Papers by Alessandro Mario Amoroso
African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, 2022
The 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) is a complex instrument, consisting of a general agreement de... more The 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) is a complex instrument, consisting of a general agreement dealing with national issues and six additional agreements negotiated in parallel "tracks," separately addressing the multiple regional conflicts that have beset Sudan in recent decades. The purpose of the article is to provide a legal analysis of the JPA and to assess its implications for both peacebuilding in Darfur and the democratization of Sudan. After situating the agreement in the context of Sudan's comprehensive peace process, the article presents the structure of the document, sheds light on its legal nature, and introduces the core issues addressed therein. It then focuses on the Darfur Agreement, considering the importance of the Darfur conflict to both the recent history of Sudan and the success of the peace process. Based on this analysis, the article assesses the main achievements and potential challenges to an effective implementation of the JPA.
Diritti Comparati blog, 2022
Nel solco del ricco dibattito giuridico suscitato dall’aggressione della Federazione Russa ai dan... more Nel solco del ricco dibattito giuridico suscitato dall’aggressione della Federazione Russa ai danni dell'Ucraina, questo breve contributo prova a offrire alcuni spunti sul tema della legalità delle sanzioni nel diritto internazionale, concentrandosi sulle sanzioni approvate dall’Unione Europea. Dopo rapidi cenni alle sanzioni adottate, vengono messe a fuoco tre ragioni per ritenere che le misure restrittive UE contro la Russia possano far avanzare il dibattito sui limiti posti dal diritto internazionale all’adozione di misure coercitive unilaterali. I tre aspetti interessati riguardano l’attuazione, tramite un’organizzazione sovranazionale, dell’obbligo di cooperare per porre fine a violazioni gravi di norme cogenti; la prassi statale sulle sanzioni adottate a titolo di contromisura; il controllo esercitato dal giudice UE sulle misure restrittive.
International Law and Chemical, Biological, Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) Events, 2022
The purpose of this chapter is to give a comprehensive overview of international obligations conc... more The purpose of this chapter is to give a comprehensive overview of international obligations concerning the criminal repression of CBRN-related violations which do not amount to international crimes. Indeed, while a number of CBRN-related violations may meet treaty and customary definitions of international crimes, international law requires States to criminalise and prosecute a broader range of CBRN events in their domestic legal systems. The first section provides some introductory remarks, proposing a taxonomy of applicable obligations and linking them to the different phases of the CBRN emergency management cycle. The second and third sections deal respectively with the two main obligations in this field, namely the obligation to criminalise and the obligation to prosecute. The analysis proves that obligations to criminalise aim at reinforcing the prevention of and preparedness against CBRN events, whereas obligations to prosecute govern the response to and recovery from CBRN-related violations. The fourth section turns to national implementation and sheds light on the consequences of the failure to criminalise and prosecute in terms of State responsibility, and specifically human rights responsibility for violations of the right to life.
International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 102, issue 914: Emerging Voices, 515-537, 2021
Domestic law, case-law and policies play a decisive, yet underestimated role in ensuring that par... more Domestic law, case-law and policies play a decisive, yet underestimated role in ensuring that partnered operations are carried out in compliance with international law. Research on the legal framework of partnered operations has so far focused on clarifying existing and emerging obligations at the international level. Lesser attention has been devoted to understanding whether and how domestic legal systems integrate international law into national decision-making which governs the planning, execution and assessment of partnered operations. This article tries to fill the gap by focusing on the practice of selected States (the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and Italy), chosen for their recent or current involvement in partnered operations. By using the ICRC's "support relationships" framework and based on a comparative analysis of practice, the study seeks evaluate the effectiveness of national laws, case-law and policies according to their ability to prevent or mitigate the risk of humanitarian consequences posed by partnered warfare.
