Alexander Titov
I have three main research areas. The first is Russian foreign policy and its links with different interpretations of Russian national identity. The second, is in the history of political thought and national ideologies in the 20th century. The third area is political history in the post-Stalin period; I am currently working on a new biography of Nikita Khrushchev for Routledge’s ‘Historical Biographies’ series.
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To get another chance, Ukraine will have to mobilise even more troops and get more advanced weapons in greater quantities than ever before. Yet, for all the talk of Russia’s mobilisation, it is Ukraine that seems to be suffering from manpower shortages.
Kyiv is resorting to increasingly draconian measures to get sufficient numbers to the front. It recently extended mobilisation to previously exempt groups such as the partially disabled.
пановича Гумилёва за границей на материалах британ-
ской прессы 1920‑х гг. Она затрагивает более широкую
тему российско-британских
отношений. В его рамках мы
попытаемся ответить на два вопроса:
Когда появилось и как было воспринято известие о гибели
Н. С. Гумилёва в Британии? Может ли отношение к казни Гумилёва
помочь нам понять место русской культуры и поэзии в британской
общественной и культурной среде в эту эпоху?
Instead, elections in Russia legitimise its political regime. In addition to international recognition, Russia’s post-Soviet transition from the Soviet one-party state produced a domestic consensus on the necessity of multi-candidate elections. So, elections still take place, but they’re heavily controlled and don’t lead to a change in government. What we have in Russia is, therefore, a form of electoral authoritarianism.
Despite the serious impediments faced by the opposition, the real stumbling block to challenging Kremlin dominance is voter apathy.
Putin runs a soft authoritarian regime that combines political control with wide individual freedoms. In addition to private property and other economic freedoms – freedom to travel, civic freedoms – there is also pluralist print media and a vibrant Russian-language internet. Even in politics, authorities target individual opposition figures, rather than wider societal groups or parties.
Russia is no stranger to sudden regime change having witnessed two sweeping revolutions in the past hundred years. However, it’s different now. Socialism in 1917 and democratisation in the late 1980s were seen as solutions to the country’s problems. There is no similar consensus for change today. The majority of the population is indifferent to politics, while the most popular ideology – great power nationalism – was completely appropriated by Putin after the annexation of Crimea.
It seems likely that Russia will continue on its current course, which increasingly looks like stagnation. But the longer necessary changes are delayed, the higher the chance of a violent, sudden transformation in Russian affairs.
In addition, the majority of the Russians already lived through the experience of the major upheaval during Perestroika and post-Soviet transition.
Under these circumstances current evolution of the regime, which increasingly looks like stagnation, is much likelier than a new revolution. But the longer necessary changes are delayed, the higher the chance of a violent, sudden transformation in Russian affairs.
It’s quite possible that Trump will simply repeat the established pattern in U.S.-Russian relations. A honeymoon period at the start of his presidency will turn into a new crisis at the end of it, as structural differences of conflicting national interests and public pressure at home drive the two countries to a new phase of confrontation. And given Trump’s unpredictable nature, it might well be that the master of the Kremlin will soon wish that “The Donald” remain a one-term president.
To get another chance, Ukraine will have to mobilise even more troops and get more advanced weapons in greater quantities than ever before. Yet, for all the talk of Russia’s mobilisation, it is Ukraine that seems to be suffering from manpower shortages.
Kyiv is resorting to increasingly draconian measures to get sufficient numbers to the front. It recently extended mobilisation to previously exempt groups such as the partially disabled.
пановича Гумилёва за границей на материалах британ-
ской прессы 1920‑х гг. Она затрагивает более широкую
тему российско-британских
отношений. В его рамках мы
попытаемся ответить на два вопроса:
Когда появилось и как было воспринято известие о гибели
Н. С. Гумилёва в Британии? Может ли отношение к казни Гумилёва
помочь нам понять место русской культуры и поэзии в британской
общественной и культурной среде в эту эпоху?
Instead, elections in Russia legitimise its political regime. In addition to international recognition, Russia’s post-Soviet transition from the Soviet one-party state produced a domestic consensus on the necessity of multi-candidate elections. So, elections still take place, but they’re heavily controlled and don’t lead to a change in government. What we have in Russia is, therefore, a form of electoral authoritarianism.
Despite the serious impediments faced by the opposition, the real stumbling block to challenging Kremlin dominance is voter apathy.
Putin runs a soft authoritarian regime that combines political control with wide individual freedoms. In addition to private property and other economic freedoms – freedom to travel, civic freedoms – there is also pluralist print media and a vibrant Russian-language internet. Even in politics, authorities target individual opposition figures, rather than wider societal groups or parties.
Russia is no stranger to sudden regime change having witnessed two sweeping revolutions in the past hundred years. However, it’s different now. Socialism in 1917 and democratisation in the late 1980s were seen as solutions to the country’s problems. There is no similar consensus for change today. The majority of the population is indifferent to politics, while the most popular ideology – great power nationalism – was completely appropriated by Putin after the annexation of Crimea.
It seems likely that Russia will continue on its current course, which increasingly looks like stagnation. But the longer necessary changes are delayed, the higher the chance of a violent, sudden transformation in Russian affairs.
