Journal of Spiritual & Mental Force Enhancement, 2022
Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value... more Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of the central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting.
This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people.
A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it
There are at least three interpretations that attempt to read from the Sense-Certainty Chapter a ... more There are at least three interpretations that attempt to read from the Sense-Certainty Chapter a Hegelian theory of indexicals. First, the Impossibility of Singular Reference Reading understands Hegel as excluding in principle the possibility of any linguistic cognition of individuals. Second, the Theory of Reference Reading criticizes the first reading and interprets from Hegel the classical idea of direct reference theory. Third, Brandom’s Anaphoric Theory Reading suggests an alternative explanation while still defending the possibility of knowledge of individuals in Hegel. I criticize the first two readings and argue that the third is the most exegetically and philosophically adequate interpretation. The first interpretation attempts to ascribe to Hegel a sort of skepticism, but this can be at most in a very restricted sense successful and the skepticism constructed in such a way is too trivial to refute Hegel’s position. The second reading is more adequate in that it does not fall into the error that the first one committed, but is still flawed because it introduces a subject-object or mind-world dualism that Hegel denies. The third reading has great advantages compared to the first two readings in terms that it provides a suitable account of indexical knowledge on individuals while avoiding skepticism and dualism which arise in the former readings.
In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palm... more In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palmquist formulated from Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason . After showing the structure of the argument, I point the problematic point of the argument and focus on the concept of Gesinnung. The privateness of Gesinnung is problematized in the analysis of it, and I briefly suggest that an alternative account of the Gesinnung is possible. Yet I emphasize the advantage that this argument has compared to other competing arguments.
Confucius aimed to overcome the Spring and Autumn period and achieve order by restoring the human... more Confucius aimed to overcome the Spring and Autumn period and achieve order by restoring the humanist tradition and putting it right. At the same time, Confucius distanced himself from discovering the order of natural things, which caused him to be regarded as a representative humanist philosopher. This interpretation could be misleading in that it overlooks the natural aspect of Confucian philosophy. To that aspect, this article asserts that a moral practice in Confucianism has a natural character. The point emphasizing the natural character of Confucian philosophy must be argued in a way in that it does not disregard the humanist character of Confucian thought. This is possible by recognizing the dual aspect of Zhi (直), and I argue further that Confucius can be interpreted through the concept of moral naturalism. Definitions of Zhi in the Analects indicates that morality bases itself on forms of human life developed in a natural way. Confucius’s references surrounding Zhi underlie the concept that our moral beliefs and actions are not solely justified by reason alone but in a sense also depend on facts in the natural world, providing grounds to interpret his moral philosophy as a naturalism. On the other hand, that Confucius thinks Zhi alone cannot make one Ren differentiates his position from strong naturalism, which reduces the normative realm of morality to causal laws of nature. From his emphasis on the cultivation of the given dispositions to personality, one can infer that Confucius did not agree with the reduction of moral norms to natural facts. The duality of Zhi showing the aspect of morality being forced by nature while not negating the proper character of morality can be properly and coherently understood from the view of soft naturalism.
I elucidate and defend according to a view of critique of knowledge the materialistic character t... more I elucidate and defend according to a view of critique of knowledge the materialistic character that appears in Adorno’s concept of reason. Adorno, diagnosing violent feature of modern rationality and performing a critique on it, involves concept of nature in reason as its profound constituent. Implicit or explicit, Adorno lays stress on “material” character of his own concept of reason by claiming entanglement of reason and nature, thus turning it materialistic. Adorno’s view that history of reason developed in essential relation to nature, especially implies that reason not only in genetic sense but also in structural sense. Therefore the main objective in Adornian critique of reason is realization of natural elements within reason itself, and above all, in context of critique of knowledge this transforms into a claim that rational beliefs can function only by attributing natural character to itself. This thesis mainly aims to clarify epistemologically and critically arguments that could be derived from Adorno‘s position which emphasizes natural character of reason. I develop my points in following ways: In Chapter II, I clarify the materialistic character of Adornian reason by showing that it is historically entangled to nature. This can be fulfilled by showing that (i) nature breaks out of static character as an ultimate, non-historical source of history itself and determines history within history, (ii) self-destructive history of reason argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment has “forgetting nature” as a cause and “blind nature” as an effect, and (iii) self-reflection of reason as an alternative way directs toward self-realization of its affinity to nature (mimesis). The purpose of Chapter III is to show nature as an internal element of reason despite its otherness. It is accomplished by proving (a) nature has no determinations in itself but a negative determination of a marginal concept in relation to reason, (b) no extra-rational criterion is philosophically necessary in Adornian critique of reason, and (c) “non-conceptual” character of nature needs to be distinguished from unintelligibility. In Chapter IV I want to show how Adorno’s attempt to recover the proper role of sensible intuition in knowledge reveals the natural character of reason. In Chapter V I make explicit how “materialism” in Adorno’s sense properly emphasizes nature as a necessary condition of genesis and operation of rational capacity without reducing it to mere nature, and how Adornian materialism, far from popular concept of materialism, can be properly understood in non-metaphysical sense. Finally, The aim of Chapter VI is to argue the significance of Adornian insight into involvement of reason in nature by reexamining two points of critique by Habermas and Benhabib that Adorno’s critical model shows the limit of the paradigm of philosophy of consciousness.
