oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: CVE Request (nagios)
From: Andreas Ericsson <ae () op5 se>
Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2008 15:53:47 +0100
Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:
Andreas, good day. Will you be able to clarify two things. Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 05:19:52PM +0300, Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:So http://nagios.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/nagios/nagios/base/commands.c?r1=1.109&r2=1.110&view=patch just completely closes the processing of these commands from the Nagios side. May be this was the fix for the case when the evil contents from the command file were still floating around but the upgraded Nagios won't process them because they could go from the previous successful attack but are lying unprocessed?Do you think it is really so?
Umm... I can't parse the above paragraph. In short though, the removed commands are removed *from the cgi's* because it's far too dangerous to allow such things over the web. Nagios will still process them if they are submitted to the command-pipe, but the CGI's can no longer write such commands to said pipe.
It is a bit strange that it was done after 3.0.5 (CSRF was documented in 3.0.5 release notes), but... By the way, entry for CVE-2008-5028 speaks about 3.0.5 as about the vulnerable to the CSRF and it is inconsistent with the release notes at http://www.nagios.org/development/history/nagios-3x.php.So I feel the the CSRF was "somehow closed" in 3.0.5 and CVE entry may need fixing. The remains from this bug that could migrate from 3.0.5 to 3.0.6 (but not in the functional sense, only via the unprocessed command file) were "fixed" in 3.0.6.CVE-2008-5028 really speaks about 3.0.5 as about vulnerable to CSRF. At least CHANGE_ commands were closed in 3.0.5 and were (presumably) additionally closed at the Nagios server side in 3.0.6. So either 3.0.6 is vulnerable too, 3.0.5 is not vulnerable to CSRF or I am missing something. What to choose?
3.0.5 is vulnerable to CSRF. 3.0.6 (which adds in-form session tokens to cmd.cgi, which processes all commands from the web-forms), is not vulnerable to CSRF. 3.0.5 fixes the authorization bypass discussed in CVE-2008-5027, where an authenticated user can submit commands he/she was not supposed to be able to submit. However, by blocking the CHANGE_ set of commands, the worst-case impact of the CSRF was drastically reduced, and the change to blocking those commands was also a part of 3.0.5. I'm afraid Ethan (the Nagios maintainer) got it wrong in the changelog, which is why, I presume, there's so much confusion right now. I wrote the patches for it though, so I think it's safe to say I know what patch (and version) fixed what. -- Andreas Ericsson andreas.ericsson () op5 se OP5 AB www.op5.se Tel: +46 8-230225 Fax: +46 8-230231
Current thread:
- CVE Request (nagios) Josh Bressers (Dec 05)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Andreas Ericsson (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Andreas Ericsson (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Jan Lieskovsky (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 10)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Andreas Ericsson (Dec 10)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 10)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Andreas Ericsson (Dec 10)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Jan Lieskovsky (Dec 11)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Steven M. Christey (Dec 16)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Eygene Ryabinkin (Dec 08)
- Re: CVE Request (nagios) Andreas Ericsson (Dec 08)