In addition, the majority of the Russians already lived through the experience of the major upheaval during Perestroika and post-Soviet transition.
Under these circumstances current evolution of the regime, which increasingly looks like stagnation, is much likelier than a new revolution. But the longer necessary changes are delayed, the higher the chance of a violent, sudden transformation in Russian affairs.
It’s quite possible that Trump will simply repeat the established pattern in U.S.-Russian relations. A honeymoon period at the start of his presidency will turn into a new crisis at the end of it, as structural differences of conflicting national interests and public pressure at home drive the two countries to a new phase of confrontation. And given Trump’s unpredictable nature, it might well be that the master of the Kremlin will soon wish that “The Donald” remain a one-term president.
Yet, regardless of who eventually wins, these elections are taking place in a country in the grips of a profound crisis which barely registers in Western public’s mind.
Poverty, corruption, emigration, collapse of trust in Ukraine should make the West re-think it's strategy in Ukraine. Keeping things the same for another five years is not an option.
Putin used the window of opportunity to push through very unpopular but what seems necessary reforms. The Kremlin is hoping that by the time of Duma elections in 2021, and especially the presidential elections in 2024, these unpopular reforms will be largely forgotten.
To make a success of it, the demand for independence should come from within the church, not be imposed upon it by the state. And at the moment, the vast majority of the UOC MP are determined to maintain their traditional affiliation with Moscow. Above all, they are unwilling to be a pawn in the reelection campaign of an extremely unpopular president – and attempts by the Patriarchate of Constantinople to increase its power.
Russia shouldn’t protest too much as its credibility has been destroyed over the last four years.
The expulsions themselves will be easy to parry by the expulsion of western diplomats from Russia. But tougher action will be needed to really worry the Kremlin.
It'd be a mistake to reduce Russia’s problem to one man in the Kremlin, rather than appreciate the wider structural factors driving Russian foreign policy such as its insecurity over Nato and the EU’s expansion, Russia’s complex identity and the legacy of Soviet collapse.
This raises deeper questions about European security. Can there be a sustainable long-term security in Europe in which Russia is not fully invested? How to deal with a country that doesn’t share western liberal values? What implications does the rise of western illiberal populism have for relations with Russia? Can it really be reduced to Russian meddling in the western democracy?
These questions go beyond the diplomatic expulsions over the Skripal affair. And at the moment there are no clear answers to them.
North Korea is just not at the top of Russia’s list of security concerns. This is instead dominated by Ukraine, Syria, relations with NATO and the terrorist threat from radical Islamic groups. So, while its priorities are engaged elsewhere, the Kremlin is happy to let Beijing take the lead over North Korea.
Yet, ironically, Russia is perhaps the only country in the region which genuinely wouldn’t mind if the tensions between North and South Korea were resolved, and the countries reunited.
Syria was supposed to be the main area where a deal with Russia was possible, since defeating IS is in both countries’ interests.
Had Trump continued to emphasise the need to take on IS, he could have opened the possibility of a wider cooperation with Russia, perhaps paving the way for a wider rapprochement between the two countries. These hopes seem to have been premature at best. Taking on Assad sets him against Russia. So now, the focus must now be on preventing armed conflict between the two powers.
Russia, meanwhile, is a significant global player and will have to be engaged with in one form or another, not least in the quest to resolve the conflict in Syria and defeat Islamic State.
Russia is not the only country in the world to fall well short of Western values on human rights, the rule of law and democracy, but it is perhaps the most troublesome for Europe, not least because of its geographical proximity to the EU and its huge size and military power, including nuclear weapons.
This makes what happens in Russia of equal or even greater importance to similar trends in China or Saudi Arabia. So, the Litvinenko findings bring forth the dilemmas for the British government it hoped it could bury: how to reconcile moral principles with hardcore realities of international politics and economics.
It seems unlikely that Moscow can hope for an outright victory in Syria’s civil war. Instead, the immediate priority seems to be to ensure a survival of the Syrian state and military institutions in the areas it can control, what one Russian observer called an “Alawite Israel” – a strip of land from the Mediterranean coast to Damascus, able to at least contain IS with some external support.
If the West is serious about defeating IS at some point it will have to consider joining forces with Russia against IS.
This is an important book which advances our understanding of the in the post-War Soviet Union through a detailed analysis of the Communist Party in that period.
A thoughtful, innovative and thought-provoking study, this book gives important insights into what proved to be one of the most dramatic episodes in Russia's recent history. It also provides an important basis for our understanding of the subsequent epoch. In particular, it helps to explain the phenomenal popularity of Vladimir Putin, who built his image on the antithesis to the 'lawless 1990s'. This book is an invaluable contribution to the study of contemporary Russia, with its multiple paradoxes and contradictions.
All Stalin's deficiencies, however, pale in comparison with those of Khrushchev, the bête noire of Shepilov's memoirs. There is plenty of criticism of Khrushchev's policies, particularly in agriculture and foreign affairs. What comes across most pungently is, however, Shepilov's disdain of Khrushchev's personality and leadership style. In this respect, the book is unashamedly biased and remarkable for its omissions as much as for its revelations.