This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruct... more This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruction and self-critique of enlightenment and then emphasizes the dual vision which Horkheimer and Adorno hold on rationality. Firstly, it traces the explanation of the self-destruction of enlightenment so as to make explicit that it results in another form of the aporia, the self-critique of enlightenment. This is followed by formulating the criticism into two aspects, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s aporia leads them to be confronted by a self-contradiction. I argue that the criticism neglects their narrative strategy of history as critique and the methodology of immanent critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. In conclusion, it is elucidated that Horkheimer and Adorno rightly posit their aporia and suggest a proper solution, by which we could take the dual vision on rationality and their own model of immanent critique as its significances.
Journal of Spiritual & Mental Force Enhancement, 2022
Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value... more Recently, mental strength education requires to change in a way that establishes a military value system suitable for a liberal democracy while facing the need to strengthen mental strength in response to unpredictable security situations. The key to fulfilling these twofold objectives lies in the fact that there is a positive correlation between the enhancement of a soldier’s democratic awareness and intangible force. Therefore, it is of great importance to emphasize the concept of ‘citizen in uniform’ as one of the central military values. However, this concept has one problem before its use in military mental strength in which the orders of the military status and the orders of the civic seem heterogeneous and even conflicting.
This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people.
A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it
There are at least three interpretations that attempt to read from the Sense-Certainty Chapter a ... more There are at least three interpretations that attempt to read from the Sense-Certainty Chapter a Hegelian theory of indexicals. First, the Impossibility of Singular Reference Reading understands Hegel as excluding in principle the possibility of any linguistic cognition of individuals. Second, the Theory of Reference Reading criticizes the first reading and interprets from Hegel the classical idea of direct reference theory. Third, Brandom’s Anaphoric Theory Reading suggests an alternative explanation while still defending the possibility of knowledge of individuals in Hegel. I criticize the first two readings and argue that the third is the most exegetically and philosophically adequate interpretation. The first interpretation attempts to ascribe to Hegel a sort of skepticism, but this can be at most in a very restricted sense successful and the skepticism constructed in such a way is too trivial to refute Hegel’s position. The second reading is more adequate in that it does not fall into the error that the first one committed, but is still flawed because it introduces a subject-object or mind-world dualism that Hegel denies. The third reading has great advantages compared to the first two readings in terms that it provides a suitable account of indexical knowledge on individuals while avoiding skepticism and dualism which arise in the former readings.
In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palm... more In this article, I critically examine the religious argument for the existence of God, which Palmquist formulated from Kant’s Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason . After showing the structure of the argument, I point the problematic point of the argument and focus on the concept of Gesinnung. The privateness of Gesinnung is problematized in the analysis of it, and I briefly suggest that an alternative account of the Gesinnung is possible. Yet I emphasize the advantage that this argument has compared to other competing arguments.
Confucius aimed to overcome the Spring and Autumn period and achieve order by restoring the human... more Confucius aimed to overcome the Spring and Autumn period and achieve order by restoring the humanist tradition and putting it right. At the same time, Confucius distanced himself from discovering the order of natural things, which caused him to be regarded as a representative humanist philosopher. This interpretation could be misleading in that it overlooks the natural aspect of Confucian philosophy. To that aspect, this article asserts that a moral practice in Confucianism has a natural character. The point emphasizing the natural character of Confucian philosophy must be argued in a way in that it does not disregard the humanist character of Confucian thought. This is possible by recognizing the dual aspect of Zhi (直), and I argue further that Confucius can be interpreted through the concept of moral naturalism. Definitions of Zhi in the Analects indicates that morality bases itself on forms of human life developed in a natural way. Confucius’s references surrounding Zhi underlie the concept that our moral beliefs and actions are not solely justified by reason alone but in a sense also depend on facts in the natural world, providing grounds to interpret his moral philosophy as a naturalism. On the other hand, that Confucius thinks Zhi alone cannot make one Ren differentiates his position from strong naturalism, which reduces the normative realm of morality to causal laws of nature. From his emphasis on the cultivation of the given dispositions to personality, one can infer that Confucius did not agree with the reduction of moral norms to natural facts. The duality of Zhi showing the aspect of morality being forced by nature while not negating the proper character of morality can be properly and coherently understood from the view of soft naturalism.