AREL La rivista, vol 2/2020, 112-114, 2020
L'Erasmus ha acquisito nel dibattito pubblico recente, anche italiano, il valore di idea-simbolo ... more L'Erasmus ha acquisito nel dibattito pubblico recente, anche italiano, il valore di idea-simbolo della generazione nata dopo gli accordi di Schengen. Ma è sufficiente il successo di un programma educativo a definire un'intera generazione? In questo caso due ordini di ragioni suggeriscono che non lo sia. Ragioni in primo luogo numeriche: il totale di coloro che hanno preso parte al programma Erasmus in tre decenni supera di poco il 2 per cento del totale dei potenziali partecipanti. Inoltre, siccome in democrazia tutte le questioni numeriche si riflettono in dinamiche politiche, il rifiuto di quella definizione da parte dei diretti interessati si è rapidamente tradotto in dissenso elettorale. In occasione delle elezioni politiche del 2018, ai partiti che si erano esplicitamente proposti come portavoce della "generazione Erasmus" e i cui programmi in materia di politiche giovanili facevano espressamente appello ai suoi componenti, l'elettorato più giovane ha largamente preferito altre proposte. Il dibattito sull'esistenza e il ruolo della "generazione Erasmus" è un dibattito, quindi, che per ragioni non solo statistiche ma anche rigorosamente politiche dovrebbe ritenersi esaurito. Eppure, l'esito di quel dibattito sembra aver offuscato, depotenziandola, una riflessione più scrupolosa sulle ragioni che lo avevano innescato: qual è il ruolo che la società contemporanea attribuisce alla mobilità internazionale?
The War Report. Armed Conflicts in 2018, 102-116, 2019
In 2018 Mali, supported by France, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization M... more In 2018 Mali, supported by France, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and by militias of the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA), continued to be involved in a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) on its territory against Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). According to the War Report, intercommunal clashes between Dan Nan Ambassagou and the Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel also reached the threshold of a NIAC during the last year.
This chapter in the War Report 2018 offers a complete overview of the several conflicts afflicting Mali in recent years. The first parttraces back the root causes of the initial Tuareg rebellion in the Northern regions, to then show the jihadist takeover of the insurgency. It provides an in-depth analysis of the planning, generation and deployment of two multinational operations, one sponsored by the African Union, the other authorised by the United Nations. It sheds light on the French intervention in Mali, first as Operation Serval and then under Operation Barkhane. Finally, it accounts for the progressive return to peace in the Northern territory, while intercommunal conflicts in the Central regions rise to the level of a separate non-international armed conflict. The second part of the chapter scrutinizes the status and legal position of each party to the conflict. Key developments in 2018 are then surveyed. The last part summarises concluded and ongoing prosecutions before the International Criminal Court for crimes committed in the Malian conflicts.
Geneva Centre for Security Policy , 2019
This Training Guide is designed for Swiss industry to fulfil the obligations introduced by the Fe... more This Training Guide is designed for Swiss industry to fulfil the obligations introduced by the Federal Act on Private Security Services provided Abroad (PSSA) of 27 September 2013 and its accompanying Ordinance (OPSA) of 24 June 2015, entered into force on 1 September 2015. It is tailored to the needs of companies operating and maintaining weapons systems and/or providing installation services, training on equipment and systems, and/or operational or logistical support to armed forces. Its purpose is to enable company personnel to understand key concepts and standards of human rights and international humanitarian law, including the risk and avoidance of direct participation in hostilities, in order to ensure their activities do not violate the PSSA. The Guide therefore provides the necessary knowledge and tools to train company personnel to identify, prevent, and report activities that can constitute direct participation in hostilities or complicity in human rights and international humanitarian law violations. The Training Guide is complete with thirty scenarios for practical training on direct participation in hostilities, including answers, that can be used to discuss the risk and avoidance of activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities.
