As someone who often works on philosophical issues in old texts, I have learned to read for somet... more As someone who often works on philosophical issues in old texts, I have learned to read for something I call philosophical systematicity. It is difficult to say what this is, precisely. The rough idea is that it is the cognitive state or disposition of having (1) stable and at least somewhat generalizable views about some particular philosophical issue and (2) some sense of the implications of those views for other issues. It is easier to illuminate philosophical systematicity by pointing to some examples and reliable indicators of it. Some present-day philo sophers of language exhibit philosophical systematicity in their treat ment of truth. If you ask this sort of philosopher whether she thinks propositions are true in virtue of corresponding to facts, or of cohering with certain other propositions, or of having some sort of pragmatic value or social acceptability, chances are good that she will have views about this question, views that she can describe in their general contours....
... Ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996. Nussbaum, Martha C. Upheavals of Th... more ... Ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996. Nussbaum, Martha C. Upheavals of Thought. New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. ... Eds. DD Raphael and AL Macfie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984. Tiwald, Justin. Dai Zhen on Human Nature and Moral Cultivation. ...
Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars... more Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.
This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a... more This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi’s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another’s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?
This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” (ren 人) and not “institutional... more This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” (ren 人) and not “institutional rules” (fa 法) are the proper sources of good governance and social order, as well as some notable Confucian objections to this position. It takes Xunzi 荀子, Hu Hong 胡宏, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 as the primary representatives of the “virtue-centered” position, which holds that people’s good character and not institutional rules bear primary credit for successful governance. And it takes Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 as a major advocate for the “institutionalist” position, which holds that institutional rules have some power to effect success independently of improvements in character. As I show, the Confucian virtue-centered view is best captured in two theses: first, that reforming people is far more demanding than reforming institutional rules; second, that once the rules have reached a certain threshold of viability, further improvements in those rules are unlikely to be effective on their own. Once we specif...
<p>In this chapter the author defends the view that the major variants of Confucian ethics ... more <p>In this chapter the author defends the view that the major variants of Confucian ethics qualify as virtue ethics in the respects that matter most, which concern the focus, investigative priority, and explanatory priority of virtue over right action. The chapter also provides short summaries of the central Confucian virtues and then explains how different Confucians have understood the relationship between these and what some regard as the chief or most comprehensive virtue, ren (humaneness or benevolence). Finally, it explicates what most Confucians take to be a requirement of all virtues, which the author calls "wholeheartedness," and concludes by highlighting some neglected implications of the wholeheartedness requirement for ethics more generally. These include reasons for linking conceptions of virtue and human nature, for thinking that good character necessitates that individuals change how things seem to them, and for endorsing automatic as opposed to intensively deliberative judgments and decisions.</p>
This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: relationships based on s... more This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: relationships based on shared ends. These are an indispensable part of most ethically worthy or valuable lives, and our successes or failures at participating in these relationships constitute a great number of our moral successes or failures overall. While many philosophers agree about their importance, few provide us with well-developed accounts of the nature and value of good shared-end relationships. This paper begins to develop a positive account of such relationships. In the interest of highlighting some strengths and weaknesses of competing approaches, it contrasts the theories that are proposed by the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen (1724–1777) and the influential moral philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Both philosophers share many of the same core ethical commitments, but as the author shows, Dai Zhen’s approach to thinking about the nature and value of good shared-end relationships is superior to ...
As someone who often works on philosophical issues in old texts, I have learned to read for somet... more As someone who often works on philosophical issues in old texts, I have learned to read for something I call philosophical systematicity. It is difficult to say what this is, precisely. The rough idea is that it is the cognitive state or disposition of having (1) stable and at least somewhat generalizable views about some particular philosophical issue and (2) some sense of the implications of those views for other issues. It is easier to illuminate philosophical systematicity by pointing to some examples and reliable indicators of it. Some present-day philo sophers of language exhibit philosophical systematicity in their treat ment of truth. If you ask this sort of philosopher whether she thinks propositions are true in virtue of corresponding to facts, or of cohering with certain other propositions, or of having some sort of pragmatic value or social acceptability, chances are good that she will have views about this question, views that she can describe in their general contours....
... Ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996. Nussbaum, Martha C. Upheavals of Th... more ... Ed. Bryan W. Van Norden. Chicago: Open Court Press, 1996. Nussbaum, Martha C. Upheavals of Thought. New York: Cambridge UP, 2001. ... Eds. DD Raphael and AL Macfie. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984. Tiwald, Justin. Dai Zhen on Human Nature and Moral Cultivation. ...
Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars... more Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.
This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a... more This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi’s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another’s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?
This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” (ren 人) and not “institutional... more This paper explicates the influential Confucian view that “people” (ren 人) and not “institutional rules” (fa 法) are the proper sources of good governance and social order, as well as some notable Confucian objections to this position. It takes Xunzi 荀子, Hu Hong 胡宏, and Zhu Xi 朱熹 as the primary representatives of the “virtue-centered” position, which holds that people’s good character and not institutional rules bear primary credit for successful governance. And it takes Huang Zongxi 黃宗羲 as a major advocate for the “institutionalist” position, which holds that institutional rules have some power to effect success independently of improvements in character. As I show, the Confucian virtue-centered view is best captured in two theses: first, that reforming people is far more demanding than reforming institutional rules; second, that once the rules have reached a certain threshold of viability, further improvements in those rules are unlikely to be effective on their own. Once we specif...
<p>In this chapter the author defends the view that the major variants of Confucian ethics ... more <p>In this chapter the author defends the view that the major variants of Confucian ethics qualify as virtue ethics in the respects that matter most, which concern the focus, investigative priority, and explanatory priority of virtue over right action. The chapter also provides short summaries of the central Confucian virtues and then explains how different Confucians have understood the relationship between these and what some regard as the chief or most comprehensive virtue, ren (humaneness or benevolence). Finally, it explicates what most Confucians take to be a requirement of all virtues, which the author calls "wholeheartedness," and concludes by highlighting some neglected implications of the wholeheartedness requirement for ethics more generally. These include reasons for linking conceptions of virtue and human nature, for thinking that good character necessitates that individuals change how things seem to them, and for endorsing automatic as opposed to intensively deliberative judgments and decisions.</p>
This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: relationships based on s... more This paper offers an account of an important type of human relationship: relationships based on shared ends. These are an indispensable part of most ethically worthy or valuable lives, and our successes or failures at participating in these relationships constitute a great number of our moral successes or failures overall. While many philosophers agree about their importance, few provide us with well-developed accounts of the nature and value of good shared-end relationships. This paper begins to develop a positive account of such relationships. In the interest of highlighting some strengths and weaknesses of competing approaches, it contrasts the theories that are proposed by the Confucian philosopher Dai Zhen (1724–1777) and the influential moral philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Both philosophers share many of the same core ethical commitments, but as the author shows, Dai Zhen’s approach to thinking about the nature and value of good shared-end relationships is superior to ...
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