I elucidate and defend according to a view of critique of knowledge the materialistic character t... more I elucidate and defend according to a view of critique of knowledge the materialistic character that appears in Adorno’s concept of reason. Adorno, diagnosing violent feature of modern rationality and performing a critique on it, involves concept of nature in reason as its profound constituent. Implicit or explicit, Adorno lays stress on “material” character of his own concept of reason by claiming entanglement of reason and nature, thus turning it materialistic. Adorno’s view that history of reason developed in essential relation to nature, especially implies that reason not only in genetic sense but also in structural sense. Therefore the main objective in Adornian critique of reason is realization of natural elements within reason itself, and above all, in context of critique of knowledge this transforms into a claim that rational beliefs can function only by attributing natural character to itself. This thesis mainly aims to clarify epistemologically and critically arguments that could be derived from Adorno‘s position which emphasizes natural character of reason. I develop my points in following ways: In Chapter II, I clarify the materialistic character of Adornian reason by showing that it is historically entangled to nature. This can be fulfilled by showing that (i) nature breaks out of static character as an ultimate, non-historical source of history itself and determines history within history, (ii) self-destructive history of reason argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment has “forgetting nature” as a cause and “blind nature” as an effect, and (iii) self-reflection of reason as an alternative way directs toward self-realization of its affinity to nature (mimesis). The purpose of Chapter III is to show nature as an internal element of reason despite its otherness. It is accomplished by proving (a) nature has no determinations in itself but a negative determination of a marginal concept in relation to reason, (b) no extra-rational criterion is philosophically necessary in Adornian critique of reason, and (c) “non-conceptual” character of nature needs to be distinguished from unintelligibility. In Chapter IV I want to show how Adorno’s attempt to recover the proper role of sensible intuition in knowledge reveals the natural character of reason. In Chapter V I make explicit how “materialism” in Adorno’s sense properly emphasizes nature as a necessary condition of genesis and operation of rational capacity without reducing it to mere nature, and how Adornian materialism, far from popular concept of materialism, can be properly understood in non-metaphysical sense. Finally, The aim of Chapter VI is to argue the significance of Adornian insight into involvement of reason in nature by reexamining two points of critique by Habermas and Benhabib that Adorno’s critical model shows the limit of the paradigm of philosophy of consciousness.
This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruct... more This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruction and self-critique of enlightenment and then emphasizes the dual vision which Horkheimer and Adorno hold on rationality. Firstly, it traces the explanation of the self-destruction of enlightenment so as to make explicit that it results in another form of the aporia, the self-critique of enlightenment. This is followed by formulating the criticism into two aspects, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s aporia leads them to be confronted by a self-contradiction. I argue that the criticism neglects their narrative strategy of history as critique and the methodology of immanent critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. In conclusion, it is elucidated that Horkheimer and Adorno rightly posit their aporia and suggest a proper solution, by which we could take the dual vision on rationality and their own model of immanent critique as its significances.
Uploads
This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people.
A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it
distanced himself from discovering the order of natural things, which caused him to be regarded as a representative humanist philosopher. This interpretation could be misleading in that it overlooks the natural aspect of Confucian philosophy. To that aspect, this article asserts that a moral practice in Confucianism has a natural character.
The point emphasizing the natural character of Confucian philosophy must be argued in a way in that it does not disregard the humanist character of Confucian thought. This is possible by recognizing the dual aspect of Zhi (直), and I argue further that Confucius can be interpreted through the concept of moral naturalism. Definitions of Zhi in the Analects indicates that morality bases itself on forms of human life developed in a natural way. Confucius’s references surrounding Zhi underlie the concept that our moral beliefs and actions are not solely justified by reason alone but in a sense also depend on facts in the natural world, providing grounds to interpret his moral philosophy as a naturalism. On the other hand, that Confucius thinks Zhi alone cannot make one Ren differentiates his position from strong naturalism, which reduces the normative realm of morality to causal laws of nature. From his emphasis on the cultivation of the given dispositions to personality, one can infer that Confucius did not agree with the reduction of moral norms to natural facts. The duality of Zhi showing the aspect of morality being forced by nature while not negating the proper character of morality can be properly and coherently understood from the view of soft naturalism.
