It will show that p... more The article introduces the term “political Arab Jew,” its nature and meaning. It will show that proponents of the Arab Jew seek to separate the ethnic from the national, the Jew from the Zionist, and realign ethnic identities: Arabs, who include Jews and Muslims, vs. Ashkenazim/Zionists. They do so by creating an “imagined community,” by rejecting an ascriptive identity based on an ethnic/national juxtaposition, and by suggesting their own kind of identity, a self-ascriptive identity that separates the ethnos from the nation. They have failed in their mission, as the majority of Jews of Middle Eastern and North African origin reject the Arab Jew definer as representing their own identity. Even the more militant Mizrahim, who are fighting to change Mizrahi-Ashkenazi relations, limit their activities to the cultural field; when their goal is to redefine the place of the Mizrahim in Israel, they do so from within, not outside of, Jewish/Zionist society.
The accepted approach to American-Israeli relations during Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-1957) ho... more The accepted approach to American-Israeli relations during Eisenhower’s presidency (1953-1957) holds that Eisenhower was aloof and distant in his attitude toward Israel. In fact, however, the Eisenhower administration’s policy and attitude toward Israel during those years were nuanced and sophisticated, intertwining interests with ideals. With the onset of the Cold War, it aimed to preserve and increase US influence in the Middle East, but in a way that would not put Israel at risk, on the one hand, while being attentive and responsive to the voices emanating from the United States regarding American policy toward Israel and the Middle East, on the other. Furthermore, the policy carried out by the Eisenhower administration toward Israel was one of continuity with the Truman administration more than it was a policy of change, as Eisenhower and Dulles would have had us believe. This is evident in four main aspects: the way the administration presented its policy of “friendly impartiality” toward Israel; its attentiveness to Israel’s military needs; its attentiveness to Israel’s economic needs; and its sensitivity to what American Jews had to say.
This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic a... more This book examines the negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms during the Cold War, from 1969 to 1979. The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, which were concluded in two agreements SALT I and SALT II (with only the first ratified), marked a major change in the history of arms control negotiations. For the first time, in the relatively short history of nuclear weapons and negotiations over nuclear disarmament, the two major nuclear powers had agreed to put limits on the size of their nuclear strategic arms. However, the negotiations between the US and USSR were the easy part of the process. The more difficult part was the negotiations among the Americans. Through the study of a decade of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in the Cold War, this book examines the forces that either allowed US presidents and senior officials to pave a path toward a US arms limitation policy, or prevented them from doing so. Most importantly, the book discusses the meaning of these negotiations and agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and seeks to identify the intention of the negotiators: Were they aiming at making the world a safer place? What was the purpose of the negotiations and agreements within US strategic thinking, both militarily and diplomatically? Were they aimed at improving relations with the Soviet Union, or only at enhancing the strategic balance as one component of the strategic nuclear deterrence between the two powers? This book will be of much interest to students of Cold War history, arms control, US foreign policy and international relations in general.
The history of Israel is framed by wars. However, the nature of Israel’s wars has changed over ti... more The history of Israel is framed by wars. However, the nature of Israel’s wars has changed over time, from mainly infantry-based warfare to modern armor warfare, and from conventional warfare to regular armies clashing with nonstate combatants, known in the professional literature as low intensity conflict (LIC). Conventional warfare took place within a clear and well-defined territory, with relative separation between civilians and soldiers. Low intensity conflict has blurred the battlefield boundaries, and armed operations take place in civilian areas. With these changes, the meaning of victory has changed as well. The decisive military victory that marked the military campaigns of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 is no longer relevant in the LIC battlefield. Conquest of territory and destruction of the enemy’s military forces, the hallmark of victory during the days of the conventional wars, are much less important in a mode of fighting in which the image of being able to continue to in...
A new look at the 1956 Suez War, David Tal Suez - the last imperial war or an imperial hangover?,... more A new look at the 1956 Suez War, David Tal Suez - the last imperial war or an imperial hangover?, Aron Shai Eisenhower and the Sinai campaign of 1956 - the first major crisis in US-Israeli relations, Isaac Alteras France and the crisis in Suez - an appraisal, 40 years on, Paul Gaujac the Soviet Union and the Suez, Laurent Rucker Britain's slow march to Suez, Keith Kyle the protocol of Sevres, 1956 - anatomy of a war plot, Avi Shlaim the origins of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal - a reappraisal, Rami Ginat the Snai War, 1956 - three partners, three wars, Motti Golani Egyptian perspectives on the Suez War, Yoram Maital regaining lost pride - the impact of the Suez affair on Egypt and the Arab world, Elie Podeh.
The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and polit... more The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 quickly ushered in a popular and political movement toward nuclear disarmament. Across the globe, heads of state, high-ranking ministers, and bureaucrats led intense efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements. Ultimately these efforts failed. In "The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma", David Tal offers a detailed analysis of U.S. policy from 1945 to the summer of 1963, exploring the reasons for failure and revealing the complex motivations that eventually led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty.While previous books have focused on the policies of specific administrations, Tal's is the first to consider negotiations as an evolving phenomenon that preoccupied three presidents, from Truman to Kennedy. Drawing on extensive archival research, the author examines the profound dilemma faced by leaders on all sides - forced by political pressure to engage in negotiations whose success they saw as injurious to national interests. Far from believing that the nuclear arms race would inevitably lead to war, the United States regarded nuclear weapons as the greatest guarantee that war would not happen.
ABSTRACT Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel... more ABSTRACT Scholars and pundits believe that Anwar Sadat went to war in October 1973 because Israel left him no choice. The Israeli government rejected his peace proposals during 1971–73, and Sadat initiated the war in order to demonstrate his refusal to agree to the status quo and to the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the territories it occupied in June 1967. However, when the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt in March 1979 is carefully studied, it appears the terms of the treaty were in fact much closer to the Israeli position and terms as presented before the 1973 war than to those set by Sadat. Careful reading of the relevant documents in general and Sadat's claims and arguments in particular will show that it was actually Sadat who needed the war, and he needed it not in order to force Israel into a political process, but for himself, so as to accept terms he could not accept without a war.
Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was o... more Arab involvement in the Jewish-Palestine conflict had started during the late 1930s, but it was only in the wake of the UN Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 that active military intervention was considered. The Arab League tried to form a unified army that would prevent the implementation of the Partition Resolution, but failed. In Egypt, the government and the army opposed the idea of dispatching an expeditionary force to Palestine, but the pressure of public opinion and King Farouq's insistence carried the day. The order was given and in May 1948, Egyptian forces crossed the international border with Palestine. The author analyses the reasons for the decisive victory enjoyed by Israel over a larger opponent; and the successes and failures that were sealed in the Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement signed in Rhodes in March 1948.
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