Papers by Alexey Chernyak
Vestnik Pravoslavnogo Svâto-Tihonovskogo Gumanitarnogo Universiteta. Seria I: Bogoslovie, Filosofiâ, Feb 29, 2016
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RUDN Journal of Philosophy, Dec 15, 2016
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Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов, Sep 29, 2022
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Эпистемология & философия науки, 2022
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St. Tikhons' University Review
The present article is dedicated to the problem of moral evaluation of historical figures and eve... more The present article is dedicated to the problem of moral evaluation of historical figures and events as illustrated by an example of one of the most prominent figures of biblical stories Jesus Navis. He is one of those figures who commits something obviously morally wrong, if seen from the point of view of the dominant modern morality, but still is a moral authority for many people due to his commitment to God, place in Sacred history and some other features. The author considers in the article the following question: may such persons and acts be ever evaluated in modern historical narratives? He presumes that to this question positive answer may be given without sticking to some kind of prejudice, and proposes an argument which combines a semantic thesis that from the truth of the proposition “x committed an immoral action a” does not necessarily follow the proposition “x acted immorally by doing a”, with the justification of the claim that only the first one is applicable to histo...
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Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология, 2023
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SCHOLE, Jan 14, 2017
According to Aristotle spoken words are signs of impressions, and those words which are used as n... more According to Aristotle spoken words are signs of impressions, and those words which are used as names have conventional meanings. This theory of meaning poses a problem because it is unclear how exactly impressions which are essentially subjective may be assigned to names conventionally, i.e. due to certain interactions between different persons. In the following article the nature of the problem as well as the most prominent notions of conventions are analyzed: it is shown that considering the ways by which conventions about meanings should be established according to them the problem cannot be eliminated. It is also claimed that this is the problem not only for the particular Aristotle's theory of names, but also a problem for a much wider set of theories of meaning and interpretation
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В статье проводится мысль о том, что значения собственных имен могут быть рассмотрены как активат... more В статье проводится мысль о том, что значения собственных имен могут быть рассмотрены как активаторы нарративов. Авторы применяют методологию дискурсивной семантики и подчеркивают, что в современной семантике различаются денотаты – объекты в мире, обозначаемые именами, ‒ и абстрактные сущности, являющиеся элементами дискурсов, в которых используются имена, которые эти имена в этих дискурсах вводят, – так называемые дискурсивные референты. Существенной характеристикой дискурсивного референта является то, что он задается дискурсом – конечной последовательностью высказываний. В рамках данного подхода определенное выражение, частным случаем которого является собственное имя, всегда вводит нечто уже знакомое вследствие знакомства с соответствующим дискурсом, тогда как неопределенное выражение вводит новое содержание. Авторы приходят к выводу, что определенное выражение может быть использовано в ситуации, когда из предшествующего дискурса еще не ясно, о чем именно идет речь; его ди...
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2021
The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is no... more The idea that knowledge as an individual mental attitude with certain propositional content is not only true justified belief but a belief the truth of which does not result from any kind of luck, is widely spread in contemporary epistemology. This account is known as anti-luck epistemology. A very popular explanation of the inconsistency of that concept of knowledge with the luck-dependent nature of truth (so called veritic luck taking place when a subject’s belief could not be true if not by mere coincidence) presumes that the status of propositional knowledge crucially depends on the qualities of actions that result in the corresponding belief, or processes backing them, which reflect the socalled intellectual virtues mainly responsible for subject’s relevant competences. This account known as Virtue Epistemology presumes that if a belief is true exclusively or mainly due to its dependence on intellectual virtues, it just cannot be true by luck, hence no place for lucky knowledge...
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Vestnik Pravoslavnogo Svâto-Tihonovskogo Gumanitarnogo Universiteta. Seria I: Bogoslovie, Filosofiâ, 2012
This article analyses the apparent parallelism between cases, one of which takes place from the d... more This article analyses the apparent parallelism between cases, one of which takes place from the deliberate breach of principles, while the other is that in which a less than optimal result is reached through a lack of cooperation — the so-called prisoner's dilemma. The author demonstrates that in spite of apparent similarities between the two cases, there nevertheless exists a fundamental difference which does not allow them to be classed as the same. On the other hand, the reasoning behind both of these situations may be explained by resorting to a type ofprinciple or maxim which can best be described as finding a middle way. The basic structural difference between the two types may be described as follows: if the hypothesis seems probable, the given principle will condition the decision in different situations and on different levels of thought
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2020
There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is inco... more There is a widely shared belief in contemporary epistemology that propositional knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck, most of all with so called veritic luck. A subject is veritically lucky in his or her belief that p if this belief is true not due to its foundations (for example, reasons which an agent has to believe that p) but by mere accident. The acceptance of the thesis of incompatibility of knowledge with this kind of luck led to significant modifications of a popular modern epistemological tripartite analysis of propositional knowledge according to which subject knows that p if and only if he or she believes that p is true, p is actually true, and an agent’s belief that p is true is justified. In his famous paper “Is True Justified Belief Knowledge” E. Gettier demonstrated that true justified belief may not be knowledge. The core of the problem is that in the cases described by Gettier and the like an agent’s belief, though justified, is true by accident. Thi...
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St. Tikhon's University Review, 2018
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 2019
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Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities, 2016
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Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Arts, Design and Contemporary Education, 2016
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St.Tikhons' University Reviews, 2016
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As any tool, language is created by people. Since any language which we know could be different (... more As any tool, language is created by people. Since any language which we know could be different (have different grammars, consist in different words and sounds etc.), it may be said to be designed in a certain way. Since meanings of linguistic expressions also might be different, they may be said to be designed in the past as well. But no one can design a meaning alone; this is normally a result of some collective efforts. The most popular explanation of how meanings are collectively designed by people refers to the notion of convention, but the idea of semantic convention encounters serious problems since meanings are essentially subjective and can be publicly learned neither by demonstration nor by description. As a result, the idea of semantics as conventionally designed by people looks contradictory. Keywords—design; meaning; language; convention; coordination; function; subjectivity I. MEANING AS A MATTER OF DESIGN The word "design" has several meanings. On one hand, ...
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Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2017), 2017
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Voprosy Filosofii
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Standard semantics of proper names assigns them the function of reference to individual things. T... more Standard semantics of proper names assigns them the function of reference to individual things. This presupposes that to understand the meaning of a proper name is to understand what it denotes in the context of its referential use. But unambiguous identification of the referent of a proper name in its normal (referential) use looks like an unsolvable problem. Senses associated with referential uses of such names don't allow ascribing them singular referents in their contexts; and what concerns contexts themselves, they either don't contain proper referents at all or contain more than one, thus being referentially ambiguous. Some philosophers of language believe that the main problem for the standard semantics of proper names is that they assign them referents of wrong kind: that these, for instance, should be rather abstract entities, i.e. sets, than individual things. In this paper I try to argue that the choice of an alternative semantics for proper names does not solve the main problem with their meanings, i.e. that of their referential ambiguity. On the one hand even in the most transparent contexts there is always available an alternative referent to be assigned to the proper name's use along with some standard or default one; the fact that we prefer some standard interpretation (when we actually do) over alternative ones reflects at best that certain semantic theories contribute more substantially to ordinary communication in comparison with others. This does not yet imply that they better explain meanings of proper names. On the other hand there is also no good explanation of a phenomenon of reference to a particular thing as such: we still don't understand how a name may become referring to one and the same particular thing in many different situations for many different agents of its use etc., and how the thing may literally become a bearer of a name.
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Papers by Alexey Chernyak