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 16, no. 5, 1063-1091, 2018
On 4 July 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court) issued a second warrant for the... more On 4 July 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC, the Court) issued a second warrant for the arrest of Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, a commander within General Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). Already wanted by the Court since August 2017, Al-Werfalli remains at large. The LNA maintains that he is facing justice in Libya, implicitly excluding the surrender of the suspect to the ICC. As a result, in the second arrest warrant the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) addressed the admissibility of the case and declared that the proceedings initiated by the LNA do not satisfy the requirements of the complementarity test. This conclusion, although not surprising, hides a question on the relationship of the Court with non-state entities. It is a question the PTC I deliberately avoided answering: is the ICC required to assess its complementarity with respect to criminal prosecutions undertaken by non-state entities in general, and with non-state armed groups (NSAG) in particular? ICC Judge Kovács, presiding over the chamber, had already suggested that a rigid approach should be rejected when dealing with entities having both undisputed control over a territory and the capacity to exercise criminal jurisdiction. Moving from that hint, this article first shows that the issue is not unique to the Libyan situation and that the ICC can easily find itself confronted with criminal proceedings run by courts of NSAGs. It then restricts the analysis to NSAGs armed groups that control a territory, are capable of exercising criminal jurisdiction and have a legal basis in international law to do so. Finally, it submits that the combined effect of the ne bis in idem principle and the command responsibility regime under the ICC Statute provides a solid argument allowing the Court to answer the question in the affirmative.
The Italian Yearbook of International Law, vol. 26, 562-566, 2017
Decision no. 219/2016 of the Italian Corte Costituzionale provides interpretive guidance on the e... more Decision no. 219/2016 of the Italian Corte Costituzionale provides interpretive guidance on the exercise of the right of redress by the central administration against local authorities responsible for breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights involving the state financial liability. The court was seized by the Tribunale di Bari, questioning the constitutionality of the right of redress (as enshrined in Article 16-bis(5) of Law No. 11/2005) with several constitutional provisions, most notably the standard of reasonableness drawn from Article 3 and the right of defence under Article 24 of the Italian Constitution. Dismissing the claim, the Corte Costituzionale pointed to local authorities' responsibility, required by Law 11/2005, as a condition for exercise of the right of redress. Since assessment of local responsibility must take place at domestic level, the right of defence is not violated by local authorities' lack of standing before the European Court of Human Rights.
EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law, 2018
The extensive air strikes launched by Israel on Iranian forces and assets across Syria in the ear... more The extensive air strikes launched by Israel on Iranian forces and assets across Syria in the early morning of 10 May 2018 present a complex case study. The strikes were decided in retaliation for a rocket barrage fired some hours earlier from Syrian territory on IDF forward outposts in the Israeli-controlled Golan. The rockets were immediately attributed by the IDF to the Quds Force, the special unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in charge of extraterritorial operations.
The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany explicitly referred to Israel's right to act in self-defence against Iran. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked 'Israel's obligation and right to defend itself against Iranian aggression from Syrian territory'. A self-defence argument raises in the present case a legal issue related to the status of the territory attacked: the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967 and annexed in 1981. Can an annexing state invoke Article 51 UN Charter to justify the use of force in self-defence against an armed attack directed exclusively at a territory that it annexed? This post submits that the answer to this question, which appears unsettled and largely unexplored, cannot overlook the situation of manifest illegality that a self-defence argument would purport to preserve and protract.
Book Reviews by Alessandro Mario Amoroso
International Review of the Red Cross vol. 100, issue 907-909, 429-436, 2019
The 'Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations' belongs to the class ... more The 'Leuven Manual on the International Law Applicable to Peace Operations' belongs to the class of publications that deserve a prominent place in every bookshelf on peace operations and public international law. The Manual provides a restatement of all international norms applicable to peace operations, thereby filling a gap in a field where political priorities and situational specificities hinder a comprehensive legal regulation. Its systematic analysis of the applicable international law responds to pressing calls by practitioners, policy-makers and academics, and will serve as an indispensable tool for better decision-making in future operations.
The Leuven Manual does not have any major flaws in its legal findings. A limited number of issues, however, deserve closer scrutiny because of their considerable practical relevance for the establishment and conduct of peace operations. This book review selectively focuses on some of them: the consent of the parties to the deployment of a peace operation; the need of a UN Security Council mandate for non-UN peace operations; the deployment of peace operations in international armed conflicts without becoming a party to the IAC; the use of force in defence of others and the risk of direct participation in hostilities; the temporal scope of application of IHL to the military contingents of a peace operation that has become party to a conflict.