I develop my points in following ways: In Chapter II, I clarify the materialistic character of Adornian reason by showing that it is historically entangled to nature. This
can be fulfilled by showing that (i) nature breaks out of static character as an ultimate, non-historical source of history itself and determines history within history, (ii) self-destructive history of reason argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment has “forgetting nature” as a cause and “blind nature” as an effect, and (iii) self-reflection of reason as an alternative way directs toward self-realization of its affinity to nature (mimesis). The purpose of Chapter III is to show nature as an internal element of reason despite its otherness. It is accomplished by proving (a) nature has no determinations in itself but a
negative determination of a marginal concept in relation to reason, (b) no extra-rational criterion is philosophically necessary in Adornian critique of reason, and (c)
“non-conceptual” character of nature needs to be distinguished from unintelligibility. In Chapter IV I want to show how Adorno’s attempt to recover the proper role of sensible intuition in knowledge reveals the natural character of reason. In Chapter V I make explicit how “materialism” in Adorno’s sense properly emphasizes nature as a necessary condition of genesis and operation of rational capacity without reducing it to mere nature,
and how Adornian materialism, far from popular concept of materialism, can be properly understood in non-metaphysical sense. Finally, The aim of Chapter VI is to argue the significance of Adornian insight into involvement of reason in nature by reexamining two
points of critique by Habermas and Benhabib that Adorno’s critical model shows the limit of the paradigm of philosophy of consciousness.
This study aims to dissolve the internal tension of this concept through a new philosophical interpretation of citizens in uniform, freedom, people and state, thereby providing the foundation for establishing for establishing new military values and enhancement of mental force. To this end, it examines the explanation of the current curriculum regarding these concepts first and diagnoses its several problems (II). The current curriculum presents a brief explanation of the compatibility of civil rights and military obligations but does not resolve the conflict between the two. A new understanding of them is possible by introducing Hegelian insights in Philosophy of Rights (III). From Hegel's point of view, freedom is not the mere absence of coercion but a capacity for self-determination. Freedom is difficult to realize wholly at the level of an isolated individual, and it calls for an ethical community to give it a specific form. A state that is the best entity in humanity is the supreme unit that defines individual freedom and identity. Then it naturally derives that national defense is one of the supreme missions directly related to the freedom and identity of its people.
A re-description of the contents of the curriculum based on these insights can conceptually resolve the aforementioned problem and even strengthen its arguments (IV). The state and the people are in a more essential correlation than previously depicted, and liberal democratic values such as freedom, human rights and welfare are proved as constitutive of a state itself. The superiority of liberal democracy, which the current textbook attempts to prove, also becomes transparent. Finally, military duties do not conceptually conflict with civil freedom but are considered as a form of it
distanced himself from discovering the order of natural things, which caused him to be regarded as a representative humanist philosopher. This interpretation could be misleading in that it overlooks the natural aspect of Confucian philosophy. To that aspect, this article asserts that a moral practice in Confucianism has a natural character.
The point emphasizing the natural character of Confucian philosophy must be argued in a way in that it does not disregard the humanist character of Confucian thought. This is possible by recognizing the dual aspect of Zhi (直), and I argue further that Confucius can be interpreted through the concept of moral naturalism. Definitions of Zhi in the Analects indicates that morality bases itself on forms of human life developed in a natural way. Confucius’s references surrounding Zhi underlie the concept that our moral beliefs and actions are not solely justified by reason alone but in a sense also depend on facts in the natural world, providing grounds to interpret his moral philosophy as a naturalism. On the other hand, that Confucius thinks Zhi alone cannot make one Ren differentiates his position from strong naturalism, which reduces the normative realm of morality to causal laws of nature. From his emphasis on the cultivation of the given dispositions to personality, one can infer that Confucius did not agree with the reduction of moral norms to natural facts. The duality of Zhi showing the aspect of morality being forced by nature while not negating the proper character of morality can be properly and coherently understood from the view of soft naturalism.
I develop my points in following ways: In Chapter II, I clarify the materialistic character of Adornian reason by showing that it is historically entangled to nature. This
can be fulfilled by showing that (i) nature breaks out of static character as an ultimate, non-historical source of history itself and determines history within history, (ii) self-destructive history of reason argued in Dialectic of Enlightenment has “forgetting nature” as a cause and “blind nature” as an effect, and (iii) self-reflection of reason as an alternative way directs toward self-realization of its affinity to nature (mimesis). The purpose of Chapter III is to show nature as an internal element of reason despite its otherness. It is accomplished by proving (a) nature has no determinations in itself but a
negative determination of a marginal concept in relation to reason, (b) no extra-rational criterion is philosophically necessary in Adornian critique of reason, and (c)
“non-conceptual” character of nature needs to be distinguished from unintelligibility. In Chapter IV I want to show how Adorno’s attempt to recover the proper role of sensible intuition in knowledge reveals the natural character of reason. In Chapter V I make explicit how “materialism” in Adorno’s sense properly emphasizes nature as a necessary condition of genesis and operation of rational capacity without reducing it to mere nature,
and how Adornian materialism, far from popular concept of materialism, can be properly understood in non-metaphysical sense. Finally, The aim of Chapter VI is to argue the significance of Adornian insight into involvement of reason in nature by reexamining two
points of critique by Habermas and Benhabib that Adorno’s critical model shows the limit of the paradigm of philosophy of consciousness.