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Papers by Alessandro Mario Amoroso
This chapter in the War Report 2018 offers a complete overview of the several conflicts afflicting Mali in recent years. The first parttraces back the root causes of the initial Tuareg rebellion in the Northern regions, to then show the jihadist takeover of the insurgency. It provides an in-depth analysis of the planning, generation and deployment of two multinational operations, one sponsored by the African Union, the other authorised by the United Nations. It sheds light on the French intervention in Mali, first as Operation Serval and then under Operation Barkhane. Finally, it accounts for the progressive return to peace in the Northern territory, while intercommunal conflicts in the Central regions rise to the level of a separate non-international armed conflict. The second part of the chapter scrutinizes the status and legal position of each party to the conflict. Key developments in 2018 are then surveyed. The last part summarises concluded and ongoing prosecutions before the International Criminal Court for crimes committed in the Malian conflicts.
The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany explicitly referred to Israel's right to act in self-defence against Iran. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked 'Israel's obligation and right to defend itself against Iranian aggression from Syrian territory'. A self-defence argument raises in the present case a legal issue related to the status of the territory attacked: the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967 and annexed in 1981. Can an annexing state invoke Article 51 UN Charter to justify the use of force in self-defence against an armed attack directed exclusively at a territory that it annexed? This post submits that the answer to this question, which appears unsettled and largely unexplored, cannot overlook the situation of manifest illegality that a self-defence argument would purport to preserve and protract.
Book Reviews by Alessandro Mario Amoroso
The Leuven Manual does not have any major flaws in its legal findings. A limited number of issues, however, deserve closer scrutiny because of their considerable practical relevance for the establishment and conduct of peace operations. This book review selectively focuses on some of them: the consent of the parties to the deployment of a peace operation; the need of a UN Security Council mandate for non-UN peace operations; the deployment of peace operations in international armed conflicts without becoming a party to the IAC; the use of force in defence of others and the risk of direct participation in hostilities; the temporal scope of application of IHL to the military contingents of a peace operation that has become party to a conflict.
This chapter in the War Report 2018 offers a complete overview of the several conflicts afflicting Mali in recent years. The first parttraces back the root causes of the initial Tuareg rebellion in the Northern regions, to then show the jihadist takeover of the insurgency. It provides an in-depth analysis of the planning, generation and deployment of two multinational operations, one sponsored by the African Union, the other authorised by the United Nations. It sheds light on the French intervention in Mali, first as Operation Serval and then under Operation Barkhane. Finally, it accounts for the progressive return to peace in the Northern territory, while intercommunal conflicts in the Central regions rise to the level of a separate non-international armed conflict. The second part of the chapter scrutinizes the status and legal position of each party to the conflict. Key developments in 2018 are then surveyed. The last part summarises concluded and ongoing prosecutions before the International Criminal Court for crimes committed in the Malian conflicts.
The governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany explicitly referred to Israel's right to act in self-defence against Iran. The Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked 'Israel's obligation and right to defend itself against Iranian aggression from Syrian territory'. A self-defence argument raises in the present case a legal issue related to the status of the territory attacked: the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967 and annexed in 1981. Can an annexing state invoke Article 51 UN Charter to justify the use of force in self-defence against an armed attack directed exclusively at a territory that it annexed? This post submits that the answer to this question, which appears unsettled and largely unexplored, cannot overlook the situation of manifest illegality that a self-defence argument would purport to preserve and protract.
The Leuven Manual does not have any major flaws in its legal findings. A limited number of issues, however, deserve closer scrutiny because of their considerable practical relevance for the establishment and conduct of peace operations. This book review selectively focuses on some of them: the consent of the parties to the deployment of a peace operation; the need of a UN Security Council mandate for non-UN peace operations; the deployment of peace operations in international armed conflicts without becoming a party to the IAC; the use of force in defence of others and the risk of direct participation in hostilities; the temporal scope of application of IHL to the military contingents of a peace operation that has become party to a conflict.